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JV9.19353, Ia30.
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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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THE
OFFICIAL
WEEKLY RECORD
OF
UNITED STATES
FOREIGN POLICY
INDKX
VOLUME XL VI: Numbers 1175-
-1200
January 1 -June 25, 1962
Issue
Number
Date of Issue Pagi
es
1175
Jan. 1, 1962 1-
40
1176
Jan. 8, 1962 41-
80
1177
Jan. 15,1962 81-
120
1178
Jan. 22,1962 121-
156
1179
Jan. 29,1962 157-
192
1180
Feb. 5, 1962 193-
228
1181
Feb. 12,1962 229-
264
1182
Feb. 19,1962 265-
308
1183
Feb. 26,1962 309-
352
1184
Mar. 5,1962 353-
400
1185
Mar. 12, 1962 401-
440
1186
Mar. 19, 1962 441-
484
1187
Mar. 26, 1962 485-
528
1188
Apr. 2, 1962 529-
568
1189
Apr. 9, 1962 569-
612
1190
Apr. 16,1962 613-
656
1191
Apr. 23,1962 657-
700
1192
Apr. 30,1962 701-
744
1193
May 7,1962 745-
784
1194
May 14, 1962 785-
820
1195
May 21, 1962 821-
856
1196
May 28, 1962 857-
892
1197
June 4,1962 893-
928 /^-^
964 '
1198
June 11, 1962 929-
1199
June 18, 1962 965-1004
1200
\4
June 25, 1962 1005-
1044
^f33'^-
30
1963
Corrections for Volume XLVI
The Editor of the Bulletin wishes to call atten-
tion to the following errors in Volume XLVI:
January 15, page 89, first column: The first sen-
tence in the second paragraph should begin "To-
morrow is the 131st anniversary of the death of the
great liberator of this country . . . ."
March 19, page 465: The subhead should read
"President Kennedy's Message of February 25."
INDEX
Volume XVI: Numbers 1175-1200, January 1-June 25, 1962
Abello, Emilio, 418
Able, Elie, 164
ACDA. See Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, U.S.
Achilles, Theodore C, 324
Adjustment assistance. See Trade ad.iustment assistance
Adoula, Cvrille, 137, 203, 335
Advertising material and commercial samples, interna-
tional convention (1952) to facilitate the importa-
tion of, 817
AEC. See Atomic Energy Commission
Afghanistan :
Antilocust operation, U.S. aid, 987
Soviet activities in, address (Bowles), 675
Technical cooperation program, agreement vpith U.S.
amending, 610
U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 398
Africa (see also individual countries) :
Agriculture in, address (Williams), 639
Challenge to American enterprise in, address (Wil-
liams), 60
Colonial issues in, statement (Bingham), 70, 72
Communism in, resistance to, address (Bowles), 375
Economic and educational development of, U.N. General
Assembly action re, letter (Stevenson), 224
FAO program in, article (Phillips, Sohl). 394
Health problems in, address (Williams), 26
Independent African states, conference of, address
(Williams), 845
Mid- Africa, regional groupings within, address (Wil-
liams), 841
Newly independent countries in :
Progress in, address (Bowles), 255
U.S. relations with, address (Fredericks), 879
Organization of African States, formation of, joint
communique (Kennedy, Olympic) re, 638
Refugee problem in, addresses : Brown, 102 ; Cieplinski,
733
UNESCO meeting of African education ministers, an-
nouncement, 607
Unity in, efforts to promote, joint communique (Houp-
houet-Boigny, Kennedy), 952
U.S. policy and relations, statement and addresses:
Rowan, 380 ; Williams, 26, 544, 719, 841, 917
Visits of U.S. officials to:
Assistant Secretary Williams, 722
Deputy Assistant Secretary Tasca, 52
Voting record of African states in U.N., remarks
(Rusk), 490
African and Malagasy Union, addresses and statement
(Williams), 172, 722, 843, 916
Agency for International Development :
Act for, cited, 151, 152
Administration and accomplishments of, statement
(Rusk), 660, GOl
Appointments, 35, 78, 698
Appropriations, need for, address (Rusk), 901
Confirmations : Gaud, Hutchinson, Janow, Moscoso,
398 ; Peyser, 1041
Establishment and purpose of, addresses : Bowles, 254,
258 ; Kennedy, 161 ; Rostow, 628 ; Ru.sk, 407
Factfinding mission to Dominican Republic and other
Caribbean islands, 177
Far East, inspection of AID efforts in, 143
Financing of inter-American police academy by, 847
Policy of, address (Tubby), 300
Programs in : Africa, 63, 547, 643 ; Brazil, 105 ; Colom-
bia, 91 ; Dominican Republic, 425 ; Korea, 143 ;
Venezuela, 91
Aggression, Soviet conception of, address (Mann), 506
Agrarian reform, Venezuelan project, remarks (Kennedy)
and text of joint communique (Betancourt, Kennedy),
90
Agricultural Sciences, Inter-American Institute of (OAS),
convention on and protocol (1958) of amendment to,
154, 397
Agricultural surpluses, U.S., use in overseas programs :
Address and statement: Gardner, 151; Rusk, 948
Agreements with: Bolivia, 438, 697; Brazil, 654, 818;
China, Republic of, 854, 1041 ; Colombia, 154, 482,
610; Cyprus, 305; Greece, 482; Guinea, 398, 854;
Iceland, 654 ; India, 890, 961 ; Indonesia, 512, 961 ;
Iran, 305, 512; Israel, 78, 741, 854; Korea, 566;
Liberia, 818 ; Morocco, 482 ; Peru, 698 ; Philippines,
106 ; Poland, 35, 106, 779, 818 ; Spain, 305 ; Syrian
Arab Republic, 782 ; Tunisia, 482 ; Turkey, 78, 306,
610; United Arab Republic, 438, 698, 818, 1002;
Uruguay, 890 ; Venezuela, 926 ; Viet-Nam, 106, 398,
961 ; Yugoslavia, 106, 890, 1041
Emergency relief aid to : Chinese refugees, 994 ; Kenya,
244 ; Togo, 639 ; Tunisia, 641
School lunch program, memorandum of understanding
with Cyprus re grant for, 610
United Nations, memo of understanding re Congo francs
acquired under program, 482
Agricultural trade :
Canadian-U.S. consideration of problems of, joint com-
munique on, 169
Common Market policy re (see also European Economic
Community), 561, 563, 564, 713, 715, 770, 1033
Index, January to June 7962
1047
Agricultural trade — Conlimied
GATT consideration of {see also Tariffs and trade, gen-
eral agreement on), agreements with EEC with re-
spect to corn, sorghum, wheat, rice, and poultry, 512
U.S. agricultural trade :
Agreements with : Brazil, 818 ; China, Uepublic of,
782; Colombia, 926; El Salvador, 926; Guatemala,
1002; India, 782; Ireland, 854; United Kingdom,
818
Need for expansion of, address and statement: Ball,
603 ; Martin, 474
Restrictions on, address and statement: Gudeman, 6;
Rusk, 197, 198
Agricultural workers, agreement further extending agree-
ment (19rjl) with Mexico, 106, 151
Agriculture {see also Agricultural headings and Fiod and
Agriculture Organization) :
Research and development of in Mexico, remarks
(Rusk), 792
Role in Africa, addresses (Williams), 545, 639
Agricultural workers, agreement further extending agree-
of, agreement with Brazil amending and extending
1953 agreement re, 961
Agronsky, Martin, 241
Ahidjo, Ahmadou, 418, 543
AID. See Agency for International Development
Air Afrique, address (Williams), 844
Air transport and services. See Aviation
Aircraft. Sec Aviation
Al-Atiqi, Abdul Rahman Salim, 970
Algeria :
Cease-fire in, address (Fredericks), 881
Refugees from, address (Cieplinski), 733
Violence in, U.S. concern with, 1023
Aliama para el Progreso. See Alliance for Progress
Alliance for Progress :
Authorizations and appropriations requested of Con-
gress, address, message, and statement : Kennedy,
160, 551 ; Rusk, 663
Emergency credit to Dominican Republic under, state-
ment (Kennedy), 258
Goals and principles of, addresses and remarks : Bowles,
255; Kennedy, 89, 01, 92; McGhee, 724; Rostow,
968; Rowan, 379; Rusk, 361, 462, 492, 703, 910, 921;
Stevenson, 559
OAS support, statement (Stevenson), 557
Progress, message (Kennedy), 552
Projects in : Argentina, 470; Brazil, 706, 778; Chile, 538;
Panama, 215
Punta del Este consideration of: resolution on, 280;
statements (Rusk) , 267, 271, 275
Relationship to U.S. foreign i)oIicy, address and re-
marks (Rusk), 787
Ambassadors. See Diplomatic repre.seutatives uml iDutcr
Foreign Service
American Association for the United Nations, 12th an-
nual conference of national organizations called by,
message (Kennedy), 578
American Foreign Ministers. See Punta del Este con-
ference
American Republics («ee also Latin America and in-
dividual countries), Foreign Relations, volume on,
1042
American Revolution, principles and objectives of, ad-
dress (Mann), 501, .504
American States, Organization of. See Organization of
American States
Anderson, Mrs. Eugenie, 1041
Angola :
Problems of, addresses : Cleveland, 331 ; Fredericks,
882
Refugees from, addresses : Brown, 102 ; Cieplinski,
733
U.N. General Assembly consideration of situation In,
statements (Stevenson) and text of resolution,
385
U.S. position re, statement (Bingham), 70
Antarctica, treaty of, address (Stevenson), 580
ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, U.S.) :
11th Council meeting :
Announcement of Secretary Rusk's attendance, 481
News conference ( Rusk ) re, 864
Text of communique, 869
U.S. delegation, 871
Treaty of, 938, 944
Apartheid problem, address and statement : Bingham, 71 ;
Williams, 173
Argentina :
Alliance for Progress loan to, 470
Cuban exclusion from OAS system, statement re posi-
tion on, 282
Political situation in, U.S. concern, statement (Rusk),
800
Scientific Mission on Foot and Mouth Disease in, co-
operative effort with U.S., 67, 543
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
GATT, declaration on provisional accession to, 397
Safety of life at sea, international convention (1960)
on, 740
Telecommunication convention (1959), international,
with six annexes, 1002
Wheat agreement, international, 026
U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 398
U.S. relations with, continuance of, 778
Armaments (see also Disarmament, Military equipmeni,
and Nuclear headings) :
Cuba:
Soviet-bloc supply to, 644
Suspension of traffic in arms with :
Punta del Este resolution, 282
Statements re : Rusk, 275, 285, 286, 287 ; Stevenson,
557
Internationa! control and reduction of:
U.S. proposed outline of treaty for :
Statement (Rusk), 532, 534
Text of, 748, 752, 754, 757
Armed forces :
Cuban, training of by Soviet-bloc instructors, 645
Force levels for, reduction of :
Inspection during process, message and statement:
Kennedy, 358 ; Rusk, 359
1048
Department of State Bulletin
Armed forces — Continued
Force levels for, reduction of — Continued
Proposals for, statements (Rusk), 535, 621
U.S. proposed outline of treaty for, text of, 747, 749,
752, 755, 757
Geneva conventions relative to treatment in time of
war, 500
Thai forces, U.S. contribution to, joint statement (Kho-
man. Rusk), 499
Armed forces, U.S. :
Abroad, addresses (Rusk), 941, 948
Cubans in, statement (Stevenson), 556
In Southeast Asia :
Address (Rostow), 968
In Thailand, letter (Yost) and statements (Kennedy,
SEATO, Thai), 904
Strength of, address (Johnson), 246
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, U.S. :
Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament in
the United States, release of publication, 902
Purpose, address (Rusk), 903
Report of, transmission to Congress, message (Ken-
nedy), 349
Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia (see also Southeast
Asia Treaty Organization and individual countries) :
Communist aggression in, address (Bowles), 2.57
Development in :
Address (Bowles), 674, 675
Petroleum resources, ECAFE symposium on, 852
Education in, UNESCO/ECAFE conference, 695
Emerging nations of, address (Johnson), 53
Southeast Asia :
Situation in :
Address (Rostow), 967, 968
Joint communique (Kennedy, Macmillan), 803
Voice of America Lao and Thai language broadcasts
to, statement (Rusk), 377
Associa(;ao dos Ex-Combatentes do Brasil, 878
Atlantic Alliance. See North Atlantic Treaty Organ-
ization
Atlantic community (see also North Atlantic Treaty
Organization) :
Economic integration and cooperation within, address
and message (Kennedy), 161, 162, 233, 238
Importance of and means of strengthening, statement
(McGhee), 132
Partnership in, addresses: Ball, 364, 414, 416, 666;
Cleveland, 805; Johnson, 992; McGhee, 292, 828;
Rusk, 934
Unity of, address (McGhee) , 680, 681, 682
U.S. part in, address and remarks : Bundy, 419, 423 ;
Kennedy, 906 ; Rusk, 910
Atlantic Fisheries, Northwest. See Northwest Atlantic
Fisheries
Atlantic partnership. See under Atlantic community
Atomic energy :
International control of, U.S. proposal and policy re,
address and statement (Rusk), 798, 932
Mutual defense purposes of, agreement for cooperation
with Belgium, 1002
Nuclear weapons. See Nuclear weapons
Atomic energy — Continued
Peaceful uses of (see also Atomic Energy Agency) :
Agreements for cooperation with : Brazil, 1002 ; Can-
ada, 961 ; China, Republic of, 1002 ; Colombia, 739,
741 ; European Atomic Energy Community, 961 ;
Greece, 697 ; Portugal, 1002 ; Thailand, 1002
Fissionable materials, transfer to peaceful purposes,
statements and U.S. treaty proposal : Rusk, 534, 619,
623 ; treaty outline, 750, 750
AVeather stations, nuclear powered, remarks (Cleve-
land), 695
Atomic Energy Agency, International :
Atomic reactors, agreement with U.S. for inspection of
safeguards, 696, 697
Director General Eklnnd to visit U.S., announcement,
652
Statute of, amendment to, 106, 189, 259, 397, 438, 566,
610, 854, 889, 925, 961
Atomic Energy Commission, U.S., 444, 739, 795
Atomic reactors : IAEA inspection of safeguards, agree-
ment for, 696, 697
Australia :
Administration of New Guinea, statement (Bingham),
72
ANZUS communique, 869
Common heritage with U.S., address (Rusk), 936
Deputy Premier, discussions with U.S. re trade, joint
statement, 549
EEC and Commonwealth trade problems, address and
statements (Rusk) , 865, 867, 946
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Civil aviation convention (1944), international, pro-
tocol (1961) to, 654
Diplomatic relations, Vienna convention (1961) on,
817
IAEA statute, amendment to article VI.A.3 of, 961
International telecommunication convention (1959),
with annexes, 511
International trade in cotton textiles, arrangements
re, 38
Radio regulations (1959), with appendixes, annexed
to international telecommunication convention
(1959), 511
Safety of life at sea, international convention (1960)
on, 740
Wheat agreement, international, 926
U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 1041
Austria :
Fund for settlement of persecutee property losses, filing
of claims against, 718
Pension payments made retroactive to claimants, 302
Treaties, agi'eements, etc. :
Educational exchange program agreement with U.S.,
512
GATT:
Declaration giving effect to provisions of art. XVI :
4 of, 397
Declarations on provisional accessions of Switzer-
land and Tunisia, proc&s-verbaux extending, 3.50
Interim agreements, with schedules, 511
International trade in cotton textiles, arrangements
re, 38
Index, January to June 7962
1049
Austria — Continued
Treaties, agreements, etc. — Continued
Wheat agreement, international, 926
U.S.-Austrian interim air transport agreement of 1947,
consultations re renegotiation of, 718
Visit of Chancellor to U.S., joint communique (Gorbach,
Kennedy), 832
Automobiles, reciprocal tariff concessions under GATT,
562, 565
Aviation :
Air Afrique, address (Williams), 844
Air transport negotiations with Austria, 718
Aircraft, jet, sale of to Yugoslavia, statement (Rusk),
347
Berlin air corridors, Soviet harassment of Western
traffic in, U.S. memorandum of protest, 370
Colonel Glenn's flight, world reaction to, remarks
(Rusk), 492
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Air services transit, international agreement (1944),
653, 817, 925
Aircraft, double taxation on earnings from opera-
tions of, agreement with Colombia for relief of,
77
Aircraft, imported, certificates of airworthiness for,
agreement with Federal Republic of Germany, 350
Aircraft manufactured by Lockheed-Azcdrate, agree-
ment with Mexico re certificates of airworthiness,
305
Civil aviation convention (1944), international, 259,
438, 653, 654, 782, 817, 854, 889, 961
Landing rights for commercial aircraft, agreement
with Indonesia extending arrangement for, 854
Zanderij Airport in Surinam, agreement with Nether-
lands re U.S. use of, 890
Balaceanu, Petre, 25
Balance of payments, U.S. :
Deficit in :
Causes of, address (Ball), 671
Measures to counteract, address and message: Ball,
415 ; Kennedy, 550
Expansion of exports necessary to U.S. stability in,
address, message, and report: Kennedy, 231, 233,
239 ; Rusk, 196, 197, 199 ; Trezise, 647, 884
Importance of maintaining, addresses : Kennedy, 162 ;
Rostow, 835
Ball, George W. :
Addresses, article, correspondence, and statements:
American Business Abroad, 912
Atlantic partnership, 364, 412, 666
Congo, elements of U.S. policy in, 12, 43
Foreign policy, practice of, 872
GATT, cooperation in strengthening of, 118
Less developed countries, 4, 412
Nuclear weapons, transfer of to other countries, U.S.
position, 609
Speech review proceflures of Department of State,
513, 1038
Trade Expansion Act, proposed, major aspects of, 597
United Nations, role of, 632
Ball, George W. — Continued
Attendance at GATT cotton textile conference, 218
Confirmation as Under Secretary of State, 306
Visit to Panama, 215
Barbosa da Silva, E. P., 118
Baseball gloves and mitts, decision against increasing
duty on, 649
Bataan Day, 729
Batchelder, Charles, 123
Battle, Lucius D., 1041
Battle, William C, 1041
Bayley, Edwin R., 78
Belgium :
IMF, Belgian commitment to, 187
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Atomic energy, mutual defense purposes, agreement
with U.S. for cooperation in, 1002
Civil aviation convention (1944), international pro-
tocol (1961) to, 654
Diplomatic relations, Vienna convention (1961) and
protocol on, 817
GATT:
Compensatory concessions under GATT for certain
tariff actions taken by U.S.. 512
Proces-verbaux extending declarations on provi-
sional accessions of: Switzerland, 817; Tunisia,
818
IAEA, amendment to art. VI.A.3 of statute of, 397
Mutual defense assistance agreement with U.S.
amending annex B of 1950 agreement, 77
Safety of life at sea, international convention (1960)
on, 740
Visas and visa fees, agreement with U.S. re reciprocal
waiver of, 1041
Bell, John O., 306
Bengelloun, Ali, 499
Berger, Samuel D., 951
Berlin (see also Germany and Germany, Federal Republic
of):
Addresses, remarks, and statements : Ball, 875 ; Bundy,
419, 424 ; Kennedy, 161, 168, 708 ; R. Kennedy, 762,
764 ; Rostow, 967, 968 ; Rusk, 84, 123, 127, 165, 166,
200, 201, 241, 243, 360, 450, 457, 460, 797, 798, 799,
801, 802, 868, 939, 976
East Berlin, Soviet position on East German claim to,
statement (Rusk), 360
Free access to Berlin :
International Access Authority, U.S. proposal for, 463
Western rights to, addresses, statements, and U.S.
note: Rusk, 84, 4.50, 457, 460, 798; U.S. note, 370
Free-world unity of position on, statement (Rusk), 127
Mission of General Clay to, statements (Kennedy), 168,
708
NATO communiques re, 51, 862
Negotiations and consultations on :
Basis sought, joint communique (Kennedy, Mac-
millan), 94
Ex-ploratory talks with Soviet Union re, statementa
(Rusk), 123, 200, 201, 808, 976
Possibility of with Soviets, U.S. views, statements
(Rusk), 797, 798, 799, 801, 802
1050
Department of Stale Bulletin
Berlin — Continued
Soviet position re, addresses and statements: Rostow,
967 ; Rusk, 360, 450, 798
U.S. position, addresses and statements: Ball, 875;
Bundy, 419, 424; Kennedy, R., 762; Rostow, 907;
Rusk, 80, 450
Wall in :
NATO views re, 51
Problem of, statement (Rusk), 166
Betancourt, Romulo, 90
Bills of lading, international convention (1924) for uni-
fication of rules re, 305, 610
Bingham, Jonathan B., 69, 398
Blumenthal, W. Michael, 259, 596, 848, 997
Bohlen, Charles E., 652, 1012
Bolivia :
Agricultural commodities, agreements with U.S. re, 438,
697
ICEM constitution, 511
Bontempo, Salvatore A., 118
Borton, Hugh, 142
Bowles, Chester:
Addresses :
Asia, Balance Sheet on, 674
Education for World Responsibility, 206
Global forces shaping history, 371
Middle East, situation in, 765
U.S. foreign policy, 252
Ambassador at Large and President's Special Repre-
sentative and Adviser on African, Asian, and Latin
American affairs : confirmation, 306 ; designation,
118
Far East Regional Operations Conference, attendance
at, 511
Foreign policy briefings at Chicago, participation in, 104
Visit to Middle East, Africa, South Asia, and Far
East, 251
Brazil :
Associagao dos Ex-Combatentes do Brasil, message
(Kennedy), 878
Cuban exclusion from GAS system, position on, 283
Expropriation of IT&T holdings, statement (Rusk),
460
Northeast Brazil, U.S. aid to, 740, 778, 960
Trade unions of, statement (Kennedy), 470
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Agricultural commodities agreements with U.S., 654,
818
Agricultural trade agreement with U.S., 818
Agriculture and natural resources, cooperative pro-
gram of, agreement with U.S. amending and ex-
tending 1953 agreement re, 961
Atomic energy, peaceful uses of, agreement amend-
ing 1955 agreement with U.S., 1005
Communications satellites, agreement with U.S. on
cooperation in testing of, 154
Economic and social development in the Brazilian
Northeast, agreement with U.S. for cooperation
in, 740
GATT, protocol relating to establishment of sched-
ule III (1958), 350
Brazil — Continued
Treaties, agreements, etc. — Continued
Peace Corps program, agreement with U.S. for es-
tablishment of, 106
Safety of life at sea, international convention (1960)
on, 740
Sodium sulphates and manganese ores, agreement
with U.S. re settlement of debt for purchase of, 350
Special services program, agreement with U.S. re,
961
Vocational education program, agreement with U.S.
extending 1950 agreement re, 961
Wheat agreement, international, 926
U.S. extension of credit to, 105
U.S. science attach^ at Rio de Janeiro, appointment,
1042
Visit of President to United States, 259, 705
Brezhnev, Leonid, 164
British Cameroons, U.N. Trust Territory of, dissolution
of, 25
British East Africa, International telecommunication
convention (1959) , with annexes, 397
British Guiana :
Touring, convention concerning customs facilities for,
5G6
Road vehicles, customs convention on temporary im-
portation of, 566
U.S. economic planning team visits, 769
Brown, Richard R., 100
Brubeck, William H., 890
Bulgaria :
Safety of life at sea, international convention (1960)
on, 740
U.S. Minister, confirmation, 1041
Bundy, McGeorge, 419
Bunker, Ellsworth, 975, 1039
Burma :
GATT, rectifications and modifications to texts of sched-
ules, protocols 6, 7, 8, and 9, 350
U.S. recognition of government of, 499
Burns, John H., 306
Business Abroad, American, address (Ball) , 912
Cabot, John M., 306
Calendar of international conferences and meetings {see
also subject), 36, 107, 220, 303, 383, 480, 605, 651, 780,
850, 924, 995
Cambodia :
Communist subversion In, threat of, address (Bowles),
676
GATT, protocol of accession to, 696
Cameroon :
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 499
Immigration quota, U.S. establishment of, 25
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Civil aviation convention (1944), international,
and protocols to, 654, 961
Cultural property, convention (1954) and protocol for
protection in event of armed conflict, 225
Economic, technical, and related assistance agreement
amending 1961 agreement with U.S., 482
Index, January to June 1962
1051
Cameroon — CJontinued
Treaties, agreements, etc. — (Jontinued
Narcotic drugs, manufacture and regulating the dis-
tribution of, convention (1931) for limiting, 38
Narcotic drugs, protocol (1948) bringing under inter-
national control drugs outside the scope of the
1931 convention, 38
Opium, protocol (1953) regulating the production,
trade, and use of, 511
Opium and other drugs, convention (1912) relating
to suppression of abuse of, 38
Safety of life at sea, international convention (1960)
on, 740
Slavery convention (1926), as amended, 654
Visit of President to U.S., 418, 543
Canada :
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 955
IMF, Canadian commitment to, 187
International Joint Commission (U.S.-Canada), 728,
729
Nuclear weapons, question of availability to, statement
(Rusk), 457, 458
Trade and Economic Affairs, Joint U.S.-Canadian Com-
mittee on, 7th meeting, delegations and text of
communique, 105, 168
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Atomic energy, civil uses of, amendment to 1955
agreement with U.S., 961
Civil aviation convention (1944), international, pro-
tocol (1961) to, 654
Copyright convention (1952), universal, and protocol
S, 1002
Diplomatic relations, Vienna convention (1961) on,
817
Double taxation, conventions with U.S. for avoidance
of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on estates :
1944 and 1950 conventions, termination of, 739,
740 ; 1961 convention, 305, 512, 739, 740, 782
GATT:
Interim agreements, with schedules, 511
Proc6s-verbaux re provisional accessions of:
Switzerland, 350 ; Tunisia, 818
Protocol for accession of Portugal, 1041
Haines cutoff road for winter maintenance of Hames-
Fairbanks pipeline, agreement with U.S. for, 740
Haines-Fairbanks pipeline, agreement with U.S. for
construction of additional pumping stations, 890
High seas fisheries of North Pacific Ocean, interna-
tional convention (19!)2) on, 740
IAEA statute, amendment of, 189
NATO status-of -forces agreement, agreements supple-
menting and implementing agreement on, 106
Radio regulations (1959), 782
Safety of life at sea, international convention (1960)
on, 740
Telecommunication convention (1959), international,
with six annexes, 890
Wheat agreement, international, 926
Canal Zone, inter-American police academy in, opening
of, 847
Cancer research, Japan-U.S. joint project, 955
1052
Caribbean Organization, designation as public interna-
tional organization. Executive order, 188
Carpets, woven, decision to increase duty on, 649, 650, 671
Casablanca powers, list of and cultural objectives, ad-
dresses (Williams), 172, 843, 844
Castro, Fidel, 556, 558
CENTO. See Central Treaty Organization
Central African Republic:
Ambassador to U.S., credentials. C44
Diplomatic relations, Vienna convention (1961) and
protocol on, 817
U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 306
Central America, seasonal marketing fund proposed for,
178, 998
Central Treaty Organization :
Economic Committee, 10th session:
Statement (Rostow), 522
Text of communique, 526
U.S. delegation, 436
Secretary General, visit to Washington, 411
10th Ministerial Council meeting :
Statement (Rusk), 859
Text of communique, 860
U.S. delegation, 861
Ceramic tile, decision against increasing duty on, 649
Ceylon :
Governor General of, message (Kennedy) to, 644
GATT, declaration on extension of standstill provisions
of art. XVI :4, 397
GATT, declaration on provisional accession of Argen-
tina to, 397
Radio Ceylon, agreement amending and extending
agreement with U.S. re, 890
Chad, UNESCO health project in, address (Williams),
29
Chancellor, John, 241
Charlotte, Grand Duchess of Luxembourg, 950
Charter of Punta del Este. See Punta del Este, Charter
of
Chayes, Abram, 851
Cheese, Colby and blue-mold cheese, actions on imports of,
779
Chiari, Roberto F., 976
Chile :
Economic development, joint communique with U.S. re
financing of, 538
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Educational programs, agreement with U.S. amend-
ing 1955 agreement for financing, 566
GATT, declaration on provisional acces.sion of Switz-
erland, proc&s-verbal extending, 350
Satellite tracking facility at Mapallenes Province,
agreement with U.S. re reactivation of, 77
University of Chile, economic training, address (Rusk),
792
China ;
Foreign Relations, volume on, released, 610
U.N. representation question :
General Assembly action, letter and statement
(Stevenson), 222, 320
Soviet draft resolution, 117
Department of State Bulletin
China — Continued
U.N. representation question — Continued
U.N. important-question resolution, 117
U.S. position on, statements (Stevenson), 108, .320
China, Communist (see also Communism and Sino-Soviet
bloc) :
Aggression in Asia and the Far East, statement (Steven-
son), 108. 109
Communist failure in, address (Rusk) , 454
Disarmament conference, question of participation in,
statement (Rusk), 462
Economic problems of, addresses : Johnson, 57, 58 ; Tre-
zise, 595
Guerrilla warfare training centers in, statement (Ste-
venson), 109, 110, 116
Objectives and methods of attainment, address (Achil-
les), 324, 325
Refugees from. Sec under Refugees
Revolution in, results of, address (Bowles), 371, 375
Tibet, domination of, statement (Bingham), 74
U.N. representation question. See under China
U.S. policy toward, address (Bowles), 676
U.S. shipment of food to, question of, statement (Rusk),
974
China, Republic of :
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 205
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Agricultural commodities, agreements with U.S., 782,
854, 1041
Atomic energy, peaceful uses of, agreement amending
1955 agreement with U.S., 1002
Safety of life at sea, international convention (19G0)
on, 740
U.N. representation. See China : U.N. representation
question
U.S. aid to, address (Tubby), 301
U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 1042
Christmas Lsland, U.K.-U.S. nuclear test project, joint
statement re, 329
Cieplinski, Michel, 730
Citizenship, domestic and foreign responsibility of, ad-
dress ( Louehheim ) , 337
Civil aviation. See Aviation
Civilian persons in time of war, Geneva convention rela-
tive to treatment of, 398, 566
Claims :
Austria :
Fund for settlement of persecutee property losses,
filing of claims against, 718
Retroactive pension payments by, 302
Damage from nuclear tests, U.S. position re compen-
sation in event of, 840
Yugoslavia, negotiations re U.S. claims against, 847
Clay, Lucius D., 168, 708
Cleveland, Harlan :
Addresses, remarks, and statement :
Disarmament, progress toward, 583
Meteorological observations, cooperation in. 694
The Practice of Peace, 1019
United Nations :
Bond issue, 96
Role in U.S. foreign policy, 330
Cleveland, Harlan — Continued
Addresses, remarks, and statement — Continued
U.S. diplomatic relations, problems of, 803
Trip to Europe and Congo, announcement of, 760
Cleveland, Stanley M., 073
Coale, Ansley J., 306
Cocoa, trade problems, statement (Blumenthal), 998
Codex Alimentarius Commission (FAO/WHO), establish-
ment at FAO conference, article (Phillips, Sohl), 394
Coerr, Wymberley DeR., 1042
Coffee :
Problems of trade in, address (Blumenthal), 907
Seasonal marketing fund proposed by U.S., 178, 998
U.S. importation of, address (Trezise), 885
Worldwide agreement on, joint support of, communique
(Goulart, Kennedy), 706
Cold war, statements re : Rusk, 559 ; Stevenson, 553
Collective security (see also Mutual defense) :
Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. See Southeast
Asia Treaty Organization
Europe. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Latin America. See Organization of American States
Near and Middle East. See Central Treaty Organiza-
tion
Regional arrangements for :
Iran-U.S. views, joint communique (Kennedy,
Pahlavi),760
U.S. position on, address and statement : Johnson,
246, 250 ; McGhee, 131, 133, 1.35
Colombia :
Cuban exclusion from OAS system, position on, 282
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Agricultural commodities, agreements with U.S., 154
482, 610, 926
Atomic energy, peaceful uses of, agreement with U.S.
for cooperation in, 739, 741
Continental shelf, convention on, 482
Double taxation on earnings from operations of ships
and aircraft, agreement with U.S. for relief of, 77
Geneva conventions (1949) on treatment of prisoners
of war, wounded and sick, and civilians in time
of war, 398
Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences,
protocol of amendment to convention on, 154
WMO convention, 189
Visit of President and Mrs. Kennedy, address and re-
marks (Kennedy), 91
Colonialism (see also Self-determination and Trust terri-
tories) :
Development and passing of, addresses and remarks:
Ball. 364, 413, 414, 633 ; Cleveland, 807 ; Rusk, 945 ;
Stevenson, 210, 212 ; Williams, 170
U.N. General Assembly consideration of : letter, re-
marks, and resolution: Rusk. 490; Steven.son, 223;
text of res., 76
U.S. position re, address and statements: Bingham, 69;
Johnson, 58 ; Stevenson, 147
Colorado River water :
Agreement with Mexico re supplying of water under
1944 agreement, 144
Problem o fsalinity, joint U.S.-Mexican study of, 650
Index, January to June 7962
1053
Commerce, Department of, commercial program within
Foreign Service, interdepartmental agreement witli
State Department for, 741
Commercial agreements. See Trade: Treaties
Commodity Trade, Commission on International (ECO-
SOC), confirmation of U.S. member, 596
Commodity trade problems {see also Agricultural head-
ings and individual commodity) :
Canadian-U.S. consideration of, communique on, 169
GATT declaration re disposal of surpluses, 10
Latin American and U.S. officials confer on seasonal
marketing problems, 178
Stabilization agreements, formulation of, remarks
(Kennedy), 540
U.S. proposals and views re, address, article, and state-
ment : Blumenthal, 997 ; Phillips, Sohl, 395 ; Rusk,
949
Common markets. See European Economic Community,
European Free Trade Association, and Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development
Communications (see also Radio, Satellites: Communi-
cation, and Telecommunications) :
Advances in, address (Bohlen), 1015
Films as an international means of, remarks (Tubby)
213
Communism (see also China, Communist ; Germany, East;
Sino-Soviet bloc; and Soviet Union) :
Aggression and subversive activities In:
Africa, statement (Williams), 918
Southeast Asia, addresses, messages and statements:
Bowles, 675, 676 ; Diem, 14 ; Johnson, 53, 54 ; Ken-
nedy, 13, 914; Rusk, 455, 458, 459, 498; SEATO,
905 ; Thai, 905 ; Tost, 905
"Western Hemisphere. See under Cuba and Punta
del Este conference
Communist organizations :
Address (Hughes), 981, 982, 984
Regulations and statement re issuance or revocation
of passports to members of, 179, 202, 847
Doctrine of, address (Mac Arthur), 710
Economic challenge of (see also Less developed coun-
tries: Economic offensive), address and statement:
Ball, 598 ; Trezise, 592
Failures of, addresses and statement: Rusk, 790, 868
948 ; Tubby, 16
International challenge and threat of and measures to
combat, addresses, communique, and statement:
Achilles, 326; ANZUS, 870; Ball, 417; Bowles, 372^
374 ; Cleveland, 1019, 1020 ; Harriman, 177 ; Johnson'
245 ; Khoman, 498 ; Rostow, 626, 629, 6.30, 967, 968,'
970 ; Rowan, 379, 380 ; Rush, 449, 498 ; Tubby 299'
301
Objectives of, addresses and statement: Johnson, 54;
Rostow, 522, 525; Rusk, 896, 897, 898, 899, 934
Problems of, address (Kennedy), 616
Propaganda. See Propaganda
Refugees from, addresses : Brown, 101, 103 ; CiepUnskl,
731, 733 ; Stevenson, 211, 557
Rivalry for control between Moscow and Poiping, state-
ment (Rusk), 241
Communism — Continued
Strategy and techniques of, addresses, remarks, and
statements: Rusk, 84, 272, 276, 488; Stevenson,
211
Theories, Dogmas, and Semantics of, addresses (Mann)
500
U.S. strategy toward (see also infra), address (Mc-
Ghee), 683
Communist countries :
Trade agreement concessions denied to, address and
act : summary of act, 344 ; Weiss, 341
U.S. policy toward, addresses: Bohlen, 1017; McGhee,
&31 ; Rostow, 835 ; Rusk, 902
Communist Party :
Authority in, address (Mann), 502
Members in U.S., restrictions on issuance of passports
to, 847
Conference of the eighteen-natlon committee on disarma-
ment. See 18-nation committee on disarmament,
conference of
Conferences and organizations* international (see also
suljject), calendar of meetings, 36, 107, 220, 303,
383, 480, 605, 651, 780, 850, 924, 995
Congo, Republic of (Brazzaville), civU aviation conven-
tion (1944), international, 889
Congo, Republic of the ( Leopold ville) :
Consulate at Stanleyville, opening of, 853
Francs acquired by U.S. under agriculture commodities
program, memo of understanding with U.N. re, 482
Freedom of exit for Moise Tshombe, 769
International telecommunication convention (1959),
with annexes, 77
Prime Minister's visit to U.S., toasts (Adoula, Ken-
nedy), 335
Situation in. See Congo situation
Visit of U.S. Assistant Secretary (Cleveland), announce-
ment, 760
Congo situation:
Developments in, addresses, article, communique, and
statements : Ball, 43, 635, 876 ; Kennedy, Macmillan,
95; Rostow, 967, 968; Rusk, 126, 165, 199, 216;
Stevenson, 222 ; Williams, 136, 547, 720
Katangan secession :
Kitona agreement, 49, 95, 137, 171
Negotiations for reintegration, address, article, and
statements : Ball, 40 ; Department, 11, 49, 95 ; White,
10 ; Williams, 720
U.N. action re, 48
U.S. opposition to, address and statement: Rusk,
217 ; Williams, 136, 140
Maps, 43, 45
Preparation for self-government, problem of, state-
ment (Bingham), 71
Refugee problem, address (Brown), 102
U.N. operation in :
Addresses and statement: Ball, 035, 876; Rusk, 126
Communist People's Dailii comment on, 116
Financial obligations of U.N. members for (see aUo
International Court of Justice: U.N. assessment),
U.S. position, 435
Kalanga attacks against, statements: Ball, 12; De-
partment, 11
1054
Department of State Bulletin
Congo situation — Continued
U.N. operation in — Continued
Security Council consideration of, question of, state-
ment (Stevenson), 304
Soviet opposition to, article (Ball),4G
U.X. bond sale for payment of (.see also United Na-
tions: Financing of: Bond issue), U.S. views, 160,
311, 315, 317, 322
U.S. contribution and support, article and addresses :
Adoula, 33(); Ball, 12, 44, 4G, 50; Bowles, 207, 256;
Cleveland, 97, 331, 332; Kennedy, 336; Rusk, 216,
450 ; Williams, 140
Congress, U.S. :
Committee bearings on :
Congo situation, statement (Rusk), 216
Oil imports program, statement (Nichols), 31
Speech review procedures of Department of State,
letter and statements : Ball, 513, 1038 ; Rusk, 972 ;
Tubby, 518
Textile industry, statement (Martin), 218
Documents relating to foreign policy, lists of, 68, 179,
302, 382, 519, 734, 923, 994
Legislation, tariff classification system, modernizing,
statement (Kennedy), 1038
Legislation proposed :
Communications satellite corporation, U.S., statement
(Plimpton), 815
Foreign aid program for FY 1063, address, message,
and statement : Kennedy, 550 ; Rusk, 659, 901
Peace Corps, expansion of, letter (Kennedy), .521
Philippine indemnity for war damage, statement
(Kennedy), 911
Refugee aid programs, address (Cleplinskl), 732, 734
Trade Expansion Act of 1962, addresses, message, re-
port, and statement : Ball, 597 ; Coppock, 958, 1031 ;
Kennedy, 163, 231, 239
U.N. bond purchase, message, proposed bill, and state-
ments : Kennedy, 311 ; Rusk, 312 ; Stevenson, 317 ;
text of bill, 312
Presidential addresses, messages, reports, etc. See
tinder Kennedy
Senate approval requested for safety of life at sea con-
vention (1960), statement (Trezise), 520
State Department relations with, statement (Rusk), 126
Conservation of the living resources of the high seas, con-
vention on, 854
Consultative Committee on Security (OAS), Special,
Punta del Este resolution re establishment of, 279
Contiguous zone and territorial zone, convention (1958)
on, 225, 854
Continental shelf, convention (1958) on, 77, 225, 482
Contingency fund, authorization request for FY 1963,
message and statement : Kennedy, 551 ; Rusk, 664
Control Commission, International, Communist attacks
on in Viet-Nam, 14
Coombs, Philip H., 926
Cooperatives, growth of, U.S. assistance in, address (Wil-
liams), 642
Coppock, Joseph D., 426, 770, 956, 1027
Copyright convention (1952), universal, and protocols, 1,
2, and 3, 77, 305, 1002
Corrick, Ann, 358
Costa Rica, Vienna convention (1961) on diplomatic re-
lations, 817
Cotton :
Sale of to Poland, 779
Zipper tape, consultations with Japan re exports to
U.S., 1037
Cotton Textile Committee (GATT) :
Establishment of, statement (Martin), 219
Meeting of and text of agreement reached, 2.50, 430
Cotton textiles :
Arrangements (1961) re international trade in, cur-
rent action, 38
GATT negotiations on trade in, 218, 259, 430
Long-term cotton textile arrangement, text of, 431
Hong Kong restraint of shipments to U.S., discussions
re, 848
Crawford, William A., 306
Cuba:
Charges against :
OAS and call for World Court opinion re, statements
(Stevenson) and text of draft resolution, 684
United States, General Assembly rejection, state-
ments: Plimpton, 559; Stevenson, 553
Communism in and threat to American Republics (see
^ also Punta del Este conference), addres.ses, report,
and statements: Rostow, 967, 968; Rusk, 85, 125,
165, 166, 168, 242 ; Stevenson, 553, 687 ; U.S. report,
129
Guantanamo Naval Base in, U.S. treaty rights to, state-
ment (Rusk), 287
NATO-U.S. alinement of policy toward, statement
(Rusk), 459
OAS consideration of and actions re. See Punta del
Este conference
Refugees from, addresses and statement: Brown, 101,
103 ; Cieplinski, 732 ; Stevenson, 557
Soviet-bloc military aid to. See Armaments : Cuba
Sugar quota, determination of, proclamation (Ken-
nedy), 34
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Diplomatic relations, Vienna convention (1961) on,
817
GATT:
Declaration on provisional accession of Tunisia,
350, 397
Declaration on relations between contracting par-
ties of GATT and Poland, 397
Proces-verbal of rectification concerning protocol
amending part I and articles XXIX and XXX
and protocol amending preamble and parts II
and III, 350
Wheat agreement, international, 926
U.S. trade with, embargo on, proclamation and state-
^ ments : proclamation, 283 ; Rusk, 285, 287, 288, 348
Cultural relations and programs (see also Educational
exchange and Exchange of persons) :
Japanese-U.S. exchanges:
Discussions and conference on, 99, 142
Use of GARIOA funds in programs, 188
Index, January to June 1962
1055
Cultural relations and programs — Continued
Soviet-U.S. exchanges:
Statements : Bohlen, 652 ; Hughes, 982
Test of joint communique, 653
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Cultural exchange agreement with U.A.R., 959
Cultural property, convention (1954) and protocol
for protection in event of armed conflict, 225
Educational, scientific, and cultural materials, agree-
ment and protocol on importation of, 817
Exchange of films with Rumania, 959
Exchanges in scientific, technical, educational, cul'
tural, and other fields, 1962-63 agreement with
U.S.S.R., 512. 652
Customs (see also Tariff jwlicy) :
Commercial samples and advertising material, inter-
national convention (1952) to facilitate the im-
portation of, 817
Road vehicles, private, customs convention (1954) on
temporary importation of, 38, 566, 782
Touring, convention (1954) concerning customs facili-
ties for, 566, 817
Customs unions. See Common markets
Cyprus :
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Agricultural commodities, memorandum of under-
standing with U.S. re grant for school lunch pro-
gram, 610
Educational exchange program, agreement with U.S.,
225, 350
IBRD and IMF articles of agreement, 77
IDA articles of agreement, 854
Universal postal convention (1957), with final proto-
col, annex, regulations of execution, and provisions
re airmail with final protocol, 77
Wheat, memorandum of understanding with U.S. re
purchase of, 305
Visit to U.S. of President Makarios and discussions with
U.S. official.s, 413, 1011
Czechoslovakia :
Civil aviation convention, International, protocol (1961)
to, 854
GATT, proces-verbaux extending declarations on pro-
visional accession of Switzerland and Tunisia, 926
Dahomey :
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Civil aviation convention, international, protocol
(1961) to, 854
Geneva conventions relative to treatment of prisoners
of war, wounded and sick, and civilians, 566
Narcotic drugs, convention and protocol (1931) on,
259
Road trafl3c convention (19-49), with annexes, 259
Slavery convention (1926), as amended, 961
Visit of goodwill mission to U.S., 1036
Dean, Arthur H., 888
Decade of Doveloi)ment. See under I'liitcil Xiitions
Declaration of Independence, cited, 60
Defense (see also Collective security and Mutual de-
fense) :
Furnishing of defense articles and services for purpose
of internal security, agreement with El Salvador
re, 818
Inventions relating to defense for which patent appli-
cations have been filed, agreement for safeguarding,
740
Strengthening of by U.S., address (Bowles), 254
U.S. collective defense arrangements, address (John-
son), 246, 250
Defense, Department of, speeches reviewed by Depart-
ment of State, statement and remarks : Ball, 513,
Tubby, 518
Defense Board, Inter-American, 557
Democracy, defense of by Venezuela, letter (Kennedy),
1023
Denmark :
Educational exchange programs, agreements with U.S.
re, 1041
GATT:
Compensatory concessions for certain tariff actions
taken by U.S., 512
Declarations giving effect to and extending standstill
provisions of art. XVI : i, 818
Declarations on provisional accessions of Switzerland
and Tunisia, proces-verbaux extending, 350
Interim agreements, with schedules, 511
IAEA statute, amendment of, 854
Safety of life at sea, international convention (1960)
on, 740
De Peiia, Marco A., 129
Dependent territories :
African, problems of, address (Fredericks), 881
Pacific, territories of, ANZUS assistance to, address
(Rusk), 944
Development Assistance Group:
Commitment to underdeveloped countries, statement
(Rusk), 165
Committee meeting in Paris, U.S. representative to,
designation (Rubin), 1042
Development Loan Fund, loans to Ghana, 30
Development loans and grants, authorizing legislation re-
quest for FY 1963, message and statement : Kennedy,
551; Rusk, 663
Diem, Ngo Dinh, 13
Dillon, Douglas, 168
Diplomacy :
Addresses and remarks : Ball, 876 ; Bowles, 677 ; Cleve-
land, 803; McGhee, 1007; Rusk, 488
Dulles Library of diplomatic history, statement (Rusk),
923
Diplomatic IHstorfi, International Law, and the Condnet
of Foreign Relations, Department of State Publiea-
tions on, 190
Diplomatic recognition and relations :
Argentina, continuance of relations with, 778
Dominican Republic, U.S. relations with, 34, 120
Vienna convention (1961) on diplomatic relations and
protocol concerning compulsory settlement of dis-
putes, 817
1056
Department of State Bulletin
Diplomatic representatives abroad, U.S. See under For-
eign Service
Diplomatic representatives in tlie U.S. :
Presentation of credentials : Cameroon, 499 ; Canada,
955; Central African Republic, 644; China, 205;
Dominican Republic, 904 ; Ecuador, 1C9 ; Gabon,
1(!9; Greece, 479; Iran, 707; Kuwait, 970; Mali,
871 ; Morocco, 499 ; Philippines, 418 ; Rumania, 25 ;
Soviet Union, 644 ; Syrian Arab Republic, 244
Travel of in U.S., State Advisory Committee considera-
tion of, 382
Disarmament (see also Armaments, Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, Nuclear test-ban treaty. Nu-
clear weapons, and Outer space ) :
Agreed principles for, U.S.S.R.-U.S. joint statement of,
statement (Rusk), 533
Chinese Communist views on, cited, 116
Coordination of U.S. approach to, addresses (Bowles),
253, 257, 376
Economic and social consequences of:
ACDA publication, release of, 962
U.N. report on, statement re (Rusk), 532
Eighteen-nation disarmament conference at Geneva.
See Eighteen-nation committee on disarmament,
conference of
■•^General and complete, U.S. position, letter, proposed
treaty outline, and statement : Ball, 609 ; Kennedy,
747 : text of outline, 747
International Disarmament Organization, U.S. proposal
for, 621, 622, 747, 749, 751, 759
Negotiations {sec also Eighteen-nation committee)
NATO communique re, 51, 52
U.K.-U.S. joint communique and report re, 95, 409
U.N. call for, letter (Stevenson), 223
U.S. efforts for, addresses, Cleveland, 583, 585; Ken-
nedy, 160 ; Rusk, 4.54
U.N. consideration of, statement (Stevenson), 319
Use of savings from for peaceful purposes, joint com-
munique (Goulart, Kennedy), 706
Verification of, Soviet and U.S. views on : Kennedy,
465 ; Khrushchev, 468, Rusk, 124
Disarmament agency, U.S. See Arms Control and Dis-
armament Agency, U.S.
Dobrynin, Anatoliy Fedorovich, 644
Dominican Republic :
AID mission to, 177, 425
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 904
Developments in, statements : Kennedy, 128 ; Rusk, 165,
108, 200, 202, 203
Diplomatic relations with :
Conditions for, 34
Resumption of, 129
Emergency credit to, statement (Kennedy) , 258
Military assistance, U.S. team survey of need, 258
OAS system, participation in, remarks (Kennedy), 541
Soviet charges of OAS action against, statements
(Stevenson), 690, 693
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Civil aviation convention (1944), international, pro-
tocol (1961) to, 654
Dominican Republic — Continued
Treaties, agreements, etc. — Continued
Diplomatic relations, Vienna convention (1961) and
protocol on, 817
Economic, technical, and related assistance, agree-
ment with U.S. for, 305
Investment guaranties, agreement with U.S. re, 854
Military assistance, agreement with U.S. for, 697
Peace Corps, agreement with U.S. re establishment
of, 854
Safety of life at soa, international convention (1960)
on, 740
Wheat agreement, international, 926
U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 482
Double taxation, agreements and conventions for avoid-
ance of on :
Estates, with Canada, 305, 512, 739, 740, 782
Income, with : Colombia, 77, Greece, 512
List of U.S. agreements in force, 261
Drugs, narcotic :
Manufacture and distribution of, convention (1931)
limiting and regulating, 38, 259, 397, 740
Opium, and other drugs, production, trade, and use of :
Convention (1912), 38, 350, 566, 740
Protocol (1953) regulating, 350, 511
Protocol (1948) bringing under international control
drugs outside the scope of 1031 convention, 38, 259,
397, 740
Dulles Library of diplomatic history, statement (Rusk),
923
Duncan, John P., Jr., 392
Dutton, Frederick G., 306
East- West relations, address (Ball), 874
ECAFE. See Economic Commission for Asia and the Far
East
Economic and military matters, agreement with Korea
rescinding certain provisions of agreed minute for
cooperation in, 398
Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament in
the United States, ACDA publication, release of, 962
Economic and Social Council, U.N. :
Commission on International Commodity Trade, con-
firmation of U.S. member, 596
Documents, lists of, 437, 526, 609, 738, 817, 889
Population Commission of, confirmation of U.S. repre-
sentative, 306
U.S. representative to, confirmation (Kotschnig), 926
Economic and social development {see also Economic and
technical aid to foreign countries, Foreign aid pro-
grams, and Less developed countries) :
Africa, progress in, addresses (Williams), 60, 171
CENTO'S programs for, communiques and statement :
communiques, 520, 861 ; Rostow, 523
Drive toward worldwide, address and remarks (Rusk),
788
Food programs to aid in, statement (Gardner), 1.52,
153
Health in relation to, address (Williams), 28
India, progress in, address (Johnson), 56
Index, January fo June 7962
1057
Economic and social development — Continued
Japan, progress in, addresses : Jolinson, 55 ; Trezise,
294
Latin America {see also Alliance for Progress), co-
operation in, address and remarks (Kennedy), SO,
91; joint communique (Bctancourt, Kennedy), 90
Long-range financing and planning, address and state-
ment : Johnson, 59 ; Rusk, CGO, 6G3
Middle East, progress in, address (Bowles), 765, 767,
768
OECD. See Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development
Population growth, relationship to, address (Nunley),
22
Programs of and U.S. cooperation with : Brazil, 706,
740, 778; British Guiana, 769; Chile, 538; Domini-
can Republic, 128, 425; India, 57, 124; Iran, 760;
Korea, 143 ; Tunisia, 425 ; Viet-Nam, 141
Soviet progress in, addresses : Hughes, 980 ; Trezise,
593
U.S. policy for furthering, addresses, remarks, and state-
ment: Bowles, 372; McGhee, 723, 1009; Rusk, 18,
407 ; Stevenson, 581
Economic and technical aid to foreign countries (see also
Agency for International Development, Agricultural
sur|)luses, Alliance for Progress, Economic and social
development. Foreign aid programs, Inter-American
Development Bank, and International Development
Association) :
Address, message, remarks, and statement : Kennedy,
550 ; R. Kennedy, 762, 763 ; Mann, 508 ; Rusk, 659
Aid to; Afghanistan, 610; Africa, 173, 547, 643, 721,
882 ; Brazil, 105, 778 ; Cameroon, 482 ; Dominican
Republic, 305; Ecuador, 818; El Salvador, 106, 697;
Ghana, 30; Iran, 154; Korea, 398, 951; Nicaragua,
782 ; Nigeria, 25 ; Panama, 106, 698 ; Viet-Nam, 142
Program for FY 1963, message and statement: Ken-
nedy, 550 ; Rusk, 659, 663
Soviet-bloc aid, addresses, communique, and message:
Bowles, 766; Hughes, 981; Johnson, 249, 250; Ken-
nedy, 232, 233, 234 ; McGhee, 726 ; NATO, 863
U.N. agencies for, article and statement: Gardner, 152;
Phillips, Sohl, 395
Economic and Trade Affairs, Joint U.S.-Canadian Com-
mittee on, 7th meeting, 105
Economic assistance to Japan, postwar, agreement for
settlement of debts resulting from, 188, 305
Economic Commission for Africa, U.N., 251, 845, 846
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, U.N. :
Education conference, participation with UNESCO in,
696
18th session of, U.S. delegation, 251, 481
Petroleum Resources of Asia and the Far East, Second
Symposium on, 852
Economic Commission for Europe, U.N. :
Housing Comniittce, 23d session of, U.S. delegation, 925
U.S. representative to 17th session, confirmation (Kot-
schnig),926
Economic Cooperation and Development, Organization for.
See Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment
Economic policy and relations, U.S. {see also individual
countries and Trade Expansion Act of 1962, pro-
posed) :
American Agriculture in Foreign Trade, address (Mar-
tin), 471
Domestic economy :
Nation's security dependent upon, address (Rostow),
835
Tennessee Valley -\uthority, example of progress in,
address ( Rusk ) , 898
Trade policy, effect on, addresses, message, and re-
marks : Johnson, 988 ; Kennedy, 237, 825, 908 ; Weiss,
342
Foreign economic policy :
Addresses and remarks: Ball, 364, 413; Bundy, 420;
Coppock, 427, 956; Galbraith, 1024; Johnson, 247;
Kennedy, 824 ; R. Kennedy, 761 ; McGhee, 289 ; Ros-
tow, 627 ; Rusk, 403
Balance-of-payments problem. See Balance of pay-
ments
Cuba, embargo on trade with: proclamation, 283;
statement (Rusk), 285,287, 288
Foreign aid program. See Foreign aid
Tariff policy. See Tariff policy, U.S.
World Trade Week, proclamation, 825
Soviet challenge to, addresses : Mann, 509 ; Trezise, 592
Ecuador :
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 169
Cuba, exclusion from O.IS system and sanctions against,
position on, 283
Treaties, agreements, etc.:
Economic, technical, and related assistance, agree-
ment with U.S. for, 818
ICEM constitution, 511
Telecommunication convention (1959), international,
with six annexes, 890
Education {see also Cultural relations and programs,
Educational exchange, and Exchange of persons) :
Africa, U.S. aid and views on need for, addresses
(Williams), 173, 546, 547, 548, 643
Contacts with foreign educators and students, state-
ment (Rusk), 460
Economic and social development, importance in, re-
marks and statement (Rusk), 20, 660
International affairs, need for education in, addresses:
Bowles, 206 ; Tuhhy, 15
Land-grant college system, U.S., address (Rusk), 901
Mexico, progressive institutions in, remarks (Rusk),
920
Philippines, U.S. aid to and exchanges with, 175, 176
Role of the university, address (Kennedy), 615
SEATO research fellowship program (1962-63), an-
nouncement of, 76
Study groups, formation and program of, address
(Louchheim),338
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Financing of educational programs in Chile, agree-
ment amending 1!)55 agreement on, 566
Vocational education program in Brazil, agreement
extending 1950 agreement re, 961
1058
Deparfmenf of Sfafe Bulletin
Education — Continued
UNESCO/ECAFE conference on, 608, 695
Viet-Nam, program in, joint Viet-Nam-U.S. communique
on, 141
Educational, scientific, and cultural materials, agreement
and protocol on importation of, 817
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, U.N. :
African education ministers meeting in Paris, announce-
ment, U.S. delegation to, 607
Asia, conference on education in, U.S. delegation, 695
Chad, health program in, address (Williams), 29
Constitution of, 512, 782, 818, 1002
Nubian project, agreement with U.S. relating to a grant
of funds for, 306
Educational exchange program, international (see also
Cultural relations. Education, and Exchange of
persons) :
Agreements with: Austria, 512; Cyprus, 225, 350;
Denmark, 10-11; Ethiopia, 106; Ghana, 293, 350;
Pakistan, 438 ; Peru, 961 ; U.S.S.R., 512, 652
Fulbright program with Pakistan, 10th anniversary of,
955
Importance of, remarks and statement (Rusk), 21, 460
Value to U.S. of contacts with foreign students, address
(Bowles), 209
With Africa, address (Williams), 547
EEC. See European Economic Community
Egypt, political and economic developments in, address
(Bowles), 674
Eighteen-nation disarmament committee, conference of:
Arrangements for :
Call for by U.N., letter (Stevenson) re, 223
Foreign Ministers preliminary discussions, proposals
for, statements and messages : Kennedy, 358, 494 ;
Khrushchev, 356, 494; Rusk, 359, 456, 458, 462;
U.K.-U.S. position, 329, 356
Framework and task of, messages and statement:
Kennedy, 358, 465; Khrushchev, 356; Rusk, 201;
U.K.-U.S., 355
Heads of Government participation in, U.S. and
Soviet views on : Kennedy, 358, 466 ; Khrushchev,
357, 466, 494 ; Rusk, 360, 462
U.S. delegation, advisers to, 536
U.S.S.R.-U.S. request for U.N. services at, letter
( Stevenson, Zorin ) , 205ji
Committee of the Whole, agenda of, statements: De-
partment, 664 ; Rusk, 623
Disarmament proposals and position of:
ANZUS, communique re, 870
NATO, communique re, 862
Soviet Union, messages and statements re: Depart-
ment, 708; Khrushchev, 356, 466, 494; Rusk, 571,
574, 970
U.K.-U.S., message and statements : Department,
205 ; Kennedy, Macmillan, 355 ; Rusk, 572, 573
United States, addresses, letters, notes, statements,
and proposed treaty outline: Ball, 609; Kennedy,
446, 531, 747 ; McGhee, 829 ; Rostow, 629 ; Rusk, 531,
571, 618, 903, 971 ; U.S. notes, 839, 840 ; treaty out-
line, 747
Mesican-U.S. efforts at, remarks (Rusk), 920, 921
Eighteen-nation disarmament committee, conference of
— Continued
Negotiations, continuation of, U.S. position, 802, 840
Nuclear tests, consideration of. See under Nuclear
test-ban treaty, proposals for
Report to U.N. on, statement (Ru.sk) re, 970
Eighth Meeting of Consultation of the American Foreign
Ministers. See Punta del Este conference
Eklund, Sigvard, 652
El Salvador:
Agricultural trade, agreement with U.S., 926
Communications between radio amateurs on behalf of
3d parties, arrangements with U.S. for, 782
Defense articles and services for purpose of internal
security, agreement with U.S. for furnishing of,
818
Economic, technical, and related assistance, agreement
(1901) with U.S. for, superseding previous agree-
ments for, 106, 697
IDA articles of agreement, 889
Universal postal convention (1957), 225
Emergency Force, U.N. See Congo situation : U.N. forces
in and United Nations Emergency Force
Emergency fund. See Contingency fund
Emergency relief to : Kenya, 244 ; Viet-Nam, 13, 14
Erhard, Ludwig, 130
Escape-clause policy, U.S., history of, address (Ball), 671
Escapee Program, U.S., address (Cieplinski), 732
Establishment, friendship, and navigation treaty with
Luxembourg, 437, 438
Estate-tax convention (1961) with Canada, 739, 740
ETAP. See Expanded Program of Technical Assistance,
U.N.
Ethiopia :
Educational exchange programs, agreement with U.S.,
106
Peace Corps program, agreement with U.S. establish-
ing, 1041
Training of health oflBcers in, address (Williams), 29
U.S. technical aid program in, address (Tubby), 301
Europe (see also European headings, individual countries,
and North Atlantic Treaty Organization) :
Agricultural production in, growth of, address (Weiss),
1034
Austrian participation in economic integration of, joint
communique (Gorbach, Kennedy), 832
Central Europe, neutral free zones in, U.S. position re,
665
Eastern Europe:
Cultural association with Western civilization, ad-
dress (Rusk), 87
Soviet rule in, statement (Bingham), 74
Foreign Relations, volume on, released, 926
U.S. Representative to European Office of the United
Nations and Other International Organizations,
designation (Tubby), 698
Visit of U.S. officials to:
Assistant Secretary Cleveland, 760
Attorney General Kennedy, 99, 762
Index, January to June 7962
1059
Europe — Continued
Visit of U.S. officials to — Continued
Secretary Rusk, 974
Western Europe :
Aid to new African countries, address (Williams),
172
Challenge and opportunities in for United States,
address (MacArtbur), 709
Economic development and unity in, addresses and
statements: Ball, 306, 598, 667, 668; Bundy, 422;
Martin, 471 ; McGhee, 132, 134, 679 ; Rostow, 969 ;
Rowan, 379 ; Rusk, 86, 195, 196, 940, 946 ; Trezise,
596
Marshall plan In, address (Tubby), 16
Oil from U.S.S.R. and the Middle East for, address
and statement: Bowles, 766; Nichols, 33
Refugees in, aid to, addresses : Brown, 101 ; Ciepllnskl,
731
U.S. partnership and trade with, addresses and mes-
sage: Johnson, 991; Kennedy, 234; Rusk, 452
European Atomic Energy Community, atomic energy,
peaceful uses of, amendments to 1958 and 1960 agree-
ments with U.S. for cooperation concerning, 961
European Economic Community (Common Market) :
Agricultural trade, U.S., implications for, addresses:
Martin, 474 ; Weiss, 1032
Australian-U.S. discussions re, joint statement (Ken-
nedy, McEwen), 549
Challenge to U.S. economy, addresses: Bundy, 420;
Johnson, 248 ; MacArtbur, 712 ; Rusk, 196, 404, 405
Economic unity within and expansion of, addresses, re-
marks, and statements : Ball, 3, 367, 368, 415, 598 ;
Bowles, 256; R. Kennedy, 763; Trezise, 595
EEC-U.S. relations, joint communique (Kennedy, Hall-
stein), 769
GATT treaties with :
Agreement pursuant to art. XXIV :6, 512
Agricultural agreements with, 512
Compensatory concessions for certain tariff actions
taken by U.S., 512
Interim agreements, with schedules, 511
Joint declaration with, 512
Latin American access to, remarks (Kennedy), 540
Members of, 471m
Norway, application for membership, joint commimique
(Gerbardsen, Kennedy), 878
Political implications of, addresses: Coppock, 1030;
Rusk, 899
Soviet countertrade proposal, statement (Rusk), 971
U.K. negotiations with :
Application for membership:
Address (Coppock), 772
U.S. support of, address (Martin), 471, 473, 477
Canadian-U.S. trade committee views on, 169
Commonwealth-U.S. interest in, addresses and state-
ments : Ball, 367, 368, 415, 602; Rusk, 865, 866, 867,
940, 946
Joint communiques (Kennedy, Macmillan) re, 95, 803
U.S. support and views, addresses and remarks :
Achilles, .328; Ball, 008; Coppock, 427; Kennedy,
907 ; McGhee, 680, 828 ; Rusk, 910
European Economic Community — Continued
U.S trade with {see also Trade Expansion Act of 1962,
proposed) :
Need for adjustment of U.S. policy, addresses: Cop-
pock, 771, 773; Johnson, 989, 991; Kennedy, 824;
Trezise, 647
Presidential authority to negotiate tariff rates with,
proposed (nee also Trade Expansion Act of 1962,
proposed), addresses, message, and report: Ken-
nedy, 162, 231, 239 ; McGhee, 290, 291, 293 ; Weiss,
340
Tariff concessions exchanged with U.S., smnmary of
negotiations, 561
European Free Trade Association, 471n, 773
Exchange agreement, U.S.-Soviet Union, in scientific,
technical, educational, cultural, and other fields for
1962-63 :
Current action, 512
Joint communique and statement (Bohlen), 652
Exchange of persons progi^am (see also Educational
exchange) :
Exchange of scientists with Japan, joint communiques
re, 67, 954
Remarks (Rusk), 425
Executive orders:
Carribbean Organization, designation as public inter-
national organization (10983), 188
Inter-American Development Bank, amending previous
order relating to (11019), 852
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, administration
by Secretary of Interior (11021), 887
Expanded Program of Technical Assistance, U.N., FAO
projects under, article (Phillips, Sohl), 395
Experiment in International Living, 548
Export-Import Bank, loans to: Brazil, 105; Ghana, 30
Exports :
African agricultural, address (Williams), 545
Cuban, to U.S., prohibition of, statement (Rusk), 348
U.S.:
Expansion of:
Need for, addresses: Kennedy, 824, 826; Martin,
472; Trezise, &46, 647
Promotion program for, addresses, agreement, mes-
sage, remarks, and report: Commerce and State
Departments' agreement, 741 ; Kennedy, 232, 234,
238, 239, 908 ; Rusk, 197, 198, 911 ; Tubby, 214
Importance to economy of, addresses: Bimdy, 420;
Coppock, 429
Markets for, problems of, address (Johnson), 989
World, address (Coppock), 1029
Expropriation :
Agreement with Panama protecting against, 566
U.S. policy on, address (Ball). 914
Fahs, Charles B., 096
FAO. See Food and Agriculture Organization, U.N.
Far East (sec also Asia and inilividiial countries) :
AID inspection trip to, itinerary, 143
Foreign Relations, volume on, released, 610
Refugees. Sec Refugees and displaced persons
Regional Operations Conference at Bagnio, 511
1060
Department of State Bulletin
Farmers Union, National, aid to co-ops in Africa, ad-
dress (Williams), 639, 643
Fessenden, Russell, 673
Fiji, copyright convention (1952), universal, 305
Films:
Exchange of with Rumania, agreement for, 959
Festivals, international, U.S. participation in, remarlis
(Tubby), 215
Finance Corporation, International, articles of agreement,
654
Financing, compensatory, proposal to stabilize commodity
trade, statement (Blumenthal), 999
Finland :
Reelection of President Kekkonen, message (Kennedy),
418
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Civil aviation convention (1944), international, pro-
tocol (1961) to, 654
Diplomatic relations, Vienna convention (1961) and
protocol on, 817
GATT:
Interim agreements, with schedules, 511
Proces-verbaux extending declarations on provi-
sional accessions of : Switzerland, 817 ; Tunisia,
818
Rectifications and modifications to texts of sched-
ules, 9th protocol, 818
Safety of life at sea, international convention (1960)
on, 740
Fish and fisheries:
Fishing and conservation of living resources of the high
seas, convention on, 854
North Pacific Ocean, amendment to annex to interna-
tional convention (1952) on the high seas fisheries
of, 740
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries :
International Commission for, appointment of U.S.
commissioner, 1040
International convention for, declaration of under-
standing re, 305, 566
Flynn, Mrs. Elizabeth Gurley, 847
Food and Agi-iculture Organization, U.N. :
Agricultural and economic development in Asia, report
re, address (Johnson), 57
Constitution of, 740
11th session of conference of, article (Phillips, Sohl),
392
U.N. multilateral food program, study and recommen-
dations for, statement (Gardner), 150, 152
U.S. agreement re the Peace Corps, 890
Food-for-peace program :
Accomplishments of, address (Kennedy), 161
Africa :
Participating countries, address (Williams), 641
Role in Togo, joint communique (Kennedy, Olympio),
639
Aid to Brazil, 960
Expanded program, address (Williams), 547
Tuni.sia, program in, statement (Gardner), 151
Foot and Mouth Disease, Scientific Mission on, members
of and report to Argentina, 62, 543
Foreign aid programs {see also Agency for International
Development, Economic and social development, ayid
Economic and technical aid) :
Accomplishments of, address (Tubby), 299
Foreign A.ssistance Act of 19(i2, proposed legislation,
requests for enactment and authorizing appropria-
tions, message and statement: Kennedy, 550; Rusk,
659, 664
International efforts for :
Financing of, report, (Kennedy), 240
Long-term planning, communique and statement:
CENTO, 526; Rostow, 524
Multilateral vs. bilateral, remarks (Rusk), 19
Operations of:
Changes in, address (Bowles), 253, 254, 258
Coordination of by U.S. ambassador in country, ad-
dress (McGhee),1009
U.S. policy and objectives in, addresses: Bowles, 253,
677 ; Cleveland, 806 ; Rusk, 18, 19, 21, 404, 406 ; Tubby,
301; Williams, 61
Foreign Assistance Act of 1962, proposed, message and
statement : Kennedy, 550 ; Rusk, 659, 664
Foreign Ministers (France, Germany, U.K., U.S.). See
under Eighteen-nation disarmament committee, con-
ference of : Arrangements for
Foreign Ministers of American States, eighth meeting of
consultation. See Punta del Este conference
Foreign policy, U.S. :
Briefing conferences, 104, 208, 476, 549, 576, 961
Challenges to and problems of, addresses : Bowles, 252 ;
Hughes, 979, 982, 983
Congressional documents relating to. See under
Congress
Defense Department statements pertaining to, review
of, remarks and statement: Ball, 513; Tubby, 518
Developments affecting, addresses and statement : Ball,
413 ; Bohlen, 1014 ; Fredericks, 879 ; Rusk, 363
Domestic base of, address (Rostow), 833
Foreign attempts to influence, statement (Rusk), 165
Principles, goals, and strategy of, addresses and re-
marks : Achilles, 327 ; Ball, 872 ; Bowles, 768 ; Ken-
nedy, 159 ; McGhee, 678, 827 ; Rostow, 625 ; Rowan,
378 ; Rusk, 85, 451, 787, 897, 933, 945 ; Stevenson, 212
Realities of, remarks (Rusk), 487
Relationship of to :
Industry communications programs, remarks
(Tubby), 213
Public information, address (Tubby) , 15
Refugee problems, address (Brown), 103
United Nations :
Role of, addresses : Ball, 636, 638 ; Cleveland, 330
U.N. bonds, promotion of through purchase, message
and statements : Kennedy, 311 ; Rusk, 313 ; Steven-
son, 318
Foreign policy conference for nongovernmental organiza-
tions, national, 961
Foreign Relations, Importance of, address (Bohlen), 1012
Foreign Relations of the United States, published:
China, 194S, 610
1941, Volnme V, The Far East, 610
Index, January fo June 7962
664859—62 3
1061
Foreign Relations of the United States, published— Con.
19i2, Volume II, Europe, 926
1942, Volume V, The American Republics, 1012
Foreign Service (see also State Department) :
Ambassadors and Minister, appointments and confir-
mations, 35, 78, 189, 306, 398, 438, 482, 698, IWl
Commercial program within. State and Commerce De-
partments' agreement for, 741
Consulate at Stanleyville, Republic of the Congo (Leo-
pold viUe) , opening of, 853
Courage of members of, remarks (Rusls), 488
Diplomatic missions abroad, increase in, address
(Rusk), 83
Embassy aid to American businessmen abroad, address
(Ball), 915, 916
Foreign Service Inspection Corps, Inspector General,
designation (Haselton), 1042
Officers :
Growth in number and responsibilities of, address
(Bohlen), 1016
Retirement benefits of, statement (Rusk), 455
Role of, address (McGhee), 1007
Regional operations conferences :
Announcements of, 252, 511
Objectives of, address (Bowles), 676
Reorganization of, address (Bowles), 255
Science attaches, appointments to: Bern, 566; Rio de
Janeiro, 1042
West Indies, termination of U.S. mission to, reestabllsh-
ment of office of consulate general, 438
Wives of Foreign Service officers, contribution to Serv-
ice, remarks (Louchheim), 922
Foreign Service Institute :
Department of Commercial Affairs, established, 741
Director of, designation (Morgan), 1042
Senior Seminar in Foreign Policy, address (McGhee),
1007
France :
Aid to Africa, address (Williams), 547
De Gaulle position on Berlin negotiations, question of,
statement (Rusk), 123
German-French rapprochement through Common Mar-
ket, address (MacArthur), 711
IMF, French commitment to, 187
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Diplomatic relations, Vienna convention (1961) and
protocol on, 817
GATT, procfes-verbaux extending declarations on pro-
visional accession of : Switzerland, 817 ; Tunisia,
818
IAEA statute, amendment to, GIO
Military procurement, memorandum of understanding
with U.S. re, 77
Safety of life at sea, international convention (1960)
on, 740
Status-of -forces agreement (NATO forces in Ger-
many), agreements supplementing agreement on,
189
Wheat agreement, international, 926
Fredericks, J. Wayne, 607, 879
1062
Free elections :
Cuban position on, statement (Stevenson), 557
I'unta del Este conference resolution on, 280
Freedman, Selma, 698
Freedom, global struggle for, remarks (Rusk), 487
Freedom-From-Hunger Campaign, review of by FAO, ar-
ticle (Phillips, Sohl), 394
Freeman, Orville, cited, 153
Freites Barreras, Andres, 904
Friedkin, J. F., 683
Friendship, establishment, and navigation treaty with
Luxembourg, 437, 438
Fulbright program with Pakistan, 10th anniversary of,
955
Gabon :
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 169
Civil aviation convention (1944), international, 259
Galbraith, John Kenneth, 1024
Gardner, Richard N., 150, 586
GARIOA. iSee Government and relief in occupied areas.
GATT. See Tariffs and trade, general agreement on
Gaud, William S., 398
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Analysis of
United States Negotiations, volumes released, 565
General Assembly, U.N. :
Committee I (Political and Security), consideration of:
Cuban charges of U.S. aggression and intervention,
statements : Plimpton, 559 ; Stevenson, 553
Outer space, international cooperation in peaceful
uses of, statement (Stevenson), ISO
Consideration of all international disputes, question of,
statement (Rusk), 242
Documents, lists of, 149, 437, 526, 609, 696, 738, 816
Member assessment for UNEF and ONUC operations.
See under International Court of Justice
Nuclear weapons, resolutions re transfer of, U.S. posi-
tion on, letter (Ball), 608
Resolutions :
Angolan situation, 391
China, representation of, an important question, 117
Colonial countries, establishment of Special Com-
mittee to further granting of independence to, 76
Outer .space, international cooperation in, 185
Test-ban negotiations at Geneva, resumption of, cited,
63
10th session :
Problems and achievements of, addresses, letter, and
statement: Ball, 636; Cleveland, 334; Rusk, 167;
Stevenson, 222
U.S. repre.sentatives to, confirmation of, 398
Geneva Accords of 195!,. 13. 14. 449, 450, 455
Geneva conference of experts on detection of nuclear tests :
Soviet repudiation of agreements of, U.K.-U.S. report
on, C4
Statement (Rusk). 572, 573
Geneva conference on the disiontinuam'e of nuclear
weapon tests :
Soviet rejection of controlled test-ban treaty, 205
U.K.-U.S. actions ro:
Draft test-ban treaty proposed, statement (Rusk),
572
Department oi Sfafe Bulletin
Geneva conference on the discontinuancce of nuclear
weapon tests — Continued
U.K.-U.S. actions re — Continued
Recess of proposed, 288
Reports on, G3, 409
Williuguess to continue test-ban negotiations in dis-
armament conference, 205
Geneva conventions (1949) on treatment of prisoners of
war, wounded and sick, and civilians in time of war,
398, 560
Geneva disarmament conference (1962). See Eighteen-
natlon disarmament committee, conference of
Gerhardsen, Einar, 470, 877
Germany :
Berlin. See Berlin
Kalmyk refugees in U.S., 17
Problem of :
Joint statement (Gromyko, Rusk), 625
NATO views, 51
Reunification of, U.S. position, address and remarks :
Bundy, 424 ; R. Kennedy, 763
Germany, East :
Berlin. See Berlin
Recognition of government of, U.S. position, statement
(Rusk), 457
Refugees from {see also Refugees), address (Cieplln-
ski),731
Situation in, statement (Rusk), 241
Germany, Federal Republic of :
Berlin. See Berliu
French-German rapprochement through Common Mar-
ket, address (MacArthur), 711
IMF, German commitment to, 187
Refugees from East Zone, absorption by, address (Ciep-
linskl),731
Role in Western Europe, address (Bundy), 424
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Certificates of airworthiness for imported aircraft,
agreement with U.S. for application to land Berlin,
350
GATT:
Compensatory concessions for certain tariff actions
taken by U.S., 512
Declaration giving effect to provisions of art. XVI :
4 of, 397
Rectifications and modifications to texts of sched-
ules, 8th protocol of, 3.50
NATO status-of-forces agreement, agreements sup-
plementing and Implementing, 106, 189
Safety of life at sea. International convention (1960)
on, 740
Wheat agreement. International, 926
Vice Chancellor and Minister of Economics to visit U.S.,
announcement, 130
Visits to, proposed :
Attorney General Kennedy, plans for, 99
White House Press Secretary, announcement, 846
Ghana :
Nuclear weapons tests, U.S. note to re resumption of,
840
Ghana — Continued
Refugees from, address (Brown), 102
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Copyright convention (1952), universal, and proto-
cols, 1, 2, and 3, 1002
Educational exchange, agreement with U.S., 293, 350
GATT, declarations on provisional accession of Argen-
tina and Tunisia to, 397
IAEA statute, amendment to art. VI.A.3 of, 610
Pollution of the sea by oil, international convention
(1954) , with annexes, for prevention of, 1041
Safety of life at sea. International convention (1960)
on, 854
, Scientific cooperation, agreement with U.S. for pro-
gr;nn in bloniedicine, 2.59
U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 1041
Volta River project, U.S. aid, 30
Gibraltar, copyright convention (1952) , universal, 305
Glass, decision to Increase duty on imports, ($49, 650, 671
Glenn, John H., Jr., 411, 492, 577, 582
Goa, Indian use of force in, letter and statements : Rusk,
124 ; Stevenson, 145, 224
Goodneighbor policy, address and remarks (Kennedy),
89,92
Gorbach, Alfons, 832
Goulart, Joao Belchior, 259, 705
Government and relief in occupied areas, Japanese ac-
count, settlement of, 188
Grant, James P., 225
Greece :
Ambassador to U.S., 479
Economic development of, NATO members to assist
in. Council communiques, 52, 863
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Agricultural commodities, agreement with U.S., 482
Civil uses of atomic energy, agreement with U.S. for
cooperation re, 697
Diplomatic relations, Vienna convention (1961) on,
817
Double taxation, convention for avoidance of on in-
come, with U.S., 512
GATT, declaration on provisional accession of Switz-
erland, proc&s-verbal extending, 350
IDA articles of agreement, 654
Loan of vessels to, agreement with U.S. re, 890
Safety of life at sea, international convention (1960)
on, 740
U.S. Ambassador: appointment, 189; confirmation, 306
Green, Ronald W., 1040
Greenfield, James L., 698
Gromyko, Andrei A., 625
Guantanamo Naval Base, U.S. treaty rights to, statement
(Rusk), 287
Guatemala :
Agricultural trade, agreement with U.S., 1002
Continental shelf, convention on, 77
High seas, convention on, 77
Road traflic, convention (1949) on, with annexes, and
protocol re accession to of occupied countries or
territories, 610
U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 306
Gudeman, Edward, 6
Index, January to June 1962
1063
Guerrilla warfare in Latin America, Cuban inspired,
statement (Stevenson), 554
Guiana, British. See British Guiana
Guinea :
Agricultural commodities, agreement with U.S. re, 398,
854
Civil aviation convention (1944), international, protocol
(1061) to, 654
International telecommunication convention (1959),
with annexes, 77
Investment guaranty program, agreement with U.S. re,
926
Slavery convention (1926), as amended, 961
GulUon, Edmund, 11, 95
Haines-Fairbanks pipeline, agreements with Canada re,
740, 890
Haiti :
GATT, interim agreement, with U.S. re, 1041
Punta del Este conference, statement by, 283
Safety of life at sea, international convention (1960)
on, 740
U.S. Ambassador: appointment, 35; confirmation, 306
Ilallstein, Walter, 769
Hamaday, Dan R., 925
Hamilton, Fowler, 143
Ilandley, William J., 35, 306
Harrar, J. George, 543
Harriman, W. Averell, 174, 438, 953, 993
Hart, Parker T., 306
Hart, Thompson, 35
Haselton, Norris S., 1042
Heads of Government meeting, proposed :
Participation in Geneva disarmament conference. See
under Eighteen-nation disarmament committee, con-
ference of
U.K.-U.S. views, 802
Health and sanitation :
Afi-ica, problems of, addresses (Williams), 26, 27, 546
Foreipm aid i)rogram gains in, address (Tubby), 299, 301
Scientific cooperation in the field of biomedicine, gen-
eral agreement with Ghana for a program of, 259
Viet-Nam, program in, joint Viet-Nam-U.S. communi-
que on, 141
World Health Organization. See World Health Organ-
ization
Herman, George, 464
High Commissioner for Refugees, U.N., 101, 102, 731, 732
High seas, convention on, 77, 225, 854
High seas, freedom of, U.S. position re proclamation of
danger areas, 839
Hill, .lohn Calvin, Jr., 129
Hoffmann, Harry G., 769
Holy Sec, The. .See Vatican City
Honduras, Cuban exclusion from GAS system, statement
ro position on, 282
Hong Kong :
Chinese refugee problem, statement (Harriman), 993
Cotton textiles, arrangements (1961) re international
trade in, 259
Cotton textiles, discu.ssions with U.S. oflJcials, 848
Hosiery and knitwear manufacturing equipment, new de-
preciation schedules for, 381
Houphouet-Boigny, Felix, 764, 952
Housing Committee (ECE), 23d session of, U.S. delega-
tion, 925
Housing project in Colombia, address and remarks
(Kennedy), 91, 93
Hughes, Thomas L., 977
Hull, Cordell, cited, 904
Human rights («ee also Racial equality) :
Human Rights Week, 1961, proclamation, 08
Inter- American Commission on, revision of statute of:
Pimta del Este conference recommendation for, 282
Statement (Stevenson), 557
Hungary :
Refugees flight from, remarks (Stevenson), 211
Soviet occupation of, statement (Bingham), 74
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
IAEA statute, amendment to article VI.A.3, 925
Law of the sea, conventions on, 225
Safety of life at sea, international convention (1960)
on, 740
U. N. consideration of problem of, statement (Steven-
son), 320
Hutchinson, Edmond C, 398
IAEA. See Atomic Energy Agency, International
lA-ECOSOC. See Inter-American Economic and Social
Council
IBRD. See International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development
Iceland :
Agricultural commodities, agreement with U.S., 654
Industrial property, convention (1934) for protection of,
817
Oil, pollution of sea by, convention (1954) for preven-
tion of, 654
Safety of life at sea, international convention (1960)
on, 740
ICEM. See Intergovernmental Committee for European
Migration
ICJ. See International Court of Justice
IDA. See International Development Association
IPC. See International Finance Corporation
IJC. See International Joint Commission (U.S.-Canada)
Ikeda, Hayato, 498
IMF. See International Monetary Fund
Immigration :
Changes in U.S. laws governing, address (Cieplinski),
730
Quotas established for Cameroon, Kuwait, Nigeria, and
Syria, 25
Immigration and Nationality Act, admendment providing
for adjustment of quotas, 25
Imports («ee also Customs; Exports; Tariff policy, U.S.;
Tariffs and trade, general agreement on ; and Trade) :
Commercial sami)les and advertising material, inter-
national convention (1952) to facilitate importa-
tion of, 817
Road vehicles, customs convention on temporary im-
portation of, 566
1064
Department of State Bulletin
Imports — Continued
United States:
Adjustment assistance to industries affected by im-
ports. See Trade adjustment assistance
Cotton textiles, discussions with Hong Kong officials
re restrictions on, 848
Cotton zipper tape, consultations with Japan re trade
in, 1037
Importance in U.S. economy, addresses : Coppock,
1029 ; Johnson, 990 ; Trezi.se, 296, 884
Oil imports program, congressional hearings on, state-
ment (Nichols), 31
Inconvertibility, guaranties against losses due to, agree-
ment with Panama re, 566
Independence movement. See Nationalism and Newly
independent nations
India :
Malaria control program, U.S. assistance in, address
(Tubby), 301
I'rogress in, addresses ; Bowles, 675 ; Johnson, 56
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Agricultural commodities, agreements with U.S., 782,
890, 961
Civil aviation convention (1944), international, pro-
tocol ( 1961 ) to, 654
IAEA statute, amendment to article VI.A.3 of, 889
Road traffic, convention (1949) on, with annexes. 653
Safety of life at sea, international convention (1960)
on, 740
Wheat agreement, international, 926
U.S. aid to, 57
Use of force in Goa by, U.S. views on, letter and state-
ments ; Rusk, 124 ; Stevenson, 145, 224
West New Guinea, U.S. views on Indian proposal for
solution of problem of, statement (Bingham), 75
Indonesia :
Attorney General Kennedy's visit to, 99, 761, 762
Soviet arms buildup in, statement (Rusk), 866
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Agricultural commodities, agreement with U.S., 512,
961
Civil aviation convention (1944), international, pro-
tocol (1961) to, 654
GATT, proces-verbal extending declaration on provi-
sional accession of Tunisia, 818
Landing rights for commercial aircraft, agreement
with U.S. extending arrangement for, 854
Universal postal convention (1957), 225
Wheat agreement, international, 926
West New Guinea, dispute with Netherlands re. See
West New Guinea
Industrial productivity, agreement with Mexico relating
to program of. 78
Industrial riroperty, convention (1883, as revised) for pro-
tection of, 106, 189, 817
Industrial revolution, effects on politics and society,
address (Mann), 500
Information activities and programs (see also Publica-
tions, United States Information Agency, anrl Voice
of America), need for TV and press coverage of, ad-
dress (Tubby), 16,17
Information Agency, U.S. See United States Information
Agency
Interagency Textile Administrative Committee, 219
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, statute of:
Revision of, Punta del Este conference recommendation
for, 282
Strengthening of, statement ( Stevenson ) , 557
Inter-American Defense Board, Cuban exclusion from
participation in :
Punta del Este resolution, text of, 281
Statements re: Rusk, 268, 275, 285; Stevenson, 557
Inter-American Development Bank :
Executive order re, 852
Report of, remarks (Kennedy), 541
Inter-American Economic and Social Council, August 1960
meeting, remarks (Kennedy) re, 539, 540
Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences, con-
vention (1944) and protocol of amendment to, 154, 397
Inter-American Peace Committee:
Investigation of violations of human rights in Cuba,
129
Report of:
Cited, 199, 281, 282
Statement (Stevenson) re, 687, 689
Inter- American system, Cuban incompatibility with, Amer-
ican Republics decision re, statement (Stevenson),
555, 557
Intergovernmental Committee (U.N./FAO), establish-
ment of, article (Phillips, Sohl), 393
Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration :
Constitution of, .511
Convention on, current actions, 697, 1002
U.S. support of. address (Cieplinski), 732
Interior, Department of :
Salinity of Colorado River water supplied to Mexico
under treaty of 1944, study of, 144
Secretary of, administration of Trust Territory of
Pacific Islands, Executive order, 887
International Access Authority (Berlin), U.S. proposal
for, 451, 463
International Atomic Energy Agency. See Atomic Energy
Agency, International
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development :
Articles of agreement, 77, 654
Financial statements, 435, 851
Leadership in aiding India and Pakistan, address
(Johnson), 56, 57
Loans in Africa, 172
International Boundary and Water Commission (Mexico-
U.S.) :
Activities of and U.S. Commissioner (Friedkin), 683
Scientists named for joint study of salinity problem,
650
International Commission for Northwest Atlantic Fisher-
ies, U.S. commissioner, appointment of, 1040
International Commission on Measures To Reduce the
Risk of War, proposal for. statement (Rusk), 620
International Court of Justice :
Cuban call for opinion on OAS action, statements
(Stevenson) and text of Soviet-sponsored draft
resolution, 684
Statute of, 398
Index, January to June 7962
1065
International Court of Justice — C!ontlnued
U.N. assessment of member nations for emergency
operations, opinion requested of :
U.N. application to, i)7
U.S. views and position on, 222, 311, 315, 435, 851
International Development Association, articles of agree-
ment, 6.>4, 8.H 889
International Finance Corporation, articles of agreement,
654
International Joint Commission (U.S.-Canada) :
Niagara Falls, request for study by withdrawn, 728
Pembina River, study of development of resources of,
728
Role in U.S.-Canadian relations, statement (Kennedy),
729
International Labor Conference, 46th session, U.S. dele-
gation, 1040
International law :
Building of, address (Rusk), 935
Outer space, development of principles for guidance In
activities in, statement (Plimpton), 816
International Monetary Fund :
Articles of agreement, 77, 654
Role in compensatory financing for commodity trade
problems, proposed, statement (Blumenthal), 1000
Strengthening of, proposals for, report to Congress
(Kennedy), 240
Supplementary resources borrowing arrangements, 187
International organizations and conferences (see also
subject) :
Assistant Secretary Cleveland to visit European OflBce
of, 760
Calendar of International meetings, 36, 107, 220, 303,
383. 480, 605, 651, 780, 850, 924, 995
FY 1963, authorization request for U.S. contributions
for, message and statement : Kennedy, 551 ; Rusk,
664
U.S. participation in, remarks (Rusk), 18
U.S. Representative to the European Office of U.N. and
Other International Organizations, designation
(Tubby), 698
International Organizations Immunities Act (1945), pro-
visions of, 188
International Telecommunication Union:
Communication system of global satellites, development
of, statement (Plimpton), 811, 815
Outer space, conference on radio frequency bands for,
proposed :
Address and statement: Gardner, 590; Stevenson, 184
U.N. resolution re, 186
"Internationalism," proletarian. Communist definitions of
cited, 504
Inventions, agreement for safeguarding inventions relat-
ing to defense for vs-hich patent applications have been
filed, 740
Investment guaranty program :
Address (Ball), 914
Agreements with : Dominican Republic, 8.54 ; Guinea,
890, 926 ; Ivory Coast, 78 ; Niger, 926 ; Panama, 566 ;
Togo, 610
Authorization requests for FY 1963, message and state-
ment : Kennedy, iJSl ; Rusk, (MM
Investment of private capital abroad : Africa, U.S. views,
address (Williams), 546, 547
Brazil, transfer of public utilities to state ownership,
joint communique and statement: Goulart, Ken-
nedy, 706 ; Rusk, 460
Economic progress through, address (Mann), 508
Mining and petroleum, investment in, address (Mc-
Ghee), 72.5, 727
New forms of security for, address (Ball), 913
Philippine need for, address (Harriman), 177
Protection of. See Investment guaranty program
Tax incentives for, proposed elimination of, report
(Kennedy), 239
Iran :
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 707
CENTO. See Central Treaty Organization
Economic development of, CENTO consideration of:
communique, 526; statement (Rostow), 522
Reform programs in, addresses (Bowles), 675, 767
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Agricultural commodities, agreements with U.S., .305,
512
Economic cooperation, agreement with U.S., 154
Visit of Attorney General Kennedy to Tehran, plans
for, 99
Visit of Shah of and Empress Farah to U.S., joint com-
munique (Kennedy, Pahlavi), 760
Iraq, Vienna convention (1961) and protocol on diplo-
matic relations, 817
Ireland :
Agricultural trade, agreement with U.S., 854
Bills of lading, convention (1931) for unification of
rules relating to, and protocol, 610
Civil aviation convention, international, protocol (1961)
to, 854
Safety of life at sea, international convention (1960)
on, 740
Wheat agreement, international, 926
Isle of Man :
Copyright convention (1952), universal, 305
NATO status of forces agreement, 305
Israel :
Development in, address (Bowles), 768
GATT decision on accession of, 8
Syrian-Israel observance of Armistice Agreement,
statement (Yost) and test of resolution re, 735
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Agricultural commodities, agreements with U.S., 78,
741, 854
Civil aviation convention (1944), international, pro-
tocol (1961) to, 0.54
GATT, declaration and protocol on accession to. 438,
696, 1041
GATT, interim agreements, with schedules, 511
IAEA statute, amendment to article VI.A.3 of. 889
Safety of life at sea, international convention (I960)
on, 740
Telegraph regulations (Geneva revision 1958), 305
Wheat agreement, international. 926
U.S. technical aid in, address (Tubby K 301
1066
Departmenf of Stale Bulletin
Italy:
IMF, Italian commitment to, 187
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Diplomatic relations, Vienna convention (1061) and
protocol on, 817
GATT:
Compensatory concessions under GATT for certain
tariff actions taken by U.S., 512
Declaration giving effect to provisions of art. XVI :
4 of, 3!)7
Proc6s-verbaux extending declarations on provi-
sional accession of : Switzerland, 817 ; Tunisia,
818
OECD, convention on, with supplementary protocols,
782
Safety of life at sea, international convention (1960)
on, 740
Sugar agreement (1958), international, 654
Wheat agreements, international, 259, 926
ITU. See International Telecommunication Union
Ivory Coast:
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Civil aviation convention (1944), international, pro-
tocol (1961) to, 654
Geneva conventions relative to treatment of prisoners
of war, wounded and sick, and civilians, 566
Investment guaranties, agreement with U.S. re, 78
Narcotic drugs :
Convention (1931) limiting maniifacture and regu-
lating distribution of, as amended, 397
Protocol (1948) bringing under international con-
trol drugs outside the scope of 1931 convention,
397
Opium, protocol (1953) regulating production, trade,
and use of, 350
Opium and other drug.s, convention (1912) relating to
suppression of abuse of, 350
Road traffic convention (1949), with annexes, 259
Slavery convention (1926) , as amended, 397
Visit of President Houphouet-Boigny to U.S., 764, 952
Jamaica, agreement with U.S. re establishment of Peace
Corps program, 482
Janow, Seymour, 35, 398
Japan :
Attorney General Kennedy's visit to, 50, 99, 761
Cotton textiles, bilateral trade arrangement with U.S.
on, statement (Martin), 219
Cotton zipper tape exports to U.S., consultations re,
1037
Cultural and educational exchanges with, discussions
on, 99, 142
GATT, discussion of full participation by, 8
Economic progress in, addresses : Johnson, 55 ; Rusk,
87 ; Trezise, 594, 595
IMP, Japan's commitment to, 187
Role in aiding le.ss developed areas, address (McGhee),
829
Trade relations with U.S., addresses: Kennedy, 826;
MacArthur, 710 ; Trezise, 294
Japan — Continued
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Diplomatic relations, Vienna convention (1961) and
protocol on, 817
Economic assistance, po.stwar, agreement with U.S.
for settlement of debts resulting from, 188, 305
GATT:
Compensatory concessions under GATT for certain
tariff actions taken by U.S., 512
Declarations on provisional accession of : Switzer-
land, 818 ; Tunisia, 350, 397
Interim agreements, with schedules, 511
High seas fisheries of North Pucific Ocean, interna-
tional convention (1952) on, 740
Safety of life at sea, international convention (1960)
on, 740
Typewriter-ribbon cloth, understanding with U.S. re
export of, 697
Wheat agreement, international, 926
U.S.-Japan Committee on Scientific Cooperation :
1st meeting, remarks (Rusk), 425; text of joint com-
munique, 66
2d meeting, announcement, joint communique, and
remarks (Harriman), 953
U.S. relations with, addresses: Bowles, 253, 256; Ros-
tow, 627
U.S. resumption of nuclear weapon tests, exchange of
messages (Ikeda, Kennedy) and U.S. note re, 497,
839
Johnson, G. Griffith, 926, 988
Johnson, U. Alexis, 53, 245
Joint Commission (U.S.-Canada), International. See In-
ternational Joint Commission
Jordan :
Civil aviation convention (1944), international, proto-
col (1961) to, 654
Development in, address (Bowles), 766, 767
Kalmyk people, commemoration of 10th anniversary of
arrival in U.S., 17
Karachi Plan, 696
Katanga, secession from Republic of the Congo. See under
Congo situation
Kearney, Richard D., 565
Kekkonen, Urho K., 418
KeUy, Harry C, 425
Kelly, John M., 8."i2
Kennedy, John F. :
Addresses, statements, etc. :
Alliance for Progress, 539
Berlin, mission of General Clay to, 168, 708
Brazil, greetings to members of trade unions in, 470
Disarmament, U.S. outline of treaty on, 747
Dominican Republic, U.S. position re, 128, 258
Education, role of the university in, 615
IJC, role in U.S. -Canadian relations, 729
Nuclear weapons :
Nuclear Testing and Disarmament, 443
Test-ban treaty, U.S. position, 624
Philippines, U.S. relations with, 911
Sino-Soviet bloc, 379
State of the Union (excerpts), l.TO
Index, January to June 1962
1067
Kennedy, John F. — Continued
Addresses, statements, etc. — Continued
Tariff classification system, 1038
Thailand, dispatch of U.S. forces to, 904
Trade of the U.S., relationship to Atlantic partner-
ship, 823, 906
Correspondence and messages :
Brazil :
Alliance for Progress program, letter to President
Goulart re, 778
Greeting to war veterans on VE-Day, 878
Ceylon, congratulations to Governor General of, 644
18-nation disarmament conference :
Objectives of, letter read by Secretary Rusk at open-
ing session, 531
Proposals for, exchanges of messages veith Mr.
Khrushchev, 355 (Joint message with Prime Min-
ister Macmillan ) , 358, 4G5, 494
Finland, congratulations to President Kekkonen upon
reelection, 418
Kenya, exchange of letters with President of, 244
New Year's greeting to Soviet leaders, 164
Nuclear weapons testing, U.S. plan for, message to
Japanese Prime Minister re, 497
Outer space, exchange of messages with Chairman
Khrushchev re cooperation in exploration of, 411,
536
Philippines, message to President Macapagal on
Bataan Day, 729
Refugees, U.S. concern for, letter cited, 104
Tanganyika, independence of, 37
United Nations, U.S. support of, 578
Venezuela, defense of democracy, letter to President
Betaneourt, 1023
Viet-Nam, Republic of :
New Year greetings to, 377
U.S. aid to and support of, 13
Decisions on Tariff Commission recommendations :
Baseball gloves and mitts, carpets, ceramic tile, and
sheet glass, 649
Cheese, imports of, 779
Lead and zinc, spring clothespins, stainless steel flat-
ware, and safety pins, 382
Straight pins, 849
Tung oil and tung nuts, 883
Executive orders. See Executive orders
Meetings with Heads of State and officials of, remarks
and Joint communiciues : Australia, 549 ; Austria,
832; Brazil, 705; Cameroon, 543; Colombia, 91;
Congo, 335; Cyprus, 1011; EEC, 769; Iran, 760;
Ivory Coast, 0.52 ; Norway, 877 ; Saudi Arabia, 377 ;
Togo, 638 ; United Kingdom, 94, 355, 802 ; Venezuela,
89
Messages, letters, and reports to Congress :
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, U.S., trans-
mission of report of, 349
Escape-clause investigation of straight pins, decision
re, 849
Foreign aid program, request for authorizations for
FY 19C3, .550, 551
Peace Corps, requesting legislation for expansion of,
521
Kennedy, John F. — Continued
Messages, letters, and reports to Congress — Continued
Stale of the Union (excerpts) , 159
Trade Expansion Act of 1962, requests for enactment
of, 231, 239
U.N. bonds, request for authorization of purchase of
and appropriation for, 311
Proclamations. See Proclamations
Visit to South America, 89
Kennedy, Robert F., trip around the world :
Announcement of and plans for, 50, 99
Excerpts from addresses, 761
Statements (Rusk), 203, 360, 459
Kenya, U.S. famine relief aid, exchange of letters (Ken-
nedy, Ngala), 244
Khalatbary, Abbas All, 411
Khoman, Tlianat, 498
Khrushchev, Niklta S. :
Congratulatory message re Colonel Glenn's space flight,
411
18-nation disarmament conference, proposals for, mes-
sages, 357, 466, 494
New Year's greeting to President Kennedy, 164
Kirk, Alan G., 1042
Klutznick, Philip SI., 398, 481
Knight, Ridg^vay B., 35, 306
Knitwear and hosiery manufacturing equipment, new de-
preciation schedules for, 381
Kombet, Jean-Pierre, 644
Korea, Republic of:
AID loan for power project in, 143
Health program in, address (Tubby), 301
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Agricultural commodities, agreement with U.S., 566
Civil aviation convention (1944), international, pro-
tocol (1961) to, 654
Diplomatic relations, Vienna convention (1961) and
protocol on, 817
Economic and military matters, agreement with T'.S.
rescinding certain provisions of agreed minute for
cooperation in, 398
lAE.V statute, amendment to article VI.A.3 of, 889
IMCO convention, 1002
Nonimmigrant visas, agreement with U.S. re recipro-
cal waiver of fees for, 1041
Safety of life at sea, international convention (1960)
on, 740
Wheat agreement, international, 926
U.N. operations in, statement (Cleveland), 98
U.S.-Korean relations, statement (Berger), 951
Kotschnig, Walter, M., 926
Kuwait :
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 970
Immigration quota, U.S. establishment of, 25
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Oil pollution convention (19,54), international, with
annexes, 38
Safety of life at sea, international convention ( 1960)
on, 740
U.S. Ambassador: appointment, 35; confirmation, 306
1068
Department of State Bulletin
Kuwait — Continued
U.S. recognition of, 25
Kuwait Development Fund, 766
Labor:
Full employment goal of domestic policy, address (Ros-
tow), 836, 837
International Labor Conference, 46th session, U.S. dele-
gation, 1040
Trade unions in Brazil, statement (Kennedy), 470
U.S. laws and benefits affecting, remarks (Robert Ken-
nedy), 761
Labor-Management Committee, President's, 473
Labouisse, Henry R., 189, 306
Lagos group, address (Williams) , 843, 844
Land reform, Venezuelan project, remarks (Kennedy) and
text of joint communique (Betancourt, Kennedy), 90
Laos:
ANZUS communique re, 870
Civil aviation convention, international, protocol (1961)
to, 854
Situation in. See Laos situation
VOA broadcasts to, statement (Rusk), 377
Laos situation :
Addresses and joint statement re : Bowles, 256, 257 ;
Khoman, Rusk, 499; Rostow, 967, 968; Rusk, 85
Cease-fire negotiations, address (Rusk), 449
Communist aggression, address, correspondence, and
statements : Johnson, 54 ; Kennedy, 904 ; Tbai, 904 ;
Yost, 905
Geneva negotiations and agreement for settlement,
statements ( Rusk), 123, 126, 201, 939
U.S. position, address and statement: Kennedy, 161;
Rusk, 973
Latin America («ee also Caribbean, Inter- American,
Organization of American States, and individual
countries) :
Agricultural and economic training in, address (Rusk),
792, 793
Communist activities in. Sec under Cuba and Punta
del Este conference
Inter-American communication program through use
of films, remarks (Tubby), 214
Inter-American police academy in Canal Zone, opening
of, 847
Social and economic reform in {see also Alliance for
Progress) :
Cooperation in, address and remarks (Kennedy), and
text of joint communique (Betancourt, Kenne-
dy), 89
Goals in, statement (Rusk), 661, 662
Latin American free trade area, support of, communique
(Goulart, Kennedy), 706
Law of the sea (see also Safety of life at sea), conven-
tions on, 77, 225, 425, 482
Lead and zinc, decision against reopening escape-clause
action on, 382
League of Red Cross Societies, refugee program, address
(Brown), 102
Lebanon :
IAEA statute, amendment to article VI.A.3 of, 889
IDA articles of agreement, 854
Lebanon — Continued
U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 306
U.S. technical aid project in, address (Tubby), 301
Lee, Robert E., 154
Less developed countries (see also Newly independent
countries) :
Aid to (see also Economic and social development and
Economic and technical aid), need for and increase
in, addresses, communiques, and remarks : ANZUS,
870; NATO, 863; R. Kennedy, 702, 763; Rusk',
453, 935, 941, 948
Economic and social development of:
Need for, address (Ball), 672
Progress in, address (Louchheim), 337
U.N. programs for, remarks and statement : Rusk,
19; Stevenson, 321
Economic offensive of Soviet-bloc countries : addresses,
communique, message, and statement: Ball, 913,
916 ; Bowles, 766 ; Hughes, 981 ; Johnson, 249, 250 ;
Kennedy, 232, 233, 234 ; McGhee, 726 ; NATO, 863,
Nichols, 33
Obligations of Atlantic partnership members to, address
(Ball), 413, 414, 417
Population problems in, address (Nunley), 23
Revolution of rising expectations in, address and state-
ment: Bowles, 371, 374; Stevenson, 320
Trade with :
GATT discussion of promotion of, declaration, state-
ment, and report on : Ball, 4 ; text of declaration,
9; U.S. report, 7, 8
Need for development of, addresses and statement :
Ball, 598, 604; McGhee, 290; Weiss, 341
U.S. role and policies, addresses and statement : Ball,
913; McGhee, 830, 1008, 1010; Rostow, 628, 834, 838;
Rusk, 404, 406, 659, 660, 900
Use of GARIOA repayments for assistance to, 188
Liberia :
Negro American investments in, address (Williams), (53
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Agricultural commodities, agreement with U.S., 818
IBRD, IDA, IFC, and IMF, articles of agreement, 654
Military equipment and materials, agreement with
U.S. re furnishing of, 305
Peace Corps program, agreement with U.S. for estab-
lishment in, 697
Pollution of the sea by oil, international convention
(1954) for prevention of, 890
Safety of life at sea, international convention (1960)
on, 740
Wheat agreement, international, 926
Liechtenstein, universal postal convention (1957), with
final protocol, annex, regulations of execution and
provisions re airmail, 890
Lingle, Walter L., Jr., 698
Lippmann, Walter, cited, 371, 417
Loans, U.S., development, authorization request for FY
1963, message (Kennedy), 550, 551
Locust menace in Afghanistan, 987
Louchheim, Mrs. Katie, 225, 337, 921
Luck, J. Murray, 566
Luxembourg :
Grand Duchess to visit U.S., 950
Index, January /o June 1962
1069
Luxembourg — Continued
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Diplomatic relations, Vienna convention (1961) and
protocol on, 817
Friendship, establisbment, and navigation treaty
with U.S., 437, 438
GATT, compensatory concessions for certain tariff
actions taken by U.S., 512
GATT, proc^s-verbaux extending declarations on pro-
visional accession of Switzerland and Tunisia, 818
OECD, convention and supplementary protocols, 225
Macapagal, Diosdado, 665, 911
MacArthur, Douglas II, 709
Macmillan, Harold, 94, 355, 802
Madagascar, cultural property, convention (1954) and
protocol for protection in event of armed conflict, 225
Mahoney, William P., 1041
Makarios, Archbishop, 418, 1011
Malagasy Republic :
African and Malagasy Union, addresses and statement
(Williams), 172, 722, 843, 916
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Air services transit, international agreement, 925
Civil aviation convention (1944), international, 782
Universal postal convention (1957), with final pro-
tocol, annex, regulations of execution, and provi-
sions re airmail with final protocol, 77
Malaya, international civil aviation convention (1944),
protocol ( 1961 ) to, 654
Mali:
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 871
Civil aviation convention (1944), international, proto-
col (1961) to, 654
Telecommunication convention (1959), international,
566
U.S. Ambassador : appointment, 35 ; confirmation, 306
Manganese ores and sodium sulphates, agreement amend-
ing agreement with Brazil re settlement of debt from
agreement of 1954 for purchase of, 350
Manila Pact of 195/,, 904
Mann, Thomas C, 500
Manning, Robert J., 698
Mansfield, J. Kenneth, 962
Mapping agreement with Paraguay, cooperative, 259
Marshall plan, 16
Martin, Edwin M., 218, 471, 926
Martin, John Bartlow, 482
Martinez. Luis Manuel, 556
Marton, Kndre, 123
MatsHs, Alexander A., 479
Mauritania :
Civil aviation convention (1944), international, and
protocols amending, 259, 854, 961
Telecommunication convention (19iJ9), international,
with six annexes, S90
UNESCO constitution, 512
WMO convention (1947), 305
May, Herbert K., 1002
Mbuh, .Jules, l(!i)
McClintock, Robert, 398
MeCloy, John J., 4!)2
McConaughy, Walter P., 438
McEwen, John, 549
McGhee, George C. :
Addresses :
American ambassador, role of, 1007
Atlantic Community, 131
Mineral Resources and the World of the 1960'8, 723
New trade program, proposals for, 289
U.S. foreign policy, 678, 827
Confirmation as Under Secretary of State, 306
Meteorological Organization, World. See World Meteor-
ological Organization
Mexico :
Agricultural research and development Ln, remarks
(Rusk), 792
International Boundary and Water Commission (U.S.-
Mexico), 650, 683
OAS system, exclusion of a member from, statement
re, 283
Oil importation from, statement (Nichols), 32
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Agricultural workers, agreement amending and ex-
tending 1951 agreement with U.S., 106, 154
Aircraft manufactured by Lockheed-AzcSrate, agree-
ment amending agreement (1961) with U.S. for
acceptance of certificates of airworthiness for, 305
Civil aviation convention, international, protocol
(1961) to, 854
Industrial productivity, agreement with U.S. re pro-
gram of, 78
Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences,
convention (1944) and protocol of amendment to,
397
Safety of life at sea, convention (1948) and agree-
ment with U.S. on, 189
Television channels along U.S.-Mexican border,
agreements with U.S. re, 818, 890
Water supply from Colorado River, agreement with
U.S. re scheduling of water under 1944 agreement,
144
Wheat agreement, international, 926
U.S.-Mexico, partners in a common task, remarks
(Rusk), 919
Meyer, Armin H., 306
Middle East See Near and Middle East
Migration, European, Intergovernmental Committee for,
511, 732
Military assistance {see also Military equipment, mate-
rials, and services and Mutual defense) :
Appropriation and authorization requests for FT 1963,
550, 662
Dominican Republic:
Agreement providing, 697
Survey of needs of, 258
Importance of program, address (Rusk), 899
Military equipment, materials, and services :
Furnishing of, agreement with Liberia, 305
Military procurement, memorandum of understanding
with France re, 77
Military establishments and expenditures :
Importance to present U.S. security, address (Rostow),
728
1070
Department of Slate Bulletin
Military establishmeDts and expenditures — Continued
Reduction and discontinuance of, U.S. proposed treaty
outline for, 747, 751, 756, 758
Minerals :
African resources, address (Williams), 545
Resources and economic growth, address (McGhee), 723
U.S. importation of, address (Trezise), 886
Missiles :
Importance of in U.S. defense pattern, address (John-
son), 245, 246
Research in missile penetration and defense, address
(Kennedy), 445
Monetary Fund, International. See International Mone-
tary Fund
Mongolia. People's Republic of, Cuban complaint of U.S.
aggression, amendment to Cuban draft res., state-
ment (Plimpton), 560
Moreland, Allen B., 1042
Morgan, George Allen, 1042
Morocco :
Agricultural commodities, agreement with U.S. re, 482
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 499
Moscoso, Teodoro, 177, 398
Moukouri, Jacques Kuoh, 499
Mutual defense assistance agreements:
ANZUS communique re, S71
With Belgium, 77, 1002
Narcotics. See Drugs, narcotic
NASA. See United States National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
National defense and security :
Foreign economic policy, relationship to, address (Cop-
pock), 956
Peaceful coexistence, relationship of to, address (Achil-
les), 324, 327
Policy of, address (Rostow), 629
Trade agreements (see also Trade Expansion Act),
proposed legislation re, 344
National organizations, 12th annual conference of, mes-
sage and addresses : Cleveland, 583 ; Gardner, 586 ;
Kennedy, 578 ; Stevenson, 577
Nationalism («ee also Newly independent countries) :
African, addresses (WiUiams), 172, 173, 545, 640, 720
Development of, addresses : Ball, 634 ; Kennedy, 616 ;
Rostow, 627, 630
Force of spirit of, address (Rusk), 788
U.N. relationship to, statement (Stevenson), 321
NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Navigation, friendship, and establishment treaty with
Luxembourg, 437, 438
Near and Middle East (see also Central Treaty Organ-
ization and individual countries) :
Divisions within, address (Hughes), 979
Situation in, address (Bowles), 765
Soviet efforts to communize, address (Bowles), 375
UNEF activities in. See United Nations Emergency
Force
Netherlands :
IMF, Netherlands commitment to, 187
Netherlands — Continued
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
GATT, compensatory concessions for certain tariff
actions taken by U.S., 512
Safety of life at sea, international convention (1960)
on, 740
Weapons production, agreement with U.S., 225
Whaling convention, international, and schedule of
whaling regulations, 890
Wheat agreement, international, 926
Zanderij Airport in Surinam, agreement with U.S.
re use of, 890
West New Guinea, dispute witi Indonesia. See West
New Guinea
White House Press Secretary to visit, announcement,
846
Neutralism, address (Adoula), 337
New Guinea, Trust Territory of :
Australia's administration of, statement (Bingham), 72
Self-determination for, statement (Rusk), 867
New Guinea, West. See West New Guinea
New Zealand :
ANZUS Council communique, 869
Colby cheese exports to U.S., reduction of, 779
Role in Pacific and Southeast Asia, address and state-
ment (Rusk), 868,944
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Diplomatic relations, Vienna convention (1961) and
protocol on, 817
GATT:
Interim agreements, with schedules, 511
Proems-verbal extending declaration on provisional
accession of Tunisia, 926
Protocol relating to establishment of new schedule
Ill-Brazil, 350
Safety of life at sea, international convention (1960)
on, 740
Wheat agreement, international, 926
U.S. relations with, address (Rusk), 942
Newly independent nations (see also Less developed coun-
tries and Nationalism) :
Economic and social development of, addresses : Ball,
365 ; Louchheim, 337
Resistance to Communist penetration and control, re-
marks, address, and statement : Bohlen, 1015 ; Rusk,
127, 241
U.S. policy toward and relations with, addresses and
remarks: Ball, 413; Johnson, 58; Rusk, 490; Wil-
liams, 170, 172
Ngala, Ronald G., 244
Niagara Falls, request for study on by IJC withdrawn, 728
Nicaragua :
Civil aviation convention (1944), international, pro-
tocol (1961) to, 654
Economic, technical, and related assistance, agreement
with U.S., 782
Nichols, C. W., 31
Niger :
Civil aviation convention (1944), international, pro-
tocol (1961) to, 654
Investment guaranty program, agreement with U.S. re,
926
Index, January to June J 962
1071
Nigeria :
Economic development program in, address (Williams),
171
Immigration quota, U.S. establishment of, 25
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Civil aviation convention, international, protocol
(1961) to, 854
Diplomatic relations, Vienna convention (1961) on,
817
GATT, proc^s-verbal extending and amending declara-
tion on provisional accession of Switzerland, 926
IMCO convention, 697
International Bice Commission, constitution (1953)
of, 697
Opium and other drugs, convention on suppression of
abuse of, 566
Sugar agreement ( 1958 ) , International, 305
Wheat agreement, international, 926
U.S. aid to, proposed, 25
Nonintervention :
Principle of, U.S. position, statement (Stevenson), 557
Punta del Este conference resolution on, 279
Non-self-governing territories {see also Self-determination
and Trust territories), U.S. administration of, state-
ment (Bingham), 73
North Atlantic Council, ministerial meetings of :
28th (Paris), text of communique, 51
29th (Athens) :
Secretary Rusk's arrival statement, 861, 962, and
CBS interview re, 863
Text of communique, 862
U.S. delegation, 864
North Atlantic Treaty Organization :
Aid to less developed countries, statement (Rusk) , 661
Council of. See North Atlantic Council
Creation and growth of, statement (McGhee), 133, 134
Cuba, U.S. talks with NATO re, statement (Rusk),
459
Military equipment supplied to Portugal, question of
disposition of, statement (Stevenson), 387
Norway-U.S. support of, joint communique (Gerhard-
sen, Kennedy), 878
Nuclear deterrent for, question of, addresses and state-
ments : Ball, 666 ; Bundy, 422 ; McGhee, 828 ; Rusk,
456, 458, 801, 973, 974
State Department coordinator for, establishment of
office, 673
Status of forces, agreements supplementing agreements
on, 106, 189, 305
"^ Unity and effectiveness of, addresses : Johnson, 246,
250 ; Kennedy, 161
U.S. relations with, address and remarks: Ball, 637;
Rusk, 490
North Pacific Ocean, high seas fisheries of, amendment to
annex to International convention (1952) on, 740
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries :
International Commission for, U.S. commissioner, ap-
pointment of, 1040
International convention for, declaration of under-
standing re, 305, 666
Norway :
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Civil aviation convention (1944), international, pro-
tocol (1961) to, 654
Customs convention (1954) on temporary Importa-
tion of private road vehicles, 38
GATT, interim agreements, with schedules, 511
GATT, proems- verba ux extending declarations on pro-
visional accession of Switzerland and Tunisia, 818
IAEA, amendment of article VI.A.3 of statute of,
106
Safety of life at sea, international convention (19G0)
on, 740
Whaling convention (1946), international, and sched-
ule of regulations, 154, 1041
Wheat agreement, international, 926
Visit of Prime Minister to U.S., 470, 877
Nubian project, UNESCO, U.S. grant of funds for protec-
tion of temples and monuments, 306
Nuclear energy. See Atomic energy and Nuclear headings
Nuclear free zones, establishment of, U.S. position on,
665
Nuclear test-ban treaty, proposals for :
18-nation conference consideration of :
Negotiations, progress of, statements : Department,
664 ; Kennedy, 624 ; Rusk, 798
Nuclear test-ban discussion in context of general
disarmament, U.K.-U.S. proposal and Soviet rejec-
tion, 205, 228
Preconference ministerial discussion by nuclear pow-
ers, U.S. proposal, statements (Rusk), 458, 462
Resumption of tests by U.S., question of effect on
conference, statement (Rusk), 464
Japanese position on, message (Ikeda), 498
Soviet position and proposals, communique, message
and statements : Dean, 888 ; Department, 288, 665 ;
Kennedy, 624; Khrushchev, 409, 495, 496; NATO,
51 ; Rusk, 795, 799
U.K.-U.S. proposals and efforts for, joint communique,
reports, and statements on, 63, 64, 288, 409, 707,
802
U. S. proposals and position on, address, message, notes,
statements, and treaty outline : Dean, 888 ; Kennedy.
447, 497, 498h, 624. 747: Rostow, 969; Rusk, 167,
201, 535, 571. 795, 796, 797, 860, 869, fMO, 944, 945 ;
treaty outline, 750; U.S. notes, 839, 840
Nuclear weapons:
Control, inspection, and reduction of, U.S. proposals for,
statements and treaty outline : Kennedy, 624 ; Rusk,
619, 020, 009; treaty outline, 747, 750, 756, 758
Factor in U.S. foreign policy, address (Bohlen), 1014
Fissionable materials, ban on production for weapons
purposes (see also under Atomic energy, peaceful
uses of), U.S. proposal for, statement (Rusk), 534
NATO nuclear defense policy. Council communique re,
862
NATO nuclear deterrent, question of, 422, 456, 458, 666,
801, 828, 973, 974
Tests. See Nuclear weapons tests
Transfer of to nonnudear countries, U.S. position on,
address, correspondence, and statements: Ball, 60S;
Cleveland, 805 : R\isk, 457. 459, 972, 975
1072
Department of State Bulletin
Nuclear weapons — Continued
U.N. General Assembly recommendations re, letter
(Stevenson), 223
Nuclear weapons tests:
Cessation and control of :
Detection and identification of. See Geneva con-
ference of experts on detection of nuclear tests and
Nuclear test-ban treaty, projwsals for
Geneva conference on. See Geneva conference on the
discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests
Test-ban treaty. See Nuclear test-ban treaty, pro-
posals for
Resumption of by :
Soviet Union :
Communist China's views on, 116
Japanese position on, 498
U.S. views on, 443, 444, 446, 464, 497, 535, 839, 840
United States :
AEC announcement re, 795
ANZUS communique re, 870
Need for and purpose of, address, joint communi-
que, and statements : Dean, 888 ; Kennedy, 443,
466; Kennedy, Macmillan, 94; Rusk, 360, 464,
795, 796, 797, 944
Soviet views on, messages (Khrushchev), 469, 495
U.K.-U.S. cooperation at Christmas Island, 329
U.S. correspondence with: Ghana, 840; Japan,
497. 839
Soviet call for moratorium on testing during 18-nation
disarmament conference, 708
Nunley, William T., 22
OAS. See Organization of American States
OECD. See Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development
Oil:
African, production of, address (Williams), 545
ECAFE symposium on development of petroleum re-
sources of Asia and the Far East, 852
Geologists' role in development of, address (McGhee),
723, 725, 726, 728
Middle East and U.S.S.R. production of, 766
Oil imports program, hearings before congressional
committee, statement (Nichols), 31
Pollution of sea by, convention (1954) for prevention
of, 38, 77, 654, 890, 1041
Soviet sale of, address (Hughes), 981
Olympic, Sylvanus, 638
OXUC. See Congo : U.N. operation in
Operation Crossroads, 548
Opium. See Drugs, narcotic
Organization for African and Malagasy Economic Cooper-
ation. See African and Malagasy Union
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment:
Accomplishments and purpose of, addresses and re-
marks, McGhee, 292, 829; Rusk, 910
Consultation and coordination among members, address
(Ball), 670, 672
Convention on, with supplementary protocols, 225, 782
Expansion of gross product of, address and statement :
McGhee, 724; Rusk, 164
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment— Continued
Organization and development of, statement (McGhee),
133, 134
State Department coordinator with, establishment of
office, 073
U.S. cooperation in, addresses (Ball), 365, 367, 415, 637
Organization for Trade Cooperation, agreement on, 397
Organization of American States :
Council of :
Measures against :
Cuba, statement (Rusk), 275, 287
Dominican Republic, discontinuance of, statements :
Department, 129 ; Kennedy, 128
Pan American Day, 1962, observance of, address
(Rusk), 703
Cuba:
Charges against OAS and call for World Court opin-
ion re, statements (Stevenson) and text of draft
resolution, 6S4
OAS pronouncements and actions re Castro regime.
Sec Punta del Este conference
Ministerial meeting, 8th Meeting of Organ of Consulta-
tion. See Punta del Este conference
Panel of experts :
Proposals of, statement (Blumenthal), 999, 1000
Responsibility of, remarks (Kennedy), 540
Special Consultative Committee on Security of the:
Establishment of, instructions re, 279
U.S. member, nomination, 591
OTC. See Organization for Trade Cooperation
Outer space (see also Satellites, earth) :
Colonel Glenn's flight, significance of, statement (Ste-
venson), 577, 582
Peaceful uses of, need for international cooperation in,
statements : Plimpton, 809 : Rusk, 620 ; Stevenson, 180
U.N. actions re uses of, addresses, correspondence, and
resolution: Ball, 6.36; Gardner, 587; Stevenson,
223; text of resolution, 185
U.N. registry of launchings into, U.S. information for,
address and letter (Gardner, Stevenson), 588
U.S. proposals and views, addresses and treaty outline :
Kennedy, 160 ; Rusk, 932 ; text of proposed treaty
outline re, 751
U.S.S.R.-U.S. cooperation in, proposals for, addresses,
correspondence, and statement : Gardner, 587, 591 ;
Kennedy, 411, 536, 615 : Khrushchev, 411 ; Plimpton,
812; Rusk, 903
Outer Space. U.N. Committee on Peaceful Uses of :
Cooperative efforts within, letter (Kennedy), .537
Meeting of, addresses and statement re : Cleveland, 584 ;
Gardner, 587, 588 ; Plimpton, 809 ; Stevenson, 584
Responsibilities of, statement (Stevenson) and U.N.
resolution on, 181, 184, 18a, 186
Pacific Commission, South, membership of, 960
Pacific Conference, South, 5th session of, U.S. delegation,
960
Pacific Islands, Trust Territory of the :
Address (Ball), 634
Index, January fo June 1962
1073
Pacific Islands, Trust Territory of the — Continued
Administration of by Secretary of Interior, Executive
order, 887
Pallia vi, Mohammad Reza Shah, 760
Pakistan :
CENTO. See Central Treaty Organization
Fulbright program with, 10th anniversary of, 955
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Cotton textiles, arrangements regarding international
trade in, 38
Diplomatic relations, Vienna convention (1961) on,
817
Educational exchange program, agreement amending
agreement (1950) with U.S., 438
GATT, interim agreements, with schedules, 511
GATT, procfes-verbaux extending declarations on
provisional accession of Switzerland and Tunisia,
818
Safety of life at sea, international convention (1960)
on, 740
Pan American Day and Pan American Week, 1962; ad-
dress (Rusk), 703 ; proclamation, 542
Panama :
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Economic and technical cooperation, agreements with
U.S. for, 106, 698
ICEM constitution, 511
Investment guaranties program, agreement with U.S.
re, 566
Safety of life at sea, international convention (1960)
on, 740
Visit of President Chiari to U.S., 976
Visit of Under Secretary Ball to, 215
Panama Canal Company, quarterly meeting of Board of
Directors, U.S. representative to, 215
Paraguay :
Cooperative mapping agreement with U.S., 259
Copyright convention (1952), universal, and protocols,
1, 2, and 3, 77
Geneva conventions (1949) on treatment of prisoners of
war, wounded and sick, and civilians in time of war,
398
Reciprocal trade agreement with U.S., agreement ter-
minating portions of and bringing up to date sched-
ule I of, 741
Passports :
Issuance to members of Communist organizations, re-
vision of regulations re, announcement and state-
ment (Ru.sk), 179,202
Revocation due to subversive activities, hearings on, 847
Patents, inventions relating to defense for which patent
applications have been filed, agreement for safeguard-
ing, 740
Peace :
Communist conception of, address (Mann), 505
Importance of military strength in maintenance of, ad-
dress (Itusk), 84
Peace force, international (sec alxo United Nations
Emergency Force), building of, address (Cleve-
land, iJS5
Peaceful settlement of disputes, U.S. proposed measures
to strengthen process of, 243, 753, 756, 759
Peace — Continued
Peacemaking role of U.S., address (Ball), 875
The Practice of, address (Cleveland), 1019
Peace Corps :
Addresses : Bowles, 208 ; Kennedy, 161
Expansion of requested of Congress, letter (Kennedy),
521
FAO agreement with U.S. re, 890
Programs :
Africa, addresses : Fredericks, 882 ; Williams, 547
Agreements for establishment : Brazil, 106 ; Domini-
can Republic, 854; Ethiopia, 1041; Jamaica, 482;
Liberia, 697 ; Sierra Leone, 225 ; Somali, 926 ; Thai-
land, 350 ; Tunisia, 482 ; Venezuela, 1041
Philippines, address (Harriman), 175
Peaceful coexistence :
Relationship of U.S. national security to, address
(Achilles), 324
Soviet policy, addresses (Rusk), 934, 938
Pembina River, study of resources by International Joint
Commission (U.S.-Canada), 728
People's Daily, cited, 116
Peru:
Agricultural commodities, agreement with U.S., 698
Educational exchange programs, agreement amending
19.j6 agreement with U.S. for financing of, 961
GATT, declarations on provisional accession of Tunisia,
817, 818
GATT, interim agreements, with schedules, 511
Safety of life at sea, international convention (1960)
on, 740
Petroleum. See Oil
Peyser, Seymour M., 1041
Philippines :
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 418
Educational programs of, U.S. assistance in, address
(Tubby), 301
Rizal Day, address and message : Harriman, 174 ; Rusk,
175
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Agricultural commodities, agreement with U.S.. 106
Diplomatic relations, Vienna convention (1961) and
protocol on, 817
Safety of life at sea, international convention (1960)
on, 740
Wheat agreement, international, 926
U.S. Ambassador : appointment, 78 ; confirmation, 306
U.S.-Philippine relations, address, message, and state-
ment : Harriman. 174 ; Kennedy, 729, 911
U.S. role in establishment of Republic of, address
(Johnson), 59
Visit of President to U.S. : announcement of proposed
trip, 605 ; postponed, 911
Phillips, Ralph W., 392
Pico, Rafael, 425
Pins, straight, decisions against Increasing duty on, 849
Pittsburgh, role in U.S. economy, address (Johnson), 988
Plimpton, Francis T. P., 398, 559, 809
Poland :
Agricultural commodities, agreements with U.S. re
purchase of, 35, 106, 779, 818
1074
Department of State Bulletin
Poland — Continued
GATT, declaration on relations with contracting par-
ties, 397
U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 306
Visit of Minister of Foreign Trade to U.S., 871
'Claris and Minuteman programs, strengthening of, ad-
dress! Ball), 007
»oIaris submarines, U.S. commitment to NATO, Council
communique and statement: communique, 8C2; Rusk,
804
Police academy, inter-American, opening of, S47
'Dilution of sea by oil, international convention (1954)
for prevention of, 38, 77, 654, 890, 1041
'once Miranda, Neftali, 169
'opulation explosion:
Problem of, U.S. policy, address and statement : Bohlen,
1015; Rusk, 800
Relationship to economic and social development, ad-
dress (Nunley), 22
'ortugal :
GATT decision on accession of, 8
Problems of Angola and Goa. See Angola and Goa
Threat of withdrawal from United Nations, U.S. views
on, statement (Rusk), 124
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Atomic energy, peaceful uses of, agreement amending
1055 agreement with U.S., 1002
GATT, interim agreements, with schedules, 511
GATT, protocol of accession to, 696, 1041
Safety of life at sea, international convention (1960)
on, 740
Wheat agreement, international, 926
U.S. relations with, address (Fredericks), 882
'ostal convention (1957), universal, with final protocol,
annex, regulations of execution, and provisions re
airmail, 77, 225, 482, 782, 890
'overty, means of overcoming, address (Galbraith), 1024
'owers, Francis Gary, 359
'risoners of war, Geneva convention on treatment of, 566
'rivate enterprise :
American system of, address (Martin), 478
Loan to Ivory Coast Development Bank to promote,
joint communique (Houphouet-Boigny, Kennedy),
953
Role in :
Africa, address (Williams), 61, 62
Domestic economy, address (Rostow), 837
Less developed countries, address (McGhee), 830
'reclamations by the President :
Cuba, embargo on trade with (3447), 283
GATT tariff agreement, announcement of proclamation
(3468) giving effect to, 848
Human Rights Week, 1961 (3442), 68
Pan American Day and Pan American Week, 1962
(3452), 542
Sugar quota for Cuba, (3440), 34
United Nations Day, 1962 (3649), 853
World Trade Week, 1902 (3474), 825
'rocurement for foreign aid program, U.S. position, mes-
sage (Kennedy), 550
'reject Mercury (see also Tracking stations) Australian-
U.S. cooperation in, address (Rusk), 941
Propaganda :
Cuban, in the Americas, statement (Stevenson), 554
Soviet use of, address and statement: Ball, 515, 517;
Hughes, 981, 982
Property, cultural, convention (1954) and protocol for
protection in event of armed conflict, 225
Property, industrial, convention (1883, as revised) for
the protection of, 106, ISO
Property, industrial, convention (1934), for the protec-
tion of, 817
Pryor, Frederic L., 359
Public Law 480. See Agricultural surpluses and Agricul-
tural trade
Publications :
ACDA, Economic and Social Consequences of Disarma-
ment in the United States, released, 962
Congressional documents relating to foreign policy,
lists of, 68, 179, 302, 382, 519, 734, 923, 994
State Department :
Diplomatic History, International Laio, and the Con-
duct of Foreign Relations, Department of State
Publications on, 190
Foreign Relations of the United States, published :
China, 19J,3, 610
19J,1, Volume V, The Far East, 610
19^2, Volume II, Europe, 926
19/i2, Volume V, The American Republics, 1042
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Analysis of
United States Negotiations, volumes released, 565
Lists of recent releases, 78, 190, 226, 742, 818
United Nations, lists of current documents, 149, 436,
526, 009, 696, 738, 816, 889
Punta del Este, Charter of :
Message, statement, and remarks re : Kennedy, 5.51 ;
Rusk, 661, 662, 789
U.S.-Venezuelan support of, text of joint communique
(Betancourt, Kennedy), 90
Punta del Este conference (Jan. 1962) :
Accomplishments of, TV report on and news confer-
ence re (Rusk), 267, 285
Communist penetration of Western Hemisphere, con-
sideration of and actions re :
Decision and resolution on, 278, 554
Statements re: Rusk, 270, 272, 276, 277, 284, 285;
Stevenson, 553, 556, 685
Cuban exclusion from OAS system, consideration of :
Statements re : Rusk, 125, 199, 200, 202, 242, 207, 270,
273, 275, 277, 284, 286, 348, 361, 451, 403 ; Stevenson,
687, 689
Texts of resolution and member statements re, 281
Purpose of and U.S. delegation to, 224
Qods-Nakhai, Hosein, 707
Racial equality :
In Africa, address and statement : Bingham, 71 ; Wil-
liams, 546
Responsibility of citizens for, address (Louchheim), 339
Radio («ee a/so Telecommunications) :
Communications between radio amateurs on behalf of
3d parties, arrangement with El Salvador, 782
ndex, January to June J 962
1075
Kadio — Continued
Badio Ceylon, agreement amending and extending agree-
ment with Ceylon re, 890
Regulations (1959), witli appendixes, annexed to in-
ternational telecommunications convention (1959),
782
Radioactive fallout, minimal content of U.S. proposed
tests, address (Kennedy), 444
Rapacki plan, U.S. objections to, 665
Red Cross Societies, League of :
Chinese Communist refusal of aid from, address (Stev-
enson), 117
Program of work with refugees, address (Brown), 102
Red Flag, journal of Chinese Communist Party, cited, 115,
116
Refugees and displaced persons :
Angolan refugees in the Congo, U.S. support of U.N.
aid to, statement ( Stevenson) , 387
Arab refugee problems, address (Bowles), 768
Chinese :
In Hong Kong, U.S. position and aid, address (Har-
riman), 993
U.S. admission and aid to, address and statement :
Cieplinski, 732 ; Rusk, 974
Flight from Communism, remarks and statement
(Stevenson), 211, 557
Kalmyk people in U.S., 10th anniversary of arrival, 17
Problem of, U.S. and U.N. concern for and aid to,
addresses: Rrown, 100; Cieplinski, 730
Regional organizations (see also subject):
Discussion of, address (McGhee), 831
Trading arrangements, GATT discussion of, 8
U.S. participation in and position on, addresses and
statement: Achilles, 328; Cleveland, 332, 804;
McGhee, 135, 830 ; Rusk, 902
Research (see also Science, Scientific cooperation, and
Satellites) :
Cooperative efforts in, statement (Plimpton), 814
SEATO fellowship program for, announcement of, 70
Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Federation of :
Self-government for, address (Fredericks), 881
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
GATT, declaration on provisional accession of
Switzerland, procfts-verbal extending, H'A)
GATT, proei^'s-verbal extending declaration on acces-
sion of Tunisia, 818
ICEM withdrawal from, 511
Wheat agreement, international, 026
Rice, Edward I^arl, IS!)
Rice, sale of to I'oland, 779
Rice Commission, Inlcrnational, amended constitution
(1953), 697
Ritchie. Charles Stewart Alnion, 955
Rizal Day, 174, 175
Road trafiic, convention (1949) on, with annexes, 77, 259.
610, 653, 782, 817
Road vehicles, private, customs convention (10.54) on
temporary importation of, 38, 566, 782
Rostow, Walt Whitman, 438, 522, 625, 833, 067
Rountree, William M., 43(i, 526
Rowan, Carl T., 378
Ruanda-Urundi, Trust Territory of :
Flight of refugees from Ruanda, address (Brown), 102
Independence for, U.N. action, remarks (Rusk), 40C
Rubber Study Group, International, 909
Rubin, Seymour J., 1042
Rumania :
Films, exchange of with U.S., 9.59
Minister to U.S., credentials, 25
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Law of the sea, conventions on, 225
Telecommunication convention (1959), international
with six annexes, 890
U.S. Minister, confirmation, 306
Rusk, Dean :
Addresses, remarks, and statements :
Alliance for Progress. 361, 462, 402, 787
ANZUS Council meeting, 481, 804 I
ANZUS partners in cooperative efforts, 930
America's Goal — A Community of Free Nations, 44}'
Argentina, situation in, U.S. policy, 800
Atomic energy, international control of, 798
Attorney General Kennedy's trip, 203, 360
Australia and New Zealand, role in Pacific area'
866
Berlin. See Berlin
Brazil, discussions re U.S. holdings in, 460
CENTO, 10th Ministerial meeting, 859
Cold war, 5.59
Communism, 241, 284, 28.5, 455, 458, 459, 974
Congo, proposed visit of Prime Minister Adoula U
U.S., 203
Congo situation, 12, 126, 165, 199, 216
Cuba :
Communist penetration of Western Hemisphen
through, threat of ,125, 165, 166, 168
NATO-U.S. policy toward, question of, 459
OAS consideration of and actions re. See und&
Punta del Este conference
U.S. trade with, 288, 348
Disarmament, 18-nation disarmament conference :
Preconference discussions and participants, ques
tion of, 456, 458, 462
U.S. position and proposals. 124. 201, 461, 531, 61f
708, 802, 970
Dominican Republic, progress in, 16.5, 168
Dulles Library of diplomatic history, 923
Economic and social development, 18, 493
Euroi)e. proposed trip to, 974
Euroiiean Economic Community, U.K. negotiation
with, S(i5, 866, 867
Fcueign aid program for FY 1963, 659
Foreign educators and students, contacts with, 460
Foreign policy, U.S., 165, 3(i3, 487
Foreign Service officers, 455
Germany, East :
Recognition of, IT.S. position on, 457
Sitnaticm in, 241
Guantanamo Naval Base, 287
India, U.S. policy toward, 124.
Inter-American Defense I'.oard. 285
Issues of contemporary history, 83
1076
Department of Sfafe Bulletii
ask, Dean — Continued
Addresses, remarks, and statements — Continued
Japan, scientific cooperation with, 425
Land reform in Latin America, 492
Laos, 123, 120,201,973
Mexico-U.S., partners in a common task, 919
NATO Council meeting at Alliens, 861, 803, 962
NATO nuclear deterrent force, question of, 456, 458,
801
New Guinea, problems of, 864, 866, 867
Newly independent states, resistance to Communist
pressure, 127, 241
Nuclear weapon tests :
Test-ban treaty, efforts toward, 167, 571, 795, 797
U.S. resumption of, necessity for, 300, 46-1, 796
Nuclear weapons, si)read of use of, U.S. po.sition, 457,
458, 4.59, 972, 975
OECD, expansion of gross product of, 164
Pan American Day, 1902, 703
Passport regulations, 202
Peaceful settlement of disputes, 243
Philippines, Rizal Day, 175
Population increase, problem of, 800
Portugal, continued membership in the U.N., question
of, 124
Punta del Este conference, 267, 270, 284, 287, 361
Refugees, Chinese, U.S. admission of, 974
Santo Domingo, situation in, 200, 202, 203
Science, space, and foreign policy, 031
Sino-Soviet bloc :
Cuban alliance with, 274, 275, 2S4
Economic offensive of, 127, 910
Soviet Union :
Arms buildup in Indonesia, 866
German problem, U.S. discussions with re, 625
Negotiating with, 123, 124, 127, 167
Release of Francis Gary Powers, 359
Trade proposal, 971
State Department:
Position re use of word "Victory," 972
Relations with Congress, 126
Summit conference, proposed, 797, 798
Thailand, U.S. relations with, 498
Trade and Aid — Essentials of Free World Leadership,
403
Trade legislation, proposed, 866, 868, 909
Trade policy, U.S., 195
U.A.R., economic consultations with, 800
Underdeveloped countries, assistance to, 165
United Nations :
General Assembly, 16th session, 167, 242
U.K.-U.S. consultations on affairs of, 204
U.N. bonds, U..S. purchase of proposed, 312, 362
Viet-Nam :
Aggression against, 127
Situation in, 868, 869. 9.39
U.N. consideration of problem, question of, 243
U.S. policy toward, 363, 455, 458, 459, 461, 463
Voice of America :
Lao and Thai language broadcasts to Southeast
Asia, 377
20th anniversary of, 510
Rusk, Dean — Continued
Addresses, remarks, and statements — Continued
West New Guinea, 125, 203, 401, 870, 975
World crisis, U.S. policy in, 895
Yugoslavia, U.S. policy toward, 340
New.s conferences, transcripts of, 199, 284, 455, 795, 864,
970
Radio and TV interviews, transcripts of, 123, 126, 164,
241, 358, 464, 803
Ryerson, Knowles A., 960
Safety Conference, international, statement (Trezise),
520
Safety of life at sea, conventions on :
194S convention, 189
1900 convention :
Current actions, 740, 854
Senate approval requested, statement (Trezise), 520
Safety pins, decision against reopening escape-clause ac-
tion on, 382
Salinger, Pierre, 846
Salter, .Tohn L., 698
San Marino :
Diplomatic relations, Vienna convention (1961) on,
817
Road traffic, convention (1949) on, 782
Sarawak, copyright convention (1952), universal, 305
Satellites, earth (see also Outer space) :
Communications satellites :
Agreement with Brazil, 154
International cooperation in, statement (Stevenson)
and U.N. res., 183, 185, 186
Progress in development of, addresses : Cleveland,
584; Gardner, 589
U.S. proposals and policy re, statement (Plimpton),
811, 815
Tracking station.s, 77, 537, 810, 812
Weather satellites, cooperation in use of:
Program for, addresses : Cleveland, 584 ; Gardner,
588; Kennedy, 536
Technical studies and personnel for, statements and
U.N. res. : Plimpton, 811, 815 ; Stevenson, 183 ; text
of res., 185
Saud ibn Abd al-Aziz Al Saud. 377
Saudi Arabia :
Aviation, international civil, convention (1944) on,
438
Improvements in, address (Bowles). 767
Visit of King Saud to U.S., 377
Wheat agreement, international, 1041
Schactzel, J. Robert, 673, 1042
Science {see also Atomic energy, Nuclear weapons. Outer
space. Research, and Satellites) :
Advancement of science and technology, address
(Bowles), 371,376
Attach('>s, appointments to : Bern, 506 ; Rio de Janeiro,
1042
New frontiers for, address (Rusk), 931
Scientific cooperation. See Scientific Cooperation
Scientific, educational, and cultural materials, agreement
and protocol on importation of, 817
dex, January fo June 7962
1077
Scientific cooperation, U.S. witli :
Argentina, Scientific Mission on Foot and Mouth Dis-
ease, study and report of, 67, 543
Ghana, program of cooperation in the field of biomedi-
eine, agreement for, 259
Japan, joint committee on scientific cooperation, an-
nouncement, communiques, remarlcs : announce-
ment, 953 ; Ru.slv, 425 ; texts of communiques, C6, 954
Mexico, joint study of salinity problem, 650
U.S.S.R, :
Agreement on exclianges in scientific, technical, edu-
cational, cultural and other fields for 1962-63, 512,
652
Weather satellite system, U.S. proposals for coopera-
tion in, letter (Kennedy), 536
Sea. See Law of the sea
SEATO. See Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
Secretary of State. See RusIj, Dean
Security Council, U.N. :
Cuban call for World Court opinion on OAS action, con-
sideration of, statements (Stevenson) and draft
resolution, 684
Documents, lists of, 149, 436, 696, 738
Goa, proposed cease-fire resolution, statements (Steven-
son), 145
Israel and Syrian observance of Armistice Agreement,
statement (Tost) and text of resolution, 735
U.N. operations in the Congo, proposed consideration
of, statement (Stevenson), 304
Self-determination :
American Republics' position, statement (Stevenson),
558
Angolan right to, U.S. position on, statements (Steven-
son), 385
Punta del Este conference resolution on, 279
U.S. position on, addresses and statements: Bingham,
71, 72, 74, 75; Cleveland, 1022; Mann, 505; Wil-
liams. .546
Senegal, international civil aviation convention, protocol
(1961) to, 854
Ships and shipping:
Double taxation on earnings from operations of, agree-
ment with Colombia for relief of, 77
Loan of vessels to Greece, agreement for, 890
Oil pollution convention (1954), international, 38, 77,
054, 890, 1041
Shoup, David M., 381
Shutt, Charles, 126
Sierra Leone :
Commercial samples and advertising material, interna-
tional convention (1952) to facilitate the importa-
tion of, 817
Customs convention (19.54) on temporary importation
of private road vehicles, 782
Educational, scientific, and cultural material.?, agree-
ment and protocol on importation of, 817
Law of the sea, conventions on, 425
Narcotic drugs :
Manufacture and distriI)Ution of, convention (1931)
and protocol (194S), 740
Opium and other drugs, convention (1912) relating
to the suppression of the abuse of, 740
1078
Sierra Leone — Continued
Peace Corps program, agreement with U.S. for estab
lishment of, 225
Road traffic, convention (1949) on, with annexes, 81'
Slavery convention (1926), as amended, 817
Telecommunication convention (1959), international
with annexes, 189
Touring, convention (1954) concerning customs facili
ties for, 817
UNESCO constitution, 818
Universal postal convention (1957), 482 I
WMO convention, 697 '
Simms, John W., 853
Simonpietri, Andre C, 1042
Singapore-British Borneo grouj), international telecom
munication convention (1959), with annexes, 106
Sino-Soviet bloc (see also Communism and individua
countries) :
Activities in the Congo, article (Ball), 45
Cuban alliance with :
Military aid to, 644
Punta del Este resolutions and explanatory state
ments re, 2S1
U.S. views, statements: Department, 129; Rusk, 267
274, 27.5, 284
Design of, statement (McGhee), 131, 132
Economic development and offensive, addresses and re
marlis : Rusk, 790, 910 ; Trezise, 593
Pressures on newly independent states, statemen-
(Rusk), 127
Rift within, question of, addresses : Hughes, 983 ; Ros
tow, 631
Subversion in the Americas, Inter-American Peac(
Committee report on, cited. 199
Trade policies of, address (McGhee), 291
Western European economic unity vs., address
(Rowan), 379
Yugoslav relationship with, statement (Rusk), 346
Slavery convention (1926), as amended, 397, 654, 817, 961
Snyder, James, 3.58
Social and economic development. See Economic and
social development
Sodium sulphates and manganese ore.s, agreement amend-
ing agreement with Brazil re settlement of debt for ,
purchase of, 350
Sohl, Walter W., 392
Sokolsky, George, 380
Somali Republic, Peace Corps program, agreement with
U.S. for establishment of, 926
South Africa, Republic of :
Apartheid policy of, address and statement : Bingham,
71; Williams, 173
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Civil aviation convention (1944), international, pr>l
tocol ( 1961 ) to, 654
Diplomatic relations, Vienna convention (1961) on,
817
IAEA, amendment to statute of, 438
Wheat agreonient, international, 926
South and Southeast Asia. See Asia and individual
countries
South Pacific Commission, 960
Department of State Bulletin
South Pacific Conference, 5th session of, U.S. delegation,
960
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization :
ANZUS communique re, 870
Membership of, 77
Research fellowship program (1962-63), announcement
of, 76
Thai-U.S. statement (Khoman, Rnsk) ro, 498
U.S. forces in Thailand, Council statement re, 905
Soviet Union (see aluo Communism and Sino-Soviet
bloc) :
Afghanistan, Soviet activities in, address (Bowles),
675
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 644
Arms buildup in Indonesia, statement (Rusk) , 866
Berlin situation. Sec Berlin
China, People's Republic of, membership in the U.N.,
proposed U.N. draft resolution on, 117
Colonial empire of, remarks and statement : Bingham,
69, 73, 74 ; Stevenson, 211, 212
Communism in, addresses (Mann), 503, 509
Congo situation, Soviet activities and position, article
and statements : Ball, 46 ; Rusk, 217 ; Stevenson, 304
Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, 22d, address
re (Mac.\rthur), 710
Cuba, sponsorship in the U.N. of Cuban charges against
OAS and the United States, statements and draft
resolution : Stevenson, 556, 557, 684 ; resolution, 693
Diplomatic contacts with U.K. and U.S. Ambassadors,
joint communique (Kennedy, Macmillan), 94
Disarmament. See Disarmament and Eighteen-nation
disarmament committee, conference of
Economic challenge of, address (Trezise), 592
Foreign policy of, addresses : Hughes, 977 ; Rusk, 195
Geneva conference on the discontinuance of nuclear
weapon tests, proposals and actions re, 205, 288
German problem, 424, 625
Goa, invasion by India, veto of proposed Security Coun-
cil res. on, statement ( Stevenson ) , 149
Industrial and military aims of, address (Bowles), 371,
374
Middle East, pressures on, address (Bowles), 765, 766
Negotiating with, address, communique, and statements :
Johnson, 251; Kennedy, 161; NATO, 51, 52; Rusk,
123, 124, 127, 167
New Year's greeting, exchange with U.S., 164
Nuclear weapons and tests. See Nuclear headings
Oil exports, statement (Nichols), 32
Outer space, U.S.S.R.-U.S. cooperation in, proposals for,
addresses, correspondence, and statement : Gardner,
587, 591 ; Kennedy, 411, 536, 615 ; Khrushchev, 411 ;
Plimpton, 812 ; Rusk, 903
Peaceful coexistence, policy of, addresses : AchlUes, 324 ;
Rusk, 934, 938
Problems of, address (Bowles), 256, 258
Release of Francis Gary Powers and Frederic L. Pryor,
statements (Rusk), 359
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Exchanges In scientific, technical, educational, cul-
tural, and other fields for 1962-63, agreement with
U.S. for, 512, 652
Soviet Union — Continued
Treaties, agreements, etc. — Continued
Safety of life at sea, international convention (19G0)
on (with a reservation), 740
Wheat agreement, international, 926
United Nations :
Failure to pay share of peace-keeping operations In
the Congo and Middle East, U.S. views, statements
and message : Cleveland, 97 ; Kennedy, 312 ; Rusk,
315
Strategy in, statements (Stevenson), 223, 319, 321,
323
U.S. relations with, address and statement.^ : Boblen,
652, 1017, 1018 ; Rusk, 903
White House Press Secretary to visit, announcement,
846
World trade proposal, statement (Rusk) , 971
Sow, Oumar, 871
Space. See Outer space
Spain :
Agricultural commodities, agreement with U.S. re close-
out of account, 305
Civil aviation convention, international, protocol (1961)
to, 854
Wheat agreement, international, 926
U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 098
Special Consultative Committee on Security (OAS) :
Punta del Este resolution re establishment of, 279
U.S. member, nominated, 591
Special Fund, U.N. :
FAO projects of, article (Phillip.?, Sohl), 395
Surveys for raw materials financed by, address (Mc-
Ghee), 726
Special services program, agreement with Brazil re, 961
Spring clothespins, decision against reopening escape-
clause action on, 382
Stainless steel flatware, decision against reopening escape-
clause action on, 382
Standards of living, world, address (Williams), 545
State Advisory Committee to the Chief of Protocol, 4th
meeting of, 382
State Department (see also Agency for International De-
velopment, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
Foreign Service, and Peace Corps) :
Activities of , address (Ball), 874, 875
Ambassador at Large and President's special represen-
tative (Bowles) : confirmation, 306; designation,
118
Appointments and designations, 78, 118, 154, 189, 225,
565, 698, 890, 962, 1002, 1042
Assistant Secretaries of State, confirmations and resig-
nation : Battle, 1041 ; Coombs, 926 ; Harriman, 438 ;
Johnson, 926 ; Manning, 60S ; Martin, 926
Atlantic Affairs, post of Deputy Assistant Secretary for
established, 673
Counselor (Rostow), confirmation, 438
Domestic information program on foreign affairs, re-
sponsibility for, address (Bowles), 208, 210
Foreign policy briefing program and conferences, 104,
208, 476, 549, 576, 961
Index, January fo June 7962
1079
state Department — Continued
Immigration laws, responsibilities in administration
of , address (Cieplinski), 730
Interdepartmental agreement with Commerce for com-
mercial program within Foreign Service, 741
Publications. See under Publications
Relations with Congress, statement (Rusk), 126
Resignations : Bontempo, 118 ; Coombs, 926
Speech review procedures, remarks and statement:
Ball, 513 ; Tubby, 518
State Advisory Committee to the Chief of Protocol,
4th meeting of, 382
Under Secretary for Political Affairs, confirmation (Mc-
Ghee), 306
Under Secretary of State, confirmation (Ball), 30G
"Victory," Department position re use of word, letter
and statement : Ball, 1038 ; Rusk, 972
State of the Union, address (Kennedy), 159
Status of forces (NATO), agreements supplementing and
implementing agreement on, 106, 189, 305
Steeves, John M., 398
Stevenson, Adlai E. :
Address, remarks, and statements:
Angola, U.S. position, 385, 390
China, question of representation in U.N., 108
Cuban and Soviet call on Security Council for World
Court opinion on OAS action, 684
Cuban charges of U.S. aggression and intervention,
553
Freedom, Winds of, 210
Goa, Indian use of force in, U.S. views on, 145
Outer space, international cooperation in peaceful
uses of, 180
Tanganyika, membership in the U.N., 37
United Nations:
Decade of Development, 577
Operations in the Congo, question of Security
Council consideration of, 304
U.S. policy, 317
Letters :
Disarmament negotiations, joint request with
U.S.S.R. for U.N. services at coming conference,
205n
Space launchings, U.S. supplies information to U.N.
on, 588
U.N. General Assembly, 16th session, transmitting
report on, 222
U.S. representative to the U.N., confirmation, 398
Stevenson, William E., 78, 306
Stewart, C. Allan, 398
Stockpiles, strategic, dispo.sal problem, statement (Blum-
entbal), 999
Student exchanges with Africa, address (Williams), 547,
548
Subversive Activities Control Act, 179, 847
Sugar :
Cuban quota, determination of, proclamation, 34
Dominican Republic, U.S. position on nonquota alloca-
tion to, 34
International sugar agreement (1958), 305, 654
Summit conference, proposed (sec also Eighteen-nation
committee, conference of: Heads of Government par-
ticipation), statements (Rusk), 360, 462, 797, 798
Supporting assistance, authorization request for FY 1963,
message and statement : Kennedy, 551 ; Rusk, 663
Surprise attack, prevention of, need for, statement
(Rusk), 623
Sweden :
IMF, Sweden's commitment to, 187
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Civil aviation convention (1944), international, proto-
col (1961) to, 654
GATT:
Declaration on provisional accession of Tunisia,
procfis-verbal extending, 350
Interim agreements, with schedules, 511
Proc&s-verbal extending declaration on provisional
accession of Switzerland, 818
IAEA, amendment of statute of, 106
Intergovernmental Committee for European Migra-
tion, withdrawal from, 511
Safety of life at sea, international convention (1960)
on, 740
Wheat agreement, international, 926
Switzerland :
GATT discussion of provisional accession of, 8
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
GATT:
Declaration and proces-verbal on provisional ac-
cession to, 189, 350, 438, 817, 926
Interim agreements, with schedules, 511
Proces-verbal extending declaration on provisional
accession of Tunisia, 818
Reciprocal trade agreement (1936) with U.S., agree-
ment modifying, 610
Safety of life at sea, international convention (1960)
on, 740
Wheat agreement, international, 926
U.S. science attach^, appointment, 566
Syrian Arab Republic :
Agricultural commodities, agreement amending 1961
agreement with U.S., 782
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 244
Immigration quota, U.S. establishment of, 25
Israel-Syrian Armistice Agreement, observance of, state-
ment (Tost) and Security Council res., 735
U.S. Ambassador: appointment, 35; confirmation, 306
U.S. recognition, 25
Taiwan. Sec China, Republic of
Tanganyika :
Independence of, congratulatory message (Kennedy), 3T
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Civil aviation convention (1944), international, 817
Diplomatic relations, Vienna convention (1961) and
protocol on, 817
GATT, admitted as contracting party to, 38
GATT, declarations and protocols re, 350, 397, 398,
4.38, 512, .'')06
FAO constitutiou, 740
UNESCO constitution, 782
WMO constitution, 697
U.N. membership, admission to, statement (Stevenson),
37, 398
1080
Department of State Bulletin
Tariff Commission, U.S. :
Duties under proposed trade expansion act, 237, 341,
343
Recommendations re escape-clause cases, 382, 649, 779,
849, 883
Tariff policy, U.S. (*'ee also Customs; Economic policy
and relations ; Tariffs and trade, general agreement
on ; and Trade) :
Adjustment of, need for (see also Trade Expansion Act
of 19G2, proposed) : addresses, message, and report:
Ball, 669 ; Kennedy, 231, 239 ; MacArthur, 714
Baseball gloves and mitts, decision against increasing
duty on, 649
Carpets, woven, decision to increase duty on, 649
Ceramic tile, decision against increasing duty on, 649
Common Market («ee also European Economic Com-
munity) :
Challenge to U.S. policy, addresses: Ball, 602; Ken-
nedy, 162 ; Rusk, 195
EEC and U.S. tariff schedules, comparison of, state-
ment (Ball), 602
Negotiations with under GATT, summary of, 561
Glass, sheet, decision to increase duty on, 649
History of, address (Coppock), 1028
Lead and zinc, spring clothespins, stainless steel flat-
ware, and safety pins, decision against action re,
382
Political and economic aspects of, address (McGhee),
290
Straight pins, decision against increasing duty on, 849
Tariff classification system, act modernizing, statement
(Kennedy), 1038
Tung oil and tung nuts, decision against import quota
on, 883
Tariffs and trade, general agreement on :
Agreements, declarations, proc^s-verbaux, and proto-
cols, current actions on :
Accessions to : Cambodia, 696 ; Israel, 438, 690, 1041 ;
Portugal, 696, 1041 ; Tanganyika, 38
Annecy protocol of terms of accession to, 566
Art. XVI : 4, declaration on extension of standstill
provisions of and declaration giving effect to, 397,
818
Art. XXIV, special protocol re, 512
Australia, protocol replacing schedule I, 512
Brazil, protocol relating to establishment of new
schedule III, 350
Ceylon, protocol replacing schedule VI, 512
Cotton textiles, arrangements re international trade
in, 38, 259, 431
Declarations and procfes-verbaux on provisional ac-
cessions of : Argentina, 397 ; Israel, 438 ; Switzer-
land, 189, 3.50, 438, 817, 926 ; Tunisia, 189, 350, 397,
817, 818, 926
Declarations on relations with : Poland, 397 ; Yugo-
slavia, 438
EEC, agreements and joint declaration with, 512
French text, protocol of rectification to, 397
Geneva tariff conference (1960-61), interim agree-
ments, with schedules, 511
Haiti-U.S., interim agreement between, 1041
Tariffs and trade, general agreement on — Continued
Agreements, declarations, etc. — Continued
Less developed countries, declaration on promotion
of trade of, 9
Modifications to, protocols of, 512
OTC, agreement on, 397
Proci's-verbal of rectification concerning protocol
amendment part I and articles XXIX and XXX,
protocol amending preamble and parts II and III,
and protocol of organizational amendments, 350
Protocols amending part I and arts. XXIX and XXX
and preamble and parts II and III, 397
Protocols modifying arts. XIV, XXIV, part I and
art. XXIX, part II and art. XXVI, 512
Rectifications and modifications to texts of schedules,
protocols of : 1st, 2d, and 3d protocols, 566 ; 4th
and 5th protocols, 397 ; 6th, 7th, and 8th protocols,
350 ; 9th protocol, 350, 818
Rectifications to : 1st, 2d, and 3d protocols, 512 ; 4th
and 5tb jjrotocols of, 566
Suplementary concessions to, 6th protocol of, 398
Torquay protocol, 566
U.S., agreements providing compensatory concessions
for certain tariff actions taken by, 512
Cotton textile negotiations :
Cotton Textile Committee :
1st meeting, short-term arrangement of, statement
(Martin), 219
2d meeting : announcement and text of long-term
arrangement, 430 ; U.S. delegate to, 259
Geneva conference, results of, statement (Martin),
218
General Agreement on Tariffs and, Trade: Analysis of
United States Negotiations, volumes released, 565
Geneva tariff negotiations (1960-61) :
Publication on, released, 565
Summary of, 561, 718, 1035
U.S. concessions exchanged :
Effective date for implementing, 1036
Proclamation giving effect to, 848
Recapitulation of, 565
Ministerial meeting :
Decisions of, Canadian-U.S. views on, 169
Statements : Ball, 3 ; Gudeman, 6
Text of declaration adopted, 9
19th session of Contracting Parties:
Text of declaration adoptetl, 9
U.S. delegation report on, 7
Relationship of U.S. oil imports program to U.S. agree-
ments under, 31
Riiles of and negotiations with, address (Trezise), 646,
648, 649
Strengthening of, cooperation in, messages (Ball, Bar-
bosa da Silva), 118
Tasca, Henry J., 52
Taxation :
Changes recommended to improve U.S. balance-of-pay-
ments position, report (Kennedy), 2.39
Double taxation, conventions for avoidance of. See
Double taxation
Revision of depreciation schedules for certain textile
manufacturing equipment, 381
ndex January to June 7962
1081
Technical aid to foreign coimtries. See Economic ana
teclinical aid
Technical Cooperation in Africa South of the Sahara,
Commission for, work of, address (Williams), 845,
846
Telecommunications :
Communications satellites, 154, 183, 185, 186, 584, 589,
811, 815
Radio regulations (1959), with appendixes, annexed
to international telecommunication convention
(1959), 511
Telecommunication convention (1959), international,
with six annexes, 77, 106, 189, 305, 397, 511, 566, 890,
1002
Telegraph regulations (Geneva revision 1958) annexes
to international telecommunication convention
(1952) with appendixes and final protocol, 305
Television channels along U.S.-Mexican border, agree-
ments with Mexico re assignment and use, 818, 890
Tennessee Valley Authority, 898
Territorial sea and contiguous zone, convention (1958)
on, 225, 854
Terry, Luther L., 852
Textile Administrative Committee, Interagency, 219
Textiles :
Cotton. See Cotton
Hosiery and knitwear equipment, new depreciation
schedules for, 381
Thailand :
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Atomic energy, peaceful uses of, agreement amending
1956 agreement with U.S., 1002
Civil aviation convention (1944), international, pro-
tocol (1961) to, 6.54
Diplomatic relations, Vienna convention (1961) on.
817
IAEA, amendment to statute of, 397
Peace Corps program, agreement with U.S. re estab-
lishment of, 350
U.S. forces dispatched to, letter (Tost) and statements
(Kennedy, SEATO, Thai), 904
U.S. joint committee with, 499
U.S. relations with, joint statement (Khoman, Busk),
498
VOA broadcasts to, statement (Rusk), 377
Thurston, Raymond L., 35, 306
Tibet :
Chinese Communist domination of, statement (Bing-
ham), 74
Refugees from, address (Cieplinski), 732
Tin Council, International, 998
Tobacco, trade in, address (Trezise), 885
Togo:
Ghanaian refugees, aid to, 102
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Geneva conventions relative to treatment of prisoners
of war, wounded and sick, and civilians, 506
Investment guaranties, agreement with U.S. relating
to, 610
Postal convention (19.57), universal, with final proto-
col, annex, regulations of execution, and provisions
re airmail, 782
1082
Togo — Continued
Visit of President to U.S., joint communique (Kennedy,
Olympic), 03.8
Tourism. See Travel
Tracking stations (Project Mercury) :
Agreement with Chile for reactivation of, 77
Cooperation with U.S.S.R. in development and use of,
letter (Kennedy), 537
U.S. participation with other nations in operation of,
statement (Plimpton), 810, 812
Trade (see also Agricultural surpluses. Commodity trade.
Customs, Economic policy. Exports, Imports, and
Tariff policy) :
Developments in international trade, U.S.-Australian
and ANZUS discussion of, statements: Kennedy,
McEwen, 549 ; Rusk, 865, 867, 946, 947
Economic interdependence, address (Ball), 365
Laws and organizations pertaining to, address (Cop-
pock), 770 772, 773, 774
Less developed countries, need for promotion of, ad-
dresses and statement : Ball, 598, 604 ; McGhee, 290;
Rusk, 949 ; Weiss, 341
Soviet policy, addresses : Hughes, 981 ; Mann, 507
Trade and Atlantic partnership, remarks: Kennedy,
906 ; Rusk, 909
Treaties, agreements, etc.: {
Bills of lading, international convention (1924) for
unification of rules re, 303
Commercial samples and advertising material, inter-
national convention (1952) to facilitate the impor-
tation of, 817
Cotton textiles, arrangements (19G1) re international
trade in, 259
Reciprocal trade agreements with: Paraguay, 741;
Switzerland, 610
U.S. trade :
Adjustment assistance. See Trade adjustment as-
sistance
Expansion of:
International trade services. State and Commerce
Departments' program for, 741
Need for, addresses: Ball, 416; McGhee, 682; Rusk,
403, 404 ; Tubby, 16
Trade Expansion Act of 1962, proposed. See Trade
Expansion Act of 1962
Policy, addresses : Cleveland, 806 ; Coppock, 773, 958,
1027 ; Johnson, 988 ; Kennedy, 823 ; MacArthur, 711,
716 ; Trezise, 646 ; Rusk, 19, 195
With:
Africa, address (Williams), 642
Cuba, embargo on, proclamation and statements:
proclamation, 283; Rusk, 2S5, 287, 348
EEC, {see also European Economic Community),
volume of and negotiations, 561
Japan, address and statement : Martin, 219 ; Trezise,
294
Yugoslavia, statement (Rusk), 346
World Trade Week, 1962, proclamation, 825
Trade Act of 1934, proposed legislative changes, address
(McGhee), 290
Department of State Bulletin
Trade adjustment assistance (see also Trade Expansion
Act of 190:2, proiiosed) :
Advisory Board, establishment of proposed, 342
domestic business and labor benefit from: addresses
and summary of : Johnson, 9!)2 ; Martin, 476, 479 ;
Rusk, 406; summary, 345; Weiss, 342
Program of proposed, address, message, and remarks
(Kennedy), 237, 825, 908
Trade Expansion Act of 1902. proposed :
Addresses, remarks, and statements : Achilles, 328 ; Ball,
367, 410, 597, 001, 669 ; Coppock, 428, 429, 774, 9.58,'
1031; Johnson, 990, 991, 992; Kennedy, 162 23l'
824, 826, 906, 908; JIacArthur, 715, 716; ai'artini
471, 475, 477; McGhee, 289, 681, 727; Rostow, 830;
Rusk, 404, 405, 860, 868, 900, 909. 910, 940 ; Trezise,
648, 774, 884, 887 ; Weiss, 340, 1035
Advantages and provision of, addresses and statement:
Ball, 416, 597 ; Martin, 471, 475, 477 ; Rusk, 900
Importance and goals of, address (Johnson), 990 991
992
Legislation requested of Congress, message, report, and
statement : Ball, .597 ; Kennedy, 231, 239
Need for, addresses : Ball, 367 ; McGhee, 681, 727 • Rusk
404, 405
Presidential authority to negotiate tarife reductions,
proposed : addresses and summary : Coppock, 958,'
1031 ; summary of provisions re, 343 ; Trezise, 774 •
Weiss, 340
Reduction of trade barriers between EEC and U.S.,
proposal for, address and joint communique: Cop-
pock, 774; Hallstein, Kennedy, 770
Summary of, 343
rrade and Economic Affairs. U.S.-Canadlan Committee
on, 7th meeting :
Announcement of and delegations, 105
Test of communique, 168
'rade Cooperation, Organization for, agreement on, 397
'rampczynskl, Witold, 871
'ravel :
Foreign diplomatic representatives in U.S., State Ad-
visory Committee's efforts to facilitate travel of
382
Private road vehicles, customs convention (1954) on
temporary Importation of, 38, 566, 782
Road traffic, convention (1949) on, with annexes 77
259, 610, 653, 782, 817 ' '
Touring, convention (1954) concerning customs facili-
ties for, 566, 817
reaties, agreements, etc., international {for specific
treaty, see country or subject), current actions on
. listed, 38, 77, 106, 154, 189, 225, 259, 305, 350, 397 438'
482, 511, 566, 610, 653, 696, 740, 782, 817, 854, 889, 925*
961, 1002, 1041
reaty of Rome (see also European Economic Commu-
nity), 599, 712, 770, 776
rezise, Philip H. :
Addresses and statements :
Imports, 884
Safety of life at sea convention, .520
Soviet economic challenge, 592
Trade policy, 646, 774
t/ex, January to June 7962
Trezise, Philip H.— Continued
Addresses and statements — Continued
U.S.-Japanese trade, 294
Chairman of delegation to U.S.-Austrlan air transport
negotiations, 718
Trust territories, U.N. {see also individual territory) :
Problem of, address (Ball), 634
Self-government of, need for steps toward : statement
(Bingham), 72; General A.ssembly res., 76
Tshombe, Moise, 10, 137, 138, 709
Tsiang, Tingfu F., 205
Tubby, Roger W., 15, 213, 298, 518, 698
Tung oil and tung nuts, decision against Import quota on
883
Tunisia :
Economic and social development :
Discussions with U.S. officials on, 425
Progress in, address (Williams), 171
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Agricultural commodities, agreement with U S re
4S2
Air services transit, international agreement, 817
Civil aviation convention (1944), International, pro-
tocol (1961) to, 6.54
GATT:
Declaration and proc&s-verbal on provisional acces-
sion to, 189. 350, 397, 817, 818, 926
Proces-verbal extending declaration on provisional
accession of Switzerland, 818
IAEA, amendment of statute of, 106
Peace Corps program, agreement with U.S. re estab-
lishment, 482
U.S. Food-for-Peace Program In, 151, 641
Turkey :
Economic development of :
CENTO consideration of: communique, 526; state-
ment (Rostow), 522
NATO role, 52, 863
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Agricultural commodities, agreements with US 78
306, 610 ' '
GATT, procfes-verbaux extending declarations on
provisional accession of Switzerland and Tunisia
926
Inventions relating to defense for which patent appli-
cations have been filed, agreement for safeguard-
ing, 740
WMO constitution, 740
U.S. aid program in, address (Tubby), 301
Typewriter-ribbon cloth, understanding with Japan re ex-
port to U.S. of, 697
U.A.R. See United Arab Republic
Uganda, progress toward Independence, address (Fred-
ericks), 881
UNEF. See United Nations Emergency Force
UNESCO. See Educational, Scientific and Cultural Or-
ganization, U.N.
UNHCR. See United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees
UNICEF. See United Nations Children's Fund
1083
Union Africaine et MalgJiche, organization and activities
of, addresses and statement (Williams), 172, 722,
843, 916
United Arab Republic :
Economic consultations with, statement (Rusk), 800
Problems of development, address (Bowles), 7G6, 767
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Agricultural commodities, agreements with U.S. re,
438, 698, 818, 1002
Civil aviation convention (1944), international, proto-
col (1961) to, 654
Cultural exchange, agreement with U.S., 959
Safety of life at sea, international convention (1960)
on, 740
Wheat agreement, international, 920
United Kingdom :
Aid to Africa, address (Williams), .')47
Disarmament negotiations (see also Eighteen-nation
committee, conference of), U.S.-U.K. joint com-
munique and report re, 95, 409
East African territories of, progress toward independ-
ence, address (Fredericks), 881
EEC membership, negotiations for. See European Eco-
nomic Community : U.K. negotiations with
Geneva conference of experts on detection of nuclear
tests, Soviet repudiation of agreements of, U.K.-
U.S. report on, 64
Geneva conference on the discontinuance of nuclear
weapon tests. See Geneva conference on the dis-
continuance of nuclear weapon tests
IMP, U.K. commitment to, 187
Nuclear weapons tests (.see also under Nuclear test-ban
treaty), U.K.-U.S. joint action and proposals, 94,
329
Prime Minister, meetings with President Kennedy, joint
communiques, 94, 802
Relationship with Tanganyika, statement (Stevenson),
37
Tarifif concessions, reciprocal, negotiated with U.S., 565
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Agricultural trade, agreement with U.S., 818
Civil aviation convention (1944), international, proto-
col (19C1) to, 654
Cotton textiles, arrangements (1961) re international
trade in, 259
Diplomatic relations, Vienna convention (1901) and
protocol on, 817
GATT :
Interim agreements with schedules, 511
Compensatory concessions under GATT for certain
tariff actions taken by U.S., 512
Proces-verba<ix extending declarations on provi-
sional accession of Switzerland and Tunisia, 818
IAEA, amendment of statute of, 106
ICEM constitution, 511
International telecommunication convention (1959)
with annexes, extension to overseas territories of,
305
Road vehicles, customs convention on temporary im-
portation of, 500
Safety of life at sea, international convention (1960)
on, 740
United Kingdom — Continued
Treaties, agreements, etc. — Continued
Touring, convention concerning customs facilities for
566
Wheat agreement, international, 926
United Nations, consultations with U.S. re, 140, 204
United Nations: |
Addresses and remarks : Ball, 632, 876 ; Cleveland, 330
Rusk, 489; Stevenson, 317
African policy in, address (Fredericks), 883
Cameroon-U.S. joint communique (Ahidjo, Kennedy;
re views on, 543
Congo problem, action on. See Congo situation
Cuban activities in, statement (Rusk), 274
Decade of Development :
General Assembly designation of, letter (Stevenson)
223
Role of economically developed countries in, addres
(Ball), 673
U.S. support of, addresses and message: Ball, 6.S6
Kennedy, 578 ; Stevenson, 577
Disarmament (see also Eighteen-nation disarmamen
committee, conference of) :
Economic and social consequences of, report on. 90
U.N. consideration of, statement (Stevenson), 319
Documents, ILsts of, 149, 436. 526, 609, 696, 738, 816, SS'
Economic and social programs for underdeveloped cour
tries, remarks (Rusk), 19
Equality of member states, address (Cleveland), i<0
Expanded Program of Technical Assistance, articl
(Phillips, Sohl), 395
Financing of :
Assessment of member nations for emergency opera
tions, ICJ opinion requested, U.N. application am
U.S. position on, 97, 222, 311, 315, 435, 851
Bond issue for operations in the Congo and Middli
East :
Authorization of by General Assembly, letter ( Stt
venson), 222
Need for, U.S. views, address, message, and statl
ments : Cleveland, 96 ; Kennedy, 160, 578 ; Rowai
380; Rusk, 362
U.S. purchase of, authorization requested, messag
and statements: Kennedy, 311; Rusk, 312, 318
Stevenson, 317, 322
Budget, addresses (Cleveland), 96, 334
General Assembly. See General Assembly, U.N.
OflBce of Secretary-General :
General Assembly election of U Thant to act, lette
(Stevenson), 222
Significance of, statement (Stevenson), 322
Outer space (see also Outer Space, U.N. Committee <M
Peaceful Uses of), registry of outer-space laund
ings, U.S. information for, address and lette
(Gardner, Stevenson), 588
Peace force (see also T'nited Nations Emergenc;
Force), proposals for, statement and U.S. pro^ios
treaty outline : Rusk, 622 ; text of treaty outlim
747, 754, 757
Peace observation corps, proposed, 754
Peacekeeping operations of, addresses and statement
Ball, 635; Cleveland, 96, OS, 806, 1020
1084
Deparfmenf of Sfate Bulletb
Jnited Nations — Continued
Security Council. See Security Council, U.N.
Tanganyilia, admission to membership, 37, 398
U.K.-U.S. consultatious on, 140, 204
United Nations Day, 1962, proclamation, 853
U.S. Representative to the European Office of U.N. and
Other International Organizations, designation
(Tubby), 698
U.S. support of, addresses : Cleveland, 334 ; Kennedy,
159; Rowan, 380; Rusk, 313, 902; Stevenson, 317
West New Guinea problem :
Appeal to Netherlands and Indonesia for negotiation
of, statement (Department, Rusk), 203
Release of text of Bunker proposals for negotiation
of, 1039
World Food Program, proposed, statement (Gardner),
150
[Jnited Nations Children's Fund, FAO collaboration with,
article (Phillips, Sohl), 395
Dnited Nations Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space. See Outer Space, U.N. Committee on Peace-
ful Uses of
Jnited Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Or-
ganization. See Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization, U.N.
[Jnited Nations Emergency Force :
Activities of, addresses, Cleveland, 332, 333, 1020
Financing of. See United Nations : Financing
[Jnited Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 101, 102,
731, 732
[Jnited Nations Relief and Works Agency, U.S. support
of, address (Cieplinski), 733
anited Nations Special Fund, 395, 726
[Jnited Nations Truce Supervision Organization, observa-
tion on Israel-Syrian border, statement and Security
Council res. re : Yost, 73.5, 736, 737 ; text of res., 737
[Inited States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
See Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, U.S.
[Jnited States citizens and nationals :
Claims. See Claims
Domestic and foreign responsibility of, address (Louch-
heim), 337
Racial equality for, address (Williams), 546
United States Escapee Program, address (Cieplinski), 732
United States Information Agency {see also Voice of
America) :
Expansion of program of, address (Bowles), 254
Use of films as an informational media, remarks
(Tubby), 214
United States Mission to the United Nations, impor-
tance of (Ball), 638
United States National Aeronautics and Space Adminis-
tration, training in space projects, statement (Plimp-
ton), 811, 812
Universal postal convention (1957), 225, 482, 782
UXRWA. See United Nations Relief and Works Agency
Upper Volta :
Civil aviation convention (1944), international, 053
Geneva conventions (1949) on treatment of prisoners
of war, wounded and sick, and civilians in time of
war, 398
Upper Volta — Continued
International telecommunication convention (1959) with
annexes, 305
Uruguay :
Agricultural commodities, agreement with U.S., 890
Punta del Este conference resolutions re Cuba, position
on, 283
U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 1042
USIA. See United States Information Agency
Vatican City :
IAEA statute, amendment of article VI.A.3 of, 259
Telecommunication convention (1959), international,
with six annexes, 1002
Wheat agreement, international, 926
VE-Day anniversary, greeting to Brazilian war veterans,
message (Kennedy), 878
Vernon, Edward M., 694
Venezuela :
Defense of democracy, congratulation to President of,
letter (Kennedy), 1023
Trade agreement with, relationship of U.S. oil imports
program to, 31
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Agricultural commodities, agreement with U.S., 926
Civil aviation convention (1944), international, proto-
col (1961) to, 6.54
IAEA statute, amendment to, 889
Peace Corps, agreement with U.S. establishing, 1041
Rice Commission, International, constitution (1953)
of, 697
Safety of life at sea, international convention (1960)
on, 740
Wheat agreement, international, 926
U.S. Ambassador, confirmation, 398
Visit of President and Mrs. Kennedy, remarks (Ken-
nedy) and text of joint communique (Betancourt,
Kennedy), 89
"Victory," State Department position re use of word, letter
and statement : Ball, 1038 ; Rusk, 972
Viet-Nam :
Communist aggression and activities in :
ANZUS communique re, 870
Campaign against social and economic progress in,
address (Johnson), 54
Guerrilla warfare of north Viet-Nam regime, ad-
dresses (Rusk), 9.5, 449, 455
Message of President Diem re, 13
U.S. position. See infra
United Nations, question of referral to, statement
(Rusk), 243
Economic development programs for, joint communique
with U.S. on, 141
Negotiations for settlement of problem of :
Geneva Accords of 195i, 13, 14, 449, 450, 455
Prospect of further negotiations, statement (Rusk),
459, 461, 463
New Tear greetings to, message (Kennedy), 377
Index, January to June 1962
1085
Viet-Nam — Continued
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Agricultural commodities, agreements witli U.S., 106,
398, 9G1
Safety of life at sea, international convention (1960)
on, 740
U.S. position and aid, addresses, message, and state-
ments : Ball, 875 ; Bowles, 257 ; Kennedy, 13, 101 ;
Rostow, 967, 968 ; Rusk, 12;^ 363, 455, 459, 868, 869,
939 "^^
Viet-Nam, north, aggression against Republic of Viet-
Nam. See Viet-Nam : Communist aggression
Visas :
Issuance of, address (Cieplinski) , 730
Reciprocal waiver of visas and visa fees, agreements
with : Belgium re, 1041 ; Korea, 1041
Visa Office, Director of, designation (Moreland), 1042
VGA. See Voice of America
Vocational education program in Brazil, agreement ex-
tending 19.50 agreement re, 901
Voice of America :
Lao and Thai language broadcasts to Southeast Asia,
statement (Rusk), 377
Latin America, increase in broadcasts to, address
(Kennedy), 161
20tb anniversary of, remarks (Rusk), 510
Volta River project, 30
Voluntary relief agencies, U.S., aid to Chinese refugees
in Hong Kong, statement (Harriman), 994
Wages, low wage countries, imports from, address (John-
son), 991
War, investment guaranties agreements relating to losses
due to, 566
Waters, Herbert J., 698
Weapons production program (see also Military equip-
ment), agreement with Netherlands, 225
Weather (see aiso World Meteorological Organization) :
Forecasting, cooperation in development of, remarks
(Cleveland), 694
Weather satellites. See under Satellites
Weaver, George L. P., 1040
Weiss, Leonard, 340, 1032
West Indies, The :
Dissolution of the Federation of, proposed, 438
Jamaica, Peace Corps program, agreement with U.S.
re establishment of, 482
West Nevf Guinea, dispute between Netherlands and In-
donesia over :
ANZUS Council communique, 870
Appeal of U.N. Secretary-General for negotiation of,
statements (Department, Rusk), 203
Bunker proposals for negotiating: statement (Rusk),
975 ; text of, 1039
General Assembly res., 76
Threat of use of force in, statement (Rusk) , 125
U.S. views, statements : Bingham, 74 ; Rusk, 4G1, 864
Western Europe. See Europe : Western Europe
Western Powers (France, U.K., U.S.). See Berlin ano
inflividttal countries
Western Samoa, Trust Territory of :
Independence for, address (Rusk), 944
Road traffic, convention (1949) on, with annexes, 77
Whaling convention (1946), international, and scheduU
of regulations, 154, 350, 890, 1041
Wheat :
Cyprus, memorandum of understanding re sale of anc
use of proceeds, 305
EEC-U.S. trade in, negotiations re, 564
International wheat agreements (1959), 259; (1962)
926, 1041
White, Lincoln, 10
White, Thomas D., 591
WHO. See World Health Organization
Wiesner, Jerome B., 6.50
Williams, G. Mennen :
Addresses and statement relating to Africa :
Challenge to youth and American enterprise, 60, 544.
719
Congo situation, U.S. position on, 136
Health Frontier of the Developing Nations, 26
Progress in newly independent states of, 170
Regional groupings within mid-Africa, 841
Role of agriculture in development of, 639
Strengthening of friendship and cooperation with,
017
Consulate at Stanleyville, opened by, 853
Visit to 10 countries of Africa, announcement, 722
WMO. See World Meteorological Organization
Women, free-world cooperation among, remarks (Louch
heim), 921
Woodward, Robert F., 698
World Bank. See International Bank
World Court. See International Court of Justice
World Food Program ( FAO/U.N. ) :
Initiation of program, article (Phillips, Sohl), 392, 393,
397
U.S. support of, statement (Gardner), 150
World Health Organization :
Africa, health programs in, address (Williams), 27, 29
Constitution (1946) of, 607, 740
15th Assembly, U.S. delegation, 852
World Meteorological Organization :
Commission for Synoptic Meteorology of, 3d session,
announcement, remarks (Cleveland), and U.S. dele-
gation, 094
Convention of, ISO, 305. 560, 697. 7S2
Weather satellites. See under Satellites
Wounded and sick in time of war, Geneva conventions
relative to treatment of, 566
Yemen, UNESCO constitution. 1002
Yost, Charles W., 398, 735, 905
Youth of America, African challenge, address (Williams),
544
1086
Department of State Bulletin
Jugoslavia Yugoslavia — Continued
GATT consideration of relationship with, 8 U.S. claims against, negotiation of, 847
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Agricultural commodities, agreements with U.S., 106, U.S. policy toward, statements (Rusk), 340, 489
890, 1041
Civil aviation convention, international, protocol Zanderij Airport in Surinam, agreement with Netherlands
(1961) to, 854 re U.S. use of, 890
GATT, declaration on relations with contracting , , ^ .^ • • -4. ■ i
' Zinc and lead, decision against reopemng escape-clause
parties, 438 ,. ooo
« , J,.^ . • ,. i.- , ^- ,-,nrn\ action on, 382
Safety of Life at sea, international convention (19G0)
on 740 Zorin, Valerian, 205n.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Publication 7445
Released January 1963
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, tJ.S. Oovernment Printing Offlce
Washington 25, D.C. - Price 30 cents
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFriCEi1963
fHE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
XJ . t- >vl c
ICiAL
;KLY RECORD
Vol. XLVI, No. 1175
ISSUES FACING GATT IN THE NEW TRADING
WORLD • Statements by Under Secretary Ball and
Under Secretary of Commerce Edward Gudeman, U.S. Delega-
tion Report, and Text of Declaration 3
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVEL-
OPMENT • Remarks by Secretary Rusk and Address
by William T. Nunley 18
THE HEALTH FRONTIER OF THE DEVELOPING
NATIONS OF AFRICA • by Assistant Secretary
Williams 26
THE CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT, THE MEDIA,
AND EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS • by
Assistant Secretary Tubby 15
TED STATES
EIGN POLICY
For index see inside back cover
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Vol. XLVI, No. 1175 • Publication 7319
January 1, 1962
For sale by tbo Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing OfDce
Washington 26, D.C.
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The Department of State BULLETIN,
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Issues Facing GATT in the New Trading World
The Contracting Parties to the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade met at Geneva for a
ministerial meeting November 27-30 and for their
19th session November 13-Decemher 9} Follow-
ing are statements made during the ministenal
m,eeting iy Under Secretary of State George W.
Ball, U.S. ministerial rejyresentative, and hy Under
Secretary of Comnnerce Edioard Gudemnn, vice
chairman of the U.S. ministerial delegation, to-
gether with a report of tlie U.S. delegation to the
19th session issued on December 9 and text of a
U.S. declaration on 'prom,otion of trade of less de-
veloped countries adopted at the ministerial meet-
ing and at the 19th session.
STATEMENT BY MR. BALL, NOVEMBER 27
Press release S72 dated December 11
Reduction of Tariff Barriers to Trade
In the 14 years of its life tliis organization has
been extremely fortunate in having as its Execu-
tive Secretary a very remarkable man who has
served us both as mentor and conscience, and I
should like on behalf of the United States delega-
tion— and I am sure that in this respect I can
speak for all of us assembled here — to express
our thanks to Mr. Eric Wyndliam White for his
very large part in the organization of this meeting
as well as for his valiant and patient toils over the
years on behalf of the principles of liberal trade.
I may say that he is the yoimgest elder statesman
on record.
I should like also to say that we of the United
States delegation feel a sense of ui-gency about
getting on to the conclusion of the Dillon round
of negotiations, and it is our hope that, during the
course of this meeting, in the conversations that we
* For an annoiincement of the meetings, see Bttlletin
of Dec. 4, 1961, p. 947.
may have with ministers assembled here we shall
on our part be able to reach substantial conclu-
sions on the various items which are left unsettled.
I would hope that this could be the case for all of
the other members of the GATT, so that this
round can be brought to a conclusion.
In the 14 years that the GATT has been in exist-
ence the world has seen many changes and the
trading patterns of the world have shifted and
clianged and altered their form very substantially.
In the early days of the GATT we were still
experiencing the slow and painful recovery from
a shattering war. Since that time we have had
a new phenomenon to deal with, a very hopeful
one, the emergence on the world scene of a great
number of new nations achieving sovereignty and
independence for the first time and becoming most
useful members of the society of nations. While
this has added a complication, it also affords an
additional promise to our work here in trying
together to bring about the expansion and im-
provement of world trade.
The other principal circumstance which has
arisen and which becomes a new element in the
equation of trade liberalization is, of course, the
development of the European Economic Com-
munity itself, and now the possibility of a sub-
stantial further expansion of the Community by
the adhesion of the United Kingdom and possibly
of other govermnents. This is a development
which is of direct interest not merely to those
nations which are participating in this great ex-
perience but also to all of the trading nations of
the world. The size, the importance, the very
special position which the Community must
necessarily play in world commerce and in the
negotiating process which could lead to trade
expansion is obviously something of the very high-
est significance.
I think, therefore, that this is a very good time
for us assembled here today to begin to think
seriously about trying to adapt some of our
January 1, 7962
techniques and some of our ideas with regard to
trade liberalization to the new realities of what
is essentially a new trading world, having a differ-
ent size and shape and form from any trading
world that we have known before. We are very
fortunate, I think, that the GATT is such a flexible
instrument. We are very fortunate that it has
been so wisely led as to preserve that essential
element of flexibility. I think that through the
GATT we should be able, by the pooling of the
experience of all of us, to develop some new and
extremely useful ideas.
For our own part, speaking as the delegate from
the United States, I may say that we are engaged
in a very careful reexamination of our policies.
We are looking quite seriously at the possibilities
of shaping new legislation which will provide new
tools for the United States Executive to enable us
to play our part in the development of new policies
through the GATT and the adoption of those
policies through the multilateral mechanism which
the GATT provides. I would hope that within a
very short time we can disclose in some detail the
exact form of the proposals which the President
will be making to the United States Congress.
But I can say that they will be adapted to the new
realities of the trading world as we see them.
This is a time I think for the development of
new teclmiques. But it is certainly no time for the
abandonment of old and steadfast principles.
I may say that the eternal verities of trade liberal-
ization are three so far as we are concerned : the
negotiation of trade liberalization through a multi-
lateral mechanism, the preservation and the
application assiduously and consistently of the
principle of nondiscrimination, that is, the most-
favored-nation principle, and, finally, the primacy
of the GATT in the reaching of arrangements for
the expansion of trade through the negotiating
process. These principles we urge upon this meet-
ing here today as having a very special character
and as being of very special value.
I think that we should not lose the momentum
that we have created over the years. I think that
with the prospective conclusion of the present
round of negotiations we should be thinking very
seriously of plans for imdertaking a further
negotiating round. In that connection I think
we may need techniques which are better adapted
to the conditions which we face in the world today.
There are obviously a whole new set of ideas which
have been introduced withm the past few years,
to a considerable extent through the developments
of the techniques of the Kome Treaty. These in-
clude the possibility of linear cuts, of weighted
averages, and other techniques which might be
applied to assist a successful negotiation. I do
not think we should prejudge at this point what
techniques should be the most useful to us all.
But I should think that it would be useful if the
Contracting Parties in the course of this meeting
would direct the undertaking of a study of plans
for a new round of tariff negotiations and the
development of techniques appropriate for today's
world which may be employed in the course of
those negotiations.
STATEMENT BY MR. BALL, NOVEMBER 28
Press release 873 dated December 11
Obstacles to the Trade of Less Developed Countries
For a decade the attention of many of the eco-
nomically advanced countries of the world has
been focused on the problem of providing assist-
ance to the less developed countries in their efforts
to improve their standards of living and to ad-
vance their economies. As a part of this effort
very substantial capital siuns have been made
available and a very substantial effort of technical
assistance has been provided. I think, however,
that, in our emphasis on the provision of foreign
assistance or capital for development purposes,
we have failed to place adequate emphasis on the
equally important problem of the provision of
markets for the less developed countries as they
begin to move ahead in their development and as
they begin to increase their production not only
of primary products but also of simple man-
ufactures.
My colleagues have just d&scribed to me the very
powerful statement which the distinguished Min-
ister for Commerce of Sweden, Mr. [Gunnar]
Lange, made a few moments ago, when I was un-
fortunately out of the room, with regard to the
essential nature of the problem which we are fac-
ing in ti-ying to find ways and means to assist in
the problem of access to the markets of the world
for the production of the less developed coimtries.
Three years ago, as has been mentioned here this
morning, the GATT ministers first took note of
this serious problem. Since that time it is possible
Department of Sfafe Bulletin
,o find some improvement in the export earnings
)f the less developed countries. In spite of con-
inuing adverse trends in commodity prices, there
las been progress in diversification, there has been
progress in expanding the volume of the exports
)f the less developed countries. There have also
jeen — and this is something which my own Gov-
jniment has recently begim to play a significant
jart in — increased efforts to deal with the prob-
ems of commodity prices and efforts to find ways
md means of bringing a greater stability into
;hose price structures. But I suggest that there
las been wholly inadequate progress in terms of
;hose measures which were principally recom-
nended by GATT Committee III, that is, the re-
axations of tariffs and of nontariff measures
vhich tend to impede the access of the less devel-
)ped countries to world markets. And so I would
propose this morning that we take very serious
iccount of this problem and that we try to find
;he ways of giving new impetus to a search for
;olutions.
The United States delegation has put forward a
Iraft resolution which we commend to this body,
[n this resolution we set forth the reasons why it
s necessary for us to seek a solution to the problem
)f finding markets for the less developed coim-
ries. We suggest some guiding principles that
night be followed by the economically advanced
countries in furthering this effort, and we express
;he very specific responsibility which is the part
)f the economically advanced countries in seeking
iuch solution. The decision as to the procedures
;hat should be established to develop concrete pro-
p-ams of action is one which I think we must take
;^ery quickly. I would suggest perhaps that Com-
nittee III might be asked to take steps and make
recommendations that are necessary to strengthen
)ur authority to follow this problem and to de-
velop specific programs.
I would like on behalf of my Government to
jxpress our interest in and our support for the
proposal put forward by the Nigerian delegation,
riiis is a proposal which looks toward the problem
jf access for tropical products specifically. It is
^uite consistent with some initiatives which the
Qnited States Government has itself taken in this
field.
The problem of primary products is of course
only part of the problem. Quite obviously, as
countries move into the early stages of develop-
ment, they are interested in the development of
manufactures, and, as was suggested a moment
ago, the pi'oduction of cotton textiles is almost a
classical example of a labor-intensive manufacture
wliich is adapted to the resources of many less
developed countries. Last summer we had some
experience in trying to find an interim solution to
this problem, and, as you know, the GATT is pres-
ently undertaking to guide a group which is seek-
ing a longer term solution for the textile problem.^
In seeking that solution let me say that, so far
as the United States is concerned, we put great
emphasis on the need for increasing access for the
production of the less developed countries. This
will, I can assure you, be the guiding principle
which the United States Government will follow
in its work in this body. We have not only the
problem of providing access for simple manu-
factures ; we have the broader problem of dealing
with the tarifl' questions so far as they affect the
less developed coimtries, and I think that here we
have to be very clear that the principles of reci-
procity which may govern the dealings between
the economically advanced countries may not be
altogether as faithfully followed as in the dealings
between economically advanced countries and the
less developed countries. There is obviously room
for some flexibility.
Another aspect of this problem which I think
we should all give some attention to is the question
not merely of providing access to markets by the
reduction or elimination of national obstacles in
the form of tariffs, quotas, or the other familiar
paraphernalia of trade restriction, but there should
be a very serious effort on the part of the economi-
cally advanced countries to provide assistance to
the export industries of the less developed coun-
tries, to assist them to improve their production,
and, quite as important, to assist them in improv-
ing their marketing methods. On the part of the
United States Government let me say that we are
prepared to provide technical assistance in this
matter and we feel that this is a situation in which
efforts of this kind can be very fruitful indeed.
Along with this goes the problem of assisting the
less developed countries to meet the sanitary re-
quirements of the economically advanced countries
and to comply with the specifications and require-
' For background, see Hid., Aug. 21, 1961, p. 336 ; Sept
25, 1961, p. 528 ; Nov. 6, 1961, pp. 773 and 776 ; and Nov.
27, 1961, p. 906.
January 1, J 962
ments which have been imposed by these countries
for I'easons of public health or similar reasons.
Here, again, there is a tendency on the part of
some governments to use the sanitary restrictions
as a restrictive device. I may say that this is some-
thing which the United States Government has
tried strenuously to avoid, and I would suggest
that it is not a practice which should be continued
by any of the governments.
These are only some of the problems which I
think it is important for us to give attention to
here tliis morning. Along with the development
of markets for the primary production of the
less developed countries, we have, as I mentioned
a moment ago, the problem of bringing some
stability into the price structure. This also is
something which should, I think, represent a co-
ordinated effort on the part of the economically
advanced countries, and my Government is pre-
pared to work very seriously on this matter
through the appropriate agencies of the United
Nations, the OAS [Organization of American
States], the FAO [Food and Agriculture Organi-
zation], and so on.
These represent a few of the comments which
we would like to make at this point on this very
important problem. We have, as I say, put for-
ward a resolution, and I would hope that this body
might give serious attention to that resolution since
it seems to us to express some veiy useful ideas as
to the appropriate ways and means by which this
very important question can be approached.
STATEMENT BY MR. GUDEMAN, NOVEMBER 29
Press release 874 dated December 11
Trade in Agricultural Commodities
One of the most difficult and fundamental prob-
lems facing us is that of trade in agi-icultural
products. The time is long overdue for us to
come to grips with this problem. The challenge
this problem presents to GATT is basic. Wliat is
at issue is whether countries are prepared to co-
operate in their own and in the common interest.
While great progress has been made in the re-
moval of restrictions on trade in manufactured
items, relatively little progress has been made
as regards trade in agricultural products. Quan-
titative restrictions, state trading, mixing require-
ments, and other devices are still extensively
applied to limit trade in agricultural products.
Tlie third report of GATT Committee II describes
the wide range of restrictive devices employed ia
the agricultural field. The report indicates the
adverse consequences to resource use in the protect-
ing countries, to economic development in the ex-
porting countries, and to the continuance of
GATT as a trade-expansive body if these pro-
tective devices continue. The longer these
restrictions remain, the more deep-seated and en-
trenched they become and the more difficult they
will be to remove.
We are disturbed not only over the existing re-
strictions but also at the tendencies toward even
increased agricultural protectionism. We hope in
particular that the EEC, one of the world'si
greatest agricultural markets, will not adopt poli-
cies or measures insulating the Community from
the world market in agricultural commodities.
We are concerned because of adverse effects noti
only on our own trade but also on trade of other'
countries, notably the less developed countries,
which must have access to markets if their legiti-
mate aspirations are to be achieved.
We are pleased to hear the remarks of other;
speakers recognizing this problem and urging that
a solution to it be found. Wliile it is not clear
what form the solution should take, it is clear
that some form of international approach isi
required.
We welcome therefore the suggestions made by
the representatives of France, of Germany speakn
ing for the EEC, and of other countries, most
recently New Zealand, that this problem be studied
to see what the possibilities for action may be.
We urge that the Contracting Parties establish
procedures for tlie development of proposals to
serve as a basis for the negotiation of practical
measures to permit access to markets for inter-
national commodities. These procedures should
provide for the establishment of such groups as
may be necessary for this purpose. My Govern-
ment would be agi-eeable to beginning this work
with an examination of the possibilities for solu-
tion of the problem of cereals as proposed by the
representative of France. However, it should be
understood at the outset that possible solutions in
any other agricultural commodity where there is
an access problem, not just in wheat, should be
considered.
It should be understood, also, that the United
States could not consider these possible solutions
Department of Stale Bulhtin
as substitutes for a reasonable settlement of the
agricultural issues in the current Geneva tariff
negotiations.
We are not prepared at this time to judge what
is the right solution to the problem of access to
agricultural markets. Indeed there is likely to
be more than one answer. We should like to
emphasize, however, that, whatever the solution
may prove to be, it should be one which will, first,
provide substantially increased access to the
markets of importers of agricultural commodities ;
second, take into account the legitimate interests
of botli importers and exporters; and, third, rest
upon the fundamental principles of the GATT.
The purpose of these remarks has not been to
direct undue criticism at any country or group of
countries but to empliasize the conviction of my
Government that it is imperative to take steps to
free agricidtural trade from many of the restric-
tive devices now impeding this trade. The prob-
lem is not easy to solve, but fundamental problems
rarely are. The very complexity of the whole area
of agricultural trade, and the importance of agri-
cultural production and trade to the social, eco-
nomic, and political fabric of most of our
countries, highlight the urgency of our getting
on with the job.
REPORT OF U.S. DELEGATION
Prpss release 871 dated December 11
New procedures for future tariff reductions,
special measures to achieve broader access to world
markets for agricultural products, and intensified
efforts to expand the export earnings of less de-
veloped countries were the central topics con-
sidered by the Contracting Parties to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) at their
19tli session, which ended in Geneva on December
9. Each of these matters has been the object of
intensive study by the Contracting Parties under
their Program for the Expansion of Trade. They
were further considered at the GATT ministerial
meeting on November 27-30, and, in accordance
with decisions adopted by the ministers, the Con-
tracting Parties approved action programs for
intensified efforts to expand world trade.
Meeting from November 13 to December 9, con-
tracting parties and governments associated with
the GATT called a recess in their regular session
so that trade ministers might meet to provide the
necessary additional policy guidance for further
steps to carry forward the GATT's trade expan-
sion program.
Tlie U.S. ministerial representative was Greorgo
W. Ball, Under Secretary of State. Edward
Gudeman, Under Secretary of Commerce, was
vice chairman of the U.S. ministerial delegation.
The chairman of the U.S. delegation to the 19th
session was Joltn W. Evans, U.S. Eepresentative
on the GATT Council of Kepresentatives.
In addition to work related to the ministerial
meeting, the Contracting Parties at their 19th
session dealt with an extensive agenda of some 60
topics, including such matters as regional eco-
nomic arrangements, quantitative import restric-
tions, the application of GATT trading rules to
Japan by all contracting parties, and the welcom-
ing of a new nation — Tanganyika — as the 40th
contracting party to the GATT.
Perhaps the most far-reaching actions taken
by the Contracting Parties, however, were those
directed to ministerial conclusions on the trade
problems identified in the work of the Program
for the Expansion of Trade and the new tasks
arising from these conclusions.
The ministers reaffirmed their confidence in the
General Agreement as the basis for the trading
relationships of their countries and agreed that
steps should be taken to increase its effective ap-
plication in the three fields of action (tariff re-
duction, trade in agriculture, and trade with the
less developed countries) which were submitted
to the ministers for their consideration. The min-
isters adopted four conclusions, together with
recommendations for additional action by the
Contracting Parties :
(1) The multilateral reduction of tariffs on a
most-favored-nation basis should be continued,
but new techniques should be adopted, suited to
the changes that had taken place in world trading
relationships. In this connection one of the
tecliniques most prominently mentioned by min-
isters was some form of across-the-board or linear
tariff negotiation. Accordingly, the Contracting
Parties established a working party on procedures
for tariff reduction, which will meet in the near
future to examine new procedures and techniques
for the further reduction of tariffs on a most-
favored-nation basis.
(2) Having expressed great concern over the
degree and extent of agricultural protectionism,
the ministers requested that the Contracting Par-
January ?, 1962
ties adopt procedures designed to form the basis
for the negotiation of "practical measures for the
creation of acceptable conditions of access to world
markets for agricultural commodities." The Con-
tracting Parties decided that the work would be
coordinated by the GATT Council of Representa-
tives and that a first step would be taken in early
February of 1962 with a preliminary examination
of possibilities for a solution of the problem of
trade in cereal products. The GATT Council is
expected to initiate discussion of other commodi-
ties at its February meeting.
(3) The ministers' discussion of obstacles to the
trade of less developed countries reflected wide-
spread concern that the present rate of growth
of the export earnings of the less developed
countries is not keeping pace with the growth of
their foreign exchange requirements and recog-
nition that aid can be no substitute for trade in
the financing of economic development. Accord-
ingly the ministers adopted a U.S. -sponsored
declaration on promotion of the trade of less
developed countries. The declaration recognizes
the need for a special effort by all governments to
expand the export earnings of the less developed
countries, particularly through providing im-
proved access to markets, and sets forth certain
guiding principles to this end. The ministers
further agreed that their governments should ob-
serve these principles as fully as possible, with the
aim of reducing obstacles to the trade of the less
developed countries in the near future. More-
over, in response to an appeal from the less
developed countries for some concrete measures
of assurance that early progress will be made, the
ministers asked the Contracting Parties to draw
up specific programs of action for the reduction
of trade barriers and to establish procedures for
keeping under review the actions taken by indi-
vidual governments to improve market oppor-
tunities for the less developed countries.
Besides adopting the declaration on the pro-
motion of trade of less developed countries, the
Conti-acting Parties agreed that preliminary
arrangements for future action programs envis-
aged by the ministers would be undertaken at a
meeting of the GATT's Committee III prior to
February. The Contracting Parties also accepted
the conclusion of most of the ministers that the
question of duty-free entry for tropical products
should be given cai-eful consideration.
Finally the ministers considered the situation
resulting from the fact that the GATT was not
being applied to trade relations between Japan
and some of the contracting parties. Some min-
isters expressed the hope that early action could be
taken by the contracting parties concerned to en-
able Japan to participate fuUy in the GATT and
agreed that such action would greatly add to the
effectiveness of the GATT. The United States
strongly supported this conclusion.
Other noteworthy trade policy matters before
the Contracting Parties were regional trading ar-
rangements, mcluding the European Economiei
Community (EEC), the European Free Trade
Association (EFTA), and the Latin American
Free Trade Area (LAFTA) ; programs designed
to eliminate or significantly reduce quantitative
import restrictions still imposed by some contract-
ing parties ; reviews of waivers of GATT obliga-
tions granted to certain contracting parties, in-
cluding the United States; an extension of the^
arrangements for the provisional accession ofl
Switzerland to the GATT; special arrangements
to give newly independent states, chiefly of Africa,
full opportunity to determine their future rela-
tions to the GATT ; a review of the progress Yugo-
slavia has made toward arrangements which would
permit her to apply the GATT's rules of trade
conduct; a request by the United States that thei
Contracting Parties consider the special problem i
of applying the GATT to international trade in
television programs; and a new free-trade area<
established between Sarawak and North Borneo.
Decisions were also taken agreeing to the accession
to the GATT of Israel and Portugal upon thei
completion of certain formalities relating to tariff!
negotiations both countries completed durmg the'
1960-61 GATT tariff conference.
In addition to agreeing upon a program of meet-
ings and the GATT budget for 1962, the Con-
tracting Parties elected their officers for next year.
The new chairman will be W. P. H. Van Ooi-schot
of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The vice
chairmen will be J. B. Daramola of Nigeria and
J. H. Warren of Canada.
Mr. Evans, chairman of the U.S. delegation to
the 19th session, was assisted by two vice chairmen,
Leonard Weiss, Director, Office of International
Trade, Department of State, and William Dale,
Director, Bureau of International Programs, De-
partment of Commerce; two congressional ad-
8
Department of State Bulletin
visers, Cecil K. King and Herman T. Sclineebeli,
House of Representatives; and a special adviser,
William E. Dowling, Commissioner, U.S. Tariff
Commission. Otlier members of the U.S. delega-
tion were drawn from the Departments of State,
Treasury, Agriculture, Commerce, Interior, and
Labor.^
TEXT OF DECLARATION
] )ECLARATIO?J ON PuOMOTION OF THE TRADE OF LESS-
Developed Countries
1. The Contracting Parties recognize that there is
need for rapid and sustained expansion in the export
earnings of the less-developed countries If their develop-
ment is to proceed at a satisfactory pace. They recog-
nize the magnitude of the tasli before the governments of
those countries in increasing per capita incomes and rais-
ing the standard of living of their peoples. To achieve
these ends, increasing amounts of foreign exchange will
be required for financing the imports needed to sustain
and develop the economy. Although international aid
is now and will continue to be essential in covering these
needs, aid can be no substitute for trade. In the final
analysis, economic development will have to be paid for
from the earnings of the countries concerned.
2. The export trade of the less-developed countries is
not growing at a pace commensurate with the growth of
their foreign exchange needs or with the growth of world
trade generally. The Contracting Parties accordingly
recognize the need for a conscious and purposeful effort
on the part of all governments to promote an expansion
in the export earnings of less-developed countries through
the adoption of concrete measures to this end. The suc-
cess of the efforts of developing countries will depend to
a great extent upon their ability to find the necessary mar-
kets. Accordingly, contracting parties should reduce to
a minimum restrictions inhibiting access to markets for
the export products of the less-developed countries. The
governments of the major industrialized areas, on whose
markets the less-developed countries must necessarily
largely depend, recognize a particular responsibility in
this respect.
3. The Contbactino Parties agree that, if the needs of
the less-developed countries for enlarged and diversified
export trade are to be met, these countries must develop
trade in other than traditional products. They note that
some developing countries already have the investment
and technological resources for the processing of raw
materials and are able to produce eflSeiently some manu-
factured goods. They recognize that it is desirable that
the.se countries and others possessing the necessary ma-
terials and skills be provided with increased opportunities
to sell in world markets the industrial goods which they
can economically produce, and urge that governments give
^ For the members of the U.S. delegations to the minis-
terial meeting and to the 19th session, see Department of
State press release 773 dated Nov. 9.
special attention to ways of enlarging these opportunities.
4. The Contracting Parties recognize that govern-
ments can contribute to the general objectives outlined
above by observing the following principles and taking
into account the following facts regarding tariff and non-
tariff measures affecting access to markets.
(a) Quanlitative restrictions. Governments should
give immediate and special attention to the speedy removal
of those quantitative Import restrictions which affect the
export trade of less-developed countries. Where it Is
necessary for a government to maintain such restrictions
under appropriate provisions of the GATT, it should apply
them in a non-discriminatory manner causing the mini-
mum hindrance to international trade, pursue policies
designed to remove the underlying conditions requiring
the use of such restrictions and, pending their elimination,
give careful and sympathetic consideration to progressive
increases in quotas. Contracting parties which are in
process of moving out of balance-of-payments difficulties
should take particular care that liberalization benefits are
extended in the fullest measure to the trade of less-
developed countries, having regard to the urgent need for
helping these countries attain rapid, self-sustaining
growth.
(b) Tariffs. Governments should give special attention
to tariff reductions which would be of direct and primary
benefit to less-developed countries. In this connexion,
they should consider the elimination of tariffs on primary
products important in the trade of less-developed coun-
tries. They should also consider reducing thofse tariffs
which differentiate disproportionately between processed
products and raw materials, bearing in mind that one
of the most effective ways in which less-developed coim-
tries can expand their employment opportunities and in-
crease their export earnings is through processing the
primary products they produce for export.
(e) Revenue duties. Fiscal charges, whether imposed
as tariff duties or internal taxes, may inhibit efforts
directed towards increasing consumption of particular
products important in the trade of less-developed coun-
tries and, even where applied equally to imports and to
competing domestic products, can be a serious obstacle
to the expansion of trade. The Contracting Parties
appreciate that adjustments in a fiscal system may be a
complex matter, with important financial, economic and
other consequences which have to be taken into account.
Bearing in mind, however, the urgent development needs
of less-developed countries and the current financial and
economic .situation in the industrialized countries mainly
concerned, they agree that the removal or considerable
reduction of revenue duties and fiscal charges in indus-
trialized countries would be a useful contribution to the
foreign exchange earning capacity of less-developed ex-
porting countries.
(d) State trading. Access to markets for products of
the type studied by Committee III should not be unnec-
essarily impeded through the operations of State import
monopolies or purchasing agencies. For many products
exported by less-developed countries, the prices charged
on resale by some State monopolies, whether in countries
with centrally-planned economies or in others, involve an
implicit heavy taxation of imports. Countries operating
January h 7962
state import monopolies or purchasing agencies, should
endeavour to improve access to their markets for products
of less-developed countries by decisions to import larger
quantities of the products concerned and, if necessary,
by reductions in the difference between import and sales
prices.
(e) Preferences. Some less-developed countries benefit
neither from the preferential tariff systems which were
in operation when the GATT came into being nor from
the preferential treatment being established in the new
customs unions or free-trade areas. The Contracting
Parties appreciate the concern of these less-developed
countries whose export trade in certain products may be
placed at a competitive disadvantage by the preferred
treatment given to certain less-developed suppliers. They
note, however, that the benefits afforded participating
less-developed countries may include not only tariff pref-
erences but other forms of assurances in the marketing
of the products concerned. While it was important that
these various advantages .should not operate to the detri-
ment of other less-developed countries, it was also neces-
sary that action to deal with this problem should be on
a basis that meets the marketing needs of supplying
countries now enjoying preferred access to markets.
(f) Suhsidies. The subsidization of either the pro-
duction or export of primary products may restrict the
market opportunities of less-developed countries. Where
this is so, the governments concerned should seek to limit
the use of the subsidies in question, with a view to avoid-
ing injury to the export earnings of less-developed
countries.
(g) Disposal of commnditij surpluses. Governments
disposing of commodity surpluses should bear in mind
that the products concerned are generally important in
the export trade of one or more less-developed countries,
and tiat this is an added reason for careful observance of
the principles and guidelines regarding .such disposals
accepted in the GATT Resolutions of 4 March 19.5.5 on the
Disposal of Commodity Surpluses and on the Liquidation
of Strategic Stocks and in the FAO's Principles of Sur-
plus Disposal.
5. In negotiations for reductions in barriers to the ex-
ports of less-developed countries, contracting parties
should adopt a .sympathetic attitude on the question of
reciprocity, keeping in mind the needs of these countries
for a more flexible use of tariff protection. In making
arrangements to bring about a general reduction of tariffs,
account should also be taken of the special needs of less-
developed countries.
fi. An important contribution to the expansion of export
earnings can also be made by intensified efforts to impr()ve
the production and marketing methods of the less-
developed countries. The efforts of the less-develope<l
countries along these lines would be greatly assisted if
the industrial countries would give greater iiltention to
this matter in the framework of their tcchniciil and
financial assistance programmes.
7. Efforts to expand the export earnings of the loss-
developed countries and efforts to lessen the instability
of such earnings which results fi-om fluctuations in pri-
mary commiKlity markets should proceed concurrently.
Progress towards reducing market instability, or towards
offsetting its effects on foreign exchange receipts, is
essential if the maximum benefits of the trade expansion
effort are to be realized ; at the same time, progress
towards a diversified export trade will reduce the
vulnerability of primary exporting countries to market
fluctuations.
8. Finally, it is recognized that there are important
possibilities for encouraging sound economic development
in the less-developed countries through increase<l trade
among themselves and that these countries should keep
this in mind in formulating their tariff, commercial and
economic policy measures. Lest the development of this
important trade potential be prevented or unduly delayed,
they should strive to attain and preserve liberal access
to one another's markets in the same manner as they now
seek to secure improved access to the markets of the
economically advanced countries.
President Kennedy Asked To Facilitate)
Negotiations Between Congo Leaders
Following are texts of a statement made hy
Lincoln White, Director of the Office of News, on
December 15 and a Department statement of
December 17.
STATEMENT BY MR. WHITE
Press release 885 dated December 15
For some time now the U.N. and a number of'
the member comitries, mcluding the United States,,
have been attempting to make clear to Mr.
[Moise] Tshombe the necessity of liis meeting
Prime Mmister [Cyrille] Adoula to develop
arrangements for reintegratuig the Katanga intoi
the Congo under the overall authority of the legit-
imate government in Leopoldville.
Yesterday [December 14] President Kennedyi
received a telegram from Mr. Tshombe, expressing
"my desire to negotiate'' with Prime Minister
Adoula. The text of the telegram follows:
For ten days trooiw of the United Nations have been
exerting pre.ssure against Katanga causing loss of human
lives and great material damage. Force alone can never
resolve the Congolese problem. I confirm my desire to
negotiate the various aspects of this problem with M.
Adoula. I ask your intervention as a free man and as a
Christian to designate a suitable negotiator and to stop
at once useless bloo(khed.
President Kennedy promptly replied through
the United States con.'^ul in Elisnbotliville that the
United Stales was proceeding immediately to ex-
plore possibilities and would communicate further
with him as soon as possible.
10
Department of State Bulletin
The United States Government is hopeful that
Ml". Tshombe is sincere in the purposes he ex-
presses. The question of a cessation of hostilities
is up to the United Nations. But we would hope
that, once Mr. Tshombe has demonstrated the seri-
ousness of his intentions to negotiate by actually
leaving Elisabethville for an agreed meeting place
with Prime Minister Adoula, the fighting coidd
be suspended. We are in consultation with the
Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations
on this point. Prime Minister Adoula is at
present in Ki%Ti Province, about 1,000 miles away
from Leopoldville, but Ambassador [Edmimd A.]
Gull ion hopes to be in contact with him before
loner.
DEPARTMENT STATEMENT
Press release I
! dated December 17
United States Ambassador Edmund Gullion has
reported to the United States Government that
Prime Minister Adoula of the Republic of the
Congo has indicated he is prepared to meet
with Mr. Moise Tshombe of Katanga to discuss the
reintegration of the Katanga Province into the
Congo under the national government at Leopold-
ville.
Ambassador Gullion's call on Prime Minister
Adoula was one further step in a sequence of
events which began last Thursday (December 14),
when Mr. Tshombe telegraphed an appeal to Presi-
dent Kennedy. In response to that appeal the
President designated Ambassador Gidlion as his
special representative to facilitate this meeting
with Prime Minister Adoula.
In consequence of the above, the American con-
sul in Elisabethville has delivered the following
message to Mr. Tshombe :
President Kennedy has received your message, and the
United States Government has been in touch with Acting
Secretary General U Thant and Prime Minister Adoula
about it.
The President is glad that you are prepared to enter
immediate talks with Prime Minister Adoula with a view
to finding a solution for the differences now dividing you.
He has designated Ambassador Edmund Gullion to act
for him in facilitating rapid arrangements to this end.
Acting Secretary General U Thant is making Robert Gar-
diner and Ralph Bunche available to you both on behalf
of the United Nations for such assistance in your con-
sultations as you may require of them.
The President hopes that you can proceed to Kitona for
this purpose within a matter of hours.
He is asking Ambassador Gullion to fly to Elisabeth-
ville in a United States plane to escort you to Kitona and
return you safely to Elisabethville. The President is as-
sured that your personal safety at Kitona and throughout
the trip will be guaranteed both by the United Nations
and by the Central Government. The President has full
confidence in these assurances.
The Department calls attention to the follow-
ing points in connection with developments in the
Congo.
1. As the President's special representative Am-
bassador Gullion's function is not to mediate but to
assist in arranging a meeting between Mr.
Tshombe and Prime Minister Adoula.
2. The United States Government is working
closely and in fidl cooperation with the United
Nations in all aspects of tliis matter.
Since the United Nations appears to have estab-
lished the security of its positions in Elisabethville,
and Mr. Tshombe is about to go to Kitona, it is
expected that fighting in Elisabethville will be
suspended wliile negotiations and conciliations are
under way.
U.S. Supports U.N. Aid to Congolese
Efforts To Resolve Difficulties
DEPARTMENT STATEMENT OF DECEMBER 5>
The situation in southern Katanga has been
increasingly explosive in recent weeks. Since
mid-November the Katanga authorities have
stepped up their propaganda campaign against
United Nations presence. In recent days tliere
has been a series of unprovoked attacks against
United Nations personnel who have been mur-
dered, imprisoned, beaten, and threatened by
armed and often undisciplined Katangans. At
least one United Nations plane has been fired
upon.
The influence of the United States has been
directed toward the integration of the Congo, pre-
venting the outbreak of hostilities, and pursuing
efforts at conciliation between Katanga and the
national government.
' Read to news correspondents by a Department spokes-
man on Dec. 5 and released to the press by the U.S.
Mission to the United Nations (U.S./U.N. press release
3876). For background, see Bulletin of Dec. 25, 1961,
p. 1061.
January I, J 962
11
The Katanga attacks appear to have culminated
yesterday in military action by Katangan troops
against the freedom of movement of Unit«d Na-
tions forces in Elisabethville and in an armed at-
tempt to prevent United Nations use of tlie airport
link to the rest of the Congo. Both attempts
would be in direct violation of United Nations
resolutions and of the cease-fire agreement between
the United Nations and Katangan authorities.
Secretary-General U Thant has authorized the
United Nations forces to take whatever action is
considered necessary to restore freedom of move-
ment in Elisabethville. This directive has the
support of the United States, which will continue
to meet its obligation to assist the United Nations
in carrying out its mandate in the Congo.
STATEMENTS BY ACTING SECRETARY BALL
Statement of December 10
Press release 869 dated December 10
The increasing military action in Elisabeth-
ville does not mean that the U.N. has broadened its
limited military objective in the Congo. The
fighting of the last few days was brought about
by a series of events that endangered U.N. forces
and their presence in the Katanga.
Secretary-General U Thant has made clear
that the purpose of the United Nations action there
is solely to maintain the U.N. forces in a position
of sufficient strength to enable it to fulfill its mis-
sion of establishing the essential conditions for a
peaceful reintegration of the Katanga in the Con-
go through national reconciliation.
Peacemaking is at best a tough and not always
popular assignment. It sometimes requires the
limited use of international military forces to ac-
complish limited military aims. We are backing
the U.N.'s peacemaking task in the Congo as the
only apparent road to a peaceful settlement there.
As Secretary Kusk said at his press conference
Friday [December 8] : ^
"Our aim is the consolidation of the coun-
try under a stable government which will be
able to pursue freely the true national interests
of tlie Congolese. ... If Katanga is not peace-
fully reintegrated, the Congo will face civil war
and anarchy and be open to Communist penetra-
tion. . . . We hope that the leaders of Katanga
will recognize that their present path leads no-
where and that the Katanga will soon be recon-
ciled with the rest of the Congolese people."
Statement of December 13 '
I wanted to meet with you today to explain our
attitude toward the current situation in the Katan-
ga. I know you must find the picture somewhat
confusing. There has been little which has
happened in the Congo since its independence that
has not been confusing.
We believe that every reasonable attempt must
be made to bring Tshombe [Moise Tshombe, presi-
dent of Katanga Province] together with Prime
Minister Adoula [Cyrille Adoula, Prime Minister
of the Republic of the Congo] to seek agreement
on the reintegration of the Katanga. As Sec-
retary Rusk said at his press conference Friday:
Our aim is ttie consolidation of the country under a
stable government which will be able to pursue freely
the true national interests of the Congolese. ... If
Katanga is not peacefully reintegrated, the Congo will face
civil war and anarchy and be open to Communist penetra-
tion. . . . We hope that the leaders of the Katanga
will recognize that their present path leads nowhere and
that the Katanga will soon be reconciled with the rest of
the Congolese people.
The main problem facing us at the moment is
whether or not there should be an immediate cease-
fire. The answer to this question is not easy and
is one on which there can be honest differences of
opinion. The attitude of the United States is
simply this : We want a cease-fire as soon as feasi-
ble. But we do not believe any cease-fire is feasi-
ble until the minimum objectives of the U.N. have
been attained. There cannot be a repetition of the i
events of September, when the United Nations
was widely regarded as having suffered a defeat at
the hands of the Katanga authorities and the situ- j
ation further deteriorated. The United Nations j
has not only the need but the right to jirotcct it-
self, to maintain its freedom of movement and
communications in order to discharge the mission
given it by the Security Council and the General
Assembly. We believe that force should be used
only to the extent necessary to achieve this limited
objective. The U.N. has made it clear again and
again that its purpose is not to crush the Katanga
forces militarily or to impose a political solution
'Ibid., Dec. 25, 1961, p. 1053.
' Made to news correspondents on Dec. 13 (press release
878).
12
Department of Stale BuUetin
by force. U Thant denied categorically that the
U.N. operations were designed "to force a political
solution of the Katanga problem by smashing the
military' strength of the present political leader-
ship there." Charges to this effect were the result
of a gross misimderstanding of what INIr. Linner
[Sture C. Linner, Oflicer in Charge of U.N. Opera-
tions in the Congo] said to a Swedish correspond-
ent last Saturday, and the Swedish correspondent
lias since retracted his story.
Having said these things, I would say that once
the U.N.'s limited objectives are achieved, the
United States would urge an immediate cease-
fire. We hope and believe these objectives will be
attained quickly and with a minimum of loss of
life and damage to property.
President Responds to Request
From Viet-Nam for U.S. Aid
Following is an exchange of messages between
President Kennedy and President Ngo Dinh Diem
of the RejnthUc of Viet-Nam.
White House press release dated December 14, for release De-
cember 15
President Kennedy to President Diem
December 14, 1961
Dear Mr. President : I have received your re-
cent letter in wliich you described so cogently the
dangerous condition caused by North Viet-Nam's
efforts to take over your coimtry. The situation in
your embattled country is well known to me and
to the American people. We have been deeply
disturbed by the assault on your country. Our in-
dignation has mounted as the deliberate savagery
of the Communist program of assassination, kid-
napping and wanton violence became clear.
Your letter underlines what our own informa-
tion has convincingly shown — that the campaign
of force and terror now being waged against your
people and your Government is supported and di-
rected from the outside by the authorities at
Hanoi.^ They have thus violated the provisions of
* For background, see a two-part report entitled A Threat
to the Peace: North Viet-Nam's Effort To Conquer South
Viet-Nam, Department of State publication 7308. Parts
I and II are for sale by the Superintendent of Documents,
U.S. Govermnent Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C.,
for 2.5 cents and 5.5 cents, respectively.
January 1, 1962
the Geneva Accords = designed to ensure peace in
Viet-Nam and to which they bound themselves in
1954.
At that time, the United States, although not a
party to the Accords, declared tliat it "would view
any renewal of the aggression in violation of tlie )^
agreements with grave concern and as seriously
threatening international peace and security." '
We continue to maintain that view.
In accordance with that declaration, and in re-
sponse to your request, we are prepared to help the
Republic of Viet-Nam to protect its people and
to preserve its independence. We shall promptly
increase our assistance to your defense effort as
well as help relieve the destruction of the floods
which you describe. I have already given the or-
ders to get these programs underway.
The United States, like the Republic of Viet-
Nam, remains devoted to the cause of peace and
our primary purpose is to help your people main-
tain their independence. If the Communist au-
thorities in North Viet-Nam will stop their cam-
paign to destroy the Republic of Viet-Nam, the
measures we are taking to assist your defense ef-
forts will no longer be necessary. We shall seek
to persuade the Communists to give up their at-
tempts of force and subversion. In any case, we
are confident that the Vietnamese people will pre-
serve their independence and gain the peace and
prosperity for wliich they have sought so hard and
so long.
John F. I^ennedt
His Excellency Ngo Dinh Diem
President and Secretary of State for
National Defense
The Republic of Viet-Nam
Saigon, Viet-Nam,
President Diem to President Kennedy
Decembeb 7, 1961
Dear Mb. President: Since its birth, more than six
years ago, the Republic of Viet-Nam has enjoyed the
close friendship and cooperation of the United States
of America.
Like the United States, the Republic of Viet-Nam has
always been devoted to the preservation of peace. My
^ For texts, see American, Foreign Policy, 1950-1955 :
Basic Documents, vol. I, Department of State publication
6446, p. 750.
' For a statement made by Under Secretary Walter
Bedell Smith on July 21, 1954, at the Geneva Conference
on Indochina, see Bulletin of Aug. 2, 1954, p. 162.
13
people know only too well the sorrows of war. We have
honored the 1954 Geneva Agreements even though they
resulted in the partition of our country and the enslave-
ment of more than half of our people by Communist
tyranny. We have never considered the reunification of
our nation by force. On the contrary, we have publicly
pledged that we will not violate the demarcation line and
the demilitarized zone set up by the agreements. We
have always been prepared and have on many occasions
stated our willingness to reunify Viet-Nam on the basis
of democratic and truly free elections.
The record of the Communist authorities in the northern
part of our country is quite otherwise. They not only
consented to the division of Viet-Nam, but were eager
for it. They pledged themselves to observe the Geneva
Agreements and during the seven years since have never
ceased to violate them. They call for free elections but
are Ignorant of the very meaning of the words. They
talk of "peaceful reunification" and wage war against us.
From the beginning, the Communists resorted to terror
in their efforts to subvert our people, destroy our govern-
ment, and impose a Communist regime upon us. They
have attacked defenseless teachers, closed schools, kUled
members of our anti-malarial program and looted hos-
pitals. This is coldly calculated to destroy our govern-
ment's humanitarian efforts to serve our people.
We have long sought to check the Communist attack
from the North on our i)eople by appeals to the Inter-
national Control Commission. Over the years, we have
repeatedly published to the world the evidence of the
Communist plot to overthrow our government and seize
control of all of Viet-Nam by illegal intrusions from out-
side our country. The evidence has mounted until now
it is hardly necessary to rehearse it. Most recently, the
kidnapping and brutal murder of our Chief Liaison Officer
to the International Control Commission, Colonel Noang
Thuy Nam, compelled us to speak out once more. In our
October 24, 1961, letter to the ICC, we caUed attention
again to the publicly stated determination of the Com-
munist authorities in Hanoi to "liberate the South" by
the overthrow of my government and the imposition of
a Communist regime on our people. We cited the proof
of massive infiltration of Communist agents and military
elements into our country. We outlined the Communist
strategy, which is simply the ruthless use of terror against
the whole population, women and children included.
In the course of the last few months, the Communist
assault on my people has achieved high ferocity. In
October they caused more than 1,800 incidents of violence
and more than 2,000 casualties. They have struck oc-
casionally in battalion strength, and they are contuiuaUy
augmenting their forces by infiltration from the North.
The level of their attacks is already such that our forces
are stretched to the utmost. We are forced to defend
every village, every hamlet. Indeed every home against
a foe whose tactic is always to strike at the defenseless.
A disastrous flood was recently added to the misfortunes
of the Vietnamese people. The greater part of three
provinces was inundated, with a great loss of property.
We are now engaged in a nationwide effort to reconstruct
and rehabilitate this area. The Communists are, of
course, making this task doubly difficult, for they have
seized upon the disruption of normal administration and
communications as an opportunity to sow more destruc-
tion in the stricken area.
In short, the Vietnamese nation now faces what is
perhaps the gravest crisis in its long history. For more
than 2,000 years my people have lived and built, fought
and died in this land. We have not always been free.
Indeed, much of our history and many of its proudest
moments have arisen from conquest by foreign powers
and our struggle against great odds to regain or defend
our precious independence. But it is not only our free-
dom which is at stake today, it is our national identity.
For, if we lose this war, our people will be swallowed by
the Communist Bloc, all our proud heritage will be
blotted out by the "Socialist society" and Viet-Nam wiU
leave the pages of history. We will lose our national
soul.
Mr. President, my people and I are mindful of the great
assistance which the United States has given us. Your
help has not been lightly received, for the Vietnamese
are proud people, and we are determined to do our part
in the defense of the free world. It is clear to all of
us that the defeat of the Viet Cong demands the total
mobilization of our government and our people, and you
may be sure that we will devote all of our resources of
money, minds, and men to this great task.
But Viet-Nam is not a great power and the forces of
International Communism now arrayed against us are
more than we can meet with the resources at hand. We
must have further assistance from the United States
If we are to win the war now being waged against us.
We can certainly assure mankind that our action is
purely defensive. Much as we regret the subjugation of
more than half of our people in North Viet-Nam, we have
no intention, and indeed no means, to free them by use
of force.
I have said that Viet-Nam is at war. War means many
things, but most of all it means the death of brave people
for a cause they believe in. Viet-Nam has suffered many
wars, and through the centuries we have always had
patriots and heroes who were willing to shed their blood
for Viet-Nam. We will keep faith with them.
When Communism has long ebbed away into the past,
my people will still be here, a free united nation growing
from the deep roots of our Vietnamese heritage. They
will remember your help in our time of need. This
struggle will then be a part of our common history. And
your help, your friendship, and the strong bonds between
our two peoples will be a part of Viet-Nam, then as now.
Ngo Dinh Diem
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.
14
Department of State Bulletin
/^ " /
■■(
The Challenge to Government, the Media, and Educational Institutions
by Roger W. Tubby
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs '
Letters coming into the Department of State,
to newspapers, magazines, TV and radio stations
indicate that many Americans are puzzled by
much of what is said by the extremists of the right
and left, puzzled and yet aware that today's per-
plexities give all of us grounds for concern,
whether over Commimist designs or the possibili-
ties of nuclear destruction.
The extremists would make it seem as if there
are clear and easy solutions. Unfortunately
there are none. "We hear calls for a man on horse-
back, or demands that the State Department be
cleaned out "from top to bottom." We hear sug-
gestions that this country unilaterally give up
atomic weapons. We hear it said that it would
be "better to be Eed than dead."
To counter these oversimplifications, to provide
better insight into the nature of our problems,
more needs to be done in the information field.
We in the executive departments of Govern-
ment, in Congress, in the mass media, in educa-
tion, in civic organizations, may be well behind
the public demand for guidance and understand-
ing. There may be apathy, too much of it, but it
may exist at least in part because we've not been
doing our jobs nearly well enough. We can ill
afford apathy on the one hand or confused and
hysterical outbursts on the other on the part of
those who are uninformed or misinformed.
Debate we must have in a healthy democratic
society. But it should be based on as sound a
judgment as possible of the complexities, frustra-
tions, and opportunities confronting us. We need
to know our strengths and our weaknesses, what
we can and cannot do, how best we can work with
^ Address made before the Foreign Policy Association
of Pittsburgh at Pittsburgh, Pa., on Dec. 8 (press release
SeOdatedDec. 7).
our allies and others, how we can best maintain
our independence and enhance our well-being, how
and why we must be prepared even to risk war to
check those who would dominate the free world.
How do we deal with Soviet Russia's efforts to
commmiize the world through terror, subversion,
and economic, political, and military pressures?
How do we deal with activities of other Com-
mimist nations ? How do we best meet the insist-
ent pressure of millions for more food, better hous-
ing, education, jobs, and health? How can we
most effectively use our resources, our scientific
and educational skills ?
There can and should be differences of opinion
as to how to deal with these and other problems.
There are differences amongst members of the
FPA in Pittsburgh as to the wisest courses to
follow ; between this and other organizations ; be-
tween Congressmen, editors, farmers, and all of us
generally, although surely there is general agree-
ment amongst most of us that the free world must
not succumb to the world of coercion. Mostly our
differences are expressed in traditional ways of
democratic discourse, founded on information that
is reasonably held.
However, creating fear, suspicion, and hatred
amongst Americans on unsupportable allegations
is not only mischievous and irresponsible, but it
is not the tradition of our democracy. Such tac-
tics, tried by Father Couglilin, by William Dudley
Pelley and the Silver Shirts, and Joe McCarthy,
have been repudiated by the great majority of our
people in the past^-but not before doing grave
damage.
Indeed, the Communists would be hard put to
plot and carry out campaigns more divisive and
harmful to our society and our position in the
world than some of those launched in the name of
ianuary 7, 1962
15
anticommunism. This is so especially with re-
gard to tlie irresponsible campaigns operating to-
day which have been scored by President Ken-
nedy = and former President Eisenhower.
Yet most people supporting such campaigns
have been sincerely and deeply concerned about
the welfare of our country, or at least about their
personal welfare in it. Too often, though, they
have a narrow and prejudiced view of what's
wrong, based on lack of balanced imderstanding of
our society. They may blame the country's
troubles, and their own, on labor, Negroes, teach-
ers, ministers, liberals, foreigners. Some believe
even our Presidents and Justices of the Supreme
Court have been or are Conmiunist dupes.
The confused and well-publicized clamor made
in public rallies by some of the more extreme ad-
vocates of irresponsibility gives peoples in other
lands a distorted view of our society.
Need for Public Understanding
We need not only to straighten out misconcep-
tions but win support for new programs. We
need support, for instance, for the new and revo-
lutionary foreign trade proposals^ that can
enormously strengthen the economies of the free
world.
One month before Congress authorized the
Marshall plan, after months of congressional de-
bate and public discussions, only 16 of 100 voters
had heard of it. Yet the plan was largely respon-
sible for saving Western Europe from communism
and led to the astonishing economic recovery
of the free-world parts of that war-devastated
continent.
Failure to understand the even gi-eater oppor-
tunities now opening up to us in international
trade could jolt our economy and jeopardize our
security and freedom. Because the economic is-
sues are even more complex than in the days when
the Marshall plan was being voted, we need still
greater understanding if we are to have the sup-
port needed for these new programs.
But we need greater understanding also on a
host of other matters: on the innumerable vital
operations of the U.N. ; on the culture, history,
economic policies of many other countries; on dis-
' RULi.ETiN of Dec. 4, mr.l, I). 01.^.
' For bat-ksround, see ibid., Nov. 20, 1961, p. 831, and
Dee. 25, 1961, p. 1039.
armament possibilities; on the nature of commu-
nism ; on tlie overall situation in tlie world.
Are we losing time after time, in place after
place, to the Communists, as some allege? Then
what of Communist failui-e to seize all of Korea,
their losses in Malaya, the Philippines, in Greece,
in France, and Italy, in Scandinavia? "\Yliat of
failure of Communist agricultural production in
Red China? What of their desperate efforts to
wall in the people of East Germany? Is the
Soviet zone there a "workers' paradise"?
Fifteen years ago, in the chaotic postwar world,
Communist Party strength, Communist subver-
sion, Communist hopes were higher in many coun-
tries than they are today. Their failures, their
frustrations are worth noting in our stocktaking,
together witli acknowledgment of Communist suc-
cesses in mainland China, North Viet-Nam, Cuba,
and those coimtries of central Europe seized and
held by force. For we need understanding and
balance if we are to avoid either euphoria or
hysteria.
Improving Information Operations
Improvements in information operations ? Let-
ters to the Department of State have nearly
doubled in the last couple of years, and most of
these have sought information about our policies
and those of other coimtries. Editors, TV and
radio people report a similar rising tide of mail
along similar lines. Our Department has had a
sharp rise in demand for speakers and pamphlets.
Tliis year we started holding briefing conferences
for media representatives in Washington and for
media and nongovernmental organization leaders
around the country. The response has been good.
We have been asked to do many more of these.
Wliile TV has presented many imaginative and
highly informative shows on world affairs, while
some of the press has been outstanding in its pro-
vision of news and guidance in the same field,
while a few universities and colleges provide
courses on world affaii-s, more can and should be
done, by Government — botli tlio executive and con-
gressional branches — by press, magazines, TV and
radio, by universities and colleges, by schools, by
book publisliers, by citizen groups, by business, by
the movie industry, by individual citizens. More
should be done if we are to act with wiser judg-
ment on our own behalf.
16
Department of Sfofe Bulletin
Some of the things we could do would be of
nearly immediate effect; some, in the field of
school and college education, of long-range bene-
fit. I suggest a few :
1. Sights should be raised on Government in-
formation programs covering international af-
fairs— on tlie quality and variety thereof. Tlie
President and the Secretary of State carry the
main task of announcing and explaining our for-
eign policy, and persuading us to support it. Con-
gress focuses very considerable attention on for-
eign affairs in committee hearings, in debates on
the floor, and in speeches by individual Members.
The State Department engages in normal informa-
tion activities. Nevertheless its efforts in this
field should be greater, but this requires a larger
commitment of resources.
2. The press should be encouraged to give wider
coverage to world affairs ; too many papers around
the country still print too little about what is go-
ing on overseas.
-S. TV has a tremendous opportunity to bring
into our liomes far broader understanding of the
world around us. There are indications that more
is being planned along this line.
4. It is suggested that courses on world affairs
become part of the curricula in many more schools
and colleges. Training young people in the cul-
tures, history, economics, and politics of other
countries should be of value to them as citizens.
5. Much more on world affairs could be done in
adult education through nongovernmental organi-
zations, through institutional courses in commimi-
ties large and small, such as the programs in
Aspen, Colorado.
6. Paperback book publishers may find a sur-
prisingly good market for more books on many
different aspects of world affairs.
These suggestions are obvious enougli. Yet the
other day I heard one educator, for instance, say
that, while many college presidents and deans
recognize the need for courses in world affairs,
little is done to provide them, due to inertia, to
opposition from established disciplines, to short-
age of qualified teachers and textbooks. But a
vigorous begimiing should be made and I tliink
will be made if the recommendations of the Com-
mittee on the University and World Affairs are
followed.
State legislators and community school boards
might themselves consider moving to broaden sec-
January 1, 7962
622556— «2 3
ondary school curricula, recognizing that a large
proportion of youngsters still do not go on to col-
lege. If they are to have a basic understanding of
our contemporary world, they should get it in
school. For those going on to college, more infor-
mation can be made available.
Many publishers have resisted suggestions that
news and background coverage be broadened in
their papers. Many apparently do not realize that
there is more need for, more place for, and a larger
public for good newspapers than ever before, as
the New York Times, for one, has shown.
TV leaders talk in an inhibited way of low
ratings for public-service programs (even 10 mil-
lion viewers is considered low), yet at the same
time express concern over loss of "opinionmakers"
amongst their audiences.
A wise precept for those of us in informational
or educational work in or out of Government is
Secretary Rusk's statement : *
"I deeply believe that the public should be fully
informed about the world situation and our
courses of action to deal with it. In no other way
can we mobilize both the necessaiy effort of a
people who act througli consent and the unity
which is critically necessary in hazardous times."
Kalmyk People Observe
10th Anniversary in U.S.
The Department of State announced on Decem-
ber 14 (press release 881) that Assistant Secretary
Harriman would meet with representatives of the
Committee for Commemoration of the lOtli Asi-
niversary of tlie Kalmyk People in the United
States in the Depaitment on December 15. The
meeting was arranged to mark the anniversary
in December of the arrival in the United States
of 700 Kalmyks from refugee camps in Germany.
The Kalmyks are celebrating their arrival and
settlement in this country after their long and
arduous search for freedom.
Mr. Harriman, who has participated in a pre-
vious observance of the resettlement of the Kal-
myk refugees in the United States, accepted a
plaque from the Kalmyk people on behalf of the
President of the United States.
' Ibid., July 31, 1961, p. 175.
17
International Economic and Social Development
Following are extemporaneous remarJcs made
hy Secretary Rush before the National Conference
on International Economic and Social Develop-
ment at Wa.shingfo'n, D.C., on December 1, to-
gether with an address mad.e by 'William T.
Nunley^ Special Assistant to Under Secretary
Ball, before tlie conference on November 30.
REMARKS BY SECRETARY RUSK
Press release 832 dated December 1
It's a very great pleasure indeed for me to have
this opportunity to meet briefly with the National
Conference on International Economic and Social
Development. I am particularly flattered that
you have asked me to one of your working ses-
sions, because as I look at my schedule I find
myself often resenting the fact that the working
level in the Department of State is supposed to
exclude the Secretary of State. (Laughter.)
As President Kennedy's message implied, we
look upon you in this National Conference as our
principal allies in our determined efl'ort to help
build a more decent world order. Indeed, as we
move day bj' day and week by week in some of
the eye-catching and turbulent problems through
which we have to live, it is a matter of the great-
est possible encouragement and confidence for us
to know about the work of the organizations that
are represented here, all over the country, in get-
ting on with the central tasks which confront us
in tliis climactic period of history.
Let me say in the other direction that I think
that we have not been able to get before you the
breadth, the deptli, the extent of the efl'ort which
in fact is going into this matter of building a
decent world order. For example, we liave 600
to 800 U.S. mailbags a day going out of the De-
partment of State. I suppose 90 percent of that
traffic is concerned with wliat you yourselves are
concerned about.
Today, for example, you will be aware of the
fact that there is a sharp debate going on in the
Political Committee of the United Nations on
the issue of Chinese representation. But I dare
say what you will not hear about will be the im-
poitant, far-reaching, consti-uctive discussions
going on in Committees II and III of the United
Nations General Assembly, or about the dozen
other important international meetings going on
somewhere in the world today, to get the world's
work done on a practical and peaceful basis.
We are deeply committed to this task. And
we are working at it and gnawing at it all the
time. These matters go on beneath the surface
of controversial politics. These are matters
which tie people together, despite political
differences, despite race, despite alliances, and are
helping to spin those threads which may in due
course, God willing, help us to bind the peace
together.
If you were to ask me in these brief remarks
to indicate what foreign aid is all about, let me
say quite briefly that if you want a sharp defini-
tion of what it's all about, compare two docu-
ments, the one, those portions of the proceedings
of the recent party congress in Moscow which
have to do with the kind of world which they not
only see come into being under their doctrine but
to which they are committing themselves as a
matter of national policy. And. on the other
side, study — don't just brush aside, but study — the
charter of the United Nations, which outlines with
nnich sophistication, much practical wisdom, the
kind of world comnuniity whicli most of the world
is trying to bring into being.
Now, foreign aid fits into that issue. Foreign
aid is a part of our contribution to that struggle.
But it is not that foreign aid was invented because
following World War II tlie Communists came
forward with a far-reaching and basic challenge
to our society and to the kind of world we liope to
18
Depariment of Sfafe Bulletin
achieve. Indeed, these same purposes preceded
that challenge. These same purposes preceded
that charter. These same purposes indeed, for
men in most parts of the earth, preceded the found-
ing of this Kepuhlic.
These are basic commitments of most peoples,
and our foreign aid is our contribution to the
kind of world in which these basic commitments
can take on shape and practical meaning.
I might also say that we are this next year
going to bo involved in another great debate about
foreign policy, this time on the subject of our
trade policy. Now, foreign aid is almost a junior
partner of our trade policy, in moving toward
a growing, expanding, developing world. It
would make no sense whatever for us to ask our
taxpayers to come up with substantial amounts
of money for foreign aid if we and other principal
trading nations were to adopt trade policies which
would frustrate and imdermine the possibilities
of development.
The drop of a few cents in a primary com-
modity can, for example, in a particular country,
wipe out by several times any effect of American
aid to that particular country.
The amount of American aid being applied is
a very small fraction, indeed, to the productive
systems upon which development must depend.
Our contribution is marginal in quantity. We
hope that it can be critical in quality. But trad-
ing opportimities will determine in fact the prac-
tical possibilities of moving into a new decade
of development throughout the world.
And so as we talk about foreign aid today, we,
I think, must have in the back of our minds that
these matters are related to our tariff and the
quota-cutting negotiations in the GATT and the
critical need in this coming year to adjust our own
trade policies to the new patterns of world trade,
which are emerging in such negotiations as those
for a Common Market in Europe, and are related
to a search for increased markets for the exports
of the developing countries, and for the coopera-
tive efforts to stabilize commodity prices, and for
the highly complex, technical, and difficult negotia-
tions to adjust problems with regard to specific
products, say, for example, textiles.
These are all of the most far-reaching impor-
tance in terms of whether peoples of other lands —
and indeed our own — can move into a new world
of expanding opportunity in the economic and
social field.
Multilateral vs. Bilateral Aid
I am sorry that Mr. Paul Iloii'man [Managing
Director, U.N. Special Fund] is unable to be here
today, but I wanted to comment very briefly on
our general approach to multilateral versus bi-
lateral types of aid, in the matters which you are
discussing today.
The debate between these two methods tends
to be a fruitless and illusory debate, because both
multilateral and bilateral have to be used to their
full cai^acity. Multilateral aid has some impor-
tant advantages. It helps to mobilize t he resources
of many countries — and I am not thinking pri-
marily of financial resources. I am tliinking about
those resources in people, in which we are all in
such short supply.
It eases in some situations the sensitivities, the
political relationships, between those who give aid
and those who receive it.
But there are limits to what the trafRc can bear
in the multilateral field. It would not be wise
or wholesome or even acceptable abroad were the
United States to dominate this field so heavily that
the essential quality of multilateral aid could be
distorted. So we must find a balance. But, by
and large, I think it can be said that the United
States is prepared to support the further develop-
ment of multilateral aid efforts to the maximum
which is accepted and tolerable to the woi-ld com-
miuiity, and that if there are limitations on the
multilateral approach, these wiU not be for lack
of interest or support on the part of the United
States.
This harmony between a bilateral and a multi-
lateral effort, has been illustrated by President
Kennedy's call for a decade of progress, which
is now being backed up by a new AID act, by the
declaration of Punta del Este,^ and by his call for
a United Nations decade of development,^ which
was backed up this week by Committee II of the
United Nations, in which it expressed its ^new that
the economic and social development of the eco-
nomically less developed coimtries is basic to the
attainment of international peace and security.'
Then the resolution * sets forth the general
'■ Bulletin of Sept. 11, 1961, p. 459.
'Ihid., Oct. 16, 1961, p. 619.
' For a statement made in Committee II (Economic and
Social) on Oct. 6 by Ptiilip M. Klutzniek, .see ihid.. Dee. 4,
1961, p. 939; for a statement made by Mr. Klutzniek on
Nov. 29, see U.S. delegation press release 3864.
* U.N. doe. A/C.2,/L.599.
January 1, 7962
19
target of a minimum annual rate of economic
growth of 5 percent annually, in all underde-
veloped countries, by the end of the decade, and
calls on the Secretary-General to elaborate an am-
bitious, specific program of international activities
to help make a reality of the decade of
development.
I regret that I have not been present here this
morning as you turned your attention to tlie im-
portant subject of the development of human re-
sources, because there is no more realistic, no more
inspiring, no more necessaiy aspect of develop-
ment than this matter of people.
I had the privilege of commenting on that sub-
ject to you earlier in the year, briefly.^ But it is
not just that people are the target of aid pro-
grams. It is that people are the dynamos which
generate the power of development. They are the
sources of development. They provide the aspira-
tion ; they provide the mind, the will, the means
by which development can occur.
This is something I think we in this country
know a good deal about and which we have shared
with people in other parts of the world. For ex-
ample, I suspect that there are many of you in this
room who can remember in rural parts of our
covmtry — as can I — that when tlie time came to
build a house a neighborhood party was thrown,
old-fashioned outdoor picnics — with or without
beer, depending upon wliich part of the country
you lived in. (Laughter.) And the neighbors
got together and helped the particular farmer
build his house.
The same American can travel to a village in
the Punjab and find villagers getting together in
just the same way, first in one village and then in
another, to build a school.
In our own experience one farmer may have a
sorghum mill, in an informal cooperative division
of labor in a niral counti-yside. And we could leap
to a village in Pakistan and find a retired soldier
in the army who used his retirement pay to bring
home a feed chopper to cut, to chop feed for vil-
lages in a considerable area.
And as we pass information out througli our
extension services, from neighbor to neighbor, we
know of the Mexican farmers who are passing
improved seed and improved management from
farm to farm across the countryside in Mexico.
There can be no substitute for the involvement
•Bulletin of July 3, 1961, p. 6.
of people in their own development. This soiuids
like a tiaiism, of course, because people are the
stuif that we are talking about. But the critical
thing is not only the attitude but the competence
of people to get on with the task of development
when they have committed themselves to it as a
primary purpose.
Role of Education in Development
And here education plays the critical role. The
chart of American economic and social develop-
ment and the chart of American educational de-
velopment would show approximately the same
curve. We did not wait in our educational devel-
opment until we were rich enough to afford it. "We
could not become rich enough to afford it unless we
had built education in, with a major effort, at our
very beginnings. And we have to be a little care-
ful as Americans in ti-ying to translate our
experience into other countries.
My guess is that we might be well instructed to
try to think back for a generation, or even 50
years, to look at some of our own problems in
education somewhat earlier, if we are to be directly
responsive and relevant to the situation that we
find in many other countries.
I gather tliat we liave about 2,000 institutions
of higher education in this country, including
junior colleges. One who served in a private
foundation for a number of years got tlie impres-
sion that among these 2,000 — Dean Keppel will
perhaps forgive me— every college aspired to be a
university and every imiversity thought that it
had to have a department of veterinary medicine.
(Laughter.)
In other words our higlier education, within an
educational system which has 24 or 25 billions of
dollars at its disposal, admitted to needing more.
Our system of higher education is made possible
by the enormous resources of the country that are
already here. Now, when we turn to other coun-
tries that are somewhat nearer the beginnings of
their educational effort, wo have to remember that
it's easier to build a l)>iilding than it is to build a
faculty, that a university cannot inject an educa-
tional system downward, tliat a imiversity caps an
effective educational sj-stem which provides men
and women ready for, prepared for, a univei-sity
education. And that there could be such a thing,
perhaps, despite the generality of our own ex-
perience in this comitiy — there could be such a
20
Department of State Bulletin
thing as effective cooperation among educational
institutions, some division of labor, some sharing
of responsibility, some regional cooperation, in
order that the resources M'hich can be made avail-
able can be used to the best advantage, on a some-
what rationalized basis, within the situation in
which peoples find themselves.
One of the great challenges, I think, in relating
education to development is to find ways to mobi-
lize the resources that may be available in a par-
ticular i-egion in order that they may be made
somewhat more effective in service to all those who
might be involved.
And, Dr. Mora [Jose A. Mora, Secretary Gen-
eral of the Organization of American States], I
think we have seen many instances, and growing
instances, in which the great institutions of higher
education in Latin America are reinforcing each
other, sending their young people to each other's
campuses for specialized training, and with a total
net effect which is strengthening for all concerned.
But when we talk about people, we come back
to the point from which I started. It is that people
are those who are most immediately involved in
the attempt to build a decent world order. If you
look at the relationships which are being worked
out across national frontiers, underneath the polit-
ical level and despite the political problems, here
is the making of a kind of world scene which is
our principal hope for the future.
In this aspect of the matter, private organiza-
tions and government play an inseparably linked
role of partnei-ship. You will be talked to this
afternoon about the role of private organizations
in this field of education.
Without pointing my finger at you, I should
like to suggest to all of us, whether in government
or in the private field, that when we are talking
about education, and particularly when we are
talking about bringing yoimg people from other
countries to the United States for training, the em-
phasis had perhaps better be on the quality of the
job rather than the numbers of those who might
be somehow involved.
I may leave my colleagues in the Department of
State some explaining to do, with these remarks,
before the afternoon is over (Laughter.), but let
me put it this way : Two halves don't make a whole
in this matter. Two ill-prepared or half-prepared
young people going back to their counti"y cannot
make the contribution which one well-prepared
person can make. And if you have six yoiuig
people who come here for training, who go back
disappointed or frustrated or with a sense of fail-
ure, there may be six young people who had better
not have come in the first place.
And so I would urge both those of us in govern-
ment and those of us in private organizations to
take this business of playing with the lives of
people with the greatest of seriousness. And if
we involve young people abroad in this process of
education by any effort of ours, we do so deter-
mined to do it right, whatever the nimibers in-
volved. Fewer done well will be far more effec-
tive and important and satisfying than a larger
number done less well.
And I would urge that we consider the factors
which go for excellence, elegance, success in this
relationship, and try to cut down somewhat on the
casualties which occur in these situations. And
when we are dealing with tens of thousands of
yoimg people, of course there are going to be some
casualties. Students have been students for cen-
turies, and no one would expect young people to
act like wise older people but sometimes like fool-
ish older people. (Laughter.)
I can recall, for example, one student from a
far country to the south, in the Pacific, coming
to Minnesota for training. He had a liberal
clothing allowance, but he stopped off in Manila
on the way. And he found those lovely shirts
which all of us find so spectacular in the Philip-
pines. And there went his clothing allowance,
all of it, on about 20 of these shirts. He got to
Minnesota, sent a telegram to his sponsor saying,
"Hey, it's cold up here."
Well, of course, management has to take place.
But the thing that I am emphasizing is that we
who are sponsors must sponsor. We who are
going to take on these jobs must see them through.
We who involve ourselves must do so with the
greatest responsibility. And it's vei"y encourag-
ing to me to see in the course of the last year or
two the serious attention which so many are giv-
ing to just this part of the problem, how we can
make their exi^erience here more effective, how
we can avoid the unnecessary casualties, how we
can send them back with something which they
can take back to their own homes, their own. coun-
tries, their own universities, that can make a
great difference.
I think you would agree with me that among
the new emphases in our aid program has been
something of a shift toward the himian resources
January 1, 7962
21
that are involved in foreign aid, the rising place
of education. Of course, dams and factories arc
vital to the economic and social development.
But a dam which is not linked to the lives of the
people in the area in which it is built is relatively
sterile. And the failure of ourselves and others
to develop the human resources will be a self-
imposed limitation, not only upon their ability to
develop but our ability to contribute to it.
So we urge your most thouglitful and critical
and imaginative attention to this element of hu-
man resources in aid programs, not only in the
public field but in the private field, because this
is basic to development, development is critical
to this decent world order, and this decent world
order will decide the survival of man.
ADDRESS BY MR. NUNLEY
Press release 827 dated November 30
In speaking about world population problems
and their relationship to economic and social de-
velopment, I want to begm by identifying myself.
I do not pretend to be speaking in a purely per-
sonal capacity, although some of my observations
are necessarily personal. I am an officer of the
Department of State and have served for 15 years
under three administrations. I am currently as-
signed as a Special Assistant to the Under Secre-
tary of State. It is therefore my intention to
explain as best I can the current attitudes of the
Department of State with respect to intei'national
population problems.
The essential task of the Department of State
is to advise and assist the President in the con-
duct of international relations. As you know.
President Kennedy's administration has become
popularly known as "the New Frontier." I be-
lieve this label is altogether appropriate. Henry
David Tlioreau once defined a frontier as some-
thing that is "neither east nor west, but wherever
a man faces a fact." During the last year many
Americans have been deeply impressed by the
determination of President Kennedy and his top
officials to face the hard, undiluted, and undeco-
rated facts of our national and international life.
This willingness to face facts — to come to grips
with the facts that are known and to ferret out the
facts that are still unknown — provides the prin-
cipal explanation of the State Department's at-
tention to international jiopulation problems.
We have all heard a great deal about the "world
population explosion." However, I sometimes
suspect that this metaphor has produced more
confusion than enlightenment. For example, I
recently heard a story about a little gh'l who asked
her mother to let her watch some people explode.
At the same time, there are a handful of relatively
mature citizens who write sincere letters to the
State Department which sometimes seem to sug-
gest that we should devote less attention to such
problems as the Berlin crisis, southeast Asia, dis-
armament, international trade, collective security,
and so forth, and instead concentrate a mucli
larger portion of our diplomatic energies upon
attempting to regidate the private lives of men
and women 10,000 miles away.
Please imderstand that I am not questioning
the reality of the "population explosion." The
world's population is growing at an alarming rate.
It is probable that the three-billionth human being
was born some time this year. According to the
best available demographic estimates, 3,000 babies
will be born before I finish speaking tonight. (So
maybe I'd better hurry along.)
In the eyes of the State Department, population
problems are significant primarily because of their
economic implications. This applies to families,
communities, and nations alike. I realize that if
I had 12 children instead of 4, my house would be (
a lot noisier than it is now, although this possi-
bility sometimes seems pretty incredible. But my
big problem would still be food, clothing, shelter,
and popsicles.
I also realize that some people are worried about
the prediction that, at some future date — say,
2100 A.D. — the entire planet may require a "stand-
ing room only" sign. "Wliile such a dismal situa-
tion may indeed lie within the realm of theoretical
possibility, the prospect is not giving me and my
colleagues any sleepless nights. During the '
months and years immediately ahead we shall
probably s]'>end a great deal more of our time wor-
rying about an equally theoretical and even
drearier prospect — the possibility that liuman life
may be wholly extinct by 2100 A.D.
In any event, from the viewpoint of the State
Department the fact that India, for example, has |
about 400 million people is intrinsically neither
good nor bad. This would hold true even if In-
dia's population should increase to 600 million or
800 million. The important question is wliother
these people can be fed, clothed, and sheltered.
22
Depar/menf of State Bulletin
given the necessities of life and some of the com-
forts, given the means to educate themselves, to
preserve their freedom, and to attam greater ma-
terial and spiritual growth.
While demographic statistics are highly unre-
liable, a few broad generalizations are possible.
Any child born into the non-Communist world
today has a two-to-one chance of being born into
a nation where the average per capita income is
less than $5 per month.
This is the really important fact. It is impor-
tant not only to the child himself, his family, his
community, and his nation, but it is also immensely
important to the United States of America. It
is important in terms of our ethical and religious
values, in terms of our domestic prosperity, in
terms of our political freedom, and in terms of
our ultimate survival. Wlien an American under-
stands this fact, it doesn't matter very much
whether his heart is dripping with the milk of
human kindness or whether he is as selfish as
Scrooge. It is no longer possible for any man or
nation to be safe in a world where two-thirds of
the people are on the verge of starvation.
Some Truths and Uncertainties
"What I have said leads to some fairly obvious
conclusions. The State Department has given
little attention to the population problems of the
economically advanced nations, which are able to
provide a fairly decent standard of living to most
of their citizens. We are concerned primarily
with the population problems of the lesser devel-
oped nations. Even here, we are not concerned
with population problems per se but only with
population problems as they may relate to eco-
nomic and social development.
"Wlien we begin to consider this relationship,
we find ourselves upon a small island of miscel-
laneous truths surrounded by a vast ocean of ig-
norance and uncertainty. Let me give some
examples.
First, we know there is a substantial and intri-
cate relationship between economic growth and
population growth. More specifically, we know
that our economic assistance programs have a con-
tinuing impact upon population growth, although
( Ins impact has never yet been deliberate and is
usually unconscious. However, the nature and
extent of the interaction between economic de-
velopment and population growth is often hazy.
For example, public health programs tend to re-
duce the death rate and thus accelerate popula-
tion growth, but also mcrease the productive
capacity of the labor force. Similarly, rural de-
velopment may reinforce a village way of life
favorable to high fertility but may simultaneously
produce new opportunities for women which com-
pete with the traditional role of childbearing.
Second, we know that worldwide economic
growth is well ahead of worldwide population
growth. But this doesn't mean much to people
who are hungry. Moreover, as we look into the
future we cannot be sure whether the problems
produced by population growth will ultimately
be resolved by reducing the rate of population
growth, by technological breakthroughs in the
production of goods and services, by commercial
arrangements which permit a better distribution
of goods and services, by mass emigration, or by
various combinations of these alternatives.
Third, we know there are tremendous variations
in the population problems of difi'erent countries.
In some lesser developed covmtries the present
ratio between economic development and popula-
tion growth is favorable. In other instances the
rate of population growth is so high that a par-
ticular country is not yet achieving, even with
considerable American economic assistance, a per
capita rate of economic growth that is sufficient
to satisfy the aspirations of its people and to as-
sure political and social stability. In two or three
countries the current rate of population growth
is actually higher than the rate of economic
growth. In many countries, however, we are un-
able to draw any very useful conclusions, because
there is no reliable information about the actual
rate of population gi'owth, the actual rate of eco-
nomic growth, the relationship between the two,
the probable social and political consequences, and
probable future trends.
Fourth, we know that certain citizens in foreign
countries believe that their governments need a
deliberate policy and effective program of popula-
tion control. However, these citizens suffer many
uncertainties. They are often imclear as to exist-
ing facts and future probabilities concerning both
population growth and economic growth. They
sometimes fail to appreciate the difference between
population control and birth control and also do
not know what techniques are available in each
case. Population growth, of course, is affected
by a great many factors other than birth control.
January 1, 1962
23
These may include the mobility of workers, the
minimum marriage age, kinship obligations, the
system of land tenures, urbanization, and so forth.
But no one knows very much about the methods
by which governments may deliberately bring
these factors into play so as to produce predict-
able results.
The citizens mentioned often do not know how
to persuade their governments to adopt a definite
program, and the govei-nment itself may not yet
know how to obtain the cooperation of its popula-
tion or how to achieve the results desired without
conscious cooperation. Even where all other con-
ditions are favorable, a government may lack the
resources or technology to carry out an effective
population control program.
As a consequence, very few governments have
as yet adopted anything resembling an active
program of population control, although several
have adopted measures which make it easier or
harder for individual families to regulate births.
Moreover, I can say quite categorically that no
government has ever yet requested any specific
assistance from the United States in controlling
population growth.
Need for More Knowledge
I could spend several hours in describing the
areas of knowledge and the areas of uncertainty,
but my time is limited and I want to make one
positive suggestion. At the outset, I want to pay
tribute to the large number of individuals and
institutions who have done valuable research into
population problems and have produced a signifi-
cant body of knowledge. More than anything
else at this moment, we need additional knowledge.
We need knowledge about general population
problems and specific population problems. We
need more knowledge about the relationship be-
tween population growth and economic develop-
ment. We need technological research, physio-
logical research, social research, economic
research, and political researcli. We need to know
more ; and we even need to know more about what
we need to know.
In the past, most of the research concerning
population problems has been conducted by pri-
vate organizations and individuals. I suspect
this will be true in the future. There are people
in this audience who know far more about the
subject than I do, and there are certain individ-
uals here who know more about particular aspects
of the subject than is known by the entire Depart-
ment of State. There are several private organi-
zations in this country, including religious
organizations with differing views, which have
already done more about direct population con-
trol than the Department of State is likely to do
in tlie foreseeable future.
If what I have said sounds confusing, let me
assure you that the basic facts are confusing.
However, I want to urge the members of this
audience — and evei-y other person in the United
States who may be interested in population prob-
lems— to undertake or stimulate further research
into all aspects of these problems, especially with
reference to their relationship to economic and
social advancement in the lesser developed
coimtries.
Meanwhile I can tell you fairly simply what the
Department of State is doing and what it is not
doing. Fii"st, we are thinking about population
problems and talking about them. Second, we
are attemptmg to get other people to think and
talk about these problems — to stimulate individ-
uals, organizations, and governments to add to the
total store of knowledge on this subject. Finally,
we are prepared to consider, on their merits, cer-
tain types of requests for assistance to other gov-
ernments. In fact, we have already begun to
advise and assist a few governments in their
efforts to acquire additional knowledge about
their own population problems, specifically in the
conduct of censuses.
I haven't the slightest idea what we will be do-
ing 1 year or 10 years from now, because we are
standing at the edge of a jungle that is largely
imexplored. However, there are certain things
which I feel certain that the United States Gov-
ernment will not do. We will not attempt to
impose population controls upon other govern-
ments or peoples. We will not make population
control a condition of our economic assistance to
other countries. We will not advocate anj' par-
ticular technique of population control in pref-
erence to other teclmiques.
Our refusal to do these things is not based upon
])olitioal timidity. It is based in part upon the
lack of information by our Government and other
governments. It is also based upon certain in-
escapable facts of international political life — the
nature of the relationships among free govern-
24
[ispat\men\ of State Bvlhtin
ments and the relationship of governments to
peoples.
In any event, our ultimate objective is clear.
Our Government intends to continue providing
economic assistance to the lesser developed nations.
I do not know whether or not the United States
Government will ever consciously provide specific
assistance in controlling population growth, and
I am even less certain whether we will ever offer
assistance in support of birth-control programs.
At the present moment, incredible as it may seem
to some Americans, birth control is not a major
issue in most parts of the world. It certainly is
not a policy objective of the United States Gov-
ernment. Our real objective was stated by Under
Secretary [George W.] Ball in Vienna only a
few weeks ago,^ when he said that what we want
to do is to make sure that every birth eveiywliere
in the world will some day be accompanied by a
birthright.
Immigration Quotas Set for Cameroon,
Kuwait, Nigeria, and Syria
White House press release (Palm Beach, Fla.) dated December 7
The President on December 7 signed a procla-
mation establishing and revising annual immigra-
tion quotas as follows :
Cameroon 151
Kuwait 100
Nigeria 149
Syria 100
The increase in the quotas for the Federal
Kepublic of Cameroon and the Federation of
Nigeria is due to the division of the former U.N.
Trust Territory of British Cameroons into two
parts, the northern portion of which, with 49
percent of the population, joined the Federation
of Nigeria, the southern portion, with 51 percent
of the population, uniting with the former Ee-
public of Cameroon to form the Federal Republic
of Cameroon. Nigeria and Cameroon are the first
countries to benefit by the amendment of section
202(E) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
by the act of September 26, 1961, to provide that,
when a quota area has been subject to a change of
administrative arrangements, change of bounda-
ries, or other political change, the annual quota of
the newly established quota area shall not be less
'/6iV/., Oct. 9, 1961, p. 579.
January J, 7962
than the sum total of quotas in efl'cct immediately
preceding the change.
The establishment of a quota for the Syrian
Arab Republic, which was extended de jure recog-
nition by the United States on October 10, 1961,
following its withdrawal from the United Arab
Republic, recalls the former provisions of the Im-
migration and Nationality Act. Before Syria and
Egypt formed the United Arab Republic, each
country had a minimum quota of 100. The United
Arab Republic, however, could not be accorded
more than a minimum quota of 100 imder legisla-
tion then in effect.
The State of Kuwait, the former Sheikdom of
Kuwait, has now been extended de jure recogni-
tion by the United States.
Letters of Credence
Rumania
The newly appointed Minister of the Rumanian
People's Republic, Petre Balaceanu, presented his
credentials to President Kennedy on December 12.
For texts of the Minister's remarks and the Pres-
ident's reply, see Department of State press re-
lease 880 dated December 12.
U.S. Announces Intention To Aid
Nigerian Development Program
Press release S77 dated December 12
The Department of State announced on Decem-
ber 12 that the U.S. Government intends to pro-
vide assistance in the order of $225 million to the
Government of the Federation of Nigeria in sup-
port of its development plan to be implemented
during the years 1962-67. This decision follows
two visits of a special U.S. economic mission to
Nigeria which reported favorably on the extent to
which Nigeria is committing its own resources
to weU-conceived development plans, its ability to
absorb foreign assistance, and the sense of social
justice that pervades its planning.
The provision of funds will be subject to the
necessary appropriation by the Congress and to
subsequent mutual agreement on specific programs
and projects which meet U.S. legislative and
policy criteria.
The Department also annomiced that up to $45
million of the $225 million will be made available
to Nigeria during the current U.S. fiscal year.
25
The Health Frontier of the Developing Nations of Africa
hy G. Mennen Williams
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs ^
It is a pleasure to address this distinguished
audience. Indeed I am greatly honored by your
invitation to speak to this assemblage of people
whose professional competence in the field of
health cannot be excelled. Clearly it is a venture
for a Government official to talk about medical
problems to a group like this, but, to be honest, I
must admit that I jumped at the chance to speak
here tonight because I am convinced that Africa
holds a special challenge for people with your
skills— and I must admit, too, I ti-y never to miss
a chance to talk about Africa.
Over the past 9 months I have had the good
fortune to travel to most areas of the continent of
Africa. I have been acquiring a firsthand knowl-
edge of what may be the greatest new challenge
and the greatest new opportunity of our genera-
tion— the emergence of Africa onto the world
scene. I have felt the seething new vitality of this
vast continent with its 230 million people, its vivid
contrasts in topography, in climate, in stages of
political, economic, and social development. And
I have observed how that development has been
hampered by the dead hands of disease and igno-
rance. I have also keenly felt the sharp contrast
between this vast need and our own rare ability to
fill the need. With the special help of my wife,
Nancy, who has been devoted to health and welfare
work both here in Michigan and abroad and has
accompanied me on my journeys in Africa, I have
gained some insight into the problems to which
you have devoted your lives.
But my journeys in Africa have had other pur-
' Address made before the National Citizens Committee
for the World Health Organization, Inc., at Detroit, Mich.,
on Nov. 14 (press release 784).
poses as well. It has been my privilege to convey
to the leaders and peoples of Africa the warm
greetings of President Kennedy and the people of
the United States.
American Policy Regarding Africa
I have also tried to help Africans to understand
better America's purposes regarding them. The
essence of my message in this task is that the
United States wants for Africa what the Africans
want for themselves. We want to see there a com-
munity of sovereign nations growing in vigor and
prosperity. We welcome the independence of new
African nations. We imreservedly stand for the
application of the principles of self-detemiina-
tion for peoples still in a dependent status. And
we oppose any abridgment of human rights,
especially so where, as in the case of South Africa,
an official policy of white supremacy— apartheid —
affronts the conscience of mankind.
These key points of American policy are being,
and will continue to be, put to the test in Africa.
Much is expected of us. We cannot afford to be
preoccupied only with such issues as Berlin and
nuclear tests, important though these assuredly
are. We must make good on our traditional com-
mitment to freedom and self-determination when
these questions are at stake in Africa, as they are
in xVlgeria and Angola and the Congo and South
Africa. Our historic principles and our general
stand on the great moral issues are genuinely and
widely respected in Africa. But that respect can
be eroded. Because our position of leadership is
too pronounced and our relative allluence and
power are too evident, we cannot escape censure if
we falter in facing up to African issues on tlieir
merits.
26
Deparfment of State Bulletin
The great upsurge of nationalism in Africa is
very much a matter of the assertion of human dig-
nity and the struggle for equal rights on a massive
scale. Colonial rule has not been all bad ; in fact
the British and the French have made some nota-
ble contributions to African development. But
unquestionably the master-servant relationship is
an anaclironism in the world politics of today, in
the framework of the high but also realistic prin-
ciples of the United Nations Charter. Racial
discrimination in this country is, understandably,
a disagreeable reminder to Africans of their expe-
riences under white European colonialists. We
cannot afford, nor do we want, the constant recur-
rence of this rather profound emotional irritant
in our relations with the nations and peoples of
Africa. We must eliminate discrimination in
America both because it is right to do so and also
because our national security in world affairs
requires it.
My second task in these travels has been to ac-
quaint myself, on behalf of the Government, with
what Africa expects of the United States. I be-
lieve it important that all Americans get to imder-
stand what Africans have on their minds and in
their hearts.
The leaders I met define Africa's new freedom in
three principal ways. It means for them and for
their peoples the right, first of all, to shape their
own political destinies, their future as independ-
ent nations. Secondly it means the assertion of
their dignity and the right to full racial equality.
And finally it means freedom from degrading
poverty, from ignorance and debilitating disease —
it means the prospect of a better standard of
living.
For Americans, also, freedom has always meant
these things. And it is in these common meanings
that we see Africa's challenge to America's posi-
tion of free- world leadership.
Role of Preventive Medicine
Tonight I would like to dwell on one special as-
pect of this challenge. To express it in terms of
the theme of tliis dinner, I want to discuss the
health frontier of the developing nations of Af-
rica. I base my remarks on the work of Dr. Ealph
W. McComas, the chief of the foreign operations
branch of the Division of Foreign Quarantine of
the Department of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare. Dr. McComas accompanied me on my last
trip to countries bordering the Sahara in order to
assess conditions of health there. I have relied also
on the work of Dr. Arthur C. Curtis, who heads
African public health programs of the Agency for
International Development. Their general con-
clusions are supported by the earlier studies of the
Public Health Consultant Mission to Tropical Af-
rica of the International Cooperation Adminis-
tration and the World Health Organization,
which is now in its 12th year in Africa. And I
must say again my wife's devotion to meeting
health challenges widened my own understanding
and observation.
It is no accident that I draw primarily from
sources known for their devotion to preventive
medicine. The history of health work in Africa
imtil recent years has been almost exclusively that
of valiant but hopelessly inadequate curative im-
dertakings. The role of preventive medicine is
only now being seriously examined. Curative
programs have been based of necessity on the
skills of foreign doctors, who have sought to train
African assistants, nurses, and technicians in the
operation of hospitals and clinics. Today there
are only nine medical schools in the entire conti-
nent. Their graduates are few in number, and it
is highly unlikely that they will increase signifi-
cantly in the near future. This is so because most
education systems of African nations are inade-
quate. They cannot now and will not for a num-
ber of years to come qualify a significant number
of Africans for advanced medical training.
Curative medicine of course remains indispen-
sable in Africa as elsewhere. There is nothing
more iniraculous to me than the work done today
to cure the human body and mind. In the clinics
I have visited in Africa heroic work is the daily
fare of dedicated African and foreign medical
personnel. Their heroism can be fully appreci-
ated by those who are cognizant of the extent and
prevalence of disease and the impossibility of
making progress against it with curative tech-
niques alone.
The U.S. Government has been accumulating
data on which to base action against disease in Af-
rica with preventive techniques. All studies re-
veal a number of grave problems common to the
entire continent. Almost universal are such epi-
demic and endemic diseases as malaria, smallpox,
leprosy, the intestinal parasitic diseases, trachoma
and river blindness, tuberculosis, and sleeping
January 1, 1962
27
sickness. There is no question that African
health officials are deeply concerned about the
need for expanded and improved liealth services to
control these diseases. They are aware also of the
almost universal need for better nutrition —
especially for more protein — as well as for potable
water, for more and better housing particularly
in urban areas, for environmental sanitation, for
programs to control animal and insect vectors, and
for education in everything from personal hygiene
through subprofessional health skills to advanced
medicine and science.
Unfortunately the departure of foreign techni-
cians and the reduction of other forms of assist-
ance from many countries at the time of independ-
ence have aggravated these needs. Furthermore,
concern on the part of government policy leaders
for health varies widely from nation to nation.
Budget support for health programs and the pri-
orities assigned to them in development plans also
vary widely. Heavy emphasis is still given to
medical care and facilities — up to 15 percent of
some national budgets. Despite this emphasis and
the long-term efforts of the colonial powers and
missionaries, many of whom have been American,
the facilities, equipment, supplies, and even stores
of pharmaceuticals are limited and, in many areas,
grossly inadequate. The contribution of medical
care toward solution of tlie basic problem must be
termed minimal. Yet most of the diseases treated
could have been prevented by the application of
known public health techniques.
This tabulation of needs will not, I hope, be con-
sidered an adverse criticism of the selfless men and
women from all over the world who have dedi-
cated their lives to health in Africa. Nor is it my
intention to criticize either the African or his land.
My desire is to set forth clearly the problems in
Africa that challenge health specialists and politi-
cal leaders throughout the world. It is a chal-
lenge to apply known techniques of public health
and research on the health frontier of the develop-
ing nations of Africa. It is a challenge to invent
new techniques for problems unique in their vast-
ness. It is a challenge to prevent disease or to
limit it to magnitudes with which treatment can
cope.
A few minutes ago I named some widespread
diseases. I pointed to a liistory of health pro-
grams in Africa limited primarily to curative
medicine. I indicated that African governmental
budgets still devote the bulk of funds to medical
care. I stated that this care is far from adequate.
To all tliis must now be added the fact that even
with contributions from external sources, from in-
dividual nations, including the former colonial
powei-s, and from multilateral agencies of the
United Nations, the resoui-ces available to African
nations will be insufficient to justify great hopes
for expansion of expensive curative facilities.
Rational use of resources demands concentration
on preventive programs. "With a concentrated,
sustained program of this kind there is reason to
expect that substantial progress against disease
can be achieved ; there is reason to expect that this
drag on economic and social progress can be signi-
ficantly reduced.
Health in Relation to Economic and Social Growth
Africa's health problems seriously affect the
economic and social growth of its developing
countries. The success of many development
plans will depend upon the availability of man-
power. Many of Africa's preventable diseases
strike individuals in their potentially most pro-
ductive age periods. The occurrence of these
diseases in yoimger age groups either eliminates
or handicaps these potential producers. Endemic
malaria alone has caused repeated failure of agri-
cultural development projects in other parts of the
world. In all of tropical Africa, malaria of the
most serious kind is endemic and is only one of
several equally serious diseases limiting the pro-
ductivity of the people of this region.
Economic and social progress are sure to be
slow and uncertain in countries where debilitating
diseases constantly undermine the physical and
mental vitality of the people. Obviouslj', how-
ever, progress in the field of health is impossible
without commensurate progress in social and eco-
nomic fields as well. Effective programs of dis-
ease control require sizable cadres trained in the
various aspects of the health services and profes-
sions. Development of such cadres depends upon
the product of the basic educational programs of
countries. In Africa literacy ranges as low as 10
percent. Secondary educational facilities in al-
most all areas are too small to supply a full com-
plement of students for the all-too-few existing
institutions of liigher learning.
Education is, of couree, also essential to im-
proved nutrition. Improved nutrition requires
28
Deparfmenf of Sfate BuUefin
the intake of a greater variety of foods. This
means that housewives must not only overcome
their skepticism about new foods but must also
learn to prepare them. Educated personnel are
needed to determine what new foods are to be pro-
duced and to train those who produce them. Edu-
cated people are required to develop the agricul-
tural sector of the economy and to build and
operate complementary systems of transportation
and so on. Educated people are required also to
teach others to do these things. To quote a recent
WHO statement, ". . . health improvement must
be geared to social progress and economic devel-
opment, and with them constitutes an inseparable
triad."
President Kennedy has recognized that economic
and social development can occur only through
sustained advance on a broad front. He has
called for an American program to help the de-
veloping nations help themselves. He has also
called for more commitment to long-term devel-
opment and to orderly planning for national and
regional development. He has established the
new Agency for International Development to
give effect to this American program.
President Kennedy has also placed high priority
on stimulating contributions from other developed
nations and has given impetus to the new Organi-
zation for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment for this purpose. He has called for the most
effective use of resources, stressing the importance
of coordination of all programs including, of
course, those of the multilateral agencies of the
United Nations, such as the World Health Organi-
zation (WHO) , the Food and Agriculture Organ-
ization (FAO), the United Nations Children's
Fund (UNICEF), and others. Within the
framework of these principles, the United States,
both the Government and private organizations,
can assuredly develop effective programs of assist-
ance for Africa in the field of health.
Projects in Ethiopia and Chad
I would like to suggest the direction which these
programs might take by quickly describing several
established projects, which have varying national
and organizational sponsorsliip. These projects
have proven effective. They have tested princi-
ples wliich can guide activities in other areas.
The few I can reasonably name in my allotted
time this evening can only suggest the solid and
the imaginative start being made in Africa today.
I think first of the school located at Gondar,
Ethiopia, for health officers, community nurses,
and sanitarians. There the United States and
Ethiopian Governments, WHO, and UNICEF
are contributing each according to its potential.
Since its establishment in 1954, 200 graduates have
gone out to staff some 30 newly opened health
centers. The health officers are a truly new type
of professional. Their training, designed to re-
spond to local needs, places major emphasis on
preventive medicine but also includes curative.
Moreover, graduates in each of Gondar's sldlls
are trained to work with the others as a team.
And of special importance it seems to me is that
the Ethiopian Government has instituted a health
tax for the consti-uction of additional health cen-
ters to insure an expanding program.
Another exciting and promising experimental
project, this one in the field of health education,
has been sponsored by UNESCO [United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organiza-
tion] in the Republic of Chad. Within the frame-
work of a basic education program, a central
radio station has broadcast health classes to a
field staff of village educators who move about on
bicycles, equipped witli receiving sets, to rural
dispensaries and schools. These and other health
workers are armed with inexpensive supplemental
visual aids. Taken all together the program has
demonstrated sufficient promise to justify UNES-
CO plans to begin siinilar programs in other
countries. Many other projects in Libya, Liberia,
and elsewhere demonstrate how multilateral and
bilateral methods of assistance can be harmo-
nized. The goals are the same, but the resources
are different. Wlaen coordinated with the efforts
of the Africans tliis assistance can have tremen-
dous impact.
These examples point up the kind of innovation
that will hasten progress against Africa's diseases.
Less spectacular programs of the World Health
Organization in north Africa have been sufficiently
successful to permit planning of broad programs
for the control or eradication of trachoma and
malaria. In some areas of west Africa the
French-sponsored Organization for Coordination
and Control of Large Epidemics has made con-
siderable progress in the control of sleeping sick-
ness. British research has contributed greatly to
our imderstanding of vectors and their control.
January 1, J 962
29
These and other programs of WHO, UNICEF,
FAO, and the philanthropic foundations, although
modest, appear sound, well executed, and geared
to the resources of the countries.
Expansion and multiplication in Africa of pro-
grams in preventive medicine and in training of
personnel are vital if the most practical use of
existing human resources is to be made. The
growth of these programs must be coordinated
with the indispensable curative programs; their
development must be in step with social and eco-
nomic progress. Without diligent effort now to
establish and expand preventive medicine and
public health services, the African's hopes for a
better life — for human dignity — which imderlie
today's continent-wide resurgence could turn to
despair. As President Kennedy put it in his
speech before the United Nations,^
Political sovereignty is but a mockery without the
means of meeting poverty and illiteracy and disease.
Self-determination is but a slogan if the future holds no
hope.
Ladies and gentlemen, your presence here to-
night is eloquent testimony of the leading position
of the United States in the fields of health which
are of critical importance to Africa today. With
your support, your Government, together with
other free nations and the multilateral agencies
of the United Nations, can move against the prob-
lems on the health frontiers of Africa's develop-
ing nations. You remember the words of the
President's inaugural,^ "To those people in the
huts and villages of half the globe struggling to
break the bonds of mass misery, we pledge our best
efforts to help them help themselves, for whatever
period is required — not because the Communists
may be doing it, not because we seek their votes,
but because it is right."
U.S. To Aid Basic Economic Project
on Volta River in Ghana
Press release 887 dated December 16
The Department of State announced on Decem-
ber 16 that Clarence Eandall, on behalf of the Gov-
ernment of the United States, would on that day
inform the Government of Ghana that the TTnited
States will join Ghana, the United Kingdom, the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Devel-
opment, and American private industry in financ-
ing the Volta River project.^ The 5-year project
will involve a U.S. loan of $37 million, of which
about $25 million will be paid out over the next
3 years.
This action is the culmination of nearlj' 3 years
of active study and negotiation to insure the eco-
nomic and technical feasibility of the project.
The go-ahead on the Volta project, like recent U.S.
approval of substantial commitments of economic
assistance to Tanganyika and Nigeria, is expected
to assist the developing African nations to
strengthen their economies, maintain their inde-
pendence, and facilitate the growth of free polit-
ical institutions.
The United States, through its agencies, the
Development Loan Fund and the Export-Import
Bank, will loan $37 million to the Volta River
Authority over a period of at least 5 years for the
construction of a dam, power station, and trans-
mission grid. The remaining funds will come
from sources outside the U.S. Government, Loan
advances to the Volta River Authority will be
made on a 50-50 matching basis with the Ghanaian
Government. The Volta River Authority is an
independent Ghana Government corporation, pat-
terned after the Tennessee Valley Authority. Its
chief engineer will be Frank J. Dobson, a distin-
guished Canadian engineer now with the Hydro-
electric Power Commission of Ontario.
In addition, the United States, through the De-
velopment Loan Fund and the Export-Import
Bank, will extend loan assistance and investment
guaranties to a consortiiun of private American
companies [Volta Aluminum Co.] who will build
and operate an aluminum smelter using power gen-
erated by the dam. VALCO's shareholders, the
American aluminum companies, have agreed to
purchase the aluminum produced by the smelter
at a price which will cover debt service charges and
operating costs, iiicluding power costs. The power
rate, in turn, has been established at a level which
will cover debt service on the dam. Thus the
repayment of both loajis is assured. Under an
agreement between VALCO and the Authority,
the First National City Bank of New York will
act as a trustee to receive these payments for the
aluminum and apply the funds directly to pay
VALCO's obligations.
' Bulletin of Oct. 16, 1961, p. 619.
• Ibid., Feb. 6, 1961, p. 175.
' For background, see Bulletin of July 24, 1961, p. 153,
and Nov. 6, 1961, p. 771.
30
Department of State Bulletin
Department Responds to Queries
Concerning Oil Imports Program
Statement hy C. W. Niclwls ^
I appreciate the opportunity of appearing at
these hearings and presenting information on be-
lialf of the Department of State respecting the
mandatory oil imports program. Your letter of
Dctober 20 posed four separate questions and asked
the Department's views on each of them. My
presentation today will follow the order in which
^our letter posed the questions.
First, your letter stated: "We are most inter-
jsted in obtaining evidence with respect to whether
the United States has any treaty obligations, pur-
suant to the Trade Extension Agreements, that
might interfere or conflict with limitations on the
importation of foreign oil."
We take this question to be asking broadly
whether the United States has any agreements
jntered into under the authority of the Trade
i^greements Act of 1934, as amended and extended
(19 U.S.C. 1351(a)), which might interfere or
conflict with limitations on the importation of
foreign oil. Two such agreements exist, the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the bi-
lateral trade agreement with Venezuela.^ The
fundamental intent of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade and the Venezuelan agi-eement
is to stimulate the broadest possible international
jxchange of goods. There is a basic inconsistency
between the petroleum restrictions and this intent.
However, the GATT and the Venezuelan agree-
ment make exception for the national defense re-
3(uirements of their contracting parties. The
United States maintains that such exceptions
provide legal justification for its petroleum policy.
Phis legal justification mitigates the conflict be-
tween these restrictions and the goal of these trade
agreements but only for such time as there is
Bvidence that they are necessary to safeguard the
security of the United States.
Second, the letter stated: "We would like to
dave your views as to the possibility of the United
States being deprived of foreign oil and the con-
' Made before Subcommittee 4 of the House Select Com-
mittee on Small Business on Nov. 21 (press release 801).
Mr. Nichols is Special Assistant to the Assistant Secre-
tary for Economic Affairs.
' 54 Stat. 2375 ; 3 UST 4195.
comitant importance of maintaining a healthy
and adequate domestic oil production industry."
The Department believes that full considera-
tion of this subject requires also the coordinated
views of several agencies, including the Depart-
ment of Defense, the Office of Emergency Plan-
ning, and the Department of the Interior. The
following comments are offered with this in mind.
There are a number of possible developments in
world production and trade in petroleum that
might affect U.S. oil supplies. Wo witnessed one
such event in the Suez Canal difficulty in 1956-57.
In that case, however, the loss of oil supplies to
the U.S. was less important than the interruption
of the oil flow to European destinations that de-
pended on it, but we suffered some inconvenience
in the adjustment that had to be made.
It is highly unlikely that developments short
of war could cause a serious interference with U.S.
access to foreign oil. In the first place, the large
and growing number of oil-producing countries
provide alternative sources. Secondly, since most
major oil-exporting countries have a one-product
economy, they have a strong interest in maintain-
ing their position in the U.S. market.
A wartime situation can be described only in
the most general of terms because the possibility
of deprivation would vary with the participants
and the type of war being fought. Oil from ad-
jacent friendly countries obviously is as safe as
domestic oil from a military standpoint. This is
the reason for the overland exemption to the pres-
ent oil import control program.
Military authorities can speak with greater au-
thority than the Department of State on the
extent to which oil brought in by tanker might
be vulnerable to submarine attack. It may be
pointed out, however, that any war so general in
nature as to involve submarine attack on our ocean
shipping also would involve a high probability
of damage to ports, refineries, railroads, highways,
and consuming areas. Because of such damage,
available supplies both of oil and of solid fuels
might be surplus to requirements during such all-
out conflict. "Brush fire" wars might interfere
with some sources of oil, but it is improbable that
the U.S. woidd suffer a crippling shortage on that
account. The existence of well-developed foreign
sources would probably mean advantage in local
overseas fighting.
The Department believes that security in oil
lanuary h 1962
31
demands a balanced approach. A healthy, effi-
cient, and progressive industry is needed to pro-
vide oil, in an emergency, to our oountiy and its
allies. Government intei-vention in tlie oil mar-
ket may be necessary but should not be pushed
beyond the point of diminishing returns.
In assessing what Government should imder-
take, one must consider the need of the economy
for low-cost fuel, the effect of import restrictions
in this country on our efforts to open up foreign
markets for the products of American farms and
factories, and the stake of American investors in
oil production abroad. We also must consider
the security effect of political repercussions in
friendly countries dependent for a livelihood on
oil.
The third question took the following form:
"It would be helpful if you . . . would ex-
plain . . . the arrangements by which foreign
imported oil is trucked into this country from
Mexico as exempt overland imports."
The circumstances that led to the import of oil
by truck into the U.S. from Mexico were an un-
expected byproduct of the oil import control pro-
gram. Before the program began, PEMEX, the
Mexican petroleum coi-poration, used to sell oil,
in approximately the quantities now entering at
Brownsville, to customers in the New York City
area. When the progi-am started, these custom-
ers, being historic importers, received import
quotas. The New York importers subsequently
were absorbed, along with their import quotas,
by a major international oil company which de-
cided to utilize these import quotas to bring in its
own oil from Trinidad instead of buying oil in
Mexico. The Brownsville arrangement resulted
from PEMEX's effort to locate replacement cus-
tomers for some 30,000 barrels a day. Mexico
needed the income from these sales, both for the
Mexican company and as a small contribution to-
ward meeting the large perennial deficit in
Mexico's trade with the U.S. The functioning of
the import control program had created an imf ore-
seen and unintended hardship for Mexico.
In the absence of adequate unloading and stor-
age facilities for petroleum products on the Mexi-
can side of the border at Matamoros-Brownsville
or of a pipeline from the Gulf Coast oil fields of
Mexico to the U.S. border, Mexico sought and
found another means whereby it could continue to
export the small amount of residual and other
oils produced in Mexico wliich it had exported
to the U.S. under import quotas imtil the above-
mentioned absorption of the former importers by
other companies.
The arrangements by which oil enters the United
States under this exemption are:
1. Mexican oil is shipped by tanker from Mexico
to Brownsville, Texas, where it enters a customs
bonded warehouse or otherwise remains in con-
tinuous customs custody.
2. It subsequently is withdrawn by the Mexican
petroleum corporation under a "warehouse with-
drawal for exportation," or from other customs
custody under an immediate export entry, in order
that it may be taken into Mexico for sale. Under
U.S. customs rulings the oil has not been imported
into the U.S.
3. The oil is transported by motor carrier to
Matamoros, Mexico, via the Gateway Bridge.
Ownership is transferred after the oil enters
Mexico.
4. The new owner takes possession, and the oil
enters the United States by motor carrier.
As this is Mexican oil entering the U.S. over-
land from Mexico, its entry is consistent with the
President's amended proclamation No. 3279 of
March 10, 1959 (which imposed restrictions on
oil imports), which exempts from tlie restrictions
crude oil, unfinished oils, and finished products
entering the United States by pipeline, motor car-
rier, or rail from the country of production.
Tanker shipments direct from Tampico to con-
suming areas are more economic and involve less
handling of product than the Brownsville ar-
rangement. Consequently, PEMEX is continuing
its efforts to find new customers entitled to import
quotas. The company regards the Brownsville
procedure as a supplementary marketing method
and intends to utilize direct tanker shipments to
the fullest extent possible. The Mexican Gov-
ernment has given the United States assurances
that its overland shipments via Brownsville will
average not over 30,000 barrels a day tlirough
1963.
The subcommittee's fourth and last question
was : "We would also like to have your views as
to the extent and probable effect upon this nation
and (he other free world countries of the current
tremendous expansion in oil exportation by the
Soviet Union."
The U.S.S.R., which is endowed bountifully
32
Deporfmenf of Sfofe Bulletin
with extensive sedimentary basins, has, during
recent years, increased its production of petro-
leum at a rapid rate. This production, which
amounted to slightly more tlian a million barrels
a day in 1953, has increased almost threefold to
slightly less than 3 million barrels a day in 1960.
The 7-year plan of the U.S.S.R. has set as its ob-
jective the production of 4.8 million barrels a day
in 1965. At present rates of increase in produc-
tion, this target may be exceeded by as much as
15 percent.
The U.S.S.R. has not been increasing consump-
tion at as rapid a rate as production and has
found itself with an increasing surplus of oil
available for export. As a consequence, since
1955 Soviet oil exports to the free world have in-
creased sharply.
Exports of Soviet oU to the free world, which
averaged about 100,000 barrels a day in 1955,
have increased rapidly to approximately 450,000
barrels a day in 1960. Such exports are currently
estimated to be nmning in the neighborhood of
550,000 barrels a day. It has been estimated that
the Soviets may have the capacity in 1965 to ex-
port approximately 1 million barrels a clay of
crude oil and petroleum products to the free
world, with an additional export of some 500,000
barrels a day to the Eastern European satellites
and Communist China.
The ability of the Soviet Union to achieve this
rate of export will be enhanced by the completion,
which is planned for 1965, of pipelines to ports
on the Baltic and Black Seas. The extension of
a pipeline from central Siberia to the Pacific is
also under consideration and may be available
about the same time.
The Soviets have pointed out that they have
been traditional exporters of oil in the past and
have as their objective regaining their previous
market position in the period 1925 to 1935,
which averaged some 14.3 percent of the total oil
imports of Western countries. In 1959 Soviet
exports were about 4 percent of estimated free-
world trade in petroleum. If the Soviets export
1 million barrels a day in 1965, their phase of
the market would be roughly 7 percent of esti-
mated free-world trade in petroleum.
At present approximately 75 percent of Soviet
exports of oil are moving to Western Europe.
The Soviets have found this market relatively
easy to penetrate, owing to its geographical prox-
imity and its large and rapidly growing demand
for ci-ude oil and petrolemn products. Many in-
dustrialists in Western Europe desire a cheap
form of energy and are thus keenly interested in
importing low-priced Soviet oil. The Soviets, in
return, find that the Western European countries
are able to supply many of the industrial items
which are needed for the domestic expansion pro-
gram in the U.S.S.II.
There is a general overcapacity to produce oil
throughout the free world at the present time,
and this condition will probably exist for several
years. This condition of surplus supply has, for
some time, tended to have a softening effect on
petroleum prices. The addition of more than half
a million barrels a day of Soviet oil to a market
already overloaded with surplus oil has added
significantly to the weakening of the oil price
structure. Moreover, the Soviets, in order to sell
oil in Western markets, have in some instances
reduced their prices to obtain the business. The
effects of these reduced prices greatly outweigh
the importance of Soviet oil measured as a percent-
age of total movements of oil.
While it is probable that exports of oil from
the U.S.S.R. to Europe are made to a considerable
extent for economic reasons, oil shipments to less
developed countries seem to have a great degree
of political motivation. Since the market for
petroleum in less developed countries is generally
small, a small volume of exports of oil to any one
country by the U.S.S.R. can cause considerable
disruption of the markets there. In several cases
the Soviet Union has been willing to accept local
currency for shipments of oil to less developed
countries or, on the basis of barter transactions, to
accept surplus goods which these countries have
had difficulty in exporting to the free world. Such
trading tactics on the part of the U.S.S.R. may,
in the long rim, result in some less developed
coimtries' becoming dependent upon the Soviet
Union to an extent whereby their freedom of ac-
tion is compromised.
Since the bulk of exports of Soviet oil obviously
displace oil wliich would have been sold from
other sources, Soviet oil has had the effect of de-
creasing the rate of growth which free- world pro-
ducer countries might otherwise have expected to
attain. This has resulted in lessening the antici-
pated amounts of revenue which these countries
had hoped to receive. Recently at the third Arab
January J, J 962
33
Oil Congress a delegate spoke strongly against the
depressing effect on prices for free-world oil
caused by exports of low-priced Soviet oil. Con-
cern has also been expressed in both Europe and
the United States.
Overdependence on Soviet oil exports or on the
U.S.S.R. as a market for Western products is a
danger that free-world countries must take very
seriously. The Soviet Union will have to be
reckoned with as a substantial oil supplier in world
markets for a number of yeare to come.
President Sets Cuban Sugar Quota
at Zero for First Half of 1962
A PROCLAMATION'
Whereas section 408(b) (1) of the Sugar Act of 1&18,
as amended by the act of March 31, 1961, provides that
the President shall determine, notwithstanding any other
provision of Title II of the Sugar Act of 1948, as amended,
the quota for Cuba for the period ending June 30, 1962,
in such amount or amounts as he shall find from time to
time to be in the national interest, and further provides
that in no event shall such quota exceed such amount
as would be provided for Cuba under the terms of Title
II of the Sugar Act of 1948, as amended, in the absence
of section 408(b) ; and
Whereas section 408(b) (1) of the Sugar Act of 1948,
as amended, further provides that determinations made
by the President thereunder shall become effective im-
mediately upon publication in the Federal Register ; and
Whereas section 408(b) (2) and section 408(b) (3) of
the Sugar Act of 1948, as amended, authorize the Presi-
dent, subject to certain requirements, to cause or permit
to be brought or imported into or marketed in the United
States a quantity of sugar not in excess of the amount
by which the quotas which would be established for
Cuba under the terms of Title II of such Act exceed the
quotas established for Cuba by the President pursuant
to section 408(b) of the Act; and
Whereas, by Proclamation No. 3401 of March 31, 1961,'
the President determined the quota for Cuba for the
calendar year 1961, to be zero ; and
Whereas, pursuant to section 40S(b)(l) of the Sugar
Act of 1948, as amended, I find it to be in the national
interest that the amount of the quotas for sugar and for
liquid sugar for Cuba pursuant to the Sugar Act of 1948,
as amended, for the six-month period ending June 30,
1962, should be zero :
Now, therefore, I, John F. Kennedy, President of the
United States of America, acting under and by virtue of
the authority vested in me by section 408(b) of the Sugar
Act of 1948, as amended, and section 301 of title 3 of the
United States Code, and as President of the United
States :
1. Do hereby determine that in the national interest the
amount of the quotas for sugar and for liquid sugar for
Cuba pursuant to the Sugar Act of 1948, as amended, for
the six-month period ending June 30, 1962, shall be zero ;
and
2. Do hereby continue the delegation to the Secretary
of Agriculture of the authority vested in the President
by section 408(b) (2) and section 408(b) (3) of the Sugar
Act of 1948, as amended, such authority to be continued
to be exercised with the concurrence of the Secretary of
State.
This proclamation shall become effective immediately
upon publication in the Federal Register.
In witness whereof, I have hereimto set my hand and
caused the Seal of the United States of America to be
aflSxed.
Done at the City of Washington this first day of Decem-
ber in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred
[seal] and sixty-one and of the Independence of the
United States of America the one hundred and
eighty-sixth.
f^J /L^
By the President:
Dean Rusk,
Secretary of State.
Department Explains U.S. Position
on Dominican Sugar
Department Statement
Press release 864 dated December 8
In connection with the statement in an an-
nouncement by the Department of Agriculture on
December 8 that authorization to purchase the
tonnage of nonquota sugar allocated to the Do-
minican Eepublic would be withheld at tliis time,
the Department of State wishes to make clear
that the reason for withholding purchase authori-
zation is the fact that the United States does not
maintain diplomatic relations with the Dominican
Republic.^
' No. 3440 ; 26 Fed. Reg. 11714.
" For text, see Bulletin of Apr. 24, 1961, p. 592.
' For background, see Bulletin of Sept. 12, 1060, p.
412.
34
Department of State Bulletin
Existing legislation authorizes the Executive to
withhold purchases of nonquota sugar from any
country with which we do not maintain diplo-
matic relations. Purchases of nonquota sugar
from the Dominican Republic will be authorized
when diplomatic relations are resumed, provided
the resumption takes place within a reasonable
time.
The resumption of diplomatic relations de-
pends upon (1) action by the Council of the Or-
ganization of American States to rescind the res-
olution of the Sixth Meeting of Foreign Ministere
at San Jose, Costa Rica, in August 1960, which
called for the breaking of diplomatic relations of
all member states with the Dominican Republic,^
and (2) a determination by the United States
and by the Dominican Republic that diplomatic
relations between the two countries should be re-
sumed. In making its determination, the United
States would, of course, be guided by its estimate
of the extent to which its renewal of diplomatic
relations with the Dommican Republic would as-
sist that country in its efforts toward democrati-
zation.
deposited to the credit of the United States and
will be available for use by the U.S. Government.
The agreement provides that, beginning January
2, 1972, the Polish Government will repurchase for
dollars at the rate of $1.5 million annually such
zlotys as have not been used.
This agreement represents a further step of this
Government to meet Polish needs by sales of agri-
cultural commodities. Since 1957 similar agree-
ments under Public Law 480 have provided for a
total of $365.3 million in such sales to Poland. A
total of $61 million in credits has also been ex-
tended to Poland between 1957 and 1959 through
the Export-Import Bank, which has been used
primarily for the purchase of equipment and ma-
terials, agricultural commodities, and poliomy-
elitis vaccine. Shipments of these items have con-
tributed directly to an improvement in Polish
diets and medical care, and they have been ac-
cepted by the Polish people as material evidence
of the continuing interest and friendship of the
United States for Poland.
P.L. 480 Agreement Signed
by U.S. and Poland
The Department of State announced on Decem-
ber 15 (press release 884) that an agreement ^ was
concluded at Washington on that day by the
United States and Poland which provides for the
sale to Poland of agricultural commodities having
a total export market value of $44.6 million includ-
ing certain ocean transportation costs. Under the
provisions of the Agricultural Trade Development
and Assistance Act, as amended (Public Law 480) ,
Poland will purchase surplus agricultural com-
modities, including wheat, barley, edible oils, and
tallow. Shipments under this agreement are ex-
pected to help meet current urgent Polish needs
in these commodities.
As provided in the act, payment will be in local
currency (Polish zlotys). This currency will be
' For background, see ibid., Sept. 5, 1960, p. 358 ; Feb.
20, 1961, p. 273; Dec. 4, 1961, p. 929; and Dec. 18, 1961,
p. 1000.
' For text, see press release 884 dated Dec. 15.
DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE
Recess Appointments
The President on December 7 made the following recess
appointments :
William' J. Handley to be Ambassador to Mali. (For
biographic details, see White House press release (Palm
Beach, Fla.) dated December 7.)
Ridgway B. Knight to be Ambassador to Syria. (For
biographic details, see White House press release (Palm
Beach, Fla.) dated December 7.)
Raymond L. Thurston to be Ambassador to Haiti. ( For
biographic details, see Department of State press release
891 dated December 18.)
The President on December 10 appointed Seymour
Janow to be Assistant Administrator for the Far East,
Agency for International Development. (For biographic
details, see White House press release (Palm Beach, Fla.)
dated December 9.)
The President on December 14 appointed Parker
Thompson Hart to be Ambassador to Kuwait. (For
biograjjhic details, see White House press release dated
December 14.)
January h 1962
35
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings '
Scheduled January Through March 1962
U.N. ECAFE Committee for Coordination of Investigations of ttie Phnom Penh, Cambodia . . . Jan. 3-
Lower Mekong Basin: 16th (General) Session.
CENTO Scientific Council Lahore Jan. 4-
CENTO Symposium on the Role of Science in the Development of Lahore Jan. 8-
Natural Resources With Particular Reference to Iran, Pakistan, and
Turkey.
IMCO Maritime Safety Committee: 5th Session London Jan. 8-
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights: 14th Session of Sub- New York Jan. 8-
commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities.
ICAO Communications Division: 7th Session Montreal Jan. 9-
U.N. ECAFE Intraregional Trade Promotion Talks Bangkok Jan. 10-
U.N. ECAFE Working Party on Commercial Arbitration Bangkok Jan. 11-
CENTO Economic Experts Ankara Jan. 15-
FAO Desert Locust Control Technical Advisory Committee: 10th Rome Jan. 15-
Session.
IAEA Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Law (including third-party Brussels Jan. 22-
liability for nuclear shipping).
U.N. ECAFE Committee on Trade: 5th Session Bangkok Jan. 22-
FAO Desert Locust Control Committee: 7th Session Rome Jan. 24-
North Pacific Fur Seal Commission: Scientific Committee Ottawa Jan. 29-
FAO Meeting on Hemorrhagic Septicemia Kuala Lumpur Jan. 29-
WMO Commission for Instruments and Methods of Observation: 3d New Delhi Jan. 29-
Session.
U.N. ECOSOC Regional Seminar on the Participation of Women in Singapore Jan. 30-
Public Life.
U.N. ECAFE Committee on Industry and Natural Resources: 14th Bangkok Jan. 31-
Session.
WHO Executive Board: 29th Session (and Standing Committee on Geneva January
Administration and Finance).
U.N. Special Fund Governing Council: 7th Session New York January
North Pacific Fur Seal Commission: 5th Meeting Ottawa Feb. 7-
U.N. ECAFE Inland Transport and Communications Committee: 10th Bangkok Feb. 12-
Session.
OECD Maritime Transport Committee: 2d Session Paris Feb. 14-
FAO International Rice Commission: 6th Session of Consultative Sub- Rangoon Feb. 15-
committee on the Economic Aspects of Rice.
IMCO Council: Extraordinary Session London Feb. 19-
U.N. Economic Commission for Africa: 4th Session Addis Ababa Feb. 19-
IMCO Council: 6th Session London Feb. 20-
CENTO Economic Committee Washington Feb. 26-
lAEA Board of Governors Vienna Feb. 27-
ICAO Air Traffic Control Automation Panel Montreal February
ICAO Panel on Origin and Destination Statistics: 4th Meeting . . . Montreal February
U.N. International Wheat Conference Geneva February
OAS/UNESCO/ECLA Conference on Education and Economic and Santiago Mar. 5-
Social Development.
U.N. ECOSOC Committee for Industrial Development: 2d Session . . New York Mar. 5-
U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) : 18th Tokyo Mar. 6-
Session.
ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Geneva Mar. 15-
Recommendatious.
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Status of Women: 16th Session. . . . New York Mar. 19-
WMO Commission for Synoptic Meteorology: 3d Session Washington Mar. 26-
CENTO Military Committee London Mar. 28-
Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences: 7th Meeting of Tech- Turrialba, Costa Rica .... March
nical Advisory Council.
' Pn'ijared in the Oflice of International Conferences, Dec. 15, 1961. Following is a list of abbreviations: CENTO,
Central Treaty Organization; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECLA, Economic Commission
for Latin America; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; IAEA, Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ILO, International Labor Organi-
zation; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; OAS, Organization of American States; OECD,
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational,
Scientifie and Cultural Organization; WHO, World Health Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.
36 Department of Sfofe Bulletin
Tanganyika Admitted
to United Nations
Statement by Adlai E. Stevenson
VJS. Representative to the United Nations ^
Tlie United States is most happy to welcome the
application of Tanganyika for membership in the
United Nations. And we acknowledge with warm
appreciation the competent speeches of welcome
we have lieard here this morning.
For my part, I shall long remember the charm-
ing and informative address about Tanganyika
by our colleague, the distinguished Ambassador
of Ceylon. I did not overlook liis reminder that
the Olduvai skull, the oldest human remain, was
found in Tanganyika and is sometimes called the
Nutcracker Man. If American slang is not for-
bidden, I could express the hope that the United
Nations might find in Tanganyika another "nut-
cracker man."
There is little for me to add to what has already
been said, but I can repeat that Tanganyika was
the largest of the trust territories, both in area and
population. It is the most recent of the trust ter-
ritories to emerge as an independent nation from
the trusteeship process of the United Nations.
The United States is one of the countries that has
from the beginning taken an active interest in
the United Nations trusteeship system. We may,
therefore, be forgiven if we feel a special pride
and satisfaction as this large and promising new
nation enters our ranks. Closely associated as we
are with the work of the Trusteeship Council, we
are well aware of the part that the United King-
dom has played and happily continues to play in
Tanganyika. A firm foundation has been laid by
many devoted and talented English men and
women who furnish what promises to be a fruitful
and close relationship between two great countries
in the future.
We are honored to know that Prime Minister
Julius Nyerere and representatives of the Tan-
ganyika Government have come to the seat of the
United Nations for this memorable event, and we
extend to them our warm welcome. They are, to
use the words of my country's representative on
the Trusteeship Council [Jonathan B. Bingham],
symbols of African hopes, African dignity, and
African success, and they give us a glimpse of the
iMade in the Security Council on Dec. 14 (U.S./U.N.
press release 3SS9).
U.S. Congratulates Tanganyika
on Independence
Following is the text of a message from President
Kennedy to the Oovernment and people of Tan-
ganyika, whioh teas delivered to Prime Minister
Julius Nyerere at Dar-es-Salaam on December 9
by Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., Personal Representa-
tive of the President at the Tanganyika independ-
ence celebrations.
White House press release (Palm Beach, Fla.) dated
December 8
On behalf of the people of the United States of
America, I extend the heartiest congratulations to
the government and people of Tanganyika on the
occasion of their independence.
Tanganyika's leaders, above all Prime Minister
Julius Nyerere, and its people have brought their
land to Freedom and equality among nations in a
manner that has won the admiration of all Ameri-
cans. For Americans also cherish individual liberty
and national independence, and they share with
Tanganyikans the knowledge that these goals are
achieved and maintained only at the cost of un-
remitting labor and sacrifice.
Americans also share with the people of Tan-
ganyika a profound respect for the principles of
the United Nations Charter. Tanganyika has
passed to independence through a period of United
Nations trusteeship under British administration.
It is gratifying that this period ends with continu-
ing cooperation between these two sovereign friends
of the United States. Gratifying also is this new
nation's example in the exercise of human rights
in which Tanganyikans of different racial origins
band as one to the task of economic and social
progress. This new nation brings to world councils
a welcome sense of responsibility and a stanch
independence.
The people of the United States of America shall
work to multiply and strengthen bonds of friend-
ship with the government and people of Tanganyika.
We look forward to working together with Tan-
ganyikans in the cause of freedom, dignity and
peace.
tremendous contribution which the peoi^le of
Africa can make to this upset world of ours. Tan-
ganyika has had notable success in establishing a
harmonious multiracial society. The representa-
tive of the United Kingdom in the Trusteeship
Council, Sir Hugh Foote, has called Tanganyika's
achievement one of the most striking and success-
ful ventures in racial harmony and freedom ever
seen.
While Tanganyika has reason to be proud of its
achievements, its people and its leaders still face,
January 1, 1962
37
needless to say, formidable problems in develop-
ing the economy, the education, and the social po-
tential of their comitry. Prime Minister Nyerere
and Tanganyika's other leaders are well aware
of these challenges and have declared their in-
tention to wage a silent revolution against poverty,
disease, and ignorance, in order to raise the stand-
ards of living of the people and the general cir-
cumstances of life in this new country. In tliis
we wish them all success and are prepared to ex-
tend our help and our cooperation. We extend
our sincere congratulations to the Government
and the people of Tanganyika and with great
pleasure will vote in favor of the resolution spon-
sored by Ceylon, Liberia, and the United Arab
Republic. And we look forward to a happy and
fruitful association in the United Nations with
the representatives of this great country.^
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Automotive Traffic
Customs convention on temporary importation of private
road vehicles. Done at New Yorlt June 4, 1954. En-
tered into force December 15, 1957. TIAS 3943.
Accession deposited: Norway, October 10, 1961.
Narcotics
Convention relating to the suppression of the abuse of
opium and other drugs. Signed at The Hague Janu-
ary 23, 1912. Entered into force February 11, 1915.
38 Stat. 1912.
Notification received that it considers itself bound:
Cameroon, November 20, 19C1.
Convention for limiting the manufacture and regulating
the distribution of narcotic drugs, as amended (61 Stat.
2230; 62 Stat. 1796). Done at Geneva July 13, 1931.
Entered into force July 9, 1933. 48 Stat. 1543.
Notification received that it considers itself iound:
Cameroon, November 20, 1961.
Protocol bringing under international control drugs out-
side the scoi>e of the convention limiting the manufac-
ture and regulating the di.stribution of narcotic drugs
concluded at Geneva July 13, 1931 (48 Stat. 1.543), as
amended (61 Stat. 2230; 02 Stat. 1790). Done at
Paris November 19, 1948. Entered Into force Decem-
ber 1, 1949 ; for the United States, September 11, 1950.
TIAS 2308.
Notification received that it considers itself bound:
Cameroon, November 20, 1961.
Oil Pollution
International convention for the prevention of pollution
of the sea by oil, with annexes. Done at London
May 12, 1954. Entered into force July 26, 1958; for
the United States December 8, 1961.
Acceptance deposited: Kuwait, November 27, 1961.
Trade and Commerce
General agreement on tariffs and trade, with annexes and
schedules, and protocol of provisional application. Con-
cluded at Geneva October 30, 1947. TIAS 1700.
Admitted as contracting party: Tanganvika, Decem-
ber 9, 1961.
Arrangements regarding international trade in cotton
textiles. Done at Geneva July 21, 1961. Entered into
force October 1, 1961. TIAS 4884.
Acceptances: Australia, November 17, 1961; Austria
(with a statement), December 5, 1961; Pakistan, De-
cember 1, 1961.
2 On Dec. 14 the General Assembly by acclamation ad-
mitted Tanganyika to membership, foUovdng a recom-
mendation on the same date by the Security Council.
No.
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: December 11-17
Press releases may be obtained from the Office of
News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.
Releases Issued prior to December 11 which ap-
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 784 of
November 14 ; 801 of November 21 ; 827 of Novem-
ber 30; 832 of December 1; 860 of December 7;
864 of December 8; and 869 of December 10.
Subject
Coombs : "A New Dimension of U.S.
Foreign Relations."
Report of delegation to 19th session
of GATT.
Ball : "Reduction of Tariff Barriers
to Trade."
Ball : "Obstacles to the Trade of Less
Developed Countries."
Gudeman : "Trade in Agricultural
Commodities."
U.S. participation in international
conferences.
Ball : interview on "Meet the Press."
Development aid to Nigeria.
Ball : situation in the Congo.
Richards receives AID distinguished
service award.
Rumania credentials (rewrite).
Visit of Kalmyk people's delegation
to Department (rewrite).
Popkin appointed AID development
program officer for the Far East
(biographic details).
Bayley sworn in as AID director of
public affairs (biographic details).
Agricultural commodities agreement
with Poland (rewrite).
White : situation in the Congo.
Ambassador of Nigeria thanks U.S.
for aid.
Volta River project in Ghana.
Meeting of Congolese leaders.
*870
12/11
871
12/11
872
12/11
873
12/11
874
12/11
*875
12/11
•876
877
878
*879
12/11
12/12
12/13
12/14
880
881
12/12
12/14
•882 12/15
•883
884
885
•886
887
888
12/15
12/15
12/15
12/15
12/16
12/17
♦Not printed.
38
Department of Sfate Bulletin
January 1, 1962 I n
Africa. The Health Frontier of the Developing
Nations of Africa (Williams) 26
ARriculture. P.L. 480 Agreement Signed by U.S.
aud Poland 35
Asia. Janow apix)inted assistant administrator for
Far East, .\ID 35
Cameroon. Immigration Quotas Set for Camer-
oon, Kuwait, Xigeria, aud Syria 25
Congo (Leopoldville)
Prisident Kennedy Asked To Facilitate Negotia-
tions Between Congo Leaders (White, Depart-
ment statement) 10
US. Supports U.N. Aid to Congolese Efforts To Re-
«niye Difficulties (Ball, Department statement) . 11
Congress, The. Department Responds to Queries
I'oneerning Oil Imports Program (Nichols) . . 31
Cuba. President Sets Cuban Sugar Quota at Zero
for First Half of 1962 34
Department and Foreign Service. Recess Appoint-
ments (Handley, Hart, Janow, Knight, Thurs-
ton) 35
Dominican Republic. Department Explains U.S.
Position on Dominican Sugar 34
Economic Affairs
Department Explains U.S. Position on Dominican
Sugar 34
Department Responds to Queries Concerning Oil
Imports Program (Nichols) 31
International Economic and Social Development
(Nunley, Rusk) 18
Issues Facing GATT in the New Trading World
(Ball, (iudeman, U.S. delegation report, text of
declaration) 3
President Sets Cuban Sugar Quota at Zero for First
Half of 1962 34
U.S. To Aid Basic Economic Project on Volta River
in Ghana 30
Foreign Aid
International Economic and Social Development
(Nunley, Rusk) 18
Janow appointed assistant administrator for Far
East, AID 35
President Responds to Request From Viet-Nam for
U.S. Aid (Diem, Kennedy) 13
U.S. Announces Intention To Aid Nigerian De-
velopment Program 25
Ghana. U.S. To Aid Basic Economic Project on
Volta River in Ghana 30
Haiti. Thurston appointed ambassador 35
Health, Education, and Welfare. The Health Fron-
tier of the Developing Nations of Africa
(Williams) 26
Immigration and Naturalization. Immigration
Quotas Set for Cameroon, Kuwait, Nigeria, and
Syria 25
International Organizations and Conferences
Calendar of International Conferences and Meet-
ings 36
The Health Frontier of the Developing Nations of
Africa (Williams) 26
Issues Facing GATT in the New Trading World
(Ball, Gudeman, U.S. delegation report, text of
declaration) 3
Kuwait
Hart appointed ambassador 35
Immigration Quotas Set for Cameroon, Kuwait,
Nigeria, and Syria 25
e X Vol. XLVI, No. 1175
Mali. Handley appointed ambassador 35
Mexico. Department Responds to Queries Concern-
ing Oil Imports Program (Nichols) 31
Nigeria
Immigration Quotas Set for Cameroon, Kuwait,
Nigeria, and Syria 25
U.S. Announces Intention To Aid Nigerian Develop^ "
ment Program 25
Poland. P.L. 480 Agreement Signed by U.S. and
Poland 35
Presidential Documents
President Responds to Request From Viet-Nam for
U.S. Aid 13
President Sets Cuban Sugar Quota at Zero for First
Half of 1962 34
U.S. Congratulates Tanganyika on Independence '. 37
Public Affairs. The Challenge to Government, the
Media, and Educational Institutions (Tubby) . . 15
Refugees. Kalmyk People Observe 10th Anniver-
sary in U.S 17
Rumania. Letters of Credence (Balaceanu) ... 25
Syria
Immigration Quotas Set for Cameroon, Kuwait,
Nigeria, and Syria [ 25
Knight appointed ambassador 35
Tanganyika
Tanganyika Admitted to United Nations (Steven-
son) 37
U.S. Congratulates Tanganyika on Independence
(Kennedy) 37
Treaty Information
Current Actions 33
P.L. 480 Agreement Signed by U.S. and Poland . '. 35
U.S.S.R. Department Responds to Queries Con-
cerning Oil Imports Program (Nichols) ... 31
United Nations
President Kennedy Asked To Facilitate Negotia-
tions Between Congo Leaders (White, Depart-
ment statement) iq
Tanganyika Admitted to United Nations (Steven-
son) 37
U.S. Supports U.N. Aid to Congolese Efforts To Re-
solve Difficulties (Ball, Department statement) . 11
Viet-Nam. President Responds to Request From
Viet-NamforU.S. Aid (Diem, Kennedy) . ... 13
Name Index
Balaceanu, Petre 25
Ball, George W 3, 12
Diem, Ngo Dinh 13
Gudeman, Edward 6
Handley, William J 35
Hart, Parker Thompson 35
Janow, Seymour 35
Kennedy, President 13, 34, 37
Knight, Ridgway B 35
Nichols, C. W 31
Nunley, William T 22
Rusk, Secretary 18
Stevenson, Adlai E 37
Thurston, Raymond L 35
Tubby, Roger W 15
White, Lincoln 10
Williams, G. Mennen 26
D.S. GOVERHHENT PRINTIN6 OFFICEi t»62
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United States
Government Printing Office
DIVISION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS
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PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID
PAYMENT OF POSTAGE. S300
(GPO)
OFFICIAL BUSINESS
A Threat to the Peace
North Viet-Nam's Effort
To Conquer South Viet-Nam
Department
of
State
A detailed, two-part report of Viet Cong (Vietnamese Communist)
activities in South Viet-Nam and of the elaborate organization in
North Viet-Nam that supports these activities.
Part I, a 53-page booklet, describes the operations of the Com-
munist Hanoi government and the Lao Dong (Coimnunist) Party of
North Viet-Nam to provide support and encouragement to the illegal
movement to destroy the Republic of Viet-Nam.
Part II, the appendices, a 102-page booklet, contains reproductions
of various captured Communist documents, confessions of Viet Cong
personnel taken prisoner, excerpts from articles and speeches of North
Viet-Nam Communist Party and government officials, and other ma-
terials, which clearly demonstrate that the so-called "liberation" move-
ment in South Viet-Nam is directed and supported by North Viet-Nam.
Publication 730S
Part 1-25 cents
Part 11-55 cents
Order Form
ro: Supt. of Documents
Govt. Printing Office
Washington 25, D.C.
Enclosed find:
{cash, check, or money
order payable to
Supt. of Docs.)
Please send me copies of:
A Threat to the Peace: North Viet-Nam's Effort To Conquer South Viet-Nam
a Part I
D Part II
Name:
Street Address:
Citv 7.nnf>- anrf Statue:
THE. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Vol. XLVI, No. 1176
January 8, 1962
CiAL
KLY RECORD
THE ELEMENTS IN OUR CONGO POLICY • Article
by Under Secretary Ball ,. 43
NATO MINISTERS EXAMINE PROBLEMS CON-
FRONTING THE ALLIANCE • Text of Communique . 51
THE EMERGING NATIONS OF ASIA • by Deputy Under
Secretary Johnson ..................... 53
AFRICA'S CHALLENGE TO AMERICAN ENTER-
PRISE • by Assistant Secretary Williams 60
GENERAL ASSEMBLY SETS UP COMMISSION TO
IIVIPLEMENT COLONIALISM DECLARATION •
Statement by Jonathan B. Bingham and Text of Resolution . 69
FED STATES
EIGN POLICY
For index see inside back cover
THE DEPARTIVIENT OF STATE
Vol. XLVI, No. 1176 • Publication 7325
January 8, 1962
Uoston Public Librarj
Superintendent ot Documents
JAN 26 1962
DEPOSITORY
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington 25, D.C.
Price;
62 Issues, domestic $8.60, torelgn $12.25
Single copy, 25 cents
Use or funds for printing of this publica-
tion approved by the Director of the Bureau
of the Budget (January 19, 1961).
Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and Items contained herein may
be reprinted. Citation of the Depahtmunt
o» State Bulletin as the somce will be
appreciated. The Bulletin Is Indexed In the
Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.
The Department of State BULLETIN,
a tceekly publication issued by the
Office of Public Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public
and interested agencies of the
Government with information on
developments in the field of foreign
relations and on the tcor/c of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service. The BULLETIN includes se-
lected press releases on foreign policy,
issued by the White House and the
Department, and statements and ad-
dresses made by the President and by
tlie Secretary of State and other
officers of the Department, as well as
special articles on various phases of
internatiotuil affairs and tlie func-
tions of the Department. Informa-
tion is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to
which the United States is or may
become a party and treaties of gen-
eral international interest.
Publications of tlie Department,
United Nations documents, and legis-
lative material in the field of inter-
national relations are listed currently.
The Elements in Our Congo Policy
iy Under Secretary Ball
I want to discuss the Congo — why it is impor-
tant, what has been happening there since July
1960, and what your Government, under both the
Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, has
sought to do about it, both directly and through
the United Nations. We should not permit the
outpouring of current news on the Congo to ob-
scure the difficult, long-term problems and the
actions necessary to bring stability to that tor-
mented new nation.
The Keystone of Central Africa
As the map quite clearly reveals, the former
Belgian colony called the Congo is the keystone
of central Africa. It has a long frontier with
each of three major areas into which we divide the
African contment south of the Sahara Desert:
west Africa, already independent and divided
into a number of states of varying sizes ; east Af-
rica, now rapidly evolving from British tutelage
into what we hope will be a stable and prosperous
independence ; and the southern part of the conti-
nent, beset with critical problems that are only
aow beginning to emerge in sharp relief on the
world scene.
• This article is based on an address made hy
Mr. Ball iefore the Town Hall at Los An-
geles, Calif., on December 19 {press release
893) . It has heen released in pamphlet form
as Department of State publication 7326 and
is for sale by the Sxhperintendent of Docu-
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington 25, D.C., price 15 cents.
Occupymg this central and strategic position is
the Congo, a country vast, exotic, and remote. It
is one-third the geo-
graphical size of the
United States. It has
a population of almost
14 million people.
Wliat happens to this
land and its people
will obviously play a
decisive role in what
happens to the areas
around it. Should the
Congo crumble into
chaos and become a
successful object of
Communist penetration, the Soviet bloc will have
acquired an asset without price — a base of opera-
tions in the heart of Africa from which to spread
its tentacles over this newest of continents. The
avoidance of this very real danger is the immediate
objective of our policy in the Congo.
Our Long-Term Objective
But what in the longer run do we seek to achieve
in the Congo? The same thing that we seek to
achieve in other areas of Africa : a stable society
under a stable and progressive government. That
government may be "non-aligned" in its interna-
tional policies. That is for it to decide. But it
should be strong enougli and determined enough
to safeguard its real independence. And it is
important that it maintain with us, and with the
European states that are contributing to its suc-
cessful development, the kind of friendly and con-
structive relations that will serve our mutual
purposes.
Equally important, we wish to avoid the crea-
tion in Africa of a new Korea or a new Laos. We
^anuatY 8, 7962
43
wish to insulate the African Continent from the
kind of military intervention by the Sino-Soviet
bloc that has created such problems in other parts
of the world.
The United States could, of course, not sit idly
by in the case of sucli a direct intervention. It
would be compelled to act even at the risk of a
direct confrontation between the free world and
the bloc — a confrontation that could lead to an-
other Korean war, that could, in fact, blow the
flames of a bi'ush-fire conflict into the horrible
firestorm of nuclear devastation.
Fortunately the United Nations has served so
far to make such a confrontation unnecessary.
Breakdown of Orderly Government
On that bright June day 18 months ago, when
the King of the Belgians and the President of the
Congo joined in declaring the Congo a sovereign
and independent state, there were hopes for the
success of this large and relatively prosperous
African country. But stability and well-being
were unfortunately more apparent than real. As
subsequent events have amply shown, the country
was not yet able to maintain its independence
without outside help. The structure of local in-
stitutions on which the success of a nation depends
was largely lacking. In the absence of solid
civilian institutions peace and stability were de-
pendent entirely vipon the continuing loyalty and
discipline of the 28,000-man army.
Five days after independence, the army muti-
nied. A total breakdown of law and order en-
sued. Faced with a tragic choice, the Belgian
Government sent in Belgian paratroopers to pro-
tect the lives and property of 80,000 to 100,000 of
its citizens who were then still living and working
in the Congo. Many Congolese recognized tlie
need for some outside force to prevent utter chaos
in the country, but Belgian force was symbolically
unacceptable. The presence of these paratroop-
ers seemed a throwback to an earlier colonial day.
Their presence caused resentment and pushed
even moderate Congolese leaders to take extremist
and anti-Western positions.
Within a matter of days the Congo began fall-
ing apart. Tribal groups all over the countiy —
including Mr. Moi'se Tshombe in the southern Ka-
tanga— undertook to proclaim their independence,
contributing further to the breakdown of orderly
government throughout the country. Congolese
leaders at the national, provincial, and tribal lev-
44
els invited various types of foreign involvement.
The Congo faced full-scale anarchy, civil war, and
the inevitable consequences of great-power inter-
vention. It was moving rapidly down a slippery
slope toward chaos — and dragging the great pow-
ers dangerously close to war.
The Congo Asks for U.N. Help |
It was in this situation that the Government of
the Congo called on the United Nations for help.
The purpose of this call was to provide an accept-
able alternative to a return of Belgian control and ^
to the threat of great-power intervention, to fur-
nish the Congolese Government, whose own in-
strumentalities for maintaining law and order had
broken down, with the necessary breathing space
to enable it to create a new basis for law and
orderly government and to lay the groundwork
for rebuilding the country on the shattered foun-
dations of the former system.
Secretary-General Hammarskjold responded to
this appeal by what Walter Lippmann has called
"a bold attempt to fill a dangerous vacuum." He .
asked the Security Council to approve the forma- i
tion of a U.N. Force that could replace the Bel- ^
gian troops and assist in the maintenance of order.
He made it clear that this force would include
troops from African countries and other smaller
countries of the United Nations but not those of
the great powers.
The United States supported the Security
Council resolution,^ which authorized Mr. Hani-
marstjold to give the Congo military assistance
until the Congolese themselves might be able to
fulfill the task of maintaining law and order.
The resolution also contained provisions against
intervention by the great powers or other outside i
countries in the Congo's internal affairs.^
U.S. Support for U.N. Military Force
In supporting the creation of a United Nations'
military force for the Congo, the United States-
was seeking not to promote conflict but to avoid it.
It was recognizing a reality already all too ap-
parent— that the injection of the United Nations
was the only alternative to big-power intervention
in the Congo.
' For background and text of resolution S/-1387, see
nuixETTN of Auff. 1, 1060, p. l.W.
' For background and text of resolution S/4405, see
iii(?., Aug. 8, 1960, p. 221.
Department of Stale Bulletin
CAMEROUN
REPUBLIC
OF THE CONGO
The Lunda and related tribes which support Tshombe are in shaded areas of Katanga. Baluba and related tribes
which oppose Tshombe are in remaining portion of Katanga Province.
Big-power intervention had, in fact, already
proceeded a fair distance. Tlie Soviet-bloc coun-
tries were moving their agents into the Congo.
They were sending in planes and equipment.
Their prospects for setting up shop in the middle
of Africa appeared excellent. Counterpressures
for direct American involvement were growing.
In the circumstances three courses of action
*vere open to us.
We could stand by, wringing our hands and
doing nothing.
We could intervene directly, putting United
States power face to face with Soviet power, with
all the risks of conflict and escalation that that
implied.
Finally, we could support a move into the
Congo by the United Nations, acting impartially
on behalf of the world community and in suj^port
January 8, J 962
45
of its obligation spelled out in the charter to pre-
serve peace.
We exercised the third option. The Eisen-
hower administration joined other governments in
sponsoring the United Nations action. It was not
an easy choice. The choices that have followed
have not been easy either. But 17 months later
I have no doubt that our Government was right
then as it is right now.
The U.S.S.E., on the other hand., has consist-
ently opposed the U.N. operation in the Congo.
It tried to remove Secretary-General Ham-
marskjold because of his vigorous leadership of
the U.N. operation in the Congo. It opposed the
recognition by the United Nations of Joseph
Kasavubu as President of the Congo.' It assisted
dissident elements in the attempt to promote a
Communist takeover. It refused to contribute
one ruble to support the U.N. operations in the
Congo.
Let there be no mistake about it. Had the
United Nations not placed its forces in the Congo,
had those forces not moved decisively under the
leadership of Mr. Hammarskjold to restore order
and to prevent the import- of military supplies and
equipment from the Soviet Union and its friends,
there would have been only one way of stopping
a complete breakdown leading to a Soviet domina-
tion of the Congo — the confrontation of other big-
power forces.
The prompt action of the United Nations, made
possible partly by our diplomatic support, our mil-
itary airlift, and our financial contribution, has
kept direct Communist power out of the Congo
while avoiding the dangers of a brush-fire war in
the heart of this volatile continent. We are still
a long way from being out of the woods, and the
Communists are always waiting in the shadows —
waiting for us to falter. But our sense of direc-
tion is right, and we are moving.
Creation of the Adoula Government
The year tliat followed these first dramatic
events was full of spectacular incident and deep
confusion. Rival governments laid claim to the
allegiance of the Congolese people and the recog-
nition of the outside world. Tribal separatisms
burgeoned and subsided, backed by greater or les-
ser degrees of outside support. Much of the
' For biickground, see ihid., Dec. 12, 19C0, p. 904.
country was under no effective government at all,
yet miraculously survived, although with increas- I
ing difficulty.
But the details of these months are largely ir-
relevant. Wliat is important is that behind the
shield of United Nations troops and protected
by the United Nations from massive great-power
intervention, the basically moderate political
leadership in Leopoldville began to pull itself to-
gether. Slowly but perceptibly it laid the ground-
work for some sort of orderly and democratically
based government in the country. i
The culmination of this long slow process was'
an act of faith in the democratic process. A year
after the breakdown on July 6, 1960, the President
of the Congo convened the Congolese Parliament
under U.N. protection to provide the political
leaders of the country with an opportimity to
create a legitimate government, representative of
the country and capable of dealing with its prob-
lems. Events justified this act of faith. After
10 days of deliberation and debate, the political
leaders of the Congo reached agreement. On the
basis of that agreement the Parliament brought
into being a government of national unity undei
the leadership of the moderate nationalist tradf
union leader — Cyrille Adoula.
Mr. Adoula is moderate in his views, -firmly Tion-
Communist and committed to genuine independ-
ence and progress for the Congo. He is one ol
the outstanding leaders that have emerged in th(
new Africa. His government was duly electee
under the provisions of the Constitution approved
before independence by all the political leaders of
the Congo — including those who have since tried
to secede. Its legitimacy is imquestioned. It ha?
a broad political base comprising \-irtually all the
major elements in Congolese political life, includ-
ing even factions which formerly supportec
Patrice Lumumba and Antoine Gizenga. If this
government can survive its present severe political
tests, the prognosis for the Congo can be hopefulj(j|
If all other things were equal, the Congolesf
people under tlie Adoula government should now
be coping with the basic human problems — eooJi
nomic development, the provision of adequate!
employment, education, health and welfare — ^
activities which should, in a well-ordered world,
be the principal concern of a countrj' like the
Congo.
46
Department of State Bulletin
Threats to Congolese Unity
Unfortunately, however, all other things have
not been equal. Prime Minister Adoula's ability
to concentrate the energies of his government on
.the prime tasks of the Congo has been vmder-
mined by the danger of two major defections — the
defection of Moise Tshombe and his group, who
have claimed to set up an "independent" govern-
ment in Elisabethville in the Katanga in the
southern Congo, and the defection of Antoine
Gizenga, who is pursuing his own ambitions in
Stanleyville in the Orientale Province of the
eastern Congo.
In these circumstances the Congo's main politi-
cal issue, perhaps the only really "modem" issue,
|is Congolese unity. If Prime Minister Adoula
should prove unable to deal effectively with the
Katanga secession of Mr. Tshombe, militant ex-
tremists such as the Communist-chosen instru-
ment, Mr. Gizenga, would bid to take over the
central government — in the name of Congolese
imity. In the resulting civil war our main objec-
tives in central Africa would be drowned in blood.
No Case for Balkanizing the Congo
The road to nationhood for the Congo has been
a rough one.
The Congo is composed of a large number of
tribes, some large, some small. They speak over
100 tribal languages and four varieties of lingua
franca. Out of this diverse material there was
created in the last 50 years a single countiy, ad-
ministered as six major provinces.
Both the nation and the provinces were given
their imity essentially by a common colonial ad-
ministration and a structure of political institu-
tions which created the habit of common govern-
ment. It was on tliis structure — the only one the
Congo has ever known except for tribal institu-
tions— that the present Federal Constitution was
based. This Federal Constitution, adopted and
placed into force at the time of independence, is
the fundamental law of the Congo.
In view of the absence of any experience with
federalism it was not surprising that under the
stress and strain of political turmoil a number of
the larger tribes in the Congo, and the political
leaders who drew their strength from those tribes,
should begin to develop ambitions toward separate
national existence, albeit a separate national ex-
istence for which there was in fact no historical
basis. This was the case with Mr. Tshombe with
his Limda and Bayeke supporters in the south
Katanga; of Mr. Kalonji with his Baluba sup-
porters in the south of Kasai ; of the Mongo tribe
in the northeast; and even of some of President
Kasavubu's Bakongo supporters in the area around
Leopoldville.
What distinguishes Mr. Tshombe's particular
brand of secession from the others is that the slice
of territory which his supporters inhabit — less
than one-twelfth of the area of the Congo, with
about one-twentieth of its population — ^liappens
to contain a disproportionate part of the mineral
wealth that is the Congo's greatest natural re-
source. It is the revenues Mr. Tshombe has been
able to obtain by taxing the production under his
control, the soldiers of fortune and writers of
propaganda he has been able to mobilize with these
revenues, and the encouragement he has received
from outside financial interests, that have given
the peculiar flavor to the Katangese attempt at
secession.
The question may, of course, be asked: Why
shouldn't the Katanga be independent ? For that
matter, why shouldn't every other tribe in central
Africa that wishes to declare its independence have
a right to do so ? There are, I think, two answers
to this question — one political and the other legal.
To pose the question as I have posed it answers
the political question without need for much elabo-
ration. The government strvicture which the Bel-
gians left behind in the Congo is the only political
structure the Congo has ever known. Under it,
the Congo has evolved from a primitive area to a
potentially prosperous power in Africa, with a
relatively high standard of basic education and a
level of economic development that many other
African areas could envy. To break up this entity
into a number of conflicting and competing tribal
satrapies could only confirm and render perma-
nent the chaos we have already seen in the Congo.
And that, as I hope I have made clear, would open
the way inevitably for the Soviets and their
friends to fish where they can catch the most — in
troubled waters.
To those who approach the problem from the
viewpoint of protecting particular interests, some-
thing may perhaps be said for carving enclaves out
of the Congo, though I am convinced that even
this calculation is mistaken. But if one looks at
January 8, J 962
47
the problem from the viewpoint of saving all of
central Africa from chaos and Communist infil-
tration, then clearly the acceptance of armed seces-
sion by a tribal area, no matter how rich and well-
supported, can lead only to disaster.
At no time has any responsible leader in the
Congo itself advocated that the Congo be split into
sovereign states. The absurdity of such a notion
is clear. If the Congo were split into separate
states with populations equivalent to the popula-
tion of the Katanga Province, we could wind up
with over 20 governments; indeed, Katanga itself
would split in two if the concept of tribal separa-
tism were given full play. There sim-ply is no
legal case^ no political case, no economic case, and
no moral case for Balkanizing tlie heart of Africa.
But there may be a case for injecting an element
of decentralization in a country the size of the
Congo. The Congo is a very large country; its
institutions for governing are still in the "less
developed" category ; its leadership cadres are still
dangerously thin; many of its people still lack a
sense of nationhood. In these circumstances most
of the political leaders of the Congo appear to
believe that there should be enough local autonomy
on local matters to discourage secession.
Yet if the Congo is to be a nation, it can hardly
permit provincial leaders to break off pieces of the
country, especially when such provincial leaders
are heavily influenced from the outside. What I
am saying applies not only to the Katanga, but
equally to the northern provinces and to any efforts
of Antoine Gizenga, the agent of Communist de-
signs, to set up shop as leader of a leftward-
leaning separatism in Stanleyville.
Threat of Civil War
It is clearly in the direction of constitutional
changes brought about by agreement among the
regional and national leaders that the solution
must be sought. But this has so far proved im-
possible because the Katanga authorities, confident
they were secure behind their mercenary-led
private army, have shown little interest in real
negotiations and have blocked talks by insisting,
in effect, on a prior recognition of independent
status.
The continuation of this situation, which has
lasted for over a year, has posed an increasingly
serious threat of civil war. Pressures have grown
progressively greater on the central govei-nment ;
to break the deadlock and put an end to secession i
by military means. The moderate leadership in ,
the present government has made statesmanlike i
efforts to resist these pressures and rely on the
U.N. But it has been perfectly clear that an
explosion into civil war became every day more
likely if no political solution were found. Gizenga
and his Communist advisers have based their hopes
on this explosion.
Reasons for the Fighting in the Katanga
The United Nations forces were stationed in
Elisabethville — in the Katanga — over a year ago
for the same purposes as in the rest of the Congo —
to assist in the maintenance of law and order and
the prevention of civil war. As the threat of civil I
war has steadily grown, the importance of the
United Nations mission — to interpose itself be-
tween the rival forces in the Katanga — has grown
in equal measure. But during the same period
these forces have been subjected to a continuing
and growing campaign of harassment by the
Katanga authorities and their military append-
ages— African and European — designed appar-
ently to make the position of the United Nations in
the Katanga untenable. These efforts have been
spearheaded by mercenaries, adventurers, soldiers
of fortune who have flocked to the well-heeled
standard of the "independent" Katanga.*
Even the cease-fire that followed the outbreak of
fighting in the Katanga last September served only
to exacerbate the situation : While the United Na- i
tions stuck strictly to the terms of the cease-fire,
the Katanga authorities engaged in a steady build-
up of men, munitions, and equipment (including
airplanes) obtained through the devious channels
of the international arms trade in spite of the sin-
cere efforts of Western European governments to
stop the traffic.
The result was, of course, the series of incidents
that began about 2 M-eeks ago. The Katanga
forces and authorities arrested and beat up the top
leaders of the United Nations in Elisabethville,
kidnaped and murdered a number of their troops
including one oilicer, kept up a steady propaganda
* For statements made by U.S. Representative Adlai E.
Stevenson in the Security Council on Nov. 16, 21, and 24,
together with text of a resolution adopted by the Council
on Nov. 24, see ihid., Dec. 25, 1961, p. 1061.
48
Deparfment of State Bulletin
barrage against the U.N., and finally tried to cut
oil' the United Nations forces from their base of
supplies and communications. The United Na-
tions leaderehij) on the spot showed commendable
patience. But it was finally necessary for the
U.N. conunand in Elisabetliville to recognize that
these repeated breaches of the cease-fire agree-
ment could no longer be tolerated and to take the
necessaiy limited action to restore the ability of the
United Nations to carry out its mandate in the
Katanga.
No one can be happy about the bloodshed on
either side that accompanied these military opera-
tions. Peacekeeping is not necessarily wholly
peaceful. But in this case it was necessary to
pi'event a civil war that would have made the past
few days in Elisabetliville look like a picnic.
The U.N. action in Elisabetliville has now
largely achieved its limited objective — to maintain
freedom of movement for the peacekeeping forces,
witliout the daily, bloody harassment by local
Katanga troops, whipped into excited and irre-
sponsible action by rumor, radio, and beer. The
U.N. forces have stuck loyally to the limited aims
set for them by Acting Secretary-General U Thant
in New York. Now that discussions are in prog-
ress between Prime Minister Adoula and Mr.
Tshombe, the fighting has stopped. We hope it
is over for keeps.
Negotiations Between Congolese Leaders
The principal immediate objective of U.S. ef-
forts has been to bring about the negotiations be-
tween Prime Minister Adoula and Mr. Tshombe
for the peaceful reintegration of the Katanga into
the Congo and to carry the results of these negotia-
tions into effect. Just before he left on his Latin
American trip, President Kennedy took a major
initiative to bring these efforts to fruition.^
We are watcliing developments hourly. In a
situation as fluid as this, it is rash to be optimistic,
but I am convinced that we are on the right path.
In the difficult period ahead, it is most important
that secession not be encouraged there and that we
remember our interest is in bringing about stability
throughout the Congo. Our allies are working
closely with us in seeking that same goal.
In the final analysis the interests of the Katanga
and those of the moderate leaderslup in Leopold-
U.S. Welcomes News of Agreement
on Reintegration of Katanga
Department Statement '
The United States Government welcomes the news
that agreement on reintegrating Katanga into the
Congo has been reached in the talks at Kitona.'
Great credit is due the parties to the agreement, in
particular the statesmanlike contributions of Prime
Minister [Cyrille] Adoula and Mr. [Moise] Tshom-
be, and to the long, patient efforts of the United
Nations.
Further meetings are now in view to work out
specific details of reintegration. The goal is not a
weaker Katanga but a stronger Congo, fully able to
defeat subversion from within or attempts at out-
side domination. This has been the objective of
United States policy in support of the United Na-
tions in the Congo from the beginning.
' Read to news correspondents on Dec. 21 by Lin-
coln White, Director of the OflSce of News.
' For background, see Bulletin of Jan. 1, 1962,
p. 10.
'Ibid., Jan. 1, 1962, p. 10.
January 8, 7962
ville are parallel. The sooner they pull in the
same direction, the better for both of them — and
for us as well.
I said before that a solution to the Katanga
problem should contribute decisively to the ability
of the Leopoldville government to cope with the
diversionary activities of Antoine Gizenga. Al-
though teclinically Vice Premier in the Govern-
ment, he has never worked at his job. His basis
of real support in the country is narrow. His
policy is founded upon the hope that the Adoula
government and the United Nations will be imable
to deal with the Katanga problem and that the
country must then turn to him for a solution. But
if the Katanga problem can be disposed of, I am
convinced that Mr. Gizenga, who has already
slipped badly, will cease to be of much use to the
Communist bloc. He can then be dealt with ef-
fectively by the genuine nationalists in the Congo
Government.
The Major issues
I have tried in these comments to be as succinct
and straightforward as possible. Let me sum up
the main points :
Firfit, our objective in the Congo, as elsewhere
in Africa, is a free, stable, non-Communist govern-
49
ment for the Congo as a whole, dedicated to the
maintenance of genuine independence and willing
and able to cooperate with us and with other free
nations in meeting the tremendous internal chal-
lenges it must face.
Second^ the United Nations is in the Congo with
objectives that by and large parallel our own— to
help the Adoula government create a stable and
unified Congo and to ward off the dangers of civil
war and great-power intervention. So far the
United Nations has been remarkably successful in
its efforts toward this end ; had it not been avail-
able for this purpose we should have had to invent
it, or the situation would already be lost. The
United Nations effort deserves our support. We
have given it. We should continue to do so.
Thirds the Adoula government, the only legiti-
mate government of the Congo, is a broadly based
coalition under the leadership of an outstanding
non-Communist African nationalist. This gov-
ernment's objectives are fully consistent with ours.
It too deserves our support and will have it. Be-
fore it can buckle down to its true task of pursuing
the national development of the Congo, this gov-
ernment must cope successfully with the threat of
armed secession in the Katanga and deal effectively
with political dissidence in Stanleyville. We
shall continue to support both of these efforts.
Fourth, the issue in the Katanga is not self-de-
termination. It is the threat of armed secession
by a tribal area that happens to contain a dis-
proportionate part of the weaUh of the entire
country. There is no legal, political, or moral
basis for these secessionist efforts. To allow them
to be pursued by provincial leaders with outside
support can only place in jeopardy the success of
our efforts in the Congo as a wliole, threaten tlie
entire Congo with cliaos and civil war, and lead
to the establislmaent of a Communist base in the
heart of central Africa. The ai-med secession in
the Katanga plays into tlie hands of the Commu-
nists. This is a fact that all Americans should
ponder.
Fifth, the only way out of the present situation
in the Katanga is to assure an end to se<;ession by
negotiations between Prime Minister Adoula and
Mr. Tshomlae designed to obtain agreement on any
necessary changes in the existing Constitution of
the Congo. Our efforts will continue to be de-
voted to this end.
Sixth, the difficulties and dangers in this com-
plex situation are extraordinaiy, and only enor-
mous effort and a certain amoimt of good luck has
brought us as far as we have come since the dark
days of August and September of 1960. Even
now the chances for success are precarious. No
matter what we do we liave no assurance that the
situation will turn out to our liking.
But certainty is more than one can or should
expect in this hazardous world. Quite clearly it
is too much to expect of foreign policy which al-
most invariably contains a component of calcu-
lated risk. In the case of our Congo policy the
risks are large, but they are still worth taking, for
none of the alternatives can be reconciled with
our larger objectives.
Yet if we are to take these risks it is essential
that our policies be grounded on a firm foundation
of public understanding. That understanding is
not easy to achieve. The Congo is not only a re-
mote country but relatively little known to Amer-
ica, and the actors in the drama of the Congo have
unfamiliar names and speak unfamiliar lines.
Yet I am not concerned about the ultimate
judgment of America. Events in the Congo are
complex ; but the major issues of policy are never-
theless quite simple. And if those issues are fully
exposed to debate, I have no question whatever as
to the outcome. We Americans have come a long
way in the last few decades. We have learned to
face facts, tough facts, without flinching. .Ind
we have learned the stern lesson that comes with
leadership — that the rewards of hard decisions,
provided they are also right decisions, are not
necessarily reflected in the next day's headlines —
or even in the approbation of columnists — but
only in tlie slow, patient, and implacable judg-
ment of history.
Attorney General'and^Mrs. Kennedy
To Visit Japan in February
Press release 902 dated Decemher 22
Secretary Rusk announced on December 22 that
Attorney General Eobert F. Kennedy will visit
Japan this coming February. Mrs. Kennedy will
accompany him.
In visiting Japan the Attorney General is ac-
cepting a longstanding invitation from the Min-
ister of Justice and the Young People's Commit-
tee for Better International Understanding, Mr.
Rusk said.
50
Department of State Bulletin
The Attorney General will be the gaest of the
Japanese Government for the first 2 days of a 6-
day stay. Thereafter he will be the guest of the
Committee and will visit Tokyo and a number of
other cities. The Attorney General and Mrs. Ken-
nedy will be in Japan from February 4 to 10.
NATO IVIinisters Examine Problems
Confronting the Alliance
Secretary Eusk attended a Ministerial Meeting
of the North Atlantic Council at Paris Decembei
13-15. Following is the text of a coTumuniquc
issued at the conclusion of the meeting on De-
cember 15.
Press release 892 dated December 18
The North Atlantic Council met in Ministerial
session in Paris from the 13th to the 15th of De-
cember, 1961. A thorough examination was made
of the problems confronting the Alliance. The
world-wide Communist threat to freedom, the
problem of relations between the North Atlantic
Alliance and the Soviet bloc, in particular Berlin,
were its central concern.
The aim of the peoples of the Atlantic Com-
munity is a stable order in which no man and no
nation need fear for their existence, their liberty
or their future. World peace cannot indefinitely
rest on a precarious balance of mutual terror.
The Alliance seeks peace and disarmament, but
this desire has consistently been frustrated by the
Soviet bloc. The Western Powers have presented
a series of plans for general and complete disarma-
ment.^ The Soviet Government has, however, so
far refused to accept an effective and imivereally
applicable system of international control, without
which no nation could have confidence in a dis-
armament agreement. It envisages only verifica-
tion of the anns destroyed, while rejecting control
of the arms that remain. It is still the earnest
hope of the Alliance that despite previous disap-
pointments disarmament negotiations wlien re-
sumed will yield useful results.
On the question of the abolition of nuclear tests,
the Soviet Union has argued, evaded and ob-
structed for over three years, and through more
than three hundred meetings. The Soviet Union,
while professing to negotiate in good faith, must
for many months past have been secretly prepar-
ing the longest series of nuclear tests yet carried
out, culminating in the largest nuclear explosion
yet known. ^
At the same time as the Soviet Union has been
attempting to intimidate the peoples of the free
world with demonstrations of its nuclear strength,
it has intensified its efforts to get the whole of
Berlin at its mercy, to impose a discriminatory
status on Germany, to perpetuate her divided state,
and to break up the Atlantic Alliance. With
these ultimate aims in mind, the USSR has arti-
ficially provoked a crisis over Berlin. Disregard-
ing obligations it has imdertaken, the Soviet Union
has cut Berlin in two. The walling in of the peo-
ple imder its control has once more demonstrated
to the world the real nature of the Conununist
system and the irresistible attraction of a free so-
ciety. Ministere expressed their sympathy with
all those for whom the raising of this wall in Ber-
lin has meant the separation of families and the
denial of escape to freedom in the West. They
also expressed their admiration of the courage and
attachment to freedom of the people of Berlin, and
reiterated their conviction that a just and peace-
ful solution of the problem of Germany, includ-
ing Berlin, must be found on the basis of self-
determination.
In the spirit of the agreed policy of the Alliance,
the Ministers recalled their communique on Berlin
of 16th December, 1958,' and reaffirmed their de-
termination to protect and defend the liberties of
West Berlin, and ensiire to its people the condi-
tions for a free and prosperous life.
Established rights and obligations, solemnly
confirmed in international agreements, cannot be
extinguished unilaterally by the stroke of a pen,
by the signature by the Soviet Government of a
"peace treaty," with a regime whicli i-epresents
no one but its Soviet masters. The Three West-
em Powers who bear special responsibilities for
Berlin stand by their clear obligation to protect
those who have put their trust in them. Acting
in close cooperation witli their NATO allies, they
have taken the necessary measures to maintain
their i-ights and to fulfill their obligations. Con-
firming their agreement on this policy, the mem-
' For text of a U.S. proposal submitted to the United
Nations on Sept. 25, 1961, see Bulletin of Oct. 16, 1961,
p. 650.
' For background, see Hid., Nov. 20, 1961, p. 844.
' For text, see ibid., Jan. 5, 1959, p. 4.
January 8, 1962
51
bers of the Alliance reaffirmed the responsibilities
■which each member state has assumed in regard
to the security and welfare of Berlin and the
maintenance of the position of the Three Powere
in that city. They agreed to maintain close con-
sultation on this qiiestion.
The Council heard statements on Berlin by the
Foreign Ministers of the countries most directly
concerned, and was informed of the intention to
resume diplomatic contacts with the Soviet Union,
in accordance with the aims which the West is
pursuing for the maintenance of world peace and
in the hope that these contacts might serve to deter-
mine whetlier a basis for negotiation could be
fomid. Their colleagues approved the resumption
of diplomatic contacts and expressed the hope that
a negotiated settlement could be achieved. After
full discussion of the situation, the Council agreed
that the Alliance must continue on its resolute
course, combining strength and firmness of pur-
pose with a readiness to seek solutions by peaceful
means.
Ministers noted the improvements made by
member countries in their force contributions,
particularly in response to the aggravation of the
military threat arising from the deterioration in
the Berlin situation. Units have been reinforced
and their state of readiness enhanced. A mobile
Task Force has been established. There have been
advances in cooperative programs for defense re-
search and production, as well as in communica-
tions and infrastructure. Ministers also noted
the progress made by the Council in its study of
the long term problems of improving the deter-
rent and defensive strength of the Alliance.
They instructed the permanent Council to con-
tinue its examination of these urgent questions
at an early date.
The North Atlantic Treaty Alliance threatens
no one. In the world as it is today the Alliance
must more than ever look to its defense, in view
of the ever increasing military capability of the
Communist bloc and its manifest intention to ex-
pand its domination. So long as the Communist
bloc is unwilling to agree to real disarmament, the
coimtries of the Alliance must continue to
strengthen their forces and modernize equipment
so as to be able to deal with any form of attaclc.
Only by an increased defense capability can the
Alliance continue to deter Communist aggi-ession.
This will require still further dedication and ef-
fort from the NATO nations, but the clear and
growing threat they face leaves no alternative.
In considering civil emergency planning, par-
ticularly the protection of the civilian population,
the Council recognized that such measures repre-
sented an essential element in the defense effort
of NATO countries.
In the economic field the Council noted that a
mission of high ranking personalities had been
set up in conformity with a decision taken at the
last Ministerial Meeting to study ways and means
of assisting the efforts of Greece and Turkey to
speed up their development programs and improve
the living standards of their peoples. The mis-
sion will report to the Council before the end of
April, 1962.
Ministers emphasized the importance for mem-
ber states, not only of raising the living standards
of their peoples, while maintaining an economic
structure capable of supporting an adequate de-
fense system, but also of expanding aid to the de-
veloping countries. The economies of the NATO
countries are far stronger now than when the Al-
liance was formed. Ministers stressed the need
to strengthen and deepen co-operation between all
member countries in order to continue this prog-
ress.
The next Ministerial Meeting of the Council
will be held at Athens from the 3rd to the 5th of
May, 1962.
Deputy Assistant Secretary Tasca
Visits Africa
The Department of State announced on Decem-
ber 21 (press release 901) that Henry J. Tasca,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs,
will visit U.S. missions in east and south Africa to
consult with ambassadors and principal officers on
mission operations, meet informally with ap-
propriate government officials, and obtain first-
hand impressions of political, economic, and aid
developments.
Mr. Tasca left Washington on December 21 and
will visit Cairo, Addis Ababa and Asmara
(Ethiopia), Mogadiscio (Somalia), Nairobi
(Kenya), Kampala (Uganda), Dar-es-Salaara
(Tanganyika), Salisbury (Southern Ehodcsia),
Blantyre (Nyasaland), Johannesburg and Cape-
town (South Africa), and Louren^o Marques
(Mozambique). He wiU return to Washington
at the end of January 1962.
52
Department of State Bulletin
The Emerging Nations of Asia
hy U. Alexis Johnson
Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs *
This decade of the 1960's will, in all probability,
see man land on the moon. It will see other won-
ders of science and technology that may be put to
good or evil as man wills. The sixties will likely
see the dream of a United States of Europe sub-
stantially complete its transformation into reality.
Profound developments will doubtlessly take
place in the Communist bloc. However, when
you meet here in December 1971, I think it en-
tirely likely that you may decide that the most
significant development of the 1960's will have
been the emergence of the nations of Asia with all
of their potential.
These emerging nations may well hold the key
to the world of tomorrow. Our ability to identify
ourselves with their aspirations, indeed our ability
to permit this revolution to unfold and not be
turned back by communism, is crucial to our own
future. Thus I feel that the theme you have
chosen for this conference is particularly apt.
The theme of the emerging nations and our re-
lationship to them is a dramatic one. The theme
encompasses not only the revolution of ideals and
technology by the peoples of these countries, but
it also encompasses a counterrevolution. Com-
munism, arming itself with modern technology, is
increasingly ranged against the revolution. It is
a counterrevolution in the purest sense of the
word. In discussing these emerging nations of
Asia with you this evening, and in particular the
nations and people of the Far East, I am not just
paying a courtesy to this audience, which has al-
ways had a special interest in the Far East. I am
doing this because of the present intrinsic impor-
tance of the area and because of the richness of the
' Address made before the Institute of World Affairs at
Pasadena, Calif., on Dec. 6 (press release 842 dated
Dec. 5).
resources to be found there — the human, cultural,
and material resources, which once released will
make a contribution to the future of our globe
second to none.
Throughout this area we find that in the few
years that have elapsed since the Second World
War ancient nations, which had fallen under alien
colonial control, have regained their political in-
dependence. In the vast continental sweep from
India and Pakistan through to Japan and Korea,
we find only vestigial and minor remnants of co-
lonialism. Certainly in the non-Conmaunist areas
of Asia, as in the rest of the free world, the prin-
ciple of self-determination has met with almost
total fulfillment. This political revolution, how-
ever, is merely the prelude, a necessary prelude,
to the principal revolution. This is the social,
political, and economic revolution. It is in a very
real sense the release of the aspirations and cre-
ative energies of hundreds of millions of people.
What is happening in the Far East, as in the
otlier emerging areas of the world, is the destruc-
tion of the old society, grown static, under the
impact of new ideas and the new technology of
the West. These peoples are seeking imperatively
and urgently to create a new society, in con-
sonance with the individuality of the old but
which will be responsive to the new aspirations
and concepts which have come in and which can
no longer be denied.
The attainment of independent nationhood im-
mediately following the disruption of the Second
World War has been sought — and fought for —
so long that independence seemed to provide the
answer to all problems. In fact, of course, it
solved few problems, created many new ones, and
sharpened the necessity for immediate solutions
to the horde of needs that pressed in on the new
nations. There is no need to catalog these prob-
ianuaty 8, 1962
53
lems ; they may be summarized in the word "pov-
erty." There was economic and financial poverty
of the starkest sort, poverty of trained pei-sonnel,
poverty of experience, poverty of administrative
ability, poverty of even basic literacy. The gap
between available resources and the aspirations of
nationhood was great. This gap has narrowed
appreciably in the case of a few nations, notably
Japan, the Republic of China, Thailand, and
Malaya, to cite a few examples. It has begun to
narrow in the case of such a comitry as India.
In a few cases, such as that of Laos, the gap has
tragically widened.
Communism's Objectives
This last category brings me to the role played
by communism in the struggle of the emerging
nations. The problems confronting these coun-
tries are gigantic. They are all-consuming even
without the menace of subversion and aggression
from across their frontiers. If you add to these
problems the necessity for maintaining a large
defensive military force to meet an external threat
and the calculated sabotage of subversion, the
difficulties exceed the human and material re-
sources available for progress.
Communism has as large a stake in the emerg-
ing nations as does the free world. The Com-
munist effort is to disrupt and to destroy and to
seek profit in the ruins. Progress in these coun-
tries directly lessens the chances of Communist
control. Disillusionment, chaos, and insecurity
directly increase the Commimist opportimity.
Every stress and strain in the process of adjust-
ment to changed conditions and modernity is ex-
ploited by the Communists. Every effort is made
to increase these stresses and strains. The objec-
tive is to make the pressures of adjustment too
great, to make the rate of progress too slow, to
make the basic economic and social problems ap-
pear insurmountable, so that, in the desperation
of their impatience, the people will turn to the
draconian methods of communism in their search
for a solution.
It is for these reasons that we find the Com-
munist world maintaining a state of tension and
unease in southeast Asia. Threats against one
country require it to direct a crippling proportion
of its national income into defense. Blandish-
ments are used against another where there ap-
pears to be an opportunity for increasing direct
54
Communist influence. Throughout the brief his-
tory of Laos a Communist-controlled military or-
ganization, supplied and directed from neighbor-
ing Communist territory, has denied that tragic
country the time and opportunity to even face the
issue of social and economic progress. Laos'
neighbor. South Viet-Nam, has been subjected to
every form of Communist pressure. Guerrilla
operations and direct Communist aggression have
imposed a crushing defense burden on the nation.
Kidnaping, assassination, torture and terrorism,
economic sabotage, disruption of communications,
are all part of the Communist catalog of weaponry
for what they cynically refer to as the "liberation"
process. Perhaps the most telling evidence of
Commimist motivations to be found in Viet-Nam
is the organized Conomimist campaign against
social and economic progi-ess." Viet Cong harass-
ment against efforts to eradicate malaria has re-
sulted in the murder of many members of the
spraying teams and the kidnaping of others. The
"Agroville" program of land and economic re-
form has been a particular military target.
Bridges and roads designed to permit the peasant
to market his produce have been sabotaged. No
effort has been spared by the Communists to pre-
vent the Government from improving the lot of
the people of Viet-Nam. Stability and progress
are the prime Communist targets.
The challenge to the emerging nations, then, is
a double one. The people of these nations are
faced with the tremendous difficulties inherent in
the creative revolution in which they are engaged.
At the same time they must meet the destructive
and disruptive activities of tlie Communists. This
threat is posed with varying degrees of intensity.
However, the common denominator is that com-
munism thrives on instability and finds scant foot-
hold where orderly progress is being achieved.
The challenge is a great one and one which will
require the greatest dedication and effort on the
part of the peoples of these new countries. It will
also require the wholehearted support, encourage-
ment, and assistance of the United States and the
other nations of the world who support the emer-
gence of truly independent nations. Despite some
setbacks, as in Laos, and the savagery of the Com-
munist attack in Viet-Nam, progress in meeting
the challenge has been encouraging. The stakes
• For background, see Bulletin of Jan. 1, 1962, p. 13.
Department of State Butletin
are large. The future of east Asia, the role it will
play in the world, is a great one.
The. area I am discussing has today well over
11^ billion people, more than half of the popula-
tion of the globe. The people of this vast area
have already made tremendous contributions to
the world of today. I thmk it is important for
us to remind ourselves that not until the industrial
revolution did the West pull ahead of the East.
Viewed historically the balance of trade in ideas
and social and political organization has not long
or heavily been weighted in favor of the West.
There is certainly no reason to believe that the
technological advantage that the West gained dur-
ing the industrial revolution of the last century
and a half is necessarily a permanent one. With-
in the last 10 years vast changes have occurred in
Asia. Within the next 10 years we can confidently
expect an even greater transformation.
Japan
Two underdeveloped areas of Asia, by virtue of
their size and population and by virtue of the key
roles which they play, merit particular attention
in tins discussion. These are India and Com-
munist China. But first I would like to cite the
example of Japan.
Japan, until the end of the 19th century, was
as underdeveloped as any countiy in Asia today.
Japan today suggests what other nations of Asia,
with leadership, hard work, and the support of
friendly countries, can achieve in a brief span of
years. And Japan's immediate hopes and pros-
pects provide an inkling to the accelerating pace
of development which is possible once the initial
economic and social base is achieved.
Today Japan has the highest standard of liv-
ing and the largest reserve of skilled manpower
in all Asia, and one of the highest rates of literacy
in the world. Japanese industry, while satisfying
a soaring domestic demand for increasingly
sophisticated products, is also known and respected
throughout the world. Its products are competi-
tive in price and quality with the products of
Western Europe and the United States. Japan
is now the fourth largest industrial complex in
the world. Japanese science, technology, art, and
literature are recognized and are having an in-
creasing impact throughout the world. Parallel-
ing the growth of industry and following on the
enlightened land-reform program of the postwar
years, the Japanese farmer, only recently a land-
less peasant, is increasingly a prosperous business-
man who through hard work and advanced tech-
niques has made the 93 million Japanese virtually
self-sufficient in rice.
The gross national product of Japan in 1950
was $10.96 billion ; today it is $40.4 billion. Dur-
ing the period between the end of the Second
World War and today Japan has achieved the
highest economic growth rate in the world. This
has been achieved by the Japanese people through
a high rate of investment, which in recent years
has been averaging 25 percent of the gross national
product annually. Despite this stress on devel-
opment funds for capital outlay, total personal
consumption expenditures in 1958 on a per capita
basis were about one-third above the 1934-36 level,
despite an almost 50 percent increase in popula-
tion.
The present enviable situation of Japan,
achieved despite the wartime destruction of the
economy, is however only a harbinger of the de-
velopment to come. Within the context of the free
enterprise system that has fostered Japan's pres-
ent high degree of development and prosperity,
the Japanese Government is engaged in a plan
to double the national income of Japan within
the next 10 years. This plan envisages an annual
economic growth rate of 7.2 percent, actually con-
siderably lower than the growth rate experienced
in the last few years. Upon the successful carry-
ing out of the plan, Japan will have a per capita
national income of about $579, the equivalent of
present-day Austria's.
Japan should not necessarily be cited as a model
for the emerging nations of Asia. Each country
is an individual entity and has its own special cir-
ciunstances. Each country is at a different stage of
economic development. Each coimtry must work
out its own destiny. It is important to remark,
however, that what is most typical of Japan, what
separates it most distinctly from its fellow Asian
nations, is the poverty of its material resources.
Japan has few minerals. It must import 15 per-
cent of its food. Less than 16 percent of its total
area is arable. Progress in Japan, therefore, has
not been achieved by the tapping of unexploited
natural resources, as that term is normally used.
Kather, its progress has been achieved by well
utilizing that most important of all resources —
the human resource.
In Japan we see what an Asian people can ac-
complish when they assimilate modem political
January 8, 1962
55
concepts and technology, together with a free en-
terprise system, enriching their own ancient cul-
ture. In Japan's present important world role
and in the cordiality of its partnership with the
free world we see the important position of pres-
tige, power, and leadership which an Asian nation
can achieve when it has won the first crucial
battles of the revolution in which we are all en-
gaged.
India
India is in another stage, an earlier stage, of
this same process of growth and progress. The
importance of India does not need to be empha-
sized. In area it is the largest Asian nation next
to Conmiunist China. In population its 440 mil-
lion citizens are surpassed in niunber only by the
650 millions of Communist China. It is signifi-
cant that India's importance should most readily
be stated in terms of comparison with Communist
China. Totally aside from the great intrinsic im-
portance of India, the revolution of progress there
has a special importance that transcends even the
destiny of India's millions.
In this struggle India has some great advan-
tages. India has an effective government, based
on solid resources of trained administrators. In-
dia has a substantial measure of literacy and a
backlog of entrepreneurial and technical talent
which, while at present not fully adequate, are
still large in relation to those of many other Asian
lands.
Like the rest of Asia, India is primarily an agri-
cultural country. Almost three-quarters of its
population depends directly on agriculture for
their living. Again like the rest of free Asia,
India's immediate development efforts are de-
signed to build up a momentum of progress to
overcome the ancient scourges of poverty, popula-
tion pressures, disease, and a tragically low stand-
ard of living.
In 1951 the Indian Government launched the
first of a series of 5-year plans designed to mobi-
lize India's resources in the most efficient manner
compatible with India's constitutional injunction
that "justice, social, economic and political, shall
inform all the institutions of the national life."
Now, as 1961 draws to a close, India is in the midst
of its third 5-year plan (1961-65). The prevail-
ing atmosphere in India is one of optimism, confi-
dence, and hope. The basis for this attitude is not
56
to be found in any startling improvement in the
absolute level of development which has been at-
tained but rather lies in the fact that real progress
has begun, the planning has been proved sound,
and confidence has been instilled that domestic
resources and the assistance of friends abroad will
be available to assist in the carrying out of the
third 5-year plan.
In 1951 the per capita annual income in India
was only $50. The scope of the problem facing
India is perhaps best indicated by the modesty
of the goal that the Indians have set for them-
selves— to double this figure within a period of
25 years. To date the achievements of India's
economic and social effort include a 16 percent
increase over 1950-51 in per capita income, a 40
percent increase in gross national income, a 45
percent increase in food grain production, an 85
percent increase in the number of hospital beds.
The progress which has been achieved provides
the basis for real satisfaction. The distance still
to go, however, is a guarantee against smugness.
Tlie principal aims of the third 5-year plan on
which India is now embarked include the securing
of a minimmn of 5 percent annual increase in na-
tional income, the achievement of self-sufficiency
in food grains, the expansion of basic industries,
the utilization to the fullest extent possible of the
manpower resources of the country, and the estab-
lishment of progressively greater equality of op-
portunity and the reduction of disparities in in-
come and wealth. Fulfillment of this plan will,
it is hoped, advance the Indian economy a long
way toward the point of self-sustaining growth.
Once this stage is reached the slow improvement
in standard of living which the average Indian has
enjoyed since 1950 will probably pick up
momentum.
A measure of the significance of India's revo-
lutionaiy struggle is to be found in the response
by the free world to India's needs. In a move
which has no precedent the free international com-
munity has acted to join with India to supple-
ment India's financial resources.
A group centered around the World Bank, in-
cluding representatives from the United States,
Great Britain, Japan, Canada, France, and "West
Germany, with observers from the International
Monetary Fund, Austria, Denmark, Norway, and
Sweden, has moved to consider the amount and
nature of assistance that can be made available to
Deporfmenf of State BuUetin
India. At, (he fourth meeting of this consortium
in the spriu"; of tliis year, financial connnitmonts
of $'2,2'25 million were made to supplement India's
resources for the initial period of the third 5-year
plan. Tliis figure is in addition to an earlier un-
dertaking by the United States to make aA'ailable
$1,300 million worth of surplus food grains.
The concept of a cooperative free-world venture
in assistance to the emerging nations is being more
and more frequently used. The World Bank has
been the focus for a consortium on Pakistan, and
a cooperative approach is being considered for
countries of Latin America. The Colombo Plan
countries, who met recently in Kuala Lumpur,^
have of course been consulting for many years on
economic development problems and prospects.
Communist China
Among the Chinese people we find the same
genius of an ancient culture, the same energies
and intelligence, the same revolutionary s^Dirit,
the same determination for a better life. The dif-
ference between mainland China and tlie rest of
Asia does not lie in the capabilities or the aspira-
tions of the Chinese people. The difference lies
in tlie fact that in free Asia the people and their
leaders are joined in a dedication to the achieve-
ment of the goals of social and political and eco-
nomic freedom and progress. On mainland
China, however, the jieople have been betrayed by
their leaders in their blind enthusiasm for ap-
proaching all problems from the standpoint of
supposed Marxian doctrine, rather than from the
standpoint of human welfare. The energies of
the Chinese people have not been mobilized in
their own welfare but rather in the service of the
state. Freedom, welfare, progress have all been
sacrificed. They have been replaced by one goal
only, that of power — power of the state for its own
uses. The revolution has been betrayed.
Communist China is a closed society. As a re-
sult, obtaining an accurate picture of the economic
situation today m Communist China is fraught
with uncertainty and imknown quantities. How-
ever, the full dimensions of the Communist fail-
ures in China are beginning to emerge, and the
repercussions may be vei-y deep indeed. In 1958
a "great leap forward" was decreed — productivity
was to know no limits. Production statistics
' Ibid., Dec. 11, 1961, p. 988.
Januory 8, 1962
623332—62 3
were produced to justify the new program, and
according to these statistics productivity indeed
knew no limits. According to Chinese Commu-
nist official figures of the time, the grain harvest
for 1958 was 375 million tons, over 100 percent
more than that of 1957. On the basis of these
figures the target for 1959 was set at 525 million
tons. Then some sti-ange events began to occur.
The harvest figures for 1958 were revised down-
ward. The 1958 grain harvest, it was announced,
was not 375 million but rather 250 million tons.
(Actual jiroduction was probably al)out 210 mil-
lion tons.) Despite this discrepancy, however,
politics remained in command and the "great leap
forward" continued. The 1959 harvest was re-
ported to be 270 million tons, that is, 20 million
tons more than the revised 1958 figures. I cannot
bring these figures up to date. A statistical
blackout has been imposed on agricultural and
industrial production statistics for 1960 and 1961.
However, other information indicates per capita
food output is below even the level of 1950, when
the country was just emerging from the ravages
of the civil war.
It is obvious that the glowing agricultural re-
ports, and similar "leaps forward" in industrial
production statistics, have rapidly disintegi-ated
in the face of the growing food and other short-
ages that have gripped the nation. This is an
unpleasant but very real fact that is becoming
increasingly difficult to conceal.
Thus, despite the difficulties of obtaining statis-
tical information, the general outline of develop-
ment in Communist China is clear. For 11 years
total power has been in the hands of a regime
dedicated to the forced-draft creation of state
power. Political considerations, that is, the re-
gime's expansionist ambitions and search for the
symbols and power of great-nation status, have
been in command. The agricultural sector of the
economy, that is, 80 percent of China's popula-
tion, has been heavily exploited to finance the mil-
itary and heavy-industry expansion, although
prudence would have dictated investment in agri-
culture to bring it to the point where it could
support the burden of industrial development. As
I have pointed out, the disastrous consequences of
this policy are becoming clear. The United Na-
tions Food and Agriculture Organization, in its
1961 amiual report, offers a revealing contrast
between the encouraging improvement in agricul-
57
tural production of the free countries of Asia
compared with the agricultural failures and food
shortages of the Chinese mainland. Communist
China's economic development, offered with much
fanfare as the model for an Asian underdeveloped
nation, has collapsed in a monumental example of
centralized mismanagement.
Tlie execution of Communist China's grandiose
economic plans has ground to a halt. It is not
clear what will emerge. However, the regime's
control is based on military power and not on
popular support, and its hold over the 650 million
Chinese does not seem to have been seriously
threatened by the fantastically costly errors of its
leadership. This continued command of the re-
sources and people of Communist China remains
wedded to single-minded dedication to the crea-
tion and external application of state power. It
would thus be imprudent for us to base our cal-
culations on any presumption other than a future
in which the Red Chinese regime continues to
control the heartland of the Far East and con-
tinues to build up the power of the regime — a
power which will be used in an effort to expand its
influence over surrounding territories and to expel
the American presence from Asia and the west-
ern Pacific. Nor would it be prvident to believe
that this power may not be subject to sudden in-
creases— perhaps the development of nuclear
weapons — as well as to dramatic setback such as
that caused by gross economic mismanagement.
The principal lesson which Communist China
teaches is the enormity of the cost when a popular
revolution is betrayed. The cost, of course, is
bome primarily by the immediate victims, the
people of the country whose hopes have been
dashed and who have had the fulfillment of their
aspirations postponed and who find that tlioir
labors are used to strengthen their bonds, not to
free them. The next most affected are the people
of neighboring areas, who find, instead of the i-e-
gional strength and cooperation which they need,
that their neighbor has designs against them and
actively combats every painful step forward that
they attempt. But the cost also weighs heavily
on all those who have a stake in a world of order
and peace, a world in which the welfare of the
individual is judged more important than the
trappings of state power or the chauvinism of
totalitarian rule. With the lesson of the heavy
58
cost of failure in mind, let us turn to the role of
the United States in the revolution of the emerging
states.
U.S. Role in Revolution of Emerging States
The history of the United States and the tradi-
tions and ideology of this country have already
shaped this role. America's deep dedication to
social justice, to the dignity of the individual, and
to human progress requires us to give our sympa-
thetic support and assistance to new nations im-
bued with the same ideals and struggling along the
same path that we ourselves have traveled. But
in the face of the Communist determination to ex-
tend its sway throughout the world, it is clearly in
our self-interest to extend our encouragement and
help to the emerging nations. In terms of our na-
tional security interests, each one of these strug-
gles for progress is a battle in the campaign for
freedom in which we are all engaged. In the
words of Secretary of State Rusk : *
Whenever an underdeveloped country makes economic,
social, and political progress it expands the frontier of
freedom. Wherever we cooperate in breaking down the
barriers of ignorance, poverty, disease, and despair, we
farther not only the well-being of mankind but our own
security.
Our actions are founded on the belief that the
revolution of the emerging nations — the transition
to modem social concepts of human freedom and
to the technological base which can support the
practice of these concepts — must be permitted to
unfold. This revolution can only be carried out
by the people of these nations themselves. No one
else can do it for them. But we do have two major
roles to play. The first of these is to assure the
freedom of the revolution. We must prevent ex-
ternal interference, subversion, and aggression
from stifling the revolutionary process. The sec-
ond is to give such cooperation and support as we
can to the orderly social, economic, and political
development of the emerging nations.
Political Support for Termination of Colonialism
The discharge of our first responsibility has
been the history of our political and defen.se efforts
in Asia since the closing days of the Second World
War. We furnished strong political support for
the termination of colonialism in Asia and the
* Ibid., Oct. 30, 1961, p. 702.
Department of State Bulletin
establishment of these new countries as independ-
ent nations. We are proud of the example we our-
selves set in our role in the establishment of the
Republic of the Philippines and in sharing with
the people of the Philippines our own dedication
to democratic ideals. The recent elections in the
Philippines furnish renewed evidence of the
strength and vitality of the democratic institu-
tions established there. Our occupation of Japan
and peace treaty with that country was a notable
example of a helping hand proffered to a foi'mer
enemy. Our participation in the United Xations
action to repel Communist aggression in Korea
was a signal of our awareness of the threat of
communism to the nations of Asia and our deter-
mination to assist in meeting this threat. The
establislmient of the Southeast Asia Treaty Or-
ganization and our bilateral defense treaties with
Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of
China, and the Philippines, and our mutual de-
fense assistance programs with numerous coun-
tries in the area are all further landmarks in this
continuing effort to join with the emerging nations
in their responsibility for maintaining the integ-
rity of their countries. The most recent chapter
in this history is our current heightened concern
with assistance to the Republic of Viet-Nam in its
struggle for survival against North Yiet-Nam's
efforts at conquest.
Long-Range Economic and Social Development
The discharge of our second responsibility en-
compasses almost every phase, aside from the
strictly military, of our relationships with the
emerging nations. Our objective is purely that
of helping to foster the long-range economic and
social development of these countries in accord-
ance with their own plans and aspirations.
Our cooi^eration with the emerging nations
ranges from the Fulbright program to Food for
Peace, from long-term developmental loans to the
Peace Corps, from technical assistance programs
to private investment, from outright grant aid to
enlightened trade policies which will permit the
emerging nations to find a market for the prod-
ucts of their industries and to become a market
for our own. I will not seek to catalog the pro-
grams on which we are engaged but will only
mention some of the chief premises on which these
programs are based.
The major premise for these programs is of
course to be found in our own dedication to free-
dom and progi-ess. This dedication is a major
component of our national purpose and our na-
tional strength. The confidence which others re-
pose in the United States and tlieir willingness
to look to the United States for leadership stem
directly from our demonstration, at home and
abroad, of our support for these ideals.
Secondly, progress can only be assured when a
country fulfills its own responsibilities to help it-
self. We cannot carry out their revolution for
others. And we cannot dissipate our resources in
seeking to help a nation whose leaders are miwill-
ing to match economic growth with increasmg
measures of social justice, of education, of im-
provement in the lot of the people.
An important point which lies at the core of our
programs is that we do not seek to have other na-
tions mold their image in that of the United
States. Indeed, this would be the antithesis of
our purpose. Our purpose is to assist each nation
to produce, out of its own culture and heritage,
out of its own resources and aspirations, the kind
of modern society it wants for itself. We are con-
fident that, if permitted to do so, each nation will
fashion in its own way and at its own pace a so-
ciety where human freedom and the dignity of
the individual are valued. In this way our own
open society will find an increasingly compatible
environment.
Each benchmark of progress that is achieved
increases the contribution which the diversity and
richness of the Pacific area will make to our world,
increases the power and importance of the area.
This great potential, and the importance of our
own contribution to its realization, are at the base
of my conviction that a significant shift in the bal-
ance of our mterests and of our attention toward
the Pacific community of nations is in the making.
Indeed, the Pacific community may well be the
most significant theater of decision in the revolu-
tion I have discussed this evening. I am confi-
dent that we on this side of the Pacific shall not
be found wanting in extending the fi'iendship,
support, and enlightened cooperation which the
emerging countries will need in the years ahead.
In so doing we shall, as Americans, be accepting
the responsibilities inherent in our traditions and
beliefs and best contributing to the attainment of
our own national ideals.
January 8, 1962
59
Africa's Challenge to American Enterprise
hy G. Mennen Williams
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs ^
To share this luncheon meeting with such a dis-
tinguished group of fellow Americans is a reassur-
mg pleasure. I am happy to join you this after-
noon in these important discussions which seek the
most effective means of enlarging the participation
of Negro Americans, a vital element of our popu-
lation, in the business life of our nation. This is
a timely endeavor. Its success can contribute sub-
stantially to our total welfare and to the fi-eedom
we are pledged to defend and to extend at home
and abroad.
We are citizens of a responsible government,
and we live in a world which becomes day by day
a more closely knit community. With friends and
allies, we are engaged in an historic struggle, a
struggle, as President Kennedy has described it,
"against the common enemies of man: tyranny,
poverty, disease, and war itself." ^ This is our
heritage and our historic opportunity.
I am also pleased to be with you today because
I believe you can enhance America's contribution
to international development. Your efforts might
well be directed toward nations of Asia, Latin
America, or parts of Europe — and I think you
should examine the possibilities offered by those
areas; however, my own parochial interests urge
me to suggest that you consider the challenge of
Africa. I believe you can make a significant con-
tribution to our mutual assistance efforts on that
continent as you enlarge your participation in our
own national economy, strengthening it, and as
you become increasingly involved in international
economic affairs.
One of the great challenges of Africa is the
challenge of economic development. Only t Inough
' Aildress made hcfoio the National Conference on Suiiill
Business al Washiii;;t(in, T).C, on Poe. 1 (press release
828).
' Bulletin of Feb. G. l!)('.l. p. 175.
increased productive power and improved eco-
nomic well-being can the nations of Africa meet
the ever-rising expectations of their citizens for a
better life.
In examining this challenge let us not under-
estimate the size of the task. Consider the fact
tliat Africa is a great landmass more than three
times the size of the United States. I wish all of
you could see for yourselves, as I have seen, the
extraordinary diversity of its geophysical, cli-
matic, etlmic, and cultural aspects. Africa is the
home of some 230 million people. Some of them
participate in a surprisingly advanced economy,
but most of them are only beginning to enter a
modern economy and are only beginning to carry
their share of the continent's productive burdens.
You know already of Africa's economic poten-
tial. Producer of most of the M'orld's diamonds,
gold, and cobalt, it is the source of very large sup-
plies of uranium, manganese, copper, and iron.
Rubber, palm oil, cocoa, coffee, and vanilla are
among Africa's principal resources, and the con-
tinent is coming into its own as a major oil pro-
ducer. This great economic potential, African
leaders realize, is yet only partially tapped. Plow-
ever, an equally important consideration is that in
most of Africa the tasks of meeting the basic needs
of most of the people have just begun. Among
the problems still to be resolved are these: Health
conditions must be drastically improved. To meet
manpower needs, education, botli liberal and tech-
nical, must be improved, adapted to the African
scene, and extended to lai'ger segments of the pop-
ulation. If well planned and executed, there can
be no more rewarding investment than in human
beings. Tlie development of networks of trans-
portation and communications also deserves high
priority. And of course the vital role of water
and liydroelectric power can be seen in the impor-
60
Department of Stale Bulletin
lance more and more African leaders attach to
projects for constructing dams.
Irrespective of the political forms they have
adopted, developing African countries must ac-
cumulate capital in order to meet these basic needs.
Two courses are open to them. They can reduce
tlieir present rate of consumption; or they can
achieve a more rapid rate of economic growth,
tJiereby generating a larger supply of savings. In
a continent wliere the average per capita income
is $i;>2 — and only $89 in tropical Africa — de-
ci'eased consumption is not a wise goal. Rapid
economic growth is a much more judicious and
humane means of capital accumulation. It im-
plies, however, availability of capital — capital in
the largest sense of the word. In Africa, as else-
where in the world, capital must either be gen-
erated internally through domestic savings out of
income, or it must come from external sources.
These external sources include private investment
as well as various kinds of foreign government as-
sistance.
The United States is clearly committed to for-
eign aid. Our own nation owes a gi'eat deal to
the assistance European countries and European
private business gave us during our formative
years.
The United States has been involved in foreign
aid of various kinds for some time. Our overrid-
ing philosophy has been that set forth by Presi-
dent Truman in his point 4 address : ^
Only by helping the least fortunate of its members to
help themselves can the human family achieve the decent,
satisfying life that is the right of all people.
Now we are engaged in a new program of inter-
national development aimed at helping these less
fortunate nations to increase their productivity
and improve their standard of living. Our Gov-
ernment assists these nations through various
means : scholarships and other forms of educa-
tional assistance, through the Peace Corps and
other human-resource and human-commitment
activity, through the Food-for-Peace Program,
through long-term loans, tlirough supporting as-
sistance, through development grants, and by
drawing on the financial and management assets of
private enterprise.
^\niat is the role of American private enterprise
in fostering the economic growth of Africa?
3 Ibid, Jan. 30, 1949, p. 123.
January 8, 1962
Briefly, in the course of normal business activity
it can assist by providing capital, by making avail-
able qualified technicians and business administra-
tors, and bj' helping to improve the quality of
African management.
Among the business areas in wliich African na-
tions require immediate economic assistance are
those of insurance, banking and loan associations,
low-cost housing, and cold storage. There is room
for commercial, fuiancial, extractive, and indus-
trial activities, exporting and importing busi-
nesses, large and small. As an exam[)le, I am in-
trigued by the number of African craft and folk
art items I am beginning to see in American stores.
Climate for U.S. Business in Africa
"What is the climate for United States business
in Africa? I am sure that my colleagues from
other departments will speak more directly on this
question. This afternoon's panel, I understand,
will get down to specifics. However, let me give
you a few thoughts.
Admittedly these are turbulent times in Africa,
when newly emerging nations are attem{)ting to
develop personalities and institutions of their own.
The framework in which foreign private invest-
ment will operate in many of these nations is still
unclear. At the same time the need for such in-
vestment is almost universally recognized, and we
can be certain that, one way or another, it will
play an important role.
There is no point in hiding the fact that risks
for the private investor are high in some parts of
Africa — because the place of foreign in^-estment
has not yet been determined, because adequate
safeguards have not yet been devised, and in some
areas simply because the possibility of political
instability exists. But we should not let the head-
lines which dramatize the areas of unrest and
governmental irresponsibility obscure the fact
that in much of Africa conditions are peaceful
and that, with the enthusiastic support of the
mass of the people, energies are being devoted
to the constructive tasks of economic dev-eloi^ment
and the maintenance of political stability.
For those of us who have been close to tlie
African scene, broad outlines of the future are
becoming increasingly clear, even though the fer-
ment of transition still obscures many of the de-
tails. Africa must be accepted on its own terms.
We cannot expect, with rare exceptions, that the
61
African nations will immediately develop all the
institutions of democracy in our sense of the word.
African nations are now developing their own
forms of government and their own institutions,
based on cultural patterns that are familiar to
them and that they can make work effectively. I
am confident that they will move in the direction
of free choice and self-expression.
At the risk of considerable oversimplification,
we might say that many of the new states of
Africa are attempting to substitute national loyal-
ties for tribal loyalties and that, to obtain accept-
ance as a substitute for the tribe, the nation must
take on certain characteristics familiar to the peo-
ple. In practical terms, for the time being, this
often means a strong leadership with paternal
overtones and a rather different and more difficult
role for political opposition. It often means a
high degree of state responsibility for the well-
being of the individual citizen, which derives less
from modern welfare theory than from the tradi-
tional claims of a member of a family or a tribe
on its chief. Government ownerslup tends to fit
well into this kind of structure, and the lack of
entrepreneurial skills and private capita] in much
of Africa accentuates the tendency. It is thus
no accident that even some of the most pro-West-
ern leaders of Africa in large measure think auto-
matically in terms of state enterprise.
New Pattern of Cooperation
We must, of course, encoui-age the African na-
tions to develop the plurality of institutions that
we have found to be the greatest bulwark of free-
dom. In particular we must help them find a
place for private enterprise. But we would be
remiss if we did not say very candidly that pri-
vate enterprise itself must be prepared to make
major adjustments. It may well be that Africa
will provide the proving ground for new forms of
cooperation between private foreign investment
and underdeveloped societies.
First of all, the new pattern of cooperation, to
be effective, is likely to emphasize the management
functions. If the major emphasis is placed on
management rather than ownership, many new
possibilities are opened which provide opportu-
nities for us and wliich are fully acceptable to
the Africans.
Second, I lie new pattern of cooperation is likely
to show a somewhat different relationship be-
tween investment in capital and investment in
labor than we are accustomed to. Much of Africa
luis great labor resources, although woefully short
of capital. E\en assuming a sharp increase m
capital made available from outside, the needs
will far exceed the amount received if there is
simply an attempt to reproduce the capital-inten-
sive development of the industrialized West. But
with good planning and good management, hu-
man resoui'ces can be used as a substitute for
capital, not within the harsh framework of Com-
munist exploitation but through humane and
progressive enterprise. We in America may have
a reputation abroad of efficiency and wealth
through machines, but a far more accurate state-
ment of America's contribution to the modern
world has been its development of techniques
through which large-scale production can be
achieved in a genuinely free society. If we can
provide the managerial skills for labor-intensive
production as well as we have for production
based on high capital investment, there is an as-
sured place for us in Africa.
Stated another way, there are limitations on
African development but there is also a tremen-
dous potential. Political and social factors must
be given very special recognition. American pri-
vate enterprise can make a major contribution if
it shows a flexibility in meeting African condi-
tions that goes beyond anything we have experi-
enced in the past.
Robert L. Garner, former President of the In-
ternational Finance Corporation, has suggested
certain particular aspects of responsibility for
foreign businessmen operating in developing
countries. They are worth noting. Foreign
businessmen, he believes, "need to make special
efforts to associate themselves with the local com-
munities— first through maximum use of local re-
sources and people, with positive efforts to pro-
vide training and opportunity for advancement
to senior positions." Garner points out the "mu-
tual advantages in joint ventures with local en-
terprises, or in sharing ownership with local in-
vestors." He cites the role of business in setting
the example and stimulating their local counter-
parts in supporting education, technical and busi-
ness training, and otlier constructive community
activities.
I hope that those of you who are already en-
gaged in foreign business will keep those ideas
62
Department of Stale BuUelin
in mind, aware that the posture of American en-
terprise abroad greatly influences the attitudes of
foreign peojjles and governments toward the
United States.
Participation of Negro Americans
I am convinced that there are among you busi-
nessmen who can turn their capital, know-how,
and experience to the promotion of the broad in-
terests of our nation in aiding African develop-
ment. Negro Americans are already among those
of our citizens demonstrating the benefits which
good private business can contribute to economic
growth. Needless to say, stalwart sons of Michi-
gan were among the pioneers. I speak of a Libe-
rian-American timber firm run jointly by a group
of young men from Detroit in collaboration with
Ijiberian citizens. I understand also that Wilson
Hines, a graduate of Howard and M.I.T., has
established a liquid-air manufacturing company
in Liberia. Another successful venture is the in-
surance company established in Ghana by a group
of enterprising New Yorkers.
Some of the larger United States firms in
Africa have hired Negro Americans in profes-
sional positions. These include a major alumi-
num company and leading soft-drink and cigarette
manufacturers. This is a welcome sign of the
extension of the American principle of fair em-
ployment practices that our Government is en-
forcing with increasing vigor. It is a develop-
ment which I hope will spread throughout Amer-
ican business overseas.
I might say here parenthetically that our AID
[Agency for International Development] missions
in Sierra Leone and in Mali are directed by Negro
Americans of high skills and competence.
The United States has great need for the partic-
ipation and assistance of talented people in its
activities to build security by increasing world-
wide economic development, and larger participa-
tion of the Negro American in this task is no more
and no less than an integral part of his full inte-
gration into American life.
To stimulate appropriate participation of pri-
vate enterprise, the United States Government has
worked out a program of providing insurances
against various kinds of political risks and in
some cases business risks as well.* Certain loans
are available to private enterprise on high-prior-
ity projects. Also the United States Government
is in a position to provide financial help in sur-
veys undertaken by potential investors to acquire
the information essential to investment decisions.
As I have said, the magnitude of the task of
African economic development is tremendous.
Therefore it is reassuring to think that our Gov-
ernment can count upon the support of private
enterprise in its efforts to meet the challenges of
Africa and contribute toward the development
of a stable and prosperous world.
U.S. and U.K. Accuse Soviet Union
of Hampering Geneva Test Ban Talits
Press rploase 804 dated December 19
The following report on the situation at the
Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nu-
clear Weapon Tests was submitted on December 19
to the United Nations Dlsarm/iment Commission.
Report of the United Kingdom and the United
States to the Unitfj) Nations Disarmament
Commission on the Geneva Conference on
the DlSCONaiNUANCE OF NuCLEAR WeAPON
Tests, December 19, 1961
Following a searching and exhaustive discus-
sion of nuclear testing, the Sixteenth United Na-
tions General Assembly passed Resolution 1649
(XVI)^ urging resumption of the test ban nego-
tiations at Geneva.
In accordance with the resolution, the United
Kingdom and the United States immediately pro-
posed to the Soviet Government that the Geneva
Conference resume its meetings on November 28,
1961.= Shortly thereafter the Soviet Government
agreed.
Resolution 1649 (XVI) provided the followmg
guidance to the negotiators.
— It recognized that a permanent and continu-
ing cessation of nuclear weapon testmg in all en-
vironments would be guaranteed only by an efTec-
tive and impartial system of verification in which
all states would have confidence.
— It reaffirmed that it was urgently necessary
to reach an agreement prohibiting all nuclear
weapon tests under effective control, which would
' nid., Nov. 20, 1961, p. 837.
January 8, 1962
' For text, see Bulletin of Dec. 4, 1961, p. 938.
' For texts of a U.S. note of Nov. 13 and a Soviet reply of
Nov. 21, see ihU., Dec. 11, 1961, p. 965.
63
be a first step toward reversing the dangerous and
burdensome arms race, -which would inhibit the
spread of nuclear weapons to other countries,
which would contribute to the reduction of inter-
national tension and which would eliminate any
health hazards associated with nuclear testing.
— Finally, it urged the three negotiating states
to renew at once their efforts to conclude at the
earliest possible time a treaty on the cessation of
nuclear and thenno-nuclear weapon tests on the
basis :
(1) that the treaty should have as its objective
the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests in all
environments mider inspection and control ma-
chinery adequate to ensure compliance with its
terms;
(2) that international control machinery should
be organized so as to be representati^'e of all par-
ties to the treaty and should be staffed and oper-
ated to guarantee its objectivity and effectiveness,
avoiding self-inspection, under procedui-es which
would ensure that its facilities would be used ex-
clusively for purposes of effective control ; and
(3) that the day-to-day executive and adminis-
trative responsibility should be concentrated in
the hands of a single administrator acting impar-
tially and functioning under the supervision of a
commission composed of representatives of parties
to the treaty.
The Soviet announcement that it would return
to the negotiating table raised the hopes of many
people around the world that the Soviet Union at
last was ready to negotiate an effective test ban
treaty. Even before the Conference resumed,
however, the Soviet Union dashed these hopes by
presenting a draft test ban agreement which
would in effect be a moratorium without any in-
ternational controls — a proposal which the Soviet
Union knew ran counter to the declared i)ositions
of the Western powers and to General Assembly
Resolution 1649.
This Soviet proposal amounted to an uncontrol-
led agreement on the suspension of all nuclear
tests. It repudiated every previous agreement for
international inspection and control undertaken by
the U.S.S.R. during three years of patient and
laborious negotiations at Geneva. It abandoned
as well commitments made in other international
forums and in correspondence between the Heads
of Government of the United States, the United
Kingdom and the U.S.S.R., in which the Soviet
Union contmually professed its willingness to ac-
cept effective, reliable, workable, and impartial
international conti'ols to guarantee fulfillment of
its disarmament obligations.
For example, on June 14, 1957, the Soviet Gov-
ernment submitted a proposal to the United Isa-
tions Sub-Committee on Disarmament calling for
an international commission to control a cessation
of nuclear tests. The same proposal provided for
the establishment of control posts in the United
Statas, the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R. and in
the Pacific Ocean.
The Soviet Union also discarded agreement on
the report ^ of the 1958 Geneva Conference of Ex-
perts convened to study the teclmical basis of an
agreement on the suspension of nuclear tests.
Even the draft treaty proposed by the U.S.S.R.
on October 31, 1958 — when the Geneva Confer-
ence on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon
Tests was first convened — called for the establish-
ment of a netwoi-k of control posts in accordance
with the recommendations of the Conference of
Experts.
In addition, the November 27 draft agreement
proposed by the Soviet Union further repudiated
the Soviet-accepted recommendations of the group
of experts from both sides convened during the
Geneva test ban conference to study methods to
detect high-altitude tests. Tliese experts — includ-
ing Soviet scientists — recommended that earth
and solar satellites be placed in orbit and that
additional equipment be installed at ground con-
trol posts to detect space tests. The new Soviet
draft asked states to rely on existing national sys-
tems to detect tests in space.
Also repudiated by the latest Soviet volte face
are the preamble, 17 draft treaty articles, and
two annexes ^ agreed by the three powers during
the course of the test ban negotiations. These
agreements recognized the need for the establish-
ment and contmued operation of an effective in-
ternational inspection and control system. In do-
ing so they provided for:
(1) the establishment of a Control Organiza-
tion to include a Control Commission, a Detection
' For text, see ihUL. Sept. 22, 1958, p. 453.
'For texts, see Dorumcnts on Disarmament, 19G0 (De-
partmeut of Stnto publication 7172), pp. 376-387 ; for sale
by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printinf; Office, Washington 2.5, D.C., price ?1.25.
64
Department of State Bulletin
and Identification System, and a single Adminis-
trator ;
(2) the installation and operation of the Con-
trol System;
(3) the composition of the Control Commission ;
and
(4) arrangements designed to insure the signa-
tory states' cooperation with the Control System
for, inter alia, transportation, aircraft flights, air
sampling and on-site inspection.
Throughout the Geneva Conference on the Dis-
continuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests, the Soviet
Union has constantly attempted to hamper the
establishment of an effective, reliable inspection
and control system. Yet even the U.S.S.R. ad-
mitted on many occasions to the principle of in-
ternational inspection and control — whatever dif-
ferences it may have had as to the details of on-site
inspection, international control posts, and inter-
national inspection teams. Now the Soviet Union
has abandoned the very principle of international
verification and control to which it has been com-
mitted throughout the negotiations.
The Western Delegates to the resumed Confer-
ence at once indicated their wish to avoid all po-
lemics and immediately begm work to negotiate
a meaningful treaty. They called Soviet atten-
tion to the draft of a treaty ^ presented to the Con-
ference in April 1961 by the United States
and the United Kingdom which consisted of
twenty-four articles and three annexes. The draft
treaty was complete and much of it already
agreed. The remainder consists of compromise
proposals put forward by the West to meet the
Soviet point of view. The Western Powers have
never insisted that these articles be accepted by
the Soviet Union as they stand; and while the
West considers them fair and responsible pro-
posals, they remain open to negotiation.
The Soviet draft agreement, on the other hand,
with which the United States and the United
Kingdom were suddenly confronted on their re-
turn to the conference, in effect rejected not only
the nvmierous provisions for international super-
vision already agreed at Geneva but even the small
amount of control contained in the Soviet Union
one-page treaty tabled at the very first meeting in
1958. This constituted an extraordinary step back-
wards and must be considered an affront both to
the otlier members of the conference and to the
majority of members of the United Nations who
voted for Eesolution 1649 (XVI). Nevertheless,
in the course of the resumed negotiations, the
United States and United Kingdom delegations,
in order to leave no doubt about the Soviet posi-
tion, questioned the Soviet delegation closely.
The Soviet Delegate said that the Soviet Union
was no longer prepared to accept impartial inter-
national verification because of the tension exist-
ing in international relations. He was, however,
unable to say :
(A) How the international situation had de-
teriorated since June 4, 1961, when the Soviet
Government had most recently stated in a note ' to
the United States Government that it was pre-
pared to accept international control for a nuclear
test ban treaty;
(B) Why the Soviet Union had continued
during the period immediately before its test series
to adhere to agreed treaty articles embodying the
principle of international control which it was
obviously planning to repudiate as soon as its tests
were concluded ;
(C) Why the United States and United King-
dom were confronted with this sudden change in
the Soviet attitude only a day or two before the
conference began and then only through the inter-
national press.
The Soviet contentions that the international
situation compelled it first to resume testing and
then to change its attitude in the conference is
patently untenable. The Soviet-manufactured
crisis in 1961 corresponds closely to the tense situa-
tion created by the Soviet Union in 1958 when the
conference began. It is precisely the existence of
tension and the absence of confidence engendered
by Soviet actions over Berlin and elsewhere which
makes international verification of a test ban all
the more necessary.
Moreover, the Soviet series of tests has contrib-
uted to tension in the international situation and
it is notable that the Soviet Union is only propos-
ing a test ban agreement without international
supervision at a moment when it has concluded its
massive series of tests and is unashamedly boasting
about them and threatening to renew them.
The Soviet proposal for an agreement simply on
the word of the parties is all the more unacceptable
in that the Soviet Union had previously given its
' For text, see Bulletin of Jvine 5, 1961, p. 870.
January 8, J962
' For text of a Soviet aide memoire, see ibid., July 3,
1961, p. 22.
65
word that it would not be the first among the three
members of the nuclear test ban conference to re-
sume testing and liad soleimily voted in the United
Nations on the 20th of December 1960 for
a moratorium on further nuclear weapon testing.
The Soviet Government argues that its new pro-
posals resemble those made by President Kennedy
and Prime Minister Macmillan on September 3.'
But the Soviet Government rejected them. In
any case, the Western proposals on that date were
made in an emergency in an attempt to save the
woi-ld from the dangers of the Soviet test series
and in the hope that they would lead to a somid
treaty under international control. Experience of
Soviet actions since then has, however, gone far
to destroy that hope.
The United States and the United Kingdom are
continuing their efforts at Geneva to persuade the
Soviet Union to revei-se its present position and
open the way to fruitful negotiations on the basis
recommended by the United Nations General As-
sembly in Resolution 1649 (XVI) .
The United States and the United Kingdom
undertake to continue to keep the Disannament
Commission, and thi-ough it, the General As-
sembly, informed of the progress of the Geneva
negotiations.
U.S.-Japan Committee on Scientific
Cooperation Concludes First Meeting
Following is the text of a joint commtmique is-
sued on December 15 by the United States-Japan
Committee on Scientific Cooperation at the close
of its first meeting.
Press release 895 dated December 19
1. The First Meeting of the United States-Japan
Committee on Scientific Cooperation was held
from December 13 to 15, 1961 at the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Tolryo.^ The joint communique -
issued last June by President Kennedy and Prime
Minister [Hayato] Ikeda led to the establisliment
of this Committee.
2. President Kennedy, in his message to the First
Meeting of the Committee,' emphasized that the
' For text, see ibid., Sept. 18, 1961, p. 476.
' For a Department nnnouncement of the meeting, see
Bulletin of Dec. 25, 1001, p. 1059.
' For text, see ihid., July 10, 1961, p. 57.
' Not printed here.
people of the United States are determined that
science and technology shall be dedicated to the
service of humanity and to the arts of peace.
Prime Minister Ikeda, at his limcheon given in
honor of the United States and Japanese members
of the Committee, extended a warm welcome to the
United States members and expressed the hope
that, through the Committee, even closer coopera-
tion would be established in the field of science and
that the two countries would contribute, hand in
hand, to the goal of promoting human welfare.
In his address at the opening session. Minister
[Takeo] Miki expressed his belief and expectation
that the Committee would be a living example of
international scientific cooperation contributing
to peace and not to war, to construction and not
to destruction. United States Ambassador [Ed-
win O.] Reischauer, who was present at the open-
ing session, also expressed his conviction that close
cooperation in the field of science was an obvious
and necessary aspect of the partnership between
Japan and the United States and that from such
close cooperation would come benefits for the peo-
ple of both nations and indeed for all humanity.
3. Dr. [Kankyuro] Kaneshige and Dr. [Harry
C] Kelly were elected chairmen and served on
alternate days. The principal points of the Com-
mittee's discussions, which took place in a frank
and cordial atmosphere, were embodied in a re-
port adopted by the Committee for submission to
the two Governments.
4. The next meetmg of the Committee will be
held in Washington, D.C. The date of this meet-
ing was tentatively set for May 21-23, 1962.
5. A summary of the report follows :
(1) Analysis and Review of the Present Status of
Scientific Cooperation between the United
States and Japan
Reports were exchanged and discussions con-
ducted on such problems as sharing of research
facilities, exchange of information and materials,
cooperative research projects, exchange of schol-
ars, and financial assistance. It was recognized
that there has already been a considerable degree
of cooperation between the two countries. This
cooperation has taken place on an individual basis
between investigators, learned societies and re-
search institutes.
In the discussion of obstacles to increased scien-
tific cooperation, it was noted, for example, that
there is a lack of adequate financial support for
66
Department of Sfofe Bulletin
the furtherance of joint research; tliere is room
for improvement of communication between the
institutions and scientists of the two countries;
questions of patent rights are still in need of clar-
ification ; and the language barrier imposes special
difficulties.
(2) Fields in Wliich Closer Collaboration Is Par-
ticularly Desirable
In the course of exchanging views, the Commit-
tee members raised a number of topics relating to
their respective field specialization. These topics
included those in which regional characteristics
are of special importance — such as scientific inves-
tigation of the Pacific Ocean, and animal and
plant geography and ecology. These fields also
included those which have undergone unique de-
velopment in the respective countries and in which
both countries would benefit from cooperation —
such as cancer research, air pollution studies, and
Antarctic research. Topics pertaining to other
fields where sharing of special, existing facilities
is desirable were also raised.
(3) Exchange of Scientists and Sharing of Re-
search Facilities
Wliile scientists have already been exchanged
between Japan and the United States, it was rec-
ognized that there was need to promote further ex-
change. The desire was expressed that more
American scholars be sent to Japan. The fact
that some Japanese scholars tend to stay in the
United States for prolonged periods of time was
recognized as a problem. The Committee ex-
pressed the hope that arrangements could be made
for increased sharing of research facilities by both
countries.
(4) Exchange of Scientific Information and Re-
search Materials
In order to promote cooperation in this field, the
following measures were recognized as desirable :
further exchange of documents and materials by
assembling basic information and establishing a
clearinghouse for the exchange of infonnation;
cooperation in translating documents, including
mechanical language translation; facilitation of
the exchange of research materials; and research
on the processing of information.
(5) Conclusions
The Committee has come to the following con-
clusions :
a. "While recognizing that there are many ways
to promote scientific cooperation between Japan
and the United States, the Committee has decided
to concentrate on the following points :
(a) The promotion of further exchange of
scholars.
(b) The encouragement of exchange of more
scientific information and materials.
(c) The encouragement and the pursuit of joint
research projects in certain specific scien-
tific areas.
b. Although important and appropriate sub-
jects of joint reseai-ch in various fields are nu-
merous, the Committee has selected the following
three fields as subjects of further study with the
goal of developing concrete forms of joint re-
search :
(a) Scientific investigation of the Pacific Ocean.
(b) Animal and plant biogeography and ecol-
ogy of the Pacific area.
(c) Cancer research.
These three significant fields were chosen be-
cause the results are expected to be mutually bene-
ficial, and they might become the model for future
projects in other fields.
c. Before the next Committee meeting the items
identified in paragraphs a. and b. will be studied
jointly through consultation with experts witliin
each nation and by communication between the
chairmen. Dr. Kaneshige and Dr. Kelly.
The questions of exchange of persons and study
of languages are extremely important in scientific
cooperation; at the same time they are subjects
that would also be of concern to the Japan-U.S.
Educational and Cultural Committee. Therefore,
it is higlily desirable to establish close liaison be-
tween the two Committees.
U.S. and Argentine Scientists Study
Control of Foot-and-Mouth Disease
White House press release dated December 14
The President on December 14 announced that
a scientific mission would visit the Republic of
Argentina on January 8, 1962. The mission,
headed by J. George Harrar, president. Rocke-
feller Foundation, will hold a series of meetings
with Argentine scientists to discuss the teclinical
aspects of foot-and-mouth disease. This is the
January 8, 7962
67
most important disease affecting the world's popu-
lation of cattle and has been of concern to both the
United States and Argentina for many years.
As a result of a request to President Kennedy
by President [Arturo] Frondizi during his visit
to the United States last September,^ Jerome B.
Wiesner, the President's Science Adviser, con-
vened a panel of experts to review^ the scientific
and technical history of foot-and-mouth disease
and the attempts to control it. The Argentine
Government has invited the panel to discuss all
of the complex problems including diagnosis, vac-
cination, and the processing of meat. The purpose
of the mission is to evaluate the latest information
and, based on modern scientific methods, plan a
constructive research and development program
which might provide a marketable product free
of the disease. Such an accomplishment would
benefit not only other Latin American countries
but most of the major meat-producing countries
of the world.
This cooperative effort between the Govern-
ments of Argentina and the United States ad-
vances the Alliance for Progress program and is
in keeping with the traditionally close relations
between the two countries.
Human Rights Week, 1961
A PROCLAMATION"
Whebeas December 15, 1961, marks the one hundred
and seventieth anniversary of the adoption of the first
ten amendments to the Constitution of the United States,
which are known as the Bill of Rights ; and
Whebeas December 10, 19C1, marks the thirteenth anni-
versary of the adoption by tie United Nations General
Assembly of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
as a common standard of achievement for all nations and
all peoples ; and
Whereas the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
gives fresh voice to the equal dignity and worth of every
human being proclaimed in our own Declaration of In-
dependence and in the Constitution of the United States ;
and
Whebeas the strongest guarantee of liberty is the
cooperation of independent nations in defense of peace
and jiLstice, each in support of its own freedom and the
rights of its own citizens :
Now, thebefobe, I, John F. Kennedy, President of the
United States of America, do hereby proclaim the period
of December 10 to December 17, 1961, as Human Rights
Week, and I call upon the citizens of the United States
to liouor our heritage by study of these great documents
and thereby gain new strength for the long struggle
against the forces of terror that threaten the freedoms
which give meaning to human existence — the right to
speak without fear and to seek the truth regardless of
frontiers ; the right to worship in accord with conscience
and to share the strength and glory of religion with our
children ; the right to determine our own institutions of
government and to vote in secret for tlie candidate of our
choice ; the right to justice under law and to protection
against arbitrary arrest ; the right to labor and to join
in efforts to improve conditions of work ; the right to
unite with our fellows, without distinction as to race,
creed, or color, in tearing down the walls of prejudice,
ignorance, and poverty wherever they may be, and to
build ever firmer the foundations of liberty and equality
for all.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand
and caused the Seal of the United States of America to
be affixed.
Done at the City of Washington this ninth day of
December in the year of our Lord nineteen hun-
[seal] dred and sixty-one, and of the Independence of
the United States of America the one hundred
and eighty-sixth.
' Buu-ETIN of Oct. 30, 19C1, p. 719.
* No. 3442 ; 26 Fed. Reg. 12023.
By the President :
Dean Rdsk,
Secretary of State.
Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy
87th Congress, 1st Session
Cuban Aftermath — Red Seeds Blow South : Implications
for the United States of the Latin American Conference
for National Sovereignty and Economic Emancipation
and Peace. Hearing before the Subcommittee To In-
vestigate the Administration of the Internal Security
Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Senate
Judiciary Committee. Testimony of Dr. Joseph F.
Thorning. March 16, 1961. 62 pp.
World Refugee Problems. Hearings before the Subcom-
mittee To Investigate Problems Connected With
Refugees and Escapees of the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee. July 12-14, 1961. 159 pp.
The Task for 1962: A Free World Community. Pre-
pared by Henry S. Reuss for the Subcommittee on
Foreign Economic Policy of the Joint Economic Com-
mittee. November 1, 1961. 8 pp. [Joint Committee
print]
A New Look at Trade Policy Toward the Communist
Bloc : The Elements of a Common Strategy for the
West. Materials prepared by Sanniol Pisar for the
Subcommittee on J''oreign Economic Policy of the Joint
Economic Committee. November 10, 1961. 103 pp.
I Joint Committee print]
.lapan in Uuite<l States Foreign Economic Policy. Pre-
paro<l by Warren S. Hunsberger of the Iiustitute for
International Development, School for Advanced Inter-
national Studies, for the Subcommittee on Foreign Eco-
nomic Policy of the Joint Economic Committee. Novem-
ber 20, 1961. 27 pp. [Joint Committee print]
68
Department of Slate Bulletin
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
General Assembly Sets Up Commission
To Implement Colonialism Declaration
Following is a statement made in the plenary
session of the U.N. General Assembly on Novem-
her 22 l)y Jonathan B. Bingham,, U.S. Represent-
ative, together with the text of a resolution
adopted iy the Assembly on Novemher 27.
STATEMENT BY MR. BINGHAM
U.S. delegation press release 3851
On December 14, 1960, the General Assembly
solemnly proclaimed "the necessity of bringing to
a speedy and unconditional end colonialism in all
its forms and manifestations." ' To that end, the
Assembly called for
I Immediate steps ... to transfer all powers to the
peoples of those territories, without any conditions or
reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed
will and desire, without any distinction as to race, creed
or colour, in order to enable them to enjoy complete inde-
pendence and freedom.
As I think all delegates know, my country has
associated itself with the principles of that historic
declaration. We shall be happy if, by our partici-
pation in this and future debates, as well as by our
actions both within and outside the United Na-
tions, we can help to advance its great purposes.
As we consider the problem of "colonialism" — a
term which is given many different meanings in
our debates — it is first of all important that we
understand each other and be clear in our own
thinking. That is the first purpose of this debate :
to clear our own and other minds of the prejudices,
suspicions, and half-truths which complicate and
hinder our mutual search for progress.
I Secondly, it is important that we should ex-
amine the problem of colonialism in its entirety.
Since all of us view this and other problems in the
light of our own experience, some of us have in
the past tended to take a narrow or partial view
! of colonialism. Our efforts resembled the blind
' For background and text of resolution, see Buixetin of
Jan. 2, 1961, p. 21.
men in the fable, each of whom attempted to un-
derstand and describe an elephant by touching
a different part of the animal's anatomy.
In the United States, for example, it is often
asked why Western Powers, who have relinquished
their former rule over nearly a billion men and
women since 1945, are still criticized — even in some
of the new nations themselves — as arch imperial-
ists, while the Soviet Union, which in the same
period has subverted or absorbed so many inde-
pendent countries in Eastern Europe, or Commu-
nist China, which has for 10 years been crushing
the struggle for self-determination in Tibet, has of
late been much more gently handled by these same
critics.
Heritage of All Humanity
As for the United States, we are not newcomers
to the spirit of anticolonialism. Ours was the
first nation in modern times to emerge from colo-
nial domination into independence. The Declara-
tion of Independence, which is my country's
founding document, adopted July 4, 1776, set forth
these self-evident truths :
. . . That all men are created equal, that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights,
that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of
Happiness. That to secure these rights. Governments are
Instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from
the consent of the governed.
Our founders declared, and we still hold, that
these truths are not the heritage of any particular
race or nation but of all hiunanity. It is not my
people or your people alone who are created
equal : It is "all men." And in fact the influence
of that Declaration has reverberated around the
world and still reverberates today.
But we recall from our own experiences that
the United States did not cease to probe the full
meaning of colonialism after it was bom into
freedom as the first great anticolonial nation.
Long after independence from Great Britain was
won and long after the wounds of our Revolution
were healed by a friendship with the mother
country based on the firm foundation of coequality,
ianuary 8, 7962
69
we continued, and still continue, to probe the facts
of colonial history we had passed through. We
continued, and still continue, to remind successive
generations of Americans about the circumstances
of their birth into independence. We continued,
and still continue, to redefine and reenlarge the
meaning of self-determination in an ever- widening
arc of freedom moving from politics, to the social
structure, to the educational structure, to the
economic structure, to our rights and duties in the
family of nations.
Although in the early days of our independence
there was always the temptation to blame our
former colonial overlord for all our troubles, as
time went on we were able more and more to
resist that temptation and to look forward rather
than backward. We were forced to face up to
the trutlis about ourselves: where we stood, where
we wanted to go, and how to get there. And fac-
ing up to these truths, we learned how to work on
concrete things of benefit to our own people.
For all these reasons, based on our own experi-
ences, the United States delegation applauds the
statesmen of the newly independent nations who
forge new and mutually beneficial associations of
equality with various nations, including those that
formerly ruled them. We reserve our special
applause for the increasing number of these states-
men who shun the ways of theatrical adventurism,
who make enormously valuable practical contribu-
tions to the solution of practical problems before
the United Nations, and who here set for their
own people at home the best of all examples about
how to work in building a new nation.
Thus we in this Assembly hall have much com-
mon groimd. The sentiments of our friends in
the emerging nations on this question of colo-
nialism do not shock or offend the people of my
country. In fact we share and applaud them.
And we feel privileged to live in an age when
those sentiments of freedom are transforming the
political map and inspiring the actions of men and
women in one-third of the entire world at a rate
without precedent in human history.
The United Nations has fostered this liberating
movement since its fovmding. The charter re-
quires administering powers to treat colonial and
dependent territories not as sources of profit to
the governing power but rather as a "sacred tnist"
and a means of progress for dependent peoples.
This is made plain in ai'ticle 73 of chapter XI
of the charter, the Det'laration Regarding Non-
Self -Governing Territories. That article declares
that the administering powers have a respon-
sibility to the community of nations, that the in-
terests of the indigenous populations come first,
and that among those interests are progress toward
self-government and free institutions and the
realization of their "political aspirations" — which
in most cases has meant separate independence.
The same article also makes clear that the pace
and method of progress must take into account
the "particular circumstances of each territory
and its peoples and their varying stages of
advancement."
In the 15 years of the United Nations, article 73
has been put into effect with great speed and on a
grand scale. Some 40 countries, containing over
800 million people, have attained independence
since 1946. Nearly all are members of the United
Nations, with delegates in this hall. In Africa
alone, no less than 22 states have made this transi-
tion, until two-thirds of the whole area of Africa
is free and independent. And still others will fol-
low in the years just ahead.
Now this success has given a powerful impetus
to the drive for independence and full self-gov-
ernment in other countries which are still depend-
ent today and which feel themselves to be part of
the same great stream of liistory. It is natural and
healthy that this should be so. The very presence
in our midst of a greatly increased number of new
nations, all free to express their views as they think
right, has imparted to this question a new urgency,
an urgency which received dramatic expression in
Eesolution 1514, the historic declaration adopted
last year to which I referred at the begimiing of
my remarks.
Situation in African Colonial Territories
Against this background let me now consider
the present situation as it appeal's to my Govern-
ment, particularly with regard to the very large
colonial ten'itories remaining on the African
Continent.
There is first the issue of Portugal's African
territories, an issue with which the General As-
sembly has been concerned for some years and
which during the past year has focused on the
situation in j(\jigola. There is no doubt that the
people of Angola and other Portuguese African
territories are entitled to all tlie rights guaranteed
70
Deparlment of Sfafe Bulletin
tliem by the charter, the right of unfettered oppor-
tunity to develop their full economic, political, and
cultural potentialities. The United States posi-
tion on this issue is, I am sure, entirely clear to the
Assembly.
Last spring, in the Security Council, Ambassa-
dor Stevenson expressed the conviction of my Gov-
erimient,- which remains firm and unchanged, that
step-by-step re f onus within Portuguese territo-
ries, and indeed an acceleration of such reforms,
were imperative if the peoples under Portuguese
administration were to advance politically, eco-
nomically, and socially toward full self-determina-
tion, which is their right. But my delegation shall
have more to say on tliis in a few weeks when we
examine the situation in Angola.
There is next the problem of South- West Af-
rica, a problem which has been rendered more
complicated by historical and juridical problems.
But the fundamental issue is clear: The popula-
tion of South- West Africa must be given the op-
portunity to aspire to and achieve its own self-
determination.
In this context I think it is inescapable to men-
tion the policy of apartheid in the Republic of
South Africa, even though that problem has been
mider debate elsewhere on our agenda. We still
believe, as our forefathers did at the founding of
our nation, that governments "derive their just
powers from the consent of the governed." And
in South Africa the consent of the vast majority
coimts for little. We believe it is inadmissible that
a group which makes up no more than a fifth of
a country's population should hold all the effective
power and relegate the majority, by reason of their
race, to a perpetual subjection. Under the charter
we are all dedicated to the eradication of this in-
justice, this gross infraction of human rights.
In Africa, for the most part, the transfer of
power to Africans has been accomplished in areas
where European minorities are veiy small. In
such areas tlie United Kingdom and France have
been quick to respond to the "winds of change" and
to transfer power to African leaders.
This creative record is, I am sure, an earnest of
the sincerity of both these metropolitan powers
in tackling the much more difficult problem of
bringing about self-determination in mixed com-
munities such as Algeria or the Rhodesias. If
progress here is taking longer, it is m part for the
= /6i(/., Apr.3, 1961,p.497.
January 8, 1962
reason that the problem is infinitely more complex.
In these cases a long-dominant minority and a
majority which does not enjoy all its legitimate
rights and safeguards must find a new basis for
living together. The majority must learn to cari-y
its share of the responsibilities of power. The
privileged minority must help in that learning
process and must in return be assured of safe-
guards for minority rights. For no free society
is possible except where the majority rule and mi-
nority rights are balanced and reconciled.
The historic metamorphosis of colonies into self-
governing, multiracial, democratic societies im-
poses on all concerned a most delicate and demand-
ing task. It is a task which we hope and expect
the governments and peoples concerned will con-
tinue to pursue with all feasible speed.
I have mentioned some of the urgent and burn-
ing colonial issues in Africa. We pledge again
that the United States will apply unremittingly
its devotion, its energies, and its abilities to seek
peaceful and constructive solutions, consonant
with the ideals of the charter, of the problems
created by these issues.
U.S. Views on Colonialism issue
Let me now state a general belief which ani-
mates the United States in all phases of this issue.
We would rather see the leaders and peoples of
Africa conquer the realities of independence, with
all the exertion that this requires, with all of the
institution-building that this requires, than to be
satisfied with the hollow and sterile image of inde-
pendence without the reality.
And here we must seek a delicate balance. Tlie
declaration of the granting of independence to
colonial countries and peoples states precisely that
inadequacy of political, economical, social, or edu-
cational preparedness should never serve as a pre-
text for delaying independence. But the key word
here is "pretext," an alleged reason which con-
ceals or cloaks some other motive. But let no one
cry "obstruction" if the building in good faith
of these institutions takes time. To refuse to take
the necessary time is to practice a cruel deception
on ourselves and on all of the peoples involved.
The tragic experiences in the Congo have taught
us this lesson so vividly that I hope we will never
have to be taught it again.
Here was a country which, after only limited
preparations, had full political independence
71
granted suddenly upon request — virtually thrust
upon it — and saw that independence turn to chaos
overnight. Surely every member of the United
Nations must take to heart the implications of this
tragedy and the duty of imparting to dependent
peoples the skills and institutions which are pre-
requisites of viable freedom. The legacy of free
institutions, honest, competent, and loyal civil
servants, adequately developed trade and industry,
an effective and widespread educational system are
among the most precious resources any newly
emerged or emerging nations can have. Despite
understandable impatience, the leaders of these
nations should be prepared to insist on achieving
them to the maximimi attainable degree before em-
barking on the rough and dangerous waters of a
world in turmoil.
It is easy to shout '■'■UhuruP'' or "Freedom!" in
any language. But if a country is to be truly
free, its people and its leaders must have the in-
stitutions and the knowledge to enable them wisely
to choose year after year, through all the years
ahead — to make the great sovereign choices which
will determine their national destinies. And such
fateful choices, Mr. President, must be made not
only at the outset of a nation's independence but in
«very succeeding year and decade of its national
career. The power to make these choices is the
most precious patrimony of every nation. A na-
tion which is not free to make such choices for
itself is, to that extent, not free at all.
For a nation to have such freedom, two things
are necessary. It must have in its own hands, in-
stead of in alien hands, the right to decide. And,
no less vital, it must have among its people and
among its leaders the knowledge and experience
which alone confer the ability to decide.
There is no counsel of perfection. Every free
nation runs the risk of making the wrong choice.
But every nation also must have the knowledge and
experience which at least give it a fair chance to
choose wisely and well. Only thus can the new
nations have the strength to preserve their inde-
pendence. The importance of this concept has
been wisely and properly emphasized here by a
number of delegates, notably by the distinguished
Foreign Minister of Nigeria in introducing his far-
sighted resolution.'
• U.N. doc. A/L. 357.
72
What the U.N. Can Do
Now, Mr. President, the question remains which
most directly concerns us here in this Assembly :
"Wliat can the United Nations do now to speed
and guide the decolonizing process?
The nature of United Nations action must vary
with the types of situations presented which, as
we have seen, are radically different in different
places. The Assembly's famous Resolution 1514
last December called for "immediate steps" by the
administering powers toward ending colonial rule.
In many places this has presented little or no
problem. Tanganyika, to take but one example,
was already far along the road and will actually
achieve independence next month. On the other
hand, in the Portuguese territories in Africa the
people's right to ultimate self-determination has
not yet been recognized by the Government.
Then there are other cases, of which the Trust
Territory of New Guinea is an example, where
the administering authority — in this case Aus-
tralia— has fully accepted, both in law and in
practice, its charter responsibilities but where
tens of thousands of the people are not yet in touch
with the outside world. They still have a long
period of development ahead before they could
hope to be a viable independent nation.
We of the United States believe that the United
Nations has two quite different tasks in this whole
field. Toward the governments which, unfortu-
nately, have been slow and imwilling to accept
their responsibilities under the charter, we believe
the right course is to appoint special committees to
investigate the situation in the area, to consult
with and persuade the governing powers, to keep
the General Assembly informed, to make specific
recommendations, and to maintain on each of
these situations the clearly focused judgment of
world opinion. We are confident that this method
will yield i-esults in due time, though not as soon
as many of us would wish.
Clearly such a course would be entirely inap-
propriate for the other cases, in which the govern-
ing power has accepted its responsibilities under
the charter and is working in good faith with the
indigenous population to carry them out. Wlien,
for instance, a government which administers a
non-self-governing territory faithfully reports to
the General Assembly, through the Committee on
Information From Non-Self-Governing Terri-
Departmenf of Stafe Bulletin
tories, on the administration of this area, on social
and economic and even j^olitical developments
therein, we think it is scarcely appropriate that
this situation should be treated by the United
Nations as if it were a problem of colonial
oppression.
The United States is associated with three terri-
tories that are not fully self-governing, the Virgin
Islands, Guam, and American Samoa, with a total
indigenous population of less than 100,000.
To the extent that the word "colonialism" means
an imjust relationship continued against the wishes
of the people of the territories in question, a re-
lationship of subjugation, oppression, and exploi-
tation, the term "colonialism" has no application
whatsoever to the situation in these territories.
However, we recognize that, although these terri-
tories possess a large measure of self-government
in the sense that they have their own legislative
bodies freely elected on the basis of universal adult
suffrage, they are not fully self-governing within
the meaning of that term as it is generally used at
the United Nations. We have accordingly re-
ported under article 73 e of the charter on these
three territories as "non-self-governing terri-
tories," even though, I might add, the term is
sometimes resented by the elected leaders of the
territories, who consider that they are self-gov-
erning. It further follows that these territories,
being at least technically non-self-governing, fall
within the scope of Kesolution 1514.
In accordance with our belief in the principle of
self-determination and in accordance with Reso-
lution 1514, 1 am glad to advise this Assembly that
the United States is proceeding to consult with
the appropriate elected councils in Guam, in
American Samoa, and in the Virgin Islands as to
what steps might be taken in each territory, in
the light of its own particular conditions, to deter-
mine the wishes of its people regarding their polit-
ical future. (We are also doing the same in the
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, but that
territory is the concern of the Security Council.)
In many dependent areas, as in the U.S. terri-
tories I have mentioned, there are vital and grow-
ing relationships of consultation and partnership
between the administering authority and the indig-
enous leaders. Nothing should be done by the
United Nations to cut across, or interfere with,
these relationships, wliich offer the straightest and
shortest road to true self-determination. Indeed
the effectiveness of that process has been proved by
hundreds of millions of newly independent peoples
in the last 15 years. By the test of history it de-
serves respect and a continued chance to work
without new complications.
Yet there is certainly a most constructive part
for the United Nations to play. A General As-
sembly committee has been suggested, to concern
itself with the progress of the ending of colonial
rule among remaining dependent territories. We
believe its main fimction should be to survey the
situation and to present for the consideration of
the Assembly, and of all the members concerned,
guiding principles of action in this all-important
area. It would consider, for example, some of the
particularly difficult problems which remain, such
as the small islands, enclaves, and territories where
there are sizable minorities. Such a committee,
patterned after the Special Conmiittee of Six,
which dealt with some of the problems of defini-
tions in this field, could well be of genuine value.
Happily the cases where the governing power is
working in good faith with the local peoples to
achieve the aims of chapter XI of the charter are
the great majority of cases of colonial rule today.
At its best, colonial rule is and must be self-liqui-
dating. That is what it has been in the historic
15 years just past, and many delegations present
in this great hall are the living proof of that fact.
Domination Practiced by Moscow and Peiping
Mr. President, I wish it were possible for me to
leave this subject on this happy note. But I feel
it my duty to say something about another kind
of subjugation of foreign peoples which afflicts
humanity in this period of history.
The Soviet Union is never shy about demanding
immediate independence of all colonial territories
from Western control. In fact, it goes further and
demands, in effect, that all contacts between the
emerging nations and the West should be severed,
leaving the new nations cut off from all the
technical and economic support which the Western
industrial nations can and do offer them. This
interesting device would leave the new nations in
the weakest possible position to resist whatever
designs the Soviet Union may have in mind for
them.
Meanwhile a great many people, not only in my
country but in many parts of the world, under-
standably ask : 'What about the 200 million alien
people whom the Soviet Union has subjugated
January 8, 1962
73
since 1945? Haven't they also the right, in the
words of the historic colonial declaration (Resolu-
tion 1514), to "freely determine their political
status" and to "enjoy complete independence and
freedom" ? Is this subjugation not also a virulent
form of colonialism or, if you prefer, "imperial-
ism"?
These people want to know why the United
Nations concentrates on forms of Western colo-
nial rule which are fast coming to an end and
gives little or no attention to those much more
stubborn and subtle forms of domination practiced
by the Soviet Union, especially in Eastern Europe,
and by Commimist China in Tibet and elsewhere.
Are not the same principles of self-determination
involved in all these cases? Why not be most
forceful and insistent with those who persist most
stubbornly in injustice ?
We sympathize very deeply with those who ask
this question. The feelings of the United States,
and of the majority of members, on the tragic
problems of Hungary and of Tibet are well known
in the General Assembly and will be made clear
again when those two items are shortly reached on
our agenda. The time will surely come when
justice can be done in peace to those and other
peoples who are held today, against their will,
under the alien rule of Moscow or Peiping.
Their day will come, and the U.N. will have its
part to play in the fullness of time. History has
its own patterns and its own logic.
In this connection it was remarkable to note
the extreme statements which the very able dele-
gate from the Soviet Union felt constrained to
utter in reply to some of the observations on Soviet
colonialism which the distinguished representative
of the United Kingdom made in his recent forth-
right statement in this debate. I could only as-
sume Mr. [J. B.] Godber must have touched on a
raw nerve end. Mr. [S. G.] Lapin's reply, though
short, contained such remarkable assertions as
the following: "The Soviet Union is composed of
free republics which are united by friendship and
the solidarity of interests of its people."
I wonder, just to cite one example among many,
if tlie 900,000—1 repeat, 900,000— Moslem Kasakhs
who mysteriously disappeared from their national
republic between 1920 and 1939 would agree with
Mr. Lapin. Or would the 400,000 Volga Germans,
the 259,000 Crimean Tatars, the 130,000 Kal-
myks— all deported to the East — would they agree
with Mr. Lapin ?
Mr. Lapin also stated, "As for military bases, ,
you know vei-y well indeed that the Soviet Union i
does not have military bases on foreign territory."
Just to take one example, it is a fact that there '
are currently in Hungary in the neighborhood of
50,000 Soviet troops. Now Mr. Lapin's statement
which I quoted to you can lead us to one of two
conclusions. Either the 50,000 Soviet troops are
living and operating from hotels, guest houses,
and country inns, or the Soviet Union does not
consider Hungary a foreign territory. Let each
draw his own conclusions.
In a document * circulated previously in connec-
tion with this item, the Soviet Union chose to di-
rect its main fire against my country, whose de-
pendent territories, including its trust territory,
have a population of less than 200,000 people, and
which is working hard to live up to the charter in
all these matters. I do not wish to impose on the
delegates by answering these absurd charges here.
We shall, nevertheless, shortly circulate a docu-
ment which will set forth some of our views on the
Soviet memorandum."
Dispute Over West New Guinea
I should like to turn now to another matter.
The dispute over the territory of West New Guinea
provides this Assembly with a great challenge and
an imusual opportunity. I shall not attempt to
review the tangled history of this dispute nor pre-
sume to pronounce judgment on the conflicting
claims of the Governments of Indonesia and the
Netherlands. However, hopefully the barren con-
frontation of claims and counterclaims is nearing '
its end. Provided the Assembly acts with judi-
cious realism, this territory may soon cease to be a
focus of international disputation. Indeed, it may
well serve as a model for responsible decoloniza-
tion.
My Government regards as imaginative and con-
structive the initiative which the Government of
the Netherlands has taken in proposing its relin-
quislmient of control over West New Guinea, with
a United Nations administration for an interim
period. The basic condition set by the Govern-
ment of the Netherlands is that the inhabitants of
' U.N. (l(>i\ A/48S9.
° For text of U.S. comments on the Soviet memorandum,
see U.S. delegation press release 3S62 dated Nov. 28 or
U.N. doc. A/4985.
74
Department of State Bulletin
the territory be afforded the right to exercise
freedom of choice witli regard to the ultimate dis-
position of the area. The position of the United
States on the principle of self-determination is
well known, and we perceive no valid reason wliy
an appropriate expression of the will of the people
should be denied the inliabitants of West New
Guinea.
On tlie other hand, while we welcome the gen-
eral nature of the Netherlands proposal, in our
opinion the Netherlands draft resolution ^ repre-
sents completely the point of view of its sponsor
and does not suiBciently recognize the intense In-
donesian interest in the territoiy. We believe that
there is no purpose to be gained by attempting to
ignore, as does the Netherlands draft, the claim of
Indonesia to sovereignty over the territory the
latter calls Irian Barat. The Assembly should,
in our view, not be asked to accept either the Dutch
claim to sovereignty or the Indonesian claim.
Wliatever it does should be without prejudice to
either side. In the light of the dispute that exists
the proper course, in accordance with the United
Nations Charter, would seem to be to assure the
people of the area an opportunity at the proper
time to express their own choice as to their politi-
cal future, under the aegis of the United Nations.
In order to assure this result, we believe that
any resolution adopted by the Assembly should
make perfectly clear that the administration of
the area would be turned over by the Dutch to the
U.N. by a certain date. The conditions for the
transfer would be laid down by the 17th General
Assembly, after receiving the recommendations of
a small commission comprised of disinterested
member states.
We believe that such a U.N. administration,
leading to the expression of choice by the people
of the area, should provide to Indonesia every
reasonable opportimity to pursue its objective of
achieving the integration of West New Guinea
with Indonesia. During the interim period,
Dutch control would have been ended and an im-
partial U.N. administration would be in complete
control. We would assume that under such an
administration Indonesia would have access to
the area.
We do not believe that the proposal of the
delegation of India ' offers a definitive solution to
' U.N. doc. A/L. 354.
' U.N. doc. A/L. 367.
the problem we confront. INIuch as we would like
to see a reconciliation of the views of the Nether-
lands and Indonesia on this matter and much as
we would welcome friendly discussions between
the disputants, we would point out that similar
proposals for simple bilateral negotiations have
been presented here before and rejected. We be-
lieve any resolution on this matter must take into
account the new developments which are repre-
sented by the expressed willingness of the Nether-
lands to relinquish its control over the territoi-y to
the United Nations.
Moreover, m our view, adoption of a simple
appeal to the parties to negotiate would amount to
rejecting, or at least ignoring, the idea that the
people of the area should be given the right of
self-determination. Indeed we note with sorrow
that the draft resolution offered by the Indian
delegation makes no mention of the people of West
New Guinea and it seems to accept the notion that
their political future can, and indeed should, be
settled by others without taking their views into
account.
The right of self-detennination is a basic right
imder the charter and under Kesolution 1514. The
distinguished representative of India, Mr. Krishna
Menon, in effect stated here the other day that he
could not accept the idea of a U.N. commission
since this would be tacit acceptance that the
sovereignty of the area was open to dispute. But
that is precisely the case: Indonesia claims sov-
ereignty, and its claim is supported by a number
of delegations, including India. But the Nether-
lands also claims sovereignty, and its claim is like-
wise supported by a number of delegations. Thus,
this would seem to be a case in which the principle
of self-determination is entirely appropriate and
indeed offers the only practical and just way out
of an impasse which has now continued for more
than a decade.
One final point : We have every reason to hope
and believe that the Indonesian Government can
and will accept the idea of self-determination for
West New Guinea, provided that the administra-
tion of the process is impartial and provided that
Indonesia would have every appropriate access
to the area. We believe that it would clearly be
in Indonesia's interest to accept the prospective
Dutch withdrawal from West New Guinea and
then to pursue Indonesia's objectives through
peaceful means.
January 8, 1962
75
This is a complex matter which will take time,
patience, and concerted effort by all concerned.
Mr. President, wo in the General Assembly are
privileged to play a part in one of the most creative
historic evolutions of human history: the emer-
gence of new nations from colonial status into full
equality in the world community. That evolution
is far advanced. It is for us to help it, encourage
it, and guide it into peaceful channels. Where the
responsible parties falter or fail in their duties,
we have a duty to press for action. Where
problems are being solved in good faith, we must
respect the work that is being done. And where
all our appeals are met with stubbornness and
defiance, let us stand and work for the right xmtil
the right can prevail in peace.
TEXT OF RESOLUTIONS
The General Assembly,
Recalling the Declaration on the granting of inde-
pendence to colonial countries and peoples contained In
its resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960,
Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of that
Declaration,
Recalling in particular paragraph 5 of the Declaration
providing that :
"Immediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and Non-Self-
Governing Territories or all other territories which have
not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to
the peoples of those territories, without any conditions or
reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed
will and desire, without any distinction as to race, creed
or colour, in order to enable them to enjoy complete in-
dependence and freedom",
Noting with regret that, with a few exceptions, the pro-
visions contained in the aforementioned paragraph of the
Declaration have not been carried out,
Noting that, contrary to the provisions of paragraph 4
of the Declaration, armed actiini and repressive measures
continue to be taken in certain areas with increasing
rulhlessnoss against dependent peoples, depriving them of
their prerogative to exercise peacefully and freely their
right to complete Independence,
Deeplp concerned that, contrary to the provisions of
paragraph 0 of the Declaration, acts aimed at the partial
or total disruption of national unity and territorial in-
tegrity are still being carried out in certain countries in
the process of decolonization.
Convinced that further delay in the application of the
Declaration is a continuing source of international con-
flict and disharmony, seriously impedes international co-
'U.N. doe. A/KES/1654(XVI), adopted in plenary ses-
sion on Nov. 27 by a vote of 97-0-4.
operation, and is creating an increasingly dangerous situ-
ation in many parts of the world which may threaten!
international peace and security.
Emphasizing that inadequacy of political, economic,
social or educational preparedness should never serve as
a pretext for delaying independence,
1. Solemnly reiterates and reafflrms the objectives and
principles enshrined in the Declaration on the granting
of independence to colonial countries and peoples con-
tained in its resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960;
2. Calls upon States concerned to take action without
further delay with a view to the faithful application and
implementation of the Declaration ;
3. Decides to establish a Special Committee of seven-
teen members to be nominated by the President of the
General Assembly at the present session ;
4. Requests the Special Committee to examine the ap-
plication of the Declaration, to make suggestion.s and
recommendations on the progress and extent of the imple-
mentation of the Declaration, and to report to the Gen-
eral Assembly at its seventeenth session ;
5. Directs the Special Committee to carry out it.s task
by employment of all means which it will have at its dis-
posal within the framework of the procedures and modali-
ties which it shall adopt for the proper discharge of its
functions ;
6. Authorizes the Special Committee to meet elsewhere
than at United Nations Headquarters, whenever and
wherever such meetings may be required for the effective
discharge of its functions, in consultation with the ap-
propriate authorities ;
7. Invites the authorities concerned to afford the Spe-
cial Committee their fullest co-operation in carrying out
its tasks ;
8. Requests the Trusteeship Council, the Committee on
Information from Non-Self-Goveming Territories and the
specialized agencies concerned to assist the Special Com-
mittee in its work within their respective fields ;
9. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the Spe-
cial Committee with all the facilities and the personnel
necessary for the implementation of the present resolution.
SEATO Research Fellowships, 1962-63
Press release 897 dated December 20
For the sixth consecutive year the Southeast
Asia Treaty Organization is offering a number of
postdoctoral research fellowships to established
scholars of the member states.
The object of the SEATO fellowship program
is to encourage study and research of such social,
economic, political, cultural, scientific, and educa-
tional problems as give insight into the present
needs and future development of the southejist
Asia and southwest Pacific areas.
Grants are normally for a period of 4 to 10
months and include a monthlv allowance of $400
76
Department of State Bulletin
and air travel to and from the countries of re-
search. Candidates are selected on the basis of
special aptitude and experience for carrying out
a major research project. Academic qualifica-
tions, professional experience beyond graduate
llevel, and published material are taken into
account.
The competition for the awards for the 1962-63
jacademic year is now open. American citizens
may apply to the Committee on International Ex-
cliange of Persons, Conference Board of Associ-
ated Research Councils, 2101 Constitution Avenue,
Washington 25, D.C. American candidates for
the awards arc selected by the Department of
State, with SEATO selecting the final award win-
ners. Awards will be announced in August 1962.
Tlie member states of SEATO are Australia,
France, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines,
Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United
States.
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
at Geneva September G, 1952. Entered Into force Au-
gust 19, 19.'54. TIAS 3324.
Accession deposited: Paraguay, December 11, 1961.
Finance
Articles of agreement of the International Monetary B^und.
Opened for signature at Washington December 27, 194,').
Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1501.
tiiynatitre and acceptance: Cyprus, December 21, 1961.
Articles of agreement of the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development. Opened for sig-
nature at Washington Decemlter 27, 1945. Entered into
force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1502.
Si(/n<iturc and acceptance: Cyprus, December 21, 19C1.
Law of the Sea
Convention on the high seas ;'
Convention on the continental shelf ;'
Done at Geneva April 29, 1958.
liatificaiion deposited: Guatemala, November 27, 1961.
Oil Pollution
International convention for the prevention of pollution of
the sea by oil, with annexes. Done at London May 12,
I'XA. Entered into force for the United States Decem-
ber 8, 1961.
Proclaimed by President of the United States: Decem-
ber 8, 1961.
Postal
Universal postal convention with final protocol, annex,
regulations of execution, and provisions regarding air-
mail vrith final protocol. Done at Ottawa October 3,
1957. Entered into force April 1, 1959. TIAS 4202.
Adherences deposited: Cyprus, November 23, 1961;
Malagasy Republic, November 2, 1961.
Telecommunications
International telecommunication convention with six
annexes. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered
into force January 1, 1961 ; for the United States Octo-
ber 23, 1961.
Accessions deposited: Congo (Wopoldville), Decem-
ber 6, 1961 ; Guinea, December 8, 1961.
MULTILATERAL
BILATERAL
Automotive Traffic
Convention on road traflSc, with annexes. Done at Geneva
September 19, 1949. Entered into force March 26, 1952.
TIAS 24S7.
Application to: Trust Territory of Western Samoa (with
a declaration), December 29, 1961.
Copyright
Universal copyright convention. Done at Geneva Sep-
tember 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 1955.
TIAS 3324.
Accession deposited: Paraguay, December 11, 1961.
Protocol 1 to the universal copyright convention concern-
ing the application of that convention to the works of
stateless persons and refugees. Done at Geneva Sep-
tember 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 1955.
TIAS 3324.
Accession deposited: Paraguay, December 11, 1961.
Protocol 2 to the universal copyright convention concern-
ing the application of that convention to the works of
certain international organizations. Done at Geneva
September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16,
1955. TIAS 3324.
Accession deposited: Paraguay, December 11, 1961.
Protocol 3 to the universal copyright convention concern-
ing the effective date of instruments of ratification or
acceptance of or accession to that convention. Done
Belgium
Agreement amending annex B of the mutual defense
a.s.si.stance agreement of January 27, 1950 (TIAS 2010).
Pvlfected by exchange of notes at Brussels November 29
and December 11, 1961. Entered into force Decem-
l)er 11, 1961.
Chile
Agreement again reactivating the temporary satellite-
tracking facility in Magallanes Province, Chile.
Effected by exchange of notes at Santiago October 25
and November 18, 1961. Entered into force Novem-
ber 18, 1961.
Colombia
Agreement for relief from douljle taxation on earnings
from operations of ships and aircraft. Effected by ex-
change of notes at Washington August 1, 1961.
Entered into force: December 11, 1961.
France
Memorandum of understanding relating to military pro-
curement, with an exchange of letters. Signed at
Washington December 20, 1961. Entered into force
December 20, 1961.
' Not in force.
ianuary 8, J 962
77
Israel
Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agree-
ments of November 6, 1958, as supplemented and
amended (TIAS 4126, 4188, and 4818), and January 7,
1960, as supplemented and amended (TIAS 4401, 4513,
and 4875). Effected by exchange of notes at Wash-
ington December 5 and 8, 1961. Entered into force De-
cember 8, 1961.
Ivory Coast
Agreement relating to investment guaranties. Effected
by exchange of notes at Abidjan December 1, 1961.
Entered into force December 1, 1961.
Mexico
Agreement relating to a program of industrial productivity
in Mexico. Effected by exchange of notes at Mexico
City February 21 and November 15, 1961. Entered into
force November 15, 1961.
Turkey
Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agree-
ment of July 29, 1961, as amended (TIAS 4819 and
4874). Effected by exchange of notes at Ankara De-
cember 8, 1961. Entered into force December 8, 1961.
Freedom From War— The United States Program for I
General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World. I
Pub. 7277. Disarmament Series 5. 19 pp. 15^.
A summary of the principal provisions and full text of the
U.S. program on disarmament.
International Tracing Service — Continuing Administra-
tion by the International Committee of the Red Cross.
TIAS 4736. 33 pp. 15^.
Agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany. Ex-
change of notes — Signed at Bonn and Bonn/Bad Godes-
berg April 28 and May 5, 1960. Entered into force May
5, 19C0. Agreement with the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, and the International Committee of
the Red Cross. Exchange of notes between the Federal
Republic of Germany and the International Committee
of the Red Cross — Signed at Bonn and Geneva May 9 and
12, 1960. Entered Into force May 12, 1960. Protocol
with Other Governments renewing and amending the |
agreement of June 6, 1955 — Signed at Bonn August 23, !
1960. Entered Into force May 5, 1960. Protocol between
the International Commission for the International
Tracing Service and the International Committee of the
Red Cross, renewing and amending the agreement of
June 6, 1955 — Signed at Bonn and Geneva September 30
and October 7, 1960. Entered into force May 5, 1960.
Ultra-violet Survey of Southern Skies. TIAS 4749. 3
pp. 5!f.
Agreement with Australia. Exchange of notes — Dated at
Canberra May 22, 1961. Entered into force May 22, 1961.
Recess Appointments
The President on December 19 appointed WiUiam E.
Stevenson to be Ambassador to the Philippines. (For
biographic details, see Department of State press release
896 dated December 20.)
Appointments
Edwin R. Bayley as Director of Public Affairs, Agency
for International Development, effective December 15.
(For biographic details, see Department of State press
release 883 dated December 15.)
PUBLICATIONS
Recent Releases
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Qov-
emment Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Address
requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, ex-
cept in the case of free puhlieations, lohich may be ob-
tained from the Department of State.
Berlin— 1961. Pub. 7257. Euroi)ean and British Com-
monwealth Series 64. 48 pp. 30(i(.
An illustrated background pamphlet presenting some of
the basic facts underlying the i)resent Berlin situation
Including the threats to its freedom, the obligations of
the Western Allies, and the related documents.
78
Ciiecl< List of Department of State
Press Releases: December 18-24
Press releases may be obtained from the OflSce of
News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.
Releases appearing in this issue of the Bulletin
which were issued prior to December 18 are Nos. 828
of December 1 and 842 of December 5.
No. Date Subject
*889 12/18 U.S. participation in international
conferences.
*890 12/18 Hutchinson sworn in as AID assistant
administrator for African and
European Affairs (biographic de-
tails).
♦891 12/18 Thurston sworn in as Ambassador to
Haiti (biographic details).
892 12/18 NATO communique.
893 12/19 Ball: "The Elements in Our Congo
Policy" (revised text).
894 12/19 Report on Geneva nuclear test talks.
895 12/19 U.S.-Japan Committee on Seientiflc
Cooperation : joint communique.
*896 12/20 Stevenson sworn in as Ambassador to
Philippines (biographic details) .
897 12/20 SEATO research fellowships.
*89S 12/21 Cultural exchange (Afghanistan,
India, Nepal).
*S99 12/21 Crawford sworn in as Minister to
Rinn.TUia (biographic details).
t900 12/21 Salinity of water delivered to Mexico.
901 12/21 Tasca visit to Mrica (rewrite).
902 12/22 Attorney General Kennedy visits
Japan.
•903 12/22 Lingle appointed AID consultant.
* Not printed.
t Held for a later is.sue of the Buu-etin.
Department of State Bulletin
ranuary 8, 1962
Index
Vol. XLVI, No. 1176
Africa
Africa's Challenge to American Enterprise
(Williams) 60
deputy Assistant Secretary Tasca Visits Africa . 52
Jeneral Assembly Sets Up Commission To Imple-
ment Colonialism Declaration (Bingham, text of
resolution) 69
Agriculture. U.S. and Argentine Scientists Study
Control of Foot-and-Mouth Disease 67
Argentina. U.S. and Argentine Scientists Study
Control of Foot-and-Mouth Disease 67
Asia. The Emerging Nations of Asia (Jolinson) . 53
Atomic Energy. U.S. and U.K. Accuse Soviet
Union of Hampering Geneva Test Ban Talks
(text of report) 63
3hina, Communist. The Emerging Nations of Asia
(Johnson) 53
Communism. The Emerging Nations of Asia
(Johnson) 53
3ongo (Leopoldville)
Dhe Elements in Our Congo Policy (Ball) ... 43
J.S. Welcomes News of Agreement on Reintegra-
tion of Katanga 49
Congress, The. Congressional Documents Relating
to Foreign Policy 68
Department and Foreign Service
Appointments (Bayley) 78
lecess Appointments (Stevenson) 78
Economic Affairs. Africa's Challenge to American
Enterprise (Williams) 60
Educational and Cultural Affairs. SEATO Re-
search Fellowships, 1962-63 76
Foreign Aid. Bayley appointed Director of Public
Affairs, AID 78
[ndia. The Emerging Nations of Asia (Johnson) . 53
Japan
(Attorney General and Mrs. Kennedy To Visit Japan
in February 50
rhe Emerging Nations of Asia (Johnson) ... 53
D.S.-Japau Committee on Scientific Cooperation
Concludes First Meeting (text of joint communi-
que) 66
Non-Self-Governing Territories. General Assem-
bly Sets Up Commission To Implement Colonial-
ism Declaration (Bingham, text of resolution) . 69
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO Min-
isters Examine Problems Confronting the Alli-
ance (text of communique) 51
Philippines. Stevenson appointed Ambassador . . 78
Presidential Documents. Human Rights Week,
1961 68
Public Affairs. Bayley appointed Director of Pub-
lic Affairs, AID 78
Publications. Recent Releases 78
Science
U.S.-Japan Committee on Scientific Cooperation
Concludes First Meeting (text of joint communi-
que) 66
U.S. and Argentine Scientists Study Control of
Foot-and-Mouth Disease 67
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. SEATO Re-
search FeUowships, 1962-63 76
Treaty Information. Current Actions 77
U.S.S.R.
General Assembly Sets Up Commission To Imple-
ment Colonialism Declaration (Bingham, text of
resolution) 69
U.S. and U.K. Accuse Soviet Union of Hampering
Geneva Test Ban Talks (text of report) ... 63
United Kingdom. U.S. and U.K. Accuse Soviet
Union of Hampering Geneva Test Ban Talks
(text of report) 63
United Nations
The Elements in Our Congo Policy (Ball) ... 43
General Assembly Sets Up Commission To Imple-
ment Colonialism Declaration (Bingham, text of
resolution) 69
U.S. Welcomes News of Agreement on Reintegra-
tion of Katanga 49
Name Index
Ball, George W 43
Bayley, Edwin R "^8
Bingham, Jonathan B 69
Johnson, U. Alexis ^^
Kennedy, President
68
Stevenson, William E '^8
Williams, G. Mennen 60
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: I95Z
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OFFICIAL BUSINESS
A Threat to the Peace
North Viet-Nam's Effort
To Conquer South Viet-Nam
Department
of
State
A detailed, two-part report of Viet Cong (Vietnamese Communist)
activities in South Viet-Nam and of the elaborate organization in
North Viet-Nam that supports these activities.
Part I, a 53-page booklet, describes the operations of the Com-
mimist Hanoi government and the Lao Dong (Communist) Party of
North Viet-Nam to provide support and encouragement to the illegal
movement to destroy the Eepublic of Viet-Nam.
Part II, the appendices, a 102-page booklet, contains reproductions
of various captured Communist documents, confessions of Viet Cong
personnel taken prisoner, excerpts from articles and speeches of North
Viet-Nam Communist Party and government officials, and other ma-
terials, which clearly demonstrate that the so-called "liberation" move-
ment in South Viet-Nam is directed and supported by North Viet-Nam.
Publication 7308
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Part 11-55 cents
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Street Address:
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ICIAL
EKLY RECORD
January 15, 1962
SOME ISSUES OF CONTEMPORARY HISTORY •
Address by Secretary Rusk 83
PRESIDENT AND MRS. KENNEDY VISIT
VENEZUELA AND COLOMBIA • Address and
Remarks by President Kennedy and Text of U.S.— Venezuela
Communique 89
PEOPLE ON THE MOVE • by Richard R. Brown ... 100
THE UNITED NATIONS BOND ISSUE • Statement
by Assistant Secretary Cleveland 96
UNITED NATIONS RULES OUT CHANGE IN
REPRESENTATION OF CHINA • Statements by
Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson and Texts of Resolutions . 108
ITED STATES
ItEIGN POLICY
For index see inside back cover
THE DEPARXrVlENT OF STATE
Vol. XLVI, No. 1177 • Pubucation 7328
January 15, 1962
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Some Issues of Contemporary History
Address hy Secretary Rusk '
I accepted your invitation to speak on this oc-
casion with genuine satisfaction but with an ap-
preciation of the exacting demands unposed by
the nature of my audience. Indeed, I find myself
with an assignment wliich you yourselves have set,
more particulai'ly in the excellent presidential ad-
dress delivered by Professor Bemis [Samuel
Flagg Bemis, president of the American Histori-
cal Association] last evening — an address notable
both for its lucid review of the course we have
traveled and for the sharpness and relevance of
tlie questions it posed for us today.
Tlie community of historians and a Secretary of
State are linked by a common task — that of find-
ing and articulating the scarlet threads of mean-
ing and direction in the flow of tumultuous events.
Their approach may differ both in time and in
purpose because of their differing responsibilities.
Wliat to the historian becomes a swirling blizzard
of papers is for a Secretaiy of State an unrelent-
ing parade of precise day-to-day business. The
historian has a slight advantage in that he knows
a bit more about how the story came out ; a Sec-
retary has the stimulation which comes from a
commitment, as the President's adviser, to try to
shape the story toward a tolerable conclusion.
Both historian and Secretary must wrestle with
the problem of complexity, each in his own way.
At no point in our history has this been more
exigent than now, and it would be naive to hope
that we are moving toward simplicity. It was
not until 1823 that John Quincy Adams estab-
lished our tenth diplomatic mission abroad, not
mitil a century later that Charles Evans Hughes
established our fiftieth, and only 40 years later
' Jlade before the American Historical Association at
Washington, D.O., on Dec. 30 (press release 917 dated
Dec. 29).
that Christian Herter established our hundredth.
Before World War II less than 10 capitals dis-
posed of the foreign relations of the vast continent
of Africa ; today the nvunber is over 30. With 104
membere in the United Nations and approximate-
ly 100 items on the agenda of the recent General
Assembly, some 10,000 primary votes were cast in
which the United States had a larger or lesser in-
terest. Our missions in a number of capitals ex-
change some 10,000 telegrams with the Depart-
ment in the course of a year. How grateful we
become to those capitals which are never respon-
sible for a telephone call past midnight! When
Thomas Jefferson or John Marshall bade God-
speed to an American ambassador departing for
his post, they knew that it might be months before
they would hear from him again. How tempting
it now is to say to liis modem colleague, "If I
don't hear from you for the first year, you would
please me very much."
There is a widespread illusion that modern com-
munications have degraded the role of the am-
bassador— that cable, telephone, and radio have
made him merely the messenger boy of impulses
from his capital. The trouble with this notion is
that it overlooks the breathtaking acceleration of
the flow of events, brought about largely by these
same communications and the latest modes of
travel and transport. The man on the spot is more
just exactly that than ever before, and every week
brings instances of the critical responsibility of
the ambassador abroad.
This question of pace is perhaps more difficult
for a Secretary than for tlie historian, who can
make certain choices. For a Secretary lives with
the spurs of time upon him. His is not the luxury
of a leisurely conclusion but the pressures of in-
escapable decisions, for he knows that both action
January 15, 7962
83
and inaction are decisions where the United States
is concerned. He is conscious of the decisions
made, but he is haunted by the limitless possibili-
ties of the decisions which are taken by not being
made — the decisions which tantalize and often
escape the view of the historian.
It occurred to me that it would be appropriate
for me to comment on the larger issues of contem-
porary history posed at the close of Professor
Bemis's address and to relate these to my daily
tasks.
Clarity of Purpose a Basis of Peace
First is this searching question : Does our com-
fortable democracy have the nerve and will to
protect its essential interests and the frontiers of
freedom in the face of potential enemies who com-
mand nuclear weapons and the capacity to deliver
them against our homeland ?
This is not a rhetorical issue, and we must clear-
ly imderstand its grim reality. There are sev-
eral paths to nuclear war. It could happen if
one side or the other deliberately sets out to pro-
voke one. I am inclined to believe that the ir-
rationality of such a course makes it relatively
unlikely. Another would be a situation in which
two sides confront each other, each utterly con-
vinced that under no circumstances would the
other resort to nuclear war, each therefore tempted
to press its demands across the threshold of dis-
aster. A third path lies in simple confusion about
essential interests, misapprehensions about the tol-
erable limits of conduct.
We confront a direct challenge, in Berlin, to the
vital interests of the United States and the West.
The challenge takes tlie form of the assertion that
our presence there, on the basis of well-established
rishts, and access to Berlin from the West, can be
radically altered or extinguished by the unilateral
act of the other side and that this act would require
us to petition the authorities in East Germany
for the privilege of maintaining the freedom of
West Berlin.
Before the President spoke to the American
people on July 25th,^ he and other Western lead-
ers decided that vital interests and commitments in
West Berlin, crucial to our own security, must be
defended at whatever cost. That decision re-
mains the basis on which we intend to explore
the possibilities of a peaceful resolution of the
' Bulletin of Aug. 14, 1961, p. 267.
Berlin crisis. If peace depends on clarity, the
other side must not be allowed any dangerous
illusion.
This clarity is the basis of an assurance to our
own and other peoples that the possibilities of pa-
tient diplomacy will be exhausted to insure that
vital interests are protected and that the other side >
will not be permitted to make a fatal mistake. We
regard it as essential that our negotiators — wher-
ever they may sit — work with measured con-
fidence, knowing that behind them there exist
well-balanced, flexible, and highly mobile military
strength and a government and people prepared to
use that strength if vital interests are threatened.
Since George Wasliington first enjoined the
American people to recognize a connection be-
tween the maintenance of adequate military
strength and the maintenance of the peace, our
history has underlined that the danger of war
is greatest when potential enemies are in doubt
about the capacity of nations to defend their vital
interests, about their will to defend them, or about
how they define those vital interests. All three of
those conditions for a peaceful resolution of dif-
ferences are heightened in a world where the use
of nuclear weapons may quickly come into play
once conflict begins at any level.
I believe the American people, and other free
peoples with whom we are allied, have long mem-
ories and understand that unlimited appetite
grows in the act of devouring and, as President
Kennedy has put it, ". . . if there is one path
above all others to war, it is the path of weakness
and disimity." I believe free peoples understood
him when he said,
We do not want to fight, but we have fought before.
And others in earlier times have made the same dan-
gerous mistake of assuming that the West was too selfish
and too soft and too divided to resist invasions of freedom
in other lands.
The answer to Professor Bemis's first question is
and must be "Yes," because the other answer would
make war inevitable.
Dealing With Techniques of Communist Power
A second question with which Professor Bemis
confronts us is this: Do the ITnitcd States, its
allies, and other non-Communist nations have the
capacity to deal with the techniques of Communist
power now being applied to Asia, the Middle East,
xVfrica, and Latin America ?
84
Department of State Bulletin
In the 2 years preceding this administration's
assumption of responsibility four significant lioles
had been punched in the truce lines which had
emerged after the Second "World War: Pathet
Lao forces in Laos had moved out of the two
nortliem provinces which had been identified by
the Geneva Agi-eement of 1954 ; the authorities in
Hanoi, building on foundations which they had
maintained in the south since 1954, systematically
expanded the guerrilla forces in South Viet-Nam
from something like 2,000 in 1959 to more than
16,000 at present, in a purposeful and organized
act of international aggression; in the Congo,
amidst the confusion which followed the end of
colonialism, the Communists were rigorously seek-
ing to establish a central African base ; in Cuba a
Communist regime was installed, having seized
and successfully subverted what appeared to be
a broad-based national movement to escape an
intolerable dictatorship. These limited break-
throughs carried with them serious threats to the
security of southeast Asia, to Afi-ica, and to
Latin America.
It has been a first charge on our energies to find
ways to deal with these problems. I shall not de-
tail here the policies we have adopted in each case,
for they are imdoubtedly familiar to you. In
different ways, however, they all pose for us the
test of learning to deal with what is called, in the
inverted language of communism, "wars of na-
tional liberation." Beliind this concept is the no-
tion that the safest way to extend Communist
power and influence in the contemporary world is
to exploit the inevitable turbulence which accom-
panies the revolutionary movement toward mod-
ernization, by building a jwlitical base rooted in
local fnistrations, painful memories, and imful-
filled aspirations, and by mounting, on that base,
insurrectional activity aided from outside the
country. The objective is, of course, not national
liberation but entrapment within the Commimist
bloc. TMs method, from the Commimist point of
view, is designed to bypass American nuclear
strength, to bypass the conventional strength that
we have helped build with our allies, and to tear
down institutions not under their own control.
Over the past year we have given increased at-
tention to this form of mixed political and mili-
tary aggression, and in South Viet-Nam we — and
the whole world commmiity — are up against a for-
midable problem : mounting from outside an in-
dependent nation of a guerrilla war with men
trained, infiltered, supplied, and directed from
day to day across international bomidaries. The
free world must recognize this familiar form of
aggression and act accordingly.
I cannot report to you that we have fully solved
these problems which were waiting for us in Jan-
uai-y of this year. I do believe that we have made
some headway, but they remain on the list of im-
finished business. We can draw confidence from
the long list of failures in other and somewhat
similar Communist efforts to expand their empire.
And we can be encouraged to note that the large
numbers of new nations which have become inde-
pendent since World War II have shown a stub-
born resistance to the imposition of Communist
rule.
But the points of crisis which dominate the
headlines do not reflect adequately all that is going
forward in the underdeveloped areas in the south-
ern half of the world.
Our objective in these regions of revolution is
simple. We wish to see emerge out of the powerful
ferment of modernization a community of inde-
pendent nations. We wish them to modernize, not
in our image but in the image they themselves
formulate out of their own imique liistories, cul-
tures, and aspirations. We are confident that if,
in tlais crucial transitional process, they maintain
their independence, they will fashion societies
which, in one way or another, will move in the
direction of consent.
Democracy is not an absolute; and the condi-
tions for democracy are complex. It requires not
merely a literate population but a sense of national
direction and of consensus, a linkage of urban and
rural peoples, the existence of rules and institu-
tions of law, a civil service and armed forces dedi-
cated to nationhood and not to faction. And in
the end political freedom requires a citizenry
which assumes substantial individual responsi-
bility for the fate of the community.
All this takes time. Our first objective, there-
fore, is to help preserve the independence of the
modernization process, meanwhile working to help
build the conditions which will make consent in-
creasingly a reality and to encourage those who
would remain steadfast to their own version of the
democratic objective.
How should we assess our chances? Wliat are
the possibilities of seeing emerge in the southern
January 15, J 962
85
half of the world an environment of independent
and increasingly democratic states which would
permit our own society to maintain and develop
its humane and open character?
The task ahead is long, but I am basically opti-
mistic. The impulse of these peoples and govern-
ments to remain independent is strong. I sense
that there is a new generation emerging, dedicated
to modernizing their societies with vigor and imag-
ination. I sense that the word is spreading that
the pragmatic and apparently diffuse methods of
free men are more effective than the iUusory ef-
ficiency of totalitarianism.
The issue is not yet fuUy decided. There are
certain to be frustrations and setbacks; but I
would doubt that the Communist leadership, as-
sessing recent developments and trends, believes
with confidence that commimism is the wave of
the future in the underdeveloped areas of the free
world. It is our assessment that the wave of the
future will lie with those who struggle for their
independence, face their problems pragmatically,
and maintain loyalty to the longrun goal of politi-
cal and social democracy.
It is in this sober but confident spirit that we
are going forward with the Alliance for Progress,
with our programs of long-term economic develop-
ment elsewhere, and with other measures of au-
thentic partnership with the new nations who are
entering the world commimity.
Complexities of Alliance Policy
Professor Bemis, in his concluding pages, puts
to us a third question, which I might rephrase as
follows : Can a free- world system, based on a loose
alliance of sovereign nations, stand up against the
outward thrust of a highly centralized Communist
bloc ? Can an international democracy of nations
deal with disciplined and purposeful totalitarian
adversaries ?
No Secretary of State can be immindf ul of the
complexities of alliance policy in a period when
our allies number more than 40. The problem of
clarifying a national policy within our own Fed-
eral Government is, in all conscience, complex
enough; and to achieve common action within a
large alliance is, as you well know, major business.
Nevertheless, having seen that business at close
range, I can again report to you a mood of tem-
perate optimism. Over tlie past year our Western
allies have been subjected to an ugly threat: the
threat of being held in nuclear hostage by the in-
termediate-range ballistic missiles which the
Soviet Union now commands. They have stood
firm against that tlareat, and I have no doubt but
that the Soviet Union will find, in the response
of the West, that this form of blackmail is counter-
productive.
More than that, there is a wholesome ferment in
Europe and throughout the Atlantic community,
generating a debate wluch historians may well
rank with the American constitutional debate of
the I780's. Tliis ferment centers on the emer-
gence and articulation of a new vision : the vision
of a Europe moving toward unity and establish-
ing, as it does so, a transatlantic partnerehip in
all the affairs with which great powers must be
concerned in the 1960's — the problems of defense
in a nuclear age, the problems of sustained assist- i
ance to the underdeveloped areas, the problems
of trade, the problems of using our international
monetary reserves with economy and wisdom in
the mutual support of each other's currencies, and
problems of economic growth itself. This ferment
has not yet yielded a resolution of all the com-
plicated matters involved. But beneath the sur-
face our alliance arrangements are moving into
a new and rather grand phase.
In 1947 the American Government decided that
it would link the recovery of Europe to efforts at
European unification. We cliose quite consciously
not to play a balance-of-power game with the na-
tions of Europe but to build toward a strong part-
nership in the affairs of the West. At that mo-
ment we joined forces with those Europeans who ,
drew from the lessons of the Second World War, |
and iiideed fi-om the longer history of Europe, the
conclusion tliat the great European center of West-
ern culture and strength could play its proper part
on the world scene only if it transcended its na-
tional divisions and moved toward unity. The
extraordinary resurgence in Europe of the 1950's
now provides the base for a major move forward,
and I am confident that we shall see the "grand
design" unfold in coming months and years.
Our relations with the countries of Western
Europe have, of course, been complicated from
time to time since the Second World AVar by prob-
lems arising from the end of the colonial era.
During the past year we have confronted several
problems where there have been divergencies, in
emphasis at least, with some of our European part-
ners. These inevitable difliculties should not, how-
86
Department of State Bulletin
ever, obscure tlie larger pattern whicli is emerg-
ing— a pattern of constructive association among
the whole of the northern half of the world, from
Toliyo to Bonn, and with the new nations to the
south — an association based on principles of part-
nership among equals, a shared interest in the eco-
nomic development of the emerging nations, and,
in the end, a shared commitment to the objectives
of the United Nations Charter.
History Has Not Stopped in Communist World
A fourth question posed by Professor Bemis is,
in effect, whether we are wholly on the defensive.
Must we look to a future in which we can, at best,
hold the frontiers of freedom ? Must we abandon
hope that the principles of independence and de-
mocracy might emerge within what is now the
Commimist bloc?
It would not be prudent to close one's eyes to
the capacity of totalitarian methods to maintain a
surface of unity and order. It is infinitely harder,
for example, for opposition to make itself felt in
a police state than in an open society. Nor should
we imderestimate the capacity of a totalitarian
system to produce striking results by mobilizing
men and resources around high-priority objectives.
But it is inaccurate to believe that history has
stopped within the Communist world or that the
currents of history are moving automatically to its
advantage.
In Europe we have had, in the postwar years, a
fundamental test of Western and Communist con-
cepts as they apply to economic, social, and politi-
cal life. No one can question, I believe, the out-
come of that test thus far. It is Western, and not
Eastern, Europe that constitutes the more vital
center.
Despite a Commimist monopoly of education
and propaganda, the peoples of Eastern Europe
remain loyal to their culture and to their nation-
hood. In every field — from natural and social sci-
ence to painting and music — they find ways to ex-
press their traditional association with Western
civilization. And in time, as Communists know
perhaps better than others, these tests of historical
vitality count.
In free Asia there has been another test; and
there, too, free men are doing vastly better than
even the greatest optimists would have predicted
only a few years ago. The economic progress of
the new Japan — democratic and working in co-
operation with other free nations — is one of the
splendid achievements of the postwar era. In the
Indian Peninsula, in southeast Asia, in Hong
Kong, on Formosa, and now in Korea, there is a
resilience, a will to get on with the job, the emer-
gence of a new, modern generation of men and
women which promise well for the future. IMean-
wliile, in the areas controlled by communism the
techniques of totalitarianism, applied in regions
where three- fourths of the people live in the coun-
tryside, have been unable to deal with hunger and
apathy. Every day it becomes clear that the Com-
munist methods for modernizing an underdevel-
oped area are old-fasliioned, reactionary, and re-
strictive, quite aside from their simple inhumanity.
And this, too, will count.
Finally, it is becoming clear that the same power-
ful forces which are diffusing power and influence
within the free world — forces which our own polit-
ical history and instinctive methods teach us how
to weave together in new patterns of interdepend-
ence— are operating within the Conxmunist world
itself. We should take no cheap comfort from the
deep schisms within the Communist bloc. On the
other hand, we should be aware that the concept
of independent nationhood, of national interest,
and of national cidture are day to day asserting
themselves strongly. And if we are wise, we can
patiently find ways to pick up strands of overlap-
ping national interest between Communist nations
and the free world, moving toward a cushioning
of the raw clash of power.
From Berlin to Laos, from the question of arms
control and disarmament to the exchange of per-
sons, we are prepared to look at each proposal
and possibility on its merits and to look system-
atically toward a world which would permit us
all to live easier on a planet shadowed by nuclear
weapons. And we are prepared to do so not de-
fensively, out of fear, but out of an inner con-
fidence that, if we use time well, time is on the
side of the forces making for independent nation-
hood, dignified interdependence, and human
freedom.
Taking Our Part in the Shaping of History
What of the American base? Is ours a society
really given to "loose social dalliance and croon-
ing softness"? There is enough dalliance to
merit our genuine concern, but my view of our
condition is less somber than your president's.
January 15, 1962
87
Democracies have always given an appearance
of some disarray and self-indulgence. As a stu-
dent I knew well interwar Britain. It was a
costly conclusion tliat Hitler and Mussolini — and
perhaps Stalin — deduced from surface phenomena
that Britain of those years had lost its fiber. I
was present in the Oxford Union, for example,
when the house resolved "not to fight for King
and country." It was apparent to most of us
present that the vote was a compliment to the
entertaining brilliance of C. E. M. Joad rather
than a verdict on the merits of the issue. Although
the Union was not amused by a later effort to ex-
punge the record, the record was set right, in
fact, witliin a few short years by the gallantry
of its members in fighting for King and country,
and for freedom, in a great war.
I recall, too, the headshaking of many Ameri-
cans about our youth in the twenties and thirties.
In tlie twenties it was said that they were irre-
sponsible, even decadent ; in the thirties, that they
lacked enterprise, yearned only for security, and
neither wished nor knew how to work. Yet these
were the generations which fought our greatest
war, fashioned a remarkable achievement in our
own society, and took up a worldwide responsi-
bility we have never known before.
Moreover, I am not excessively concerned witli
the tendency of Americans to self-examination and
self-criticism. Long ago Alexis de Tocqueville
noted that we were a self-conscious people, com-
pelled by our remarkable origins to measure our
day-to-day performance against exceedingly high
standards and the transcendent idealism built into
our Declaration of Independence.
I am confident tliat we still have the will and
the dedication required for the great tasks aliead.
From the men in the Strategic Air Command, fly-
ing complex missions on endless alert, to the volun-
teers in the Peace Corps ; from our special forces
working side by side with soldiers in southeast
Asian villages to our Berlin garrison; from our
imaginative scientists to my devoted colleagues
working long hours at the Department of State
and abroad, there is solid reason for confidence —
not for despair — in the fiber of our people in gen-
eral and of our youth in particular.
Moreover, I believe I detect among our citizens
a developing ability to live in this world of revolu-
tionary change, of multiple crisis, and of nuclear
threat with a poise supported by the endemic sense
of liumor which has always been a great solvent in
our national life. We go about our business with
a solid sense of a good and grave and resilient
people behind us.
And so, as we deal with the day-to-day problems
which are our lot, we are not merely counterpunch-
ing against crises. We are taking our part in the
shaping of history. Step by step, cable by cable,
we are trying to build a commonwealth of inde-
pendent nations, each — including ourselves — try-
ing to improve the degree to which we actually live
by the high standards of democratic ideals. We
are trying to pull together in new association the
powerful, industrialized nations of the north ; we
are trying to build a new partnership between the
north and the south. Against the background of
an enlarged and increasingly flexible military
strength, we are protecting the frontiers of free-
dom; and with confidence we are peering beyond
for every constructive possibility of bringing the
nations now under communism toward that com-
monwealth wliich the charter of the United Na-
tions described in 1945.
Perhaps it is a profession of faith to believe that
the human story continues to show the power and
majesty of the notion of political freedom. But
the historian can find the evidence, and many have
done so. The future historian will assess what we
in our generation are doing to write new chapters
in that story and how we emerge from this cli-
mactic period in which we sense we now live. Our
commitments are deeply rooted in our own history,
a history which links us in aspiration to the great
body of mankind. If we move ahead with these
shared commitments, we shall not lack company,
for men at their best are builders of free common-
wealths and a peaceful world community.
88
Department of Sfofe Bulletin
President and Mrs. Kennedy Visit Venezuela and Colombia
President and Mrs. Kennedy visited Caracas,
Venezuela, on Decerriber 16 and Bogota, Colom-
hia, on December 17. Following are texts of re-
marlcs made by the President at the dedication of
an agrarian reform project in Venezuela and a
self-help housing project in Colombia, together
with a joint coimnunique released at Caracas and
an address made by the President at Bogota.
REMARKS AT LA MORITA, VENEZUELA
DECEMBER 16
White House press release (Maracay, Venezuela) dated December
16 ; as-delivered teit
President Betancourt, Governor, ladies and gen-
tlemen: I want to express to you our warm ap-
preciation and thanks for the generous welcome
which you have given to Mrs. Kennedy and my-
self, and I know that in welcoming us you extend
the hand of friendship to the people of my coun-
try, who are so vitally interested and concerned
with the common destiny of our hemisphere. And
for this welcome we both thank you.
Tomorrow is the 131st anniversary of the birth
of the great liberator of this coimtry, who not
only had the satisfaction and pride in liberating
this country but also in a feat almost unprece-
dented in history, provided for the freedom and
liberation of five comatries — and I refer of course
to Simon Bolivar. I come here today in a tradi-
tion originated by him who saw and predicted
that some day this hemisphere would be bound
together by the closest of fraternal ties, and I
come in the footsteps of a distinguished predeces-
sor, Franklin Roosevelt, who in his own time and
generation attempted to bring to fruition the work
which Simon Bolivar had so well begun.
We today share the realization which Presi-
dent Eoosevelt expressed in 1944, when he said
that "true mdividual freedom cannot exist with-
out economic security and independence."
With a system of national independence origi-
nated over a hundred years ago, with a policy of
friendship and good neighborliness which was de-
veloped in the administration of President Roose-
velt, now, today, in 1961, it is our obligation to
move ahead and to bring to fruition the concept
that along with national independence and indi-
vidual liberty goes the well-being of people them-
selves.
We do not merely talk of slogans, of democracy
and freedom; it is our function here in this hemi-
sphere in 1961 to make it possible for all the people
not only to be free but to have a home and edu-
cate their children and have a job for themselves
and in security. And that is what we are deter-
mined to do.
Economic security, the bringing of a better life
to all of our people, must now be, in the sixties,
the principal object and goal of the inter- Ameri-
can system. And what is happening here today
at La Morita, in pursuit of that goal, symbolizes
the gigantic new steps that are now being taken.
From this day forward the inter- American sys-
tem represents not merely the unity of the gov-
ernments that are involved but the unity of peo-
ples, not only a common goal of political alinement
but a common vow by all of our governments and
all of our people to improve man's economic, social,
and political well-being— not just an alliance for
the protection of our countries but an alliance of
progress for our people. We will be, in the six-
ties, more than good neighbors. We will be part-
ners in building a better life for our people.
Here in Venezuela the meaning of the new
Alianza para el Progreso ^ is being demonstrated
for you have made a tradition and transition from
a repressive dictatorship to a free life for the peo-
ple of this country, to progressive democratic
rule under one of the great democratic statesmen
of the Western Hemisphere, your distinguished
'For bacUgroiind, see Buixetin of Apr. 3, 19C1, p. 47.
January IS, J 962
89
President, Romulo Betancourt,. And one of the
first goals of the new spirit of this hemisphere
must be the elimination of tyranny from the north
to the south until this is a hemisphere, as Simon
Bolivar once predicted, of free men and free coun-
tries, living under our system of liberty.
Mr. President, the achievement of these two
freedoms, freedom from dictatorship and freedom
from the bonds of economic and social injustice,
must be the contribution of our generation in this
decade.
It is in pursuit of these goals that I have come
with you to La Morita. It is a long way from the
noisy streets of Washington, D.C., to this field;
but it is in this field and in fields and cities across
our hemisphere that this battle must be fought,
not in speeches by Presidents, or exchanges of dip-
lomats, or studies by experts — though all those are
important — but the work must be done here — here
today — and tomorrow — all through this hemi-
sphere, imtil our people live the kind of life, Mr.
President, for which you have dedicated your life
and to which the people of my country are com-
mitted.
Today 86 families will receive titles to own
homes under a program which is already settled —
38,000 families on 3,800,000 acres of land. This is
your program, the program of your progressive,
farseeing Government; and the people of my
country will share in this program by making
available for loans to build rural homes and in
credits to finance your crops.
This program is at the heart of the Alianza para
el Progreso, for no real progress is possible unless
the benefits of increased prosperity are shared by
the people themselves.
I do not hold the view, which some now preach,
that the only way we can make economic progress
is through dictatorship. I believe the reverse. I
believe that the experiences of Eastern Europe,
the wall in Berlin, the famine in China, the hard-
ships in our own hemisphere, show that liberty
and economic progress go hand in hand, provided
the people and the government together are com-
mitted to progress for the people.
So, ladies and gentlemen, I .shall return to
Washington on Monday and tell the people of my
country that you and they are bound together in
one of the great adventures of human experience,
to make of our licmisphere a bright and shining
light for all the world.
The United States and Venezuela are bound to-
gether, and in the sixties I believe that we can
demonstrate so that all the world will want to fol-
low our example — I believe that freedom and
prosperity can move hand in hand, and I am proud
today to stand on this platform with your dis-
tinguished President, who has been working in
this field for so many years and who now is show-
ing the people of this coimtry and hemisphere
what real progress for the people can mean.
I express our thanks to you, and I can tell you
that the people of my country — in good times and
bad — are committed to the progress of your people
and this hemisphere.
Thank you very much.
JOINT COMMUNIQUE, CARACAS, DECEMBER 17
White House press release (Caracas, Venezuela) dated Decem-
ber 17
During their meeting in Caracas on December
16, 1961, the Presidents of the United States of
America and of the Republic of Venezuela, John
F. Kennedy and Eomulo Betancourt, agreed to
make the following declaration :
1. They reaffirm the irrevocable friendship of
the two peoples and governments.
2. They confirm their adherence to the prin-
ciples and standards of the United Nations and
Vi\% Organization of American States which are
dedicated to respect for human rights — to the ef-
fective practice of representative Democracy, with
equal opportunity for all — to free self-determina-
tion by the people and to non-intervention.
3. They have confidence that freedom will pre-
vail in all American countries and that the prob-
lems troubling America and the world will be
solved peacefully.
4. The two Presidents expressed their deter-
mination to achieve the objectives of the Aliama
para el Progreso in accord with the principles of
the Act of Bogota ^ and Punta del Estc charter,'
and they discussed mutual Venezuelan and United
States actions which are necessary for this pur-
pose. Venezuela's achievement in formulating
and implementing a realistic long-range plan for
economic and social development, especially in the
fields of industrial and agricultural development,
' For text, see iUd., Oct. 3, 19C0, p. 537.
' For text, see ihld., Sept. 11, 1061, p. 463.
90
Deparfmenf of Sfafe Bo//efin
land refonn, educat ion, housing and water supply,
were reviewed in connection with the need to mo-
bilize additional domestic and external resources.
Substantial new loans, in addition to those already
provided, are under consideration by the Inter-
American Development Bank.
5. Both Presidents agreed that a special effort
is necessary in 1962 to assure large-scale develop-
ment of industry and commerce, both to reinforce
the present pattern of recovery from Venezuela's
1960-1961 recession and to achieve sustained levels
of economic growth with rapid improvements
in living standards of underprivileged groups not
yet reached by the development process.
6. Both Presidents expressed their conviction
that far-reaching efforts in the social field in ac-
cordance with the spirit of the Alliance for Prog-
ress should go hand in hand with economic devel-
opment programs. The prices of basic conunodi-
ties and commercial practices of importing coim-
tries must give effective recognition to Latin Amer-
ica's dependence on exports. Such recognition is
a vital factor in carrying out the spirit and letter
of the charter of Punta del Este.
7. The Presidents discussed the great impor-
tance to the Venezuelan people of the large Guri
Hydro-electric Dam as the base for intensive de-
velopment of the Guayana Eegion. Special con-
sideration was given to Venezuelan programs for
slum clearance, low-cost housing and municipal
and community development. The Presidents be-
lieve also that this stimulating approach should
have wide applicability in accelerating local devel-
opment, in solving the most important local prob-
lems and, equally important, in taking advantage
of local economic opportunities through com-
mimity initiative.
8. During the next few months Venezuelan and
United States officials will discuss in detail de-
velopment loans and technical assistance to be
provided by the United States Agency for Inter-
lational Development and other measures to sup-
port the Venezuelan Development Program and
strengthen United States- Venezuelan economic re-
ations. President Kennedy pledged all possible
United States support and assistance to enable
Venezuela to implement its development program
)n schedule, complementing Venezuelan efforts to
his end.
9. President Kennedy and President Betancourt
oined in expressing their hope that this state-
ment made today in the birth place of Simon
Bolivar will be received by the peoples of this
continent as a message of faith and optimism.
REMARKS AT TECHO, COLOMBIA, DECEMBER 17
White House press release (Bogotii, Colombia) dated Decem-
ber 17
Mr. President, I have come here today to reply
to a speech which your distinguished President
gave more than a year ago in Washington : "I do
hope," said Lleras Camargo, "that as we come to
imderstand our reciprocal problems better, by vir-
tue of our same faith in our democratic system
and in the creative power of liberty ... we shall
go on shaping in this part of the world a better
dwelling place for men."
We have come to this open field today to join
in making this a better dwelling place for men.
And it is, I know, a source of pride to my people,
as I am sure it is to yours, to see this great effort
to provide better housing for our people in this
hemisphere.
We all of us believe in freedom. Tlie great
fight over the past decade in this hemisphere has
been the fight against tyranny and dictatorship in
countries which have been part of our sister
republics.
The great fight in the next 10 years, now that
we have seen a whole system of new, progressive
democracies established — the great fight in the
next 10 years will be to make it possible for peo-
ple to live under a system of freedom. Those of
us who love freedom realize that a man is not
really free if he doesn't have a roof over his head,
or if he cannot educate his children, or if he can-
not find work, or if he cannot find security in his
old age.
It is our responsibility, in this decade of the
sixties, to provide the kind of life for our people
that will permit freedom not only to survive but
prevail — here and around the world, in every part
of our hemisphere, in every part of the globe.
The Alianza para el Progreso is a phrase, but I
think its real significance is here in this field.
This is a battlefield, and I am glad that the Co-
lombian Government under the leadership of your
President and all of the people of this country —
joining their efforts with the Inter-American
Bank and the United States AID program — are
going to see filling this field in the next months
^anuatY 15, 1962
91
and years to come home after home for people
who desperately need it, schools for people who
need to be educated, and a steady rise in the stand-
ard of living for all of our people.
I therefore want to express my appreciation
to all of you for your generosity in permitting
us to be here today in Techo and in this and other
communities such as this across this country and
across this hemisphere. And we are going to con-
tinue our efforts until in every part of our hemi-
sphere the whole concept of progress and freedom
is general.
We wish you well, and we are joined with you
in this effort in the future, as we have on so many
occasions in the past. We wish you well, and
we want you to know that in my country we are
committed to this effort, and we shall not desist
from it until it has been completed.
Thank you.
ADDRESS AT BOGOTA, DECEMBER 17 <
White House press release dated December 17 ; as-delivered text
Mr. President, I want to express our great ap-
preciation to the President for his generous words
tonight, and also to the people of this city and to
this country for their heart-warming welcome to
Mrs. Kennedy and myself. I must say that,
though we are far from home, you made us feel
at home; so we want to express our thanks to
you and all of the citizens of your city and
country.
In 1934 one of the greatest of my predecessors,
President Franklin Roosevelt, was the first Presi-
dent of the United States to visit this country.
He came in pursuit of a new policy — the policy of
the "good neighbor." This policy, based on the
ideas of Bolivar and San Martin and Santander,
recognized the common interests of the American
states, denied that any nation in this hemisphere
had the right to impose its will on any other na-
tion, and called for a great cooperative effort to
strengthen the spirit of human liberty here in the
Americas.
I am here today — the second American Presi-
dent to visit Colombia — in that same spirit. For
our generation also has a new policy — la Aliama
para el Progreso. Today again, that policy calls
for a joint effort to protect and extend the values
of our civilization, gouig beyond the good-neigh-
bor policy to a great unified attack on the prob-
lems of our age. Today again, we deny the right
of any state to impose its will upon any other.
And today again, these new policies are based
upon the vision and the imagination of the great
statesmen of Latin America.
In 1960 your distinguished President, Dr.
Lleras Camargo, addressed the United States
Congress,^ of which I was a Member. He spoke
of the need for iho. American states to work to-
gether to conquer the evils of poverty and injus-
tice. He called for participation by the United
States. And, later in the same vnsit, he said that
"it is necessary to make a supreme effort in each
country, with the cooperation of all the others, to
prevent Western civilization from being threat-
ened within the very stronghold that has defended
it."
Those warnings of your President have been
heard. The cooperative effort of our great free
nations has begun. Help has already begxm.
And the stronghold of our civilization — the in-
dividual dignity of the indi^adual, free men — has
begun to strengthen the bulwarks of freedom.
No American has contributed more to this jjrog-
ress than your President, who is universally
admired as one of the great statesmen of this
hemisphere. As a principal architect of the Rio
Treaty and as Director General of the Organiza-
tion of American States, he has striven to perfect
the inter-American system which was the dream
of the man who once lived in this house — Simon
Bolivar. And, recently, his bold initiative has
strengthened the OAS against those extraconti-
nental forces which seek to impose a new tyranny
upon the Americas. As your President, he has
restored democratic government, strengthened
your economy, and worked, within the free institu-
tions, to improve the welfare of all Colombians.
His concept of progressive, democratic govern-
ment is at the heart of la Alianaa para el Progreso.
Aiid I leave this comitry tonight strengthened in
purpose and undei'standing by his wise counsels.
But I Imow that Dr. Lleras Camargo would be
the first to agree that even these impressive ac-
complishments of the past are inadequate in the
face of the immense and urgent problems which
now confront us.
' Broadcast and televised from the San Carlos Palace
following a state dinner.
92
' For text, see Bulletin of May 2, 19C0, p. 701.
Department of State Bulletin
Bolivar, in a letter written when he was in exile
and the cause of liberty seemed dim, wrote : "The
veil has been torn asunder. We have already seen
the light and it is not our desire to be tlii-ust back
into the darkness." In our time the veil again
has been toni asunder. The millions of our people
who have lived in hopeless poverty, patiently suf-
fering hunger, social injustice, and ignorance, have
now glimpsed the hope of a better and more
abundant life for themselves and their children.
And they do not intend to be thrust back into
darkness.
LaAlianza para el Progreso is designed to trans-
form this hope into a reality. It calls for a vast
and immediate effort on the part of all the
Americas to satisfy the basic needs of our people
for work and land and homes and schools. It ex-
pects within the next 10 years — the Decade of De-
velopment— to be well on the way toward satisfy-
ing these basic needs.
Much has already been done since la Alianza
fara el Progreso was announced on March 13.
And today at Techo I saw some of the results of
this effort. There President Lleras and I, in the
presence of the families of hundreds of workers,
dedicated a housing project in wliich more than
80,000 people will, for the first time, know what
it will be like to live in a home in which they would
want to raise their children. We also dedicated
one of 18 schools — in which 30,000 children — the
most valuable asset of this hemisphere — will be
given their opportimity to study and to learn and
to build their lives.
And along with the social progress symbolized
by the Techo project will also come an intensive
effort to develop and industrialize the economies
of Latin America, reducing dependence on raw
materials and steadily narrowing the relative gap
between the wealthy industrialized coimtries and
the Republics of Latin America.
Thus la Alianza para el Progreso is a program
which is revolutionary in its dimensions. It calls
for staggering efforts by us all and imprecedented
changes by us all. It raises far-reaching aspira-
tions and demands difficult sacrifices. And al-
though we have already done much in a short time,
we must do much more and act much more swiftly
in the months to come. For on the success of the
Alliance — on our success in this hemisphere — de-
pends the future of that human dignity and na-
tional independence for which our forebears in
every country of the hemisphere struggled.
After the American wars of independence, the
President of Colombia, Santander, said: "Arms
have given us independence; laws will give us free-
dom." These prophetic words, I think, indicate
the history of our hemisphere. For our real prog-
ress has not come about through violence or tyr-
anny but under the guidance of democratic lead-
ers who realized the great capacity of free society
for peaceful change, men such as Franklin Roose-
velt in my own country and your distinguished
President in your country.
It is this knowledge and experience which is the
great contribution of our nations to the other na-
tions of the world. There are those who tell us
that the only road to economic progress is by vio-
lent Communist revolution, followed by the com-
plete subjection of man to the will of the state.
They come with banners proclaiming that they
have new doctrines, that history is on their side.
But, in reality, they bring a doctrine which is as
old as the Pharaohs of Egypt and, like the Phar-
aohs of Egypt, doomed by history.
They promise free elections and free speech and
freedom of religion. But once power is achieved,
elections are eliminated, speech is stifled, and the
worship of God is prohibited.
They pledge economic progress and increased
hiunan welfare. But they have been unable to
fulfill these pledges, and their failure is etched in
the dramatic contrast between a free and power-
ful and prosperous Western Europe and the grim,
drab poverty of Conmiunist Eastern Europe, or
the hunger of China, or the wall which separates
West Berlin from East Berlin. The fact is that
the wall and the rifle squads of the last 12 months
have shown us again — if we needed to be shown —
that when such doctrines have had to face the
united will of free men, they have been defeated.
We are a young and strong people. Our doc-
trines— the doctrines lit by the leaders of your
country and mine — now burn brightly in Africa
and Asia and wherever men struggle to be free.
And here in our own hemisphere we have success-
fully resisted efforts to impose the despotisms of
the Old World on the nations of the New.
Today we face the greatest challenge to the vi-
tality of our American revolution. Millions of
our people, scattered across a vast and rich conti-
nent, endure lives of misery. We must prove to
them that free institutions can best answer their
implacable demand for social justice, for food, for
Jatmary 15, 7962
93
material welfare, and above all, for a new hope —
for themselves and for their children. And in so
proving the blessings of freedom in Latin Amer-
ica, we will be teacliing the same lesson to a
watchful and impatient world.
We in the United States have made many mis-
takes in our relations with Latin America. We
have not always understood the magnitude of
your problems or accepted our share of respon-
sibility for the welfare of the hemisphere. But
we are committed in the United States — our will
and our energy — to an untiring pursuit of that
welfare, and I have come to this country to re-
affirm that dedication.
The leaders of Latin America, the industrialists
and the landowners, are, I am sure, also ready to
admit past mistakes and accept new responsi-
bilities. For unless aU of us are willing to con-
tribute our resources to national development,
unless all of us are prepared not merely to accept,
but initiate, basic land and tax reforms, unless all
of us take the lead in improving the welfare of
our people — then that leadership will be taken
from us and the heritage of centuries of Western
civilization will be consumed in a few months of
violence.
This is the message I bring to those of us who
are here tonight, and I am grateful that I have
had an opportunity to be with you.
But I also want to talk to those beyond this
dinner table, and beyond this room and this old
house. And that message is for the millions of
people in a thousand cities and villages through-
out the mountains and lands of our hemisphere.
To all of them — to the workers, to the campesinos
on the farms, to the women who toil each day for
the welfare of their children — to all we bring a
message of hope. Every day, every hour, in my
country and in this country and in all the coun-
tries of this hemisphere, dedicated men and women
are struggling to bring nearer the day when all
have more to eat, and a decent roof over their
heads, and schools for their children, when all
will have a better and more abundant life to ac-
company that human dignity to which all men
are entitled and that love of freedom to which all
of us are committed by our inheritance and our
desire.
And tonight, here in this old city, I pledge to
you the commitment of the United States of
America to that great cause.
Thank you.
President Holds Talks in Bermuda
With Prime Minister Macmillan
Follovnng is the text of a joint communique
issued on Decemher 22 hy President Kennedy and
Prime Minister Harold Macymillan of the United
Kingdom at the close of a 2-day meeting at
Ham,ilton, Bermuda.
White House press release dated December 22
The President and the Prime Minister have had
two days of valuable discussions surveying the
world situation. Their discussions centered
mainly on the question of Berlin, on nuclear prob-
lems and on the situation in the Congo. Tlieir
talks vrill form the basis of continued United
States-United Kingdom cooperation during the
coming months on a great variety of questions.
The President and the Prime Minister ex-
amined the situation concerning Berlin in the light
of the decisions taken at the meetings of the For-
eign Ministers of the Four Powers and of the
NATO Council in Paris.^ In particular they dis-
cussed the steps to be taken in regard to the re-
newal of diplomatic contacts with the Soviet
Union. The President has agreed as a conse-
quence of the Paris meeting that the initial con-
tact would be made by the U.S. Ambassador in
Moscow and the Prime Minister has indicated
that the British Ambassador would be available
to play whatever part might be found helpful.
The President and the Prime Minister agreed tliat
the purpose should be to ascertain whether a rea-
sonable basis for negotiation can be found. Tlie
other governments directly concerned will of
course be fully consulted througliout. Consul-
tations with the other governments concerned are
continuing.
The President and the Prime Minister consid-
ered the problems of the nuclear arms race. Tliey
took note of the new situation created by the mas-
sive series of atmospheric tests conducted in recent
months by the Soviet Government after long
secret preparations.'^ Tliey agreed that it is now
necessary, as a matter of prudent planning for the
future, that pending the final decision prepara-
tions should be made for atmospheric testing to
maintain the effectiveness of the deterrent.
^ For text of a NATO communique, see Buujetin of
Jan. 8, 1962, p. 51.
' For background, spc ihitl.. Nov. 20, 1061, p. 844.
94
Department of State Bulletin
Meanwhile, they continue to believe that no
task is more urgent than the search for paths to-
ward effective disarmament, and they pledge
themselves to intensive and continued efforts in
this direction.
Serious progress toward disarmament is the
only way of breaking out of the dangerous con-
test so sharply renewed by the Soviet Union. The
President and the Prime Minister believe that
the plans for disarmament put forward by the
United States in the current session of the United
Nations General Assembly ^ offer a basis for such
progress, along with the treaty for ending nuclear
tests'* which the two nations have so carefully
prepared and so earnestly urged upon the Soviet
Government.
The President and the Prime Minister reviewed
recent developments in the Congo. They noted
with satisfaction that, as an encouraging step to-
ward understanding, a useful meeting had been
held at Kitona between Mr. [Cyrille] Adoula and
Mr. [!Moise] Tshombe." They expressed their
strong hope that further progress would be made
through the efforts of both parties. It seemed to
them of first importance that the present discus-
sions should be actively continued in appropriate
ways. They agreed on the importance of avoid-
ing any renewal of armed action while genuine
efforts at consultation are going forward.
In a general discussion of the economic situa-
tion the President and the Prime Minister took
note of progress in the negotiations between the
United Kingdom and the European Economic
Community and expressed the hope that these
would be brought to a successful conclusion.
U.S. Refutes False Katangan Charges
of Interference in Negotiations
DepartTnent Statement
Press release 921 dated December 29
Katangan Provincial President [Moise]
Tshombe has addressed a telegram ^ to tliis Gov-
ernment in which he repeats a charge made in
Brussels today by Evariste Kimba, one of his min-
istei-s, that U.S. Ambassador [Edmund A.] Gul-
lion interefered in the talks at Kitona in which
Mr. Tshombe agreed to end Katangan secession
from the Congo. Air. Tshombe also accuses Am-
bassador Gullion of urgmg the United Nations to
resume military action against Katanga and
makes several other allegations. All these charges
are untrue.
Ambassador Gullion was involved in the Kitona
talks specifically because Mr. Tshombe appealed
to President Kennedy to help halt the fighting in
Katanga and arrange a meeting between Mr.
Tshombe and Prime Minister [Cyrille] iVdoula.
In response to this appeal. President Kennedy
designated Ambassador Gullion as his special rep-
resentative to facilitate arrangements for a meet-
ing.^ Because Mr. Tshombe asked for an Ameri-
can guarantee of his personal security, in addition
to the guarantee given by the U.N., the Ambassa-
dor escorted Mr. Tshombe to and from Kitona and
remained there during the talks.
At no time did Ambassador Gullion interfere
in the negotiations. He was consulted by both
parties and encouraged them to reach an accord.
The agreement was freely reached after substan-
tial compromises by both conferees and was per-
sonally signed by Mr. Tshombe.
The charge that Ambassador Gullion has urged
further U.N. military action against Katanga is
absurd. On the contrary, the Ambassador and
the Department have sought to promote an at-
mosphere of conciliation.
"VVe earnestly desire to see peace in the Congo ;
thus we welcomed the Kitona agreement.^ We
hope that the false charges against Ambassador
Gullion are not part of a propaganda campaign
designed to justify denimciation of the Kitona
agreement.
Mr. Tshombe has a great opportunity to con-
tribute to the future peace and stability of
Katanga and the Congo. We earnestly hope he
will seize this opportunity and will move
promptly to carry out the Kitona agreement so a
start can be made with the rehabilitation of the
Katanga and its peaceful reintegration into the
Congo.
The U.S. Government continues to repose com-
plete confidence in Ambassador Gullion.
' IhU., Oct. 16, 1961, p. 650.
•For text, see iUd., June 5, 1961, p. 870.
° For back^ound, see iUd., Jan. 8, 1962, p. 49.
* Not printed.
" For background, see Bulletin of Jan. 1, 1962, p. 10.
' Ibid., Jan. 8, 1962, p. 49.
ianuaty 15, 7962
95
The United Nations Bond Issue
Statement hy Harlan Cleveland'^
The President has decided to put in his forth-
coming budget a request to the Congress to author-
ize the purchase of United Nations bonds. This
decision followed action by the General Assembly
of the United Nations last week, making it possible
for the Acting Secretary-General to issue up to
$200 million worth of bonds to finance the U.N.'s
peace-and-security operations in the Congo and
the Middle East.
This decision naturally gives rise to two ques-
tions : Wliy does the United Nations have to issue
bonds? And why is it in the national interest of
the United States to purchase some of them ?
The answer to the first question requires a word
of explanation about the way the United Nations
and its affiliated agencies are financed.
Essentially there are four kinds of money spent
by the U.N. family of agencies.
1. There is the U.N.'s regular assessed budget.
2. There are the regular assessed budgets of the
specialised agencies., which support the construc-
tive work in such fields as food and agriculture,
world health, educational development, civil avia-
tion, telecommunications, meteorology, and others.
3. There are voluntary contributions to special
programs that are not assessed against all United
Nations members.
4. And there are special assessments for peace-
and-security operations in the Congo and the Mid-
dle East.
Since the charter was adopted in 1945, the
United Nations Secretariat has spent $784 million
on day-to-day operations out of its regular budget,
including the administration of the General As-
sembly, the Security Coimcil, and the trusteeship
system. The United States has put up $255 mil-
lion of this amount; the proportion of our con-
tribution has been going down as new members
were admitted. Early in the history of the United
Nations, the United States contribution stood at
nearly 40 percent. More recently, it was 321/^ per-
cent. Under a resolution just passed by the Gen-
eral Assembly, the United States contribution will
go down to 32 percent.
The 13 specialized agencies of the United Na-
tions have spent $586 million in their regular as-
sessed budgets since their beginnings during the
1940's, and we have put up $168 million of this
sum.
Then there are the special operations — the Ex-
panded Technical Assistance Program, the Spe-
cial Fund, the Palestine refugee program, the
malaria eradication program, the Cliildren's
Fund, and others — which are financed by volun-
tary contributions. These programs are financed
by those countries interested in financing them;
their cost is not assessed against all United Na-
tions member states. The United States has put
up a larger proportion of these operations — $797
million out of a total of $1.3 billion.
This year's slice of the same picture looks like
this:
Fitcal year 19St
E»timated tota\ Estimated U.S.
expenditures share
' Read to news correspondents by Mr. Cleveland on
Dec. 28 (press release 909). Mr. Cleveland is Assistant
Secretary for International Organization Affairs.
U.N. regular budget (as-
sessed) $72.7 million $22.3 million
U.N. specialized agencies,
regular budgets ( as-
sessed) 64.9 million 18.0 million
Voluntary contributions 159. 0 million 79. 8 million
The United Nations and its affiliated organiza-
tions have never been, and are not now, a major
factor in the United States budget, and the Con-
gress has provided tlie full amoimts required from
the United States to support United Nations activ-
ities. The 1961 Congress, for example, appropri-
ated all of the funds requested by President Ken-
nedy for contributions to international organiza-
tions and programs, both in the State Department
appropriation and in the AID [Agency for Inter-
national Development] appropriation.
Apart from all these regular operations, in
which most of the money goes for teclmical and
economic activities, the United Nations has two
sizable peace-and-security (which is to say, mili-
tary) operations.
The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF)
has 5,100 troops sitting on the Gaza Strip, along
the Israeli-Egyptian border, and near the Gulf of
Aqaba, maintaining the precarious peace in the
still unliquidated war between Israel and its Arab
neighbors. UNEF costs about $19 million a year,
96
Department of State Bulletin
and we put up $7.9 million of that total. No
United States forces are engaged.
The other peace-and-security operation, now
very well known indeed, is UNOC, the United Na-
tions Operation in the Congo. It consists of about
17,000 troops provided by 21 countries, none of
them great powers. During the past year we have
put up about 471^ percent of its total cost, which
runs $10 million a month or $120 million a year.
The United Nations is fiTianced from year to
year by an '■'■every member canvass." Most mem-
bers pay their dues regularly and promptly to the
regular budget. We do, the British do, the French
do, and so do the Soviets. Some countries are slow
to pay, but nobody objects on principle to making
these payments. The record of prompt payment
is not as good in some of the specialized agencies,
but again no question of principle arises.
For the operations financed by voluntary con-
tributions, the main burden is carried by the West-
ern Powers. The Soviets frequently do not pay
at all, or they pay less than their fair share, often
in rubles so thoroughly restricted that they can-
not be used.
The costs for peace-and-security operations —
UNEF and the Congo Force — are assessed against
every member of the United Nations by action of
the General Assembly. (The United States also
helps, by a voluntary contribution, to reduce the
burden on the smaller, less developed countries.)
The Soviets and their satellites take the position
that they will pay only \\ hen they agree with the
operation; they therefore pay nothing to either
UNEF in the Middle East or UNOC in the Congo.
The Arabs also do not pay for the United Nations
Emergency Force, and the French and the Bel-
gians have declined to pay their share of the Congo
operation.
The U.N.^s basic financial problem is a cash
deficit resulting from the unwillingness of some
members to pay their share. The total of unpaid
contributions, on all U.N. budgets, was about $104
million on November 30, 1961. The bulk of this
sum represented nonpayment on UNEF and the
Congo accounts.
The resulting cash deficit is actually fmided in
three main ways :
First, the United Nations has to hold back on
paying its bills. If the United Nations were a
business, we would say that it is piling up its "ac-
counts payable."
January 15, J 962
623755—62 3
Second, it has drawn down to zero its working
capital fund, which previously amounted to about
$25 million.
Third, it has engaged in a kind of internal
borrowing operation. To meet his needs for cash,
the Secretary-Genei-al borrows from other U.N.
agencies moneys which these organizations have
collected from their members but have not yet
spent. These internal borrowings are repaid
when member nations pay their assessments for
UNEF and the Congo. The borrowings have not
impaired the operations of the other U.N. agencies
involved.
AVith the operating deficit of more than $100
million, the U.N.'s problem is to get the non2:)ayers
to pay up and meanwhile to collect enough cash to
enable the United Nations to go ahead and do what
the General Assembly has told it to do in the
Middle East and in the Congo — which are actions
tlie United States Government feels are very much
in the United States interest for the United Na-
tions to take.
To solve this problem, Acting Secretary-General
U Thant has courageously proposed and the Gen-
eral Assembly has just adopted a three-part
financial plan. The plan was adopted over the
liighly vocal but ineffective opposition of the
Soviet Union and its satellites.
1. The General Assembly voted a new appro-
priation, assessed against all members, to carry the
Congo 2 and the Middle Eastern ^ operations up to
July 1, 1962, at the present level of expenditure.
The votes were overwhelming: 67 nations voted
for the Congo appropriation, and only 13 against,
with 15 abstentions.
2. The General Assembly has formally asked
the International Court of Justice at The Hague
for an advisory opinion to settle the question
whether assessments for peace-and-security opera-
tions are just as mandatory an obligation on gov-
ernments, luader the U.N. Charter, as everybody
agrees the regular budget contributions have al-
ways been. A favorable opinion, which we antici-
pate, would help governments decide to pay up
even when they are not enthusiastic about a par-
ticular operation, for fear of getting so far behmd
in their total contribution to the United Nations
that they would be deprived of their vote under the
charter's 2-year rule (article 19) .
'U.N. doc. A/RES/1732(XVI).
" U.N. doc. A/RES/1733 (XVI).
97
3. The General Assembly authorized the Secre-
tary-General to issue $200 million worth of U.N.
bonds, repa3'able at 2 percent over a 25-year pe-
riod.'' Repayments will be an annual charge (of
about $10 million) on the regular U.N. budget,
which is assessed agamst all members.
In a nutshell, the case for the U.N. bond issue
can be smnmarized this way :
a. Nonpayers will still owe their dues. The
bond issue does not bail them out. It merely bails
out the United Nations cash position while main-
taining the obligation of every member to pay up
its own accumulated debt to the United Nations.
b. The bond issue would be large enough to solve
the United Nations cash problem for this year and
next.
c. The bond issue would give the United Na-
tions Secretary-General, for the first time, a source
of funds which could be drawn on rapidly in the
event that a future emergency should require their
use.
d. The bond issue will be repaid out of the regu-
lar budget. The repayments are thus a binding
obligation on all members under the charter.
e. By having the bond issue repaid out of the
regular budget, the United States contribution for
peacekeeping operations is reduced from its pres-
ent share of about 471/4 percent to 32 percent. For
a time after July 1, 1962, our purchase of bonds
will make it unnecessary to ask Congress for ap-
propriations for UNEF and the Congo operation.
f. The U.N. bonds can be sold to nonmembers
(West Germany and Switzerland, for example)
and to nonprofit institutions. They will not, how-
ever, be sold to the general public.
n
Wliy is it in the national interest of the United
States to purchase our share of these U.N. bonds ?
Ever since the beginning of the United Nations,
its actions and its future have been a matter for
debate among Americans. Some have overesti-
mated its usefulness, viewing it as a cure-all or a
symbol of utopia. Others, congenitally gloomy
about the state of the world, see in each new crisis
the beginning of the end of the Organization.
Of course, no all-purpose formula fits the facts.
But the record shows that each new crisis has left
behind a stronger organization, better able to
tackle a larger problem the next time around. A
*U.N. doc. A/RES/1739(XVI).
small technical services program led to a sizable
Special Fund for preinvestment aid. A tenta-
tive peace-and-security operation at the time of
Suez led to a larger capacity to act in the Congo.
There are, of course, strict limits to United
Nations action, limits set by the willingness of its
membei-s to support extensions of the U.N.'s ex-
ecutive role. These limits are gradually widen-
ing. With the U.N.'s peacekeeping functions,
particularly its Congo operation, the U.N.'s
executive role has for the first time caught the
widespread attention of Americans.
That U.N. actions, and the United States rela-
tionship to the U.N., are now an American na-
tional issue, worthy of front-page controversy and
public statements by practicing political leaders,
simply means that the United Nations is doing
tilings that are important enough for us to argue
about among ourselves. Far from dying, the
United Nations is increasingly being recognized
as a significant mechanism of international poli-
tics— which is to say one of the most important
arenas for the exercise of national power.
The fact of the matter is that for 16 years the
United Nations has usefully served the national
interest of the United States as well as the inter-
ests of most of its other members.
In Korea it served our interest by enabling the
United States and other free nations to deal effec-
tively with Communist aggression in the name of
the United Nations Charter and pursuant to U.N.
resolutions.
The U.N.'s peacekeeping machinery, established
in the Middle East after the Suez crisis, has been
a major factor in keeping tliat area reasonably
quiet for the past 5 years.
In the Congo the big United Nations executive
operation was literally the only alternative to the
direct confrontation, there in central Africa, of
the military strength of gi-eat powers.
But the United Nations' growing "capacity to
act" goes well beyond its much publicized military
operations. It provides various kinds of advice
and self-starting aid for all of its less developed
members. It also provides a wide range of peace-
ful-settlement procedures, ranging from single
representatives of tlie Secretary-General to peace
observation teams, mediators, conciliation com-
missions, and the general supervision of jn-ogress
toward self-government. The peacemaking role
of the United Nations serves our interest because
98
Department of State Bulletin
many of the disputes contain the seeds of war.
Wliile some of the crises taken to the U.N. con-
tinue to be dangerous, in many instances the trend
lias been reversed.
Because the United Nations and in particular its
peace-and-security operations have been effective,
the Communist bloc has sought to control or de-
stroy it. Trying to paralyze action by misuse of
the veto is one way. Trying to substitute the
troika for a single Secretary-General is another
way. Trying to undermine its financial structure
and thereby to deny the United Nations the means
to carry on essential peacekeeping operations is
yet another way. TVe cannot afford to permit the
Communist bloc to destroy — either by political or
financial means — an organization that has served
and continues to serve our national interest, and
the national interest of most other U.N. members,
in the growth of a civilized system of collective
security.
For these reasons the President will propose,
early in the next session of Congress, legislation
to authorize U.S. purchases of United Nations
bonds. Congressional approval of this proposal
will frustrate the Soviet attempt to starve the
United Nations into submission and will preserve
the U.N. for its vital executive role in interna-
tional politics.
Cultural and Educational Exchange
To Be Discussed by U.S. and Japan
The Department of State announced on Decem-
ber 26 (press release 904) that the United States
and Japan will hold a conference on cultural and
educational affairs at Tokyo for 1 week beginning
January 25. This conference is the last of three
meetings agreed to by President Kennedy and the
Japanese Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda when the
two leaders met in Washington last June.^ A joint
meeting on economic affairs was held in November
at Hakone,^ and a conference on scientific coopera-
tion was held in December at Tokyo.'
Both leaders agreed last June on the desirability
of furthering cooperation between Japan and the
United States in the fields of culture and education.
The upcoming conference will discuss concrete
ways for bringing this about. The American dele-
gation will include : Philip II. Coombs, Assistant
Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural
Affairs, Ambassador Edwin O. Reischauer, Hugh
Borton, Aaron Copland, Clarence H. Faust,
Douglas Overton, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Willard
Thorp, and Robert Penn Warren.
The conference will have as its objective the
study of all phases of postwar cultural and educa-
tional exchange between Japan and the United
States and will make recommendations on ways
and means of broadening this exchange. Con-
cretely, various problems will be discussed, such as
intellectual interchange through exchange of per-
sons, exchange of books and other cultural ma-
terials and arts, studies in Japan and in the United
States of the other's country, English and Japa-
nese language teaching, and study of activities of
cultural academic and professional organizations
in Japan and in the United States.
Attorney General Kennedy Completes
Plans for February Trip
Press release 912 dated December 29
Secretary Rusk announced on December 29 that
Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy has com-
pleted plans for a trip that will take him to a
number of world capitals in February.
Following the Attorney General's visit to
Japan,^ Mr. and Mrs. Kennedy will go to Indo-
nesia, where they will be from February 12 to 18.
This visit is in response to an invitation from the
Indonesian Attorney General, Dr. Gunawan, who
extended the invitation personally while visiting
the United States last April.
On his way to Berlin from Djakarta, Mr. Ken-
nedy will visit Tehran and make a brief stop in
Rome. During the Tehran visit, February 19, the
Attorney General plans to call on Government
officials. The visit in Rome will be of a private
nature.
The Attorney General will be in West Berlin
from approximately February 22 to 24 and also
plans a brief trip to Bonn.
' Bulletin of July 10, 1961, p. 57.
' Hid., Nov. 27, 1961, p. 890.
= /6irf., Jan.8, 1962, p. 66.
' For an announcement of the visit, see Bulletin of
Jan. 8, 1962, p. 50.
January 15, 1962
99
People on the Move
hy Richard R. Brown
Director, Ofice of Refugee and Migration Affairs '
It is a real pleasure and a distinct honor to be
asked to appear before this combined meeting of
the National Council of Women in the United
States and the United States Committee for
Kef ugees. It is most gratifying that you are will-
ing to devote time to considering the problems
of refugees and migration. Unfortunately within
recent months there has been an almost universal
waning of interest in these problems in spite of
the efforts of a few groups and some governments
to place emphasis upon finding solutions to the
problems of people on the move.
Observant and well-read people today witness
what seems to be a flood of refugees on the move.
Most often they look upon this movement of
peoples as a phenomenon of this — the 20th — cen-
tury and attribute it to the general unrest and
turmoil generated throughout the world during
the past generation and more particularly within
the last decade. To a degree their assumptions
are correct, yet it must be borne in mind that
refugees and the causes creating refugees are as
old as mankind itself. Although archeologists
are constantly uncovering new evidences of mass
movements of ancient peoples and ethnologists are
beginning to fit together the jigsaw pieces which
make up the puzzle of races and cultures, the pre-
historic movements of man appear motivated more
by the disasters of nature in the form of floods,
famine, earthquakes, and climatic changes rather
than because of conflicts between men.
Later, as we unfold the pages of history and
1 Address made before a joint meeting of the National
Council of Women in the United States and the United
States Committee for Refugees at New York, N.Y., on
Dec. 5 (press release 838 dated Dec. 4).
historians document the behavior and conduct of
men, we find that the mass movement of peoples
has a direct relationship to war, the aftermath of
war, economic depressions, boimdary changes, and
political upheavals. Both group and individual
searching for freedom and the pureuit of happi-
ness have been prime factors in causing migration
and creating the homeless, stateless nomads which
we today identify variously as displaced persons,
expellees, refugees, and escapees.
Our I^rd began the Christian era as an escapee.
When still as an infant in swaddling clothes, his
parents spirited Him into Egypt to escape the
wrath of Herod and the repulsive controls of the
Roman army of occupation. But even for Joseph
and Mary this was no new experience, for as
Jews they were well steeped in the Old Testament
history which recounted the long and tortuous
wanderings of their forefathers.
Aiding World's Homeless
With the donning of the mantle of a world
power by the United States as witnessed by the
present generation, our nation has been catapulted
into the unsought but not unwanted role of leader-
ship in attemjjting to solve the problems of the
world's homeless and stateless people. Private re-
sources blended with Federal Government ap-
propriations have been rushed into each new crisis
with such generosity as to stimulate other nations
to respond in like manner. Citizen and agency
sponsorships have permitted Federal immigration
legislation to be im2:)lemented to the maxinmm ex-
tent and with such dispatch as to continue to as-
sure the world of this couTitry's willingness to
accept its share of the displaced populations in
100
Department of Stale Bulletin
need of a new country and the opportunity to be-
come restored as independent, self-sustaining citi-
zens.
It is not happenstance that the United States
has spent in the neighborhood of $1.2 billion for
displaced pereons, refugees, and escapees since
World "War II. It is not accidental that private
agencies from popular support and private gifts
have been proportionately us generous. It is no
coincidence that almost three-quarters of a million
persons have been admitted to this country during
tliat same period.
The traditional generous response of the United
States to the plight of the human flotsam and
jetsam is as natural as the American way of life
itself. Certainly this is true from the standpoint
of the humanitarian motives which dominate our
refugee assistance programs. It is equally true
with respect to our foreign policy interests, for in-
variably each refugee problem affects the decisions
of this and other nations in social, economic, and
political considerations. Today's refugee prob-
lems are replete with undertones and overtones
directly affecting our foreign policies and our pos-
ture in the community of nations.
Our national interests may be related to the
causes which create refugees, or they may be con-
cerned with the results of refugees arriving in a
country. In consequence our Government has con-
scientiously and consistently taken the initiative
or lent full support to efforts of others in financing
and furthering refugee assistance programs.
Through regular annual appropriations it has been
the principal contributor to the work of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Eefugees, to the
operations of the United Nations Relief and Works
Agency, and to the programs of the Intergovern-
mental Committee for European Migration. It
has carried on unilateral programs through the
United States Escapee Program and more recently
the program for assisting Cuban refugees who
have confronted the United States for the first
time with the problems attendant to being a coun-
try of first asylum.
I am sure that most of you are aware tliat the
focus of attention is being rapidly shifted from
Europe to the Far East and to Africa. Except
for the Hungarian exodus in 1956 the real prob-
lem in Europe for the last few years has not been
the movement of people but rather the inrmiobility
of large nimabers of refugees, some of whom had
been in camps since the end of World War II. A
similar situation obtained with respect to the more
than a million Palestine refugees in the Middle
East who have been displaced and unsettled since
the politicogeographic determinations made in
1947. In Hong Kong another million refugees
have manifested little or no mobility since 1950.
Thanks to the almost global generous response
to the appeals made during the World Refugee
Year, the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees is optimistic in his belief that, with
funds available and within plans already under
way, all of the official camps in Europe will be
closed and the difficult-to-resettle camp popula-
tions either resettled or locally integrated by the
end of this coming year. This is truly a modern
miracle and stands out as a reassuring beacon of
generous love of mankind in our present-day
atmosphere otherwise so clouded with jealous
nationalism and political invective and intrigue.
But there is danger in being too smug over the
splendid results of World Refugee Year. There
is even greater danger in making an assessment
of the phenomenal economic recovery of most
European countries to conclude that the govern-
ments of first asylum can and should assume the
full costs of the residual refugee problem.s in those
countries as well as care for the constant stream
of new escapees to whom they continue to grant
political asylum. The barriers of language and
the centuries-old suspicions, prejudices, and even
hatreds between peoples have not been erased by
the bonds of United Nations membership, NATO,
the Common Market, and other worthy alliances.
In consequence the refugee is at best a poor com-
petitor with the people of his host country. He
is the last to be hired and the first to be fired.
Even to obtain benefits offered him by govern-
ments whose generosity varies country by country
is a most difficult task for one whose lack of knowl-
edge of the language is exceeded only by his ig-
norance of the laws and customs of the country
to which he has fled. To overcome these obstacles
and to achieve the most rapid and satisfactory
resettlement or permanent integration of the
refugee, international funding on a somewhat de-
creased scale is still required to provide adequate
counseling and to stimulate the maximum usage
of all available resources to meet the residual and
ongoing problems for the estimated 40,000 un-
settled anti-Communist refugees still remaining
in Europe.
January IS, 7962
101
I have mentioned the shift of focus from
Europe to Africa. Let me give you a quick
summary of the refugee problems which have de-
veloped over the past few months.
Current Refugee Problems in Africa
The historic tide of nationalism in Africa and
the burgeoning independence of a number of
African states have left in their wake unrest,
disorder, and political conflict which have pro-
duced a growing number of new refugee problems.
Within the former Belgian Congo some 250,000
Baluba refugees in the Kasai Province and an-
other 40,000 in Katanga have been displaced from
their homes as a result of bitter tribal antagonism
and are being precariously maintained by the
United Nations with the aid of food donations.
There are also 140,000 refugees from Angola who
fled into the Congo during 1961 as a result of
mounting tension and strife within Angola.
These refugees have found hospitable asylum
from the Congo authorities and populace and re-
ceive necessary relief assistance from the U.N.
Operations Command in the Congo (supported
by U.S. financial contributions and major amounts
of U.S. agricultural commodities), voluntary
agencies, and the League of Red Cross Societies
under the overall coordination of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees. A further 8,000 An-
golan refugees from the Portuguese-administered
Cabinda enclave have fled into the former French
Congo, where they are being well taken care of
by the Government and natives of that newly
independent country.
Some 6,000 residents of former British Togo-
land, which in 1957 was incorporated within the
newly created state of Ghana, have fled into neigh-
boring Togo, which acquired its independence a
little more than a year ago. In Togo these
refugees have been sheltered and assisted by their
Ewe tribal kinsmen, whose resources are now
nearly exhausted. As in the case of the Angolan
refugees the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees will exercise his good offices in promot-
ing and coordinating international assistance for
the relief and resolution of this problem.
Within the country of Ruanda, presently ad-
ministered by Belgium as a U.N. ti-usteeship,
ancient antagonisms between native ethnic groups
have flared into open violence and pillage as that
country moves toward early independence. A
considerable proportion of the fonnerly dominant
minority Tutsi ethnic group of some 375,000 in
Ruanda — or 125,000 persons — have already be-
come refugees; 40,000 were displaced and homeless
within Ruanda (although of that number approxi-
mately 30,000 have been resettled as a result of the
joint efforts of the Belgian administration and the
local authorities), 20,000 have fled to Unmdi and
reportedly 40,000 to the Kivu Province of the Con-
go, while 20,000 have entered Uganda and several
thousand more have fled to Tanganyika, which
receives its complete independence this week.
The concerned authorities in the several asylum
states are doing their utmost to meet the needs of
the refugees in the face of many other serious
problems, and the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees is presently conducting a factfinding
study of the still-developing refugee problems in
Uganda and Tanganyika at the request of the
authorities in those countries.
It was my good fortune last August to be as-
signed the task of investigating the refugee situa-
tion in both Congos. I was particularly gratified
to see firsthand the fine work being done by the
United Nations Operation in the Congo (UNOC)
and the League of Red Cross Societies. Fine as
was the performance of these agencies, I was even
more impressed with the operations of the three
major relief agencies carrying on a completely
coordinated program. Caritas, the Congo Protes-
tant Relief Agency, and the Congolese Red Cross
have each assumed responsibility for a geographic
segment of the Angolan border containing ap-
proximately equal portions of the roughly 140,000
Angolan refugees. Surely every American can
take pride in the extent of American aid going into
this program and in the excellent job being done.
He can truly be gratified for the manner in which
the missionaries of his denomination and other
denominations are serving in this remarkable effort
and laboring under the most arduous conditions
imaginable.
To the problems of refugees in Africa which I
have just mentioned must be added the continuing
tragic plight of tlie almost 300,000 Algerians in
Tunisia and Morocco. Here again the League of
Red Cross Societies and the U.N. High Commis-
sioner for Refugees are conducting an exception-
ally important humanitarian program in a tense
and uncertain political situation. Tlie United
102
Deparfmenf of State Bulletin
States continues to make major contributions to
these programs both in cash and in surplus foods.
Private citizens, vohnitary agencies, and your
Government continue to have great interest in the
more than a million refugees from Red China in
Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwim. Of even more
dramatic appeal is the problem involving the
35,000 Tibetan refugees in India and 20,000 in
Nepal. Here again the problems faced by the host
governments in their relationships with the gov-
ernment of Red Cliina, coupled with limited eco-
nomic resources available to the indigenous popu-
lation, have affected the extension of adequate
assistance to these escapees from Red Chinese
aggression.
With this rapid review of various refugee prob-
lems, even though it has not included all and has
only alluded to the pressing problems we face in
caring for the 70,000 or more Cubans presently
in this counti-y, it is readily apparent that many
new people are on the move.
Basis for U.S. Concern for Refugees
Perhaps you wonder why these new refugees
are of concern to the United States. You may
even be thinking that we as a nation have done
enough. "Wliy, then, should we continue to help
solve the problems of the extant refugee groups for
whom we have done so much? Why do we need
to concern ourselves with the new problems aris-
ing in Africa?
The basis of our concern for the refugees in
Africa is a graphic reason which when outlined
explains much of our interest in refugees
generally.
As the inevitable march of independence moves
forward in Africa to bring full self-rule to states
which are now dependent, sheer realism compels
us to conclude that the attendant political meta-
morphoses will surely produce still further refu-
gee problems. The United States must continue
to exert its influence and use its resources to help
meet and solve these problems. To do so is indis-
pensable to the attainment of our basic objectives
in Africa: to demonstrate the friendship and
helpfulness of the United States toward these
newly emerging African nations, and to produce
political and economic stability and well-being in
Africa as the essential groundwork for the orderly
transition of these coimtries from dependent states
to independence and true democracy. To resolve
these arising refugee problems is to reduce sig-
nificantly the content of want, confusion, and
despair affecting millions of people. These are
the birth pangs of independence — conditions
which, we know only too well, if allowed to persist
will surely foster the inception and growth of
totalitarianism. Thus our assistance to refugees
in these localized refugee problems — in Africa as
in the Near East and elsewhere — is a blow struck
in the cause of freedom.
But there is one refugee problem which is world-
wide in scope. I refer to the problem of refugees
fleeing from communism and its attendant per-
secution of the individual. Wlierever Communist
regimes exist — in Europe, Asia, the Far East, and
even in the Western Hemisphere — the pattern is
basically the same : the agonized flight of oppressed
peoples seeking, no matter what the price, to reach
a land of freedom and, just as inevitably, the es-
tablishment by the Communists of cruel and fiend-
ish border and internal security controls, designed
to preclude escape at any cost.
Our fundamental concern for the individual, our
traditional and deep-seated sympathy for the po-
litically oppressed, make the well-being of those
fortunate persons who do escape a matter of vital
national interest. Beyond that, our assistance
demonstrates in concrete form to the enslaved
millions in Communist-dominated lands the in-
herent humanity of free society. It gives assur-
ance of the continuity of our friendship for those
who are denied freedom. The anti-Commimist
refugee places his full reliance in the basic human-
itarianism which is the very life and blood of free,
democratic society. He is a symbol of the repudia-
tion of a regime which, ostensibly interested in
promoting the well-being of masses of individual
human beings, instead makes captives of them all
and with utter cynicism and brutality stamps out
those who seek to exercise the impulses of freedom
innate in all human beings. The tragic closure of
the East Zone border in Berlin by the Communists
on August 1'3 — fresh in the minds of you all — is a
classic illustration of the gulf between the human-
ity of the free world and the inhumanity of com-
munism. In this context the significance of ref-
ugee problems in the framing of our foreign
policy may be clearly recognized.
To give a succinct summary of our traditional
concern for refugees and the basis by which that
concern is woven into our foreign policy I call
January 15, 1962
103
your attention to the statements of President Ken-
nedy himself. Quoting from the text of a letter^
which he transmitted July 21, 1961, to the Presi-
dent of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House
of Representatives along with the administration's
proposed legislation for refugee and migration
programs, the President states :
The United States, consistent with the traditional
humanitarian regard of the American people for the in-
dividual and for his right to a life of dignity and self-
fulfillment, should continue to express in a practical
way its concern and friendship for individuals in free-
world countries abroad who are uprooted and unsettled
as the result of political conditions or military action.
The successful re-establishment of refugees, who for
political, racial, religious or other reasons are unable
or unwilling to return to their country of origin or of na-
tionality under conditions of freedom, dignity, and self-
respect, is importantly related to free-world political
objectives. These objectives are: (a) continuation of the
provision of asylum and friendly assistance to the op-
pressed and persecuted; (b) the extension of hope and
encouragement to the victims of communism and other
forms of despotism, and the promotion of faith among
the captive populations in the purposes and processes
of freedom and democracy; (c) the exemplification by
free citizens of free countries, through actions and sacri-
fices, of the fundamental humanitarianism which con-
stitutes the basic difference between free and captive
societies.
Some refugee problems are of such order of magnitude
that they comprise an undue burden upon the economies
of the countries harboring the refugees in the first in-
stance, requiring international assistance to relieve such
countries of these burdens.
President Kennedy went on to express his be-
lief that the Congress shares with him and with
the people of America pride in the generous and
successful efforts of the United States in helping
the homeless and stateless victims of war and
political oppression to live again as free men,
stressing too the decidedly political interests of
the United States to maintain and continue to en-
hance our policy and leadership with respect to
assisting refugees. He concluded with the follow-
ing statement :
This country has always served as a lantern in the dark
for those who love freedom but are persecuted, in misery,
or in need. We must and will continue to show the
friendship of the United States by doing our share in the
compassionate task of helping those who are refugees
today as were so many of our forefathers in the years
past.
' Bulletin of Aug. 7, 1961, p. 255.
104
It is my hope that, with the meager outline which
I have given you of who and where the refugees
are, coupled with the compelling words of Presi-
dent Kennedy as to why it is in our national inter-
est to help them, those of you in attendance who
are dedicated to the task of helping people on the
move will become reassured of the importance of
your tasks. May those of you here whose interest
in these unfortunate victims of oppression and mis-
fortune has been only casual become convinced of
the important role of private citizens and your
Government in continuing the support of the pro-
grams designed to bring hope, security, and peace
to all people forced to move. For it is you, your
organizations, your Government, and the people of
the entire free world in which you live who must
remember that today millions of refugees through-
out the world are in desperate want and thousands
more will be added to their numbers unless the
yearned-for miracle of a just and lasting peace is
soon forthcoming. But just to remember is not
enough. We must be prepared to act promptly
and effectively to meet the pressing problems posed
by these unfortunate victims of war and violence.
To do less would be to forsake our heritage and
renege upon our obligations to humanity itself.
Foreign Policy Briefings To Be Held
in Illinois and Minnesota
Press release 911 dated December 29
The Department of State will hold regional for-
eign policy briefing conferences at Chicago, 111.,
on February 1, 1962, and at Minneapolis-St. Paul,
Minn., on February 2. Representatives of the
press, radio and television, and nongovernmental
organizations concerned with foreign policy will
be invited to participate.
The Cliicago conference, which the Chicago
Council on Foreign Relations is sponsoring, will
bring together participants from Illinois and In-
diana. The Minneapolis-St. Paul meeting, to
which media and organization representatives
from North and South Dakota, Minnesota, and
Wisconsin are being invited, is being sponsored by
the Minnesota World Affairs Center and the Uni-
versity of Minnesota.
Chester Bowles, the President's Special Repre-
sentative and Adviser on African, Asian, and Latin
Department of State Bulletin
American Affairs, and other principal officers of
the Department of State and otlaer Government
agencies concerned with foreign affairs will take
part in both conferences.
These regional meetings continue the series
which was inaugurated in July of this year at San
Francisco and Denver and continued in October
at Kansas City and Dallas. Their purpose is to
provide opportunity for discussion of interna-
tional issues between those who inform the public
on the issues and the senior officers of the execu-
tive branch who have the responsibility for deal-
ing with them.
United States Extends
Further Credits to Brazil
Press release 918 dated December 29
The U.S. Government through the Agency for
International Development (AID) and the Ex-
port-Import Bank announced on December 29
that it is making available to Brazil credits of
$40 million. $15 million will be made available
out of AID funds and $2'5 million from the Ex-
port-Import Bank. The AID funds are provided
by an amendment to the loan signed on November
20, 1961, for $50 million.^ The AID loan makes
available $65 million of a total of $100 million
in credits earmarked for Brazil. The Export-
Import Bank funds constitute an advance under a
$168 million credit authorized by the Bank in
May 1961.
The purpose of the loans is to provide further
assistance to the Brazilian Government's program
of promoting economic and social progress under
conditions of financial stability. These objectives
are an essential part of the Alliance for Progress
concept, as expressed in the Chai-ter of Punta del
Este.=
The loans mark a further step in the imple-
mentation of the financial agreements concluded
between the United States and Brazil in May
1961.^ At that time the United States announced
$338 million in new credits, which were accom-
panied by new credits from other governments,
from private sources, and from international
' Bm-LETIN of Dee. 18, 1961, p. 1003.
" For text, see ibid., Sept. 11, 1961, p. 463.
'/6!(?.,June5, 1961, p. 862.
financial institutions. At the same time, arrange-
ments were made for the rescheduling of Brazilian
debts abroad. Of the $338 million, $100 million
was conditional upon the action taken by the
United States Congress on the foreign aid pro-
gram for 1962. The passage of the Act for In-
ternational Development has enabled the United
States to implement this part of the arrangement.
The funds made available on December 29 will
bring total drawings on U.S. Government credits,
under the May arrangement, to $209 million. This
represents a little more than 60 percent of the
total commitment of AID and Export-Import
Bank funds made under the financial agreement
in May of this year.
The proceeds of the loans will be used to help
Brazil finance essential imports from the United
States and assist the stabilization program which
is so necessary for the continued economic growth
of Brazil. In order to contribute most effectively
to the objective of easing Brazil's foreign debt re-
payment obligations, particularly during the next
few years, repayment of the AID loan will be
made in 40 years. Eepayment will be in dollars.
There will be a small credit fee of three-quarters
of 1 percent of the balance outstanding each year.
The Export-Import Bank loan is likewise a
long-term loan.
U.S.-Canadian Economic Committee
Meets at Ottawa
Press release 915 dated December 29
The seventh annual meeting of the joint United
States-Canadian Committee on Trade and Eco-
nomic Affairs will be held in Ottawa January 12
and 13, 1962.
Canada will be represented by the Honorable
Howard C. Green, Secretary of State for External
Affairs ; the Honorable Donald M. Fleming, Min-
ister of Finance; the Honorable George Hees,
Minister of Trade and Commerce; and the Hon-
orable Alvin Hamilton, Minister of Agriculture.
The United States will be represented by the
Honorable C. Douglas Dillon, Secretary of the
Treasury ; the Honorable Stewart H. Udall, Secre-
tary of the Interior; the Honorable Orville L.
Freeman, Secretary of Agriculture ; the Honorable
Luther H. Hodges, Secretary of Commerce; and
January 15, 1962
105
the Honorable George W. Ball, Under Secretary
of State.
The annual meeting of the Joint Committee pro-
vides an opportunity for officials at the Cabinet
level to review recent economic and trade devel-
opments of interest to the United States and Can-
ada. The meetings have been valuable over the
years in furthering understanding between the
two governments on questions affecting their eco-
nomic relations. The last meeting was held in
Washington March lS-14, 1961.^
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Atomic Energy
Amendment of article VI.A.3 of the Statute of the In-
ternational Atomic Energy Agency (TIAS 3873).
Done at Vienna October 4, 1961.'
Acceptances deposited: Norway, December 22, 1961 ;
Sweden, December 28, 1961 ; Tunisia, December 22,
1961; United Kingdom, December 12, 1961.
Germany
Agreement to supplement the agreement between the
parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the
status of their forces, signed at London June 19, 1951
(TIAS 2846), with resi)ect to foreign forces stationed
in the Federal Republic of Germany, and protocol of
signature. Signed at Bonn August 3, 1959.'
Ratification deposited: Canada, December 11, 1961.
Agreement to implement paragraph 5 of article 45 of the
agreement of August 3, 1959, to supplement the agree-
ment between the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty
regarding the status of their forces with respect to for-
eign forces stationed in the Federal Republic of Ger-
many. Signed at Bonn August 3, 1959."
Ratification deposited: Canada, December 11, 1961.
Property
Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial
property of March 20, 1883, revised at Brussels Decem-
ber 14, 1900, at Washington June 2, 1911, at The Hague
November 6, 1925, at London June 2, 1934, and at Lisbon
October 31, 1958. Done at Lisbon October 31, 1958.
Entered^ into force: January 4, 1962.
Telecommunications
International teleeommimication convention with six
annexes. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered
' For text of a joint communique issued at the close of
the meeting, see BtniETiN of Apr. 3, 1961, p. 487.
" Not in force.
into force January 1, 1961 ; for the United States Octo-
ber 23, 1961.
Accessimi as associate member deposited: Singapore-
British Borneo group (Singapore, Brunei (Protected
State), North Borneo, Sarawak), December 9, 1961.
BILATERAL
Brazil
Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace Corps
program in Brazil. Effected by exchange of notes at
Rio de Janeiro November 11, 1961. Entered into force
November 11, 1961.
El Salvador
General agreement for economic, technical, and related
assistance to El Salvador. Signed at San Salvador
December 19, 1961. Enters Into force on the date of
the communication by which the Government of Bl
Salvador notifies the Government of the United States
that it has been ratified.
Ethiopia
Agreement for financing certain educational exchange
programs, with exchange of notes. Signed at Addis
Ababa December 6, 1961. Entered into force December
6, 1961.
Mexico
Agreement further extending the agreement of August
11, 1951, relating to agricultural workers, as amended
and extended (TIAS 2331, 2531, 2586, 2928, 2932, 3043,
3054, 3454, 3609, 3714, and 4374). Effected by exchange
of notes at Mexico December 11, 1961. Entered into
force December 11, 1961.
Panama
General agreement for technical and economic coopera-
tion. Signed at Panami December 11, 1961. Enters
into force on the date of the communication by which
the Government of Panama notifies the Government of
the United States that it has been ratified.
Philippines
Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act
of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709),
with exchanges of notes. Signed at Manila Novem-
ber 24, 1961. Entered into force November 24, 1961.
Poland
Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of
1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709),
with exchanges of notes. Signed at Washington Decem-
ber 15, 1961. Entered into force December 15, 1961.
Viet-Nam
Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act
of 1954, as amended (68 St«t. 455; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709),
with exchange of notes. Signed at Saigon December
27, 1961. Entered into force December 27, 1961.
Yugoslavia
Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act
of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709).
with exchanges of notes. Signed at Belgrade December
28, 1961. Entered into force December 28, 1961.
106
Department of State Bulletin
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings^
Adjourned During December 1961
GATT Contracting Parties: 19th Session Geneva Nov. 13-Dec. 9
ICAO South American-South Atlantic Rules of the Air and Air Lima Nov. 14- Dec. 2
Traffic Services/Communications Meeting.
ICAO Limited European-Mediterranean Frequency Assignment Paris Nov. 14-Dec. 5
Planning Meeting.
U.N. EC AFE Regional Training Seminar on Trade Promotion . .. New Delhi Nov. 20-Dec. 22
U.N. ECE Committee on Agricultural Problems: 2d Meeting of Geneva Nov. 27-Dec. 1
Study Group for Projections on Agricultural Problems.
Inter-American Consultative Group on Narcotics Control Rio de Janeiro Nov. 27-Dec. 8
U.N. ECAFE Conference of Asian Statisticians: 4th Session . . . . Tokvo Nov. 27-Dec. 8
2d U.N. ECAFE/WMO International Seminar on Field Methods Bangkok Nov. 27-Deo. II
and Equipment Used in Hydrology and Hydrometeorology.
U.N. ECE Working Party on Gas Problems Geneva Nov. 29-Dec. 1
ITU Roundtable Discussions on Revisions of Radio Regulations Geneva Nov. 30-Dec. 2
and Schedule of Conferences.
U.N. ECE Committee on Agricultural Problems: 13th Session. . . Geneva Dec. 4-8
FAO Group on Coconut and Coconut Products: 4th Session. . . . Trivandrum, India Dec. 4-9
ILO Committee on Work on Plantations: 4th Session Geneva Dec. 4-15
OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party II (Economic Paris Dec. 5-7
Growth).
U.N. Consultative Group on Prevention of Crime and Treatment Geneva Dec. 5-15
of Offenders.
U.N. ECAFE Regional Seminar on Energy Resources and Electric Bangkok Dec. 6-16
Power Development.
OECD Group of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices .... Paris Dec. 7-9
United Nations Sugar Conference (resumed session) Geneva Dec. 7-14
Four-Power Foreign Ministers Meeting Paris Dec. 11-12
NATO Civil Aviation Planning Committee Paris Dec. 11-12
OECD Meeting of Experts on Sanitary Regulations Affecting Inter- Paris Dec. 11-14
national Trade in Fish and Fish Products.
IMCO Maritime Safety Committee: 2d Session of Subcommittee on London Dec. 11-15
Tonnage Measurement.
FAO International Rice Commission: 9th Meeting of Working New Delhi Dec. 11-16
Party on Rice Production and Protection.
FAO International Rice Commission: 8th Meeting of Working New Delhi Dec. 11-16
Party on Rice, Soil, Water, and Fertilizer Practices.
GATT Cotton Textile Committee: Technical Subcommittee . . . Geneva Dec. 11-22
OECD Economic Pohcy Committee: Working Party III (Balance Paris Dec. 12-13
of Payments).
OECD Fisheries Committee Paris Dec. 13-14
NATO Ministerial Council Paris Dec. 13-15
U.N. ECE Housing Committee: 22d Session Geneva Dec. 18-19
UNICEF Program Committee New York Dec. 18-19
U.N. Scientific Advisory Committee Geneva Dec. 18-19
U.N. ECAFE Committee on Industry and Natural Resources: Sub- Bangkok Dec. 18-22
committee on Electric Power.
U.N. ECE Housing Committee: Working Party on Housing and Geneva Dec. 19-22
Building Statistics.
UNICEF Executive Board New York Dec. 20-21
U.N. Economic and Social Council: 32d Session (resumed) .... New York Dec. 20-22
In Session as of December 31, 1961
5th Round of GATT Tariff Negotiations Geneva Sept. 1, 1960-
International Conference for the Settlement of the Laotian Question. Geneva May 16-
United Nations Gener.al Assembly: 16th Session (inrecess December New York Sept. 19-
20, 1961-Jauuary 15, 1962).
Conference on Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests (resumed Geneva Nov. 28-
session).
' Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Dec. 29, 1961. Following is a list of abbreviations: ECAFE,
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; FAO, Food and Agriculture
Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ILO,
International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU, International
Telecommunication Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development; U.N., United Nations; UNICEF, United Nations Children's Fund; WMO, World Meteorological
Organization.
January 75, 1962 107
United Nations Rules Out Change in Representation of China
Followi.ng are statements made in plenary hy
Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Representa-
tive to the General Assembly, on the question of
the representation of China in the United Nations,
together with texts of a resolution adopted on
Deceniber 15 and a Soviet draft resolution which
was rejected.
STATEMENT OF DECEMBER 1
U.S. delegation press release 3872
The question confronting the Assembly of the
representation of China in the United Nations is
of worldwide importance.
"We live in an age when the ever-expanding
family of nations is striving anew to realize the
vision of the United Nations Charter: a world
community, freed from the overhanging menace
of war, acting together in equal dignity and
mutual tolerance to create a better life for human-
ity. This very Assembly, in its majestic diver-
sity, is both the physical symbol and the practical
embodiment — however imperfect — of that tran-
scendent vision.
In striving toward that vision, what we decide
about the representation of China will have mo-
mentous consequences. For more is at stake than
the status of certain delegations. More is at stake
than the registering or reflecting of existing facts
of power. Indeed, the underlying question is how
the great people of China, who by a tragedy of
history have been forcibly cut off from their own
traditions and even led into war against the com-
munity of nations, can be enabled to achieve their
own desires to live with themselves and with the
rest of the world in peace and tolerance.
This question has a long history. For 12 years
past, ever since the Communist armies conquered
the Chinese mainland and the Republic of China
relocated its Government in Taipei, the commu-
nity of nations has been confronted with a whole
108
set of profoundly vexing problems. Most of them
have arisen from aggressive military actions by
the Chinese Communists — against Korea, against
the Government of the Republic of China on its
island refuge, against Tibet, and against south and
southeast Asia.
The problem before us today, in its simplest
terms, is this: The authorities who have carried
out those aggressive actions, who have for 12 years
been in continuous and violent defiance of the
principles of the United Nations and of the reso-
lutions of the General Assembly, and deaf to the
restraining pleas of law-abiding members, these
same warlike authorities claim the right to occupy
the seat of China here and demand that we eject
from the United Nations the representatives of the
Republic of China.
The gravity of this problem is heightened in its
worldwide political and moral significance by the
fact that the Republic of China's place in the
United Nations, since its founding in 1945, has
been filled by its representatives with distinction —
filled by representatives of a law-abiding govern-
ment which, under most difficult circumstances,
has done its duty well and faithfully in the United
Nations and against which there is no ground for
serious complaint, let alone expulsion.
The United States believes, as we have believed
from the beginning, that the United Nations
would make a tragic and perhaps irreparable mis-
take if it yielded to the claim of an aggressive and
unregenerate "People's Republic of China'' to re-
place the Republic of China in the United Nations.
I realize that we have sometimes been charged with
"unrealism" — and even with "ignoring the exist-
ence of GOO million people."
That is a strange charge. My country's soldiers
fought with other soldiers of the United Nations
in Korea for nearly 3 years against a huge invad-
ing army from the mainland of China. My coun-
try's negotiators have done tlieir best, for nearly 10
Deparfmenf of Sfafe Bulletin
years, at Panmunjom, at Geneva, at Warsaw, to
negotiate with the emissaries of Peiping.
No country is more aware of their existence. I
thirdc it could be said with more justice that it
would Ix; dangerously unrealistic if this Assembly
were to bow to the demands of Peiping to expel and
replace the Eepublic of China in the United Na-
tions; it would be ignoring the warlike character
and aggressive beliavior of the rulers who domi-
nate 600 million people and who talk of the inevi-
tability of war as an article of faith and refuse to
renounce the use of force.
An Era of Revolutionary Changes
To consider this subject in its proper light, Mr.
President, we must see it against the background
of the era in wliich we live. It is an era of sweep-
ing revolutionary changes. We cannot clearly see
the end. With dramatic swiftness the classic age
of empire is drawing to a close. More than one-
third of the member states of the United Nations
have won their independence since the United Na-
tions itself was founded. Today, together with all
other free and aspiring nations, they are working
to perfect their independence by developing their
economies and training their peoples. Already
they play a vital part in the community of nations
and in the work of this Organization.
Thus, for the first time in histoiy on this grand
scale, we have seen an imperial system end, not in
violent convulsions and the succession of still an-
other empire but in the largely peaceful rise of new
independent states — equal members of a world-
wide community.
So diverse is that commimity in traditions and
attitudes, so small and closely knit together is our
modern world, so much do we have need of one
another — and so frightful are the consequences of
war — that all of us whose representatives gather
in this General Assembly hall must more than ever
be determined, as the charter says, "to practice
tolerance and live together in peace with one an-
other as good neighbors." For there can be no in-
dependence any more except in a community, and
there can be no community without tolerance.
Such is one of the great revolutionary changes
of our time: a spectacular revolution of emancipa-
tion and hope. But this centuiy has also bred
more sinister revolutions bom out of reaction to
old injustices and out of the chaos of world war.
These movements have brought into being a plague
of warrior states — the scourge of our age. Tliese
regimes have been characterized not by democracy
but by dictatorship ; they have been concerned not
with people but with power, not with the consent
of the people but with control of the people, not
with tolerance and conciliation but with hatred,
falsehood, and permanent struggle. They have
varied in their names and their ideologies, but that
has been their essential character.
Nowhere have these qualities been carried to a
greater extreme, or on a grander scale, than on the
mainland of Cliina under Commimist rule. The
regime has attempted through intimidation,
hunger, and ceaseless agitation — and through a
so-called "commune" system which even allied
Communist states view with distaste — to reduce a
brilliant and spirited civilization to a culture of
military uniformity and iron discipline. Day and
night, by poster and loudspeaker and public ha-
rangue, the people are reminded of their duty to
hate the foreign enemy.
International Activities of Chinese Communists
Into the international sphere the Chinese Com-
munists have carried the same qualities of arro-
gance, regimentation, and aggression. Many
people hoped, after their invasion of Korea ended,
that they would thereupon give up the idea of
foreign conquest. Instead they sponsored and
supplied the communizing of North Viet-Nam;
they resumed their warlike threats against Tai-
wan ; they launched a campaign of armed conquest
to end the autonomy of Tibet ; and all along their
southern borders they have pressed forward into
new territory. To this day, in a fashion recalling
the early authoritarian emperors of China, they
pursue all these policies and in addition seek to use
the millions of Cliinese residing abroad as agents
of their political designs.
In fact these modern Chinese imperialists have
gone further than their imperial ancestors ever
dreamed of going. There are at this time, in
Communist China training centers for guerrilla
warfare, young men from Asia, Africa, and Latin
America being trained in sabotage and guerrilla
tactics for eventual use in their own countries.
Thus the strategy of Mao Tse-tung, of "protracted
revolutionary war in the rural areas," has become
one of the principal world exports— and no longer
an "invisible export"— of Communist Cliina.
January 75, J 962
109
We have exact information about some of these
activities. For example, we have the testimony
of six young men from the Republic of Cameroon
who traveled clandestinely from their country to
the mainland of China last year. They arrived in
China on June 9 and left on August 30. During
that period they had a 10-week course from
French-speaking instructors in a military academy
outside Peiping. The curriculum of this educa-
tional institution, taken from the syllabus those
men brought home, included such items as these:
Correct use of explosives and grenades.
Planning a sabotage operation.
How to use explosives against houses, rails,
bridges, tanks, guns, trucks, tractors, et cetera.
Manufacture of explosives from easily obtained
materials.
Manufacture and use of mines and grenades.
Use of semiautomatic rifles and carbines.
Theory and practice of guerrilla warfare, am-
bushes, attacks on communications.
Political lectures with such titles as "The People's
War," "The Party," "The United Front," and—
of course ! — "The Imperialists Are Only Paper
Tigers."
This, incidentally, was the fourth in a series of
courses to train Cameroonians to fight for the
overthrow not of European colonial rulers (for
their rule had already ended) but of their own
sovereign African government.
Such an aiEnity for aggressive violence, and for
subversive interference in other coimtries, is
against all the rules of the civilized world ; but it
accords with the outlook and objective of the
Peiping rulers. It was the supreme leader of
Chinese communism, Mao Tse-tung, who summed
up his world outlook over 20 years ago in these
words: "Everything can be made to grow out of
the barrel of a gun." And again: "The central
dutj' and highest fonn of revolution is armed sei-
zure of political power, the settling of problems by
means of war. This Marxist-Leninist principle is
universally correct, whether in China or in f oreigia
countries; it is always true."
President Tito of Yugoslavia knows to what ex-
tremes tliis dogma of violence has l)een carried.
In a speech to his people in 1958, he quoted the
"Chinese leaders" as saying with apparent com-
placency that "in any possible war . . . there
would still be 300 million left : that is to say, 300
million would get killed and 300 million would be
leftbehmd. . . ."
In an age when reasonable men throughout the
world fear and detest the thought of nuclear war,
from the Chinese Communist thinkers there comes
the singular boast that, after such a war, "on the
debris of a dead imperialism the victorious people
would create with extreme rapidity a civilization
thousands of times higher than the capitalist sys-
tem and a truly beautiful future for themselves."
In fact, only 3 months ago it was these same
Chinese Commimist leaders who officially ac-
claimed the resimiption of nuclear tests by the
Soviet Union as "a powerful inspiration to all
peoples striving for world peace." What a queer
idea of world i>eace they seem to have !
With such a record and such a philosophy of
violence and fanaticism, no wonder this regime,
after 12 years, still has no diplomatic relations
with almost two-thirds of the governments of the
world. One cannot help wondering what the
representatives of such a predatory regime would
contribute in our United Nations couiicils to the
solution of the many dangerous questions which
confront us.
I believe these facts are enough, Mr. President,
to show how markedly Commimist Cliina has
deviated from the pattern of progress and peace
embodied in our charter and toward which the
community of nations is striving. In its present
mood it is a massive and brutal threat to man's
struggle to better his lot in his own way — and
even, perhaps, to man's very survival. Its gigan-
tic power, its reckless ambition, and its imcon-
cem for human values make it the major world
problem.
What Can Be Done About the Red China Problem?
Now, what is to be done about tliis problem?
And what in particular c^n the United Nations
do?
The problem is, in reality, age-old. How can
those who prize tolerance and humility, those
whose faith commands them to "love those that
hate you" — how can they make a just reply to the
arrogant and the rapacious and the bitterly intol-
erant? To answer with equal intolerance woidd
be to betray our own humane values. But to
answer with meek submission or with a con-
venient pretense that wrong is not really wrong —
110
Department of State Bulletin
this would betray the institutions on which the
future of a 2:)eaceful world depend.
There are some who acknowledge the illegal and
aggressive conduct of the Chinese Communists
but who believe that the United Nations can some-
how accommodate this imbridled power and bring
it in some measure under the control, or at least
the influence, of the community of nations. They
maintain that this can be accomplislied by bring-
ing Communist China into participation in the
United Nations. By this step, so we are told, the
interplay of ideas and interests in the United
Nations would sooner or later cause these latter-
day empire-builders to abandon their warlike ways
and accommodate themselves to the rule of law
and the comity of nations.
Tliis is a serious view, and I intend to discuss
it seriously. Certainly we must never abandon
hope of winning over even the most stubborn
antagonist. But reasons born of sober experience
oblige us to restrain our wishful thoughts. There
are four principal reasons which I think are of
overriding importance, and I most earnestly urge
the Assembly to consider them with great care,
for the whole future of the United Nations may
be at stake.
My first point is that the step advocated, once
taken, is irreversible. We cannot try it and then
give it up if it fails to work. Given the extraor-
dinarj' and forbidding difficulty of expulsion
imder the charter, we must assume that, once in
our midst, the Peiping representatives would
stay — for better or for worse.
Secondly, there are ample grounds to suspect
that a power given to such bitter words and ruth-
less actions as those of the Peiping regime, far
from being reformed by its experience in the
United Nations, would be encouraged by its suc-
cess in gaining admission to exert, all the more
forcefully, by threats and maneuvers, a most dis-
ruptive and demoralizing influence on the Organ-
ization at this critical moment in its histoiw.
Thirdly, its admission, in circumstances in
which it continues to violate and defy the prin-
ciples of the charter, could seriously shake public
confidence in the United Nations — I can assure
you it would do so among the people of the United
States — and this alone would significantly weaken
the Organization.
Elementary prudence requires the General
Assembly to reflect that there is no sign or record
of any intention by the rulers of Communist China
to pursue a course of action consistent with the
charter. Indeed the signs all point the other way.
The Peiping authorities have shown nothing but
contempt for the United Nations. They go out
of their way to depreciate it and to insult its mem-
bers. They refuse to abandon the use of force in
the Taiwan Straits. They continue to encroach
on the territorial integrity of other states. They
apparently don't even get along very well with
the U.S.S.R. !
Fourth, Mr. President, and with particular em-
phasis, let me recall to the attention of my fellow
delegates the explicit conditions which the Chinese
Commimists themselves demand to be fulfilled be-
fore they will deign to accept a seat in the United
Nations. I quote their Prime Minister, Chou
En-lai :
The United Nations must expel the Chiang Kai-shek
clique and restore China's legitimate rights, otherwise it
would be impossible for China to have anything to do
with the United Nations.
In this short sentence are two impossible de-
mands. The first is that we should expel from the
United Nations the Republic of China. The
second, "to restore China's legitimate rights," in
this context and in the light of Peiping's persistent
demands, can have only one meaning: that the
United Nations should acquiesce in Communist
China's design to conquer Taiwan and the 11 mil-
lion people who live there and thereby to over-
throw and abolish the independent Government of
the Republic of China.
Rights and Actions of Republic of China
The effrontery of these demands is shocking.
The Republic of China, which we are asked to
expel and whose conquest and overtlirow we are
asked to approve, is one of the founding members
of the United Nations. Its rights in tliis Organi-
zation extend in an unbroken line from 1945,
when the charter was framed and went into effect,
to the present.
Mr. President, the Republic of China is a char-
ter member of this Organization. The seat of the
Republic of China is not empty ; it is occupied and
should continue to be occupied by the able dele-
gates of the Government of the Republic of China.
The fact that control over the Chinese mainland
was wrested from the Government of the Republic
January IS, 7962
111
of Cliina by force of arms, and its area of actual
control was thus greatly reduced, does not in the
least justify expulsion nor alter the legitimate
rights of the Government.
The de jure authority of the Government of the
Republic of China extends throughout the terri-
tory of China. Its effective jurisdiction extends
over an area of over 14,000 square miles, an area
greater than the territory of Albania, Belgium,
Cyprus, El Salvador, Haiti, Israel, Lebanon, or
Luxembourg — all of them member states of the
United Nations. It extends over 11 million
people, that is, over more people than exist in the
territory of 65 United Nations members. Its ef-
fective control, in other words, extends over more
people than the legal jurisdiction of two-thirds of
the governments represented here. The economic
and social standard of living of the people under
its jurisdiction is one of the highest in all Asia
and is incomparably higher than the miserable
standard prevailing on the mainland. The pro-
gressive agrarian policy of the Government of the
Republic of China and its progress in political,
economic, and cultural affairs contrast starkly
with the policies of the rulers in Peiping under
whom the unhappy lot of the mainland people has
been little but oppression, communes, famine, and
cruelty.
All those who have served with the representa-
tives of the Republic of China in the United Na-
tions know their high standards of conduct, their
unfailing dignity and courtesy, their contributions
and their consistent devotion to the principles and
the success of our Organization.
The notion of expelling the Republic of China
is thus absurd and imthinkable. But what are we
to say of the other condition sought by Peiping —
that the United Nations stand aside and let them
conquer Taiwan and the 11 million people who live
there? In effect Peiping is asking the United Na-
tions to set its seal of approval in advance upon
what would be as massive a resort to arms as the
world has witnessed since the end of World War
II. Of course the United Nations will never stul-
tify itself in such a way.
Issue Facing the United Nations
The issue we face is, among other things, tliis
question — whether it is right for the United Na-
tions to drive the Republic of China fi-om this
Organization in order to make room for a regime
whose appetite seems to be insatiable. It is
whether we intend to abandon the charter require-
ment that all United Nations members must be
peace-loving and to give our implicit blessing to
an aggressive and bloody war against those Chi-
nese who are still free in Taiwan. Wliat an invita-
tion to aggression the Soviet proposal ^ would be —
and what a grievous blow to the good name of the
United Nations !
In these circumstances the United States ear-
nestly believes that it is impossible to speak seri-
ously today of "bringing Communist China into
the United Nations." No basis exists on which
such a step could be taken. We believe that we
must first do just the opposite: We must instead
find a way to bring the United Nations — its law
and its spirit — back into the whole territory of
China.
The root of the problem lies, as it has lain from
the beginning, in the hostile, callous, and seem-
ingly intractable minds of the Chinese Communist
rulers. Let those members who advocate Peiping's
admission seek to exert upon its rulers wliatever
benign influence they can, in the hope of persuad-
ing them to accept the standards of the commimity
of nations. Let those rulers respond to these ap-
peals ; let them give up trying to impose their de-
mands on this Organization; let them cease their
aggression, direct and indirect, and their threats
of aggression ; let them show respect for the rights
of others ; let tliem recognize and accept the inde-
pendence and diversity of culture and institutions
among their neighbors.
Therefore, Mr. President, let the Assembly de-
clare the transcendent importance of this question
of the representation of China. Let us reaffirm
the position which the General Assembly took 10
years ago, that such a question as this "sliould be
considered in the light of the Purposes and Princi-
ples of the Charter. . . ."
The issue on which peace and the future of Asia
so greatly depend is not simply whether delegates
from Peiping should take a place in the General
Assembly. More profoundly still, it is whether
the United Nations, with its universal purjioses of
peace and tolerance, shall be permitted to take its
rightful place in the minds of the people of all of
China.
' U.N. doc. A/L. ."iOO.
112
Deparfmenf of Sfofe BulleHn
Today tlie rulers in Peiping still repeat the iron
maxim of Mao Tse-tmig: "All political power
grows out of the barrel of a gim." If that maxim
had been followed the United Nations would never
have been cresited and this world would long since
have been covered with radioactive ashes. It is an
obsolete maxim, and the sooner it is abandoned, the
sooner the people of all of China are allowed to re-
sume their traditionally peaceful policies, the bet-
ter for the world.
The United States will vote against the Soviet
draft resolution and give its full support to the
continued participation of the representatives of
the Government of the Eepublic of China in the
United Nations.
No issue remaining before the United Nations
this year has such fateful consequences for the
future of this Organization. The vital signifi-
cance which would be attached to any alteration
of the current situation needs no explanation.
The United States has therefore joined today with
the delegations of Australia, Colombia, Italy, and
Japan in presenting a resolution ^ imder wliich the
Assembly would determine that any proposal to
change the representation of China would be con-
sidered an important question in accordance with
the charter. Indeed, it would be hard to consider
such a proposal in any other light, and we trust it
will be solidly endorsed by the Assembly.
STATEMENT OF DECEMBER 14
D.S. delegation press release 3891
At this session of the General Assembly the
United States favored full and free debate on the
question of the representation of China in the
United Nations. We have been having just such
a debate for 2 weeks, and we have heard from no
less than 50 speakers.
At several points we have heard again some old
ideological tirades. History has been turned up-
side down by such statements that it was South
Korea which attacked North Korea on that
infamous Sunday morning in June 1950. And a
few of the speeches have been seasoned with
captious, capricious, and irrelevant inaccuracies.
I shall resist the temptation to contradict them in
detail.
' U.N. doc. A/L. 372.
January 75, 1962
Mr. President, I must however reply briefly to
a suggestion by several speakers — that the real
reason for United States opposition to a change in
Chinese representation is that we resent the "social
system" of the Peiping regime. This, of course,
is a red herring. It is well known that we main-
tain normal relations with a number of Commu-
nist states. We did not oppose the recent entry
of another such coimtry into this body. In recent
weeks the President of the United States said
quite clearly that we have no objection to a Com-
miuiist regime if that is what the people of a
certain country want for themselves.
No, Mr. President, that is not the problem. Nor
is it the problem that we are confusing 1962 with
1945 or 1949 ; indeed, we believe in the redemption
of sin — and letting bygones be bygones.
No amount of good will, of tolerance, of gen-
erosity, or of wishful thinking can obscure the
reality of 1961 — that we are asked to offer mem-
bership in this body to a regime which believes in
the rule of the gun, not the rule of reason or of
negotiation or of cooperative action, but the rule
of the gun!
And no amoimt of sentiment can obscure the
fact that the draft resolution of the Soviet Union
would give a license for the Peiping regime to use
armed force against a member who sits in this
Assembly. One can hardly accuse Ambassador
[Valerian A.] Zorin of equivocation on this point.
In his opening statement in this debate he was
explicit about the alleged "right" of Peiping to
"liquidate through the use of force" the Eepublic
of China on Taiwan. "That," he said, "is within
its exclusive right and nobody else's."
Mr. President, this body has devoted many
anguished hours to its duty and resolve to prevent
the use of force. Now we are faced with this
stupefying request to sanction the use of force.
And some would have us believe, Mr. President,
that this really is not an important question for
the United Nations — just a routine procedural
point for casual decision.
Mr. President, article IS of the charter, which
deals with the important-question issue, is not a
narrow, legalistic concept. In the wisdom of the
founders it is left to the Assembly to determine,
on general political grounds, what is and is not an
important question. And this is precisely what
the Assembly has done on one occasion after
113
another. There is nothing unusual about the pro-
cedure involved. For example, as recently as
October 27 this year, the Assembly decided by
vote that a resolution dealing with the report of
the Scientific Committee on Effects of Atomic
Radiation was of sufficient importance to require
for passage a two-thirds majority of all members
present and voting. This was fully in accordance
with the rules of procedure and article 18 of the
charter.
There has also been an effort to confuse this de-
bate by contending that a precedent was set for the
question before us when the Assembly accepted the
credentials of the representatives of the Republic
of the Congo (Leopoldville) in November I960.'
The statement has even been made that the resolu-
tion was passed by a simple majority.
In point of fact the resolution was passed by
better than a two-thirds majority. But that is not
the main point. The main point is that there is no
analogy between the presentation of credentials by
the unchallenged chief of state of a new nation
which has just achieved membership and the pres-
ent proposal to throw out a founding member and
replace it with representatives of another regime.
I hope no further effort will be made to confuse the
issue on this score.
Mr. President, I submit with all sincerity that
the proposal to expel a member which supports the
charter to make room for a regime which defies the
charter and to arm that regime with a United
Nations license to make war across the Formosa
Strait is wrong from the viewpoint of this Organ-
ization— is morally wrong — is legally wrong — is
unrealistic in the light of the relevant realities of
1961. And, whatever else may be said, it is in-
dubitably an important question — one of the most
important questions ever likely to come before us.
A recurrent theme running through the argu-
ments put forth by those who favor immediate ad-
mission of Red China is a plea for realism. Let
us face the fact, these speakers say, that the main-
land of China has been imder the control of the
Chinese Communist Party for, lo, tliese 12 years
past. Let us, they say, face the fact — repeated
from this rostrum scores of times during the past
10 days — that there are 650 or 700 million Chinese
people under the control of that regime. And,
" For background, see Buixetin of Dec. 12, 19G0, p. 904.
114
they say finally, let us face the fact that this is
1961, not 1945.
The idea behind this theme seems to be that
other delegations are guilty of a lack of realism
because they are not bowled over by the big reality,
which seems to be that Communist control of
mainland China is Communist control of main-
land China. But no one has disputed this obvious
fact. As I heard it repeated over and over, I
thought of the aphorism about the woodpecker:
"Thou sayest such undisputed things in such a
solemn way."
But these repeated facts only help to define the
problem ; they do not help to solve it.
Six "Realities" Bearing on Communist Regime
To act wisely on the matter before us, we must ■
look at all the relevant and current realities bear-
ing upon the Communist regime in Peiping and
the Organization it aspires to join. I suggest that
there are six such realities of major consequence
to the decision we are soon to make.
The -first reality is that the regime in Peiping
does not in any meaningful way represent those
700 million people of whom we have heard so often
these past 2 weeks: the mass executions, the iron
controls, the total suppression of all personal free-
dom and civil liberties, the 2 million Chinese refu-
gees in Hong Kong — these are proof enough.
The second reality is that the Conmninist Chi-
nese regime has already made a record of aggres-
sion and hostility toward its neighbors in Korea,
in Tibet, in India, and in soutlieast Asia.
The third reality is that the Chinese Commu-
nists are dedicated today — and as a matter of high
policy — to war and violent revolution in other
countries.
The fourth reality is that the Republic of China
is a founding member of the United Nations, that
the Government of the Republic of China exists,
and so do 11 million people on Taiwan, that its
delegation which sits here now has performed hon-
orable service to the United Nations and its
charter.
The fifth reality is the charter of the United
Nations, which sets forth explicitly the require-
ments for membership and the terms for expulsion.
The sixth reality is the proposal which is put to
us in the Soviet draft resolution, which is this:
that by our own deliberate action we are first to
Department of State Bulletin
thi'ow out a founding member wlio is guilty of
nothing in order to empty a seat in this hall; we
are then to invite another delegation to enter tliis
body on its own terms, to fill that empty seat ; and
we are to present that new delegation with a spe-
cial license to commit armed aggression against
the member we have just ejected illegally.
This is the reality of the proposal before us: to
violate our own charter to make room for a regime
whose creed and actions are diametrically opposed
to the letter and spirit of the U.N. Charter.
These are realities. These are facts. And it
is precisely these hard, cold, and current realities
of 100)1 which persuade my delegation that what
we are asked to do is not realistic but mirealistic.
And it is these realities which have been over-
looked or conveniently ignored by some who have
spoken on this subject in recent days.
World View of Peiping Regime
Mr. President, to be tolerant we do not have to
be naive ; to be generous we do not have to be fool-
hardy ; and to be realistic most certainly we do not
have to be carried away by wishful dreams.
I have in naind especially the suggestion made
by several speakers that once the Peiping regime
has been admitted to this Organization, it would
forthwith change its spots — and join cooperatively
with other nations to help keep the peace and
otherwise engage in constructive international
enterprise.
This is a most tempting thought which all of us
would like to share. But I still look for evidence
that there is any substance to it. All the evidence
points tlie other way. And it would be exceeding-
ly dangerous to substitute our hopes for the hard
evidence about the intentions of the Peiping regime
which is furnished to us by that regime itself.
This evidence is not of our manufacture. It is
not the product of ill will on our side. It is the
official evidence offered by the Peiping regime
itself — in its own words and in its own actions.
We would ignore it at our common peril because it
bears directly upon the work and the future of
this Organization. And it shows clearly just how
harmoniously the Peiping regime would fit into
the deliberations of this body — just how construc-
tive a contribution we could expect from this new
voice in the United Nations.
Let me remind the delegates of the basic world
view of the Peiping regime. It was put quite
clearly by Red Flag, the theoretical journal of the
central committee of the Chinese Commimist
Party, in April 1960.
"Everyone knows," says Red Flag, that there
are "principally two types of countries with social
systems fundamentally different in nature. One
type belongs to the world socialist system, the
other to the world capitalist system." This state-
ment means that in the eyes of Peiping every
member of this Assembly which does not belong
to the world Commimist system belongs by defini-
tion to what Peiping calls the "capitalist-imperial-
ist system" — for there are only two types of
countries.
And Red Flag goes on to announce "the capital-
ist-imperialist system absolutely will not crumble
by itself. It will be pushed over by the proletarian
revolution within the imperialist country con-
cerned, and the national revolution in the colonial
and semicolonial countries. Revolution means the
use of revolutionary violence by the oppressed
class, it means revolutionary war."
This concept is further borne out by a statement
from a senior official of the Chinese Communist
government, Tung Pi-wu, who declared on October
9, 1961, at a public meeting in Peiping, "in the
present epoch, only under the leadership of the
proletariat, and by obtaining the help of the So-
cialist coimtries, will it be possible for any coim-
try to win complete victory in its national and
democratic revolution." In other words a Com-
munist revolution, aided by external support from
Communist countries, must still be fostered in the
newly independent countries of the world.
Proof that these are not mere words was heard
in this Assembly only the other day, when the dis-
tinguished delegate of one new African nation
poignantly described Peiping's incessant cam-
paign to destroy his government through subver-
sion and guerrilla warfare.
Peiping's Views of Urgent World Problems
This is the world view of the Peiping regime,
and it should be warning enough to all of us. But
what does Peiping think more precisely about our
most urgent world problems — about the kind of
problem we attempt to deal with in these United
Nations ? I shall mention two — disarmament and
the U.N. operations in the Congo.
January 15, 1962
115
On disarmament we also find the evidence in
the same Red Flag article. Remember, if you
please, the premise that all nations wliich are not
members of the world Communist system are con-
sidered to be "imperialist". Red Flag says :
It ia . . . inconceivable that imperialism will accept a
proposal for general and complete disarmament. . . . only
when the Socialist revolution is victorious throughout
the world can there be a world free from war. . . .
Tliat takes care of our search for general dis-
armament. According to Peiping it is a hopeless
illusion until all governments have been over-
thrown by violent Commimist revolution. In the
meantime Peijiing's policy on the recent rupture
of the moratorium on nuclear testing is the fol-
lowing— in their own words, of course : "The Sovi-
et Government's decision to conduct experimental
explosions of nuclear weapons is in accord with the
interests of world peace and those of the people
of all countries."
As for the United Nations Operation in the
Congo, Peiping's policy is set forth as recently as
December 6 m the People's Daily ^ the official news-
paper of the Chinese Communist Party. Our
peacekeeping effort in the Congo, in which troops
of a score of members are involved, is described in
People's Daily as nothing but imperialism imder
United Nations cover. "As long as the Congo re-
mains occupied by the United Nations force," ac-
cording to Peopleh Daily, "the Congolese issue
will remain unsolvable and the freedom of other
African coimtries insecure." The article demands
an immediate stop to the United Nations Opera-
tion in the Congo.
That, of course, is a prescription for tribal strife,
chaos, and slaughter in the Congo — which, no
doubt, is what Peiping desires.
Finally, Mr. President, at the very moment
when some members of this Assembly were plead-
ing the qualifications of the Peiping regime for
membership in the United Nations, the PeopWs
Daily of December 10, 1961— just 4 days ago —
said:
All revolutionary people can never abandon the truth
that "all political power grows out of the barrel of a
gun. . . ."
The revolutionary theories, strategy and tactics,
summed up by the Chinese people in revolutionary practice
and expressed in a nutshell in Comrade Mao Tse-tung's
writings, are carrying more and more weight with the
people of various countries. . . .
To put it frankly, all ojiprossed nations and peoples will
sooner or later rise in revolution, and this is precisely why
revolutionary experiences and theories will naturally gain
currency among these nations and peoples. This is why
pamphlets introducing guerrilla warfare in China have
such wide circulation in Africa, Latin America and
Asia. . . .
Nowhere in this extraordinary dociunent do the
Chinese Communists deny that their actions have
been as I described them. Indeed, they boast-
fully announce their intention to continue spread-
ing violence and dissension abroad.
Note carefully, also, if you will, that none of
these official statements has anything to do with
membership or nonmembership in the United
Nations. Peiping does not say that it favors
atomic testing now but would feel differently if
admitted to the United Nations. Peiping does not
say that it wants the United Nations to abandon
the Congo now but would feel differently if
admitted to the United Nations. Peiping does
not say that, although it is now training guerrillas
for revolution in other countries, it would act
differently if admitted to the United Nations.
We have no other choice but to believe that
these policies would be pursued and advocated
in this very Assembly by Chinese Communist rep-
resentatives who believe that all political power
grows out of the barrel of a gim.
IVliat else can we assimie — and be realistic?
Wliat else can we expect — confronted with the
evidence ?
Responsibilities to People of the World
It seems to me, IMr. President, that the mem-
bers will be well advised to think careful!}' about
our obligations and responsibilities to the people
of the world, who want the United Nations to
continue as a going concern — and go on to new
strengths and new triumphs. They would do well
to consider the already-delicate deliberations of
this body — and the already-difficult operations on
wliich we are embarked. They would do well to
think long and hard about these things, and then
ask themselves whether the worlv of this body
would be helped or hindered by the presence here
of a delegation from Peiping.
One of the members, in the course of debate,
lamented at length on the sad plight of the people
on mainlaiul China. My delegation yields to no
otlier in its concern for the people of China. But
the delegate in question went on to suggest that
116
Department of Sfafe Bulletin
if Peiping were in the United Nations the Food
and Agriculture Organization "could have been
of assistance" to the hungry people of China.
Perhaps he does not know that Peiping rejected
an offer of help extended to the Cliinese Conunu-
nist Red Cross Society by the League of Red
Cross Societies — of which Communist China is
a member. "VVliile we know of it from the press,
the people on tlie Chinese mainland never were
told tliat sucli an offer of international assistance
had been extended.
Would Peiping, which refused help for its own
people from one humanitarian international or-
ganization to wliich it belongs, accept help from
another international organization ?
In the meantime, Mr. President, it is not my
delegation which presumes to pass judgment on
others. We are not, as several have implied,
inventing some subtle moral criterion to dexiide
who is good and who is bad, who is correct and
■who incorrect, who is respectable and not respect-
able.
On the contrary, the principles to which mem-
bers of the United Nations are bound are stated
quite explicitly in the charter in terms which we
would be the last to want to refine. And the evi-
dence of Peiping's disdain for these principles is
written with equal clarity. We ask only that each
member compare the official charter and the official
record.
Mr. President, the Soviet proposal and the
amendment ^ to it submitted by three delegations
not only call for the expulsion of a loyal member
of the United Nations but implicitly would encour-
age the Chinese Communists to use force to achieve
their objectives.
For these reasons we believe that the Soviet
proposal to unseat the Government of the Republic
of China and replace it with, a delegation from
Peiping should be emphatically rejected, and we
will vote against it.
Tlie amendment to that proposal submitted by
the delegations of Cambodia, Ceylon, and Indo-
nesia, while set forth with greater sophistication
* U.N. doc. A/L. 375. The amendment called for dele-
tion of the operative paragraphs of the Soviet draft resolu-
tion and substitution of the following paragraph : "De-
cides in accordance with the above declaration that the
representatives of the Government of the People's Repub-
lic of China be seated in the United Nations and all its
organs."
than the Soviet proposal, clearly would have the
same effect. We believe it shoidd be likewise re-
jected and will accordingly vote against it, also.
And for all these reasons I am equally confident
that the members will confirm the plain fact that
any proposal to alter the representation of Cliina
in the United Nations would be a vitally impor-
tant question under the charter.
TEXTS OF RESOLUTIONS
Important-Question Resolution '
The General Assembly,
Holing that a serious divergence of views exists among
Members concerning the representation of a founder Mem-
ber who is named in the Charter of the United Nations,
Recalling that this matter has been described repeatedly
in the General Assembly by all segments of opinion as
vital and crucial and that on numerous occasions its in-
scription on the agenda has been requested under rule 15
of the rules of procedure as an item of an important and
urgent character,
Recalling further the recommendation contained in Gen-
eral Assembly resolution 396 (V) of 14 December 1950
that, "whenever more than one authority claims to be the
government entitled to represent a Member State in the
United Nations and this question becomes the subject of
controversy in the United Nations, the question should be
considered In the light of the purposes and principles of
the Charter and the circumstances of each case,"
Decides in accordance with Article 18 of the Charter
that any proposal to change the representation of China
is an important question.
Soviet Draft Resolution "
The General Assembly,
Considering it necessary to restore the lawful rights of
the People's Republic of China in the United NaUons,
Bearing in mind that only representatives of the Gov-
ernment of the People's Republic of China are competent
to occupy China's place in the United Nations and all
its organs,
Resolves to remove immediately from all United Nations
organs the representatives of the Chiang Kai-shek clique
who are unlawfully occupying the place of China in the
United Nations,
Invites the Government of the People's Republic of
China to send its representatives to participate in the
work of the United Nations and of all its organs.
'U.N. doe. A/RES/1668(XVI) (A/L.372) ; adopted on
Dec. 15 by a vote of 61 to 34, with 7 abstentions.
' U.N. doc. A/L.360 ; rejected on Dec. 15 by a vote of
36 to 48, with 20 abstentions. (Subsequently, Norway
requested that its vote be recorded as in favor and not as
an abstention.)
January IS, 1962
117
U.S. and GATT Reaffirm Cooperation
in New World Trading Situation
Following is an exchange of messages between
E. P. Barhosa da Sil-va, Chairman, of the Contract-
ing Parties to the General Agreement on Tarijfs
and Trade, and Under Secretary George W. Ball.
Mr. Ball was the U.S. representative to the minis-
terial meeting held at Geneva November 27-30 in
conjunction with the 19th session of tJie GATT
Contracting Parties November 13-December 9.
Mr. Barbosa da Silva to Mr. Ball
December 8, 1961
The Contracting Parties today endorsed with
enthusiasm the important declaration proposed by
you to ministers and endorsed by them.^ We are
planning to go ahead actively to pursue the direc-
tions given to us by ministers. We are heartened
by the statement made by you and President
Kennedy. We look forward to GATT going from
strength to strength under the enlightened leader-
ship of the United States. Kind regards.
Mr. Ball to Mr. Barbosa da Silva
December 16, 1961
I appreciate very much your message as Chair-
man of tlie Contracting Parties to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which was trans-
mitted to me by the United States Mission in
Geneva. We too look forward to continuous
strengthening of the GATT as the instrument for
broad international cooperation in the trade field.
I certainly hope that we will be able to work
together to make some real progress in promoting
trade which will be beneficial to the developing
countries. I am confident that the resolution on
the trade of the developing countries adopted by
ministers will provide a basis for making the
GATT an increasingly effective instrument in this
respect. As you know, President Keiuiedy will
ask for legislation which seeks broad new author-
ity to enable us better to deal with the new trading
situation that exists in the world.
I am looking forward to our continuing close
cooperation in removing barriers to international
trade.
' For background and text of declaration, see BtJiiEXiN
of Jan. 1,1962, p. 3.
118
DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE
Designations
Chester Bowles as the President's Special Representa-
tive and Adviser on African, Asian, and Latin American
Affairs, effective December 1.
Resignations
Salvatore A. Bontempo as Administrator of the Bureau
of Security and Consular Affairs, effective January 2.
(For an exchange of letters between Secretary Rusk
and Mr. Bontempo, see Department of State press release
922 dated December 30.)
Checl< List of Department of State
Press Releases: December 25-31
Press releases may be obtained from the Ofl3ce of
News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.
Release appearing in this issue of the BirLLBrnN
which was issued prior to December 25 is No. 838
of December 4.
No.
Date
904 12/26
t905
*906
12/26
12/26
♦907
12/27
*908
12/28
909
12/28
*910
12/29
911
12/29
912
t913
12/29
12/29
Subject
Japanese-American conference on cul-
ture and education (rewrite).
Williams : Sigma Delta Chi, Detroit
U.S. participation in international
conferences.
Rowan: Phi Beta Sigma, Philadel-
phia.
Handley sworn in as Ambassador to
Mali (biographic details).
Cleveland : statement on U.N. bond
issue.
Holiday entertainment fo foreign
students.
Regional foreign policy brifing con-
ferences.
Robert Kennedy travel plans.
Rusk: message to Philippine Vice
President on Rizal Day.
Stevenson : report to President on first
part of 16th session of U.N. General
Assembly.
U.S.-Canadian Committee on Trade
and Economic Affairs.
Harriman : Jos6 Rizal Day.
Rusk : American Historical Associa-
tion.
Extension of credits to Brazil.
Rusk: interview on Hearst Metro-
tone/Telenews.
Agreement with Slesico on deliveries
of Colorado River water.
Department statement on Tshombe
charges.
Bontempo resignation : exchange of
letters with Secretary Rusk.
AID loan to Korea.
♦Not printed.
tHeld for a later Issue of the Bulletin.
t914 12/30
915 12/29
t916
917
12/29
12/29
918
t919
12/29
12/30
t920
12/29
921
12/29
*922
12/30
tn2.3
12/30
Department of State Bulletin
January 15, 1962
Index
Vol. XLVI, No. 1177
Brazil. United States Extends Further Credits
to Brazil 105
Canada. U.S.-Canadian Economic Committee Meets
at Ottawa 105
China. United Nations Rules Out Change in Rep-
resentation of China (Stevenson, texts of resolu-
tions) 108
Colombia. President and Mrs. Kennedy Visit
Venezuela and Colombia (Kennedy) 89
Communism. Some Issues of Contemporary His-
tory (Rusk) 83
Congo (Leopoldvilk)
Some Issues of Contemporary History (Busk) . . 83
U.S. Refutes False Katangan Charges of Interfer-
ence in Negotiations 95
Department and Foreign Service
Designations (Bowles) 118
Resignations (Bontempo) 118
Economic Affairs
U.S. and GATT Reaffirm Cooperation in New World
Trading Situation (Ball, Barbosa da Silva) . . 118
U.S.-Canadian Economic Committee Meets at Ot-
tawa 105
Educational and Cultural Affairs. Cultural and
Educational Exchange To Be Discussed by U.S.
and Japan 99
Foreign Aid. United States Extends Further Cred-
its to Brazil 105
Germany
Attorney General Kennedy Completes Plans for
February Trip 99
Some Issues of Contemporary History (Busk) . . 83
Indonesia. Attorney General Kennedy Completes
Plans for February Trip 99
International Organizations and Conferences
Calendar of International Conferences and Meet-
ings 107
U.S. and GATT Reaffirm Cooperation in New World
Trading Situation (Ball, Barbosa da Silva) . . 118
Iran. Attorney General Kennedy Completes Plans
for February Trip • 99
Japan
Attorney General Kennedy Completes Plans for
February Trip 99
Cultural and Educational Exchange To Be Dis-
cussed by U.S. and Japan 99
Presidential Documents
President and Mrs. Kennedy Visit Venezuela and
Colombia 89
President Holds Talks in Bermuda With Prime Min-
ister Macmillan 94
Public Affairs. Foreign Policy Briefings To Be
Held in Illinois and Minnesota 104
Refugees. People on the Move (Brown) .... 100
Treaty Information. Current Actions 106
U.S.S.R. United Nations Rules Out Change in Rep-
resentation of China ( Stevenson, texts of resolu-
tions) 108
United Kingdom. President Holds Talks in Ber-
muda With Prime Minister Macmillan (text of
Joint communique) 94
United Nations
The United Nations Bond Issue (Cleveland) ... 96
United Nations Rules Out Change in Representa-
tion of China (Stevenson, texts of resolutions) . 108
Venezuela. President and Mrs. Kennedy Visit
Venezuela and Colombia (Kennedy, text of joint
communique) 89
'Name Index
Ball, George W 118
Barbosa da Silva, B. P 118
Betancourt, Bomulo 90
Bontempo, Salvatore A 118
Bowles, Chester 118
Brown, Richard R 100
Cleveland, Harlan 96
Kennedy, President 89, 94
Macmillan, Harold 94
Rusk, Secretary 83
Stevenson, Adlai E 108
SOCIAL sciew:es deft
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OFFICrAU BUSINESS
THE ELEMENTS IN OUR CONGO POLICY
On June 30, 1960, the Republic of the Congo, a former Belgian
colony, was declared a sovereign and independent state. Five days
after independence the army mutinied. A total breakdown of law
and order ensued and the Congo began falling apart. The Govern-
ment of the Congo, faced with full-scale anarchy, civil war, and the
inevitable consequences of great-power intervention, called on the
United Nations for help.
This 22-page booklet, based on an address by Under Secretary of
State George W. Ball, reviews the situation in the Congo, describes
the purposes and operations of the United Nations there, and outlines
the United States objectives for that country, namely, "a free, stable,
non-Communist government as a whole, dedicated to the maintenance
of genuine independence and willing and able to cooperate with us
and with otlier free nations in meetmg the tremendous internal
challenges it must face."
Publication 7326
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Please send me.... copies of THE ELEMENTS IN OUR CONGO POLICY.
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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Vol. XLVI, No. 1178
January 22, 1962
EKLY RECORD
SECRETARY RUSK INTERVIEWED ON "RE-
PORTERS ROUNDUP'' 123
ATLANTIC UNITY— KEY TO WORLD COMMUNITY •
by Under Secretary McGhee 131
U.S. RECORD ON THE CONGO: A SEARCH FOR
PEACEFUL RECONCILIATION • by Assistant
Secretary VTilliams 136
WORLD FOOD PROGRAM: A NEW OPPORTUNITY
FOR THE UNITED NATIONS • Statement by
Richard N. Gardner 150
SECURITY COUNCIL CONSIDERS SITUATION IN
GOA; SOVIET VETO BARS CALL FOR CEASE-
FIRE • Statements by Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson . . 145
TED STATES
EIGN POLICY
For index see inside back cover
Boston Public Library
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Use of funds for printing of this publica-
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of the Hudnet (January 19, 1801).
Note: Contents of this publication are not
co|)yriglited and items contained herein may
be reprinted. Citation of the Dki-artmest
or State Bi'i.i.etin as the source will bo
appreciated. The Bulletin is Indexed In the
Headers' Guide to Periodical Literature.
Vol. XLVI, No. 1178 • Publication 7330
January 22, 1962
The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Public Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public
and interested agencies of the
Government mith information on
developments in the field of foreign
relations and on tlie icork of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service. The BULLETIN includes se-
lected press releases on foreign policy,
issued by tlie White House and
Department, and statements and >
dresses made by the President and
the Secretary of State and oth
officers of the Department, as well
special articles on various pliases <
internatiotuil affairs and the func
tions of the Department. Informa-
tion is included concerning treaties
and interiuuional agreements to
which the United States is or nwy
become a party and treaties of gen-
eral intcnmtiorutl interest.
Publications of the Department,
United Nations documents, and legis-
Uitive material in the field of inter-
rwitiomil relafiorvs are listed t-urrrntly.
Secretary Rusk Interviewed on ''Reporters Roundup"
Following is the transcrift of an interview of
Secretary Rusk hy Charles Batchelder of the Mu-
tual Broadcasting System and Endre Marton of
the Associated Press on the radio program ^'■Re-
porters Roundup^'' broadcast over the Mutual
Broadcasting System on January 7. The mod-
erator of the program was Ken French of MBS.
Press release 11 dated January 6
Q. Mr. Secretary, the central issue, of course,
reviains Berlin. After about 3 months of prax-
tically no contact with the Soviets, Ambassador
Thompson again began explori7ig what the
chances are of the Berlin settlement. The few
reports on the first Thompson-Gromyko meeting
speculated about the possibility of a very limited
agreement, some kind of a modus vivendi.
Could you say, sir, that these reports were
correct, and, generally, do you consider the first
Thompson-Gromyko conference to represent prog-
ress f
A. Well, Mr. Marton, as we move into the new
year the Berlin question, of course, remains a very
important and potentially dangerous issue. We
are now, as you intimated, engaged in exploratoi-y
talks with the Soviet Union to find out whether
there is a basis for negotiation looking toward an
agreement. Now the differences between a ne-
gotiated agreement and what has been referred to
as a jnodus vivoidi are not very great. But I
tliink the problem is how extensive, how thorough,
how complete an agreement can be found on the
one side. What will be involved will be some ar-
rangements which will protect the vital interests
of all concerned without a resort to force. It's
much premature to speculate about how these talks
may develop, but, as you know, Ambassador
Thompson's talks will continue and we are some-
what encouraged to know that this issue is in the
course of discussion and that there is responsible
contact among the Governments involved.
Q. Mr. Secretary, let me ask a question at this
time thafs pertinent to this. Does or does not
President de Gaulle of France support this ne-
gotiation or this inquiry?
A. Well, there is complete agreement among
the principal Western Powers on the basic issues
in the Berlin question. General de Gaulle has
some very considerable reluctance about engaging
ill fonnal negotiations until it is quite clear that
there is an adequate basis for such negotiations.
My understanding is that he does not object to
these exploratory talks wliich are now going on.
The Laotian Question
Q. Mr. Secretary, could loe go over to another
area of unpleasant news? The three princes of
Laos apparently got noiohere, having met after
xoeeks of procrastination. Could you explain now,
sir, how much i^ really at stake if we are not going
ahead with the task of unification and what are
the alternatives?
A. The Laotian question has moved very far
toward a settlement insofar as the Geneva con-
ference is concerned.^ There, on the international
side, governments have worked out, or come very
close to working out, arrangements wliich would
be designed to safeguard the independence and
neutrality of Laos. Now these negotiations in
Geneva can't get much further until there is in
fact a government in Laos which can speak for
the entire country and can midertake the respon-
sibilities and obligations of neutrality and inde-
pendence. That, of course, depends upon the
ability of the Laotian leaders themselves to work
out some sort of government which will be able to
pursue a neutral, independent policy. These talks
are, at the present time, in a state of suspension.
I myself do not believe that they have been ter-
' For baeki^ound, see BuiiETiN of June 5, 1961, p. 844 ;
June 26, 1961, p. 1023 ; and July 10, 1961, p. 85.
January 22, ?962
123
minated. These are not matters which can be
worked out quickly and easily, because the feelings
are high and memories are long and the experience
in that country has been bitter. We expect that
there will be additional talks with and among these
Laotian leaders, and we're not by any means
abandoning hope that an arrangement can be
reached.
India and Goa
Q. Could we move to another scene, Mr. Secre-
tary, and that is India. What is your reaction at
this time to the change — apparent change — in at-
titude of Mr. Nehru by using force against Goa and
against the Portuguese group over there? Does
this weaken his position in the world among the
neutral nations, so-called?
A. Well, the attitude of the United States to-
ward the use of force in Goa was made very clear
indeed by Ambassador Stevenson during the dis-
cussion in the Security Council in the United
Nations.^ We made vigorous representations in
India with respect to the use of force before this
event occurred, and Ambassador Stevenson indi-
cated our attitude toward it.
I do think that India has delivered something
of a shock to opinion in many other countries. I
do not myself believe that this anticipates a major
change in orientation in Indian foreign policy.
This particular problem has been there for a long
time and had many special characteristics of its
own ; but I think that we can't know for a while
yet exactly how this will affect India's position
among other coimtries, including the neutrals.
Q. You mentioned something tliat brings up
still another phase of the Goa question, and that
is this. Of course Portugal has threatened
through Premier Salazar to withdraw from the
United Nations. Do you think that that, in this
case, would make the United Nations stronger or
less important during J 062, or would it affect their
place in the world?
A. Well, I think that any use of force contrary
to the charter does to that extent weaken the
peacekeeping machinery of the United Nations,
and from that point of view this was most un-
fortunate. I myself hope very much that Portugal
will not withdraw from the United Nations. I
think it still is the most important international
forum for the settlement of problems and for
achieving cooperation on a worldwide basis — on
a general basis — and I would hope very much that
it would continue to play that role with as wide
membership as possible. I feel quite certain that
Portugal has much to gain from continued mem-
bership in the U.N. and the U.N. has much to gain
from having Portugal there.
Q. Mr. Secretary, another related question.
Does this incident, or whatever you may call it,
affect our thinking on aiding India?
A. Well, I think that we have a basic American
interest in the economic and social development
of India and that we have not abandoned that
policy or that interest as a result of this Goa
question.
Q. Have you revised your thinking?
A. I would not say that we have revised our
approach to this problem. We do have commit-
ments, as you know, to the Indian longtime devel-
opment program, and I would expect that we
would continue on those commitments.
Disarmament Discussions
Q. Mr. Secretary, the new negotiating body on
dlsar^nament will m^eet on March Hth. Now, in
view of the basic difference between the American
and Soviet philosophy on how to achieve disar-
mament, is there any basis or hope that a new
round of talks will bring us any Jiearer to this
goal?
A. We felt that the establislmient of the forum
itself was at least a small step toward a serious dis-
cussion of disarmament. Earlier we had agreed
on certain principles governing disarmament with
the Soviet Union,' but that statement of principles
also reflected a far-reaching and most fundamen-
tal disagreement. To put it briefly, the Soviet
Union is willing to have inspection of those arms
which are destroyed or given up but is not willing
to have inspection of those arms which are re-
tained, and we believe that we cannot have an
effective disarmament without complete assur-
ance and verification to the rest of us that the
• See p. 145.
124
' For text of a joint stiitement of agreed principles, see
Bulletin of Oct. 9, 1'JCl, p. .%SS>.
Deparfmenf of Sfa/e Bw//e/in
conditions of any agreement, the provisions of
any agreement, are in fact being carried out.
Now this particular point of disagreement, Mr.
Marten, is both fundamental and far-reaching,
and I think one would not wish to be optimistic
about a particular discussion that might convene
on March 14th or thereabouts; but nevertheless the
issue of disarmament, particularly in light of
modern weapons, is so important, the dangers of
the alternatives are so great, that we feel we must
keep gnawing at it, working at it, trying our best
to find a practical and safe means by which man-
kind can move into a period of reduced arms and
to some limitation on the arms race.
The Cuban Issue
Q. Mr. Secretary, could I hring this Soviet
threat just a little closer home — in other xoords,
could loe dbicuss Cuba a hit? The State Depart-
ment has issued a white paper* a cornplete review
of the Red infiltration of Guha and Castro's af-
filiation. What can the United States do now
about Cuba?
A. Well, we have been very much encouraged
to find that throughout Latin America there is an
increasing awareness of the nature of the develop-
ment in Cuba, the threat of that particular kind
of penetration of this hemisphere by outside in-
fluence and outside elements, and the threat which
that poses to the rest of the hemisphere. We shall
be coming up to a meeting January 22d of the for-
eign ministers of the American states, and we be-
lieve that the meeting will clearly record the con-
cern of the hemisphere in this development and
that various measures will be effectively discussed
looking toward an isolation of Castroism and this
type of penetration in this hemisphere, as a part
of the basic protection of the hemisphere written
into the basic charters of the American systems.
Q. Is there any way this government could be
overthrown from the outside?
A. Well, I wouldn't at tliis point want to get
into that question, Mr. Batchelder. I believe that
basically the overthrow of the Cuban government
is a problem for the Cuban people. Of course, if
there were overt acts of aggression against Cuba's
neighbors, that would raise some very serious prob-
lems indeed.
Q. Mr. Secretary, the latest question first. Isn't
there a danger that this issue, the Cuban issue,
will be sort of watered down again as it happened
in San Jose? "
A. Well, I wouldn't want to speculate today,
Mr. Marton, about what the results of the meeting
will be. We are in very active discussion with the
other governments of the hemisphere about that.
Now I would not think that the problem would be
watering down to the point where the hemisphere
would appear to be unconcerned about this matter.
I think that this is a matter about which there is
very great interest throughout the hemisphere.
The West New Guinea Problem
Q. May I ash a question, too? Well jump to
another hemisphere, Mr. Secretary, and that is
the problem which is occurring in Indonesia and
the Netherlands and Dutch West New Guinea.
The United States, it is said, has at one time
offered its service as mediator, and then that has
again been denied. Do you care to clear ics up
on that?
A. Well, we have not at any time formally of-
fered our services as mediator. This is one of those
many, many issues which come to our desk be-
cause, when friends of ours in different parts of
the world find themselves in disagreement with
each other, each comes to us to ask if we can be of
some assistance in the dispute.
We have been involved in a certain sense with
this question since the late forties at the time of
the first movement for Indonesian independence,
and the West New Guinea problem is something
that was not clarified completely in the minds of
both Governments at that time. We see no reason
why this matter cannot be effectively discussed
between the two Governments and some sort of
peaceful settlement reached; but we're not in a
position of formal mediation.
Q. Do you actually expect that the Indonesians
IV ill use force?
A. I wouldn't want to speculate on that. I think
the use of force in a situation of this sort would
* For a Department announcement and text of the sum-
mary section of the report, see p. 129.
^ For text of Declaration of San Jos6, see Bulletin of
Sept. 12, 1960, p. 407.
January 22, ?962
125
itself be a very serious matter and -would, I think,
be contrary to Indonesia's obligations.
Q. Mr. Secretary, to conclude on a more philo-
sophical vein, the neio editor of the Saturday
Evenimg Post said in his editorial columm, the other
day, "/ feel that we, collectively, have grown
fearful and hesitant. . . . There is a danger that
in our maturity tve have become tired and cynical,
overzealous for security, afraid to live and afraid
to die.''"'
I wonder, sir, how you feel about this rather
melancholy statement.
A. Well, my guess is that if we could consult
the historians we would find expressions of that
sort made regularly for the last two or three cen-
turies, as people look at the scene of their own
time. I do not myself underestimate the whirl,
the capacity, the concern, the dedication, the com-
mitment, of the American people and the people
of the free world to continue this great struggle
for freedom. We, I think, in times of peace, in
times of relative ease, tend to think that we're
going soft in some way; but when you think of
the generation that grew up in a rather pacifist
period during the thirties and remember that that
was the generation that fought and won World
War II, when you think of the great performance
of young people who came through the flapper age
of the twenties, I am not one to lose confidence
in free peoples, and I think we'd make a great
mistake if we felt that the peoples of the free
world are not prepared to do what is necessary
to continue this great historical fight for freedom.
Q. Mr. Secretary, one additional question.. In
your immediate future you have to look to the
convening of Congress on the 10th of this month,
and I knoiu that problems ivill be faced there.
Would yoxb like to discuss your relations with
Congress so far and the foreign relation.^ commJf-
tees in pai'ticxdar?
A. Well, I believe, Mr. Batchelder, as I ran
over some time ago for another purpose a quick
count, I met conmiittees or a considerable group
of Congressmen some 45 times during the last
session. This is not only an indispensable part
of the relationships between the executive and
legislative branch, but from my point of view it is
a most valuable experience. I myself do not regret
this time whatever. If you will look around
Washington and you look for the people who
have had a responsible relationship with foreign
affairs over a long period of time, you will find
many of those people on the key committees of
the Congress. People in the executive branch come
and go, as you know. These are very, very valu-
able exchanges, particularly in the executive ses-
sions of these committees, where both the executive
and the legislative can look at these problems in
all of their depth and complexity and look at the
alternatives. I can assure you that in those dis-
cussions partisanship almost never enters into the
picture.
Moderator: Thank you very much. Secretary
Rusk.
Secretary Rusk Interviewed
on Hearst Metrotone/Telenews
Following is the transcript of an intervieio of
Secretary Rusk by Charles Shiitt of Hearst Metro-
tone/Telenews.
Press release 919 dated December 30, for release January 1
Mr. Shutt: As we begin a new year, Mr. Secre-
tary, what do you consider the prospects of achiev-
ing peaceful settlements in 1962 in the Congo,
Southeast Asia, and Berlin ?
Secretary Rusk : Well, Mr. Shutt, one of the pri-
mary tasks of foreign policy is to try to protect
the vital interests of our country, by peaceful
means if possible. The situation in each of these
three cases is somewhat different.
In the Congo, you will recall that in 1960 the
United Nations was called into the Congo to pre-
vent that country from settling into complete
chaos and to avoid its becoming a battleground of
great contending forces from the outside. Now
they have had a difficult year, but we believe that
there is a fair prospect that the Congolese leaders
themselves can continue their talks, agree on a
constitutional arrangement which is satisfactory
to them, and establish a moderate government un-
der which that potentially rich countiy can take
up again the great tasks of economic and social
development. I would be inclined to be optimistic
about the Congo.
In Southeast Asia the Laotian question depends
now for solution on the ability of the Laotian
leaders themselves to agree on a neutral coalition
126
Department of State Bulletin
goveriunent. That has proved to be a difficult
agreement to reach, although the international ar-
rangements for a neutral Laos have almost been
completed in the discussions at Geneva. I would
not want to predict what the outlook is in Laos at
this time.
In Viet- Nam there is an aggression being sup-
ported, stimulated, and supplied from the outside
against South Viet-Nam, and we, as you know,
have stepped up sharply our aid to that country,
and we suppose that in these next few months
there will be considerable strife as the Government
attempts to deal with the guerrillas that are active
there.
In Berlin I think that the free world has taken
an important first step toward a peaceful solution.
They have made it quite clear that the free world
considers that its vital interests are engaged in
West Berlin and that those vital interests will be
protected with whatever it takes to protect them.
The free world is united on that; the NATO al-
liance is firm on that. We are in contact with the
Soviet Government in order that there not be any
possible misimderstanding or misapprehension on
that point.
I think clarity and determination in that situa-
tion are first steps toward a peaceful settlement —
we shall see — because it will continue to be danger-
ous so long as the Soviet Union seems to be push-
ing in upon these vital interests which we have
there.
Mr. Shutt: Mr. Secretary, do you foresee any
new crises in 1962 ?
Secretary Rush: If 1962 should prove to be a
year without crises, it would be a most remarkable
and a most welcome year.
As a matter of fact, we are in the midst of great
tumultuous changes in the world. The revolution
of freedom is still the most dynamic and power-
ful revolutionary influence at work in the world
today. And that is a revolution which is a part
of our own tradition, which we welcome, and with
which we can work in different parts of the world.
We also have the great revolution of rising ex-
pectations. People all over the world are looking
for rapid economic and social development, and
we are a great part of that effort.
The free institutions of the world are under
pressure from the Communist bloc, but they are
not having as much success as they might have
hoped. It is interesting that no one of the coun-
tries which have become independent since 1945
has become a member of the Sino-Soviet bloc.
These newly independent countries are resistant
to this idea and this notion, despite the fact that
some of them say things from time to time which
we find disagreeable or imcomfortable.
Now we spend a great deal of our time in the
Department of State in trying to anticipate and
prevent crises, and, to the extent that we are suc-
cessful, these crises don't, of course, appear in the
headlines. But I don't think that we should fear
crises, as such. Because if you look back over the
crises of the postwar period, many of them have
turned out well from the point of view of the free
world. But, nevertheless, we get on with the great
job of building a decent woi-ld order — in the
United Nations, in the North Atlantic community,
in other parts of the world — through the Alliance
for Progress in Latin America. These are the
great tasks to which we have put our hands, and
these are the great constructive efforts into which
crises will take their place, and these are the great
stakes which we have in working through these
crises to a tolerable community.
I think one can see everywhere a steady building
up of the contacts across national frontiers, the
sorting out of the world's daily work on a basis
of cooperation across national frontiers. I think
there is room for confidence; certainly there is
room for effort and energy in the months ahead.
Mr. Shutt: Finally, Mr. Secretary, do you see
any possibility of having successful negotiations
with Mr. Khrushchev in 1962 ?
Secretary Rusk: Despite the great differences,
Mr. Shutt, that separate us from the Soviet Union,
I think that there ought to be responsible contacts
with them in order to discover at what points
some measure of agreement can be reached.
Now we have at the present time a first-class
crisis over West Berlin, and while we are trying to
resolve that one we should also consider the pos-
sibilities of other points at which our two policies
might draw somewhat closer together.
In 1961 we were deeply disappointed that they
were unwilling or unable to take up a nuclear test
ban treaty. We shall pursue that to see if we
can't make some headway on that effort.
We have agreed recently in the United Nations
to constitute a new forum to take up once again the
January 22, 1962
127
question of general disarmament.^ And there has
been some little progress made in the matter of
cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space;
and there will come up, I suppose, further discus-
sions in our cultural exchange programs. We
don't know how successful we shall be in any of
these negotiations, but the discussions ought to
be continued, the contacts kept alive, because it
is important for us to find even slender threads
of common interest reaching through and across
the Iron Curtain.
Mr. Shutt: And as long as we continue to talk,
that is at least a plus.
Secretary Rusk: Well, I think there is advantage
in talking. And I tliink that there are times when
talking, among other things, makes it clear what
we are in there after, and, if we are fortmiate, talk-
ing might find points of agreement.
Mr. Shutt: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
U.S. Welcomes Dominican Solution
of Political Difficulties
Statement by President Kennedy
White House press release (Palm Beach, Fla.) dated December 20
I want to make special note of die most en-
couraging developments in the Dominican Repub-
lic. The solution to the political difficulties in that
country, the principal feature of which is the im-
mediate creation of a council of state, was an-
nounced by President Balaguer on December 17
and has now been accepted by the principal ele-
ments of the democratic opposition. It repre-
sents, in my judgment, an impressive demonstra-
tion of statesmanship and responsibility by all
concerned. This accomplishment by the demo-
cratic opposition and the Dominican Government
is all the more remarkable when it is recalled that
only recently the Dominican Republic emerged
from three decades of a harshly repressive regime
which dedicated itself to stifling every democratic
Dominican voice. This victory of the Dominican
people and its leaders is a striking demonstration
of the fact that dictatorship can suppress but can-
not destroy the aspirations of a people to live in
freedom, dignity, and peace.
The Dominican people still face long and diffi-
cult efforts to transform their aspirations into an
effective, soimdly based democratic system. In
this struggle, they have the assurance of our sym-
pathetic and tangible support. I understand that
the Organization of American States is now con-
sidering the lifting of the sanctions imposed upon
the Dominican Republic by collective action in
August 1960 and January 1961.' If the Council
of the OAS takes such action — and our represent-
atives are supporting that step — we will resume
diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republic
promptly. When this takes place the Depart-
ment of Agriculture will authorize purchases
under the Dominican allocation of nonquota sugar
for the fii-st 6 months of 1962.
In addition, I propose to send, upon the installa-
tion of the new council of state, a United States
economic assistance mission, headed by Ambassa-
dor Teodoro Moscoso of AID [Agency for Inter-
national Development] and including Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State Milton Barall, to visit
the Dominican Republic. Its purpose will be to
explore emergency requirements and the possibili-
ties for longer range cooperative programs under
the Alliance for Progress, which can be of direct
benefit to the Dominican people. I expect that
this mission will arrive in the Dominican Republic
late this month or very early in January.
I imderstand that Mr. Felipe Herrera, President
of the Inter-American Development Bank, will
head a high-level mission to the Dominican Re-
public in the near future to begin discussions and
inquire into economic and social development
projects.
These actions are intended to assist the new
Dominican Government and people in developing
a sound economic and social structure, which is
indispensable to an enduring democratic political
system.
Tlie Dominican people and their leaders con-
front a great and seldom given opportunity : the
construction of a democratic society on the ruins
of tyraimy. It is a noble task, but it is not an
easy one. We wish them well, and we assure them
of our desire to assist them in their efforts.
' Bulletin of Dee. 18, 1961, p. 1023.
' For background, see Bulletin of Sept. 5. 1960, p. 358 ;
Feb. 20, 1961, p. 273 ; and Dec. 4, 1961. p. 929.
128
Department of State Bulletin
Diplomatic Relations Resumed
With Dominican Republic
The Department of State announced on Jan-
uary 6 (press release 13) that the Government of
the United States and the Government of the
Dominican Republic had on that day announced
that they have resumed diplomatic relations. The
action follows the decision by the Council of the
Or<^anization of American States on January 4,
1962, to discontinue the measures adopted in Res-
olution I ^ of the Sixth Meeting of Foreign Min-
isters at San Jose, Costa Rica, which called for,
among other things, the breaking of diplomatic
relations of all the member states of the Organiza-
tion of American States with the Dominican Re-
public.
John Calvin Hill, Jr., has been designated U.S.
Charge d'AfFaires ad interim. Prior to his desig-
nation, Mr. Hill had been consul general at Santo
Domingo. The Government of the Dominican
Republic has designated Dr. Marco A. de Peiia as
Charge d'Affaires ad interim of its Embassy at
Washington.
mitted this document to the Inter- American Peace
Committee.
The document covers the period from the Sev-
enth Meeting of Consultation of the Foreign Min-
isters of the American Republics (San Jose, Costa
Rica, August I960),' which condemned the inter-
vention of international communism in this hemi-
sphere, through August 1961. The United States
is also submitting to the Inter-American Peace
Committee information on events since that date,
which show even more clearly the nature and ex-
tent of the ties between Cuba and the Communist
bloc.
The Inter-American Peace Committee is in-
vestigating violations of hmnan rights in Cuba
and the subversive activities of the Castro regime
in other American Republics as a result of (1)
Resolution IV of the Fifth Meeting of Consulta-
tion of Ministers of Foreign Affairs* and (2) a
request made of the Council of the OAS by the
Government of Peru on October 13, 1961. The
Inter- American Peace Committee will report the
results of its investigation to the Eighth Meeting
of Foreign Ministere beginning on January 22,
1962, at Punta del Este, Uruguay.^
Department Reports on Cuban Threats
to the Western Hemisphere
Following is a DepartTnent announcement of the
release of a 32-page document entitled '■^The Castro
Regime in Guba^'' ^ together with the text of the
summary section of the document.
DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT
The Department of State announced on Janu-
ary 3 (press release 3) the release of a document
entitled "The Castro Regime in Cuba," which con-
tains information on the extensive ties of the Cu-
ban Government with the Sino-Soviet bloc and the
threat posed by the Castro regime to the inde-
pendent govenunents of the Western Hemisphere.
On December 6, 1961, Ambassador deLesseps S.
Morrison, the U.S. Representative on the Council
of the Organization of American States, trans-
SUMMARY
From the time the Castro regime came to power on Jan-
uary 1, 1959 it has deliberately tried to undermine estab-
lished governments in Latin America and destroy the
inter-American system. In the process it has associated
itself with the Sino-Soviet bloc in an active partnership
and adopted totalitarian policies and techniques to cement
dictatorial control over the Cuban people. This situation
confronts the nations of the Western Hemisphere with a
grave and urgent challenge.
The challenge does not stem from the fact that the
Castro regime came to power by revolution or that it ad-
vocates social and economic reform. The world welcomed
the fall of Batista and the advent of a new government
which promised political freedom and social justice for
the Cuban people and respect for Cuba's international
• For text, see Btilletin of Sept. 5, 1960, p. 358.
' For text, see Department of State press release 3 dated
Jan. 3.
' For statements made by Secretary Herter at the meet-
ing and the text of the Declaration of San Josi5, see Buir
LETiN of Sept. 12, 1960, p. 395.
' For text, see ihid., Sept. 7, 1959, p. 343.
"For a statement made by Ambassador Morrison on
Dec. 4 before the OAS Council concerning the convocation
'of the meeting, see ibid., Dec. 25, 1961, p. 1069.
Note : On Dec. 22 the Council accepted the offer of Uru-
guay to hold the foreign ministers meeting at Punta del
Este and decided upon Jan. 22 as the date for the meeting.
January 22, 1962
129
obligations. The challenge results from the fact tliat the
Oastro regime has betrayed its own revolution by deliver-
ing it into the hands of powers alien to the hemisphere
and by transforming it into an instrument deliberately in-
tended to suppress the hope of the Cuban people for a
retuni to representative democracy and to subvert es-
tablished governments of other American Republics.
Since August 1960, when the Foreign Ministers of the
American Republics considered the problem of Cuba and
the Castro regime rejected the decisions taken, this pat-
tern has crystallized with alarming rapidity and unmis-
takable clarity. The leaders of the Castro regime now
frankly admit and publicly proclaim that their revolu-
tionary dogma is to be exported with the objective of
bringing about Castro-like revolutions in all the American
Republics. The activities of Cuban diplomats and other
agents, the training of foreigners in Cuba in sabotage and
subversive techniques, and the intensive propaganda cam-
paign throughout the hemisphere clearly demonstrate the
manner in which the groimd is being prepared in other
countries for such action.
During this period the Castro regime has established
such extensive and intimate political-military, economic
and cultural ties with the Soviet Union, Communist China
and the countries associated with them as to render Cuba
an appendage of the communist system. Far from re-
jecting the efforts of the Sino-Soviet bloc to exploit social
and political problems within this hemisphere, the Castro
regime ia working with the international communist
movement to advance this exploitation.
Ideologically, the Castro government has placed Cuba
in the communist camp. This was clearly demonstrated
in the Cuban-Soviet joint communique of December 19,
1960° in which the two countries endorsed their respec-
tive domestic and foreign policies and pledged to work
together. On May 1, 1961, Dr. Fidel Castro proclaimed
Cuba to be a "socialist" state. The brand of "socialism"
referred to is not, of course, Western social democracy
but rather the second stage in the newly proclaimed com-
munist three-stage theory of political evolution : national
liberation, socialism, and communism.
The Castro regime has established diplomatic relations
with all the members of the Sino-Soviet bloc, except East
Germany. It is currently engaged in an extraordinary
military buildup which has literally transformed the
country into an armed camp. Cuba's ground forces are
now larger than those of any other country in Latin
America, and at least ten times greater than those main-
tained under the Batista regime. The receipt of thou-
sands of tons of military e(iuipment from the Sino-Soviet
bloc made this pos.iible.
Through a series of trade and financial agreements, the
Castro regime has moved toward the adaptation of Cuba's
economy and industrial plant to that of the Sino-Soviet
bloc. The major result of the trip of Major Guevara to
Moscow during the last two months of 1960 was to re-
orient Cuba's trade toward tlie bl(K- and plan the roor-
' For text, see Department of State press release 3
dated Jan. 3.
ganization of the Cuban economy in accordance with the
communist design. The degree to which Cuba has be-
come economically dependent on the bloc is evidenced by
the fact that approximately 80 percent of Its trade is now
tied up in barter arrangements with Iron Curtain coun-
tries. At the beginning of 1960 only two percent of
Cuba's total foreign trade was with the bloc.
Culturally, the Castro regime is rapidly orienting Cuba
toward the Sino-Soviet bloc. This orientation is not tak-
ing the form of a mere cultural interchange with com-
munist countries such as several Western nations are con-
ducting. On the contrary, the emerging pattern is one
of extensive cultural identification with the bloc in which
Cuban cultural patterns are being rapidly altered and the
traditional cultural ties with countries of this hemisphere
and Western Europe deliberately severed. This is to be
.seen in the comprehensive cultural agreements with bloc
countries, the increasing exchange of students, perform-
ing artists and exhibitions with the Soviet Union and
CommunLst China and their satellites, the impediments
placed before students wishing to study anywhere except
in Iron Curtain countries, the virtual halting of the flow
of movies, books and magazines from free countries with
a commensurate rise in the influx of these materials from
the Sino-Soviet bloc, and the attacks on Western culture In
general and that of United States in particular.
As a bridgehead of Sino-Soviet imperialism within the
inner defenses of the Western Hemisphere, Cuba under
the Castro regime represents a serious threat to the indi-
vidual and collective security of the American Republics
and by extension to the security of nations anywhere in
the world opposing the spread of that imperialism.
Vice Chancellor Erhard of German
Federal Republic Visits U.S.
The Department of State announced on January
5 (press release 10) that Dr. Ludwig Erhard, Vice
Chancellor and Minister of Economics of the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, would pay a 2-day
visit to "Washinjiton January 8-9 to confer with
officials of the Department of State and other U.S.
Government agencies and with representatives of
international organizations.
Dr. Erhard's di.scussions will be concerned with
various aspects of economic cooperation in the
Atlantic community, including U.S.-German eco-
nomic relations, developments relating to the
European Economic Community, and German
and American participation in aid to developing
countries.
Dr. Erhard will also spend 2 days in New York
(January 10-11).
130
Department of State Bulletin
Atlantic Unity — Key to World Community
hy Under Secretary McGhee ^
Increasingly we laave been drawn by our ex-
perience since World War II to the conclusion
that a closer association between the United States
and the other Atlantic nations is a prime requisite
for the successful carrying out of our basic na-
tional strategy. The objective of this strategy
is to help create a world environment in which a
nation with purposes such as ours can flourish.
We cannot create such an environment by merely
trying to sustain the status quo. For the United
States today confronts a world situation unparal-
leled in history. We find ourselves in the throes
of change more rapid and far-reaching than ever
before experienced. This is the nuclear era and
the jet and missile age. It is a time of exploding
populations, of liglitning communication, and of
the conquest of outer space.
All of these aspects of our era are the result of
forces deep in history that are continually evolv-
ing and in so doing pushing us on to new achieve-
ments, literally to new frontiers. These forces
respond in part to human direction and design ; in
part they seem to move on powerfully M'ith a
momentum of their own.
The world is being remade before our eyes. We,
with our wealth, our power, and our acknowledged
leadership in many fields, are being called upon
to play a major role in the task.
Central to our o^vn objectives is our national
security. The problem is not, however, simply
one of our own national defense in the traditional
sense, although this remains of critical importance
in an era of rapidly burgeoning superweapons.
Any quest for real national security today must
take into account the entire international scene.
' Address made before the 13th Annual Student Confer-
ence on United States Affairs at the U.S. Military Acad-
emy, West Point, N.Y., on Dec. 8 (press release 862).
Such a quest would indeed be futile if we con-
ceived of our own country merely as an island to
be fortified and defended in the midst of a hostile
world.
Perhaps the most significant revolution of our
era is that which is resulting in increased interde-
pendence among nations. The new forces that
have overleaped the oceans and penetrated the
hard shell of hitherto impregnable defenses know
nothing of national borders. In scores of ways the
life of our nation has become intermingled with
the life of other peoples in every quarter of the
globe.
Science and technology have swiftly brought
into being the physical reality of an international
community. Too often our thinking has lagged
behind this reality. We have tended to follow old
and familiar grooves of thinking with respect to
national security and foreign policy.
A New World Environment
In searching for a national strategy to meet the
requirements of this era, we must look out toward
the new world environment that is taking shape.
Here we see allies and adversaries, mature states
and peoples barely emerging into nationhood — all
moving forward at an unprecedented pace.
It is of crucial importance that we project our
power and influence into this emerging world com-
munity of peoples, that we attempt to shape it into
the sort of world order in wJiich we and other free
peoples can survive and thrive. The Sino-Soviet
powers are attempting to impose a universal design
upon all peoples, a design of coerced conformity.
Our interest and strategy demand that we foster
the growth of a pluralistic world in which free
nations may develop and flourish along their own
individual lines — make their own history and
Jonuory 22, ?962
131
choose their associations spontaneously as their
common interests dictate.
Thus the great issue of our times is between the
free nations on one hand and the Sino-Soviet
powers on the other as to how the world shall be
organized, as to what sort of international envi-
ronment shall come into being. Unless we can pre-
vail on this issue, our security will remain in
jeopardy and our future uncertain.
If we are to prevail we must establish a central
core of strength about which to build — a core
which will provide needed resources for the task
that lies ahead. The Communists profess to
possess such a core of their own in the heartland of
Eurasia. Even though rifts are showing in the
Sino-Soviet bloc which spans this heartland, their
power is great and we must not allow wishful
thinking to delude us into believing that this rift
offers us an easy way out.
Our best counterpoise to this power is what we
may term the Atlantic Community, linking the
free states of Europe with North America. Here
is already a closely knit association of nations pos-
sessing material and human resources far surpass-
ing those of the Soviet Union and its satellites,
and already having considerable cohesion.
But this by no means exhausts tlie collective re-
sources of the free world. Outside the Atlantic
Community are other groups of nations, more or
less closely associated, which have an important
role to play. All these groupings form the poten-
tial components of a worldwide community of free
nations.
Our problem, then, is to develop this free- world
community, witli tlie Atlantic association at its
core, so that its strength, prosperity, and attrac-
tive power will shape the world of the future —
rather than the Communist design of a world
state. Such a development would also contribute
to a stronger and more effective United Nations
and thus to the achievement of a broader world
community.
The potentialities of an Atlantic Community
are vast, tliough as yet very imperfectly realized.
Wliat are its historic foundations? Tliej' are two-
fold.
First, there has been a trend toward a tightly
integrated Europe.
Second, there has been, at the same time, a trend
toward a larger and looser Atlantic grouping.
The 18th to 20th centuries witnessed the eman-
cipation of the European empires in North and
South America, Asia, and Africa — for a time
slowly, but over the last half century at an ac-
celerating pace. Today the world teems with
newly emergent nations born of the old European
empires.
Europe also suffered shattering losses in two
world wars, lost most of her overseas investments,
and, as a result, experienced a drastic relative de-
cline in her world power position. There occurred
progressively a diffusion of power to other world
areas. Combined, the European powers were by
midcentury overshadowed to the east and west
by the Soviet and American superpowers.
But Europe was not ready to be counted out.
During the fifties Europe experienced a remark-
able recovery, demonstrating great vitality and
recuperative power. She progressed steadily to-
ward unity, toward realization of the "European
idea." She established new bonds to replace her
former colonial ties with her overseas territories.
For centuries the dream of unity had beguiled
European thinkers. There were many "plans" —
Sully's Grand Design, Penn's European Parlia-
ment, the schemes of Kant, St. Pierre, and others —
all of which came to naught. Following the dis-
astrous collapse of the Concert of Europe in the
war of 1914, tliere were renewed efforts by Edou-
ard Herriot and Count Coudenhove-Kalergi. But
again authoritarian leaders plunged Europe into
even more catastrophic war in 1939.
It was, however, only when economic collapse
and the Communist threat combined in the after-
math of the war to bring Europe to the edge of
disaster that Europeans undertook practical steps
to unite. Churchill in 1946 declared that the
"sovereign remedy for the continent's ills" was
"to re-create the European family. We must build
a . . . United States of Europe."
In the following decade and a half many men
of stature and vision arose bent on fulfilling this
\nsion in practical terms — Adenauer in Germany,
Spaak in Belgium, Monnet, Schuman, and Pleven
in France, de Gasperi in Italy. Tliey and others
fashioned the institutions that gradually knit the
free states of Europe together — Benelux, OEEC
[Organization for European Economic Coopera-
tion], EPU [European Payments Union], the
Brussels Pact, the Council of Europe, and finally
the Conmiunity of Six with its atomic energy
community, common market, and coal and steel
comuiunity.
Tlie United States, from an early date, per-
132
Department of State Bulletin
ceived the value of European union. In the Mar-
shall plan it strongly encouraged economic inte-
gration of the states to which its aid was directed.
A major achievement of European policy was the
healing of the age-old antagonism between France
and Germany and, above all, the assimilation of
Germany into a tightly knit European Commu-
nity.
There were setbacks, as when the French re-
jected the EDO [European Defense Community]
in 1954. But with the treaties of Rome in 1957
came the culminating move of the Six toward
achieving progressive economic integration over
a span of years on a supranational basis. The
Six have flourished beyond expectations and, al-
though some major matters such as a common
agricultural policy still remain to be mapped out,
now form the nucleus about which a greater
Europe seems gradually coalescing. Britain's
application for full membership in 1961 confirms
the success to date.
Interdependence of North America and Europe
Parallel with these developments it had become
clear by 1949 that purely European economic
imions and defense pacts were not enough. So-
viet imperialism was on the move in Eastern
Europe, and pressures were being exerted else-
where. The satellite empire was being consoli-
dated. National strategy was becoming out-
moded; even local regional defense efforts were
inadequate. Only an Atlantic strategy could hope
to match the pooled power of the Soviet bloc.
The United States and Canada, faced by cold-
war exigencies, were drawn toward a Europe that
formed the great land bastion between them and
Soviet power. Europe, in turn, felt bound not
only by historic, cultural, and trade ties to North
America but also by the imperative necessities of
her own security.
Together, by their mutual attraction and inter-
dependence. North America and Europe formed
the basis for a far-reaching regional community
of free nations — based on their kindred etlinic and
historic origins, their common Western culture,
and their sense of common destiny.
So in 1949 NATO was created — a 12-nation
alliance, within the spirit of the U.N. and des-
tined to be a bulwark of the charter. NATO in-
augurated an epochal experiment in integrated
defense covering tlie vast North Atlantic area and
the commimity of nations adjacent to it. By 1954
it had expanded to 15 states including Greece,
Turkey, and Germany. Since its foundation
NATO has progressed through experience and
evolution, developing a scope and intensity of
concerted defense effort never before paralleled
in peacetime.
A decade after NATO was founded another
step was taken toward Atlantic-wide cooperation
on an institutional basis. The OEEC, offspring
of the Marshall plan and embracing only Euro-
pean countries, was reorganized in 1960 as the
OECD — Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development — including 18 European states,
the United States, and Canada. With it is associ-
ated, for purposes of coordination of aid pro-
grams, the Government of Japan.
Our Common Tasks
These two trends, toward a tightly integrated
Europe and toward a somewhat looser Atlantic
association, suggest the pattern of our future pol-
icy : an increasingly fruitful partnership between
the United States and the European Community
within the framework of the Atlantic Commu-
nity in the discharge of common tasks.
What are these common tasks ?
One is a concerted effort to help the less devel-
oped countries achieve needed progress.
Another is the task of defending the frontiers
of freedom against Communist threats and ag-
gression.
A closer partnership in addressing these tasks
will become more feasible as progress is achieved
toward European integration. The United States
can work more effectively with a single integrated
Europe than with several weaker European na-
tions.
The tasks to be midertaken by the Atlantic na-
tions will, moreover, require increasing resources.
To secure these resources they will need to take
national and joint steps to accelerate their eco-
nomic growth. Trade negotiations between the
expanding European Community, the United
States, and other countries in the GATT [Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] could serve
this purpose by leading to reciprocal reductions
in their trade restrictions and thus to more effec-
tive use of their resources. The benefits of agreed
cuts would, of course, be extended to other coun-
tries on a most- favored-nation basis.
January 22, 7962
133
The European Community, the United States,
and the other OECD member countries could also
accelerate their growth by coordinating economic
and fiscal policies. Such joint efTorts will permit
these countries to press forward with expansion-
ist domestic policies without undue fear of gener-
ating costly and disruptive imbalances in their
international payments.
This process has begun through the Economic
Policy Committee of the OECD. The OECD
countries have set themselves a combined economic
gi-owth target of 50 percent by 1970." If the
OECD countries meet this target, it will mean that
by 1970 they will have added to their combined
economic strength the equivalent of that of the
United States in 1960.
If they are to use their resources in common
constructive and defensive tasks along the fron-
tiers of the free world, the European countries
must have reasonable assurance that their home
base will be secure against Soviet attack. To this
end they must have confidence that adequate nu-
clear power will be available to deter or defeat
attack upon them.
If, however, more individual European nations
should seek to acquire their own nuclear capa-
bilities to assure their defense, fears and divisions
would be created which would place the grand
design of European and Atlantic unity in jeop-
ardy. To avert such a tendency we should be
prepared to join our allies in exploring procedures
and guidelines relating to use of nuclear forces,
both those in Europe and those outside the Con-
tinent, wliich would insure that use of these forces
is responsive to their needs. It should be reas-
suring to our European allies that U.S. forces
cover targets essential to the defense of NATO
Europe and will be used in case of need.
We should also be willing to explore with our
allies, if they wish, the concept of a multilatorally
owned and controlled seaborne MRBM force
which the President put forward in his Ottawa
speech.'
A sound military base for a confident European
( association with the United States in building a
free- world community must also be one which
includes effective NATO nonnuclear forces. "We
cannot count on nuclear forces surely to deter all
' For background, see Bulletin of Dec. 18, 1961, p. 1014.
" Ihid., June 5, 1961, p. 839.
kinds of Soviet aggression. We want to have as \
wide a range of choices as possible in responding
to such aggression. It is well within the capa-
bilities of the NATO nations to build up the con-
ventional forces needed to this end. European
unity would be greatly enhanced by the addi-
tional feeling of confidence that the possession of
such additional conventional forces would give.
With a secure military base and expanding re-
sources, the United States and Western Europe
would be able to cooperate much more effectively
in meeting the needs of the developing nations.
In many cases Japan would be their partner. The
combined ability of such a grouping to extend
assistance to other nations would provide unparal-
leled opportunities for progress.
But all this presupposes a will in the European
countries to share in costly tasks outside areas of
special historical concern to them. How do we
know that they will respond to this challenge?
Their incentive to do this will be enhanced by
meaningful U.S. consultation with these countries
about the uses of our common power and resources,
which means both theirs and ours.
The forum for concerting about defensive tasks
is NATO. We should be fair and forthcoming in
the process of our NATO consultations. A
forum for concerting about constructive tasks —
notably aid to less developed countries — is the
OECD. Again this requires that the United
States play an active role.
We should seek to strengthen these organs of
Atlantic action — NATO and OECD — as progress
is registered toward European integration. In
this way a coalescing Europe will find a reward-
ing role to play within the framework of an in-
creasingly cohesive Atlantic Community.
Basis for World Order
Although the Atlantic Community is steadily
strengthening, even this is, in itself, not enough.
The interests of the Atlantic nations are global.
Their vision demands a more universal goal — a
world order in which all free nations can concert
to achieve their common purposes — a community
of free nations. This is the kind of world order
called for in the charter of the United Nations.
A basis for such a world order exists in the
consensus among nations determined to progress
in freedom. There is alroadv a great and grow-
134
Department of State Bulletin
mg network of international trade and communi-
cations, a flow of resources and capital, of people
and ideas among the nations free of Commmiist
control. There is the great common denominator
of a imiversal desire for modernization, for dig-
nity and recognition. There are the beginnings
of an emergent system of interdependence based
on mutual interest. We hope that this urge will
eventually take a fonn sufficiently flexible to en-
compass the divergent special interests of most
nations. There can thus be foreseen the basis
for the eventual development of genuine world
community.
The Atlantic Community provides a precedent
for this broader association. It is not merely
concerned with its own internal problems. It is
outward-looking, seeking to replace the old colo-
nial relationships with a new partnership in con-
structive tasks with the less developed nations.
It is, in a sense, both the model and the "motor"
of our effort to build a new world order; it must
supply the great bulk of the external resources
needed for this purpose.
We have, as I indicated earlier, valuable ties
with other nations and groupings of nations as
well. These ties help bind many free countries
closer together and thus contribute to eventual de-
velopment of a community of free nations.
One such grouping is the hemispheric union of
American states — the OAS [Organization of
American States]. This is of particular impor-
tance since it includes our neighbors in the hemi-
sphere in which we live and with which we have
strong economic ties. Here we have a special re-
sponsibility as leading partner of the hemispheric
group, having moved from the mere "good neigh-
bor"' stage in our relations to the more positive
Alliance for Progress.
There are, in addition, the Pacific countries, in-
cluding North America and the free nations of
the West Pacific from Japan to Australasia.
There are also the nations with which we are for-
mally allied in Asia and the Middle East, or with
whicli we have special defense arrangements or
economic ties.
Then there are the so-called emerging and un-
alined nations. These nations have generally two
things in common: They wish to maintain their
independence, and they aspire to economic devel-
opment and modernization. Some of them are of
key importance in their respective regions.
-Vll of these nations, and regional groupings in-
cluding them, are potential components of a
worldwide coimnunity. With many of them we
are just beginning to work toward a real com-/
munity of interest, to make clear the broad iden-
tity between their purposes and ours. We ahso
seek to encourage ties among these countries them-
selves. Thus we favor the formation of coopera-
tive regional organizations where none now exist
but where a natural basis for them can be found.
Such regional organizations are provided for
in the charter of the United Nations and can pro-
vide stable support for the purposes of the charter.
Regionalism, in the spirit of the charter, can help
to bring about the reality of the broader commu-
nity which it envisaged.
The strength and will of the Atlantic Commu-
nity are promising and essential instruments in
our strategy for achieving this long-term goal.
We and our Atlantic partners can offer to all these
states the "umbrella" of our defensive arrange-
ments, if they desire it, and the helping hand of
our aid programs.
Our broader and ultimate objective in all these
efforts is a universal community of nations. Our
best ultimate hope for lasting peace is that,
through evolution, these various emerging and
still incomplete ties and associations will eventu-
ally coalesce into a community with such strong
attraction that no nation or group of nations will
wish to remain aloof from it.
In moving toward this ultimate goal we must
avoid the trap of believing that there is one single
way to achieve it. The United Nations, the Atlan-
tic Commvmity, the Western Hemisphere alliance,
Asian groupings and alliances, and other regional
and bilateral arrangements are not alternative de-
vices. They are complementary, not exclusive.
They are mutually reinforcing and therefore must
be sought simultaneously. The best way to organ-
ize the world is to encourage it freely to organize
itself.
In this grand design the Atlantic Commvmity
has a role of special importance to play. What it
can do, others will be encouraged to believe they
can do. Only it, moreover, can supply the re-
sources, the cohesion, and the sense of direction
which is needed at the heart of our effort to build
a world in which free men can in dignity work
together to improve their lot.
January 22, 7962
135
U.S. Record on the Congo: A Search for Peaceful Reconciliation
hy G. Mennen Williams
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs ^
The Congo has been very much in the news in
recent days. The immediate focus of course is
on the December 21 agreement between Prime
Minister [Cyrille] Adoula of the central Congo
government and Mr. [Moise] Tshombe, the Ka-
tanga leader, on the reintegration of Katanga
Province into the Congo. As the United States
has made clear,^ we regard this agreement as a
real commitment by Mr. Tshombe to end his at-
tempt at secession and to work out by negotiation
the honorable place which Katanga can and
must occupy under a national Congolese govern-
ment.
As you will recall, the agreement stemmed
from Mr. Tshombe's expressed desire to negotiate
with Prime Minister Adoula, a desire set forth
in a telegram to President Kennedy on December
14. Tlie President then asked our Ambassador
to the Congo to facilitate a meeting between the
two leaders, which was held at Kitona on the Con-
go's west coast.^
The goal we have had in mind is not a weakened
Katanga but a strengthened Congo fully able to
defeat subversion from within or attempts at out-
side domination. This, briefly stated, has been
the objective of U.S. policy in support of the
United Nations in the Congo from the beginning.
The situation in the Congo is subject to daily,
almost hourly, change, as any of you know who
have tried to keep track of events there. The
history of the Congo since independence on June
30, 1960, is in itself a complex study. In addition,
conflicting interpretations — including some that
' Address made before Sigma Delta Chi at Detroit,
Mich., on Dec. 27 (press release 905 dated Dee. 26).
'For texts of Doiiartment statements, see Bulletin of
Jan. 8, 1962, p. 49, and Jan. 15, 1962, p. 95.
" lUd., Jan. 1, 19G2, p. 10.
are highly fictional — have been widely aired as to
United States and United Nations policies. It
therefore seems worth while to present to you to-
night a serious accounting of the Congo problem
and of what we have sought to do about it.*
The first and overriding element of our policy —
and of U.N. policy — is the desire to preserve an
integrated, independent Congo. This policy is
based on the desires of the overwhelming majority
of the Congolese people. It has been opposed by
a relatively small minority in Katanga, who argue
for secession of that province. Kather than come
to an understandmg with their brother Congolese,
these Katangans appropriated revenues that
should have gone to the central government and
campaigned for secession. Supported by merce-
naries, they turned to violence against the United
Nations forces in Katanga, which symbolized the
goal of maintaining an integrated Congo.
United Nations troops had to meet force with
force. Their mission has never been to seek a
military decision — only a clear acknowledgment
of the U.N.'s rightful presence in Katanga. The
U.N. role has been to prevent civil war, to eject
the mercenaries, and to keep the focus on the
need for a national reconciliation between Ka-
tanga and the rest of the Congo.
Katanga Is Part of the Congo
The United States is not alone in opposing seces-
sion by Katanga. Far from it. The Government
of the Kepublic of the Congo quite naturally op-
poses secession of the richest of its six provinces.
Bcj'ond this the United Nations memberehip, in-
cluding all the Western Powers, is opposed to se-
* For an article by Under Secretary Rail on "The Ele-
ments In Our Congo Policy," see ihid., Jan. 8, 1962, p. 43.
136
Department of State Bulletin
cession. It is worth i-ecalliiig that Mr. Tshombe
proclaimed his secession in July 1960. Yet at no
time since has any government anywhere in the
world recognized his i-egime.
Tlie fact is, there has never been any legal,
moral, or other basis for Katanga's existence as a
separate state. Let us see why this is so.
First of all, the Congo achieved indejiendence as
a miit with a Constitution specifying that its ter-
ritoi-y includes all the provinces of the former
Belgian Congo. This was agreed to before inde-
pendence by all of the Congolese party leaders,
including Mr. Tshombe, at a conference in Brussels
in February 1960. The validity of this C/onstitu-
tion was perfected by the election of officers under
it. Mr. Tsliombe in fact became President of the
Katanga Province by virtue of this same
Constitution.
Furthermore, an integrated Congo is the will of
the vast majority of the Congo's 14 million people.
Not only that, but in Katanga Province itself Mr.
Tshombe and his regime have enjoyed the support
of less than half of the population. The Baluba
tribe, centered in the north, and related subgroups
alone constitute approximately one-half of a total
provincial population of 1,650,000 people and have
been opposed to Mr. Tshombe's regime and its
secessionist efforts.
In May 1960 Mr. Tshombe's Conakat party and
its allies won 27 seats in a provincial assembly of 60
seats. The Baluba party (Balubakat) and its
allies won 25 seats. Eight seats were not effectively
filled because of disputed elections and other
reasons. Harassed by the Elisabethville govern-
ment, the Baluba representatives long ago with-
drew from the provincial legislature, leaving what
we would call a rump organization. In these cir-
cumstances the "legislature" is a body which is
witliin Ml'. Tshombe's control. The question of
"ratifying'' the Kitona agreement is thus mean-
ingless, except as a demonstration of what orders
Mr. Tshombe gives to his deputies.
In tliis comiection, you may have heard the al-
legations that the Katanga is the only area of
order and peace in the Congo. The fact is that
the Elisabethville regime has forcefully but im-
successfully sought to impose its will on the Balu-
bas and the Katanga has been as disturbed as any
other area of the Congo. An example was the
massacre at Luena, in which over 200 Baluba
tribesmen were shot down by Katanga soldiers.
January 22, T962
624352—62 3
Alternative to Reintegration
But what of the broader picture?
They have not seen it, but those who have argued
for Katanga secession have in reality been arguing
for the destniction of the Republic of the Congo.
They simply have not faced up to the civil strife
and economic and political chaos which would then
overtake 14 million Congolese. They have taken
no account of the alternative to U.N. action, wliich
is to see the army of the Leopoldville government
embark on a direct military attack against
Katanga.
Make no mistake about this: The rest of the
Congo is intent upon the return of the Katanga.
They woidd use force to secure it. No political
leader would siu^vive who did not support Ka-
tanga's return. And a very serious disaster could
easily grow out of civil strife in the Congo. In
the words of the U.N. Conciliation Commission for
the Congo, there is the "danger of civil war which
may well degenerate into a war of genocide be-
tween different tribes in the Congo."
To forestall such a calamity is reason enough
for the United Nations Operation in the Congo.
Just as important is the prevention of outside mil-
itaiy intervention which woidd all too probably
follow such warfare. Those who would denigrate
the U.N. role in the Congo have not, I fear, reck-
oned with these alternatives.
If Katanga leadere in Elisabetliville have suf-
fered from "local-itis," responsible people outside
Katanga have a broader obligation. Unfortu-
nately, this "local-itis"' has been cultivated widely
in Europe and even heie in the United States by
a well-financed propaganda machine speaking for
Mr. Tshombe and against the U.N.
Central Government of Prime Minister Adoula
The United Nations — with U.S. support, with
the support of the great majority of U.N. mem-
bers, and in direct o^jposition to the Soviet
Union — slowly built up the basis for a new politi-
cal consensus in the Congo. This bore fi'uit last
August, when Parliament met to fomi a new gov-
ermnent under the strong, moderate, independent
Prime Minister, Cyrille Adoula.
The Adoula government gained the adherence
of all major elements of the Congo body politic,
excepting Tshombe, although provision was made
for Katangan representation. Its inauguration
marked the effective end of the illegal, breakaway
137
regime of [Aiitoine] Gizenga, whom the Com-
munists had sought to make their puppet. It set
the stage for national integration imder moderate
government. It signaled the imminent accom-
plisliment of the U.N.'s emergency task and the
beginning of a new and hopeful life of recon-
struction for the Congolese people.
Mr. Adoula, whom I have met, deserves to be
much better known. As Secretary Rusk stated
the other day,'' "Premier Adoula is a man of intel-
ligence, moderation, and nationwide stature. . . .
He has made clear liis determination to keep his
country free from control from any foreign
quarter." Furthermore, Mr. Adoula has held the
door open to reconciliation with Mr. Tshombe.
Senator [Thomas J.] Dodd, who has recently re-
turned from talks in the Congo with both Mr.
Adoula and Mr. Tshombe, described both leaders
as "men of exceptional intelligence and integi'ity"
who have a great deal in common. It is evident
that agreement between the two, on the basis of
one Congo under a national government, is the
liighroad to ending the present crisis. That is
why it is so important that Mr. Tshombe and his
colleagues fulfill the commitment made at Kitona.
Extremist and Communist Threats
Tlie effect of Mr. Tshombe's erstwhile course of
secession was to threaten the survival of the mod-
erate Adoula government and to strengthen ex-
tremist elements — Mr. Gizenga in particular —
who are all too ready to invite hostile outside
intervention, which could plunge central Africa
into chaos with the Communists as the only win-
ners. Mr. Gizenga has not given up his own itch
for power in the Congo, but he has l>een cut back
severely in the last 6 months. He has no broad
political support, and his chief hope has been to
trade on the issue of Katangan secession and, per-
haps, civil war. A divided, anarchic Congo would
be wide open to communism.
Failure to see this vital role of the Adoula gov-
ernment has been the great blind spot of those
for whom it is enough that Mr. Tshombe has
described his cause as anti-Comnumist. Mr.
Tshombe is indeed anti-Communist, and this is all
to the good. But even if one imagines a separate
Katanga — and even Sir Roy Welensky of tlie
° For a transcript of Secretary Rusk's news conference
of DiK-. 8, see ibid., Dec. 25, 19C1, p. 1053.
138
Rhodesias has said he sees no future for a separate
Katanga — the price that would be paid in the rest
of the Congo would most certainly be chaos, civil
war, and conditions favorable to Communist pene-
tration. The world would then have on its hands
a disaster afl'ecting central Africa and perhaps
the whole continent. And it would be a very high-
priced disaster indeed.
Let me now speak of two important considera-
tions which deserve a better miderstanding. One
is the provocations that led up to violence in
Katanga: the other is the efforts at conciliation
which have been, and are being, made to resolve
the crisis.
Provocations Against UNOC
At his press conference December 8, Secretary
Rusk observed, "I think we ought to remind our-
selves that this recent outbreak of fighting oc-
curred after several days of harassment by Ka-
tangese against U.N. personnel, both civilian and
military." The background is this :
Since about the middle of November, and prior
to adoption of the most recent Security Council
resolution,*' Katanga provincial authorities have
directed a propaganda campaign of mcreasing
violence against the U.N. An official Katanga
communique on November 15 said that "ill-inten-
tioned officials" of the UN. were "intent on mas-
sacring the people who have remained faithful
to the Katanga Government." This is but a sam-
ple of tlie propaganda of incitement to which the
U.N. was subjected.
On November 28, Ivan Smith (Australian) and
Brian Urquliart (British), the top U.N. officials
in Elisabethville, wei-e severely beaten by Katanga
troops in front of Senator Dodd, who was visiting
Elisabethville at the time. They were rescued
only by valiant efforts of the American consul.
On the same day an Indian officer was kidnaped
and his driver was killed by Katangan troops.
The officer is still missing, and the worst is feared.
On December 2, drunken Katangan gendarmes
molested airport workers and a woman at Elisa-
bethville airfield. Indian troops disarmed the
gendarmes, whereupon other Katangan armed ele-
ments opened fire on the U.N. troops.
That same evening, a Katangan armored car oc-
' For text, see ibid., IOCS.
Department of State Bulletin
cupied by two Europeans was stationed off the road
to the airfield and roadblocks were set up by the
Katanga gendarmery to impede U.N. conununica-
tions with its headquarters.
On the night of December 2-3, seven Swedes,
two Norwegians, and one Argentine, all members
of the U.N. foi'ces, were abducted by Katanga
forces.
On December 3, the roadblocks were mamied
again, a U.N. helicopter was fired on, and shoot-
ing by Katangan gendarmeiy was reported from
various parts of Elisabethville.
Also on December 3, Katanga gendarmes fired
on U.N. personnel attempting to pass a roadblock
at the tunnel. A private Swedish soldier who was
driving was killed, and two others were injured.
On December 4, Katanga paracommandos estab-
lished roadblocks completely cutting communica-
tions between UNOC headquarters and the air-
port. Repeated representations were made to the
Katangan Foreign Minister, who promised to re-
move the troops. His orders were not obeyed.
Early in the afternoon of December 5 Indian
troops took action to clear the roadblocks.
That is when the first serious action began.
That is the background to the reinforcement of
U.N. forces in Katanga, which the United States
assisted by providing planes for an airlift.
Since Mr. Tshombe is a man of some responsi-
bility, how can we account for these provocations ?
The reason is that local political extremists and
some 400 foreign mercenaries, men of the worst
reputation, sought to convince Mr. Tshombe that
through use of force he could maintain the Ka-
tanga as a separate state. These individuals de-
liberately initiated violence and fomented activi-
ties designed to frustrate the peacemaking efforts
of the U.N.
Their handiwork is also responsible for much
of the harassment of U.N. forces, by sniping and
hit-and-rim raids, which has been reported since
Mr. Tshombe took off for Kitona. The U.N. had
issued a hold-fire at that point. The mercenaries
obviously stand to lose in a reconciliation of the
Congolese people. They have not hesitated to
keep the provocations going. The Katanga propa-
ganda machine has thus had the material to fabri-
cate horrendous tales of indiscriminate mayhem
by U.N. troops. Actually, casualty figures have
been held down only by virtue of U.N. restraint
and discipline, which has been very good.
Conciliation Efforts
Now, what of steps taken by the U.N., with U.S.
support, to achieve peaceful reconciliation of Ka-
tanga with the Congo central government ?
Attempts at reconciliation go back to July of
1960. In that summer the American consul in
Elisabethville made repeated attempts to convince
Mr. Tshombe that the only future for Katanga
lay in its reintegration with the Congo. No terms
were suggested; the nature of the political ar-
rangements was to be left to negotiations between
the two parties. Such efforts, by us and by the
U.N., continued in succeeding months.
In March 1961, the U.S. and other Western gov-
ermnents applauded the results of the provisional
conference at Tananarive, which seemed to foretell
the restoration of Congolese unity. We heartily
approved Mr. Tshombe's attendance at the con-
ference at Coquilhatville in April 1961 which was
to work out the constitutional pattern in more
detail. We were distressed when the breakdown
of this conference led to his detention at Coquil-
hatville and later at Leopoldville. However, on
June 25, after being liberated and then promising
to jom with other Congolese factions in establish-
ing a central government and participating in the
reconvening of Parliament, Mr. Tshombe returned
to Elisabethville. But once there, Mr. Tshombe
repudiated the agreements he had made in Leo-
poldville.
When in July it became apparent that a new
central government was indeed going to be formed
through legal meetings of Parliament at Leopold-
ville, the U.N. — and among othere the U.S., Bel-
gium, and Britain — made repeated efforts to con-
vince Mr. Tshombe to send his parliamentarians
to Leopoldville. Despite guarantees of protection,
Mr. Tshombe refused. The Adoula government
was fonned by all major political elements in the
Congo, excepting only the Tshombe group.
During the fighting in Elisabethville from Sep-
tember 13 to 20, Secretary-General Hammarskjold
himself came to the Congo in a new attempt at
reconciliation. He lost his life while on a mission
to accomplish a cease-fire and lay the foundation
for political negotiations.
On September 26, our consul delivered to Mr.
Tshombe a written statement in which we hailed
the cease-fire and the end of bloodshed and
pointed out the advantages of restoring the po-
litical and economic situation of Katanga by en-
January 22, J 962
139
tering into a satisfactorily negotiated settlement
with the central government. As in the past,
Tshombe's reaction to tliis suggestion was
negative.
Finally, in the period between the firet and sec-
ond U.N.-Katangan conflicts in Elisabethville,
President Kennedy asked Mr. [ W. Averell] Harri-
man to meet Mr. Tshombe in Switzerland and to
underline the importance which we attach to rec-
onciliation in the Congo. Ambassador Harriman
did indeed attempt to convince Mr. Tshombe that
the Congo situation demanded that negotiations
take place as soon as possible. Moreover, when
Senator Dodd visited Elisabethville in November,
he also attempted without success to achieve this
same objective.
The re<?ord, I believe, is clear that we want and
have actively sought peaceful reconciliation in the
Congo. There has been no thought whatever on
our part, or on that of United Nations officials of
destroying Mr. Tshombe. Certainly tliis has
been shown by our facilitation of the meeting of
Mr. Tshombe with Prime Mmister Adoula at Ki-
tona December 19-21. We have, of course, been
gravely concerned over the casualties and loss of
life that have occurred in Elisal>ethville, since we
believe that peace and tranquillity in the Congo
are necessary for fruitful negotiations. The bur-
den of this need falls heavily on Mr. Tshombe and
those around hun at the present time.
Summing Up
What is called the Katanga question is really
the Congo question in one of its major aspects.
Perhaps I should add that the Congo question is
also the question of peace, stability, and progress
for all of central Africa. With these points in
mind, let me sum up United States policy in this
wliole matter.
That policy has been consistent support of the
United Nations mission, which has prevented
cliaos and war in the Congo.
That policy recognizes the integrity of the Con-
go as one nation. Not one of our allies nor any
other nation differs with us in that attitude, and
all have publicly called for an end to Katangan
secession.
That policy was borne out by the eclipse of the
Soviet-supported Stanleyville regime of Gizonga
and the formation of a moderate, fully legitimate
government at Leopoldville last August.
That policy seeks the alinement of Katanga's
strength and resources alongside those forces in
the rest of the Congo wluch are anxious to build
a thorouglily independent nation, secure from in-
tei-nal subversion and outside intervention. The
Kitona agreement provides for such a result.
That policy, building for a secure Congo na-
tion, has thwarted Soviet designs.
The record is thus one of painful progress, but
progress nonetheless. The price of that progress
in the Congo may seem high. But it would look
trivial lieside the cost that would come with the
alternative of civil war at the strategic center of
Africa. The only winners in such a war would
be those forces in the world which always thrive
on chaos.
So it is fair to say that a great deal is at stake
in the Congo. The challenge has been tremendous.
It will continue to be tremendous. All the more
reason, then, to face it squarely, not to waver but
instead to see things through as liefits United
States leadership in the cause of freedom and
peace.
United Nations Affairs
Discussed by U.S. and U.K.
Press release 7 dated January 3
Consultations on United Nations affaii-s will
take place tetween U.S. and U.K. officials at
Washington, D.C., on January 11-13, 1962.
The meetings are part of the normal consulta-
tions between the two Goverimients and have been
scheduled to take advantage of the recess of the
16th session of the U.N. General Assembly, which
resumes on Januaiy 15.
U.S. participants in the discussions will include
Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson, permanent rep-
resentative of the United States at the United Na-
tions, and Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary
of State for International Organization Affairs.
They will be joined by other appropriate U.S.
officials.
The United Kingdom will be represented at the
talks by a delegation arriving from London which
includes Duncan Wilson, Assistant Secretary for
United Nations Affaire. Sir Patrick Dean, Am-
bassador of the United Kingdom to the United
Nations, will also participate and Sir David Orms-
by Gore, U.K. Ambassador to the United States,
will attend some sessions.
140
Department of State Bulletin
The consultations will deal with current U.N.
issues, including ways of improving the function-
ing of the United Nations under the charter.
U.S. and Viet-Nam Expand
Economic Development Programs
Joint Communique
Press release 8 dated January 4
The Government of Viet-Nam and the United
States Government annoimce a broad economic
and social program aimed at providing every
Vietnamese with the means for improving his
standard of living. This program represents an
intensification and expansion of efforts already
made for the same purpose during the past few
years.
Social facilities in the fields of education and
health will be established throughout the country.
Roads, communications and agricultural facilities
will be developed to bring increasing prosperity to
the people.
Measures to strengthen South Viet-Nam's de-
fense in the military field are being taken simul-
taneously pursuant to the recent exchange of let-
ters between President Kennedy and President
Diem.'
All of these steps — economic, social, military —
demonstrate the desire of both the United States
and Vietnamese Governments to do tlieir utmost
to improve the protection and prosperity of the
Vietnamese in the face of Communist guerrilla
aggression and depredations directed and sup-
ported by the Communist regime in Hanoi.
The Vietnamese and American Governments
have worked out a comprehensive program as a
follow-up to the study made by a joint group of
experts under the leadership of Professor Vu
Quoc Time of Viet-Nam and Dr. A. Eugene Staley
of the United States, as well as later studies.
Some measures have already been started. Others
are in the advanced planning stage and will soon
be underway.
The United States Government is furnishing
additional aid to assist the Government of Viet-
Nam in maintaining a level of essential imports
which the Government of Viet-Nam could not
otherwise finance. Priority will be given to im-
ports required to meet the needs of the people, in-
' BuixETiN of Jan. 1, 1962, p. 13.
January 22, 7962
eluding the means of developing industries of
Viet-Nam, and luxury goods will be excluded in
accordance with current conditions of austerity.
The Vietnamese Government, as recently an-
nounced, has taken steps to increase greatly the
piaster resources available to it for financing the
piaster costs of security, economic and social
programs.
With this combination of dollars and piasters,
the Government of Viet-Nam, with United States
material and advisory support, will carry out the
following programs at village and hamlet levels
and in cities:
1. Training facilities for village officials will be
set up to improve administration where govern-
ment has the closest contact with the people.
2. The rural health program will be further
developed. Maternity clinics have already been
established in over half of the districts and first
aid stations in about two-thirds of the villages.
The objective is to extend this progi-am to achieve
100 percent coverage. A nationwide program of
inoculations against diphtlieria, tetanus and
whooping cough will be started. These programs
will be concentrated in the near future in areas
relatively free of Viet Cong domination and will
be extended to other areas as Viet Cong are
suppressed.
3. The education program will also be expanded.
Public primary schools have increased from 1,191
in 1954 to 4,668 in 1961. Over the same period the
number of students has grown from 330,000 to
1,100,000. The goal is to extend primary schools
to every village in the country. As with rural
health facilities, the immediate aim is to expedite
the extension of primary schools to all those vil-
lages in areas relatively free of Viet Cong and to
extend them to villages in other areas as Com-
munist guen-illas are eliminated.
4. Village communications are being developed,
both to enable receipt of radio programs broad-
cast over the National Radio System (now near-
ing completion), and to provide the means for
village communication with district headquarters.
Such a communications system will make it pos-
sible to make emergency calls of any nature — for
example, for emergency medical assistance.
5. New roads are being built to link rural com-
munities with main highways and, in turn, with
provincial and national centers. This program,
already imderway in many areas, will make it
141
easier to ferret out Viet Cong guerrillas at the
same time it lays potential for improving the lot
of loyal citizens.
6. Adequate funds will be available to support
and expand the agricultural credit system. It has
already functioned successfully in many parts of
the country, and as security is restored an in-
creasing number of farmers will be al)le to borrow
money cheaply in order to increase their produc-
tion and income.
7. The program to control pests and insects,
especially in central Viet-Nam where they have
ravaged rice crops for the past two years, is ready
to be launched on an extensive scale. It should
materially improve the livelihood of peasants in
the areas affected.
8. Special efforts will also be taken to enable the
montagnard population in the High Plateau to
share progress in this region with their Vietnamese
compatriots. Kesettlement will be accelerated
where necessary to remove the population from
Viet Cong pressures. Increased resources avail-
able to the Government of Viet-Nam will assist
in the construction of resettlement villages and
will permit helping inhabitants where necessary
until they become self-supporting. Many of tlie
Land Development Centers created during the past
few years are now flourishing areas producing new
crops like kenaf and ramie, and people living in
them enjoy a bigger income than before. Sim-
ilar prospects exist for new resettlement centers
for montagnards, to which village improvements
in health, education and communications will be
extended.
9. Special efforts will be directed at reconstruc-
tion in flood-stricken regions in the Mekong Del-
ta. These will include regroupment of people into
new villages to which health, education and com-
munications benefits will be extended. Road and
canal constmction will also be involved.
10. Extensive programs of public works will be
undertaken to help relieve unemployment.
11. Industrial development which has been
marked in the past two years will continue. In
the field of cotton textiles, for example, a further
investment of $0 million will go far toward mak-
ing Viet-Nam nearly self-sufficient in cotton cloth.
At the same time it will provide living for thou-
■sands of workers.
Increased United States assistance for both im-
mediate economic and social measures and longer
range development reflects the confidence of the
United States Government in the future of free
Viet-Nam. Both the Vietnamese and United
States Governments also welcome the support and
assistance of other Governments in carrying for-
ward these programs for insuring the freedom of
Viet-Nam and increasing the prosperity of the
Vietnamese people.
U.S. Delegation to U.S.-Japan
Cultural Conference Meets
The Department of State announced on Janu-
ary 5 (press release 12) that the American delega-
tion to the Joint United States-Japan Conference
on Cultural and Educational Interchange, which
begins a 1-week meeting at Tokyo on January 25,^
held its organization meeting at the Japan Society
in New York on that day.
Philip H. Coombs, Assistant Secretary of State
for Educational and Cultural Affairs and a mem-
ber of the U.S. delegation, told the group that,
"building a broader bridge of understanding be-
tween these two great cultures is an imdertaking
not only for the governments but more impor-
tantly for colleges and universities, professional
societies, labor unions, private foundations, and
other nongovernmental organizations."
In outlining plans for the conference Mr.
Coombs noted that "few, if any, measures are more
important in our relations with the Japanese peo-
ple than expanding and strengthening our educa-
tional and cultural ties. "We have already come a
long way since the end of the Pacific war in
broadening this bridge of understanding and in-
creasing the ti-affic on it in both directions through
cultural and educational interchange.''
The conference, the first of its kind in United
States-Japanese history, is the third arising under
an agreement reached by President Kennedy and
Prime Minister Ikeda at Washington early last
summer. - Conferences in the economic ' and sci-
entific ■* spheres have been held in recent weeks.
Hugh Borton has been named chairman of the
American delegation. Serving witli him, besides
' For lui announcement of the meeting, see Buixetin of
Jan. !.->, 1902, p. 09.
'/()i(f.. .TulylO. 19G1, p. 57.
' /f)iVf., Nov. 27, 1901, p. 890.
' Ihid., Jan. 8, 1962, p. 60.
142
Department of State Bulletin
Mr. Coombs, will be: Aaron Copland, Charles B.
Fahs, Clarence H. Faust, Sterling!; M. McMurrin,
Douglas Overton, Edwin O. Eeischauer, Arthur
Schlesinger, Jr., Thomas C. Sorensen, Willard
Thorp, and Robert Penn Warren.
Mr. Copland will conduct a perfomiance of the
Japan Philharmonic Symphony Orchestra in
Tokyo. A chamber music program, with Mr. Cop-
land at the piano, is also being planned. Lectures
before university assemblies and other educational
and cultural groups have been scheduled by
Messrs. Borton, Fahs, Faust, Overton, Thorp, and
Warren, and others are likely to be added. Mr.
Warren will deliver two lectures under the aus-
pices of the American Literature Society at the
Japan-American Cultural Center, the first on
20tli-century American literature and the second
on his own works.
AID Approves Loan
for Korean Power Project
Press release 92.3 dated December 30. for release December 31
Fowler Hamilton, Administrator of the State
Department's Agency for International Develop-
ment, announced on December 31 the approval of
a $20,900,000 loan for a power project in Korea.
It will be repaid in dollars.
The loan will be made to the Government of
Korea and be used by the Government-controlled
Korea Electric Co. (5, 2-KA Namdeamoon-EO,
Chung-Ku, Seoul). The company will spend
the money in the United States for goods and
services needed to establish and put in operation
a 132,000-kilowatt thennal generating plant at
Kamchon-ri, a suburb of Pusan.
Participating in the financing of the project is
International General Electric, a division of Gen-
eral Electric Co., which will provide a credit of
about $3,500,000 in foreign exchange. IGE is the
prime contractor for the project and is responsible
for construction and the provision of all non-
Korean goods and services. IGE has retained the
Bechtel Corp. to perform consulting engineering
services.
The Pusan plant will include two 66,000-kilo-
watt turbine-generator units plus the necessary
auxiliary facilities. It will use primarily Korean
anthracite coal, delivered to the plant's dock by
seagoing barges. The project includes the trans-
mission lines and substations needed to (icli\er
power into the company's system.
Mr. Hamilton explained that Korea faces a
shortage of generating capacity, expected to reach
about 240,000 kilowatts by next year. This short-
age has limited industrial expansion and ham-
pered economic growth. Many industries have
been forced to operate at levels considerably below-
capacity. Consequently, he said, the expansion
of power-generating capacity has been given top
priority in Korea's development planning.
The project will help Korea cari-y out its re-
cently drafted first 5-year plan for economic de-
velopment. Among the goals of this plan are an
increase in the gi'owth rate from the present 4.7
percent to about 7 percent, a 50-percent reduction
in unemployment, and a reduction of the coimtry's
large balance-of-payments deficit.
The Korean Govermnent also is undertaking a
number of self-help measures aimed at strengthen-
ing the economy. Among other things, it is seek-
ing to strengthen the tax system, mobilize private
savings, and reduce governmental expenditures.
The Korea Electric Co. was formed last July
by consolidating three separate companies and
is now the only power company in Korea. The
Governnient owns 84 percent of the stock; the
remainder is held mostly by Korean corporations
and individuals.
The AID loan will be repayable over a period
of 40 years.
Fowler Hamilton To Inspect
AID Efforts in Far East
The Department of State announced on Janu-
ary 3 (press release 6) that Fowler Hamilton,
Administrator of the Agency for International
Development, would leave on January 4 for a 2-
week inspection trip through the Far East, in the
course of which he will examine the progress of
AID efforts in that area at first liand and confer
with AID personnel in the Orient.
Mr. Hamilton, on this fii-st of a series of trips
which he plans to make to all areas in which AID
conducts major operations, will be accompanied
by Henry Koren, Director of the Office of South-
east Asian Affairs, Department of State, William
Ellis, AID program officer for the Far East, and
Stephen Ives, his exe<?utive assistant.
He will visit Tokyo on January 6, 7, and 8;
January 22, 1962
143
Seoul on January 9 and 10; Taipei on January 11
and 12 ; Hong Kong on January 13 and 14 ; Saigon
on Januaiy 15 and 16 ; Bangkok on January 18 ;
and Manila on January 19.
U.S. and Mexico To Study Salinity
of Colorado River Water
DEPARTMENT STATEMENT OF DECEMBER 21
Presa release 900 dated December 21
The Department of State has received a num-
ber of inquiries about the salinity of water being
delivered to Mexico under the water treaty of
February 3, 1944,^ between the United States and
Mexico.
The treaty guarantees delivery of 1,500,000 acre-
feet of water to Mexico each year imder normal
circumstances out of the waters of the Colorado
River, from any and all sources.
According to information received by the De-
partment, this winter farmers in the Mexicali
Valley of Mexico do not desire to accept the water
being delivered and have largely withheld plant-
ing their wheat crop because they believe that the
saline content of the water now being delivered
makes the water unusable for the irrigation of
wheat. In November the Government of Mexico
expressed its concern to the Department of State
over this matter.
The United States considers that it is fully
complying with its obligations under the treaty,
which placed no obligation on the United States
to deliver any specified quality of water. It was
widely understood at the time the treaty was con-
cluded that the saline condition of the water might
increase as a result of the development of the Colo-
rado River basin and that a large portion of the
delivered water, especially during the winter
months, would be saline drainage and return flows
from irrigation projects.
Nevertheless, because of the concern expressed
' 59 Stat. 1219.
by the Government of Mexico, the Departments
of State and the Interior have been urgently seek-
ing a solution to this problem since it was first
brought to their attention. Each of the two De-
partments, as a part of the study, has appointed
an independent consulting engineer to consider
this problem on an emergency basis. They are
already engaged in their factfinding mission.
They will be assisted in their work by engineers
from the United States Section of the Interna-
tional Boundary and Water Commission and the
Department of the Interior. The Departments of
State and the Interior hope to have a report from
these consultants within a few days and at that
time will be able to determine whether steps can
be taken to alleviate the problem.
DEPARTMENT STATEMENT OF DECEMBER 29
Press release 920 dated December 29
Agreement has been reached with Mexico that
it will, without increasing its total annual allot-
ment, schedule larger than normal deliveries of
Colorado River water in January and February
1962 as a means of reducmg the salinity of the
water currently being delivered to farms in the
Mexicali Valley, the Departments of State and
Interior announced jointly today.
In so doing, Mexican authorities have requested,
and the United States has agreed, that the Re-
public of Mexico be permitted discretion in modi-
fying the February schedule of water deliveries on
shorter notice than the 30 days or by more than
the 20 percent that are mentioned in the Mexican
water treaty. Other provisions of the treaty will
not be affected.
Both Governments reserve their legal positions
under the treaty and, in the spirit of mutual good
will and imderstanding which has traditionally
existed between the United States and Mexico, will
enter at once into intensive discussions seeking to
resolve all questions at issue and to explore every
possibility of removing the basic problem for the
future.
144
Department of Stale Bulletin
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
Security Council Considers Situation in Goa;
Soviet Veto Bars Call for Cease-Fire
Following are three statements made in the Se-
(nirity Council on December 18 hy Adlai E.
Stevenson, U.S. Representative to the United Na-
tions, during debate on the situation in Goa.
FIRST STATEMENT
U.S./D.N. press release 3S97
I should like to express the views of the United
States at this fateful hour in the life of the United
Nations. I will not detain you long but long
enough, I hope, to make clear our anxiety for the
future of this Organization as a result of this
incident.
Wlien acts of \dolence take place between nations
in this dangerous world, no matter where they
occur or for what cause, there is reason for alarm.
The news from Goa tells of such acts of violence.
It is alarming news, and m our judgment the
Security Council has an urgent duty to act in the
interests of international peace and security.
We know, as the world knows and as has been
said countless times in the General Assembly and
the Security Council, that the winds of change are
blowing all over the world. But the winds of
change are manmade, and man can and must con-
trol them. They must not be allowed to become
the bugles of war.
Our charter begins with the determination "to
save succeeding generations from the scourge of
war" and pledges its members to "practice toler-
ance and live together with one another as good
neighboi-s."
In that connection it deserves to be said that all
of us at the United Nations owe much to India.
The largest contingent in the United Nations effort
to establish peace in the Congo are the troops of
India. India has also contributed of its resources
in the Middle East. Few nations have done more
to uphold the principles of this Organization or
to support its peacemaking efforts all over the
world, and none have espoused nonviolence more
vehemently and invoked the peaceful symbolism of
Gandhi more frequently. That nation is led by a
man whom I regard as a friend, who has been a
lifelong disciple of one of the world's great saints
of peace, whom many have looked up to as an
apostle of nonviolence, and who only this year ad-
dressed this Assembly with a moving appeal for a
United Nations Year of International Coopera-
tion.
These facts make the step which has been taken
today all the harder to understand and to condone.
The fact is — and the Indian Government has an-
nounced it — that Indian armed forces early this
morning (December 18) marched into the Portu-
guese territories of Goa, Damao, and Diu. Damao
and Diu have been occupied, and there is fighting
at this moment within the territory of Goa.
Here we are, Mr. President, confronted with the
shocking news of this armed attack and that the
Indian Minister of Defense [V. K. Krishna
Menon] , so well known in these halls for his advice
on matters of peace and his tireless enjoinders to
everyone else to seek the way of compromise, was
on the borders of Goa inspecting his troops at the
zero hour of invasion.
Let us be perfectly clear what is at stake here,
gentlemen. It is the question of the use of armed
force by one state against another and against its
will, an act clearly forbidden by the charter. We
have opposed such action in the past by our closest
friends as well as by others. We opposed it in
Korea in 1950, in Suez and in Hungary in 1956, in
the Congo in 1960, and we do so again in Goa in
1961.
The facts in this case are unfortunately all too
clear. These territories have been under Portu-
guese dominion for over four centuries. They
January 22, 1962
145
have been invaded by Indian armed forces. The
Government of India regards these territories as
having the same status as the territories of Britain
and France on the subcontinent from which those
countries have vohmtarily -withdrawn. The Gov-
ernment of India has insisted that Portugal like-
wise withdraw. Portugal has refused, maintain-
ing that it has a legal and moral right to these
territories.
Mr. President, we have repeatedly urged both of
the parties to this dispute to seek by peaceful
processes the resolution of a problem which has its
roots in the colonial past.
I do not at this time propose to concern myself
with the merits of this dispute. We are not meet-
ing here today to decide the merits of this case.
We are meeting to decide what attitude should be
taken in this body when one of the members of
these United Nations casts aside the principles
of the charter and seeks to resolve a dispute by
force.
But, Mr. President, what is at stake today is
not colonialism. It is a bold violation of one of
the most basic principles of the United Nations
Charter, stated in these words from article 2,
paragraph 4 :
All Members shall refrain in their international re-
lations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state,
or In any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes
of the United Nations.
We realize fully the depths of the differences
between India and Portugal concerning the future
of Goa. We realize that India maintains that
Goa by rights should belong to India. Doubtless
India would hold, therefore, that its action today
is aimed at a just end. But if our charter means
anything it means that states are obligated to re-
nounce the use of force, are obligated to seek a
solution of their differences by peaceful means,
are obligated to utilize the procedures of the
United Nations when other peaceful means have
failed. Prime Minister Nehru himself has often
said that no riglit end can be served by a wrong
means. The Indian tradition of nonviolence has
inspired the whole world, but this act of force
with which we are confronted today mocks the
faith of India's frequent declarations of exalted
principle. It is a lamentable (leparture not only
from the charter but from India's own profes-
sions of faith.
What is the world to do if every state whose
territorial claims are unsatisfied should resort with
impunity to the rule of armed might to get its
way? The Indian subcontinent is not the only
place in the world where such disputes exist.
The fabric of peace is fragile, and our peace-
making machinery has today suffered another
blow. If it is to survive, if the United Nations is
not to die as ignoble a death as the League of Na-
tions, we cannot condone the use of force in tliis
instance and thus pave the way for forceful solu-
tions of other disputes which exist in Latin
America, Africa, Asia, and Europe. In a world
as interdependent as ours, the possible results of
such a trend are too grievous to contemplate.
This action is all the more painful to my coun-
try because we have in recent weeks made repeated
appeals to the Government of India to refrain
from the use of force. Tliis has included not only
a series of diplomatic approaches in Washington
and in New Delhi but also a personal message
from President Kennedy ^ to Prime ^linister
Nehru on December 13 indicating our earnest hope
that India would not resort to force to solve the
Goa problem.
As a culmination of these efforts, the United
States Government last Saturday [December 16]
made an appeal to Prime Minister Nehru, both
through the United States Ambassador in New
Delhi and through the Indian Ambassador in
Washington, to suspend preparations for the use
of force in connection with a direct offer of United
States help in seeking a peaceful solution to the
problem. This resort to armed action is a blow to
international institutions such as our Unite<l Na-
tions, the International Court of Justice, which
are available to assist in the adjustment of
disputes.
This is our principal concern. This body cannot
apply a double standard with regard to tlie prin-
ciple of resort to force. We appeal to India to
recognize that its own national interests, as well as
those of the entire world community, dejiond on
the restoration of confidence in the pro<'osses of
law and conciliation in international affairs. In-
deed, Mr. President, this tragic episode reveals
clearly — if nothing else — the need for urgent re-
view of peacef id settlement procedures to deal with
the problems of peaceful cliange. The United
States will have more to say about this at an ap-
propriate otx'asion.
' Not printed.
146
Department of State Bulletin
The Council has an urtrent duty, in our judg-
ment, to bring this dispute back from the battle-
field, so fraught with danger for the world, to the
negotiating table. We earnestly urge the Govern-
ment of India to withdraw its armed forces from
the territoi'ies which they have invaded. We ear-
nestly appeal for a cease-fire. And we earnestly
urge the Governments of India and of Portugal to
enter into negotiations to achieve a solution. We
must ask for an immediate cease-fire, in our judg-
ment ; we must insist on withdrawal of the invad-
ing forces; and we must insist that the two parties
negotiate on the basis of the principles of the
charter.
The law of the charter forbids the use of force
in such matters. There is not one law for one part
of the world and another law for the rest of the
world. There is one law for the whole world, and
it is, in our judgment, the duty of this Council to
uphold it.
SECOND STATEMENT
U.S./U.N. press release 3S98
Mr. President, a decision in this case is so urgent
that I should like to proceed with the introduction
of a resolution with only a few further words.
It is clear as crystal on the basis of the facts in
the complaint that the issue before the Security
Council is not the right or the wrong of Portugal's
colonial policy. It is the right or the wrong of
one nation seeking to change an existing political
and legal situation by the use of anned force.
That is expressly forbidden in the charter. There
are no exceptions, except self-defense. And can
anyone believe that huge India is acting in self-
defense against this almost defenseless little
territory ?
The history that lies behind today's events is
well known. We know, as the world knows, and
as has been said countless times in the General
Assembly and in the Security Council, and as I
said this afternoon, the winds of change are blow-
ing all over the world. And surely areas under
Portuguese control are not immune to those winds.
But I repeat that these winds of change are man-
made and man can and must control them in the
interests of the security of all of us. They must
not blow us into war. And that is the point at is-
sue here.
Evidently I must remind the Ambassador of
India that the United States stand on colonial
questions is forthright and we make no apology for
it. We wholeheartedly believe in progress in self-
government and in self-determination for colonial
and dependent peoples. In the past year we have
supported many efl'orts to bring about progress in
colonial questions, including two resolutions in this
Council on Angola ^ and a resolution in tlie Gen-
eral Assembly on Portuguese non-self-governing
territories.' Here in the Security Council last
March when we considered the question of Angola,
speaking for the United States I said that *
The United States would be remiss ... if it failed to
express honestly its conviction that step-by-step planning
within Portuguese territories and its acceleration is now
imperative for the successful political and economic and
social advancement of all inhabitants . . . advancement, in
brief, toward full self-determination.
We have not altered that stand. And after
listening to some declarations here that the in-
habitants of Goa want freedom from Portugal and
that it is India's right and duty to use force to
liberate them, I am obliged to remind the members
of the Council that there are a lot of people in the
world, in East Germany and all the way from the
Baltic to the Black Sea, who want their freedom
too.
Do I detect in this debate an implication that a
country such as the United States, for example, is
not really anticolonial unless it approves the aboli-
tion of colonies by international armed attack ? If
so, the United States delegation totally rejects this
implication. We are against colonialism, and we
are against war. We are for the charter. And the
overwhelming testimony of recent histoiy upholds
the force and the realism of this position.
I have been struck by two contentions made in
defense of India's use of force here : first, that Goa
is a colony or non-self-governing territory and,
therefore, somehow force is permissible to be em-
ployed against it; second, that Portugal has not
relinquished control of Goa pursuant to a recom-
mendation contained in Resolution 1514^ and,
therefore, that force is permissible to be used
against it, that it is not India but Portugal that is
the aggressor. Let me comment on these conten-
tions in turn.
"For texts, see Bulletin of Apr. 3, 1961, p. 499, and
July 10, 1961, p. 89.
'V.N. doc. A/RE S/1699( XVI).
* Bulletin of Apr. 3, 1961, p. 497.
' For text, see ibid., Jan. 2, 1961, p. 27.
January 22, 7962
147
The fii-st fact is that if Goa and its dependencies
are a colony or a non-self-governing territory of
Portugal, they are not under the sovereignty of
India. In fact the Assembly last year decided just
that in Resolution 1542. It affirmed that Goa is a
non-self-governing territory of Portugal on which
Portugal was required to report. And those who
have taken other positions this afternoon sup-
ported that resolution at that time. It is not a
question of whether Goa should or should not be
under Portuguese authority. As a matter of ob-
vious fact and of international law, it is under
Portuguese authority. This being the case, India
cannot lawfully use force against Goa, especially
when the peaceful means in the charter have not
been exhausted.
And the claim that Portugal is the aggressor and
not India because it has not followed the recom-
mendation of Resolution 1514 requires an even
greater exertion of the imagination. We support
that resolution, and we hope that it will be intel-
ligently carried out. The Assembly has again
acted with our support to the same end tlus year.
But Resolution 1514 does not authorize the use of
force for its implementation. It does not, and it
should not, and it cannot under the charter. If it
did, the resolution would lead to international
chaos, not to national progress. Resolution 1514
does not and cannot overrule the charter injmic-
tions against the use of armed force. It would not
have been adopted if it had attempted to do so.
It gives no license to violate the charter's funda-
mental principle: that all members shall settle
their international disputes by peaceful means,
that all members shall refrain from the threat or
use of force against any other state.
As I have said, I do not propose at this time to
express judgment on the merits of the territorial
disputes between India and Portugal. They seem
to me irrelevant. However, even if the United
States were supporting entirely the Indian posi-
tion on the merits, we should nevertheless be firmly
opposed to the use of force to settle the question.
The charter in its categorical prohibition of the
use of force in the settlement of intei-national dis-
putes makes no exceptions, no reservations. The
charter does not say all members shall settle their
international disputes by peaceful means except in
cases of colonial areas. It says again and again
throughout its text that the basic principle of the
United Nations is the maintenance of peace, not
only peace in Europe or peace in America but
peace in Africa, peace in Asia, peace everywhere.
We know that it is the doctrine of the Soviet
Union, as the Soviet delegate made clear again
today, that while war in general may be repre-
hensible, what they call "wars of liberation" and
Coiimiunist revolutions to overthrow existing gov-
erimients are quite another breed and permissible,
even desirable. Now there have in the past been
many wars of liberation, of territorial conquest,
depending on your choice of words. But our
charter was drafted in the recognition of the grim
fact that in our times war is indivisible, that a
war of liberation from colonialism is as likely as
any other to lead to a world conflagration and
that the only way to insure that mankind is spared
that catastrophe is strictly, firmly, and consistently
to oppose the use of force in international dis-
putes, wherever it may occur and however it may
be justified.
I therefore submit the following resolution ®
and urge the Council to adopt it promptly. In
collaboration with the United Kingdom, with
France, and with Turkey, it reads as follows :
The Sccuritp Council,
Recalling that in Article 2 of the Charter all mem-
bers are obligated to settle their disputes by jieaceful
means and to refrain from the threat or use of force in
a manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United
Nations,
Deploring the use of force by India in Goa, Damao and
Diu,
Recalling that Article 1(2) of the Charter specifies as
one of the purposes of the United Nations to develop
friendly relations among nations based on respect for
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples,
1. Calls for an immediate cessation of hostilities ;
2. Calls upon the Government of India to withdraw its
forces immediately to positions prevailing before 17 De-
cember 1961 ;
3. Urges the parties to work out a permanent solution
of their differences by peaceful means in accordance with
the principles embodied in the charter ;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to provide such as-
sistance as may be appropriate.
I hope very much that the Security Council can
proceed this evening to vote on this and such other
resolutions as may be before it.
[In a further Intervention. Ambassador Stevenson stated:]
Mr. President, I see no need whatsoever for any
further delay in reachmg a vote. This is an
" S/5033.
148
Department of State Bulletin
urgent and pressing matter. This is war. People
are being killed. My delegation's proposal at
least is for a cease-fire, for the restoration of nor-
mal conditions in this territory and a resumption
of negotiations. It would seem to me that it is
clear from what has been said here that we are
all ready in fact to take a decision on these two
resolutions tonight, and I would urge that we
proceed to do so.'
THIRD STATEMENT
U.S. /O.N. press release 3900
Mr. President, I am the only delegate, I think,
at this table who was present at the birth of this
Organization. Tonight we are witnessing the
first act in a drama which could end witli its
death. The League of Nations died, I remind
you, when its members no longer resisted the use
of aggressive force. So it is, sir, with a most
heavy heart that I must add a word of epilog
to this fateful discussion, by far the most im-
portant in which I have participated since this
Organization was founded 16 years ago. The
failure of the Security Council to call for a cease-
fire tonight in these simple circumstances is a fail-
ure of the United Nations. The veto of the
Soviet Union is consistent with its long role of
obstruction. But I find the attitude of some other
members of the Coimcil profoundly disturbing
and ominous because we have witnessed tonight
an effort to rewrite the charter, to sanction the
use of force in international relations when it
suits one's own purposes. This approach can
only lead to chaos and to the disintegration of the
United Nations.
The United States appeals again to the Gov-
ernment of India to abandon its use of force, to
withdraw its forces. We appeal to both parties
again to negotiate their differences. This is the
course prescribed by the charter. It is the course
' On Dec. 18 the Security Council voted on two draft
resolutions. A draft resolution (S/o032), cosponsored by
Ceylon, Liberia, and tile U.A.R., calling for the rejection
of the Portuguese complaint of aggression against India
and calling upon Portugal "to terminate hostile actions
and to co-operate with India in the liquidation of her
colonial possessions in India," was rejected by a vote of
4 in favor and 7 against (U.S.). A draft resolution
(S/.5033), cosponsored by France, Turkey, the U.K., and
the U.S., received 7 votes in favor and 4 against and was
not adopted because one of the negative votes cast was
by a permanent member of the Council (U.S.S.R.).
of wisdom. The inability of the Council to act
because of a Soviet veto does not alter this fact.
We will consult overnight with other members
of the Coimcil about further steps which the
United Nations might take, and we reserve the
right to seek a further meeting at any time.
Current U.N. Documents:
A Selected Bibliography
Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those
listed below) may he consulted at depository libraries in
the United States. D.N. printed publications may be
purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations,
United Nations Plaza, N.Y.
Security Council
Reports, note verbale, and communication on the situa-
tion in the Congo. S/4940/Add. 12 and Corr. 1, Novem-
ber 2, 1961, 10 pp.; S/497.5, November 8, 1961, 1 p.;
S/4976, November 11, 1961, 101 pp.; S/4940/Add. 13,
November 16, 1961, 11 pp. ; S/4988, November 17, 1961,
2 pp.
General Assembly
Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Pro-
gramme. Movements to Canada of refugees with tuber-
culosis. A/AC.96/INF.4. October 16, 1961. 12 pp.
Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Pro-
gramme. Note on the Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness. A/AC.96/INP.5. October 26, 1961. 16
pp.
Cable dated November 1 from the Emperor of Ethiopia
to the President of the General Assembly concerning
events in the Congo. A/4951. November 1, 1961. 1 p.
Letter dated November 1 from the permanent representa-
tive of the United Kingdom ft) the President of the
General Assembly concerning the Geneva Conference
on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests.
A/4772/Add. 1. November 2, 1961. 22 pp.
Letter dated November 2 from the permanent representa-
tive of the Netherlands to the President of the General
Assembly concerning the situation with regard to the
implementation of the declaration on granting independ-
ence to colonial countries and peoples. A/4954. Nov-
ember 4, 1961. 14 pp.
Assistance of the specialized agencies and of the United
Nations Children's Fund in the economic, social, and
educational development of South West AJfrica.
A/4956. November 6, 1961. 4 pp.
Letter dated November 6 from the permanent representa-
tive of Cameroun to the Secretary-General concerning
the continuation of suspension of nuclear tests. A/4962.
November 9. 1961. 2 pp.
Twenty-third report of the Advisory Committee on Admin-
istrative and Budgetary Questions to the General As-
sembly on budget estimates of the Technical Assistance
Board secretariat for 1962. A/4966. November 14,
1901. 10 pp.
Letter dated November 13 from the permanent represent-
ative of the United Kingdom to the President of the
General Assembly concerning resumption of the Geneva
test ban talks. A/4967. November 13, 1961. 2 pp.
Letter dated November 13 from the permanent represent-
ative of the United States to the President of the
General Assembly concerning resumption of the Geneva
test ban talks. A/4969. November 15, 1961. 2 pp.
January 22, 1962
149
World Food Program: A New Opportunity for the United Nations
Statement hy Richard N. Gardner
Dejyaty Assistant Secretary for IntemationaZ Organization Affairs ^
Today, December 8, 1961, will surely be recorded
in the annals of the United Nations as a day of
historic paradox.
In another chamber of this house distinguished
delegates have been debating how to cope with the
newest challenge to mankind — the conquest of
outer space. In this chamber we begin considera-
tion of the oldest challenge to mankind^ — the con-
quest of hunger.
In another chamber of this house eloquent words
have been heard about the most sophisticated of
man's instincts — the desire to explore the imknown.
In this chamber we confront the most elemental
of man's instincts — the desire for food.
In another chamber our colleagues have been
considering questions of orbiting weather satel-
lites and what the earth must look like at an alti-
tude of several hundred miles. In this chamber
we are taking a closer look at our imhappy planet,
and we are finding its true face of suffering, of old
scars and new wounds — a world of famine, disease,
and neglect.
The simultaneous occurrence of these debates
confirms a fact of which we are all tragically
aware — that man's capacity for social invention
has lagged ever further behind his capacity for
scientific advance.
For years now the international community has
struggled in vain to develop acceptable interna-
tional procedures to deal with an age-old problem
of coexistence — the coexistence of food abundance
and food deficiency, of surpluses and starvation.
Time and again our governments have seemed on
the point of reaching international solutions, only
to fall back in disappointment.
Today, despite this history of frustration, we
find ourselves on the threshold of an historic op-
portunity, an opportunity to launch the first in-
ternational program of food aid for himgry
people.
The extraordinary progress which we have re-
cently witnessed in a venture wliich has hitherto
defied all efforts of collaboration has been nour-
ished from several sources. The Prime Minister of
Canada took a major initiative when he laid a
proposal for a "World Food Bank before the 14th
General Assembly. At the following Assembly the
United States introduced the resolution - which
called for recommendations on a multilateral food
I^rogram by FAO [Food and Agriculture Organi-
zation]. President Kennedy declared in a memo-
randum accompanying his second Executive order
after assuming office : ' "We must narrow the gap
between abundance at home and near starvation
abroad. Humanity and prudence, alike, counsel a
major effort on our part." Shortly thereafter the
United States offered $40 million in connnodities
toward a $100-million program of multilateral
food aid.
Both the United Nations and the FAO supplied
essential inspiration and energy. We salute the
Secretary-General and his associates in the United
Nations. We salute also the Director General and
his colleagues in FAO. Their report. Develop-
ment Through Food — A Strategy for Surplus
Utilization* will long stand as a landmark in the
history of this subject.
Acknowledgment of this extraordinary leader-
ship should not distract our attention, however,
from fundamental developments without which we
would not be where we are today. AVe stanil, as it
were, at the confiuence of three historic forces
which we should recognize if we are to take full
advantage of the opi)ortunities aliead.
'Made in Committee II (Economic and Finand.al) on
Dec. 8 (U.S. delegation press release SHSO) .
' For text, see Bulletin of Nov. 21, 1960, p. S(X).
' Ibid., Feb. 13, 1961, p. 216.
' U.N. doc. E/3402.
150
Department of State Bulletin
Urgency of Economic Development
The first of these forces is the growing under-
standing of the urgency of economic development
and of tl\e task that lies ahead for both the de-
veloped and the developing countries.
The heightened awareness of the responsibilities
of the industrialized countries finds eloquent testi-
mony in many quarters and many forums. For
example, our new foreign aid legislation, the Act
for International Development, declares it to be a
"primary necessity, opportimity, and responsi-
bility of the United States, and consistent with its
traditions and ideals, ... to help make a historic
demonstration that economic growth and political
democracy can go hand in liand to the end that an
enlarged community of free, stable, and self-
reliant countries can reduce world tensions and
insecurity."
This increased awareness of the stake which
the advanced countries have in the economic de-
velopment of the less developed areas has been
matched by the increase in the resources which
they have been prepared to make available. The
annual flow of public capital to less developed
countries has now passed the $5-bilIion mark and
can be expected to grow further in the years ahead.
The advances in the policies of developed coim-
tries have not been unrequited. In recent years
there has been increasing understanding of the
fact that the primary responsibility for economic
development rests with the developing countries
themselves — indeed, that the principal obstacle to
sound and rapid economic growth is no longer the
lack of external resources.
Developing countries have come increasingly to
appreciate — and to act upon — the truism that
sound development cannot take place without
thoroughgoing domestic reforms in such matters
as public administration, taxation, finance, and
land tenure, and without a wider sharing in the
political process.
"When we contemplate the dimension of the prob-
lem before us, however, we cannot be satisfied with
past efforts. It is therefore appropriate that this
committee should have unanimously adopted a
resolution = a fortnight ago [November 28] desig-
nating tlie current decade as the United Nations
Development Decade — a decade "in which Member
'U.N. doc. A/C. 2/L. 599; for a statement made by
Philip M. Klutznick in Committee II on Oct. 6, see Bul-
letin- of Dec. 4, 19G1, p. 939.
States and their peoples will intensify their efforts
to mobilize and to sustain support for the measures
required on the part of both developed and de-
veloping countries to accelerate progress towards
self-sustaining growth."
Contribution of Food Abundance to Development
The second fundamental trend on which our
recent progress is based is the growing recognition
of the contribution which food abundance can
make to economic development.
As economic development proceeds, the demand
for food tends to grow faster than the growth in
agricultural production. The resulting food de-
ficiency cannot always be filled through commer-
cial imports, due to the shortage of foreign ex-
change. Food aid, by filling this deficiency with-
out draining scarce foreign exchange resources,
can forestall an inflation of agricultural prices,
avoid a diversion of resources from other uses, and
sustain at a saving in human suffering a faster
pace of development.
More specifically, food aid can :
— permit increases of employment to occur more
rapidly than the capacity of the country to produce
food for the newly employed ;
— improve both the quantity and quality of
diets and thus increase productivity ;
— provide relief in famine and other emergen-
cies;
— develop, through school and preschool feeding
programs, the "human capital" of the future;
—facilitate desirable land reform by compensat-
ing for the temporary fall in agricultural produc-
tion sometimes attendant upon redistribution of
land.
Food aid is not a substitute for financial aid.
But in these ways food can stretch the limited
supply of finance that is available.
It is in recognition of this fact that the food
aid program of the United States has steadily
gathered momentiun. In the last 7 years the
United States has provided over $9 billion in agri-
cultural commodities on special terms to other
countries. In the years ahead we will be provid-
ing food aid at a rate of some $2 billion a year.
As our Food-for-Peace Program proceeds, we
are devoting increasing attention to promoting
economic and social development. In Tmiisia, for
example, food has been used as a partial wage
January 22, J 962
151
payment with spectacular results. As a result of
food aid, over half of the normally unemployed
labor force of some 300,000 men have been working
on some 6,000 projects including reforestation,
land clearing, well drilling, sanitation, and hous-
ing. In 3 years this program has generated 70
million man-days of work.
In all these activities we have given careful at-
tention to protecting established and developing
patterns of commercial trade in which we also have
a substantial interest. With this in mind we have
participated actively in the FAO Consultative
Subcommittee on Surplus Disposal and have met
i-egularly with representatives of commercial ex-
porting countries.
Advance in International Economic Cooperation
The thii'd fundamental trend on which our
progress has be«n based is the dramatic advance in
international economic cooperation. Such coop-
eration has reached dimensions imdreamt of as
recently as 15 years ago.
The Marshall plan, the Colombo Plan, the Ali-
anza fcira el Progreso^ the OECD [Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development] are
milestones on the road to the achievement of eco-
nomic progress through mutual aid. Within the
U.N. system of organizations, many of us have
worked together in the creation of the great inter-
national lending agencies such as the International
Bank for Eeconstruction and Development and
the International Development Association. Our
discussions in this, the Economic Committee of the
General Assembly, in the Economic and Social
Council, and in the governing bodies of the spe-
cialized agencies have increasingly been dominated
by our concern with multilateral assistance to help
the developing countries in their struggle for a
better life. And we have created new interna-
tional instruments to this end such as the Special
Fund and the Expanded Program of Technical
Assistance.
The promotion of international cooperation in
economic development is a cardinal point in the
foreign policy of the United States. Our new aid
legislation specifically provides that doveloi^ment
assistance "to newly independent countries shall,
to the maximum extent appropriate in the circum-
stances of each case, be furnished through multi-
lateral organizations or in accordance with multi-
lateral plans, on a fair and equitable basis with due
regard to self-help."
152
The pattern of economic development assistance
that has been emerging in recent years defies easy
classification. It goes beyond bilateralism but
stops short of complete multilateralism, if that
term is thought to mean the administration of all
aid by international agencies. To be sure, a large
part of teclmical assistance and a small part of
financial aid is now administered by international
organizations. For much of the rest there is grad-
ually emerging a kind of multilateral bilateralism,
or multilateral coordination of bilateral programs,
in which countries supply, on a voluntary basis in
each case, technical, financial, and commodity aid
in support of projects and programs drawn up
under international auspices. This pattern well
reflects the opportunities as well as the limitations
of international cooperation in a divided world.
My Government sees in the program which we
are now discussing another potentially very im-
portant expansion of our efforts at intei-national
cooperation. We see in it a new teclmique in ex-
tending assistance to countries which need external
aid, a new resource to help them meet their needs.
The new program represents a first major initia-
tive as we enter upon the United Nations Decade of
Development. It should be viewed in the context
of our other endeavors to assist the developing
countries. To this end it should be woven in with
the ongoing U.N. programs for economic ad-
vance— at the center through the kind of relation-
ships on the intergovernmental and managerial
level provided for in the resolution * before this
committee, and on the country level by making
use of the resident representatives serving as the
country directors of the Special Fund programs.
In taking this approach we trust that the pro-
gi-am of multilateral food aid will become an im-
portant vehicle in strengthening the trend toward
more effective forms of multilateral assistance for
economic and social development.
U.S. Views on Future Contributions
Tlie distinguished delegate from Canada has
already spoken to the draft resolution now before
us. I should only like to call attention now to the
second part of the resolution. This part looks to
the future.
Its first operative paragraph expresses the hope
that, as soon as experience warrants, the U.N. and
the FAO will proceed with consideration of in-
"U.N. doc. A/C.2/L. fil7.
Department of Sfafe Bu//ef/n
crt'iising the size and scope of the program with a
greater emphasis on economic and social develop-
ment.
So far as the United States is concerned, we can
state here and now that we are willing to make
substantial contributions to such an expanding
program with growing emphasis on the use of food
for development purposes.
Naturally, any futm'e decision to commit com-
modities beyond the $40 million we have already
offered will have to take account of the factors
enumerated in the first paragraph of this part of
the resolution — the advantages which the program
has brought to developing countries, the interest
of contributing coimtries, and the overall effective-
ness of the initial program.
Let me emphasize that one of the principal con-
siderations which will influence us in any future
decisions will be the willingness and ability of
other countries to contribute food to the program
and to make contributions in cash and services.
"We should like to see the broadest possible par-
ticipation in this global effort. Even very small
contributions by developing coimtries which pro-
duce more than their own needs of a certain com-
modity will serve to broaden the base of active
participation and will make for a truly multi-
lateral program. In such a fashion, by partici-
pating together, we can learn together.
As I have just noted, we should like to see this
program expand after experience has demon-
strated its value. "We should like it to place in-
creasing emphasis on economic and social develop-
ment. "We believe that the role of the U.N. will
grow naturally as this emphasis grows. Keeping
this evolution in mind, we regard the administra-
tive arrangements here proposed as tentative and
experimental.
This concept is embodied in the second operative
paragraph of this part of the resolution, which re-
quests the Secretary-General, in cooperation with
the Director General and other interested agen-
cies, to keep the relationships between their re-
spective institutions imder review and to under-
take studies which would aid in the future
development of multilateral food programs.
Benefits of Multilateral Food Aid Program
Mr. Chairman, I have not dwelt at length on the
detailed arrangements and procedures incorpo-
rated in the resolutions now before us. Both in
economic concept and in institutional arrange-
ment this is a complicated program. But our pre-
occupation with its complexity should not distract
us from the fundamental importance of what we
are doing here today.
We have today the opportunity to establish the
first multilateral program of food aid for economic
development. There are many benefits which
could flow from such a first step, but I shall men-
tion only two.
In the fii-st place the establishment of this pro-
gram could be a modest but significant step toward
strengthening the rule of law in international
connnodity trade. The value of such a step is
founded on the hard fact that, due to the technical
revolution in agriculture, more and more countries
will be in a position to distribute food abundance
to others on special terms as this decade proceeds.
We do not wish to disturb existing bilateral ar-
rangements, for which satisfactory principles have
already been developed, but there are areas and
functions in which a multilateral program can best
serve the interests of all.
In the second place a multilateral program of
the kind we are now considering can give new
vitality to the U.N. and to its family of agencies.
It can, by providing new resources, promote a
more effective relationship between the organs of
the U.N. in implementing economic development
at the country level. It can strengthen the fabric
of common interest in the U.N. and thus promote,
however gradually, more effective political
cooperation.
As I noted at the outset, Mr. Chairman, our col-
leagues have been meeting in another chamber of
this house to discuss the peaceful uses of outer
space. Let their preoccupation with this new
dimension in man's existence be a challenge to us
here. Let it inspire us to renewed determination
to resolve the oldest dimension of man's existence —
the problem of finding food.
As our Secretary of Agriculture, Mr. Orville
Freeman, said at the FAO Conference last month
in Eome:
"Let it never be said of our generation that we
were able to send men into space, but were unable
to put bread and milk into the hands of hungry
children.
"Let it never be said that we had the scientific
knowledge and the technical skill to destroy civili-
zation, but that we did not have the ability, the
January 22, 1962
153
vision, and the will to use that knowledge to pro-
duce and distribute the abundance that science and
technology offer to a world at peace." ^
DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE
Appointments
Robert E. Lee as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Con-
gressional Relations, effective January 2. (For bio-
graphic details, see Department of State press release 2
dated January 3. )
of notes at Rio de Janeiro October 27, 1961.
into force October 27, 1961.
Entered
Colombia
Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agree-
ment of October 6, 1959, as amended (TIAS 4.S37 and
4747). Effected by exchange of notes at Bogota No-
vember 9 and 20, 1961. Entered into force November
20, 1961.
Iran
General agreement for economic cooperation. Signed at
Tehran December 21, 1961. Entered into force De-
cember 21, 1961.
Mexico
Agreement amending and extending the agreement of Au-
gust 11, 1951, relating to agricultural workers, as
amended and extended (TIAS 2331. 2.-)31, 2.5S6, 2928,
2932, 3043, 3054, 3454, 3609, 3714, and 4374). Effected
by exchange of notes at Mexico December 29, 1961.
Entered into force December 29, 1961.
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Agriculture
Protocol of amendment to the convention on the Inter-
American Institute of Agricultural Sciences. Opened
for signature at Washington December 1, 1958.'
Ratification deposited: Colombia, January 3, 1962.
Whaling
International whaling convention and schedule of whaling
regulations. Signed at Washington December 2, 1946.
Entered into force November 10, 1948. TIAS 1849.
Notification of withdrawal: Norway, December 29, 1961.
Effecttve June 30, 1962.
BILATERAL
Brazil
Agreement relating to a program of joint participation
in intercontinental testing in connection with experi-
mental communications satellites. Effected by exchange
' On Dec. 13 Committee II adopted by a vote of 72 to 0,
with 10 abstentions (Soviet bloc), a resolution entitled
"World Food Programme" (U.N. doc. A/C.2/L.617/Rev.3,
as modified by the sponsors) ; the resolution was adopted
in plenary on Dec. 19 by a vote of 89 to 0, with 9
abstentions.
' Not in force.
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: January 1-7
Press releases may be obtained from the Ofiice
of News, Department of State. Washington 25, D.C.
Releases appearing in this issue of the Bulletin
which were issued prior to January 1 are Nos. 862
of December 8 ; 900 of December 21 ; 905 of Decem-
ber 26; 920 of December 29; and 919 and 923 of
December 30.
No.
*1
*4
13
Date
1/2
1/3
1/3
1/3
t5
3/3
6
1/3
7
1/3
8
*9
1/4
1/4
10
1/5
11
1/6
12
1/5
1/6
Subject
U.S. participation in international
conferences.
Lee appointed Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Congressional Re-
lations (biographic details).
Department releases document en-
titled "The Castro Regime in
Cuba" (rewrite).
Janow sworn in as Assistant Ad-
ministrator for Far East, AID
(biographic details).
Seasonal marketing fund for Cen-
tral American coffee.
Hamilton visit to Far East (re-
write).
U.S. and U.K. oflScials confer on
U.N. affairs.
U.S.-Viet-Nam joint communique.
Cleveland : Woman's National
Democratic Club (excerpts).
Visit of German Vice Chancellor
(rewrite).
Rusk : interview on "Reporters
Roundup."
Meeting of U.S. delegation to U.S.-
Japan cultural conference (re-
write).
Resumption of diplomatic relations
with Dominican Republic (re-
write).
' Not printed.
fHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin.
154
Department of State Bulletin
January 22, 1962
Index
Vol. XLVI, No. 1178
Agriculture. World Food Prograui : A New
Opportunity for the United Nations (Gardner) . 150
American Republics. Department Reports on
Cuban Threats to the Western Hemisphere (text
of summary section of report) 129
Asia. Fowler Hamilton To Inspect AID Efforts
in Far East 143
Communism. Department Reports on Cuban
Threats to the Western Hemisphere (test of
summary section of report) 129
Congo (Leopoldville)
Secretary Rusk Interviewed on Hearst Metro-
tone/Telenews 126
U.S. Record on the Congo : A Search for Peaceful
Reconciliation (Williams) 136
Cuba
Department Reports on Cuban Threats to the West-
ern Hemisphere (text of summary section of
report) 129
Secretary Rusk Interviewed on "Reporters Round-
up" 123
Department and Foreign Service. Appointments
(Lee) 154
Disarmament. Secretary Rusk Interviewed on
"Reporters Roundup" 123
Dominican Republic
Diplomatic Relations Resvmied Witli Dominican
Republic 129
U.S. Welcomes Dominican Solution of Political
Difficulties (Kennedy) 128
Educational and Cultural Affairs. U.S. Delegation
to U.S.-Japan Cultural Conference Meets . . . 142
Europe. Atlantic Unity — Key to World Commu-
nity (McGhee) 131
Foreign Aid
AID Approves Loan for Korean Power Project . . 143
Fowler Hamilton To Inspect AID Efforts in Far
East 143
U.S. and Viet-Nam Expand Economic Development
Programs (text of joint communique) .... 141
U.S. Welcomes Dominican Solution of Political
Difficulties (Kennedy) 128
Germany
Secretary Rusk Interviewed on Hearst Metrotone/
Telenews 126
Vice Chancellor Erhard of German Federal Repub-
lic Visits U.S 130
India
Secretary Rusk Interviewed on "Reporters Round-
up" 123
Security Council Considers Situation in Goa ; So-
viet Veto Bars CaU for Cease-Fire (Stevenson) . 145
Indonesia. Secretary Rusk Interviewed on "Re-
porters Roundup" 123
Japan. U.S. Delegation to U.S.-Japan Cultural
Conference Meets 142
Korea. AID Approves Loan for Korean Power
Project 143
Laos
Secretary Rusk Intert'iewed on Hearst Metrotone/
Telenews 126
Secretary Rusk Interviewed on "Reporters Round-
up" 123
Mexico. U.S. and Mexico To Study Salinity of
Colorado River Water 144
Netherlands. Secretary Rusk Interviewed on "Re-
porters Roundup" 123
Non-Self-Governing Territories. Security Coun-
cil Considers Situation in Goa ; Soviet Veto Bars
Call for Cease-Fire (Stevenson) 145
Portugal
Secretary Rusk Interviewed on "Reporters Round-
up" 123
Security Council Considers Situation in Goa ; So-
viet Veto Bars CaU for Cease-Fire (Stevenson) . 145
Presidential Documents. U.S. Welcomes Domini-
can Solution of Political Difficulties 128
Treaty Information. Current Actions 154
U.S.S.R.
Secretary Rusk Interviewed on Hearst Metrotone/
Telenews 126
Security Council Considers Situation in Goa ; So-
viet Veto Bars Call for Cease-Fire (Stevenson) . 145
United Kingdom. United Nations Affairs Dis-
cussed by U.S. and U.K 140
United Nations
Current U.N. Documents 149
Security Council Considers Situation in Groa ; So-
viet Veto Bars Call for Cease-Fire ( Stevenson ) . 145
United Nations Affairs Discussed by U.S. and
U.K 140
World Food Program : A New Opportunity for
the United Nations (Gardner) 150
Viet-Nam
Secretary Rusk Interviewed on Hearst Metrotone/
Telenews 126
U.S. and Viet-Nam Expand Economic Development
Programs (text of joint communique) .... 141
Name Index
Gardner, Richard N 150
Kennedy, President 128
Lee, Robert E 154
McGhee, George C 131
Rusk. Secretary 123, 126
Stevenson, Adlai E 145
Williams, G. Menueu 136
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING 0FFICE:1962
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OFFICIAL BUSINESS
THE ELEMENTS IN OUR CONGO POLICY
On June 30, 1960, the Kepublic of the Congo, a former Belgian
colony, was declared a sovereign and independent state. Five days
after independence the anny mutinied. A total breakdown of law
and order ensued and the Congo began falling apart. The Govern-
ment of the Congo, faced with full-scale anarchy, civil war, and the
inevitable consequences of great-power intervention, called on the
United Nations for help.
This 22-page booklet, based on an address by Under Secretary of
State George W. Ball, reviews the situation in the Congo, describes
the purposes and operations of the United Nations there, and outlines
the United States objectives for that country, namely, "a free, stable,
non-Communist government as a whole, dedicated to the maintenance
of genuine independence and willing and able to cooperate with us
and with other free nations in meeting the tremendous internal
challenges it must face."
Publication 7326
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ITED STATES
REIGN POLICY
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Boston Public Library-
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Vol. XLVI, No. 1179 PEB 2 y 1962 January 29, 1962
depository;
THE STATE OF THE UNION • Address of the President
to the Congress (Excerpts) 159
SECRETARY RUSK INTERVIEWED BY NBC NEWS . 164
RULE AND EXCEPTION IN AFRICA • by Assistant
Secretary Williams 170
JOSE RIZAL DAY • by Assistant Secretary Harrinian . . 174
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE PEACEFUL
USES OF OUTER SPACE • Statement by Ambassador
Adlai E. Stevenson and Text of Resolution 180
For index see inside back cover
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Vol. XLVI, No. 1179 • Publication 7331
January 29, 1962
For sale by the Superintendent or Documents
U.S. Government Printlnp Office
Washington 26, D.O.
Prick:
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Single copy, 26 cents
Use of funds for printing of this publlcb-
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of the Budget (January 19, 1961).
Notf: Contents of this publication are not
copyriphted and Items contained herein may
be reprinted. Citation of the Department
or State Bulletin as the source will be
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The Department of Stnte BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by th«
Offif^e of Public Services, Bureau of
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Publications of the Department,
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The State of the Union
ADDRESS OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE CONGRESS (EXCERPTS)
In the past year I have traveled not only across
our own land but to other lands — to the north and
the south, and across the seas. And I have found —
as I am sure you have, in your travels — that people
everywhere, in spite of occasional disappoint-
ments, look to us, not to our wealth or power but
to the splendor of our ideals. For our nation is
commissioned by history to be either an observer
of freedom's failure or the cause of its success.
Our overriding obligation in the months ahead is
to fulfill the world's hopes by fulfilling our own
faith.
Our Goals Abroad
All of these efforts at home give meaning to our
efforts abroad. Since the close of the Second
World War a global civil war has divided and
tormented mankind. But it is not our military
might or our higher standard of living that has
most distinguished us from our adversaries. It is
our belief that the state is the servant of the citizen
and not his master.
This basic clash of ideas and wills is but one of
the forces reshaping our globe, swept as it is by
the tides of hope and fear, by crises in the head-
linos today that become mere footnotes tomorrow.
Both the successes and the setbacks of the past year
remain on our agenda of unfinished business. For
every apparent blessing contains the seeds of
danger, every area of trouble gives out a ray of
hope, and the one unchangeable certainty is that
nothing is certain or unchangeable.
Yet our basic goal remains the same : a peaceful
world community of free and independent states,
' Delivered on .Tan. 11 (White House press release; as-
delivered text) ; also printed as H. Doc. 251, 87th Cong.,
2d sess.
free to choose their own future and their own sys-
tem so long as it does not threaten the freedom of
others.
Some may choose forms and ways that we would
not choose for ourselves, but it is not for us that
they are choosing. We can welcome diversity —
the Communists cannot. For we offer a world of
choice — they offer the world of coercion. And
the way of the past sliows clearly that freedom,
not coercion, is the wave of the future. At times
our goal has been obscured by crisis or endangered
by conflict, but it draws sustenance from five basic
sources of strength :
— the moral and physical strength of the United
States ;
— the united strength of the Atlantic com-
munity ;
— the regional strength of our hemispheric re-
lations;
— the creative strength of our efforts in the new
and developing nations; and
— the peacekeeping strength of the United
Nations.
The United Nations
But arms alone are not enough to keep the
peace; it must be kept by men. Our instrument
and our hope is the United Nations, and I see little
merit in the impatience of those who would aban-
don this imperfect world instrument because they
dislike our imperfect world. For the troubles of
a world organization merely reflect the troubles
of the world itself. And if the organization is
weakened, these troubles can only increase. We
may not always agree with every detailed action
taken by every officer of the United Nations, or
with every voting majority. But as an institu-
January 29, 1962
159
tion it should have in the future, as it has had in
the past since its inception, no stronger or more
faithful member than the United States of
America.
In 1961 the peacekeeping strength of the United
Nations was remforced. And those who preferred
or predicted its demise, envisioning a troika in
the seat of Hammarskjold — or Eed China inside
the Assembly — have seen instead a new vigor, un-
der a new Secretary-General and a fully independ-
ent Secretariat. In making plans for a new
forum and principles on disarmament, for peace-
keeping in outer space, for a decade of develop-
ment effort, the U.N. fulfilled its charter's lofty
aim.
Eigliteen months ago the tangled, turbulent
Congo presented the U.N. with its gravest chal-
lenge. The prospect was one of chaos — or certain
big-power confrontation, with all of its hazards
and all of its risks, to us and to others. Today the
hopes have improved for peaceful conciliation
within a united Congo. This is the objective of
our policy in this important area.
No policeman is universally popular, particu-
larly when he uses his stick to restore law and
order on his beat. Those members who are will-
ing to contribute their votes and their views — but
very little else — have created a serious deficit by
refusing to pay their share of special U.N. assess-
ments. Yet they do pay their annual assessments
to i-etain their votes, and a new U.N. bond issue,
financing special operations for the next 18
months, is to be repaid with interest from tliese
regular assessments. This is clearly in our in-
terest. It will not only keep the U.N. solvent but
require all voting members to pay their fair share
of its activities. Our share of special operations
has long been much liigher than our share of the
annual assessment, and the bond issue will in effect
reduce our disproportionate obligation. For
these reasons I am urging Congress to approve our
participation.
With the approval of this Congress we have
undertaken in the past year a great new effort in
outer space. Our aim is not simply to be first on
the moon, any more than Charles Lindbergh's real
aim was to be the first to Paris. His aim was to
develop the techniques of our own country and
other countries in the field of air and the atmos-
phere, and our objective in making this effort,
which we hope will place one of our citizens on the
160
moon, is to develop, in a new frontier of science,
commerce, and cooperation, the position of the
United States and the free world.
This nation belongs among the first to explore
it, and among the first — if not the first — we shall
be. We are offering our know-how and our co-
operation to the U.N. Our satellites will soon be
providing other nations with improved weather
observations. And I sliall soon send to the Con-
gress a measure to govern the financing and opera-
tion of an international communications satellite
system in a manner consistent with the public
interest and our foreign policy.
But peace in space will help us naught once
peace on earth is gone. World order will be se-
cured only when the whole world has laid down
these weapons which seem to offer us present se-
curity but threaten the future survival of the
liuman race. That armistice day seems very far
away. The vast resources of this planet are be-
ing devoted more and more to the means of de-
stroying, instead of enriching, human life.
But the world was not meant to be a prison in
which man awaits his execution. Nor has man-
kind survived the tests and trials of thousands of
years to surrender eveiything — including its exist-
ence— now. This nation has the will and the
faith to make a supreme effort to break the logjam
on disarmament and nuclear tests, and we will
persist until we prevail, until the rule of law has
replaced the ever-dangerous use of force.
Latin America
I turn now to a prospect of great promise : our
hemispheric relations. The Alliance for Progress
is being rapidly transformed from proposal to
program. Last month in Latin America I saw
for myself the quickening of hope, the revival of
confidence, and the new trust in our country —
among workers and farmers as well as diplomats.
We have pledged our help in speeding their eco-
nomic, educational, and social progress. The
Latin American Republics have in turn pledged a
new and strenuous effort of self-lielp and self-
reform.
To support this historic midertaking I am pro- •
posing, under the authority contained in the bills i
of the last session of the Congress, a special long- 1
term Alliance for Progress finid of $;l billion.
Combined with our Food-for- Peace, Export-Im-
port Bank, and other resources, this will provide jj
Department of State Bulletin
!
more than $1 billion a year in new support for
the Alliance. In addition we have increased
twelvefold our Spanish- and Portuguese-language
broadcasting in Latin America and improved
hemispheric trade and defense. And while the
blight of communism has been increasingly ex-
posed and isolated in the Americas, liberty has
scored a gain. The people of the Dominican Re-
public, with our firm encouragement and help, and
those of our sister Republics of this hemisphere,
are safely passing the treacherous course from
dictatorship through disorder toward democracy.
The New and Developing Nations
Our eli'orts to help other new or developing na-
tions, and to strengthen their stand for freedom,
have also made progress. A newly miified Agency
for International Development is reorienting our
foreign assistance to emphasize long-term develop-
ment loans instead of grants, more economic aid
instead of military, individual plans to meet the
individual needs of the nations, and new stand-
artls on what they must do to marshal their own
resources.
A newly conceived Peace Corps is wimiing
friends and helping people in 14 coimtries, supply-
ing trained and dedicated young men and women
to give these new nations a hand in building a
society and a glimpse of the best that is in our
country. If there is a problem here, it is that we
cannot supply the spontaneous and mounting
demand.
A newly expanded Food-for- Peace Program is
feeding the hungry of many lands with the
abundance of our productive farms, providing
lunches for children in school, wages for economic
development, relief for the victims of flood and
famine, and a better diet for millions whose daily
bread is their chief concern.
These programs help people, and by helping peo-
ple they help freedom. The views of their govern-
ments may sometimes be very different from ours,
but events in Africa, the Middle East, and Eastern
Europe teach us never to write off any nation as
lost to the Communists. That is the lesson of our
time. We support the independence of those
newer or weaker states whose history, geography,
economy, or lack of power impels them to remain
outside ''entangling alliances'' — as we did for more
than a century. For the independence of nations
is a bar to the Communists' "grand design" — it is
the basis of our own.
In the past year, for example, we have urged a
neutral and independent Laos, regained there a
common policy with our major allies, and insisted
that a cease-fire precede negotiations. While a
workable formula for supervising its independ-
ence is still to be achieved, both the spread of
war — which might have involved this country
also— and a Communist occupation have thus far
been prevented.
A satisfactory settlement in Laos would also
help to achieve and safeguard the peace in Viet-
Nam, where the foe is increasing his tactics of
terror, where our own efforts have been stepped up,
and where the local government has initiated new
programs and reforms to broaden the base of re-
sistance. The systematic aggression now bleeding
that country is not a "war of liberation," for Viet-
Nam is already free. It is a war of attempted sub-
jugation— and it will be resisted.
The Atlantic Community
Finall}^ the united strength of the Atlantic com-
munity has flourished in the last year under severe
tests. NATO has increased both the number and
the readiness of its air, ground, and naval units —
both its nuclear and nonnuclear capabilities.
Even gi'eater efforts by all its members are still
required. Nevertheless our unity of purpose and
will has been, I believe, immeasurably strength-
ened.
The threat to the brave city of Berlin remains.
In these last 6 months the Allies have made it un-
mistakably clear that our presence in Berlin, our
free access thereto, and the freedom of 2 million
W^est Berliners would not be surrendered either to
force or through appeasement — that to maintain
those rights and obligations we are prepared to
talk, when appropriate, and to fight, if necessary.
Every member of NATO stands with us in a com-
mon commitment to preserve this symbol of free
man's will to remain free.
I cannot now predict the course of future nego-
tiations over Berlin. I can only say that we are
sparing no honorable effort to find a peaceful and
mutually acceptable resolution of this problem.
I believe such a resolution can be found and with
it an improvement in our relations with the Soviet
Union, if only the leaders in the Kremlin will rec-
ognize the basic rights and interests involved and
the interest of all mankind in peace.
{January 29, 1962
161
But the Atlantic community is no longer con-
cerned with purely military aims. As its common
imdertakings grow at an ever-increasing pace,
we are, and increasingly will be, partners in aid,
trade, defense, diplomacy, and monetary affairs.
The emergence of the new Europe is being
matched by the emergence of new ties across the
Atlantic. It is a matter of undramatic daily co-
operation in hundreds of workaday tasks: of cur-
rencies kept in effective relation, of development
loans meshed together, of standardized weapons
and concerted diplomatic positions. The Atlantic
community grows, not like a volcanic mountain,
by one mighty explosion, but like a coral reef,
from the accumulating activity of all.
Thus we in the free world are moving steadily
toward unity and cooperation, in the teeth of that
old Bolshevik prophecy and at the very time when
extraordinary rumbles of discord can be heard
across the Iron Curtain. It is not free societies
which bear within them the seeds of inevitable
disunity.
Our Balance of Payments
On one special problem, of great concern to our
friends and to us, I am proud to give the Congress
an encouraging report. Our efforts to safeguard
the dollar are progressing. In the 11 months pre-
ceding last February 1, we suffered a net loss of
nearly $2 billion in gold. In the 11 months that
followed, the loss was just over half a billion dol-
lars. And our deficit in our basic transactions
with the rest of the world — trade, defense, for-
eign aid, and capital, excluding volatile short-term
flows — has been reduced from $2 billion for 1960
to about one-third that amount for 19G1. Specu-
lative fever against the dollar is ending, and
confidence in the dollar has been restored.
We did not — and could not — achieve these gains
through import restrictions, troop withdrawals,
exchange controls, dollar devaluation, or choking
off domestic recovei-y. We acted not in panic but
in perspective. But the problem is not yet solved.
Persistently large deficits would endanger our eco-
nomic growth and our militiiry and defense com-
mitments abroad. Our goal must be a reasonable
equilibrium in our balance of payments. With
the cooperation of the Congress, business, labor,
and our major allies, that goal can be reached.
We shall continue to attract foreign tourists
and investments to our shores, to seek increased
military purchases here by our allies, to maximize
foreign-aid procurement from American firms, to
urge increased aid from other fortunate nations to
the less fortunate, to seek tax laws which do not
favor investment in other industrialized nations
or tax havens, and to urge coordination of allied
fiscal and monetary policies so as to discourage
large and disturbing capital movements.
Trade
Above all, if we are to pay for our commitments
abroad, we must expand our exports. Our busi-
nessmen must be export-conscious and export-
competitive. Our tax policies must spur moderni-
zation of our plants; our wage and price gains
must be consistent with productivity to hold the
line on prices; our export credit and promotion
campaigns for American industries must continue
to expand.
But the greatest challenge of all is posed by the
growth of the European Common Market. As-
suming the accession of the United Kingdom,
there will arise across the Atlantic a trading
partner behind a single external tariff similar to
ours with an economy which nearly equals our
own. Will we in this country adapt our thinking
to these new prospects and patterns, or will we
wait until events have passed us by ?
This is the year to decide. The Reciprocal Trade
Act is expiring. We need a new law, a wholly
new approach, a bold new instrument of American
trade policy. Our decision could well affect the
unity of the West, the course of the cold war, and
the economic growth of our nation for a genera-
tion to come.
If we move decisively, our factories and farms
can increase their sales to their richest, fastest
growing market. Our exports will increase. Our
balance-of-payments position will improve. And
we will have forged across the Atlantic a trading
partnership with vast resources for freedom.
If, on the other hand, we hang back in deference
to local economic pressures, we will find ourselves
cut off from our major allies. Industries — and I
believe this is most vital — industries will move
their plants and jobs and capital inside the walls
of the Common Market — and jobs therefore will
be lost here in the United States — if they cannot
otherwise compete for its consumers. Our farm
surpluses will pile ujj — and our balance of trade,
162
Department of State Bulletin
as you all know, to Europe, the Common Market,
in farm products is nearly three or four to one in
our favor, amounting to one of the best earners of
dollars in our balance-of -payments structure — and
without entrance to this market — without the
ability to enter it — our farm surpluses will pile
up in the Middle West, tobacco in the South, and
other commodities, which have gone through
Western Europe for 15 years. Our balance-of-
payments position will worsen. Our consumers
will lack a wider choice of goods at lower prices.
And millions of American Avorkers whose jobs de-
pend on the sale or the transportation or the dis-
tribution of exports or imports, or whose jobs will
be endangered by the movement of our capital to
Europe, or whose jobs can be maintained only in
an expanding economy — these millions of workers
in your home States and mine will see their real
interests sacrificed.
Members of the Congress: The United States
did not rise to greatness by waiting for others to
lead. This nation is the world's foremost manu-
facturer, farmer, banker, consumer, and exporter.
The Common Market is moving ahead at an eco-
nomic growth rate twice ours. The Communist
economic offensive is under way. The opportunity
is ours, the initiative is up to us, and I believe that
1962 is the time.
To seize that initiative, I shall shortly send to
the Congress a new 5-year trade expansion action,
far-reaching in scope but designed with great care
to make certain that its benefits to our people far
outweigh any risks. The bill will permit the
gradual elimination of tariffs here in the United
States and in tlie Common Market on those items
in which we together supply 80 percent of the
world's trade — mostly items in which our own
ability to compete is demonstrated by the fact that
we sell abroad, in these items, substantially more
than we import. This step will make it possible
for our major industries to compete with their
counterparts in Western Europe for access to Eu-
ropean consumers.
On the other hand, the bill will permit a grad-
ual reduction of duties up to 50 percent, permit
bargaining by major categories, and provide for
appropriate and tested fonns of assistance to firms
and employees adjusting to import competition.
We are not neglecting the safeguards provided by
peril points, an escape clause, or the national se-
curity amendment. Nor are we abandoning our
non-European friends or our traditional most-
favored-nation principle. On the contrary, the
bill will provide new encouragement for their sale
of tropical agricultural products, so important to
our friends in Latin America, who have long de-
pended upon the European Common Market, who
now find themselves faced with new cliallenges
which we must join with them in overcoming.
Concessions in this bargaining must of course
be reciprocal, not unilateral. The Common Mar-
ket will not fulfill its own high promise unless
its outside tariff walls are low. The dangers of
restriction or timidity in our own policy have
counterparts for our friends in Europe. For to-
gether we face a common challenge: to enlarge
the prosperity of free men everywhere, to build
in partnership a new trading community in which
all free nations may gain from the productive
energy of free competitive effort.
These various elements in our foreign policy
lead, as I have said, to a single goal — the goal of a
peaceful world of free and independent states.
This is our guide for the present and our vision
for the future: a free community of nations, in-
dependent but interdependent, imiting north and
south, east and west, in one great family of man,
outgi-owing and transcending the hates and fears
that rend our age.
We will not reach that goal today, or tomorrow.
We may not reach it in our own lifetime. But the
quest is the greatest adventure of our century.
We sometimes chafe at the burden of our obli-
gations, the complexity of our decisions, the agony
of our choices. But there is no comfort or se-
curity for us in evasion, no solution in abdication,
no relief in irresponsibility.
A year ago, in assuming the tasks of the Presi-
dency, I said that few generations in all history
had been granted the role of being the great de-
fender of freedom in its hour of maximum dan-
ger. This is our good fortune; and I welcome it
now as I did a year ago. For it is the fate of this
generation — of you in the Congress and of me as
President — to live with a struggle we did not
start, in a world we did not make. But the pres-
sures of life are not always distributed by choice.
And while no nation has ever faced such a chal-
lenge, no nation has ever been so ready to seize
the burden and the glory of freedom.
And in this high endeavor, may God watch
over the United States of America.
January 29, 1962
163
President Kennedy and Soviet Leaders
Exchange New Year's Messages
Following is an exchange of messages betiveen
President Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev^
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the
V.S.S.R., and Leonid Brezhnev, President of the
Presidivmi of the Supreme Soviet of tlie U.S.S.R.
White House press release (Palm Beach, Fla.) dated December 31
President Kennedy to Soviet Leaders
December 31, 1961
Dear President Brezhnev and Chairman
Khrushchev: As the year 1961 approaches its
close I wish to extend to the people of the Soviet
Union and to you and your families my most sin-
cere wishes and those of the American people for
a peaceful and prosperous New Year. The year
which is endinfj has been a troubled one. It is
my earnest hope that the coming year will
strengthen the foundations of world peace and
will bring an improvement in the relations be-
tween our countries, upon which so much depends.
It is our grave responsibility to fulfill that hope.
As President of the United States, I can state
on behalf of the government and the American
people that we will do our best to do so.
John F. Kennedy
Soviet Leaders to President Kennedy
Decembeb 29, 1961
Mosco%o
President .Ioiin F. Kennedy
Preaident of the United States
White House
Washington, D.C.
Dear Mb. Pkesitient : In these few last hours of the
expiring 1961 we are sending to the people of the United
States the sincerest wishes for peace and happiness in
the New Year and lilcewise our best wishes of personal
happiness to you and to your entire family. Right now
on the doorstep of the New Tear the nations live with
new hope that the coming year will be such a threshold
in the development of events when there will be uiuler-
talcen eflicient steps in the cause of liquidation of cen-
ters of military danger. There is no doubt that on the
state of affairs in Soviet-American relations depends
very much whether humanity will go towards peace or
war. At the meeting in Vienna the President of the
United States and Chairman of Ministers of the U.S.S.R.
agreed that history imposed a great responsibility on our
164
peoples for the destinies of the world.' The Soviet peo-
ple regard the future optimistically. They express hopes
that in the coming year our countries will be able to
find ways towards closer cooperation, will be able to find
a basis for concerted actions and efforts for the good
of all humanity.
On the part of the Soviet Union, as before, there will
be no lack of resolution to do everything in its power
in order to ensure durable and lasting peace on our
planet.
N. Khrushchev
L. Brezhnev
Kremlin, Moscow
Secretary Rusl( Interviewed
by NBC News
Following is the transcript of an interview with
Secretary Bti~sk hy EUe Abel of NBC News, por-
tions of which were broadcast on the NBC-TV
network program "/. F. K. Report-'' on January
12.
Press release 27 dated January 12
Q. Mr. Secretary, when President Kennedy took
office about a year ago, there xoas a great wave of
hope around the world and in this country — hope
for new ideas, neio initiatives, neio solutions to
some of the old problems. So many of them are
still with us: Berlin, Laos, nuclear testing, arms
control. I grant you the style of American
foreign policy has changed, but how about the
substance? Hovj has that changed?
A. I think if we rememlier President Kennedy's
inaugural last year, he called attention to the fact
that we are in a turbulent world situation, and in
any given year, in a situation of that sort, things
are likely to be a little mixed. But there are many
reasons for encouragement and confidence as we
move into 1962.
For example, in the North Atlantic community
there are far-reaching negotiations now going on
to expand and strengtlien the European Common
Market. In the OECD [Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development], of which
we're a member, the governments there liave deter-
mined to set as their goal a r)0-percent increase in
overall gross national product over the next 10
years and to adjust their public policies — their
economic and fiscal policies — to the concept of
' Bulletin of June 26, 1961, p. 991.
Department of State Bulletin
growth.^ In the Development Assistance Group
of tlie North Atlantic community the member gov-
ernments are moving toward a commitment of 1
percent of their gross national product toward
helping the underdeveloped countries get on with
that job. In the militaiy field the Atlantic com-
munity— NATO — is stronger than it has been in
many years. There's much to be done still, but
that strength is making itself felt. I think that
we can take a great encouragement from the vital-
ity and liveliness of this great community. Now,
indeed, some of the so-called disagreements that
trickle out of these discussions with our NATO
allies themselves reflect the vigor of the discussion
that is going on. We no longer are talking about
just those questions in which we know in advance
we already agree. It is a vigorous forum of dis-
cussion of far-reaching political issues that stretch
right around the world.
In the Latin American scene the Alliance for
Progress has given new impetus to economic and
social development. We were able to be helpful
in setting the Dominican Republic on a great step
toward democratic institutions,^ after some 30
years or more of dictatorship and against a back-
ground of violence and hatred and suspicion in
that country. I think it's fair to say that the
hemisphere is becoming increasingly aware of the
dangers of the penetration of this hemisphere by
communism, as reflected in the Cuban situation.^
We'll be meeting in Punta del Este on the 22d of
this month to consult with the foreign ministers
of other hemisphere countries on that particular
problem.
On some of the critically dangerous problems
such as Berlin and Southeast Asia, our object there
has been to protect the vital interests of this coun-
try and have the free world without war if pos-
sible. Now, those problems haven't disappeared.
But on the other side, our vital interests are in-
tact, and we still have peace, as far as tliis country
is concerned. But there's much to be done on
those issues.
I think in the last week or 10 days there's been
a considerable improvement in the Congo situa-
tion. There are signs that Mr. [Moise] Tshombe
' For background, see Bulletin of Dec. 18, 1961, p. 1014.
^ For a statement by President Kennedy and an an-
nouncement of the resumption of diplomatic relations
with the Dominican Republic, see ibid., Jan. 22, 1962,
pp. 128 and 129.
" For background, see ibid., p. 129.
and Mr. [Cyrille] Adoula are reaching out toward
a negotiated agreement with respect to constitu-
tional arrangements in that country, and we are
encouraged by that.'' I tliink there are many
reasons for confidence, but the agenda of the
United States still remains a very full one.
May I conclude this remark by pointing out
something about the United States which is unique
in this foreign policy field — where no other gov-
ernment has quite the same problem that we have.
And that is that influence on American foreign
policy is a prunary objective of every other foreign
office in the world. Wlierever a dispute arises,
whether it's in Kashmir, or in West New Guinea,
or wherever it might be, we are drawn in because
the parties to these disputes hope to enlist our
aid and sympathy and interest, sometimes on their
own side of the dispute but also in terms of help
in settling them.
Q. What makes it tricky, of course., Mr. Secre-
tary, is that so often iotk of the disputants are
friends of ours.
A. Yes, and many of these disputes are over
questions which have no direct national interest
to us — over issues wliich we did not invent, where
our primary interest is that friends of ours settle
their disputes between them on a friendly basis.
But we are drawn into them. And, of course,
this gives us a very full agenda throughout the
year.
Q. Mr. Secretary, Pd like to ask a question that
I think is on the minds of a great many Ameri-
cans— following Cuba, Laos, and Berlin. It has
to do with whether President Kennedy, in your
view, understands the uses of national fower in
support of national goals. There has ieen some
doubt raised in this area. The question I wanted
to ash you is — are you, yourself — what is your
testimony? You watched this man close up deal-
ing with issues that — in which the balance between
war and peace was very narrow. Are you, your-
self, satisfied on this score?
A. I think that the American people can be
fully confident that President Kennedy under-
stands not only the burdens and responsibilities
and the necessities of power but also the limita-
tions on power. In a situation such as Berlin,
where the most immediate and direct vital inter-
' For texts of Department statements, see ihid., Jan. 8,
1962, p. 49, and Jan. 15, 1962, p. 95.
January 29, 7962
165
ests of the United States are involved, there is,
of course, a need to be absolutely determined to
protect that position. And that has been made
clear by the President, not only to the free world
but to others. I think that it is too easy to think
that every problem could be solved if we were
ready at a moment's notice simply to inject Amer-
ican troops into a particular situation.
Q. Yes.
A. That is not (he way to peace. It's not the
way to an orderly world. Nor do I believe that
the American people ought somehow to be trans-
formed into gendarmes for every dispute in any
part of the world — if there's an opportunity to
bring about a peaceful settlement which is con-
sistent not only with our national interests but
with the peace of the world.
The Threat Posed by Cuba
Q. Mr. Secretary, in his speech ' before the
American Society of Newspaper Editors last
April, at the height of the Cuban affair, President
Kennedy said: "T7e intend to profit from this les-
son. We intend to reexamine . . . our forces of
all kinds — our tactics and other institutions here
in this C07n7minity. We intend to intensify our
efforts for a struggle in many ways more difficult
than war. . . ." Can you tell us, sir, looking
back on it now, what lessons this administratio?i
learned from Cuba and how this reexamination
of forces and tactics has gorve?
A. I think one thing that we should remember
is that the struggle for freedom, which has been
going on for centuries, is not determined by one
or two or a third episode. These brave Cubans
who undertook to liberate their own country
failed in that particular effort. But the story of
freedom is a long one, and that story has not come
to its final conclusion. I think that we, at the
present time, are working closely with the other
members of the Organization of American
States — the other governments in this hemi-
sphere— on the basis that the threat posed by Cuba
and the penetration of this hemi.spliore bj' com-
munism is more directly and immediately a threat
to the rest of them than it is to the United States.
Their awareness of the nature of this threat has
been growing very rapidly. And that is the next
• Ihiii., May 8, 1961, p. 059.
166
chapter, I think, in this problem here in this
hemisphere.
Q. But has there been a change, Mr. Secretary,
of the kind that the President ivas talking about
in that speech — mi the sort of internal procedures
of the American Government — to make sure that
a disaster like Cuba will not happen again?
A. We've had a reorganization and some ad-
justment in our procedures. But I would not
think that that would be the more fundamental
aspect of that problem.
The Berlin Wall
Q. Some Americans have argued, Mr. Secre-
tary, that we should have torn down that loall in
Berlin brick by brick — or better still, that we
should have pushed it aside when it was still
barbed loire instead of brick. Was that idea ever
considered in mid-August of last year? And if
so, xuhy did the President decide not to go ahead
and do it?
A. When a question of this sort— a situation
of this sort — comes up, I think it's reasonable to
assume that all contingencies are considered and
thought about. But I would not wish to empha-
size that particular action in terms of its being
considered as an immediate step apart from every
other contingency that was thought about. East
Berlin and East Germany have been firmly in
Communist control since the war. The events of
the last 15 years gave them, in effect, control over
those areas. Now, they've put up the wall. I
think without any question, not against the West —
that is, not to keep the West out —
Q. Yes.
A. — but to keep their own people in.
Q. — to keep their oion people in.
A. Even within the last 10 days Mr. [Walter]
Ulbricht has made that very clear — that they put
up the wall to stop the outflow of East Germans
and East Berliners wlio wanted to come to tlie
West. Now, let's not be under any illusions about
this. Just as some international agreements can
confer benefits upon both sides, so can certain epi-
sodes or situations prove a disadvantage to both
sides. I think both sides have lost because of tlie
wall. I think the Communists have lost. Here
is the gretvt .symbol of the type of concentration
Department of State Bulletin
camp which they have to erect in order to prevent
their own people from seeking freedom. East
Berlin is a very dull place these days — its opera,
its showplaces, its restaurants are only partially
filled, and the life of that part of the city has
suffered a setback. But nevertheless it would be
better for West Berlin and the West had that
wall not been there. I think we must find ways
to restore the circulation of people, if we can pos-
sibly do it, so that these Germans in Berlin will
once again be able to recapture some of the life
of the city as a whole.
Q. In othe^ words, then, sir —
A. — primarily to be reunited.
Q. — ii^s an objective of American policy today?
A. That is correct.
Q. — rcould ie to open sotn-e doors — so7ne gates
in the toall?
A. Tliat is correct.
Q. — rather than to tear it down completely?
A. If you talk about shooting your way into
East Berlin, then you have got to follow on and
be prepared to answer the questions which come
tomorrow or the next day and the next week about
whether that is a basis of policy.
U.S. Negotiating Position
Q. Right. Mr. Secretary, some of us have been
puzzled — / have myself — about the nature of our
sort of prenegotiating position on Berlin.
Haven't xoe stacked the cards against real nego-
tiation by insisting that the scope of whatever
negotiation there may be, may be narrowed to Ber-
lin? If negotiation assumes a certain give and
take, what is there that we can give in Berlin that
would not underTuine the city^s future?
A. Well, I wouldn't, Mr. Abel, want to charac-
terize the narrowness or the breadth of the dis-
cussions which are now going on. The talks
which Ambassador [Llewellyn E.] Thompson is
having in Moscow are to find out whether a basis
for negotiation exists, and we presume they will
go on somewhat further to explore that point.
There are not, quite frankly, major concessions
that are available in this situation. Again, over
the last 15 yeai-s, the margins of adjustment and
compromise have been worn pretty thin. "Wliat
we see in Berlin is a confrontation of the vital in-
terests of the West, with pressures from the East.
And this is not an easy and normal trading situ-
ation where by adjustment here and there you
reach a quick agreement. This is much more dif-
ficult than that and has to be handled much more
carefully.
Q. That's precisely v>hy I asked the question.
I had wondered, myself, whether, in a wider ne-
gotiation, where xoe woidd not be dealing with
Berlin alone, we might not be in a stronger posi-
tion?
A. Well, there are broader questions which do
have a bearing upon the relations between the
Sino-Soviet bloc and the Western World but
which we've already tried to explore. For ex-
ample, one of the real setbacks, I think, not for us
but for the human race in past years, was the
failure to obtain a treaty on nuclear testing, which
we presented in March to the Soviet Union.'
That was a great disappointment to us. And we
hope very much that that can be followed up on,
in some way.
American Diplomatic Achievements
Q. Mr. Secretary, Pd like to give you a break at
this point. We^ve been talking a great deal about
setbacks and disasters and so forth. Looking back
on this first year of the Kennedy administration,
is there some single achievement of American di-
plomacy— some job particularly well done — that
gives you, as Secretary of State, particular satis-
faction?
A. Well, I think there are a number of those,
Mr. Abel. Some of them won't be known, I sus-
pect, until the papers are published some 25 years
from now, because part of our business is pre-
venting crises — and we don't put them on the
public record as we go along. I would think that
perhaps there are two things that come to mind
in connection with your question. One was the
recent session of the General Assembly, where
some very important forward steps were taken,
where the effort to unseat the Republic of China
was decisively defeated,' where a Secretary-Gen-
eral was appointed without limiting his authority
' For text, see iUd., June 5, 1961, p. 870.
■ For background, see ihid., Jan. 15, 1962, p. 108.
January 29, 1962
167
along the lines of troika. I also would point to
the remarkable work done by our consul general —
a professional Foreign Service officer — in the Do-
minican Eepublic, Mr. Jolm C. Hill, in helping
that country find its way out of the agonies in
which it had fallen.
Q. And that, incidentally, was one situation in
which we did use American national power sym-
holically, didn't loe?
A. Yes.
Yes, we did.
Q. Mr. Secretary, I have one final question.
You are going off to Punta del Este in about 10
days. What is the least that you would expect to
come out of that conference with regard to action
against C astro'' s Cuba by the other hemisphere
countries?
A. Well, Mr. Abel, a question about what we
expect to have occur in a conference Mliich is about
10 days off, I think, is just a little untimely, be-
cause we're, of course, negotiating and discussing
very closely with other governments, right now,
exactly what those results might be. I am quite
sure that there will be registered there, in closer
terms, the deep concern of this hemisphere about
the penetration of the Americas by these forces
from the outside. The exact steps which we —
which may come from that — we'll have to wait the
event. But we're in close consultation with the
other governments right now.
Q. Well, thank you very much, sir.
President Reviews Berlin Situation
Witli General Clay
Statement by President Kennedy
White House press release dated January 7
General Clay ^ and I have had a most useful and
satisfactory review of the current situation in
Berlin and Germany. I have been very glad to get
his report of the continued stanchness of the free
people of West Berlin, and we have talked at
length about the ways and means of sustaining
and strengthening the life of their great city in
the future as in the past.
We liavc also reviewed the general problem of
" Lucius D. Clay, the President's personal representa-
tive In Berlin.
effective handling of possible crisis situations, and
we have reached full agreement on the policy to
be followed during these months.
This meeting is one more way in which Mr.
Rusk, General Clay, and I can keep in the closest
touch, and we continue to be fortunate in having
him as the senior American in Berlin.
U.S.-Canada Economic Committee
Concludes Seventh Meeting
The seventh meeting of the Joint United States-
Canadian Committee on Trade and Economic Af-
fairs was held at Ottaioa January 12-13. Follow-
ing is the text of a communique released at Ottawa
at the conclusion of the meeting.
The seventh meeting of the Joint Canada-
United States Committee on Trade and Economic
Affairs was held in Ottawa, January 12 and 13,
1962, under the Chairmanship of the Honourable
Donald M. Fleming, Minister of Finance.
2. The United States was represented at the
meeting by the Honorable C. Douglas Dillon, Sec-
retary of the Treasury; the Honorable Stewart
Udall, Secretary of the Interior; the Honorable
Orville L. Freeman, Secretary of Agriculture; the
Honorable Luther H. Hodges, Secretary of Com-
merce ; and the Honorable George W. Ball, Under-
Secretary of State. The United States Delegation
also included Mr. Livmgston T. Merchant, United
States Ambassador to Canada.
3. Canada was represented by the Honourable
Howard Green, Secretary of State for External
Affairs; the Honourable Donald M. Fleming, Min- i
ister of Finance; the Honourable George Hees,
Minister of Trade and Commerce; and tlie Hon-
ourable Alvin Hamilton, Minister of Agriculture.
The Canadian Delegation included the Canadian
Ambassador to the United States, Mr. A. D. P.
Heeney. |
4. The Committee noted tlie improvement in the
level of economic activity in botli countries since
the previous meeting in Washington in INIarch, ^
1961.^ They agreed on the importance of achiev-
ine; sustained economic growth in accordance with
the resolution adopted at the first Ministerial
meeting of the OECD on November 17.= Meas-
' Bui.LKTiN of Apr. 3, 1961. p. 487.
' For a statement made by Under Secretary of State
George W. Ball at the OECD moetins and text of a com-
munique, see ibid.. Dee. IS, liHJl. p. 1014.
168
Department of State Bulletin,.
ures for the expansion of world trade would be
essential to the achievement of these aims.
5. Canadian Ministers reiterated their support
for the expansion of world trade on a multilatei'al,
nondiscriminatory basis, and Canada's readiness to
play a constructive role in the promotion of f I'eer
world trade. United States members welcomed
this statement and pointed out that the United
States had consistently supported these objectives
for many years. The Committee recognized the
importance of the recent decision at the GATT
Ministerial Meeting to explore new arrangements
for the multilateral reduction of trade barriers and
for moving toward freer trade.'' The United
States members emphasized that the new trade
legislation being sought at this Session of Con-
gress is intended to contribute substantially to this
objective.
6. The United States members explained the
general nature and purposes of the trade expan-
sion programme which the United States Admin-
istration will be submitting to Congress, which,
if approved, would enable the United States to
make a greater contribution to the growth of in-
ternational trade on a multilateral basis, and in
this way contribute substantially to the strength
and prosperity of the free world.
7. The Committee examined the problems in-
hibiting international trade in agricultural com-
modities and underlined the importance of
securing international agreement on measures
which would provide adequate access to world
markets for agricultural producers. They agreed
that such measures should take full account of the
comparative advantage of production in agricul-
tural commodities among different countries.
United States and Canadian Ministers expressed
the hope that coming international discussions
would effectively contribute to the freeing and
expansion of international trade in agricultural
products.
8. The Committee noted the current negotia-
tions between Britain and the European Economic
Community and the widespread consequences
which British entry into the EEC would have for
the rest of the world. The Committee recognized
^ For statements made by Under Secretary Ball and
Under Secretary of Commerce Edward Gudeman, a re-
port of the U.S. delegation to the 19th session of GATT,
and text of a declaration on promotion of trade of less
developed countries, see iMd., Jan. 1, 1962, p. 3.
the great importance of the Commonwealth as a
unique association of free nations bridging five
continents and the constructive contribution which
it was making to world peace and stability.
9. Canadian Ministers emphasized that the Com-
monwealth trade links, including the exchange
of preferences and the historic right of free entry
into the United Kingdom market, were an essen-
tial cohesive element in the Commonwealth asso-
ciation. They stressed the importance the Ca-
nadian Government attached to Britain's efforts
in their negotiations with the EEC to safeguard
the trade interests of Canada and other Common-
wealth countries.
10. The Committee recalled the constructive
conclusions reached at the recent Ministerial meet-
ing of the GATT concerning the trade of the
less-developed countries. They reaffirmed that it
was the continuing policy of both coimtries to
assist the efforts of those countries to expand their
trade and improve their standards of living.
11. The Committee recognized that direct ex-
changes of views at the Cabinet level are useful in
helping to maintain soundly based and effective
economic co-operation between Canada and the
United States. Such understanding and co-opera-
tion will be all the more necessary in the years
ahead if each coimtry is to play its part in a chang-
ing world with a full recognition of the essential
interests and aspirations of the other.
Letters of Credence
Eciiador
The newly appointed Ambassador of Ecuador,
Neftali Ponce Miranda, presented his credentials
to President Kennedy on January 10. For texts
of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's
reply, see Department of State press release 22
dated January 10.
Republic of Gabon
The newly appointed Ambassador of the Repub-
lic of Gabon, Jules Mbah, presented his creden-
tials to President Kennedy on January 10. For
texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the Presi-
dent's reply, see Department of State press release
23 dated January 10.
January 29, 7962
169
Rule and Exception in Africa
by G. Mennen Williams
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs '
It gives me gi-eat pleasure to join you today at
a time when the new year is still young and full
of promise. At this season we feel our energies
revive and we take a new look at the possibilities
which life offers — the stubborn problems we face
and the opportunities we all have in the pursuit of
happiness, in working for a more abundant life
in our communities, and in strengthening the
leadership of our country in the great causes of
justice, liberty, and peace.
This nation has a great deal to say in the shap-
ing of the world community today. Our good for-
tune historically, our good and hardworking peo-
ple, have endowed the United States with miprece-
dented power and material prosperity. These
attributes greatly enhance the effect of all our
actions in the world outside our borders. If we
ourselves are somewhat breathless from our ad-
vance into the atomic age and the new era of space
exploration, we can be certain that to most other
nations and peoples the force of our presence
grows ever stronger.
Yet the great promise of America continues to
spring from our spiritual heritage. When our
forebears proclaimed that governments derive
"their just powers from the consent of the gov-
erned," a profound inspiration flowed out from
these shores to nourish the very roots of civiliza-
tion. The flowering of that inspiration has re-
claimed many national destinies for peoples
throughout the world. As Jefferson foresaw, the
American ideal of freedom would surely reach out
across the world, "to some pai'ts sooner, to some
later, and finally to all."
' Address made before the Woman's National Demo-
cratic Club at Washington, D.C., on .Tan. 8 (press release
16).
In our time, this ferment, this inevitable asser-
tion of the natural rights of man, has been — and
is — at work in Africa.
Evolution to Independence
Above all else the striking thing about Africa
today is the emergence, only yesterday, of so many
new nations. Twenty-five of the 29 sovereign na-
tions of Africa have won their independence in
the last 11 years, 18 of them within the past 2
years alone.
This is a simple reckoning of an enormously
significant transfonnation in our world commu-
nity. The curtain is rapidly falling on act three
of the drama of the old imperial-power relation-
ships, the spectacle of colonialism with its master-
servant relationships. The new play of forces in
Africa may seem pooi-ly rehearsed, and we are
not very well acquainted with many of the actors.
But clearly this drama of change is a text for our
times.
There is no use crying that some way should
have been found to clap the lid on the world the
way it was yesterday. Rather, as realists, we
should welcome this new play of forces because
it offers eloquent, fresh testimony to man's in-
extinguishable desire for freedom.
The colonial powers, with important excep-
tions, have contributed intelligently to this evo-
lution to self-determination and independence of
the African peoples. The colonial experience
generated a great many frictions, but what is re-
markable is that nearly nil the new nations of
the continent have emerged to freedom peacefully.
On (ho one hand, a degree of preparation, some-
times minimal but nevertheless vital, was extended
to these dependent peoples in the field of political
170
Deporfmenf of Sfafe Bulletin
expression and self-government. On the other
hand, African nationalist leaders have generally
used the political choices open to them with great
skill.
This peaceful evolution is the rule. We must
not miss seeing it because of headlines concerning
the one great exception in newly independent
Africa — the fonner Belgian territory which is now
tlie Republic of the Congo.
I do not wish today to go into the situation in
tlie Congo, except to reiterate that American policy
has helped to lay the groundwork there for a
necessary reconciliation among the Congolese
peoples. The tui'bulence in the Congo runs too
deep to expect an overnight solution of all the
problems of that country. But on the basis of
the Kitona agreement,- which President Kennedy
helped to make possible, the goal of a stable Congo,
impervious to subversion or outside domination,
is brought within reach.
Positive Achievements Are Characteristic
What I want to reiterate is that events in the
Congo must not distract us from the broader
truths about the new African states. The Congo
is the exception. We must look to, we must get
to know, the substantial, positive achievements of
the other new states of Africa, which constitute the
great majority.
What I would like to see in headlines is not
that 1 among the 25 newly independent nations
of Africa is rent by secession and civil strife but
that the other 24 are peacefully established under
governments of their own choosing; that law and
order prevails throughout virtually every one of
these countries; that responsible leadership is
widely characteristic; that economic and social
progress is the order of the day ; and that, despite
the blandisliments of the Soviet bloc, no African
country has traded away its independence (nor is
any likely to), while hj far the majority maintain
a friendly and productive orientation toward the
West.
When we recall the rigors of our own country's
early development, we know how much we owe to
tlie courage and foresight of our first leaders and
how much sweaty toil by our people was needed to
bring us round the bend of early uncertainties and
' For background, see Bulletin of Jan. 1, 1962, p. 10,
and Jan. 8, 1962, p. 49.
setbacks. Africa has moved fast, but the excep-
tions only go to prove the rule that the nations
there have begun their careers under foresighted
leadership which is determined to realize flourish-
ing societies and a secure destiny in the free world.
This certainly is not going to be an easy task,
for the needs of the African countries are many.
The needs, in fact, are shaping the kinds of in-
stitutions which are felt to be necessary to mobilize
national resources, including what is sometimes
called human investment, in the drive for economic
and social development. There is an impatience
to move ahead, but it could hardly be otherwise.
African leaders are caught up in a race with time
and the expectations of their peoples. They are
going to make some mistakes, but again we must
see the mainstream, which is already, and will
increasingly become, a forward movement.
Examples of Progress
We are too little aware of the inspired will to
work, to plan, and to sacrifice for a growing
economy that is evident, for example, in Tunisia.
The Tunisians are being reminded over and over
again that "the future belongs to industrious
peoples"; they are taught that " 'God helps them
who help themselves' is the motto of new Tunisia."
The Tunisian people have responded vigorously.
The total school population of Tunisia has
doubled sinc« 1952 and is still growing. The num-
ber of hospital beds has increased from 6,000 to
10,000 in 3 years. Slums are being cleared, and
pure water is being supplied to remote villages.
About 9,000 new housing units are being con-
structed each year, most of them low-cost units
for workers, and plans are being made to build
20,000 annually.
The case of Nigeria is also instructive. Nigeria
has been developing in accordance with a program
based on a survey by the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development. Some 80 per-
cent of this program has been financed from in-
ternal Nigerian sources. With its help, Nigeria's
rate of economic growth has risen to about 6 per-
cent per annum. Tax withholdings are now being
started to cut down on tax evasion. Efforts are
being made to meet uncertainties of present land
ownership by changes in the tenure arrangements.
New lands are being opened up by well-drilling
and land-resettlement projects, and new conMnuni-
ties are being created.
January 29, J 962
in
Incidentally, traveling in Nigeria and several
other countries of Af i-ica, I was impressed to find
that industrial development agencies have been set
up, quite like those found in many of our own
States.
Partnership and Cooperation
We also need to be reminded of the continuing
partnership between almost every one of the Afri-
can nations and the former metropole powers. In
every instance the new nations have turned first to
these or other countries of the West for aid.
Quite a few have felt obliged to accept aid offers
also from the Soviet bloc, owing to the magni-
tude of their needs and, sometimes, as another
means of signifying their independence. There
are dangers in this, of course, but the present odds,
measured in terms of aid programs, are heavily
weighted on the free- world side.
We ourselves have done much less than the Eu-
ropean countries. Our direct economic aid to
Africa in fiscal year 1961 was $215 million apart
from surplus agricultural commodities, but
France and England together provided well over
$400 million. Germany, Belgium, Italy, and sev-
eral smaller countries have also made substantial
contributions. This pool of Western assistance
is nourishing sound programs of economic and
social development. In addition international
agencies are supporting this general forward ef-
fort. Last year almost one-third of the new loan
commitments of the International Bank for Re-
construction and Development went to Africa.
Moreover, new joint efforts in African assist-
ance are being set in motion by member nations
of the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development. And on their own account the
African nations have formed political groupings
which find their first expression in developing ra-
tional economic plans on a cooperative basis. One
example is the work of the Organization for Afri-
can and Malagasy Economic Cooperation, through
which 12 former French territories are forming a
customs union and planning coordinated develop-
ment programs. Twenty nations, including sev-
eral foimerly under British administration, expect
soon to adopt a convention with similar develop-
ment objectives, and still another group of six
nations have agreed to cooperate under the "Casa-
blanca Charter."
These are realities of constructive work and
172
orderly progress in Africa. They do not mean
that the end of the road is in sight, for the prob-
lems are manifold and tenacious. But they do
mean that a very good start has been made on the
sort of development which is consistent not only
with African needs but with free- world objectives.
That development can be brought to fruition if the
free world maintains and enlarges its support to
African nations. In this great effort we must do
our share.
American Responsiveness
Recognizing these realities. President Kennedy,
in the great tradition I referred to at the start,
has given us the framework for our new African
policy. This he outlined in his inaugural ad-
dress,^ in which he saluted the new nations and at
the same time warned the enemies of freedom of
our determination to defend that world of free
choice which is ever enlarging. As you may re-
call, he went on to pledge this coimtry's best efforts
to help these peoples help themselves — "not be-
cause the Communists may be doing it, not because
we seek their votes, but because it is right."
Our policy has been to vmdergird the stability
of the nations of Africa by assisting them in the
fight against poverty, illiteracy, and disease. We
seek to strengthen newly won independence in
Africa.
We have done so by according African nations
and leaders full recognition, full assurance of our
desire to consider their problems on their own
merits and to cooperate in solving them. We have
welcomed to America such distinguished African
leaders as President Bourguiba of Tunisia. Presi-
dent Youlou of the Congo (Brazzaville), Prime
Minister Balewa of Nigeria, President Abboud of
the Sudan, President Tubman of Liberia, and
President Senghor of Senegal. Vice President
Johnson, Attorney General Robert Kcnnedj',
Labor Secretary Arthur Goldberg, Commerce Sec-
retaiy Luther Hodges, Ambassador Chester
Bowles, and Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., have rep-
resented the United States on official missions to
Africa. My own acquaintanceship with African
leaders, and that of my associates, has been very
broadly developed in three extensive and valuable
trips to Africa.
In launching the Decade of Development, Presi-
dent Kennedy has developed a new concept within
'/&»?.. Feb. 6, 1961, p. 17.-.
Department of State Bulletin
which our efforts to promote economic growth are
being carried forward and luider which we are
seeking to mobilize the resources of the free workl/
We have taken this concept and translated it
into new aid principles calling for longer term,
planned contributions to somid economic develop-
ment. Already in Nigeria and Tanganyika those
principles govern our aid programs. We have cal-
culated our risks with great care in deciding to
assist the Volta River project in Ghana and are
confident that our national interest, as well as
African advancement, is served by this decision.
Our aid projects are typified by the decision to
help build a vital port in Somalia and a great
university in Ethiopia, and by turning over to
Liberia the port facility we built at Monrovia dur-
ing the war. Our special interest in education is
reflected by our sending of 150 teachers to east
Africa and by support to more than a dozen Afri-
can educational institutions.
Another significant program is the Peace Corps.
Dedicated, talented young Americans of the Peace
Corps are putting their shoulders to the wheel of
African development.
We have, finally, seen the United Nations Op-
eration in the Congo through thick and thin, en-
abling the Congolese to throw off a threatened
Communist infection which could have spread
dangerously.
In support of these efforts we have sought to
bring out tlie very best in our official representa-
tives stationed in Africa. We have armed our am-
bassadors with full authority to direct the activi-
ties of all our officials in these countries, and Am-
bassador Bowles and I met personally with the
ambassadors and their principal aides to reinforce
this directive and to sound out how well it was
being applied.
I am happy to say that the year past has given
me a great respect and admiration for the level of
competence, dedication, and professional skill of
these men and women who are representing
America, often under difficult conditions demand-
ing real sacrifices. Properly supported by under-
standing and a sense of commitment here at home,
and by an aid program more nearly approaching
' For an address by President Kennedy before the U.N.
General Assembly on Sept. 2.'i, 1961, see ibid., Oct. 16, 1961,
p. 619 ; for a statement by Philip M. Klutznick, U.S. Rep-
resentative to the General Assembly, made in Committee
II on Oct. 6, 1961, see ibid., Dec. 4, 1961, p. 939.
January 29, 1962
624S56— 62 3
the needs of these nations, our team in Africa can
be counted on to give new substance to our historic
role in support of freedom, in raising of living
standards, and in the elevation of human dignity.
The Dependent Territories
For those parts of Africa which are still in a
dependent status, our policy has two chief aspects.
First, as President Kennedy told the U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly in September, the "continuing tide
of self-determination, which runs so strong, has
our sympathy and our support." Second, as I
have intimated above, we regard deliberate, ex-
peditious preparation for self-goveniment as es-
sential not only to African advancement but to
the avoidance of increased tensions which could
jeopardize the remarkable progress that so far
characterizes the political evolution of Africa.
It is not our policy to intervene in the vital
processes of constitutional transition and racial
accommodation which are presently in train in
most of the dependent areas. They must be re-
solved, we recognize, primarily by the peoples and
governments concerned, and much credit is due to
European administrators and African nationalists
who have registered the progress which I had the
privilege to see on my visits in east and central
Africa. Wliere our comisel is sought, or where
it is incumbent on us to define our position, we
declare our interest in political, economic, and so-
cial progress and assert that we believe such
progress should occur without reference to the
race of individual citizens and certainly without
the derogation of the full rights of any element
of the population.
I should add that we liold these views with re-
spect also to an African nation which has long
been independent. I refer to the Eepublic of
South Africa, whose policy of apartheid so clearly
departs from the principles of our own national
policy and from the tenets of the United Nations
Charter.
American Confidence in Africa Unshaken
As a general summing up, I would say that the
iVmerican attitude toward Africa is one of confi-
dence in people and principles, a confidence un-
shaken by the multiplicity of new problems pre-
sented to our foreign policy and undistracted by
headlines which center on the trouble-starred
exceptions to the orderly transition which has
173
marked the postwar course of events in Africa.
Out of a decent respect for the opinions of our
oldest friends and the aspirations of our newest,
we are seeking to strengthen independent Africa
against internal instabilities and outside ambitions
and to contribute to an orderly evolution in de-
pendent areas, conscious of how much depends
on the actions of wise administrators and men
of good will representing all elements of
these national communities as they seek further
progress.
Above all, our outlook is centered on the record
of acliievement of the new African states. Their
leaders and peoples have earned our deep respect.
Looking out on a world of constant change, we
find here new reflections of the peniianent values
we have always sought to build on.
So in our policy for Africa, in our support to
Africa, let us get on with the job, let us build
for the future peace and opportunity that must
be secured for the world if they are to be enjoyed
by us and by our children.
Jose Rizal Day
hy W. AverellHarriman
Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs ^
It is with great personal satisfaction that I join
this distinguished company in commemorating the
memory of Jose Rizal on this 65th anniversary of
his death. Today also marks the conclusion of the
centenary year of the birth of Rizal, martyr-hero
of the Philippines, which has been observed by all
who are dedicated to the principles of freedom for
which he died. In doing so we have been ful-
filling Rizal's own admonition, "I die without
seeing the dawn brighten over my native land !
You, who have it to see, welcome it — and forget
not those who have fallen during the night !"
Jose Rizal was a man of whom all Filipinos are
justifiably proud. Still more, liowever, Rizal was
a man from whom all men who love freedom can
take inspiration. He was only 35 years old when
his life was abruptly ended before a firing squad.
Yet in that brief span he had earned many honors,
and his stature is today recognized the world over.
He was renowned as a naturalist whose specimens
may still be seen in European museums. Rizal
was a scientific agriculturalist, an educator, sculp-
tor, humorist, linguist. He was eminent as a phy-
sician and as an eye specialist. His historical re-
' Address made at the Department of State on Dec. 30
(press release 916 dated Dec. 29) at an observance of
Jos6 Rizal Day sponsored by the Philippine Embassy.
search formed the basis for the study of the pre-
Hispanic culture of his country. He has earned
a place in the distinguished company of such great
names as Jefferson and Ben Franklin.
Rizal's greatness rests on none of these impres-
sive achievements, however. It is Jose Rizal the
social reformer, the selfless embodiment of the na-
tional conscience, the seeker after trutli, the voice of
freedom, whose guiding hand is felt in tlie Philip-
pines today. The most eloquent testimony of
Rizal's eminence as a political philosoplier is the
early fulfillment of his conviction that injustice
and oppression in his colonial homeland could not
long survive the liberation of the minds of his
countrymen. He set as his first goals the attain-
ment of freedom of education, of thought, and of
speech in the Philippines. A gentle man of reason,
he sought change, not througli revolutionary vio-
lence but through the orderly paths of education
and political preparation, knowing that without
these the troubles of his country would be com-
pounded. He asked that his follow coimtrjiiien be
given a measure of responsibility for their own
destinies and that in their homeland they be af-
forded opportunities for the liberal education he
himself was forced to seek abroad.
It is especially tragic that young Dr. Jose Rizal,
who stood before a firing squad as a revolutionary
174
Department of State Bulletin
symbol 65 years ago today, had in truth dedicated
his life to peaceful reform. Hatred and revenge
played no part in his liberal outlook.
As "the Great Malayan" he is honored through-
out the world. As a Filipino he was the spokes-
man for national aspirations, foe of despotism,
and father of his country.
"We would do well to listen again to the
thoughts of Rizal, which are as fresh today as
when he first expressed them. He said :
Without education and freedom, which are the soil
and the sun of man, no reform is possible, no measure
can yield the desired result. . . .
An immoral government presupposes a demoralized
people; a conscienceless administration, greedy and
servile citizens in the settled parts, outlaws and brigands
In the mountains. . . .
My countrymen, I have given proof that I am one most
anxious for liberties for our country, and I am still
desirous of them. But I place as a prior condition the
education of the people, that by means of instruction and
indu.stry our country may have an individuality of its
own and make itself worthy of these liberties. . . .
Jose Rizal foresaw many of the circumstances
which resulted in the start, 2 years after his death,
of the close and fruitful association of the Philip-
pines and the United States. But not even Rizal
could have predicted that the system of liberal
education and political preparation he yearned
for would, soon after his death, be introduced so
quickly and effectively from America.
I am gratified to be able to say that the United
States early recognized Rizal's wisdom and the
logic of his ideals. In 1902 a bill establishing
civil government in the Philippines was adopted
by the United States Congress (the first Organic
Act). In his sponsorship speech Representative
Henry A. Cooper said of Rizal,
Search the long and bloody roll of the world's martyred
dead, and where — on what soil, under what sky — did
tyranny ever claim a nobler victim? . . . the future is
not without hope for a people which . . . has furnished
to the world a character so lofty and so pure as that of
Jose Rizal.
Present U.S.-Philippine Relationship
His ideas and ideals form an appropriate back-
groimd for the present relationship of the Philip-
pines and the United States as sovereign equals
joined in a partnership based upon mutuality of
outlook, interest, and purpose and on an active
concern with the welfare and peace of humanity
everywhere. This association has been marked
Secretary Rusk Sends Greetings
to Republic of the Pliilippines
Following is a message sent 6y Secretary Rusk to
Vice President Emmanuel Pelacz of the Pliilippines
on the occasion of Rizal Day, December 30, awl the
conclusion of the centennial observance of the hirth
of Jos6 Rizal.
Press release 913 dated December 29
December 29, 1961
Dear Mb. Vice President : Over the past twelve
months we in the United States have been honored
by the opportunity to share in celebrating with you
the centennial of the birth of your national hero,
Dr. Jos6 Rizal.
The close association of our two countries in pur-
suing our mutual ideals truly embraces the spirit
of Rizal. Founded on such an identity of prin-
ciple, our common cause and our many individual
friendships can only grow and prosper to the ad-
vantage of all mankind.
Sincerely yours,
Dean Rusk
by constantly growing respect and friendship,
with each partner maturing in step with the
other. Accompanying these official relations
from the outset have been the equally important
individual ties between Filipino and American.
As early as 1901, plans were made to send 1,000
American teachers to the Philippines. Those
dedicated teachers (known as Thomasites after
the name of the Army transport wliich took them
there) are still held in esteem throughout the
Philippines. By 1903 the education of outstand-
ing Filipino students in the United States was
authorized. Our good friend General [Carlos P.]
Romulo himself was one of them.
I like to think that Jose Rizal would have re-
sponded warmly to the arrival in this, his cen-
tenary year, of a second group of youths fired by
ideals similar to his own. The heirs of his leader-
ship, as well as we who send them, recognize the
spirit of Rizal in the Peace Corps volimteers who
are now undertaking to assist the cause of educa-
tion in the Philippines. I noted with satisfaction
a few days ago that six of them offered their
labor during the Christmas vacation to help re-
pair school buildings damaged or destroyed by a
typhoon in their locality.
Rizal did not know that liis people would so
soon have the opportunity to develop in an atmos-
January 29, J 962
175
phere of freedom of religion, of information, and,
most important to liim, freedom from fear. He
would have rejoiced in the early establishment of
libraries in which his own works have a prominent
place. He would have been gratified by the pro-
grams under which the United States helped re-
stock libraries destroyed by war. Rizal's interest
in languages today finds expression in the progress
in the Philippines in the development of a national
language. The United States has assisted this
program through the printing of textbooks in the
vernacular, principally Tagalog, as well as in
English. Our exchanges of students, leaders,
and specialists and the sharing of radio broad-
casting facilities have done much to liighlight the
similarity of our individual and national outlooks.
How splendid is the degree of harmony of ideals
and effort achieved between the Republic of the
Philippines and the United States of America!
Both our nations owe Rizal a great debt for his
foresight and wisdom, which facilitated develop-
ment of Asia's first liberal democracy.
In drawing attention to the closeness of our peo-
ple, I would be remiss were I to overlook the
occasional disagreements and problems that have
arisen between us. However, there have been none
tliat have not or cannot be i-esolved through frank
discussion. We have learned, over the yeare, to
know each other so well that we can argue with-
out fear of misunderstanding, as members of the
same family. For our part, we are impressed that
the spirit of pride in national identity and accom-
plishment that Rizal encouraged so fervently has
become an important part of the Philippine
character.
Together our peoples have progressed. From
unsure and sometimes inept first steps, the United
States assisted the Philippines to national inde-
pendence dedicated to insuring the blessings of
liberty to its citizens. Although at times the way
was not clear, neither of us ever doubted what
the goal was nor that it would be achieved. It is
a fact that the United States has done much for
the Philippines; we have contributed money, we
have sent technicians and teachers. But without
Philippine talents, energies, and dedication all
this would have been in vain. The United States
has not played the role of mentor alone. From
the Philippines we have had countless lessons in
the art and psychology of living in a world soon to
be free of the forms of traditional colonialism if
not of all of its scars. The experience has been
mutually beneficial.
United in dedication to Rizal's ideals, our coun-
tries at Bataan and Corregidor forged an alliance
to forestall any second attempt to extinguish the
light of liberty in either country. After cooperat-
ing in crushing the alien-dominated Communist
Huks, w^ho sought to destroy the Philippines, and
after fighting side by side again in Korea, our two
coimtries took the lead in developing an organiza-
tion to defend Southeast Asia from the new
colonialism.
Rizal said,
When a people is denied light, home, liberty, and Jus-
tice— things that are essential to life, and therefore man's
patrimony — that people has a right to treat him who so
despoils it as we would the robber who intercepts us on
the highway.
Today we jointly protect our liberty. We can-
not and will not compromise our responsibilities
to defend the free peoples of Asia. The help of
the people of the Philippines is essential in ful-
filling this responsibility.
The Philippine economy has made great prog-
ress in recovering from the ravages of World War
II and going far beyond prewar production levels,
and more, I feel sure, can and will be achieved.
However, as President Kennedy has said, the
challenges and opportunities of the sixties are
enormous for all of us.
U.S. Shares "Faith in the Filipino"
Of great significance is the inauguration, just
a few hours ago, of a new government in the
Philippines. President Kennedy has sent Gov-
ernor Robert B. Meyner of New Jersey as his
personal representative to emphasize the hope,
the esteem, and the respect .^Vmericans hold for
the Philippine people and their flourishing demo-
cratic institutions. I have every confidence that
the prospects for even closer cooperation between
our respective Governments are most promising.
President [Diosdado] Macapagal has dedicated
himself, his campaign, and his administration to
"Faith in the Filipino." We share that faith.
The new President has committed himself to the
maintenance of United States-Philippine coopera-
tion in defense of free-world interests. He has
outlined a progressive program for economic
development and social justice. He deserves the
176
Department of Slate Bulletin
full suppoi't of all in the Philippines, regardless
of political affiliation.
The new administration declared during the
campaign its intention to resume and to accelerate
economic progress. It specifically promised to
remove the foreign-exchange controls which have
inhibited Philippine trade these past 11 years
and also to reduce Government participation
in business enterprises to a minimum. It is
pledged to launch a positive program to encourage
private foreign investment. I feel sure that
foreign investors will respond and can help by
providing a part of the very large amounts of
capital still needed to develop the tremendous
natural and human resources of the Philippines.
Moreover, the United States Government is ready
to consider any other constructive proposals
through which we may help the Philippines to
use its resources more fully. We are prepared
to join with other friends of the Philippines, both
public and private, to supplement those resources
in the most economical way possible.
The United States particularly welcomes the
Macapagal administration's reemphasized inter-
est in a program of self-help, its announced in-
tention to develop priorities for the use of available
resources, to improve the use of forestry and fish-
ery resources, to redirect credit to more produc-
tive use, to improve tax collections, to grant
greater autonomy to local communities, and to
insure a just distribution of the blessings of eco-
nomic progress. These goals fortuitously paral-
lel the criteria set forth in the act establishing
the new United States Agency for International
Development. It is good to see Eizal's hopes and
ideals acknowledged to such a degree in his
homeland.
To President Macapagal and to the people of
the Philippines go our best wishes for his health
and success in carrying out his programs in the
spirit and example of Jose Kizal.
In extending our congratulations, we are pro-
foundly aware of the magnitude of the challenge
our countries face together. Our interest in the
continuing development of our common social and
political ideals is an historical fact. We do not
and shall not take for granted our friendship with
the Pliilippines or its people.
Wliile hundreds of millions of people have been
gaining their freedom, in most cases, as with the
Philippines, through the enlightened modem
policies of the former colonial powers, a new colo-
nialism in Europe and Asia is threatening free
peoples everywhere. I need not remind this au-
dience of what we have seen in Hungary and
Tibet, and most recently of the attempts of the
aggressive forces of this new colonialism to enslave
the free people of Viet-Nam. Certainly these at-
tacks are a portent of a continuing probing by
communism of the free world's will and dedication
to freedom.
Our mutual goals are clear. Each of us must
strive, first of all, to get on with the unfinished
business at home as we develop our economic and
social potential to the fullest. Secondly, we must
maintain and strengthen our joint and allied de-
fense posture to discourage or to repel, if need be,
aggression wherever it arises. Thirdly, we must
inform people in a manner which will lead to their
understanding and vigorously' opposing this new
Communist colonialism. And finally, we should
take positive measures to provide continuing help
to other nations who also draw inspiration from
these shared and universal ideals — the ideals of
Rizal — that liberal education and free choice, not
indoctrination and coercion, are the keys to eco-
nomic prosperity and social welfare.
In this way we shall not only fittingly remember
one who has "fallen during the night," but we
shall do much to preserve and to extend the fron-
tiers of freedom in the coming years. We owe it to
the memory of Rizal and to our American Found-
ing Fathers to pledge our energies and our pur-
pose and our honor to the cause of freedom, as
President Roosevelt said — everywhere in the
world.
Mr. IVSoscoso Heads Factfinding
Mission to Dominican Republic
White House press release (Palm Beach, Fla. ) dated January 4
Tlie Wliite House announced on January 4 that
a factfinding mission headed by Teodoro Moscoso,
Assistant Administrator of the Agency for Inter-
national Development, would depart for the
Dominican Republic on January 7 to confer with
Dominican officials on the possibility of AID
projects for that country.
Mr. Moscoso's mission will seek information
in the areas of the monetary and fiscal situation
in the Dominican Republic and the possible need
for emergency progi-ams such as unemployment
January 29, 1962
\77
relief and literacy and immunization programs, as
■well as looking into the possible requirements for
long-term AID programs in the nation in order
to strengthen the Alliance for Progress.
Mr. Moscoso will spend several days at Santo
Domingo, then return to Washington, with a short
stopover in Puerto Rico. Members of his mission
will remain in Santo Domingo for a period of at
least a week in order to obtain detailed informa-
tion.
Other members of the factfinding mission are
Milton Barall, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for Inter-American Affairs; Ralph A. Vis-
bal. Chief, Office of Caribbean and Mexican Af-
fairs, Bureau for Latin America, AID; Norman
Ward, Special Assistant, Office of Institutional
Development, Bureau for Latin America, AID;
Ralph W. Ruffner, Acting Director, Education
and Social Development Staff, Bureau for Latin
America, AID; Joseph Carwell, Deputy Director,
Office of Inter-American Regional Economic Af-
fairs, Department of State; and Gabriel Kaplan,
consultant on community development.
U.S. Proposes Seasonal Marketing
Fund for Central American Coffee
Press release 5 dated January 3
The U.S. Government is prepared, in principle,
to lend up to $12 million to help certain Latin
American countries in their efforts to relieve sea-
sonal pressure on coffee markets through more
orderly marketing of their coffee, Teodoro Mos-
coso, AID Assistant Administrator for Latin
America, announced on January 3. This furthers
the aims of the Allanza para el Progreso.
To discuss detailed arrangements the United
States is proposing that a meeting be held at
Washington on January 22. The governments of
the following six countries have been invited:
Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nica-
ragua, and Costa Rica. These are the countries
which have displayed most immediate concern
about the seasonal marketing problem. It is possi-
ble that otlier Latin American nations having sim-
ilar problems may wish to consider participation
in the program at a later date. This is not pre-
cluded by the present action.
Mr. Moscoso emphasized that the U.S. plans had
just been comnmnicated to the interested govern-
ments. They have been advised of the essential
conditions wliich the United States believes must
be satisfied if the program is to hold out promise
of success and therefore to justify U.S. participa-
tion.
There are two main elements in the approach
envisaged by the United States :
1. For their part the countries participating in
the agreement will be asked to strengthen controls
over exports as required by the existing Interna-
tional Coffee Agreement. They will also under-
take internal measures to relieve the pressure that
overproduction puts on the market.
2. If certain conditions are satisfied the United
States will be prepared to make a long-tenn loan
of up to $12 million for a Seasonal Marketing
Fund (SMF). The fund would assist the coun-
tries to hold back their quota coffees from export
for a long enough time to relieve seasonal pressure
on coffee markets. The funds advanced will be
used on a revolving-fund basis, and the United
States proposes that repayment should be provided
on an automatic basis through a levy on each bag
of coffee exported. If the program meets with the
success hoped for, it is entirely possible that lesser
sums will be needed and that repayments can be
speeded up.
Other large coffee-producing coimtries in Latin
America have indicated their support for the pro-
gram, since relief of seasonal pressures on Central
American coffees will result in reduced pressures
on coffees from elsewhere.
Mr. Moscoso emphasized that the proposed pro-
gram should strengthen the existing coffee agree-
ment to which most of the world's coffee exporters
belong. He also said that it should improve the
chances for bringing about a long-term coffee
agreement among exporters and importers which
is intended to come to grips with the basic prob-
lem of ovei-production which now plagues world
coffee markets.
Latin American countries are heavily dependent
on earnings from the exports of commodities in
order to carry out their economic and social de-
velopment programs. Coffee is particularly im-
portant in Central America, where it is the
number-one export item. The worldwide coffee
markets have been deteriorating for some years,
basically because of overproduction. They show
particular seasonal weakness in Central America
since the full year's harvest is concentrated in a
178
Department of State Bulletin
short period of 3 to 4 months, creating great pres-
sures for early sale. Overproduction has also now
for the first time become a problem for that area.
Mr. Moscoso explained that the proposed meas-
ures to ease the seasonal marketing problem would
further programs of economic and social develop-
ment in this hemisphere, in accordance with the
charter of the Alliance for Progress agreed to at
the meeting last August at Punta del Este, Uru-
guay.^ More particularly, it would further the
specific program agreed to there for dealing with
the hemisphere's coffee problems.
Mr. Moscoso emphasized that this program does
not embrace buffer-stock arrangements, purchases
of surplus coffee, or intervention by the U.S. Gov-
ernment in coft'ee markets. Moreover, he stressed
it is not intended to raise the price of coffees. In-
stead it is intended to prevent seasonal marketing
pressures from reducing prices below their al-
ready depressed levels. Wholesale prices of Cen-
tral American coffees are now about 36 cents a
pound, which is about two-fifths their level of 7
years ago (90 cents) and about one-third less than
the average price 3 years ago (51 cents). Prices
are now the lowest since 1950. Recent price de-
clines have cost the exporting countries precious
foreign exchange. Every 1-cent drop in coffee
prices costs the six countries annually $7 million
in income.
Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy
87th Congress, 1st Session
Impact of Imports and Exports on Employment (Coal
and Residual Fuel Oil). Hearings before the Subcom-
mittee on the Impact of Imports and Exports on Ameri-
can Employment of the House Education and Labor
Committee. Part 1. June 19-20, 1061. 215 pp.
Closedown and Current Status of U.S. Government Nickel
Plant at Xicaro, Cuba. Hearings before a subcommit-
tee of the House Government Operations Committee.
August 20-30, 1961. 78 pp.
Export of Logs to Japan. Hearing before the Subcom-
mittee on Forests of the House Agriculture Committee.
October 7, 1961. 73 pp.
The European Economic Community and the United
States. Paper prepared by Robert R. Bowie and Theo-
dore Geiger for the Subcommittee on Foreign Economic
Policy of the Joint Economic Committee. November 27,
1961. 60 pp. [Joint Committee print]
United States Commercial Policy : A Program for the
1960's. Paper prepared by Peter B. Kenen for the
Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy of the Joint
Economic Committee. November 30, 1961. 37 pp.
[Joint Committee print]
Passport Regulations Affecting
Communists Revised
Press release 24 dated January 12
Tlie Department of State announced on Jan-
uary 12 the promulgation of revised passport reg-
ulations ^ dealing with denial of passports to
members of Communist organizations registered
or required to be registered under the Subversive
Activities Control Act of 1950. These regulations
are designed to implement the act in light of the
recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case
of the Comtnunht Party of the United States v.
Subversive Activities Control Board.
The regulations provide that a passport shall
not be issued to or renewed for any individual who
the issuing officer knows or has reason to believe
is a member of a Communist organization regis-
tered or required to be registered under the Sub-
versive Activities Control Act.
The regulations provide further that any per-
son to whom a passport or renewal of a passport
has been denied or whose passport has been re-
voked shall have the right to a hearing before the
Passport Office and shall liave the right to appeal
from an adverse decision of the Passport Office to
the Board of Passport Appeals appointed by the
Secretary of State. In such hearings the appli-
cant shall be accorded the right to appear, to be
represented by counsel, to present evidence, to be
informed of the evidence against him and the
source of such evidence, and to confront and cross-
examine adverse witnesses. The decision to deny
a passport shall be based only on evidence which
is made available to the applicant for the passport.
The Department of State also announced on
January 12 that it will move to revoke the out-
standing passports of certain leading officers and
members of the Communist Party of the United
States. This action will be taken pursuant to the
discretionary authority of the Secretary in the is-
suance of U.S. passports and in conformity with
the provisions in the Subversive Activities Control
Act relating to passports for persons wlio are
members of Communist organizations registered
or required to be registered under the act. The
Department is now conferring with the Depart-
ment of Justice as to the procedures for carrying
out such action.
' For text, see Bulletin of Sept. 11, 1961, p. 463.
■ For text, see 27 Fed. Reg. 344.
January 29, 1962
179
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
Following is a statement made in Committee I
(Political and Security) on December ^ hy Am-
bassador Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Bepresenta-
tive to the General Assembly, together with the
text of a resolution adopted in plenary on Decem-
ber 20.
STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR STEVENSON
U.S. delegation press release 3875
The subject before tliis committee this morning
is, as you have indicated, outer space — and what
we together decide to do, or not to do, to promote
the exploration and use through peaceful cooper-
ation.
This is Year Five in the Age of Space. Already
in 4 short years scientific instruments, then ani-
mals, then men, have been hurled into space and
into orbit around the earth. Within a few more
years satellites will bring vast new developments
in weather forecasting and in worldwide tele-
phone, radio, and television communications.
More than that, rocket booster capacity will be-
come sufficient to launch teams of men on journeys
to the moon and to the nearest planets. And after
that, one can only speculate what may come next.
Unhappily this astoiuiding progress in space
science has not been matched by comparable prog-
ress in international cooperation. In the race of
history social invention continues to lag behind
scientific invention.
We have already lost valuable time that can
never be recovered.
Unless we act soon the space age — like the naval
age, like the air age and the atomic age— will see
waste and danger beyond description as a result
of mankind's inability to exploit liis technical ad-
vances in a rational social framework. In short,
unless we act soon, we shall be making the old mis-
takes all over again.
Despite the urgent need for immediate inter-
national action, I fear that we come to this subject
ill-prepared to think cleai-ly about it. I suspect
that we are handicapped by our heritage of
thought about the affairs of this single planet.
We are conditioned to think in terms of nations.
Our lives and concepts are predicated upon states
whose boundaries are fixed by oceans and rivers
and mountain ranges or by the manmade lines
drawn sharply across the two-dimensional and
finite surface of jDlanet Earth. We are condi-
tioned to think in terms of nations defined by
finite areas expressed m finite measurements — na-
tions with more or less known resources and more
or less counted populations. And especially we
are conditioned to think in terms of national
sovereignties.
Such concepts hav^e no meaningful application
to the unexplored, unboimded, and possibly un-
populated reaches of outer space, which surround
no nation more than any other nation, and which
are innocent of the idea of national sovereignty.
We are further handicapped, many of us, by the
impression that the exploration of outer space is a
matter of concern only to the great powers because
they alone have the capacity to penetrate space.
That impression gains force from the belief that
outer space is unrelated to the day-to-day pi'ob-
lems of nations whose energies are absorbed by
such earthly daily questions as growing enough
food to feed their peoples.
This impression, I submit, is totally and danger-
ously wrong.
The smallest nation represented here in the
United Nations is deeply concerned with this ques-
tion before us — and so is the poorest of our
members. Indeed, tliey may have far more to
gain from the shared benefits of space science —
and on just such matters as growing food — than
the larger and the richer societies.
Moreover, the small nations have an overriding
interest in seeing to it (liat access to space and the
benefits of space science are not preempted by a
few nations, that space exploration is not carried
180
Department of Sfofe Bulletin
forward as a competition between big-power
rivals, (hat the ideological quarrels which so un-
happily alUict this planet are not boosted into
space to infect other planets yet unsullied by the
quarrels of men.
Final]}', all nations can play a part in assuring
(hat mankind derives the maximum advantage
from space technology in the here and the now
and not just in the hereafter. Every nation can co-
operate in the allocation of radio frequencies for
space communications. Every nation can partici-
pate in global systems of weather prediction and
communications.
In outer space we start with a clean slate — an
area yet unmarred by the accumulated conflicts
and prejudices of our earthly past. We propose
today that the United Nations write on this slate
boldly and in an orderly and a creative way to
narrow the gap between scientific progress and so-
cial invention, to offer to all nations, irrespective
of the stage of their economy or scientific develop-
ment, an opportunity to participate in one of the
greatest adventures of man's existence.
The United States, together with other delega-
tions, today places before this committee a pro-
gram for cooperation in outer space — a program
embodied in the draft resolution ^ now before you.
"We look forward to constructive discussions of
these proposals — and to improvement upon them.
They do not represent fixed positions. We are
prepared to consider constructive suggestions from
any member of the committee so that the widest
possible measui'e of common agreement may be
reached. But these proposals do represent our
best and most thoughtful effort to put forward
in good faith a program of international coopera-
tion for the benefit of all mankind.
Toward a Regime of Law and Order
The first part of this program, embodied in part
A of the draft resolution, looks toward a regime
of law and order in outer space based on two
fimdamental principles wliich should commend
themselves to all nations.
The first principle is that international law, in-
cluding the United Nations Charter, applies to
outer space and celestial bodies. Now that man
has found means to venture beyond his earthly en-
vironment, we should state explicitly that the
rules of good international conduct follow him
wherever he goes. The Ad Hoc Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space noted in its report
of July 14, 1959,^ that as a matter of principle
the United Nations Charter and the statute of
the International Court of Justice are not limited
in their operations to the confines of the earth.
The second principle is that outer space and
celestial bodies are free for exploration and use
by all states in conformity with international law
and are not subject to national appropriation by
claim of sovereignty or otherwise.
The Ad Hoc Committee on Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space noted in its report that with the prac-
tices followed during the International Geophys-
ical Year "there may have been initiated the rec-
ognition or establishment of a generally accepted
rule to the effect that, in principle, outer space is,
on conditions of equality, freely available for
exploration and use by all in accordance with
existing or future international law or agree-
ments."
This rule has been confirmed by the practice of
states in the time since the report was written. It
now deserves explicit recognition by this
Assembly.
But such a statement on outer space is not
enough. In the 2 years since the report was writ-
ten, mankind has taken giant steps toward reach-
ing celestial bodies. The first manned lunar
landing may take place by the end of the present
decade. All mankind has an interest and a stake
in these monumental achievements. We must not
allow celestial bodies to be the objects of com-
peting national claims.
The members of the committee will note that we
have not attempted to define where outer space
begins. In our judgment it is premature to do
this now. The attempt to draw a boundary be-
tween air space and outer space must await fur-
ther experience and a consensus among nations.
Fortunately the value of the principles of free-
dom of space and celestial bodies does not depend
on the drawing of a boundary line. If I may cite
the analogy of the high seas, we have been able
to confirm the principle of freedom of the seas
even in the absence of complete agreement as to
where the seas begin.
Freedom of space and celestial bodies, like free-
dom of the seas, will serve the interest of all na-
tions. Man should be free to venture into space
' U.N. doe. A/C. 1/L. 301.
January 29, 1962
' U.N. doc. A/4141.
181
on the same basis that he has ventured on the
high seas — free from any restraints save those
imposed by the laws of his o^vn nation and by the
rules of international law, including those em-
bodied in the United Nations Charter.
Open and Orderly Conduct of Activities
The second part of our program is designed to
encourage the open and orderly conduct of outer
space activities. The measures proposed in part
B of the draft resolution would help all countries
participate in space activities and would foster
an atmosphere of mutual trust and confidence.
In pursuit of these objectives we proposed that
all states launching objects into orbit or beyond
should furnish information promptly to the Sec-
retary-General for the purpose of registration of
launchings. This information would include or-
bital and transit characteristics and such other
data as lavmching states might wish to make avail-
able. The Secretariat would maintain a record
of this information and would communicate it
upon request to other members of the United Na-
tions and to specialized agencies.
The establishment of a complete registry or
census of space vehicles would mark a modest but
an important step toward openness in the conduct
of space activities. It would benefit nations the
world over, large and small, which are interested
in identifying, tracking, and communicating with
space vehicles. It could lay the basis for later
arrangements for termination of radio transmis-
sion and removal of satellites when their useful
lives were ended.
The Secretariat should perform other useful
functions bej'ond these connected with the regis-
try of space vehicles :
It could, in consultation with appropriate spe-
cialized agencies, maintain close contact with gov-
ernmental and nongovernmental organizations
concerned with outer space matters.
It could provide for the exchange of informa-
tion which governments might supply in this
field on a voluntary basis — supplementing but not
duplicating existing exchanges.
It could assist in the study of measures for the
promotion of international cooperation in outer
space activities.
Finally, it could make periodic reports on sci-
entific and institutional developments in this field.
It is time to vest the Secretariat with these basic
service functions. The report of the Ad Hoc
Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space sug-
gested that some functions of this kind should be
performed by the Secretariat. It noted with ap-
proval the conclusion of its Technical Committee
that "there is a need for a suitable centre related
to the United Nations that can act as a focal point
for international co-operation in the peaceful uses
of outer space."
We believe that this recommendation should be
implemented without further delay, making full-
est possible use of existing resources of the Sec-
retariat. We understand that the services speci-
fied in this resolution can be performed with the
addition of a very small number of pereonnel.
The measures taken to carry out the new functions
could be reviewed by the Assembly at its next
session.
Weather Research and Prediction
The third part of our proposed program calls
for a worldwide effort under the auspices of the
United Nations in weather research and weather
prediction.
The dawn of the space age is opening vast new
possibilities in weather sciences. Satellites and
sounding rockets have supplemented other ad-
vances in meteorological techniques such as the
use of radar and electronic computers. They make
it possible for the first time in history for man to
keep the entire atmosphere in every region and
at every altitude under constant surveillance.
This portends a revolution in meteorology — a
peaceful revolution which can benefit all peoples
on this earth, particularly in the less developed
regions which presently lack adequate weather
information. Meteorological satellites hold spe-
cial promise for the improvement of weather fore-
casting capabilities in the Tropics and in the
Southern Hemisphere, where vast oceans cannot
be covered by present techniques.
Increased knowledge of the forces that shape
the weather will enable man to foi-ecast typhoons,
floods, rainfall, and drought with greater ac-
curacy.
These possibilities will mean the saving of
human life and reduction of property damage.
They will make possible the more efficient
use of limited water resources and enable the farm-
er to adjust the timing and the nature of his
planting to the rainfall which his fields will re-
182
Departmenf of State Bulletin
ceive. Fishing and gazing will also benefit.
Fuels and raw matei-ials can be transported and
stored more efficiently with better forelmowledge
of the weather.
In short, by making the weather and the events
which depend on it the more predictable, we can
foster progress in industry', agriculture, and health
and contribute to rising living standards around
the world.
But the enhancement of our Icnowledge of the
weather is only the beginning. In the more dis-
tant future looms the possibility of large-scale
weather modification. If this power is to be used
to benefit all rather than to gain special advantage
for a few, if it is to be used for peaceful, con-
structive purposes, progress toward weather con-
trol should be part of a cooperative international
venture.
"With these exciting prospects in mind we pro-
pose preparatory studies for two coordinated pro-
grams in part C of the draft resolution.
The first is an international atmospheric science
program to gain greater knowledge of the basic
forces affecting the climate. This will yield in-
formation essential for improved weather predic-
tion and eventually for possible weather modifica-
tion.
The second is an international meteorological
service program. The aim of this program would
be to enable men eveiywhere to reap the practical
benefits of discoveries in basic weather science.
Under this program steps could be taken leading
to the establishment of a global network of re-
gional weather stations located in less developed
as well as developed areas of the world. "Weather
information obtained from satellites could be
transmitted directly to such centers or communi-
cated indirectly after receipt in other areas of the
world.
The concept of regional meteorological centers
is already accepted and being applied in the
Northern Hemisphere, where thei-e are five such
centers serving regional needs for weather com-
munications and analysis. The needs of the
Tropics and the Southern Hemisphere are now be-
ing .studied. Tliere is. for example, a plan for
establishment of an international meteorological
center in Bombay in connection with the 4-year
international Indian Ocean expedition.
To put such a world weather network in opera-
tion will require cooperative efforts of many na-
tions. The "World Meteorological Organization —
called AVMO — has played an important role in
supplying technical assistance in the training ol
weather technicians, especially in the less devel-
oped areas. "We believe tliis activity of AVMO
should be continued and strengthened in the fu-
ture. National and international suppliers of
investment capital can help finance the e,stabli.sh-
ment of centers in countries which cannot afford
them. Nations which have developed weather sat-
ellites can make the weather information avail-
able freely for use in this system.
So far as the United States is concerned, we
stand ready, here and now, to make the weather
data received from our satellites available for such
a global system. In fact we are already making
such data available to other countries. "W^e are
developing methods which would permit direct
transmission of satellite cloud photography to any
part of the world. If this is successful the way
will be opened for a marked increase in the timely
availability of useful data.
Global System of Communication Satellites
Now the fourth part of the space program looks
toward the establishment of a global system of
communication satellites.
Space technology' has opened enormous possi-
bilities for international communications. "With-
in a few years satellites will make possible a vast
increase in the control and quality of interna-
tional radio, telephone, and telegraph traffic. In
addition, something new will be added — the possi-
bility of relaying television broadcasts around the
globe.
This fundamental breakthrough in communica-
tion could affect the lives of people everywhere.
It could forge new bonds of mutual knowledge
and understanding between nations.
It could offer a powerful tool to improve literacy
and education in developing areas.
It could support world weather services by
speedy transmittal of data.
It could enable leaders of nations to talk face
to face on a convenient and reliable basis.
The United States wishes to see this facility
made available to all states on a global and non-
discriminatory basis. "We conceive of this as an
international service. "We would like to see
United Nations members not only use this service
but also participate in its ownership and operation
if they so desire.
January 29, 1962
183
The United Nations Organization itself stands
to benefit directly from the use of satellites both
in communicating with its representatives around
the world and in disseminating programs of in-
formation and education.
As an example of the potentialities of such use,
we hope to have before long an experimental satel-
lite which will transmit across the Atlantic, for
brief periods, live television excerpts of debates
in the General Assembly of the United Nations.
In preparation for these developments the
United States proposes that the International
Telecommunication Union consider the various
aspects of space communication in which interna-
tional cooperation will be required. This will as-
sure all members of the United Nations a fair
opportunity to express their views. It is partic-
ularly important that the necessary arrangements
be made for the allocation of radio frequencies for
space communications.
In order to enable less developed countries to
participate in effective use of satellite communica-
tions, the Expanded Technical Assistance Pro-
gram and the United Nations Special Fund should
give sympathetic consideration to requests for
assistance from less developed countries to im-
prove the state of their domestic communications.
The principles I have mentioned are embodied
in part D of the draft resolution now before you.
If implemented with dispatch tliey could help to
clear the way for cooperative use of a worldwide
system of satellite communications.
Revitalizing the Outer Space Committee
The fifth part of our i^rogram seeks to put new
life and new responsibilities in the Committee on
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.
As we all know, this Committee was established
2 years ago for an indefinite period by Resolution
1472 (XIV) ^ with a continuing mandate to study
programs on peaceful uses of outer space which
might be undertaken under United Nations aus-
pices, to study the legal problems whicli might
arise from the exploration of outer space, and to
plan an international conference for the exchange
of experience in the exploration of outer space.
We propose that, in addition to the responsibili-
ties laid down in this original mandate, the Com-
mittee should review the activities provided for
in this resolution and make such reports as it may
184
consider appropriate. In the four previous parts
of the resolution we have specifically noted the
role the Committee could play in studying the
legal problems of outer space, in reviewing the
service arrangements undertaken by the Secretary-
General, and in examining the proposals for
international cooperation in weather and
coimnunications.
As my colleagues are aware, Resolution 1472
provided for 24 membei's of the Outer Space Com-
mittee elected for a period of 2 years. We propose
to continue the same membership, augmented by
the addition of Nigeria and Chad in recognition
of the increase in the membership of African
states in the United Nations during the past 2
years.
Let the Committee make a fresh beginning. Let
the Committee meet early in 1962 to undertake
its original tasks and its new responsibilities in
connection with these cooperative programs.
We recognize that outer space activities are
unique in many respects and that international
cooperation is a prerequisite to progress. Al-
though we cannot of course accept the veto in the
work of the Committee, we expect that this work
can be carried out in a spirit of mutual imdcr-
standing. We do not anticipate that the nature of
the Committee's work would give rise to differ-
ences that could not be resolved by discussion. We
hope that, proceeding in this spirit, we can finally
put life into the Committee created 2 years ago.
I ask the distinguished delegates here to bear
in mind that in weather and commimications the
resolution embodies no commitments to any specific
program. It merely calls upon the Secretary-
General in cooperation with the specialized
agencies, and with other organizations, to submit
proposals for action. These proposals will be
presented to the Economic and Social Council at
its 34th session, to the I7t.h General Assemblj', and
to the Outer Space Committee.
In short the resolution in these fields merely
clears the way for deliberate consideration of
programs by government representatiA'cs. Such
basic studies ought not be further delayed.
Now we have sought in good faith and so far
as is possible to present a program which is above
the clash of partisan politics or the cold war. The
principles and programs embodied here bestow no
^ For text, see Bulletin of Jan. 11, 1960, p. 68.
Department of State Bulletin
special advantage on any state — they are in the
interest of all states.
The resolution deals exclusively \\-ith the peace-
ful uses of outer space. The military questions
of space are closely entangled with the militai-y
questions of earth. We believe that they require
urgent study as part of comprehensive negotia-
tions for general and complete disarmament.
This does not mean, however, that the program
of peaceful cooperation now before us has no bear-
ing on the issues of peace and war. It does. If
put into operation without delay, it can help lay
the basis for a relaxation of tensions and facilitate
progress elsewhere toward general and complete
disarmament.
We Cannot Afford To Delay
Mr. Chairman, I must close with the same theme
on which I commenced this presentation : We can-
not afford to delay.
The space programs of the great powers are
well advanced. Our own nation is proceeding
with the development of satellite systems for
weather forecasting and communications. In the
months ahead important decisions will have to be
made. If the opportunity for United Nations
action is missed, it will be increasingly difficult to
fit national space progi'ams into a rational pattern
of United Nations cooperation.
Our first choice is a program making maximum
use of the United Nations for at least three
reasons :
— because it could bring new vitality to the
United Nations and its family of agencies;
— because it would help to assure that all mem-
bers of the United Nations, developed and less
developed, could have a share in the adventure of
space cooperation ; and
— because a program of such magnitude should
be carried out as far as possible through the or-
ganizations of the world community.
As I say, this is our first choice. But the march
of science is irreversible. The United States has
a responsibility to make the fullest possible use
of new developments in space technology — in
weather forecasting, in communications, and in
other areas. These developments are inevitable in
the near future. We hope they can take place
through cooperative efforts in the United Nations.
I suppose that the great climaxes in the drama
of history are seldom evident to those who are on
the stage at the time. But there can be little ques-
tion tliat man's conquest of outer space is just such
a moment, that we — all of us— are on stage, and
that how we behave in the immediate will have
a profound impact upon the course of human af-
fairs in the decades ahead.
Tiiere is a right and a wrong way to get on with
the business of space exploration. In our judg-
ment the wrong way is to allow the march of
science to become a i-unaway race into the un-
known. The right way is to make it an ordered,
peaceful, cooperative, and constructive forward
march under the aegis of the United Nations.
I most earnestly recommend your serious atten-
tion to the proposals my Government is making
to this end.
TEXT OF RESOLUTION*
A
The General Assembly,
Recognizing the common interest of mankind in fur-
thering the peaceful uses of outer space and the urgent
need to strengthen international co-operation in this im-
portant field,
Believing that the exploration and use of outer space
should be only for the betterment of mankind and to the
benefit of States irrespective of the stage of their eco-
nomic or scientific development,
1. Commends to States for their guidance in the explo-
ration and use of outer space the following principles :
(a) International law, including the Charter of the
United Nations, applies to outer space and celestial bodies ;
(6) Outer space and celestial bodies are free for ex-
ploration and use by all States in conformity with inter-
national law and are not subject to national appro-
priation ;
2. Invites the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space to study and report on the legal problems
which may arise from the exploration and use of outer
space.
B
The General Assembly,
Believing that the United Nations should provide a
focal point for international co-operation in the peaceful
exploration and use of outer space,
1. Calls upon States launching objects into orbit or
beyond to furnish information promptly to the Committee
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, through the Secre-
tary-General, for the registration of launchings;
2. Requests the Secretary-General to maintain a public
registry of the information furnished in accordance with
paragraph 1 above;
'U.N. doc. A/RES/1721 (XVI) (A/C.l/L.301/Rev. 1
and Corr. 1) ; adopted unanimously in plenary session on
Dee. 20.
ianuary 29, 1962
185
3. Requests the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space, in co-operation with the Secretary-General
and making full use of the functions and resources of
the Secretariat :
(a) To maintain close contact with governmental and
non-governmental organizations concerned with outer
space matters ;
(6) To provide for the exchange of such information
relating to outer space activities as Governments may
supply on a voluntary basis, supplementing but not
duplicating existing technical and scientific exchanges;
(c) To assist in the study of measures for the promo-
tion of international co-operation in outer space activi-
ties;
4. Further requests the Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space to report to the General Assembly
on the arrangements undertaken for the performance of
those functions and on such developments relating to the
peaceful uses of outer space as it considers significant.
C
The Oeneral Assembly,
Noting with gratification the marked progress for
meteorological science and technology opened up by the
advances in outer space,
Convinced of the world-wide benefits to be derived
from International co-operation in weather research and
analysis,
1. Recommends to all Member States and to the World
Meteorological Organization and other appropriate spe-
cialized agencies the early and comprehensive study. In
the light of developments in outer space, of measures :
(a) To advance the state of atmospheric science and
technology so as to provide greater knowledge of basic
physical forces affecting climate and the possibility of
large-scale weather modification ;
(&) To develop existing weather forecasting capabili-
ties and to help Member States make effective use of such
capabilities through regional meteorological centres ;
2. Requests the World Meteorological Organization,
consulting as appropriate with the United Nations Edu-
cational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and other
specialized agencies and governmental and non-govern-
mental organizations, such as the International Council
of Scientific Unions, to submit a report to its member
Governments and to the Economic and Social Council at
its thirty-fourth session regarding appropriate organi-
zational and linancial arrangements to achieve those
ends, with a view to their furtlier consideration by the
General Assembly at its seventeenth session ;
3. Requests the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space, as it deems appropriate, to review that report
and submit its comments and recommendations to the
Economic and Social Council and to the General Assembly.
D
The Oeneral Assembly,
Believing that communication by means of satellites
should be available to the nations of the world as soon
186
as practicable on a global and non-discriminatory basis.
Convinced of the need to prepare the way for the estab-
lishment of effective operational satellite communication,
1. Notes nith satisfaction that the International Tele-
communication Union plans to call a special conference
in 1963 to make allocations of radio frequency bands for
outer space activities ;
2. Recommends that the International Telecommuni-
cation Union consider at that conference those aspects
of space communication in which international co-opera-
tion will be required ;
3. Notes the potential importance of communication
satellites for use by the United Nations and its principal
organs and specialized agencies for both operational and
informational requirements ;
4. Invites the Special Fund and the Expanded Pro-
gramme of Technical Assistance, in consultation with the
International Telecommunication Union, to give sympa-
thetic consideration to requests from Member States for
technical and other assistance for the survey of their
communication needs and for the development of their
domestic communication facilities so that they may make
effective use of space communication ;
5. Requests the International Telecommunication
Union, consulting as appropriate with Member States,
the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization and other specialized agencies and govern-
mental and non-governmental organizations, such as the
Committee on Space Research of the International Coun-
cil of Scientific Unions, to submit a report on the imple-
mentation of those proposals to the Economic and Social
Council at its thirty-fourth session and to the General
Assembly at its seventeenth session ;
6. Requests the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space, as it deems appropriate, to review that
report and submit its comments and recommendations
to the Economic and Social Council and to the General
Assembly.
E
The Oeneral Assembly,
Recalling its resolution 1472 (XIV) of 12 December
1959,
Noting that the terms of office of the members of the
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space expire
at the end of 1961,
Noting the report of the Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space,"
1. Decides to continue the membership of the Commit-
tee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space as set forth in
General Assembly resolution 1472(XIV) and to add Chad,
Mongolia, Morocco and Sierra Leone to its membership
in recognition of the increased membership of the United
Nations since the Committee was established ;
2. Requests the Committee to meet not later than 31
March 1962 to carry out its mandate as contained la
General Assembly resolution 1472(XIV), to review the
activities provided for in the present resolution and to
make such reports as it may consider appropriate.
" U.N. doc. A/4987.
Department of State Bulletin
IMF Sets Up Borrowing Arrangements
for Supplementary Resources
The Iiilernational Monetary Fund announced
on January 8 that its Board of Executive Direc-
tors has reached a decision ^ on general arrange-
ments by which the Fund may borrow supple-
mentary resources under article VII of tlie Fund
Agreement. This decision sets out the terms and
conditions under which such borrowing will be
possible in order to enable the Fund to fulfill more
effectively its role in the international monetary
system under conditions of convertibility, includ-
ing greater freedom for short-term capital move-
ments.
Ten main industrial countries, after necessary
legislative authorizations have been obtained and
they formally adhere to the arrangements, will
stand ready to lend their currencies to the Fund
up to specified amounts when the Fund and these
countries consider that supplementary resources
are needed to forestall or cope with an impair-
ment of the international monetary system. The
total amount of such supplementary resources is
the equivalent of $6 billion, composed as follows :
Amount
(Equiimlent in miUions
Countru U.S. dollars)
Belgium $150
Canada 200
France 550
Germany 1,000
Italy .550
Japan 250
Netherlands 200
Sweden 100
United Kingdom 1, 000
United States 2,000
In an exchange of letters among themselves the
10 countries have set down the procedures they
will follow in making supplementary resources
available to the Fund for the financing of a par-
ticular Fund transaction for which such resources
are considered necessary.
The announcement by the Fund explained that
the general borrowing arrangements should make
it possible to mobilize quickly large additional
resources in defense of the international monetarj'
system. The need for the assurance of additional
resources arises not from any failure of the mone-
tary system but from the broader convertibility
^ For text, see IMF press release 377 dated Jan. 8.
January 29, 7962
of currencies, particularly tliose of the main in-
dustrial countries. This more widespread con-
vertibility, which is so useful for the growth of
world trade, has at the same time made possible
sudden and substantial shifts of funds from one
country to another. To avoid any undesirable im-
pact on the functioning of the international mone-
tary system as a result of such developments, it
has become imperative to strengthen the resources
which may be made available and so to enable the
countries which experience difficulties to pursue
appropriate policies.
Fortunately most of the industrial countries al-
ready possess substantial reserves of their own.
For its part the International Monetary Fund has
nearly $3 billion in its gold account and $6.5
billion in the currencies of the main industrial
countries. At any given time, however, some of
these countries may be facing balance-of-payments
difficulties, so that in order to promote inter-
national monetary balance it would be advisable
that temporarily these currencies should not be
drawn from the Fund. Fund drawings should
be made mainly in the currencies of those coun-
tries that have strong balance-of-payments and
reserve positions. The new general borrowing ar-
rangements are designed to provide the Fund with
additional resources of these latter currencies when
they are needed for the purpose of forestalling or
coping with an impairment of the international
monetary system. In this way both the liquidity
of the Fund and the resilience of the monetary
system will be enhanced, to the benefit of all
members.
The Fund decision provides that the requests
for drawings by participant countries for which
supplementary resources are required will be dealt
with according to the Fund's established policies
and practices with respect to the use of its re-
sources. Kepayment to the Fund of such assist-
ance will have to be made when the country's prob-
lem is solved, and in any event within 3 to 5 years.
In its turn, when the Fund receives repayment, it
will repay the countries that made supplementary
resources available, and in any event the Fund
will repay not later than 5 years after a borrow-
ing. Moreover, a country that has lent to the
Fund can receive early repayment should it re-
quest and need this because its own payments po-
sition has deteriorated, and rights to repayment
are backed by all the assets of the Fund. In this
187
way the claims of countries that have lent supple-
mentary resources to the Fund have been guaran-
teed a highly liquid character.
Interest on the resources lent to the Fund will
be based on a formula which at present yields a
rate of li/^ percent per annum; in addition, the
Fund will pay a charge of one-half of 1 percent on
each borrowing transaction.
Tlie borrowing arrangements will become effec-
tive when at least seven countries with commit-
ments totaling the equivalent of $5.5 billion for-
mally inform the Fund that they adhere to the
arrangements, and the arrangements will then re-
main in effect for 4 years, with provisions for
extension. In the light of developing circum-
stances the amounts included in the arrangement
may, however, be reviewed from time to time and
altered with the agreement of the Fund and all
the participating countries.
Caribbean Organization Designated
Public International Organization
AN EXECUTIVE ORDER'
Designating the Caribbean Organization as a Public
International Organization Entitled To Enjot Cer-
tain Privileges, Exemptions, and Immunities
By virtue of the authority vested in me by section 1 of
the International Organizations Immunities Act, approved
December 29, 1945 (59 Stat. 6G9 ; 22 U.S.C. 2SS), and by
the joint resolution of June 30, 1961, 75 Stat. 194, I hereby
designate the Caribbean Organization as a public inter-
national organization entitled to enjoy the privileges, ex-
emptions, and immunities conferred by the said Interna-
tional Organizations Immunities Act.
The designation of the above-named organization as a
public international organization within the meaning of
the said Act is not intended to abridge in any respect
privileges, exemptions, and immunities to which such
international organization may otherwise be or become
entitled.
This order revokes Executive Order No. 10025 of De-
cember 30, 1948, to the extent that such order relates
to the Caribbean Commi-ssion.
J/Lu\
The WnrrE House,
December 30, 1961.
TREATY INFORMATION
U.S. and Japan Agree on Settlement
of Postwar Economic Assistance
Department Announcement
Press release 18 dated January 9
At noon, January 9, 1962, Edwin O. Reischauer,
tlie American Ambassador to Japan, and Zentaro
Kosaka, the Foreign Minister of Japan, met at
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokj-o and con-
cluded a formal agreement ^ between the United
States and Japan for the final settlement of the
American postwar economic assistance to Japan.
Two supplementary exchanges of notes were also
signed at the ceremony.
Under the agreement the Japanese Government
has agreed to pay to the United States the princi-
pal sum of $490,000,000 and interest at the rate oi
21/2 percent jaer annum on the unpaid balance.
This debt is to be paid semiannually in 30 install-
ments beginning 6 months from the date of entry
into force of this agreement. The first 24 install-
ments will consist of $21,959,125 and the last six
installments will consist of $8,701,690. Each in-
stallment shall be applied first to accrued interest
and the remainder to principal.
In the first exchange of notes the United States
expressed its intention, subject to appropriate
legislation, to employ the major portion of
GARIOA [Government and Relief in Occupied
Areas] repayments to further its programs for
economic assistance to less developed countries.
Tiie two Govermnents agreed to continue to con-
sult closely in pursuit of the objective of acceler-
ated and balanced economic development of the
countries in east Asia.
In a second exchange of notes the United States
stated that it will accept the equivalent of $25,000,-
000 of the total amount in Japanese yen to furtlier
educational and cultural excliange between the
United States and Japan. At the time of the
signing Ambassador Reischauer handed Foreign
Minister Kosaka a letter ^ expressing (lie intent of
the United States to request this $25,000,000 in yen
' No. 10983 ; 27 Fed. Reg. 32.
188
' Not printed here.
Department of Sfofe Bulletin
entirely from the first two semiannual install-
ments under the agreement.
The United States regards this agreement as a
fair and honorable settlement of a long outstand-
ing issue in the close relationship between our two
countries. We believe that the anticipated use of
part of this settlement for cultural and educational
exchange between the United States and Japan
will strengthen the close ties of friendship of our
two peoples and will contribute to better under-
standing of our two cultures. We believe that our
continued close consultation regarding assistance
to less developed countries will aid further the at-
tainment of the joint Japanese-American objec-
tive of accelerated and balanced economic growth
of the countries of east Asia.
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Telecommunications
Internalioiial telecommunication convention with six an-
nexes. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered
into force January 1, 1961 ; for the United States Oc-
tober 23, 19«1. TIAS 4S92.
Accession deposited: Sierra Leone, December 30, 1961.
Trade and Commerce
Proc6s-verbal extending declaration of November 12, 19.59
(TIAS 4498), on provisional accession of Tunisia to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Ge-
neva December 9, 1961. Enters into force by acceptance
by Tunisia and any other party to declaration, and, for
any party subsequently accepting It, by acceptance or
upon entry Into force of declaration in respect of such
party, whichever is the later.'
Signature: United States, January 9, 1962.
Procfes-verbal extending and amending declaration of
November 22, 1958 (TIAS 4461), on provisional acces-
sion of the Swiss Confederation to the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva Decem-
ber 18, 1961. Enters into force by acceptance by Swiss
Confederation and any other party to declaration, and,
for any party subsequently accepting it, by acceptance
or upon entry into force of declaration In respect of
such party, whichever is the later.'
Signature: United States, January 9, 1962.
Weather
Convention of the World Meteorological Organization.
Done at Washington October 11, 1947. Entered Into
force March 23, 1950. TIAS 2052.
Ratification deposited: Colombia, January 5, 1962.
Atomic Energy
Amendment of article VI.A.3 of the Statute of the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency (TIAS 3873). Done at
Vienna October 4, 1961."
Acceptance deposited: Canada, January 4, 1962.
Germany
Agreement to supplement the agreement between the par-
ties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the status
of their forces, signed at London June 19, 1951 (TIAS
2846), with respect to foreign forces stationed in the
Federal Republic of Germany, and protocol of signature.
Signed at Bonn August 3, 1959.'
Ratification deposited: France, January 11, 1962.
Agreement to implement paragraph 5 of article 45 of the
agreement of August 3, 1959, to supplement the agree-
ment between the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty
regarding the status of their forces with respect to
foreign forces stationed in the Federal Republic of
Germany. Signed at Bonn August 3, 1959.'
Ratification deposited: France, January 11, 1962.
Property
Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial prop-
erty of March 20, 1883, revised at Brussels December 14,
1900, at Wa.shiugton June 2, 1911, at The Hague Novem-
ber 6, 1925, at London June 2, 1934, and at Lisbon
October 31, 1958. Done at Lisbon October 31, 1958.
Entered into force January 4, 1962.
Priiclaimed by the President of the United States:
January 2, 1962.
Safety at Sea
Convention on safety of life at sea. Signed at London
June 10. lf>4S. Entered Into force November 19, 1952.
TIAS 2495.
Acceptance deposited: Mexico, January 4, 1962.
BILATERAL
Mexico
Agreement providing that the provisions of the convention
of June 10, 1948, on safety of life at sea (TIAS 2495)
are in force between the United States and Mexico as of
January 8, 1962. Effected by exchange of notes at
Washington January 4 and 8, 1962. Entered into force
January 8, 1962.
DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE
' Not in force.
January 29, 7962
Recess Appointments
The President on December 18 appointed Henry R.
Labouisse to be Ambassador to Greece. (For biographic
details, see Department of State press release 15 dated
January 8.)
Designations
Edward Earl Rice as Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Far Eastern Affairs, effective January 2. ( For biographic
details, see Department of State press release 20 dated
January 9.)
189
PUBLICATIONS
Publications on Diplomatic History,
International Law, and Foreign Relations
The Department of State released in December an 18-
page leaflet (publication 7320) entitled Department of
State Puhlicatioiis on Diplomatic History, International
Laio, and the Conduct of Foreign Relations. Books,
periodicals, and pamphlets are listed in the following H
categories : the documentary record of American diplo-
macy ; treaties and international agreements ; interna-
tional law ; publications relating to Germany ;
publications relating to the American Republics ; publi-
cations relating to the Far East; publications on arms
control, nuclear energy, and disarmament ; documentary
publications on major postwar meetings of heads of gov-
ernment and foreign ministers ; publications on various
special subjects ; pamphlets and leaflets ; and periodicals
and annuals.
Copies of the leaflet are available upon request from
the Office of Public Services, Department of State, Wash-
ington 25, D.C.
Recent Releases
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, V.S. Gov-
ernment Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Address
requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, ex-
cept in the case of free publications, which may be
obtained from the Department of State.
Defense— Strategic Materials. TIAS 4755. 2G pp. 15if.
Agreements with Brazil. Exchange of notes — Signed at
Rio de Janeiro August 20, 1954. Entered into force Au-
gust 20, 11)54. And exchange of notes — Signed at Wash-
ington January 5, 1961. Entered into force January 5,
1961.
Economic, Technical, and Related Assistance. TIAS
4765. 9 pp. 10(f.
Agreement with the Ivory Coast. Exchange of notes —
Signed at Abidjan May 17, 1961. Entered into force May
17, 1961.
Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4768. 15 pp.
10«f.
Agreement with Ecuador — Signed at Quito April 3, 1961.
Entered into force April 3, 1961. With exchanges of
notes.
Commission for Educational Exchange. TIAS 4769. 3
pp. 5^.
Agreement with Argentina, amending the agreement of
November .5, 19156, as amended. Exchange of notes —
Signed at Buenos Aires May 8 and 17, 1961. Entered Into
force May 17, 1961.
Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4770. 13 pp.
10^.
Agreement with China, amending the agreement of August
190
30, 1960, as amended. Exchange of notes — Signed at
Taipei April 27, 1961. Entered into force April 27, 1961.
Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4771. 13 pp.
10«(.
Agreement with Spain — Signed at Madrid May 22, 1961.
Entered into force May 22, 1961. With exchange of notes.
Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4772. 3 pp.
5(f.
Agreement with Pakistan, amending the agreement of
April 11, 1960. as amended. Exchange of notes — Signed
at Karachi June 3, 1961. Entered into force June 3, 1961.
Army Mission to Panama. TIAS 4773. 5 pp. 5^.
Agreement with Panama, amending the agreement of July
7, 1942, as extended. Exchange of notes — Dated at
Panama February 17, March 23, September 22, and No-
vember 6, 1959. Entered into force November 6, 19.59.
Defense — Air Defense and Related Cooperation. TIAS
4774. 5 pp. 5^.
Agreement with Canada. Exchange of notes — Signed at
Ottawa June 12, 1961. Entered into force June 12, 1961.
Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4775. 3 pp.
5^.
Agreement with Brazil, amending the agreement of De-
cember 31, 1956, as corrected and amended. Exchange of
notes — Signed at Rio de Janeiro January 4, and April 18,
1961. Entered into force April IS, 1961.
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: January 8-14
Press releases may be obtained from the Office of
News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.
Releases
appearing in this issue of the Bulletin
which were issued prior to January 8 are Nos. 913
and 916 of December 29 ; and 5 of January 3.
No.
Date
Subject
♦14
1/8
U.S. participation in international con-
ferences.
•15
1/8
Labouisse sworn in as Ambassador to
Greece (biographic details).
16
1/8
Williams: "Rule and Exception in
Africa."
•17
1/8
Conference on summer jobs and train-
ing of foreign students.
18
1/9
Agreement for settlement of postwar aid
to Japan.
•19
1/9
Duke : remarks before Society of the
Four Arts, Palm Beach.
•20
1/9
Rice designated Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary fiu- Far t;asteru AtTairs (bio-
graphic details).
t21
1/10
Bowles : "Education for World Respon-
sibility."
oo
1/10
Ecuador credentials (rewrite).
23
1/10
Gabon credentials (rewrite).
24
1/12
Passport regulations affecting U.S.
Communists.
t25
1/12
China credentials (rewrite).
•26
1/12
Bricp appointed education adviser. Bu-
reau of .Vt'riran .\ITairs.
27
1/12
Rusk : interview by NBC News.
t28
1/13
U.S.-U.K. talks on U.N.
• Not printed.
t Held for a later issue of the Buijletin.
Deparftnent of Sfafe Bulletin
January 29, 1962 Index
Africa. Rule and Exception in Africa (Williams) . 170
American Republics
Secretary Rusk Interviewed by NBC News .... 164
The State of the Union (Kennedy) 159
U.S. Proposes Seasonal Marketing Fund for Cen-
tral American Coffee 178
Canada. U.S.-Canada Economic Committee Con-
cludes Seventh Meeting (text of communique) . 168
Communism. Pa.ssport Regulations Affecting Com-
munists Revised 179
Congo (Leopoldville). Secretary Rusk Interviewed
by NBC News 164
Congress, The
Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Pol-
icy 179
The State of the Union (Kennedy) 159
Cuba. Secretary Rusk Interviewed by NBC News . 164
Department and Foreign Service
Designations (Rice) 189
Recess Appointments (Labouisse) 189
Dominican Republic. Mr. Moscoso Heads Fact-
finding Mission to Dominican Republic .... 177
Economic Affairs
IMF Sets Up Borrowing Arrangements for Supple-
mentary Resources 187
The State of the Union (Kennedy) 159
U.S. and Japan Agree on Settlement of Postwar
Economic Assistance 188
U.S.-Canada Economic Committee Concludes Sev-
enth Meeting (text of communique) 168
U.S. Proposes Seasonal Marketing Fund for Cen-
tral American Coffee 178
Ecuador. Letters of Credence (Ponce Miranda) . 169
Europe. The State of the Union (Kennedy) . . 159
Foreign Aid
Mr. Moscoso Heads Factfinding Mission to Domini-
can Republic 177
U.S. Proposes Seasonal Marketing Fund for Cen-
tral American Coffee 178
Gabon. Letters of Credence (Mbah) 169
Germany
President Reviews Berlin Situation With General
Clay (Kennedy) 168
Secretary Rusk Interviewed by NBC News . . . 164
Greece. Labouisse appointed Ambassador .... 189
International Organizations and Conferences
Caribbean Organization Designated Public Interna-
tional Organization (text of Executive order) . . 188
Vol. XLVI, No. 1179
IMP Sets Up Borrowing Arrangements for Supple-
mentary Resources 187
Japan. U.S. and Japan Agree on Settlement of
Postwar Economic Assistance 188
Passports. Passport Regulations Affecting Com-
munists Revised 179
Philippines
Jos6 Rizal Day (Harriman) 174
Secretary Rusk Sends Greetings to Republic of the
Philippines 175
Presidential Documents
Caribbean Organization Designated Public Inter-
national Organization 188
President Kennedy and Soviet Leaders Exchange
New Year's Messages 164
President Reviews Berlin Situation With General
Clay 168
The State of the Union 159
Publications
Publications on Diplomatic History, International
Law, and Foreign Relations 190
Recent Releases 190
Science. International Cooperation in the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space (Stevenson, text of resolu-
tion) 180
Treaty Information
Current Actions 189
U.S. and Japan Agree on Settlement of Postwar
Economic Assistance 188
U.S.S.R. President Kennedy and Soviet Leaders
Exchange New Tear's Messages (texts of mes-
sages) 164
United Nations
International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space (Stevenson, text of resolution) . . 180
The State of the Union (Kennedy) 159
Name Index
Abel, Elie 164
Brezhnev, Leonid 164
Harriman, W. Averell 174
Kennedy, President 159,164,168,188
Khrushchev, Nikita 164
Labouisse, Henry R 189
Mbah, Jules 169
Ponce Miranda, Neftall 169
Rice, Edward Earl 189
Rusk, Secretary 164, 175
Stevenson, Adlai E 180
Williams, G. Mennen 170
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1962
the
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of
State
United States
Government Printing Office
DIVtSION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS
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OFFICIAL BUSINESS
ABC's
of Foreign Trade
Tliis 33-page illustrated booklet is a basic primer on the subject of
foreign trade with particular emphasis on United States trade policy.
As stated by Secretary of State Dean Rusk, "What we do about
trade policy will be a test of our ability to meet the test of leadership
in the world of the 1960's. . . . What we do affects everybody. In
trade, as in so many other matters, leadership has been placed upon
us by our own capacities and accomplislmients. We can exercise it
wisely or badly, but exercise it we must."
Publication 7321
20 cents
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FICIAL
IKLY RECORD
Vol. XLVI, No. 1180 February 5, 1962
U.S. TRADE POLICY— CHALLENGE AND OPPOR-
TUNITY • Address by Secretary Rusk 195
SECRETARY RUSK'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF
JANUARY 18 199
THE WINDS OF FREEDOM • Remarks by Ambassador
Adlai E, Stevenson 210
EDUCATION FOR WORLD RESPONSIBILITY • by
Chester Bowles 206
INDUSTRY COMMUNICATIONS PROGRAMS IN SUP-
PORT OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY • by Roger jr.
Tubby 213
UNITED STATES POLICY IN THE CONGO • State-
ment by Secretary Rusk 216
ITEO STATES
REIGN POLICY
For index see inside back cover
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Vol. XLVI, No. 1180 • Publication 7335
February 5, 1962
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U.S. Trade Policy— Challenge and Opportunity
Address by Secretary Rush '
Every generation believes that it lives in special
times, and every generation believes that its period
is one of special crisis. It is just possible that our
generation is riglit in sensing that we are now in
one of the great revolutionary periods of the hu-
man story, a period comparable to the disinte-
gration of tlie Roman Empire oi' to the rise of the
national state system, a period which will deter-
mine our fate in tlie years ahead, not just in dec-
ades but possibly in half centuries or centuries.
Many view tliis period as filled with opportunity
and challenge; I do myself. Others are appre-
hensive. But there are very few wiio would
question the proposition that change will be the
dominant characteristic of the years ahead.
As then Senator Kennedy said in 1960, "We
must learn to face the truth about our situation.
You can't stand still in a hurricane. And hurri-
cane winds of cliange are sweeping the world."
The truth of this statement has struck me over
and over again as I review the changes that have
been wrought in the world in just those 10 years
since I last served in the Department of State.
The World 10 Years Ago
Ten years ago, for all practical pnrposes, we
still had a monopoly in atomic weapons. Allien
the North Koreans stepped across the 38th parallel
bent on military conquest of South Korea, we were
able to counter the threat with little risk of esca-
lating the conflict to thermonuclear war.
Ten years ago we were engaged in shoring up
* Made before a Treasury Department conference at
Washington, D.C., on Jan. 19 (press release 44).
the governments of Western Europe and Japan
with massive assistance. We were helping to re-
store the economies which had been devastated by
the crudest and costliest war in the history of the
world. A major problem for the West was also
the fragmentation of the European Continent into
small, economically unviable states. Powerful
Communist pai-ties in Western Europe were at-
tempting to capitalize on the popular discontent to
undermine democratic government.
Ten years ago the dollar gap was so all-pervad-
ing that many assumed it would be a permanent
condition. Western Europe and Japan were
forced to utilize currency controls and quota re-
strictions on imports to utilize their limited for-
eign exchange to buy the most essential commodi-
ties they needed for their livelihood and minimum
efforts in reconstruction.
Ten years ago we had practically no competi-
tors in international trade. The United States
had to supply many of the goods needed not only
for the rebuilding of war-torn Western Europe
and Japan but also for the development needs of
the nations in Asia, the Middle East, and Latin
America.
The World Today
Today the Soviet Union has a nuclear capability
with which we and they must reckon. Dogmatic
Stalinism has given way to the doctrine of "peace-
ful coexistence." Subtleties have been introduced
into the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. No
longer is a naked use of force the only tactic
utilized by the Kremlin. They have learned that
a straight line is not necessarily the shortest dis-
tance between two points. Cultural penetration.
February 5, 7962
195
diplomatic maneuvering, trade, and aid are now
ail weapons in the Communist areenal used to
bring that "world revolution" of theirs to its al-
leged historically inevitable conclusion.
Today Western Europe and Japan are back on
their feet. Their economies are expanding even
faster than ours. The resurrection which we
helped bring about now enables these countries
to share the burden, which we carried so long, of
assisting the newly liberated countries in their
economic development.
Today the dollar gap has disappeared. Instead,
we are now faced with an outflow of gold.
Today our exporters are faced with a multitude
of competitors. Our export industries have to get
out and hustle for business, and the Departments
of State and Commerce must hustle to help seek
out trade opportunities.
And today we see emerging in Europe a dynamic
community, the Common Market, which is chang-
ing the free world's trading system in the most
far-reaching way.
Today we are faced by a world in transition, a
major element in which is the dynamism of the
European Common Market. The great flow of
American products to this market demonstrates
that this is not only a source of competition but
an unexcelled opportunity.
Today we see emerging in Europe a strong and
growing community where economic fusion is
leading toward political integration as well.
Industrial Growth Within Common Market
The creation of this mass market has already
acliieved impressive results. Industrial growth
within the Common Market has averaged about
7 percent a year. The corresponding growth for
the United States has been about 2 percent.
With a population smaller than that of the
United States, the Common Market countries in
1960 accounted for about 25 percent of the world's
trade.
Some 90 percent of the free world's industrial
production may soon be concentrated in two great
markets: the United States of America and an
expanded European Common Market. Our coim-
try, 50 States without a trade barrier, helped in-
spire the establishment of the Common Market.
Since the close of World War II we have thrown
our support beliind the concept of closer European
unity. We long ago recognized the force for peace
which a united Europe could be.
With the accession of the United Kingdom and
possibly other European nations to the Common
Mai'ket, the population of this new mass market
will have almost twice as many people as we do.
With their economies growing faster than our
own, the purchasing power of these nations will
soon rival our own. Consumer demands are grow-
ing, and we are now faced with a historic meeting
of challenge and opportunity.
As President Kennedy noted recently,''
... at the very time that we urgently need to Increase
our exports, to protect our balance of payments, and to
pay for our troops abroad, a vast new market is rising
across the Atlantic.
Opportunity for U.S. Leadership
What choices do we have in coping with these
hurricane winds of economic change ?
Tliere are really only two alternatives. We can
ignore what is going on in the world around us,
or we can prepare for the change intelligently by
an exercise of determined leadership.
In the middle of all these revolutionary changes,
we of the United States are in a position to demon-
strate leadership. We are not like a cork tossed
upon stormy waves. Nor are we a nation battered
by winds over which we have no control. We are
not the victims of the history of this period. We
are among the makers of history. We have a
capacity to shape the course of events in front of
us. Wliat the United States does or does not do
in these yeare ahead will make an enormous differ-
ence, not only in the shape of the world in which
we will live but also in the world in which our
children and their children will live.
Inadvertence or inattention on the part of the
American people may make decisions of the most
colossal importance. Everything we are, every-
thing we do, and everything we do not do helps to
shape the history of our times. Should we hesitate
at this stage the consequences will not only be most
serious in the present East- West struggle but
would be equally serious insofar as our partner-
ship in the free world is concerned.
-■ Bulletin of Dec. 25. 1961, p. 1039.
196
Department of State Bulletin
Developing a Common Western Strategy
The overriding free-world interest is, of course,
to maintain the closest possible unity. NATO is
predicated on the assumption that the most effec-
tive way to meet the Soviet military threat is
through a common "Western strategy. In the
economic sphere, for the United States to fail to
work out common policies with the Common
Market would lend credence to the Communist
claim that the West is unable to construct a com-
mon policy and that the Leninist thesis of ii-rec-
oncilable conflict exists within the "capitalist
camp." It is therefore urgent that we be able to
work toward a coordinated free-world trade
policy.
President Kennedy, in his speech to the AFL-
CIO,^ pointed out that the United States has a
surplus of $5 billion a year in its balance of trade,
but $3 billion of these funds go to support our
armed forces abroad. Any decrease in our ex-
ports would have serious repercussions in the
United States. The balance-of -payments position
of the United States requires that we improve our
export trade. To accomplish this we must have
the necessary authority to negotiate for the open-
ing up of greater trade opportunities.
The President has also pointed out that Ameri-
can farmers have a great stake in trade with
Western Europe. It is one of the most important
markets for our agricultural products. With the
accession of the United Kingdom and possibly
other countries, this market will become even more
important.
The European Economic Community, or EEC,
is now in the process of developing a common
agricultural policy. This policy will have an im-
portant bearing on our possibilities for export to
the Common IMarket. Now is the time, before
patterns are set and lines hardened, that we can
negotiate with greatest effectiveness to protect and
advance our interests. This will become increas-
ingly difficult if it is put off to the future.
There is another political factor which impels
us to actions of leadership now. The United
States has been the leader in the Western alliance
politically, economically, and militarily. But
political power and economic power go hand in
hand. It is important that we, who have helped
and earnestly want a strong and unified Europe,
'IUd.,1,. 1(M7.
take measures which will enable us to work to-
gether with the Common Market. Strong, with a
vital interest in international trade, Western
Europe is ready to join with the United States in
the further liberalization of the free world's com-
merce. We must be able to work together in
harnessing the free world's economic strength for
our common purpose.
There is tremendous momentum in Europe be-
hind the Common Market idea. It is the visible
benefits of economic integration which sustain
this political momentum. The time is ripe, psycho-
logically, for the United States to sustain this
momentum by entering into negotiations with
these countries for a comprehensive reduction in
our tariffs for similar reductions in the Common
Market external tariff. If we wait even a year,
we will allow the Common Market to make funda-
mental decisions affecting the whole free world's
interest without our voice being effectively heard.
The members of the Common Market are elim-
inating industrial tariffs among themselves in big,
broad strokes. They are also fashioning a com-
mon agricultural policy among themselves, re-
placing their individual f ann programs with what
amounts to a common support program. Impor-
tant potential effects on American exports are
inherent in both these developments. American
industrial exporters will be handicapped by the
competitive advantage which domestic suppliers
in the Common Market will have in supplying the
needs of that market. Our exporters will be out-
side the common external tariff looking in upon
this expanding community. Unless the external
tariffs can be bargained down, more and moi'e
American businesses will turn to investing in Eu-
rope as a way of getting inside. American farm
exports may be similarly handicapped if the new
common agricultural policy leads to programs of
self-sufficiency. If we are to insure the prospects
for our agricultural exports, we must be prepared
to bargain hard and soon.
We cannot expect the Common Market countries
to slow down their internal tariff reductions or to
change their bargaining methods to slower, more
selective ones. We can expect that the Common
Market, however, wiU negotiate with us across-
the-board tariff cuts covering entire categories of
goods, if we have the authority to make similar
offers on their goods coming into the United
States.
February 5, 1962
197
U.S. Needs Bargaining Authority
At the present time the United States has little
remaining bargaining authority with which to
make its voice heard in the councils of the Com-
mon Market. We need to be able to say to the
Europeans that we are willing to offer concessions
in our tariff schedules over the next 5 years. We
must have the autliority to matcli the general re-
ductions wliich they are making in (heir internal
tariffs. We must be able to say that we are will-
ing to reduce boldly duties on industrial products
important to our two common markets. We need
authority, broad authority, to make tariff conces-
sions in favor of our agricultural exports. And
■we need this authority now before the seeds of
protectionism have a chance to sprout in the Com-
mon Market.
However, President Kennedy's request for trade
authority is not focused exclusively on negotia-
tions with the Common Market. Through exten-
sion of most-favored-nation treatment, the results
of these negotiations would be extended to our
friends in Canada, Japan. Latin America, Africa,
and the Middle and Far East. Furthermore, we
contemplate direct negotiations with these coun-
tries as well.
While we are an Atlantic nation, we are also
a Pacific nation. We are also a nation in the
Western Hemisphere, with the very closest ties
with the American states. We are also the rich-
est and most powerful nation in the free world.
By virtue of our wealth and power we have re-
sponsibilities toward every other nation of the
free world.
Therefore, in defining our relationship with the
Atlantic nations, we must do so in a manner con-
sistent with our role as a world leader. Our rela-
tionship with the Common Market must be out-
ward-looking. It must be dedicated not only to
the achievement of the parochial interests of the
members of the Atlantic community but dedicated
to the increase and expansion of trade with the
rest of the free world. The President, in his state
of the Union message, propounded this thought
most eloquently.* He stated :
. . . together we face a common challenge : to enlarge
the prosperity of free men everywhere, to build in part-
nership a new trading community in which all free na-
tions may gain from the productive energy of free com-
petitive effort.
' Ibid., Jan. 29, 1962, p. 159.
198
These various elements in our foreign policy lead, as
I have said, to a single goal — the goal of a peaceful world
of free and independent states. This is our guide for the
present and our vision for the future : a free community
of nations, independent but interdependent, uniting north
and south, east and west, in one great family of man,
outgrowing and transcending the hates and fears that
rend our age.
None would deny that in attempting to achieve
this objective we must work closely with the bur-
geoning Common Market. We must have the
authority to work with tlie Common Market so
that the two great Atlantic markets, growing to-
gether, can utilize their resources and skill, share
the burdens of defense and foreign aid, and thus
meet the free world's security and economic
requirements.
Demonstrating Advantages of Economic Freedom
We have also to take up the challenge which
Khrushchev made to the Western World for an
economic and social race. I am confident that we
will win. Not only is our economic potential far
greater than that of the Communist bloc, but our
system of economic freedom is more efficient than
the coercive system of the East.
With the development of European integration
and with the economic strength of the United
States working in unison with that of Western
Europe, we can develop so dynamic an economy
in the free world that its political, economic, and
social repercussions will be great in the Commu-
nist bloc itself. We will thus demonstrate to the
entire world the advantages of our system based
on freedom.
What the President Seeks
Wliat is this authority that the President is
seeking? In brief, he is asking Congress to pro-
vide him with the authority to negotiate on a
reciprocal basis a reduction in existing duties by
50 percent. He is asking that in negotiations with
the EEC he be authorized to reduce tariffs even
further on those products of which the United
States and the EEC are the main suppliers to the
world. He seeks authority to assist the expansion
of trade of the less developed countries. He is
asking authority of Congre.ss to eliminate com-
pletely duties on tropical agricultural and for-
estry products which are not produced in the
United States, provided that the EEC agrees to
make similar reductions. And, in order to assist
Deparfmenf of State Bulletin
any firms or workers affected by the increased
import competition, lie is asking for a trade ad-
justment assistance program. Tlie assistance
would not be subsidies but would be measures to
help those affected to better meet t\i& forces of
competition. It would provide the means of per-
mitting traditional American forces of adapta-
bility and initiative to substitute progress for
injury.
Tlie legislation we are seeking is an essential
element of United States strategy to build
stronger economic and political cohesion in the
free world. Witliin this broader framework tlie
legislation will provide authority to negotiate with
the European Common Market to insure access
for American exports in a potential market of
300 million people. It will permit the United
States, in conjunction with the industrial coun-
tries of the free world, to open increasingly the
markets of the developed countries for the prod-
ucts of the less developed. It will enable the
United States to bring about a lowering of trade
barriers, which will assist the United States in
improving its balance-of -payments position. It
will facilitate the best utilization of the free
world's resources in order to accelerate the eco-
nomic growth of the non-Communist world.
We have already taken the first steps toward
closer economic cooperation in "Western Europe
through support of the Common Market and the
establishment of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development. I^eadership in
trade policy by the United States is necessary if
these efforts are to succeed. Through concerted
action in trade policy we can assure an accelera-
tion of the economic growth of the members of the
Atlantic community, increase United States ex-
ports, create export markets for the less developed
countries, and develop a constructive response to
the economic offensive of the Communist bloc.
With this authority from Congress and its suc-
cessful use in negotiating to lower Common Mar-
ket restrictions against our goods, every .segment
of the American economy will benefit. The
trade bill that the President will submit to Con-
gress shortly will not only serve the domestic in-
terests of the United States but also its foreign
policy interests as well. The Department of State
has as its responsibility the protection of United
States interests globally. It seeks to promote
peace, to strengthen our security, and to maintain
friendly relations with other countries. It is also
responsible for protecting the interests of Ameri-
can business, labor, and agriculture abroad. The
trade bill proposed by the President will promote
all of these interests.
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of January 18
Press release 43 dated January 19
Secretary Rusk: Since you have a very full
docket today, as I can tell from the tickers already
beginning to flow, and since my own schedule is
very pressed, I will not take time for any lengthy
opening statements.
I perhaps could incorporate into this session the
statement that I made this morning on the Congo,
which I understand has been released by the sub-
committee of the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee under Senator [Albert] Gore.* But I
could not mention the Congo without expressing
a deep personal sense of shock and dismay at the
news which has come in in the last few days about
the murder of missionaries in north Katanga.
"■ See p. 216.
This tragedy, a tragedy in every sense, under-
lines in the most urgent way the need for a
prompt reconciliation among the leaders of the
Congo to erect there a workable constitutional and
administrative system with responsible internal
security and police forces, so that law and order
can be restored in that country.
You are getting from the Organization of
American States the report of the [Inter-Ameri-
can] Peace Committee. That has been released by
them, and we have attempted to speed up the re-
lease in English by translation of tliat portion re-
ferring to Cuba. At the conclusion of that section
on Cuba, I would invite your attention to the por-
tion which reads :
As regards the Intense subversive activity in which the
countries of the Sino-Soviet bloc are engaged in America
February 5, 7962
199
and the activities of the Cuban Government that are
pointed out in this report, it is evident that they would
constitute acts that, within the system for the "political
defense" of the hemisphere, have been classed as acts of
"political aggression" or "aggression of a nonmilitary
character." Such acts represent attacks upon inter-
American peace and security as well as on the sover-
eignty and political independence of the American states,
and therefore a serious violation of fundamental prin-
ciples of the inter-American system, as has been re-
peatedly and explicitly declared at previous Inter-
American Conferences and Meetings of Consultation.
I shall be leaving with my colleagues on Satur-
day evening for the meeting of the foreign min-
isters of the Organization of American States in
Punta del Este. It is not possible, I think, for any
of the foreign ministers to state witli precision
ahead of the meeting exactly what will be the re-
sult of that meeting. If that were possil^le it
would not be necessary to hold the meeting. But
we do believe that without any doubt the confer-
ence at Punta del Este and the Organ of Consulta-
tion will reaffinn tlie basic principles of the
charters of the hemisphere system, that they will
point with no equivocation whatever to the events
which have occurred in Cuba as being in violation
of the obligations of tliose basic charters, and that
events in Cuba represent an unacceptable pene-
tration of this hemisphere by forces from outside
the hemisphere.^
As to the details of what action or what resolu-
tions or what arrangements will be reached in
Punta del Este, it would not be possible to say
today because the ministers and govermnents are
not only considering their own points of view but
are in intensive consultation witli each otlier on
this matter.
Now, gentlemen, I will take your questions.
The Thompson-Gromyko Talks on Berlin
Q. Mr. Secretary, to go to the Berlin situation,
in view of the quieting down of developments
there, and particularly the withdrawal of tanks
from ioth sides of the Frledrlchstrasse Gate, do
you consider that there is a significant easing of
tensions in Berlin?
A. I would not wish to characterize the situa-
' For a Department announcement concerning release
of a document entitled "The Castro Regime iu Cuba" aud
text of the summary section of the document, see Bul-
letin of Jan. 22, 1062, p. 129.
tion in those terms. It remains a dangerous situa-
tion. The removal of the tanks occurred on a
military basis, on the basis of decisions taken
locally, as announced in Berlin itself. The most
recent conversation between Mr. Thompson
[Llewellyn E. Thompson, U.S. Ambassador to the
U.S.S.R.] and Mr. Gromyko [Andrei A. Gro-
myko, Soviet Foreign Minister] was the occasion
for a reaffirmation of the longstanding Soviet
position. We expect those talks to continue fur-
ther, to find out whether there is any real change
in the situation or basis for negotiation.
Q. Mr. Secretary, the reports from London and
Bonn, which have heen somewhat more extensive
than the ones here on the Gromyho-Thompson
talks, indicate that the Russians, in addition to
not changing their position, have hecome possibly
even more rigid in their position than they tcere
when you were talking with Mr. Gromyko last
autwnn. Do you get that impression?
A. No, I would not think so. I think that
the talks reflected the standard position of the
Soviets, which has been known for some time, and
that tliere were no surprises in these talks from
that point of view, that there was no perceptible
hardening of their position but a repetition of it.
And on the other hand, there was no significant
forward movement.
Q. Mr. Secretary, do toe noio have a clearer
picture of exactly tohat is happening in Santo
Domingo?
A. We have had some reports during the day.
As I indicated yesterday, we have been disap-
pointed by what seems to be a backward step in
the development of that situation toward demo-
cratic and constitutional government. We do
think that it is of the utmost importance that the
moderate elements among the leadership in the
Dommican Republic find a basis on which they
can work together. After so many distressing
years, one can understand the suspicions and the
animosities which might have been a residue of
that troublesome period. But, nevertheless, a free
society depends upon a measure of good faith in
one's associates, and confidence, and an exchange
of confidence, if constitutional democratic proc-
esses are to work. We hope that these leaders
will bo able to get together and extend to each
other that measure of confidence in the interest
200
Department of State Bulletin
of the Dominican people and the future of that
country.
Q. Mr. Secretary, could you give us your evalu-
ation of IV hat seems to be going on in the Kremlin?
A. I would not wish to speculate on that at the
present time nor even whether there is something
going on in the Kremlin. These are matters, I
think, in which you gentlemen could have more
fim than I am permitted to have. We, of course,
are interested in such news as we get, but from
long experience I would suppose that speculation
by a Secretary of State on that particular subject
•would be fruitless.
Q. Mr. Secretary., do you anticipate a rather
lengthy series of future meetings between Mr.
Thoinpson and Mr. Gromyho?
A. There has been no understanding about the
length of such conversations. They are on a
meeting-to-meeting basis. We expect there will
be another meeting or so, in any event, and what
would follow would depend upon what happens
at those meetings.
Cease-Fire in Laos
Q. Mr. Secretary, in the event of failure of the
three princes'' conference in Geneva, do you expect
war to resume in Laos? There have been indica-
tions already that it is stepping up its tempo.
A. The cease-fire has on the whole held reason-
ably well during these past several months. The
negotiations which have been going on, or the
contacts — the prenegotiations perhaps — which
have been going on, have taken considerable time.
There has not yet been among the leadership in
Laos, among the three princes, the kind of de-
tailed discussion of portfolios, responsibilities,
and adjustments which can produce any real esti-
mates as to whether an agreement is possible. We
believe that there is a basis for more work at it,
some hard work and some detailed work, but I do
not myself believe that we should assume that, if
there is not a quick solution to this problem, there
would be a fresh outbreak of fighting.
Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us what the atti-
tude was the other day when you went before the
Foreign Relations Committee on the U.N. bond
issue, because a number of Senators have indicated
it might be preferable to ask for direct appropria-
tions if the money were needed.
A. Well, I would not wish to break the ground
rules of the executive session by reflecting or at-
tempting to reflect the attitude of a congressional
committee. If you w^ant me to make a speech on
the bond issue,' I will be happy to accommodate,
but I will leave that to you.
Q. Mr. Secretary, is the Navy again being em-
ployed in any way to reinforce our interests in
Dominican affairs?
A. If it were to be so employed, I am sure it
would be known publicly immediately.
Importance of Disarmament Talks
Q. Mr. Secretary, can you see any hope at all
for success in the coming disarmament talks this
spring ivithout first an agreement on the nuclear
test ban?
A. The discussions which are to resume on
March 14 could be discussions of very great im-
portance. We woidd like to believe that they can
make some headway, because during the last ses-
sion of the General Assembly it was possible to
find a statement of agreed principles* with the
Soviet Union on a good many matters that bear
upon the question of disarmament. But there
was one matter on which there was not an agreed
position, and that was on the cracial matter of
inspection or verification or control. This has
been the stumbling block apparently with the nu-
clear test ban discussions, and it is almost certain
to be a very important point in any discussion
of general and complete disarmament. It is im-
portant to most of the world because disarmament
can only proceed if there is assurance at every
stage of the way that no one is going to be a dupe
or a victim of disarmament arrangements.
We expect in the March 14 discussions that the
question of nuclear test bans will come up very
early, because in phase one of the plan put to
the United Nations last autumn,^ it supposed
either that there would have been by then a nu-
clear test ban agreement or that such an agree-
ment would be a matter of high priority in the
discussions of general and complete disarmament.
' For a statpment by Assistant Secretary Cleveland on
the U.N. bond issue, see ibid., Jan. 1.5, 1962, p. 96.
* For text, see iUd., Oct. 9, 1961, p. 589.
= Ibid., Oct. 16, 1961, p. 650.
February 5, J 962
201
Situation in Dominican Republic
Q. Mr. Secretary, dispatches from Santo
Domingo say that Dr. [Viriato] Fiallo and sev-
eral other leading mern,bers of the opposition po-
litical groups have been thrown into jail. Is it
possible that we can maintain our present diplo-
Tnatic recognition of the Dominican Republic if
they continite in this?
A. Let ine make a distinction between recojjni-
tion of a j=tate and recoijnition of a government.
Tliis is not a question of a withdrawal of a recog-
nition btit the question of wlietlier we, in fact,
recognize a new government if a new government
comes into operation. This is a matter which is,
of course, very much in our minds, as a problem
to consider. Rut our representatives in Santo
Domingo are in close touch with the leaders in
that country at tlie present time. This is a prob-
lem tliat may change on an hour-to-hour basis, and
I would prefer to leave it there for the moment.
(>. Mr. Secretary, do you anticipate that the
DomJnlcan Repxihlic issue loill come tip in the
Punta del Este conference?
A. The Dominican situation is not on the
agenda of the conference at Punta del Este, but
I have no doubt that there will be conversations
among foreign ministers about it, whether or not
it is taken up in any formal way.
Q. Mr. Secretar)/, is there anything you can re-
port at this time on the status of or prospects for
resumption of nuclear testing in the atmosphere?
A. No. I have nothing to add to what the
President has said in his recent press conferences
on that subject.
Q. Mr. Secretary, in that connection, sometime
ago at Bermuda we had the idea that Britain
would make a decision very shortly on xchether
or not we could use Christmas Island. My under-
standing is that they have not yet given that per-
m,ission. Can you give us any reason as to why
that is being held up or what the problem is?
A. No, I can only say that that is a matter that
has been discussed but that there is nothing that I
can add on that at this time.
Q. Mr. Secretary/, could you give us an evalua-
tion of the actual possibilities of pushing the most
vigorous action possible against Castro''s Cuba, in
the conference at Punta del Este toithout reaching
the breaking point of inter- American solidarity?
A. I would not wish to try today to cast up a
toll of the attitudes of various governments. We
are talking with each of them on almost a daily
basis, and of course this is one of the key points on
which the ministers themselves are meeting. I
doubt very much that there will be any congealing
of a consensus on a number of these points until
the ministers actually meet with each other and
talk it over among themselves.
Revised Passport Regulations
Q. Mr. Secretary, I have a question al>out pass-
ports. As I understand it, the present Into states
that a passport issuing officer cannot, without
breaking the la,w, issue a passport to anyone he
knows or has reason to believe is a member of the
Communist Party. That is the substance of it.
These passport officers now, as I understand, it, do
see classifi,ed information. If they are not able to
make their decision on the basis of classified infor-
ma.tion, does this put them in the position of vio-
lating the law, or are you going to withhold
classified information from them?
A. We have just issued, as you know, new regu-
lations on that subject.* The purpose of these
new regulations is to give effect to the new statu-
tory requirements and also to take into account the
application of basic constitutional law as inter-
preted in recent Supreme Court decisions.
As you know, there is a lot of law on this sub-
ject. In the case of Rockwell Kent against Dulles
a few years ago, it was held, broadly speaking,
that a citizen has the right to travel. And we are
attempting to apply the statute in the intent of the
statute but with, also, recognition of the possible
constitutional problems that might be involved.
We and the Department of Justice are working
very closely together on this matter, and our pres-
ent procedures represent the combined view of the
two Departments.
Q. To pursue that, do you have any intention of
restricting the classifed material now made avail-
able to the passport issuing officers?
A. The basic point on this particular issue in the
new regulations is that a person who is denied a
passport under this particular statute, we believe,
has a right to a hearing, and in such a hearing he
would have a right to be confronted with the evi-
' For a Department announcement, see ihid., Jan. 29,
1962, p. 179.
202
Depattmeni of Sfafe Bulletin
dence for the withholding of a passport. Under
these circumstances a decision would hav^e to be
based upon the materials which could be produced
in such a hearing and tested by court action. If
I have not answered your question, I am fully
aware of it. (Laughter.)
Q. Mr. Secretary^ this may be a tidier question.
Has the Government is-sved an invitation to Con-
golese Prime Minister [Cynlle] Adoula to visit
the United States?
A. It has been our understanding for some time
that Prime Minister Adouhi has been hoping to
come to New York to visit the United Nations and
to visit this country. If he comes, we certainly
would welcome him in Washington and would
hope very much to have a chance to have some
talks with him.
Q. Mr. Secretary, do you foresee any specif/;
accomfUshments by the Attorney General at his
various ports of call on his trip around the
world? '
A. Yes, we are very happy indeed that the At-
torney General is able to make this trip to visit
a number of countries. We have urged him to
go — we in tlie State Department — and we, of
course, will be working with him closely on his
visit. It is a matter of considerable importance
to us that a distinguished member of our Cabinet
has a chance to meet his opposite numbers in other
governments and to have this contact with leaders
in other countries around the world.
Problem of West New Guinea
Q. Mr. Secretary., on the decision of Secretary-
General U Thant to take a hand in the Indonesian-
Dutch disp^ite, do you see that he has tacMed a
problem that has long defied settlement, or is there
an agreement already far enough along to make
sure that he can succeed in this endeavor?
A. Well, this particular problem of West New
Guinea has been a very stubborn problem since
1949. It is not one that is simple or easy, but it
is one which has become very much inflamed in the
last several weeks and months. The Secretary-
General of the United Nations has a basic re-
sponsibility to do what he can to maintain the
U.S. Supports U.N. Secretary-General
in Efforts on West New Guinea
Department Statement of January 17
Press release 42 dated .January 18
The Secretary-General has addressed an appeal to
the President of Indonesia and the Prime Minister
of the Netherlands urging the two parties to agree
to iuiiuediate discussion with him on the possihili-
ties of a peaceful settlement of the West New
Guinea problem in conformity with the United Na-
tions Charter. The United States welcomes this
commendable initiative of the Secretary-General.
We consider that a peaceful solution is essen-
tial and strongly support his efforts to get I he
parties together. The ingredients for a peaceful
settlement of this problem clearly exist. There-
fore, we hope that U Thant's appeal will meet with
a speedy and positive response.
' For background, see iM4., Jan. 8, 1962, p. 50, and Jan.
15, 1962, p. 99.
peace, and his initiative in this matter is most
welcomed by the United States Government. We
hope that the two Governments concerned will
give heed to his appeal to them to avoid further
incidents and to establish contact with him to
explore the possibilities of negotiation and a pos-
sible peaceful settlement of this situation. We
think this is entirely in accord with not only his
privileges but his obligations under the charter.
We would support him fully in this peacemaking
effort which he has undertaken.
Q. Mr. Secretary, you said that the situation in
the Dominican Republic might change from hour
to hour. Beyond that, hoio soon do you think the
United States may maTce a decision on whether to
recognize the group which apparently is already
in power?
A. Well, since this is a matter, Mr. Hightower
[Jolm Hightower of the Associated Press], of an
hour-to-hour problem, I don't really want to
speculate on a particular time at which that de-
cision would be reached. Our representatives
there are in contact and discussion with the leaders
of the different groups in the Dominican Repub-
lic, and we shall just have to see today and to-
morrow how these discussions come out.
Q. Can you say, sir, whether any of them have
succeeded in getting into contact with the leaders
of the National Civic Union, which is an outfit
we have been interested in?
February 5, 7962
203
A. I think that you can assume that we are
in touch with the principal groups there in this
situation.
Q. Even while they are in jail?
A. I think my statement stands; yes, sir.
Q. Mr. Secretary, what action would you pro-
pose through the United Nations or otherwise if
the United Arab Refublic should close the Suez
to the Dutch, as they have indicated they may?
A. Well, quite frankly I would not wish to
speculate on that one. I have not given that the
study wliich it obviously deserves before I com-
ment on it.
U.S.-U.K. Talks on U.N. Affairs
Q. Mr. Secretary, as a result of the talks here
hetween the United States and Great Britain,^
are there any particular proposals on improving
tJie peacekeeping Tnachinery of the United Nations
which the United States contemplates putting
forward?
A. There have been no specific proposals worked
out in these particular conversations. I might
say that we are in touch with a number of gov-
ernments from time to time about the general
situation — the health and the vitality and the im-
portance of the United Nations — and we send our
representatives to different capitals in the course
of a year to talk about matters on the agenda of
the United Nations. I do think that it might
well be time, as has been indicated by the Presi-
dent and also by Ambassador Stevenson at the
United Nations, for the United Nations to give
some very thoughtful and sober attention to the
peacekeeping procedures and processes of the
United Nations and the obligations of members to
attempt to adjust their problems with their
neighbors.
There is a long list of problems now, right
around the globe, in which countries are having
problems witli their neighbors. Many of them
might yield to a persistent and sustained effort to
bring about some settlement and some solution.
We suspect that it would not be bad for the United
Nations to have a rather general discussion of the
processes of peaceful settlement and tlie position
of the United Nations and its opportmiities for
• See p. 205.
assisting in these processes of peaceful settlement.
But we did not frame specific proposals in these
discussions to which you referred.
There was a question back there.
Q. Mr. Secretary, I was wondering, without
speculating on the situation inside Russia, as to
whether you think there is a relation hetween that
and the current position on Berlin?
A. If I were to be truthful, I would simply
have to say that I don't know — I don't know.
Q. Thank you, sir.
United States and United Kingdom
Reaffirm Faitli in United Nations
Folloioing is a Department statement released
at the close of consultations on United Nations af-
fairs which took place hetween U.S. and U.K.
officials at Washington, D.C., January 11-13}
Press release 28 dated January 13
It has been congenial, stimulating, and useful
to get together with our colleagues of the United
Kingdom for the past 3 days to discuss fully and
frankly the future of our respective relationships
with the United Nations.
We face a common opportunity and a common
dilemma. The opportimity is to make peace opera-
tional by making the United Nations a more and
more effective instrument. We have fully ex-
plored the United Nations' peacekeeping role, the
strengthening of the peaceful settlement proce-
dures which are basic to the charter, the progress
toward self-government and independence, the
opportunity for international cooperation in outer
space, the financing of the Organization, and the
worldwide programs of economic and social bet-
terment which are one of the important bridges
of cooperation between the Atlantic nations and
tlie developing nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin
America.
Tlie dilemma is that the United Nations is what
its members, all of them, make of it. Therefore,
we cannot do more of the peacekeeping and peace-
making job through the United Nations than will
be supported by the great bulk of the members.
' For an aiinouiu'ement of the meetings and names of
the tJ.S. and U.K. participants, see Bxjli.etin of Jan. 22,
19C2, p. 140.
204
Oeparfmenf of Sfafe Bu//efi'n
And so we have reviewed together how far and
how fast the necessary peacekeeping and peace-
making organizations of the United Nations, and
the specialized agencies for economic and social
development, can be expected to achieve the de-
gree of effectiveness that merits support of their
continuing growth by the major contributing
comitries. Without losing sight of the ideals to
which the charter gives expression, our common
aim is to be very realistic in making sure that this
operational peace agency, the United Nations, is
subject to effective policy direction from its mem-
bers and effectively and economically adminis-
tered by a truly international staff under the Sec-
retary-General.
The world organization has begun to grow.
This gi'owth raises problems which it is the obli-
gation of the members, and the special obligation
of the large contributors, to watch very carefiilly.
And in this process of growth the United Nations
has no stronger or more faithful members tlian
the United States and the United Kingdom.
treaty. Instead, it reaffirmed its proposal of No-
vember 28, 1961, as the only basis for a continua-
tion of the current Geneva conference. That pro-
posal called for a halt to nuclear weapons tests on
the basis of an unverifiable paper pledge. It is not
acceptable to the United States and the United
Kingdom. Such a declaration of intent is wholly
impractical for it could be violated at will as re-
cent Soviet actions have amply demonstrated.
The United States and the United Kingdom
continue to view the conclusion of a test ban treaty
as a matter of the highest priority ; they have ex-
pressed their willingness to pursue a test ban
treaty under effective international safegiiards in
the context of general disarmament negotiations
because the Soviet Union's repudiation of the con-
ference's objectives leaves this as the only alterna-
tive for the attainment of that goal.^
Letters of Credence
U.S. and U.K. Willing To Discuss
Test Ban in Disarmament Negotiations
Department Statement
Press release 36 dated January 16
The United States and the United Kingdom to-
day at the Geneva test ban conference reluctantly
expressed their willingness to examine the issue
of a controlled test ban in the context of general
disarmament negotiations.'
They did so in view of the Soviet Government's
categorical rejection of the objective of reaching
agreement on a separate nuclear test ban treaty
under effective international safeguards and its
insistence that it will only discuss such an arrange-
ment in the context of general disarmament ne-
gotiations.
At today's conference session, the Soviet Union
flatly rejected a renewed U.S.-U.K. appeal that
serious negotiations be resumed at the conference
toward the establishment of a controlled test ban
China
The newly appointed Ambassador of the Re-
public of China, Tingfu F. Tsiang, presented his
credentials to President Kennedy on January 12.
For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the
President's reply, see Department of State press
release 25 dated January 12.
' For text of a U.S.-U.K. report submitted on Dec. 19,
1961, to the U.N. Disarmament Commission regarding the
Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear
Weapon Tests, see Bulletin of Jan. 8, 1962, p. 63.
- Following is the text of a letter transmitted on Jan. 17
(U.S./U.N. press release 3911) by the United States and
the U.S.S.R. to U Thant, Acting Secretary-General of the
United Nations :
January 17, 1962
Excellency : We have the honor to refer to Resolution
No. 1722 (XVI) of the General Assembly, adopted on
December 20, 1961, and to inform you that, as a result
of consultations undertaken between our two Govern-
ments and the other Members of the Disarmament Com-
mittee whose establishment was endorsed by that Resolu-
tion, the Committee will meet on March 14, 1962, at the
Palais des Nations in Geneva.
Accordingly it would be appreciated If you could ar-
range to furnish the necessary assistance and services,
as requested by the General Assembly in the resolution
under reference. In this connection we are grateful for
the preliminary ob.servations contained in .your aide-
memoire of 9 January [U.N. doc. DC/200] and on our part
find them generally acceptable.
V. ZoRiN Adlai E. Stevenson
Permanent Representative Permanent Representative
of the Union of Soviet So- of the United States of
cialist Republics to the Ameriea to the United
United Nations Nations
February 5, 1962
205
Education for World Responsibility
hy Chester Bowles ^
The next 10 years, I venture to say, will be the
decisive years of our century. Indeed this decade
may determine whether we are to have a future or
only a past. In this decade of decision it is our
task to prepare our young men and women for
the utterly new kind of world in which they will
be living and whose destinies they will help to
guide.
I am sanguine enough to believe that somehow
a new world of hope and opportunity can and
will emerge from the troubled years that lie ahead.
Yet such a world will become possible only if we
have the wisdom to understand the forces shaping
our times and the courage and resiliency to cope
with the crises and conflicts which these forces
will bring into being.
This evening I would like to discuss the nature
of these forces, to examine the failure of so many
well-educated and presumably well-informed
Americans to understand them, and finally, with
considerable hesitation, to offer some personal ob-
servations on the responsibility of our educational
system in preparing our young people for the role
they must play in the years ahead.
Observers never grow weary of pointing out
that we face greater and more complex problems
than any people in history. It should be added
that we also have far more ideas, skills, and re-
sources to contribute to a solution of these
problems.
Our effectiveness will depend on our ability to
bring those assets to bear on the challenge at hand.
This will require not only a deeper understanding
but also vastly greater personal efforts on the part
of each one of us.
Each morning we are faced with a fresh set of
headlines telling us of unrest or open hostilities
in one remote comer of the world after another.
Tliese incidents, many of them acutely dangerous
to our interests, are the surface phenomena
churned up by a number of revolutionary wliirl-
winds sweeping the face of the earth.
Revolutionary Forces in Today's World
One such revolutionary convulsion has been
described as "tlie revolution of rising expecta-
tions"— the political, social, economic, and cul-
tural movement that is now lighting the hopes of
hundreds of millions of people in Asia, Africa,
and Latin America.
In these great continents people for generations
have been accustomed to exist in need of food,
shelter, medical care, essential education and skills,
and even individual dignity and the barest jus-
tice. What is new is the sudden awareness,
spreading like a prairie fire into the most remote
rural areas, that their plight need no longer be
accepted as part of God's plan for the unfoitunate.
They now laiow that the means exist vastly to
improve their lives, and they are determined to
do so either with our help and understanding or
without it.
A second major force in our new world is the
hard reality of Soviet power. In four decades
the Soviet Union has risen from a second-class
nation to an industrial and military giant. In-
evitably many frustrated Asian and African lead-
ers look to Moscow with a mixture of awe, fear,
and expectation.
A third convulsion is taking place on the main-
land of China, where another Communist state has
emerged as the potentially greatest force in the
Eastern world.
' Address made before the American Association of Col-
leges at Cleveland, Ohio, on Jan. 10 (press release 21).
Mr. Bowles is the President's Special Representative and
Adviser on African, Asian, and Latin American Affairs.
206
Department of State Bulletin
Above and beyond these geographic areas of
revolutionary change is a whole new world of
scientific and tecluiological change that staggers
the imagination. Discoveries are coming thick
and fast, many of them involving a destructive
potential that is diflicult for ordinary minds to
comprehend.
Gap Between Realities and Public Understanding
The speed and impact with which these four
revolutionary forces have thrust themselves upon
us have led to a dangerous imbalance between the
hard realities with which our Government must
contend and public understanding of those
realities.
This gap in understanding is due partly to the
tremendous complexity of the forces themselves
and partly to our lack of experience in world af-
fairs. We are living in an age in which the sit-
uations we face are rarely black and white and
where clear-cut choices between right and wrong
approaches are rarely available to our policy-
makers. Over and over again we are forced to
choose the least undesirable of a number of dis-
tasteful courses of action. Because each choice
inevitably involves risks, we must judge where
the least risk and greatest opportunity may lie.
Now anyone who is familiar with American
history knows that we are an impatient people ac-
customed to looking for simple, clear-cut answers
to whatever problems may confront us. Inevi-
tably we are impatient with the seemingly tor-
tuous ways of diplomacy and negotiation in our
infinitely complex new world.
The resulting fears and frustrations brought on
by problems that refuse t-o disappear have led
some of our most impatient fellow citizens to as-
simie that war eventually is inevitable. Others,
appalled at the complexity of international affairs,
seek release from reality in a hunt for culprits in
their own neighborhoods who fail to conform with
their own views. Thus we read of presumably
thoughtful citizens demanding that our Govern-
ment abandon its allies, withdraw from the U.N.,
undermine our overseas trade by raising our
tariffs, cut our national budget, while simulta-
neously threatening war against any nation which
earns our displeasure.
How can this dangerous gap between the prac-
tical realities and public understanding be
bridged? With our intricate and farflung com-
munications system of TV, radio, and newspapers,
how did the gap develop in the first phice?
Three factors contribute to this gap in public
understanding.
■Many News Outlets Oversimplify
There are many responsible communications
outlets working passionately to give people a true
picture of the world today. Yet the inability of
many of our newspapers, radio and television sta-
tions, and magazines to communicate the true
depth of today's problems is clearly up])ai'ent.
The current tendency to dramatize nonessen-
tials, to oversimplify complex questions, and to
imply U.S. impotence one day and omnipotence
the next has helped foster a nat ional mood of con-
fusion and frustration. Some segments of our
daily press appear to have abandoned any serious
effort to contribute to the public understanding
upon which wise and thoughtful action in a demo-
cratic society must depend. And we are all famil-
iar with those television "newsmen" reading the
day's soberest headlines with the reckless abandon
of sports announcers. To add to tlie confusion,
there is the tendency of some news outlets to color
much of what they choose to report with a par-
tisan hostility to whatever government may be in
office.
As an example let us briefly consider the recent
crisis in regard to Katanga, in which public mis-
information and confusion have been dramatically
apparent.
Some interpretations of the U.S.-supported
United Nations action in the Congo would lead
li.steners and readers to believe that the Kennedy
administration had released the hordes of Gen-
ghis Khan against some helpless, peace-loving,
Communist-opposing Katangese wlio courageously
refused to be swallowed up by a central govern-
ment directed by Moscow. The sad fact is that
only a fraction of the American people under-
stand that we are supporting the United Nations
action to prevent a disastrous splintering of the
Congo that might lead to much of the country's
falling under Communist control.
The Soviet Union has consistently opposed the
U.N. operations in the Congo. Although Katanga
is not and never has been an independent province
or state, a stubborn band of foreign mercenaries
led it in revolt against the duly authorized central
February 5, 7962
207
government est.ablislied by Belgium in cooperation
with the Congolese leadership.
Our decision to promote and support a U.N.
operation to help unite the Congo was not under-
taken lightly. There were only two other possible
choices : either to withdraw and leave the future
of central Africa to chaos and communism or to
move in American troops and teclmicians on a vast
scale.
We are still a long way from a final solution.
However, the recent agreement at Kitona ^ between
[Cyrille] Adoula and [Moise] Tshombe may well
be the beginning of a more hopeful era in the
history of this tormented land.
Inadequacy of Government Information Programs
Another reason for the gap of understanding
among Americans is the gross inadequacy of
United States Government information programs
dealing with foreign affairs. The excellent cover-
age of current events provided by the U.S. In-
formation Agency all over the world cannot, by
statute, be made available to our own citizens.
The State Department, which conducts this coun-
try's domestic information program on foreign
affairs, has less money each year to explain foreign
policy to the American people than is spent ad-
vertising a third-rate chewing gum. The total
is only $1,400,000 a year. With this limitation on
funds we have been able to do little more than pub-
lish official policy documents.
We are now planning, however, to continue the
series of all-day foreign policy briefings to which
we invite representatives of all newspapers, TV,
and radio stations. Two important briefings will
be convened next month in Chicago and Min-
neapolis.^ This is a beginning wluch I hope we
may be able to expand.
Limitations in Educational System
A long-range and in many ways more funda-
mental reason for the present dangerous gap in
public understanding lies in certam built-in limi-
tations in our educational system. Here I knock
firmly at your doors.
Our collective failure to give the American
people an adequate understanding and background
' For bac-kground, see Btji-letin of Jan. 1, 1902, p. 10,
and .Ian. S, 1902, p. 49.
'For an announcement, see ibicl., Jan. 15, 1962, p. 101.
in such disciplines as history, economics, and in-
ternational relations has left tens of millions un-
prepared even to ask the right questions about our
world relationships. This failure in our educa-
tional process was costly enough in the unsophis-
ticated and relatively simple era between the wars.
It can become disastrous as we attempt to grapple
with the mounting challenge of the complex and
nuclear-ridden world of tomorrow.
Let me hasten to say that I recognize the ex-
traordinary improvements that have occurred in
our school and college curricula since the end of
World War II. In many of our academic in-
stitutions there have been great strides toward a
world-oriented approach. Most of you have been
in the forefront of the battle to deepen and broaden
our sense of history and our understanding of the
forces that move mankind. But few will deny
that we have much further to go.
The extraordinary response to the Peace Corps
dramatizes the willingness of young Americans
to tackle new challenges. This concept has caught
the imaginations not only of our young people
but of many adults who see in it a channel for
their own unfulfilled aspirations for service.
Indeed, wherever I go I find young people
eagerly searching for a better basis for under-
standing the problems faced by the world today.
To what extent do these frustrations reflect a fail-
ure of our educational system to provide inspira-
tion and incentive? Certainly many of our most
promising young men and women remain properly
skeptical about the outmoded dogmas and doc-
trines of the past that are often still imparted
to prepare them for the future.
A particularly tragic result is that so many have
become willing to settle for security and medi-
ocrity in large organizations where the decisions
are made by others, while others retreat into re-
actionary groupings which appear determined to
recapture the outworn political and economic con-
cepts which were scarcely relevant to the 19th
century, much less the 21st.
Need To Expand Teaching of Economics and History
Although we can take heart in the manj' out-
standing improvements in education that have
taken place in the last 10 to 15 years, we have much
further to go and a frank examination of old
curricula is now in order.
For instance, how can we bring fresh vitality
208
Department of State Bulletin
into economics teaching ? How can we transform
it from the "dismal science" to provide exciting
new ways to stir students' imaginations and spark
their appreciation for the dynamics of growth and
productivity? How can we expand the teaching
of modern economic theory and practice?
Our new times also challenge our universities
and colleges to provide more adequate background
and depth in the considei'ation of world affairs.
History is the very basis of a liberal education —
the tool by which we can measure the past and
form an estimate of the future. Yet who will
argue that students today generally have an ade-
quate knowledge of these historical forces which
will shape their world ?
Even well-educated Americans still think of
world history largely in terms of the history of
the "West. As students they were exposed only to
the civilizations of Egypt and the Middle East
and the spread of those civilizations to Greece,
Western Europe, and ultimately to the United
States. The exciting story of China, India, Japan,
Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America was
largely ignored, although these areas are crucially
important to an imderstanding of today's world.
Even today many students learn of China's ex-
istence as a phenomenon revealed by the intrusion
of Marco Polo ; Japan's history is thought to have
begun with Commodore Perry's visit in 1853 ; In-
dia appears to have become important through the
expeditions of Alexander the Great and Vasco da
Gama; and the Philippines are best known as the
final resting place of Magellan. Wlien .students
are asked to explain the role of the Chinese in
Southeast Asia or that of Indians in Africa, only
a limited few can give more than a cursory reply.
In the past decade we have seen 25 new nations
come into being in Africa alone. Each is com-
posed of people whose hopes and aspirations for
themselves and their children are just as real and
tangible as those we cherish for ourselves and our
children.
Is our educational process preparing our young
people to cope with these fundamentals of human
relations? It is of little use to help people of
other lands build the finest roads, the largest in-
dustrial plants, and the biggest dams unless they
are also assured of easier credit, more adequate
homes, health facilities, and schools, and, above all,
opportunities for creative participation in their
own national life.
Contacts With Foreign Students
This brings me to another point : How can the
foreign students who come to study in our col-
leges and universities assist us in the effort to cre-
ate a deeper imderstanding among our own young
people ? There are now nearly 60,000 of them in
America enrolled in 1,666 institutions in all 50
States and the District of Columbia. There are
few communities in the United States which are
not within easy traveling distance from a group
of foreign students at some college or university.
It is a relatively simple matter to bring these
students to talk to us at our service clubs, women's
clubs, or other local gatherings. Even those who
have little experience in speaking are able effec-
tively to describe their own country, its culture,
the way their families live, and the perspective
they bring to international relations.
Some com)nunities have even developed a sys-
tem whereby college students speak to public
school classes through a series of weekly lectures.
This has proved to be a stimulating way of awak-
ening our own precollege boys and girls not only
to the complexities of our modem world but to the
extraordinary bond of understanding and common
interest which exists between young people of dif-
ferent races, religions, and national origins.
We can also help fill the gap of understanding
by maintaining closer relations with foreign stu-
dents after they have returned to their countries.
For the most part, our foreign missions are able
to keep contact only with those students who have
participated in Government-sponsored exchange
programs. Our colleges and imiversities can
greatly expand and deepen this effort. Large div-
idends of good will can be reaped from close
personal contacts with "overseas alumni."
Hope for Closing Gap in Understanding
Few thoughtful people will question the state-
ment that the human race has reached a most
critical periwl in its long development. Scientific
technology, exploding in an unprecedented man-
ner, has multiplied our capacity to destroy each
other while opening up new visions of prosperity
and opportunity.
Observers never tire of describing the various
"gaps" that plague our modem society: for in-
stance, the gap between our tremendous capacity
to build modem housing and lingering slums in
February 5, 1962
625849—62 3
209
most American cities; the gap between the need
for faster and more convenient travel and the
antiquation of our transportation system; the gap
between rich and poor in many of our rural areas.
Yet when the history of our time is written, I
believe it will be said that the most important gap
of all is the gap between the harsh realities of
world affaii-s, with which our policymakers in
Washington must deal on a daily basis, and the
lack of understanding of tliese realities among
major segments of our population.
Can tliis gap be closed in the coming years so
that we may proceed with the kind of construc-
tive worldwide policies which are essential to
avoid a nuclear war and to build a partnership
of non-Commmiist peoples which will enable man-
kind to live at peace with an increasing measure
of prosperity and dignity ?
Much of the problem, as I have suggested, is
inherent in the situation itself. Never has the
pace been so rapid, and never have the problems
been so complex.
Yet this does not excuse our failure to take the
necessary actions. Our Govenmient, for instance,
has a major responsibility greatly to improve its
informational techniques, to free itself from in-
grown attitudes that have led so many public offi-
cials to underestimate our national intelligence,
and to establish closer contacts with the people
in the 50 States. Congress has the power to pro-
vide the funds which are needed for this task.
Our newspapers, radios, and television have a
responsibility, on occasion at least, to brush aside
the trivia, to forgo the superdramatic headlines,
and to bring to their readers and listeners a deeper
and more balanced miderstanding of the world in
which we live and the forces with which we must
somehow contend.
Our educational system from the earliest grades
through our universities has a responsibility bet-
ter to prepare our yomig men and women to com-
prehend not only the scientific possibilities of to-
morrow's world but also the human needs of its
inhabitants so that we may remain masters of
science rather than becoming its servants.
Although the magnitude of the challenge is
hard to exaggerate, I believe there is encouraging
evidence of our ability to meet this test. I see this
hope in the enormous response to the Peace Corps,
in the increasing ferment on college campuses, in
the opening of an increasing number of homes to
foreign students, in the expanded public services
offered by some newspapers and an even more
significant nmnber of television stations, in the in-
creased awareness of Govermuent officials in
Wasliington of their responsibility not only to
formulate wise decisions but also to explain them.
In one way or another the next few years may
determine whether the ideals and principles on
which our country was created are a meaningful
basis for world partnership or a brief, brilliant
interlude in the long and savage history of man.
It is our responsibility to see that the answer is
both positive and enduring.
The Winds of Freedom
Remarks hy Adlai E. Stevenson
U.S. Representative to the United Nations ^
On a grander scale than ever before, the world
in our generation is being swept by forces which
express the fierce determination of men to be free.
This liberating force is felt with particular effect
in the colonial empires which Western nations
have created in Africa and Asia in the centuries
since the age of discovery began.
Some 40 new nations, embracing about a billion
people, have emerged into the family of nations
in the past 15 years. The colonial empires of the
West have been reduced to a fraction of their
former size. Tlie age of imperialism and colonial-
ism is in its twilight.
The colonial age was neither all good nor all
bad. It developed material resources previously
unknown. It kept peace and order and taught
warring groups to live in peace. It educated
leaders and technicians. At its best it implanted
liberal political and social institutions.
But by its very nature this colonial system, if
carried on at all humanely, was destined to work
itself out of a job. It was dominated by aliens
from abroad, and this basic fact was found to
clash with the growing education and political
awareness which colonialism itself made possible
among the subject peoples. Inevitably these peo-
ple demanded the right to the same free institu-
' Made on the CBS Armstrong Circle Theater television
broadcast on Jan. 3 (U.S./U.N. press release 3908 dated
Jan. 8).
210
Department of State Bulletin
tions of wliich they learned from their conquerors.
The American Colonies walked this same path in
the 18th century. Our turn came first, perhaps,
because the American colonists were of the same
race and culture as the ministers in London who
oppressed them. But in our time it has turned out
that the thirst for freedom is imiversal and has
nothing to do with racial similarities or differ-
ences. Government by consent of the governed —
that is the root principle. And we are living to-
day in the era in which that principle is marcliing
in triumph across the old colonial world.
The Communist Empires
Now, in this same era we see a tragically con-
trastuig fact — the huge fact of the Communist
empires of Soviet Russia and Communist China,
which together operate the largest and most popu-
lous colonial empires in the history of the world.
According to their own rulers, the peoples of
the Soviet Union enjoy the right of self-determi-
nation. The Soviet regime, at its founding over
40 years ago, proclaimed "the right of the nations
of Russia to free self-determination, including the
right to secede and form independent states."
Unfortunately, this turned out to be more
doubletalk.
During and after the Second World War, as we
all know, whole nations and peoples were swal-
lowed up behind the Iron Curtain in violation of
agreements and without a free vote of the peoples
concerned. These included Latvia, Lithuania,
Estonia, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria,
Albania, and Czechoslovakia. East Germany was
made a satellite. In Asia a similar fate overtook
North Korea, North Viet-Nam, and most recently
Tibet.
Chairman Khrushchev has called Western
colonialism "disgraceful, barbarous, and savage."
But So\'iet imperial rule has not been sweet, gen-
tle, and kmd. One proof of this is the fact that
more than 12 million persons have escaped since
the Second World War from the Soviet Union,
Communist China, and the areas they control.
Since the end of the Second World War, more than
3 million Germans have fled from the Soviet-
controlled Eastern Zone and East Berlin. Even
the famous wall has not stopped them altogether.
Nor can we forget, 5 years later, that nearly 200,-
000 Himgarians fled after the revolt of October
1956 was crushed by Soviet troops.
The urge to express one's national identity is a
potent force indeed. Even the Soviet Commu-
nist Party program, newly adopted this fall, ad-
mits what a tough task is "the obliteration of
national features, particularly of the language
differences." And Mr. Khiiishchev felt con-
strained to warn only 2 months ago that "even
the slightest vestiges of nationalism should
be eradicated with uncompromising Bolshevik
determination."
Thus, although the Soviet state has possessed
nearly total control of mass propaganda and edu-
cation for two generations, it is still struggling to
wipe out the national characteristics that differen-
tiate the Uzbek from the Ukrainian, the Kazakh
from the Armenian, the non-Russian from the
Russian.
Now there are perfectly clear historical reasons
for this contrast. The nations of the West wliich
established colonial empires between the age of
Columbus and the age of Cecil Rhodes were most
of them children of the Renaissance, of the En-
lightenment, and of the doctrines of human free-
dom on which the United States itself was
founded. But these liberating winds did not blow
very much across the Russian steppes, except very
briefly and feebly in the 18th and 19th cen-
turies— and even then they were followed by
periods of bloody reaction under the czars.
And today, although we may have some reason
to hope that the evolution of the Soviet Union is
moving in liberal directions, we know that there
is a very long road ahead.
Soviet Doctrine of Political Strategy
So there are historical reasons for this contrast.
But there is hardly any excuse for the Soviet
Union — let alone the despots of Communist
China — to set themselves up as sponsors or leaders
of the liberation movement in Africa and Asia.
On their own records they are just about the last
whom history would nominate for such an honor.
Yet that is the pretension which Moscow, in
particular, makes today. And it may be well for
us to think for a minute about the Soviet doctrine
of political strategy that underlies this effort.
It is Soviet doctrine that the political develop-
ment of newly independent states is to proceed in
two distinct phases. In the "first phase" — and
now I am quoting Academician Y. E. Zhukov in
Pravda on August 26, 1960— "The majority of the
February 5, 1962
211
new Asian and African national states are headed
by bourgeois politicians under the banner of na-
tionalism." In other words, they are not under
control either of Moscow or of local Communist
parties.
But at the same time local Communists are in-
structed to prepare for the future day of direct
action. In this initial period, Communists are to
concentrate on obtaining key positions in trade-
union and student movements and front organiza-
tions of all types.
As Moscow sees it, most of the African and
Asian countries are now in that first phase. As
Academician Zhukov phrases it: "One cannot,
therefore, term Socialist (which is his jargon for
Communist) those general democratic measures
which to some degree are implemented in India,
Indonesia, the United Arab Eepublic, Iraq and
other independent countries of Asia and Africa."
At the appropriate stage, therefore, the Commu-
nist parties must come forth frankly and openly
with their bid for power. And that is the "second
phase."
So the national independence for which patriots
under colonial domination have yearned so long,
and which most of them have now achieved in
vei*y great measure, is for them a tremendous
victory, to be celebrated with rejoicing and bon-
fires and dancing in the streets. And that is what
we have seen all the way across Africa and Asia.
But this same thing called independence, or free-
dom, is in the eyes of Soviet strategy nothing bet-
ter than a way station on the road to the world
Communist system of the future, in which all
peoples will take their orders from Moscow — or
will it perhaps be Peiping?
Some of the African and Asian patriots have
perhaps been slow to learn these bitter truths.
Many of them are understandably impatient and
are tempted from time to time, in their quarrels
with the European ruler, to fall for that ancient
fallacy, "The enemy of my enemy is my friend."
Any who still think that way, however, would do
well to study Soviet strategy as it applies to them
and also to study the Soviet and Chinese Com-
munist empires as they really are.
The Communist empires are the only imperial
systems which are not liquidating themselves, as
other empires have done, but are still trying ener-
getically to expand in all directions. By the ruth-
less use of police control, by systematic falsehood.
and by the erection of artificial barriers to com-
munication, these regimes have suppressed all
movements in the direction of freedom. They
have labored to eradicate all national identity in
the people, as well as all religious loyalties, and
have held their peoples in virtual isolation from
the outside world.
Finally, the Soviet colonial empire is the only
modem empire in which no subject people have
ever been offered any choice concerning their fu-
ture and their destiny. That destiny was
"decided" once and for all — at gunpoint. Until
Moscow and Peiping change their basic outlook,
no chance will be given to any of their subject
peoples to reconsider this so-called "choice.''
America's Purpose in tiie World
The United States is against colonialism — ■
wherever and whenever it occurs. We believe
that the promise of our Declaration of Independ-
ence that "all men are created equal" literally
means what it says — not Americans only, or
Westerners only, but "all men."
We shall never join with any nation for the pur-
pose of planning, financing, or waging colonial
wars. The military alliances we have formed with
others have no such aims; they are defensive al-
liances created as a shield for free men and free
nations. But the key to our policy is not arms;
it is freedom.
As a nation we believe that man — a physical,
intellectual, and spiritual being, not an economic
animal — has individual rights, di^nnely bestowed,
limited only by the obligation to avoid infringe-
ment upon the equal rights of others.
We do not claim perfection in our own society
and in our own lives. But we do maintain that
the direction we take is always that of greater
liberty.
We believe that justice, decency, and liberty,
in an orderly society, are concepts which have
raised man above the beasts of the field. To deny
any person the opportimity to live imder their
shelter is an offense against all humanity.
Our Republic is the product of the first success-
ful revolution against colonialism in modem
times. Our people, drawn from all the nations
of the world, liave come to these shores in the
search for freedom and opportunity in a progres-
sive society. We have never forgotten either our
origins or the natui-e of the world wo live in.
212
Department of Sfafe Bulletin
And that is why we Americans do not fear the
winds of change and the winds of freedom which
are blowing across so much of the world. To us
they make a wonderful sound. And as the seeds
which they carry take root and grow, we will feel
that America's great purpose in this world is being
fulfilled.
Industry Communications Programs
in Support of U.S. Foreign Policy
hy Roger W. Tuhby
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs ^
I am delighted to be here today, to attend your
workshop, to join in your discussions and profit
from your ideas. We in government are of course
also deeply concerned with communications and
with the need to inform people and governments
of the world effectively. Our problems are sim-
ilar to many of yours. In our effort to solve them
we find that all the media of communications and
especially films are playing an increasingly sig-
nificant role.
You are asking yourselves how to get maximum
results from business films. This involves a study
of all the new techniques and component elements
of production — writing, designing, musical scor-
ing, visual effects, etc. As businessmen and ad-
vertisers you must have some way of gaging the
effectiveness of these programs. Do they drama-
tize your products? Do they improve customer
and stockholder relations? Do they train and
build the morale of your employees? Do they
expand business; if so, in what directions and
with what implications for the future? You take
into consideration whether the film material is
treated realistically and yet with imagination,
whether it will make a favorable impact on audi-
ences to whom it will be shown.
I emphasize these points, well knovm as they
are to all of you, for several reasons. American
enterprise is increasingly directed to the overseas
market. We are in a period of adjustment and
great opportunity with respect to our trading
relations with Europe and the developing areas
of Asia. Africa, and Latin America. When we
' Remarks made before a film workshop for the Asso-
ciation of National Advertisers at New York, N.T., on
Jan. 17 (press release 35 dated Jan. 16) .
ask, "Do films expand our business?" we increas-
ingly think of their impact abroad. Is their mes-
sage always intelligible? Are we sufficiently
aware of the opportunities which visual presenta-
tion of our enterprise and the workings of our
society present ? I think not.
Whether we are or not, your films, individually
and in the aggregate, export an image of America.
The higher their quality, the better the job tliey
will do for you and for our country. Films pro-
duced by many such companies as Standard Oil,
International Harvester, E. E. Squibb, Sears
Eoebuck, Caterpillar Tractor, the Aluminum
Company of America, and many others have
played an excellent dual role — effective salesman-
ship of product and, not so incidentally, of
coimtry.
Films, whether for TV or movie theater, for
schools or civic organizations, whether news or
documentary, can make more vivid and under-
standable AID programs, developments in Laos,
Berlin, the Congo, and South Viet-Nam. They
can illustrate the work of the Peace Corps, Alli-
ance for Progress projects in Latin America, or
strides being made in Europe thanks in part to
the Common Market.
We must, if we can, establish the relevance to
others of our experiment in freedom. To much
of the world we appear too comfortable and con-
servative. Many erroneously think we are op-
posed to forces of change, though our society
thrives on change. This is clearly evident in many
of your films. But we need to do more not only
to show what we are doing but how others can
more rapidly develop their own farms, industries,
schools, and other institutions. By doing so, de-
veloping and uncommitted nations may prefer to
move forward in a free society, rather than in one
imposed by the coercion of the Communists. I
might say that the many pictures of the wall seal-
ing off the people of East Berlin have character-
ized for millions the harsh meaning of Communist
coercion.
How the Film Industry Supports U.S. Objectives
"Wliile I suggest we can and should do more, rec-
ognition should of course be given to what is now
being done by the film industry in support, of our
broad American objectives.
For example, approximately 40 percent of the
films which stock the overseas libraries of USIS
February 5, J 962
213
[United States Information Service] are pro-
duced by U.S. companies. Your cooperation in
granting rights to translate the pictures into the
required languages and to narrate, reproduce, and
distribute them abroad has made it possible for
USIA to show many outstanding pictures around
the world. A few examples are "Books for All"
on U.S. libraries, "The Lady from Philadelphia"
on Marian Anderson's tour of the Near and Far
East, "Dark Interlude" on rehabilitation of the
blind, and "The Face of Lincoln."
One can appreciate the potential for expanding
this program when one considers the surge in dis-
tribution figures for business-sponsored films in
the ITnited States. For example, just one film
distribution network delivered 16 mm. prints for
its clients to over a million and a half group au-
diences last year. This means they reached nearly
68 million people as films. The same network re-
ports that television's growing interest in educa-
tional materials led to 45,000 showings of this type
film which, with an estimated audience of 40,000
viewers per showing, brings us to a total of 2 bil-
lion people for factual films.
When we consider the hunger for information
on science and technical subjects abroad, and the
many ways of distributing it — in USIA libraries,
homes, clubs, villages, and settlements, by mobile
trucks and river boats — we have some idea of the
opportunities at hand.
Figures from the Department of Commerce
support this trend, particularly with regard to the
export of 16 mm. films which has increased 100
percent in 10 years.
Aside from educational and informational films
we have learned from international medical film
exhibitions that there is much work yet to be done
by governments to simplify procedures by which
such films can be exchanged.
In the agricultural field I think American com-
panies are now more aware than ever of the value
of documentaries. One might cite as an example
of farsightedness the film entitled "Seeds of Prog-
ress" sponsored by the affiliated Ford Motor Com-
panies of Latin America. It is conceived as part
of a broad inter-American communication pro-
gram, with emphasis on the work of rural youth
clubs. It is a story with Spanish, Portuguese,
and English sound tracks which will reach mil-
lions of young people interested in exchanging
ideas and techniques on improved farming and
agricultural methods.
214
Of course, although we lay emphasis on motion
pictures as a medium for increased understanding,
other sorts of audiovisual materials are useful,
such as filmstrips, kinescopes, recordings, slides,
models, maps, and charts. One gets some idea of
what is available from the fact that the USIA
catalog on "U.S. Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Motion Pictures and Filmstrips Suitable
and Available for Use Abroad" has some 14,000
listings.
I think it helps us appreciate the dramatic possi-
bilities of films if we consider that each USIA
documentary, whether originally produced for a
U.S. firm or for the Government, after it has been
distributed in 40 languages and dialects has a
potential audience of 500 million people each year.
In this connection I would like to comment on the
very useful function which Business Screen maga-
zine performs in highlighting these programs and
establishing the relation which they have to the
basic aims of our foreign policy.
If we consider that in many parts of the devel-
oping world newspapers and radio are still limited,
we can appreciate the value of films and other
audiovisual materials in helping to provide basic
educational and technical skills. If we can reach
this audience with films of teclmical competence,
imagination, entertainment, and know-how, we
will be laying a base for expanding trade with
vast numbers of the world's people.
Export Expansion Program
In his state of the Union message last week
President Kennedy said, "Above all, if we are to
pay for our commitments abroad, we must expand
our exports. Our businessmen must be export-
conscious and export-competitive." ^ The Presi-
dent further stated that he will shortly send to
Congress a new 5-year trade expansion act to make
it possible for our major industries to compete with
their counterparts in Western Europe for access
to European consumers. "If we move decisively,"
he said, "our factories and farms can increase their
sales to their richest, fastest growing market."
I would urge everyone here to examine every
opportunity for extending the use of business and
industry motion pictures abroad. Certainly
among the 5,000 motion pictures annually pro-
duced by American business and industry there is
' Bulletin of Jan. 29, 1062, p. 159.
Department of State Bulletin
a significant resource for assisting in carrying out
the proposed new instrument of trade policy.
I should mention that the Department of Com-
merce is already exploring with a number of in-
dustrial firms the possibility of their making
available for use by commercial attaches abroad
business and industry films describing competitive
products. They propo.se to do this through the
relatively inexpensive new medium of 8 mm. sound
films with magnetic stripping for foreign
languages.
International Film Festivals
Before going on to more general observations,
I would like to say that it is not often that the
competition between nations for the minds of men
can be measured. But very much as the Olympic
games provide a means of comparing the athletic
achievements of individuals in most of the coun-
tries of the world, so do tlie international film
competitions provide confrontation between na-
tions not only in artistic accomplishments in mo-
tion pictures but also a comparison of ideologies
and social concepts which relate to their produc-
tion. I want especially to commend the business
and industry community for their part in develop-
ing a method for selecting from their very impres-
sive productions outstanding films to represent the
United States in the international film competi-
tions in Berlin, Cannes, Venice, and Edinburgh,
and many other festivals around the world. I
understand that many of you in this audience have
contributed many hours to screening and selecting
the finest examples of motion picture products to
represent the United States in these international
events. Since the United States Government is
invited by foreign governments to participate offi-
cially in these events, this cooperation is very much
appreciated by the Department of State.
The initiative and imagination which go into
the production of these motion pictures brought
into being CINE, the Committee on International
Nontheatrical Events. And I understand that
both the present and the past chairman of this or-
ganization have come from this audience. In 4
short years this organization has effectively repre-
sented the United States in the major international
exhibitions and by its participation has increased
and augmented the prestige of the United States
in these events. Its regional screening committees
fimction very much like selection boards in the
Foreign Service. Wo want to be represented
abroad by only the best ambassadoi-s.
The programs I have summarized are among
the programs which America adapts to a chang-
ing world. We change as we grow.
Communication, essentially, is an agent which
facilitates change. It can channel it in the right
direction by throwing light on societies that grow
by choice, by observing those hobbled by coercion.
The historian Toynbee said : "Our age will be
remembered . . . because it is the first generation
since the dawn of history in which mankind dared
to believe it practical to make the benefits of civi-
lization available to the whole human race." If
this challenge can be met in practical terms and
if, in the process, communication can be extended
between men, we will find that the American ex-
periment has a mighty relevance for the world.
Our communication programs — whatever pi'od-
ucts, processes, or policies are involved — must help
inform our citizens and the world of the direction
in which our society is moving. We seek to in-
form, to have access to other peoples, to learn
from them, to help them. We would help them,
I believe, if there were no Sino-Soviet threat —
help them because by doing so we help ourselves.
Under Secretary Ball Visits Panama
The Department of State announced on Janu-
ary 18 (press release 40) that Under Secretary
Ball and a party of State Department officers
would leave on January 18 for a 2-day visit to the
Republic of Panama.
The Under Secretary's trip has a twofold pur-
pose. The first is to discuss with Panamanian and
U.S. officials the Alliance for Progress and other
matters of mutual interest. The second is to at-
tend the quarterly meeting of the Board of Direc-
tors of the Panama Canal Company at Balboa
Heights. The Under Secretary represents the
Department of State on that Board.
"I look forward," the Under Secretai-y said, "to
this visit and the opportunity it affords for frank
and friendly discussions with the Government of
Panama. Panama is an important country within
Latin America and one where the Alliance for
Progress is already well imder way. I hope that,
as a result of my visit, both the Panamanians and
I will have a better understanding of the mutual
problems that confront us."
February 5, 1962
215
THE CONGRESS
United States Policy in the Congo
Statement by Secretary Rusk '
I am very pleased to have the opportunity to
appear with my colleagues before this subcom-
mittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Commit-
tee in order to discuss United States policy with
regard to the Congo and our support of United
Nations operations there.
United States policy with regard to the Congo
is consistent with our general foreign policy and
our attitude toward Africa as a whole. Briefly
stated, that attitude is (a) to help the African
peoples form societies and governments that will
be truly independent and consonant with their own
consciences and cultures ; (b) to maintain and pro-
mote the strong ties of culture, friendship, and
economic life that already exist between the new
nations of Africa and the nations of Europe and
America; and (c) to cooperate in every way ac-
ceptable to both the Afi'icans and ourselves as
these new countries strive to produce the political
stability, economic progress, and level of education
that are essential to a free society.
In pursuit of these broad objectives, the
United States has strongly supported efforts to
preserve the territorial integrity of the Congo.
Like almost every country in the world, the
United States has firmly opposed efforts by Kasai,
Katanga, Orientale, or any other province to
secede. This is our policy because there is no
legal, moral, or practical basis for the secession of
any of these provinces ; nor is there reasonable evi-
dence that secession is the will of the majority of
the population of any province involved.
Just how did the United Nations become in-
volved in the Congo? Memories tend to fade,
even after only 18 months.
You will recall that tribal fighting and mutiny
in the Congolese Army occurred in the first week
of July 1960, immediately after the Congo became
independent. During the night of July 8 many
Europeans fled from Leopoldville, and Belgium
annomiced the return of Belgian troops to protect
life and property.
The new Congolese Government reacted vio-
lently to the return of Belgian forces. On July
12 that Government requested urgent dispatch of
United Nations forces to the Congo to protect the
national territory of the comitry and avoid a
threat to international peace.^
On the same day on which the Congo Govern-
ment requested United Nations aid, it also re-
quested direct United States military aid. Three
days later the Congolese President [Joseph Kasa-
viibu] and Prime Minister [Patrice Lumumba]
cabled Chairman Khrushchev, "We have to ask
the Soviet Union's intervention, should the west-
ern camp not stop its aggression."
The urgent problem was to restore public order
and to permit the withdrawal of the Belgian
troops without leading to internal collapse in the
Congo.
President Eisenhower rejected from the start
any direct intervention by the major powers. In
reply to the Congo Government's request for
United States forces, the United States stated
that any assistance to the Government of the
Congo should be through the United Nations and
not by any unilateral action by any one countrj',
the United States included.
Wliy was this decision taken ? The alternative
to United Nations intervention would have been
violence and chaos and a readymade opportimity
for Soviet exploitation, which the United States
would have been compelled to counter. There was
no alternative to limited intervention on the part
of the United Nations if a direct confrontation
of the great powers in the heart of Africa was to
bo avoided. Thus the United States strongly sup-
' Made before the Subcommittee on Africnn Affairs of
the Senate ForeiRu Relations Committee on Jan. IS. For
an article by Under Secretary Ball on "The Kloments in
Our Congo Policy," see BuLI,ETI^f of Jan. 8, 19C2, p. 43.
° For statements made by U.S. Representative Henry
Cabot Lodjre in the Security Council on July 13 and 20,
10(10, and texts of resolutions adoi>lcd by the Council, see
ihiiL, Aug. 1, 1900, p. 159, and Aug. 8, lOCO. p. 21':?.
216
Department of State Bulletin
ported United Nations action in the Congo. Look-
ing back, gentlemen, it seems obvious now that
this was the right choice.
Soviet Efforts To Gain Footliold
It seemed clear by August 1960 that, if the
Congo was to remain free and independent, United
States support of the United Nations would have
to be sufficient to permit United Nations opera-
tion in the face of a Soviet onslaught. Despite
United Nations resolutions to the contrary, the
Soviet Union was pouring personnel, materials,
and political agents into the Congo to establish
what the Communists hoped would be a foothold
in the heart of Africa. Secretary-General Dag
Hammarskjold challenged the Russians because
of evidence which accumulated in August and
September that each Soviet Uyushin aircraft was
bringing in political agents. Wlien the Soviets
refused to halt these activities, the United Nations
Command closed major airfields in the Congo to
all but United Nations traffic. Shortly thereafter
President Kasavubu ordered the Soviet and
Czechoslovak Embassies to close, and several
hundred Russians and Czechoslovaks were forced
to leave the Congo.
It was this blocking by the United Nations of
the Soviet takeover scheme that provoked the So-
viet Union to declare political war on Secretary-
General Hammarskjold and to begin the campaign
for a troika directorate that would handcuff the
world organization. The Communist bloc has re-
fused to finance any part of the U.N.'s operations
to restore political stability and bring economic
progress to the Congo.
The United States supported the first govern-
ment of the Congo— a government that was a
compromise under which Joseph Kasavubu, a
moderate trained in a Catholic seminary, became
President and Patrice Lumumba became Premier.
Lumumba's ouster from office by President
Kasavubu in September 1960 was followed by a
period of political turmoil. Not xmtil July 1961
did the parliamentarians again meet to give ap-
proval to a government. Despite appeals by U.N.
officials and American and European diplomats,
Katangan Provincial President Moise Tshombe,
after hesitations, decided not to let his party's
parliamentarians participate in the formation of
a new government. Thus he chose to miss an
opportimity to play an important role on the na-
tional stage. Even without the hoped-for support
of Katanga, moderate forces prevailed in the new
government.
Kasavubu, of course, remained Head of State
and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces.
The new Prime Minister and Defense Minister
was Cyrille Adoula, an able and dynamic leader
of a trade union organization that is affiliated with
the free trade union movement, the ICFTU.
[Antoine] Gizenga was given the post of First
Vice Premier in the new government.
Most of the 42-man Cabinet were true Congolese
nationalists who were moderate in their views.
The United States view was that the Adoula gov-
erimient was not only the legal product of parlia-
mentary process but that it represented the only
hope of achieving a stable, secure Congo.
It was obvious, however, that there were two
main dangers to the Adoula government : the po-
litical insurrection of Gizenga, who in effect with-
drew from the government and attempted to
create a new redoubt in Stanleyville, and the con-
tinued armed secession of the Katanga. The first
was a political problem that had to be dealt with
by the Congolese themselves. This effort came to
fruition on January 1.5, when the Congolese Par-
liament voted overwhelmingly to censure Gizenga,
thus removing him from office. The U.N. re-
sponded rapidly and effectively to Prime Minister
Adoula's appeal for aid in restoring law and order
in Stanleyville in the face of armed insurrection.
Problems of Katanga Secession
The problem of the Katanga secession was more
difficult to deal with because it involved the active
participation of foreign mercenaries who had
taken up arms against both the U.N. and the
Congo Government. So strong were the senti-
ments of nationalism of the Congolese people re-
garding the secession of southern Katanga that
it became clear that no government would survive
in the Congo unless it demonstrated progress in
reintegrating the Katanga. It was obvious that
failure to bring the Katanga back into the Congo
would mean civil war and the ensuing chaos on
which the Communists have capitalized in other
parts of the world.
It was also clear that the moderate strength of
Mr. Tshombe and his party leaders and the
economic wealth of their area were needed in
the central government. U.N. officials and U.S.
February 5, 7962
217
and European diplomats therefore made repeated
efforts to achieve the reintegration of the Katanga
througli conciliation and peaceful means. One of
the difficulties was that foreign elements, not re-
sponsive to their own governments, sought to con-
vince Mr. Tshombe that through military force
he could maintain his secession.
The U.N. sought to remove the mercenaries, in
accordance with the Februai-y 21, 1961, resolution,''
so as to clear the air for a peaceful settlement.
The mercenaries refused to leave, cut off the
U.N.'s lines of communication, and resorted to
violence. The U.N. fought to protect itself and
to establish conditions under which it could pursue
its objectives with reasonable security.
Wliile it deplored the loss of life and the iso-
lated acts of barbarism that grew out of warfare,
the U.S. supported the U.N. in its limited military
action because the alternative was to acquiesce in
Katanga's secession and permit tlie civil strife that
inevitably would result in a big-power clash. ■*
Wlien Tshombe indicated a desire to negotiate,
President Kennedy set in motion efforts wliicli re-
sulted in Mr. Tshombe's meeting with Prime Min-
ister Adoula at Kitona.^ We are pleased by the
statesmanship shown by Prime Minister Adoula
and Mr. Tshombe in reaching an agreement at
this meeting. Mr. Tshombe has indicated that he
will abide by the agreement he signed at Kitona.
If so, the Congo's political crisis may be moving
toward an end and both the Congolese and the
U.N. can turn their attention from military effort
to the peaceful task of restoring the economy of
one of the wealthiest countries in Africa.
The U.N. role in militai-y matters can be brought
to an end with a political settlement on constitu-
tional and other questions among the Congolese
themselves and through U.N. assistance with the
training and organizing of the Congo's own se-
curity forces. Technical assistance in administra-
tive, economic, and social fields will undoubtedly
be required for a considerable time. It is simple
but correct to say that the U.N.'s purpose is to
help achieve as rapidly as possible the conditions
which will permit the U.N. to withdraw, leaving
full responsibility to the Congolese themselves.
We support them in that objective.
Department Reviews Negotiations
on Trade in Cotton Textiles
Statement hy Edio'm M . Martin
Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs '
The Department of State was directed by Pres-
ident Kennedy in tlie sixth point of his seven-point
program of May 2, 1961,^ to call a conference of
the principal textile exporting and importing
countries. The purpose of the conference was to
"seek an international understanding wliich will
provide a basis for trade that will avoid undue
disruption of established industries."
Geneva Conference, July 1961
Pursuant to this directive, a conference was
held at Geneva from July 17-21, 1961, under the
auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade. The participants were representatives
from the governments of 16 major importing and
exporting countries, with several others present as
observers. The United States delegation was
chaired by Under Secretary of State George Ball.
Other members of the delegation included Under
Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz and Assistant
Secretary of Commerce Hickman Price, Jr. The
conference resulted in agreement on a short-term
arrangement regarding international trade in cot-
ton textiles which became effective October 1, 1961,
for a period of 1 year.' Under this arrangement,
if cotton textiles from an exporting country cause
or threaten to cause disruption in the market of
an importing country, the latter may request the
exporting country to restrain its exports for any
of the 64 categories specified in the arrangement
at a level not lower than the level of imports dur-
ing the 12 months ending June 30, 1961. The ex-
porting country, under the short-term arrange-
ment, has 30 days in which to accept the request
" For text, see iWd., Mar. 13, 1961, p. 368.
' For statements made b.v U.S. Representative Adlni E.
Stevenson in the Security Council on Nov. IG, 21, and 24,
1901, together with text of a resolution adopted by the
Council on Nov. 24, see ibid., Dec. 25. 1961, p. lOCl.
' For text of Department statements, see ihid., Jan. 1,
1962, p. 10; Jan. 8, 1962, p. 49; and Jan. 15, 1962, p. 95.
' Made before the Special Subcommittee To Study the
Textile Industry of the Senate Oimmerce Ckimmittee on
Jan. 10 (press release 38).
' For text, see Bulletin of May 29, 1961, p. 825.
' For background and test of agreement, see ihid.,
Aug. 21. 1901, p. 336.
218
Department of State Bulletin
for export restraint. If by the end of the 30-day
period the exporting country does not agree to
restrain its exports, the requesting country may
decline to accept imports at a level iiigher than
the specified level. In critical circumstances ac-
tion may be taken provisionally while the request
is under discussion.
The arrangement also provides that countries
maintaining quantitative restrictions on cotton
textile imports shall significantly increase access
to their markets for countries wliose exports they
are restricting. The July conference also estab-
lished a Cotton Textile Committee which was di-
rected to prepare recommendations for a longer
term arrangement on cotton textiles by April 30,
1962.
Subsequent to the July conference, 19 govern-
ments adhered to the short-term arrangement.
One of these governments, the United Kingdom,
also acceded on behalf of Ilong Kong. The coun-
tries acceding to the short-term Geneva arrange-
ment account for over 90 percent of the free
world's trade in cotton textiles.
The implementation of the United States par-
ticipation in the short-term arrangement has been
delegated by the President to the Interagency Tex-
tile Administrative Committee.* It consists of
five agencies — the Departments of Agriculture,
Commerce, Labor, State, and Treasury. Assistant
Secretary of Commerce Price chairs the Com-
mittee. Two meetings of the Committee have
been held thus far; the third meeting is scheduled
for January 22. Advising the Committee is the
Management -Labor Textile Advisory Committee,
also established by the President.
Bilateral Arrangement With Japan
The short-term arrangement permits the nego-
tiation of mutually acceptable bilateral arrange-
ments on terms other than those of the short-term
arrangement. Japan, which has been controlling
its cotton textile exports to the United States
since 1957, requested the United States to enter
into a bilateral arrangement with it to replace the
voluntary Japanese program which expired at the
end of 1961. Accordingly, in August and Sep-
tember 1961, negotiations were held in Tokyo
which resulted in a United States-Japanese bi-
lateral arrangement on cotton textiles lor calen-
dar year 1962.^ The 1962 arrangement continues
the overall ceilings in Japanese cotton textile ex-
ports to the United States as in the previous Japa-
nese program. In recognition of the fact that
Japan had been controlling its exports since 1957
while other cotton textile exporting countries
were increasing their exports to the United States,
the 1962 arrangement provides for an increase of
7 to 8 percent in the Japanese cotton textile export
quotas above the 1961 quota level.
Negotiation of Long-Term Arrangement
Discussions on a long-term arrangement began
in Geneva at a 1-week meeting of the Cotton Tex-
tile Committee in October.^ At this meeting a
technical subcommittee was established to make
recommendations on the form and substance of a
long-term arrangement for presentation to the
full Committee. Problems relating to the long-
term arrangement were discussed, and guidelines
were established for the work of the teclinical
subcommittee. Consensus was reached that a long-
term arrangement would need to provide growing
opportunities for cotton textile exports of the less
developed countries, provided that the develop-
ment of this trade was reasonable and orderly, so
as to avoid disruption in individual markets.
The technical subcommittee held two meetings,
one in December and one concluded just last Sat-
urday, January 13. The result of these meetings
was the draft of a long-term arrangement for
presentation to the Cotton Textile Committee at
its next meeting, scheduled for January 29. On
several key problems the draft contains alterna-
tive solutions which will be the subject of negotia-
tion. Essentially, however, the draft arrangement
represents a continuation of the principal provi-
sions of the short-term arrangement — namely, the
right of importing countries not maintaining im-
port restrictions, if imports are causing market
disruption, to request export restraint and to im-
pose import restrictions if the request is not ac-
cepted, and the relaxation of import restrictions on
the part of countries still maintaining such
restrictions.
' For text of the President's memorandum of Oct. 18
establishing machinery to implement the agreement, see
iiid., Nov. 6, 1961, p. 773.
" The agreement was signed on Oct. 16, 1961 ; for text of
the draft agreement, see Hid., Oct. 2, 19C1, p. 572.
'For text of a communique, see ibid., Nov. 27, 1961,
p. 906.
February 5, 1962
219
Role of Textile Industry and Labor Unions
The U.S. delegations to the various interna-
tional conferences referred to above kept repre-
sentatives of our textile industry and labor unions
fully informed concerning the international dis-
cussions and negotiations. At the same time the
U.S. delegations profited from the close relation-
ship which existed with the industry and labor
representatives and from their advice and assist-
ance.
Conclusion
The international negotiations for a cotton tex-
tile arrangement have been undertaken in recogni-
tion of the need for cooperative and constructive
action with regard to international trade in cotton
textiles. The effectiveness of a long-term arrange-
ment in providing a solution to the cotton textile
import problem depends to a considerable extent
on the details of the arrangement still to be finally
negotiated. It is the United States' intention to
have an arrangement which will afford maximimi
safeguards to our textile industry against disrup-
tion of the United States market. "Wliile it is
recognized that the less developed exporting
countries must have the opportunity to increase
their textile exports, a long-term arrangement
must accomplish this without undue and disrup-
tive inroads into our markets.
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings'
Scheduled February Through April 1962
WMO Commission for Synoptic Meteorology: Working Group on
Networks.
U.N. ECE Ad Hoc Working Party on Economic Criteria for In-
vestment Choice.
U.N. ECA Standing Committee on Social Welfare and Community
Development.
U.N. ECE Ad Hoc Working Party on Thermal Power Stations . .
North Pacific Fur Seal Commission: 5th Meeting
U.N. ECE Team of Experts on Citrus Fruit
U.N. ECAFE Inland Transport and Communications Committee:
10th Session.
GATT Working Party on Cereals
ITU CCIR Study Group IX
U.N. ECE Working Party on Perishable Foodstuffs
OECD Maritime Transport Committee: 2d Session
U.N. Economic Commission for Africa: Presession on Work Program
for Plenary Session.
U.N. ECLA Committee of the Whole: 8th Session
FAO International Rice Commission: 6th Session of the Consult-
ative Subcommittee on the Economic Aspects of Rice.
GATT Committee III on Expansion of International Trade . . .
U.N. Economic Commission for Africa: 4th Session
U.N. ECE Rapporteurs on Comparison Between Systems of
National Accounts in Use in Europe.
IMCO Council: 6th Session
OECD Economic Policy Committee
OECD Manpower Committee: Ist Meeting
GATT Council of Representatives
Geneva Feb. 5-
Geneva Feb. 5-
Addis Ababa Feb. 5-
Geneva Feb. 6-
Ottawa Feb. 7-
Geneva Feb. 8-
Bangkok Feb. 12-
Geneva Feb. 12-
Paris Feb. 12-
Geneva Feb. 12-
Paris Feb. 14-
Addis Ababa Feb. 14-
Santiago Feb. 14-
Rangoon Feb. 15-
Geneva Feb. 10-
Addis Ababa Feb. 19-
Geneva Feb. 19-
London Feb. 20-
Paris Feb. 21-
Paris Feb. 22-
Geneva Feb. 22-
' Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Jan. 15, 1962. Asterisks indicate tentative dates. Follo\^nng
is a list of abbreviations; ANZUS, Australia-New Zealand-United States; CCIR, Comit6 consultatif international des
radio communications; CENTO, Central Treaty Organization; ECA, Economic Commission for Africa; ECAFE, Eco-
nomic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ftCE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECLA, Economic Commission for
Latin America- ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; G.\TT, General
Agreement on TarifTs and Trade; I.\E.'\, International Atomic Energy Agency; lA-ECOSOC, Inter- .\merican Economic
and Social Council; IBE, International Bureau of Education- ICAO, International Civil Aviation Orgai\ization; ICEM,
Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration; IDB, Inter- American Development Bank; ILO, International
Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU, International Telecommuni-
cation Union; OAS, Organization of American States; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development;
SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization; WHO, World Health Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.
220
Deparfmenf of Stale Bulletin
ILO International Institute for Labor Studies: 2d Session of the
Board.
CENTO Economic Committee
ILO Governing Body: 151st Session (and its committees) ....
IAEA Board of Governors
IBE Executive Committee
lA-ECOSOC: 1st Meeting of National Directors of Immigration,
Customs, and Tourism of Central America, Mexico, and the
United States.
ICAO European- Mediterranean Aeronautical Fixed Telecommu-
nications Network Panel.
Caribbean Organization: Ministerial Meeting on Trade and Move-
ment of Persons.
WMO Working Group on the Guide to Agricultural Meteorological
Practices.
OAS/UNESCO/ECLA Conference on Education and Economic and
Social Development in Latin America.
U.N. ECOSOC Committee for Industrial Development: 2d Ses-
sion.
U.N. ECE Working Party on River Law
U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East: 18th Ses-
sion.
ICAO Air Traffic Control Automation Panel
GATT Expert Group on Consular Formalities
U.N. ECE Working Party on Construction of Vehicles
ITU CCIR Study Group IV (Space Systems) and Study Group
VIII (International Monitoring).
WMO Regional Association I (Africa): 3d Session
U.N. Disarmament Committee: 1st Meeting
Caribbean Organization Council
WMO Working Group on the Synoptic Use of Meteorological Data
from Artificial Satellites.
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights: 18th Session. . .
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Status of Women: 16th Session .
U.N. ECE Coal Committee (and working parties)
U.N. ECE Steel Committee: 27th Session
UNESCO Meeting of Advisory Committee on Educational Projects
in Latin America.
ICAO Legal Subcommittee
WMO Commission for Synoptic Meteorology: 3d Session ....
IMCO International Conference on the Prevention of Pollution of
the Sea by Oil.
U.N. ECE Rapporteurs on Cost and Planning of New Residential
Areas.
UNESCO Conference of Ministers of Education of Africa . . . .
ICEM Executive Committee: 19th Session
CENTO Liaison Committee
Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences: 7th Meeting of
Technical Advisory Council.
Inter-American Indian Institute: Governing Board
ICEM Council: 16th Session
UNESCO Conference on Education in Asia
ILO African Advisory Committee: 2d Session
Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission: 4th Meeting . . .
U.N. Economic and Social Council: 33d Session
IDB Board of Governors: 3d Meeting
GATT Working Party on Tariff Reduction
ILO Committee on Statistics of Hours of Work
ILO/WHO Committee on Occupational Health: 4th Session . . .
IAEA Symposium on Reactor Hazards Evaluation Techniques . .
FAO Poplar Commission: 17th Session of E.xecutive Committee . .
CENTO Civil Defense Experts
ANZUS Council: 8th Meeting
U.N. ECAFE Regional Seminar on Development of Ground Water
Resources
U.N. Economic Commission for Europe: 17th Session
ITU CCIR Study Group VII
CENTO Military Committee
SEATO Council of Ministers: 8th Meeting
CENTO Ministerial Council: 10th Meeting
GATT Committee III on Expansion of International Trade . . .
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Commodity Trade: Special Work-
ing Party.
U.N. ECOSOC Social Commission: 14th Session
OECD Agricultural Committee
OECD Ministerial Meeting
OECD Committee for Scientific and Technical Personnel ....
Geneva Feb. 24-
Washington Feb. 26-
Geneva Feb. 26-
Vienna Feb. 27-
Geneva Feb. 27-
San Salvador Mar. 1-
Paris Mar. 5-
Georgetown, British Guiana. . Mar. 5-
Geneva Mar. 5-
Santiago Mar. 5-
New York Mar. 5-
Geneva Mar. 5-
Tokyo Mar. 6-
Montreal Mar. 12-
Geneva Mar. 12-
Geneva Mar. 12-
Washington Mar. 12-
Addis Ababa Mar. 14-
Geneva Mar. 14-
Georgetown, British Guiana. . Mar. 13-
Washington Mar. 15-*
New York Mar. 19-
New York Mar. 19-
Geneva Mar. 19-
Geneva Mar. 19-
Santiago Mar. 20-
Montreal Mar. 26-
Washington Mar. 26-
London Mar. 26-
Geneva Mar. 26-
Paris Mar. 26-
Geneva Mar. 27-
Lahore March
Turrialba, Costa Rica March
Mexico, D.F March
Geneva Apr. 2-
Tokyo Apr. 2-
Tananarive Apr. 3-
Mexico, D.F Apr. 3-
New York Apr. 3-
Buenos Aires Apr. 5-
Geneva .4pr. 5-
Geneva Apr. 9-
Geneva Apr. 9-
Vienna Apr. 16-
Ankara Apr. 16-
Lahore Apr. 21-
Washington Apr. 24-*
Bangkok Apr. 24-
Geneva Apr. 24-
Geneva Apr. 25-
London Apr. 26-*
Paris Apr. 26-*
London Apr. 30-*
Geneva Apr. 30-
Rome Apr. 30-
New York Apr. 30-
Paris April
Paris April
Paris April or May
February 5, 1962
221
Mr. Stevenson Reports to President
on 16th General Assembly
Following is the text of a letter from Ambassa-
dor Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Representative to
the United Nations, to President Kennedy.
Press release 914 dated December 30
December 29, 1961
Dear ]VIr. President : I submit herewith a brief
report of the results of the first part of the Six-
teenth Session of the United Nations General
Assembly.
The three months since the Assembly convened
on September 19, 1961, have been critical in the
light of the United Nations. The members were
faced with several issues of great difficulty, failure
on any one of which could have inflicted a grave
injury on the United Nations and on the hopes for
peace and justice. I mention especially the
following :
1. The succession of Dag Hammarskjold.
2. The threat of financial disaster from the
Congo operation.
3. Continued danger of secession and chaos in
the Congo.
4. The pressure to replace Nationalist China
with Communist China.
On each of these issues, whatever the remaining
difficulties, the United Nations has achieved better
results than we dared to predict in September.
In addition, I am glad to report progress on
several topics of major importance, several of
which you treated in your address to the General
Assembly on September 25.^ These include the
fields of disarmament and the effective prevention
of nuclear testing; your proposal for a United
Nations Decade of Development; and your pro-
posal on the peaceful uses of outer space.
1. After prolonged negotiations in which the
United States Mission was very active, the Gen-
eral Assembly elected U Thant of Runna to act
as Secretary- General until April 1963. The action
was unanimous — 103 to 0. Thereby the United
Nations overcame a modei-ate challenge — a chal-
lenge to the powers of the office of the Secretary-
General and indeed to the very existence of that
office ; a challenge to the continuance of the United
Nations itself as an effective agent of the com-
munity of nations and as a friend and protector
of small and weak nations.
2. The seat of the Republic of China in the
United Nations was safeguarded and reinforced,
and the claim of Communist China to this seat was
rejected, by a decisive vote of 48 to 37. This was
the first time this divisive question lias been
squarely met since it first arose more than a decade
ago. Moreover, the Assembly decided by a vote
of 61 to 34 that any proposal to make a cliange in
the representation of China would constitute an
"important question" requiring a two-thirds ma-
jority. Botli tliese votes were great successes from
the United States view.=
3. The financial crisis occasioned by the Congo
operation has been relieved, and may be on the
road toward solution. The General Assembly has
taken three important steps in this direction. It
has voted, first, to ask the International Court of
Justice for an advisory opinion as to whether the
assessments against member states to support the
Congo operation, as well as tlie United Nations
Emergency Force in the Middle East, create bind-
ing financial obligations on tlie member states. If
the Court says they do, this should stimulate pay-
ments by those now in arrears.
Second, the Assembly has further assessed the
costs of the Congo operation and of UNEF
through June 30, 1962.
Third, the Assembly authorized an unprece-
dented $200 million bond issue, to be amortized out
of the regular budget of the United Nations. It
is hoped that the member nations will now join in
purchasing these bonds so as to relieve the im-
mediate financial difficulties of the United Nations
and give us a breathing spell in which to devise
a longrun solution.^
4. The news from the Congo today is at last
hopeful, after many dark days and weeks. If the
agreement signed by Prime Minister [Cyrille]
Adoula and Mr. [Moise] Tshombe is ratified and
carried through, this will indeed be a happy con-
clusion of a grave crisis for the world and the
United Nations. The Central Government can
then turn its attention to consolidating the rest of
its vast country.
If secession, disunity and disaster in the Congo,
• Bui.u.:tin of Oct. 16, 19C1, p. 019.
'For backffround, see ibid., Jan. 15, 1962, p. 108.
" For a statoment by As.sistnnt Secretary Cleveland, see
ihid., p. 96.
222
Oepar/menf of Sfafe Bulletin
the heart of Africa, is prevented then the credit
must go to the United Nations and to the brave
men of many nations who have served it with
courage and, in many cases, with their lives.
5. As a result of bilateral negotiations between
the United States and the Soviet Union the As-
sembly laid the basis for new negotiations on dis-
armament — thus breaking the deadlock which be-
gan when the Soviet bloc walked out of tlie Geneva
disarmament talks in June 1960. Under United
Nations auspices the new forum will begin inten-
sive negotiations early next year, reporting on its
progress to the United Nations Disarmament
Commission. Among the documents the negotia-
tors will liave before them is the United States
"Program for General and Complete Disarmament
in a Peaceful World" wliich you presented to the
General Assembly on September 2b.* Thus the
stage is set for a new and vigorous attack on this
crucial problem.
6. The Assembly also gave great attention to
the problem of nuclear iveaporvi. It overwhelm-
ingly endorsed the view of the United States and
the United Kingdom that there is an urgent need
for a treaty to ban nuclear weapons tests under
effective international measures of verification
and control. This vote was helpful in obtaining
the resumption of the test ban negotiations in
Geneva on November 28.
But the United States was compelled to oppose
Assembly recommendations to prevent the testing
and use of nuclear weapons, without international
controls. In contrast the Soviet Union cynically
voted for these same resolutions — with no pro-
vision for controls — while at that very time the
Soviet Union was engaged in the most intensive
series of nuclear weapon tests in history, and was
threatening to use nuclear weapons in case of war.
In the long run this hypocrisy will be justly evalu-
ated by the Assembly and by the United Nations.
Moreover the Soviet Union defied the over-
whelming plea of the General Assembly that it
refrain from exploding a fifty-megaton bomb.
During the Assembly the United States never
ceased to expound the fundamental truth that
every measure of disarmament and arms control
must be accompanied by effective inspection and
safeguards. "We fully expect that in future ses-
sions of the General Assembly this truth will be
accepted by a growing majority of the members.
7. The Assembly unanimously designated the
current decade, as you suggested in your address,
as the United Nations Decade of Develojmient.
Under this heading the world organization can
now make a comprehensive, long-range attack on
the needs for economic and social development
which beset more tlian half of the human race.
The contributions which the United Nations can
make in this field, by its mobilization of talents
and resources without any political strings, are
of vital importance to this world objective.
8. Again, after long negotiations between the
United States and Soviet delegates, the Assembly
was able to endorse unanimously a new start for
the outer space committee with the long-sought
participation of the Soviet Union. Further, the
Assembly approved the vitally important prin-
ciple that outer space and the bodies in it are not
subject to national appropriation and are subject
to international law — including specifically the
United Nations Cliarter. It further endorsed
worldwide collaboration in the use of outer space
for the advancement of weather forecasting
and weather control, and for worldwide radio
and telecommunications by satellite — especially
promising technical fields from whicli all nations,
whether advanced or less developed, stand to
benefit.
9. On the question of the end of colonialism, the
Assembly adopted a wise and forthright position
reaffirming the goal which virtually all nations
now accept, and appointing a committee of seven-
teen nations to concern itself, on behalf of the
General Assembly, with this great peaceful tran-
sition. In connection with this action the United
States delegation made a major statement of our
country's support for the rapid and peaceful
evolution of colonial peoples toward self-determi-
nation.' The United States was happy to find
itself in company with the great majority of mem-
bers, with whom our anticolonial interests give us
a natural bond of sympathy.
The United States delegation took this occasion
to circulate a detailed memorandum on Soviet
colonial practices.' That memorandum was in-
formative to delegations from many parts of the
world, and will continue to attract attention in the
future.
10. The Assembly unanimously approved two
* For text, see iiid., Oct. 16, 1961, p. 650.
February 5, 7962
' Ibid., Jan. 8, 1962, p. 69.
' For text, see U.S. delegation press release 3862 dated
Nov. 28 or U.N. doc. A/4985.
223
resolutions for the economic and educational de-
velopment of Africa, and one to establish an inter-
nationally supported world food program of $100
million. All three resolutions arose from United
States initiatives. All will play an important
part in the economic and social development which
it is the United States policy to promote among
the emerging nations.
But I feel obliged to add a comment in a more
sober vein. The recent armed attack on Goa, and
the inability of the Security Council to deal with
such use of force quickly and decisively, remind
us of the dangerous tendency of nations to apply
one law in one part of the world or toward one
group of states, and a different law to others. If
the United Nations should habitually resort to
this double standard of judgment, serious con-
sequences for world peace, and for the United
Nations itself, are inevitable. Specifically if the
use of force against territories under the control
of other states is to be condoned for anticolonial
reasons, it can also be condoned for other reasons —
and we will have opened Pandora's box.
This is not a matter of colonialism or anti-
colonialism. The United States delegation in
this General Assembly has made clear on many
occasions the anticolonial views of the United
States. This was a question of the use of force in
violation of the charter in the opinion of a large
majority of the Security Council.
It is evident that neither the United Nations it-
self nor some of its members have used as well or
as often as they might the procedures for peaceful
settlement laid down in the charter, and the peace-
keeping machinery of the United Nations. Nor
have we paid enough attention to improving and
expanding that machinery.
But we are by no means disheartened. The
United Nations in this year has achieved notable
and life-giving successes. As for the failures, our
only permissible reaction to them is a new dedica-
tion to success. If our present methods are inade-
quate to the task, we must repair and improve
them. The task remains what it was : not the facile
choice between peace and justice, but peace with
justice — for only in justice can real peace be
attained.
In concluding, let me express my appreciation
to all the members of the delegation for their de-
voted and tireless efforts, which contributed so
greatly toward the success of our labore. We had
a strong delegation and we have worked closely
and harmoniously together.
I would also like to express the appreciation of
the entire delegation for the effective and vigorous
support and giiidance which we received in all
aspects of our work from you, from Secretary
Rusk, from Assistant Secretary Harlan Cleveland
and his able staff in the State Department.
Sincerely your^,
Adlai E. Stevenson
United States Delegations
to International Conferences
OAS Ministerial Meeting
Secretary Rusk amiounced on January 17 (press
release 39) the delegation ^ which woidd accom-
pany him to Punta del Este, Uruguay, for the
meeting of the foreign ministers of the American
states opening January 22.
The i^rincipal adviser to the Secretary will be
Roberta F. AVoodward, Assistant Secretary of State
for Inter-American Affairs. The delegation in-
cludes the following congressional advisei-s : Sena-
tor Wayne Morse, Senator Bourke B. Hicken-
looper. Representative Armistead I. Selden, Jr.,
and Representative Chester E. Merrow.
This meeting, the Eighth Meeting of Consulta-
tion of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of American
States, was convoked by the Council of the OAS
on December 4, 1961, following a request for such
action by the Government of Colombia.^
The resolution of the Council calls upon the
ministers to serve as the Organ of Consultation in
accordance with articles 6 and 11 of the Inter-
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, "in
order to consider the threats to the peace and to
the political independence of the American States
. . . and particularly to point out the various
types of threats to the peace or certain acts that,
in the event they occur, justify the application of
measures for the maintenance of the peace and
security pui'suant to chapter V of the charter of
the Organization of American States and the pro-
visions of the Inter- Ajnerican Treaty of Recipro-
' For the members of tlie U.S. delegation, see Depart-
ment of State press release 3S> dated .Tan. 17.
^ For background, see Bulixtin of Deo. 25, 1961, p. 1069,
and Jan. 22, 1962, p. 129, footnote 5.
224
Department of State Bulletin
cal Assistance, and to determine the measures that
it is advisable to take for tlie maintenance of the
peace and security of the continent."
This resohition constitutes the single item on the
agenda for the forthcoming meeting, which will
be attended by foreign ministers of all the Ameri-
can states.
TREATY INFORMATION
United States and Cyprus Conclude
Educational Exchange Agreement
Press release 41 dated January 18
The United States and Cyprus concluded on
January 18 an agreement for the establishment of
a program of educational exchange between the
two countries. The agreement was signed at
Nicosia by Foreign Minister Spyros Kyprianou
for Cyprus and by American Ambassador Fraser
Wilkins. The United States now has active ed-
ucational excliange agreements with 42 countries
throughout the world.
The agreement with Cyprus authorizes the two-
way exchange of students, trainees, teachers, re-
search scholars, and professors in all fields. It
also authorizes the establishment of a binational
commission to plan and administer the program
in Cyprus. The equivalent of $300,000 in foreign
currency is made available for the initial 3 years
of the program.
The agreement was concluded under the recently
enacted Fulbright-Hays Act (P.L. 256-87). The
new act broadens the scope of previous legislation
and provides more liberal terms for the participat-
ing country.
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Cultural Property
Convention for protection of cultural property in event of
armed conflict, and regulations of execution ;
Protocol for protection of cultural property in event of
armed conflict.
Done at The Hague May 14, 1054. Entered into force
August 7, 1956.'
Accessions deposited: Cameroon, October 12, 1961;
Madagascar, November 3, 1961.
Economic Cooperation
Convention on the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development and supplementary protocols
Nos. 1 and 2. Signed at Paris December 14, 1960.
Entered into force September 30, 19C1.
Ratification deposited: Luxembourg, December 7, 1961.
Law of the Sea
Convention on the territorial sea and contiguous zone.
Done at Geneva April 29, 19.58.'
Ratifications deposited: Hungary, December 6, 1961;'
Rumania, December 12, 1961.°
Convention on the high seas. Done at Geneva April 29,
1958."
Ratifications deposited: Hungary, December 6, 1961;*
Rumania, December 12, 1961.*
Convention on the continental shelf. Done at Geneva
April 29, 1958.'
Accession deposited: Rumania, December 12, 1961.
Postal Services
Universal postal convention with final protocol, annex,
regulations of execution, and provisions regarding air-
mail with final protocol. Done at Ottawa October 3,
1957. Entered into force April 1, 1959. TIAS 4202.
Ratifications deposited: El Salvador, November 1, 1961 ;
Indonesia, November 30, 1961.
BILATERAL
Netherlands
Agreement relating to a weapons production program.
Effected by exchange of notes at The Hague March 24,
1960. TIAS 4692.
Entered into force definitively: January 2, 1962.
Sierra Leone
Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace
Corps program In Sierra Leone. Effected by exchange
of notes at Freetown December 29, 1961. Entered into
force December 29, 1961.
DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE
Designations
James P. Grant as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near
Eastern and South Asian Affairs, effective January 15.
(For biographic details, see Department of State press
release 30 dated January 15.)
Katie Louchheim as Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Public Affairs, effective January 21. (For biographic
details, see Department of State press release 46 dated
January 20.)
' Not in force for the United States.
' Not in force.
' With reservations made at the time of signing.
* With reservations and declaration made at the time
of signing.
February 5, 1962
225
PUBLICATIONS
Recent Releases
fc
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov-
ernment I'rintiny Office, Wii.tltinulon 4o, U.C. Address
requests direct to the Superintend ent of Documents, ex-
cept in the case of free publications, which map be ob-
tained from the Department of State.
Joint United States-Japan Committee on Trade and Eco-
nomic Affairs. TIAS 4776. 3 pp. 50.
Agreement witb Japau. Excbauge of uotes — Signed at
\Va.sUiugtuu June 22, 1961. KutereU into force Juue 22,
1961.
Radio Broadcasting in the Standard Broadcast Band.
TIAS 4777. 49 pp. 40<J.
Agreement with Me.xico — Signed at Mexico January 29,
19.")7. Entered into force June 9, 1901.
Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4778. 5 pp.
5<t.
Agreement with I'aliistnn. supplementing the agreement
of .\pril 11, 19C0, as amended. Signed at Riiwalplndi
June 14. 1961. Entered into force Juue 14, 1961. With
excliange of uotes.
Tracking Stations— Transit Navigational Satellite Pro-
gram. TIAS 4779. ') pp. 50.
Agreement u'itli Australia. E.\change of notes — Dated at
Canberra June 5, 1961. Entered into force June 5, 1961.
Antarctic Treaty. TIAS 4780. 36 pp. 150.
Treaty witU Olher Gcjvernmeuts — Signed at Washington
December 1, 1959. Entered into force June 23, 1961.
Settlement of Claims of Japanese Nationals Formerly
Resident in Certain Japanese Islands. TIAS 4781. 7 pp.
100.
Agreement with Japan. Exchange of notes — Signed at
Tokyo June 8, 1961. Entered into force June 8, 1961.
Air Transport Services. TIAS 4782. 9 pp. 100.
Agreement with the Netherlands — Signed at Washington
April 3, 1957. Entered into force provisionally April 3,
1957.
Air Transport Services — Specification of Pakistan Air-
line and Route. TIAS 4783. 3 pi). 50.
Agreement uifh I'akistan, relating to the agreement of
Novemlicr 14, 1940. Exchange of notes — Dated at Ka-
rachi .March 28 and April 18, 1961. Entered into force
A|iril 18, 1901.
Surplus Agricultural Commodities — Closing of Accounts
in Connection with Certain Agreements and Payment of
Necessary Adjustment Refunds. TI.\S 47.S4. 0 pp. 50.
Agreement with France. Exchange of notes — Signed at
Paris June 12, 1901. Entered into force June 12, 1961.
Surplus Agricultural Commodities.
50.
TIAS 4785. 3 pp.
Economic, Technical, and Related Assistance. TIAS 4786.
9 pp. 100.
Agreement with Niger. Exchange of notes — Signed at
Niamey May 26, 1961. Entered into force May 26, 1961.
Economic Technical and Related Assistance. TIAS 4787.
9 pp. 100.
Agreement with Upper Volta. Exchange of notes — Signed
at Ouagadougou June 1, 1961. Entered into force June 1,
1961.
Military Equipment, Materials, and Services. TIAS 4788.
4 pp. 50.
Agreement with Liberia. Exchange of notes — Signed at
Monrovia May 23 and June 17, 1961. Entered into force
June 17, 1901.
Air Transport Services. TIAS 4789. 3 pp. 50.
A.greemeiit with Xew Zealand, iiniending the agreement
of December 30, 1960, supplementing the agreement of
December 3, 1946. Exchange of notes — Signed nt Wash-
ington Juue 30, 1961. Eutered into force June 30. 1961.
Agreement with Iran, amending the agreement of July
26, 1900, as amended. Exchange of notes — Signed at
Tehran May 18 and June 1, 1901. Entered into force
June 1, 1961.
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: January 15-21
Press re
ea.sps may be obtained from the Office
of N
ews. Department of Slate. Washington 25. D.C. |
lU
leases
appciuing in this issue of the riui.t.KTiN
whit
h were
issued prior fo January 15 ;ire N'os. 914
of December 30, 21 of January 10, and 28 of January
13.
No.
Date
Subject
t29
1/15
Bowles: "A Rn lance Sheet on U.S. For-
eign Policy."
*30
1/15
Grant npiiointed Deputy Assistant Sec-
retary for Far Eastern Affairs (bio-
graphic details).
•31
1/15
U.S. parfici|iafion in international
conferences.
*32
1/15
Bowles: Michigan State University
(excerpts).
♦33
1/15
Bowles: Michigan Pastors Conference
(excerpts).
*34
1/15
Stravinsky honored by Department.
35
1/16
Tubby : "Industry Communications
Programs in Support of U.S. Foreign
Polic.v."
36
1/16
Statement on discontinuance of Geneva
nuclear test talks.
*37
1/16
Cultural exchange (Latin America).
38
1/16
Martin : review of Geneva textile
negotiations.
39
1/17
Delegation to OAS foreign ministers
meeting (rewrite).
40
1/18
Visit of t'nder Secretary Ball to
Panama (rewrite).
41
1/18
Educalional exchange agreement with
Cyprus.
42
1/18
Statement on U.N. Secretary-General's
M|ipeal to Indonesia and Netherlands.
43
1/19
Rusk: news conference of January 18.
44
1/19
Husk: ■r.S. Trade Policy — Challenge
and Opportunity."
t45
1/20
Rusk: departure for OAS meeting.
•46
1/20
Mrs. Louchheiin designated Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs
(biographic details).
•Not printed.
flleld fo
r a later issue of the Bulletin.
226
Department of State Bulletin
February 5, 1962
Index
Vol. XLVI, No. 1180
American Republics
OAS Ministeiial Meeting (delegation) .... 224
Secretaiy Kiisli's News Conference of January 18 . 199
The Winds of Freedom (Stevenson) 210
Asia. Grant designated Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Near ISastern and Soutli Asian Affairs . . 225
Atomic Energy. U.S. and U.K. Willing To Discuss
Test Bmu ill Disarmament Negotiations . . . 205
China. Letters of Credence (Tsiaug) 205
Communism. Tlie Winds of Freedom (Stevenson) . 210
Congo (Leopoldville)
Secretary Itiisk's News Conference of January 18 . 199
United Stall's I'olicy in tlie Congo (Rusk) . . . 216
Congress, The
Deiiartniont Reviews Negotiations on Trade in Cot-
ton Textiles (Martin) 218
United States Policy in the Congo (RusIj) ... 216
Cyprus. United States and Cyprus Conclude Edu-
cational Kxcliange Agreement 225
Department and Foreign Service. Designations
(Grant, I.oiicliheim) 225
Dominican Republic. Secretary Rusk's News Con-
ference of J.iiiuary 18 199
Economic Affairs
Depiirtiiieiit Reviews Negotiations on Trade in Cot-
ton Textiles (Martin) 218
Industry Communications Programs in Support of
U.S. Foreign Policy (Tubby) 213
U.S. Trade Policy — Challenge and Opportunity
(RiisU) 195
Educational and Cultural Affairs
Education for World Responsibility (Bowles) . . 206
United States and Cyprus Conclude Educational Ex-
change Agreement 225
Europe. U.S. Trade Policy — Challenge and Oppor-
tunity (Rusk) 195
Indonesia
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of January 18 . 199
U.S. Supports U.N. Secretary-General in Efforts on
West New Guinea 203
International Information. Industry Communica-
tions Programs in Support of U.S. Foreign Policy
(Tubby) 213
International Organizations and Conferences
Calendar of International Conferences and
Meetings 220
OAS Ministerial Meeting (delegation) 224
Middle East. Grant designated Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs 225
Netherlands
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of January 18 . 199
U.S. Supports U.N. Secretary-General in Efforts on
West New Guinea 203
Panama. Under Secretary Ball Visits Panama . . 215
Public Affairs
Education for World Responsibility (Bowles) . . 206
Mrs. Louchheim designated Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary for Public Affairs 225
Publications. Recent Releases 226
Treaty Information
Current Actions 225
United States and Cyprus Conclude Educational Ex-
change Agreement 225
U.S.S.R. U.S. and U.K. Willing To Discuss Test
Ban in Disarmament Negotiations 205
United Kingdom
United States and United Kingdom Reaffirm Faith
in United Nntions 204
U.S. and U.K. Willing To Discuss Test Ban in Dis-
armament Negotiations 205
United Nations
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of January 18 . 199
Mr. Stevenson Reports to President on 16th Gen-
eral Assembly (text of letter) 222
United States and United Kingdom Reaffirm Faith
in United Nations 204
U.S. and U.K. Willing To Discuss Test Ban in Dis-
armament Negotiations 205
United States Policy in the Congo (Rusk) . . . 216
U.S. Supports U.N. Secretary-General in Efforts
on West New Guinea 203
Name Index
Bowles, Chester 206
Grant, James P 225
Louchheim, Mrs. Katie 225
Martin, Edwin M 218
Rusk, Secretary 195, 199, 216
Stevenson, Adlai E 210, 222
Tsiang, Tingfu F 205
Tubby, Roger W 213
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This 33-page illustrated booklet is a basic primer on the subject of
foreign trade with particular emphasis on United States trade policy.
As stated by Secretary of State Dean Kusk, ""VVliat we do about
trade policy will be a test of our ability to meet the test of leadership
in the world of the 1960's. . . . Wlaat we do affects everybody. In
trade, as in so many other matters, leadership has been placed upon
us by our own capacities and accomplisliments. We can exercise it
wisely or badly, but exercise it we must."
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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ICIAL
:kly record
Vol. XLVI, No. 1181 February 12, 1962
A NEW FOREIGN TRADE PROGRAM • Message of the
President to the Congress 231
BALANCE OF PAYIVIENTS • Excerpt From President's
Economic Report 239
SECRETARY RUSK INTERVIEWED ON "TODAY"
SHOW 241
A BALANCE SHEET ON U.S. FOREIGN POLICY • by
Chester Bowles 252
MILITARY, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL NECESSI-
TIES IN THE COLD-WAR WORLD • by Deputy
Under Secretary Johnson 245
TED STATES
EIGN POLICY
For index see inside back cover
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Vol. XLVI, No. 1181 • Publication 7337
February 12, 1962
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Notr: Contents of this publication are not
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appreciated. The Bulletin Is Indexed In the
Headers' Qulde to Periodical Literature.
The Department of State BULLETIN,
a uvekly publication issued by the
Office of Public Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public
and interested agencies of the
Government tcith infornustion on
developments in the field of foreign
relations and on the tcork of the
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A New Foreign Trade Program
MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE CONGRESS'
white House press release dated January 24
To the Congress of the United States:
Twenty-eight years ago our nation embarked
upon a new experiment in international relation-
ships— the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Pro-
gram. Faced with the chaos in world trade that
had resulted from the Great Depression, dis-
illusioned by the failure of the promises that high
protective tariffs would generate recovery, and
impelled by a desperate need to restore our econ-
omy. President Eoosevelt asked for authority to
negotiate reciprocal tariff reductions with other
nations of the world in order to spur our exports
and aid our economic recovery and growth.
That landmark measure, guided through Con-
gress by Cordell Hull, has been extended 11 times.
It has served our country and the free world well
over two decades. The application of this pro-
gram brought growth and order to the free- world
trading system. Our total exports, averaging
less than $2 billion a year in the 3 years preceding
enactment of the law, have now increased to over
$20 billion.
On June 30, 1962, the negotiating authority
under the last extension of the Trade Agreements
Act expires. It must be replaced by a wholly
new instrument. A new American trade initiative
is needed to meet the challenges and opportim^ities
of a rapidly changing world economy.
In the brief period since this act was last ex-
tended, five fundamentally new and sweeping de-
velopments have made obsolete our traditional
trade policy :
— The growth of the European Common Mar-
ket— an economy which may soon nearly equal our
own, protected by a single external tariff similar
'Transmitted Jan. 25 (H. Doc. 314, 87th Cong., 2d
sess. ) .
to our own — has progressed with such success and
momentum that it has surpassed its original time-
table, convinced those initially skeptical that there
is now no turning back, and laid the groundwork
for a radical alteration of the economics of the
Atlantic alliance. Almost 90 percent of the free
world's industrial production (if the United
Kingdom and others successfully complete their
negotiations for membership) may soon be con-
centrated in two great markets — the United States
of America and the expanded European Eco-
nomic Community. A trade policy adequate to
negotiate item by item tariff reductions with a
large number of small independent states will no
longer be adequate to assure ready access for our-
selves— and for our traditional trading partners
in Canada, Japan, Latin America, and else-
where— to a market nearly as large as our own,
whose negotiators can speak with one voice but
whose internal differences make it impossible for
them to negotiate item by item.
— The groioing pressures on our balance-of -pay-
ments position have, in the past few years, turned
a new spotlight on the importance of increasing
American exports to strengthen the international
position of the dollar and prevent a steady drain
of our gold reserves. To maintain our defense,
assistance, and other commitments abroad, while
expanding the free flow of goods and capital, we
must achieve a reasonable equilibrium in our inter-
national accounts by offsetting these dollar outlays
with dollar sales.
— The need to accelerate our own economic
growth, following a lagging period of 7 years
characterized by three recessions, is more urgent
than it has been in years — underlined by the mil-
lions of new job opportunities which will have to
be found in this decade to provide employment
for those already unemployed as well as an in-
Februory 72, J 962
231
creasing flood of younger workers, farm workers
seeking new opportunities, and city workers dis-
placed by teclmological change.
— The Communist aid and trade offensive has
also become more apparent in recent years. Soviet
bloc trade with 41 non-Communist countries in the
less developed areas of the globe has more than
tripled in recent years; and bloc trade missions
are busy in nearly every continent attempting to
penetrate, encircle, and divide the free world.
— The need for new markets for Japan and the
developing nations has also been accentuated as
never before — both by the prospective impact of
the EEC's external tariff and by their own need
to acquire new outlets for their raw materials and
light manufactures.
To meet these new challenges and opportunities,
I am today transmitting to the Congress a new
and modern instrument of trade negotiation — the
Trade Expansion Act of 1962. As I said in my
state of the Union address,^ its enactment "could
well affect the unity of the West, the course of the
cold war, and the growth of our nation for a
generation or more to come."
I. The Benefits of Increased Trade
Specifically, enactment of this measure will
benefit substantially every State of the Union,
every segment of the American economy, and
every basic objective of our domestic economy and
foreign policy.
Our efforts to expand our economy will be im-
portantly affected by our ability to expand our
exports — and particukrly upon the ability of our
farmers and businessmen to sell to the Common
Market. There is arising across the Atlantic a
single economic community which may soon have
a population half again as big as our own, working
and competing togetlier with no more barriers to
commerce and investment than exist among our
50 States — in an economy which has been growing
roughly twice as fast as ours — representing a pur-
chasing power which will someday equal our own
and a living standard growing faster than our
own. As its consumer incomes grow, its consumer
demands are also growing, particularly for the
type of goods that we produce best, which are only
now beginning to be widely sold or known in the
markets of Europe or in the homes of its middle-
income families.
Some 30 percent of our exports — more than $4
billion in industrial goods and materials and
nearly $2 billion in agricultural products —
already goes to the members and prospective mem-
bers of the ECC. European manufacturers, how-
ever, have increased their share of this rapidly
expanding market at a far greater rate than
American manufacturers. Unless our industry
can maintain and increase its share of this attrac-
tive market, there will be further temptation to
locate additional American-financed plants in
Europe in order to get behind the external tariff
wall of the EEC. This would enable the Ameri-
can manufacturer to contend for tliat vast con-
sumer potential on more competitive terms with
his European counterparts; but it will also mean a
failure on our part to take advantage of this grow-
ing market to increase jobs and investment in this
country.
A more liberal trade policy will in general
benefit our most efficient and expanding indus-
tries— industries which have demonstrated their
advantage over other world producers by export-
ing on the average twice as much of their products
as we import — industries which have done this
while paying the highest wages in our coimtry. In-
creasing investment and employment in these
growth industries will make for a more healthy,
efficient, and expanding economy and a still higher
American standard of living. Indeed, freer move-
ment of trade between America and the Common
Market would bolster the economy of the entire
free world, stimulating each nation to do most
what it does best and helping to achieve the OECD
target of a 50 percent combined Atlantic com-
munity increase in gross national product by
1970.»
Our efforts to prevent inflation will be rein-
forced by expanded trade. Once given a fair and
equal opportmiity to compete in overseas markets,
and once subject to healthy competition from over-
seas manufacturers for our own markets, Amer-
ican management and labor will have additional
reason to maintain competitive costs and prices,
modernize their plants, and increase their pro-
ductivity. The discipline of the world market-
place is an excellent measure of efficiency and a
force to stability. To try to shield American in-
For text, see Bulletin of Jan. 29, 1962, p. 159.
232
* For background, see ihid., Dec. 18, 1961, p. 1014.
Department of State Bulletin
dusti-y from the discipline of foreign competition
would isolate our domestic price level from world
prices, encourage domestic inflation, reduce our
exports still further, and invite less desirable gov-
ernmental solutions.
Our eflorts to collect our adverse balance of
payments have in recent years roughly paralleled
our ability to increase our export surplus. It is
necessary if we are to maintain our security pro-
grams abroad — our own military forces overseas
plus our contribution to the security and growth
of other free countries — to make substantial dollar
outlays abroad. These outlays are being held to
the minimum necessary, and we are seeking in-
cre-ased shai'ing from our allies. But they will
continue at substantial rates — and this requires us
to enlarge the $5 billion export surplus which we
presently enjoy from our favorable balance of
trade. If that surplus can be enlarged, as exports
under our new program rise faster than imports,
we can achieve the equilibrium in our balance of
payments which is essential to our economic sta-
bility and flexibility. If, on the other hand, our
siu'plus should fail to grow, if our exports should
be denied ready access to the EEC and other
markets — our overseas position would be endan-
gered. Moreover, if we can lower the external
tariff wall of the Common Market through nego-
tiation our manufacturers will be under less pres-
sure to locate their plants behind that wall in
order to sell in the European market, thus re-
ducing the export of capital fimds to Europe.
Our efforts to promote the strength and unity
of the West are thus directly related to the
strength and unity of Atlantic trade policies. An
expanded export program is necessary to give this
nation both the balance-of-payments equilibrium
and the economic growth we need to sustain our
share of "Western military security and economic
advance. Equally important, a freer flow of trade
across the Atlantic will enable the two giant mar-
kets on either side of the ocean to impart strength
and vigor to each other, and to combine their
resources and momentum to undertake the many
enterprises which the security of free peoples
demands. For the first time, as the world's great-
est trading nation, we can welcome a single part-
ner whose trade is even larger than our own — a
partner no longer divided and dependent, but
strong enough to share with us the responsibilities
and initiatives of the free world.
The Commimist bloc, largely self-contained
and isolated, represents an economic power al-
ready by some standards larger than that of
Western Europe and hoping someday to overtake
the United States. But the combined output and
purchasing power of the United States and West-
ern Europe — nearly a trillion dollars a year — is
more than twice as great as that of the entire
Sino-Soviet world. Though we have only half
the population, and far less than half the terri-
tory, we can pool our resources and resourceful-
ness in an open trade partnership strong enough
to outstrip any challenge, and strong enough to
imdertake all the many enterprises around the
world which the maintenance and progress of
freedom require. If we can take this step, Marx-
ist predictions of "capitalist" empires warring
over markets and stifling competition would be
shattered for all time — Commmiist hopes for a
trade war between these two great economic giants
would be frustrated — and Communist efforts to
split the West would be doomed to failure.
As members of the Atlantic community we have
concerted our military objectives through the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. We are
concerting our monetaiy and economic policies
through the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development. It is time now to write
a new chapter in the evolution of the Atlantic
connnunity. The success of our foreign policy
depends in large measure upon the success of our
foreign trade, and our maintenance of Western
political unity depends in equally large measure
upon the degree of Western economic unity. An
integrated Western Europe, joined in trading
partnership with the United States, will further
shift the world balance of power to the side of
freedom.
Our efforts to piove the superioiity of free
choice will thus be advanced immeasurably. We
will prove to the world that we believe in peace-
fully "tearing down walls" mstead of arbitrarily
building them. We will be opening new vistas of
choice and opportunity to the producers and con-
sumers of the free world. In answer to those who
say to the world's poorer countries that economic
progress and freedom are no longer compatible,
we — who have long boasted about the virtues of
the marketplace and of free competitive enterprise,
about our ability to compete and sell in any
market, and about our willingness to keep abreast
Fefaruory 72, J 962
233
of the times — will have our greatest opportunity
since the Marshall plan to demonstrate the vitality
of free choice.
Communist bloc nations have negotiated more
than 200 trade agreements in recent years. In-
evitably the recipient nation finds its economy in-
creasingly dependent upon Soviet goods, services,
and technicians. But many of these nations have
also observed that the economics of free choice
provide far greater benefits than the economics
of coercion — and the wider we can make the area
of economic freedom, the easier we make it for all
free peoples to receive the benefits of our innova-
tions and put them into practice.
Our efforts to aid the developing nations of the
world and other friends, however, depend upon
more than a demonstration of freedom's vitality
and benefits. If their economies are to expand,
if their new industries are to be successful, if they
are to acquire the foreign exchange funds they
will need to replace our aid efforts, these nations
must find new outlets for their raw materials and
new manufactures. We must make certain that
any arrrangements which we make with the
European Economic Community are worked out
in such a fashion as to insure nondiscriminatory
application to all third countries. Even more im-
portant, however, the United States and Europe
together have a joint responsibility to all of the
less developed countries of the world — and in this
sense we must work together to insure that their
legitimate aspirations and requirements are ful-
filled. The "open partnership" which this biU
proposes will enable all free nations to share to-
gether the rewards of a wider economic choice
for all.
Our efforts to maintain the leadership of the
free world thus rest, in the final analysis, on our
success in this undertaking. Economic isolation
and political leadership are wholly incompatible.
In the next few years, the nations of Western
Europe will be fixing basic economic and trading
patterns vitally affecting the future of our econ-
omy and the hopes of our less developed friends.
Basic political and military decisions of vital
interest to our security will be made. Unlass we
have this authority to negotiate and have it this
year — if wo are separated from the Common
Market by high tariff barriers on either side of the
Atlantic — then we cannot hope to play an effective
part in those basic decisions.
If we are to retain our leadership, the initiative
is up to us. The revolutionary changes which are
occurring will not wait for us to make up our
minds. The United States has encouraged sweep-
ing changes in free-world economic patterns in
order to strengthen the forces of freedom. But
we cannot ourselves stand still. If we are to lead,
we must act. We must adapt our own economy to
the imperatives of a changing world, and one©
more assert our leadership.
The American husinessTnan, once the authority
granted by this bill is exercised, will have a
unique opportunity to compete on a more equal
basis in a rich and rapidly expanding market
abroad which possesses potentially a purchasing
power as large and as varied as our own. He
knows that, once artificial restraints are removed,
a vast array of American goods, produced by
American know-how with American efficiency,
can compete with any goods in any spot in the
world. And almost all members of the business
community, in every State, now participate or
could participate in the production, processing,
transporting, or distribution of either exports or
imports.
Already we sell to Western Europe alone more
machinery, transportation equipment, chemicals,
and coal than our total imports of these commodi-
ties from all regions of the world combined.
Western Europe is our best customer today — and
should be an even better one tomorrow. But as
the new external tariff surrounding the Common
Market replaces the internal tariff structure, a
German producer — who once competed in the mar-
kets of France on the same terms with our own
producers — will achieve free access to French mar-
kets while our own producers face a tariff. In
short, in the absence of authority to bargain down
that external tariff, as the economy of the Com-
mon Market expands, our exports will not expand
with it. They may even decline.
The American fanner has a tremendous stake
in expanded trade. One out of every seven farm
workers produces for export. The average farmer
depends on foreign markets to sell the crops grown
on one out of every six acres he plants. Sixty per-
cent of our rice, 49 percent of our cotton, 45 per-
cent of our wheat, and 42 percent of our soybean
production are exported. Agriculture is one of
our best sources of foreign exchange.
Our farmers are particularly dependent upon
234
Department of State Bulletin
the markets of Western Europe. Our agricultural
trade with that area is four-to-one in our favor.
The agreements recently reached at Brussels*
both exhausted our existing authority to obtain
further European concessions, and laid the
groimdwork for future negotiations on American
farm exports to be conducted once new authority
is granted. But new and flexible authority is
required if we are to keep the door of the Com-
mon Market open to American agriculture, and
open it wider still. If the output of our astound-
ing productivity is not to pile up increasingly in
our warehouses, our negotiators will need both the
special EEC authority and the general 50 percent
authority requested in the bill described later in
this message.
The American worker will benefit from the ex-
pansion of our exports. One out of every three
workers engaged in manufacturing is employed in
establishments that export. Several hundred times
as many workers owe their jobs directly or indi-
rectly to exports as are in the small group — esti-
mated to be less than one-half of 1 percent of all
workers — who might be adversely affected by a
sharp increase in imports. As tlie nimiber of job
seekers in our labor force expands in the years
ahead, increasing our job opportunities will re-
quire expanding our markets and economy, and
making certain that new United States plants built
to serve Common Market consumers are built here,
to employ American workers, and not there.
The American consum,er benefits most of all
from an increase in foreign trade. Imports give
him a wider choice of products at competitive
prices. They introduce new ideas and new tastes,
which often lead to new demands for American
production.
Increased imports stimulate our own efforts to
increase efficiency, and supplement antitrust and
other efforts to assure competition. Many in-
dustries of importance to the American consimier
and economy are dependent upon imports for raw
materials and other supplies. Thus American-
made goods can also be made much less expensively
for the American consumers if we lower the tariff
on the materials that are necessary to their produc-
tion.
'Agreements were reached at Brussels in January be-
tween the United States and the European Economic
Community which will be made part of the results of the
1960-61 GATT tariff conference that began on Sept. 1,
1960, at Geneva.
American imports, in short, have generally
strengthened rather than weakened our economy.
Their competitive benefits have already been men-
tioned. But about 60 percent of the goods we im-
port do not compete with the goods we produce —
either because they are not produced in this
country, or are not produced in any significant
quantity. They provide us with products we need
but cannot efficiently make or grow (such as
bananas or coffee), supplement our own steadily
depleting natural resources with items not avail-
able here in quantity (such as manganese or
chrome ore, 90 percent or more of which must be
imported if our steel mills are to operate), and
contribute to our industrial efficiency, our economic
growth, and our high level of consumption. Those
imports that do compete are equal to only 1 or 11^
percent of our total national production ; and even
these imports create jobs directly for those engaged
in their processing, distribution, or transportation,
and indirectly for those employed in both export
industries and in those industries dependent upon
reasonably priced imported supplies for their own
ability to compete.
Moreover, we must reduce our own tariffs if we
hope to reduce tariffs abroad and thereby increase
our exports and export surplus. There are many
more American jobs dependent upon exports than
could possibly be adversely affected by increased
imports. And those export industries are our
strongest, most efficient, highest paying growth
industries.
It is obvious, therefore, that the warnings
against increased imports based upon the lower
level of wages paid in other countries are not tell-
ing the whole story. For this fear is refuted by
the fact that American industry in general — and
America's highest paid industries in particular —
export more goods to other markets than any other
nation; sell far more abroad to other countries
than they sell to us; and command the vast pre-
ponderance of our own market here in the United
States. There are three reasons for this :
(a) The skill and efficiency of American work-
ers, with the help of our machinery and teclmol-
ogy, can produce more units per man-hour than
any other workers in the world — thus making the
competitive cost of our labor for many products
far less than it is in countries with lower wage
rates. For example, while a United States coal
miner is paid 8 times as much per hour as the
Japanese miner, he produces 14 times as much
februory 72, 7962
235
coal — our real cost per ton of coal is thus far
smaller — and we sell the Japanese tens of millions
of dollars worth of coal each year.
(b) Our best industries also possess other ad-
vantages— the adequacy of low-cost raw materials
or electrical power, for example. Neither wages
nor total labor costs is an adequate standard of
comparison if used alone.
(c) American products can frequently com-
pete successfully even where foreign prices are
somewhat lower— by virtue of their superior qual-
ity, style, packaging, servicing, or assurance of
delivery.
Given this strength, accompanied by increasing
productivity and wages in the rest of the world,
there is less need to be concerned over the level of
wages in the low-wage countries. These levels,
moreover, are already on the rise, and, we would
hope, will continue to narrow the current wage
gap, encouraged by appropriate consultations on
an international basis.
This philosophy of the free market — the wider
economic choice for men and nations — is as old
as freedom itself. It is not a partisan philosophy.
For many years our trade legislation has enjoyed
bipartisan backing from those members of both
parties who recognized how essential trade is to our
basic security abroad and our economic health at
home. This is even more true today. The Trade
Expansion Act of 1962 is designed as the expres-
sion of a nation, not of any single faction, not of
any single faction or section. It is in that spirit
that I recommend it to the Congress for prompt
and favorable action.
II. Provisions of the Bill
New Negotiating Authority. To achieve all of
the goals and gains set forth above — to empower
our negotiators with sufficient autliority to induce
the EEC to grant wider access to our goods and
crops and fair treatment to those of Latin Amer-
ica, Japan, and other countries — and to be ready
to talk trade with the Common Market in prac-
tical terms — it is essential that our bargaining au-
thority be increased in both flexibility and extent.
I am therefore requesting two basic kinds of au-
thoi-ity to be exercised over the next 5 years :
First, a general authority to reduce existing
tariffs by 50 percent in reciprocal negotiations. It
would be our intention to employ a variety of
teclmiques in exercising this authority, including
negotiations on broad categories or subcategories
of products.
Secondly, a special authority, to be used in ne-
gotiating with the EEC, to reduce or eliminate all
tarifl's on those groups of products where the
United States and the EEC together accoimt for
80 percent or more of world trade in a represent-
ative period. The fact that these groups of prod-
ucts fall within this special or "dominant sup-
plier" authority is proof that they can be pro-
duced here or in Europe more efficiently than
anywhere else in the world. They include most
of the products which the members of the Com-
mon Market are especially interested in trading
with us, and most of the products for which we
want freer access to the Common Market ; and to
a considerable extent they are items in wliich our
own ability to compete is demonstrated by the fact
that our exports of these items are substantially
greater than our imports. They account for
nearly $2 billion of our total industrial exports
to present and prospective Common Market
members in 1960, and for about $1.4 billion
of our imports from these countries. In short,
this special authority w-ill enable us to negotiate
for a dramatic agreement with the Common Mar-
ket that will pool our economic strength for the
advancement of freedom.
To be effective in achieving a breakthrough
agreement with the EEC so that our farmers,
manufacturers, and other fi-ee-world trading part-
ners can participate, we will need to use both the
dominant-supplier authority and the general au-
thority in combination. Reductions would be put
into effect gradually in stages over 5 years or more.
But the traditional teclmique of trading one brick
at a time off our respective tariff walls will not
suffice to aasure American farm and factory ex-
ports the kind of access to the European market
which they must have if trade between the two
Atlantic markets is to expand. We must talk in-
stead in terms of trading whole layere at a time in
exchange for other layers, as the Europeans have
been doing in reducing their internal tariffs, per-
mitting the forces of competition to set now trade
patterns. Trading in such an enlarged basis is not
possible, the EEC has found, if traditional item-
by-item economic histories are to dominate. But
let me emphasize that we mean to see to it that all
reductions and concessions are reciprocal — and
236
Department of State Bulletin
that the access we gain is not limited by the use of
quotas or other restrictive devices.
Safeguarding Interests of Other Trading Part-
ners. In our negotiations with tlie Common
Mai'ket, we will preserve our traditional most-
favored-nation principle under which any tariff
concessions negotiated will be generalized to our
other trading partners. Obviously, in special au-
thority agreements where the United States and
the EEC are the dominant suppliers, the partici-
pation of other nations often would not be sig-
nificant. On other items, where justified,
compensating concessions from other interested
countries should be obtained as part of the negotia-
tions. But in essence we must strive for a nondis-
criminatory trade partnersliip with the EEC. If
it succeeds only in splintering the free world, or
increasing the disparity between rich and poor na-
tions, it will have failed to acliieve one of its major
purposes. The negotiating authority under this
bill will thus be used to strengthen the ties of both
"Common Markets" with, and expand our own
trade in, the Latin American Republics, Canada,
Japan, and other non-European nations — as well
as helping them maximize their opportunities to
trade with the Common Market.
The bill also requests special authority to re-
duce or eliminate all duties and other restrictions
on the importation of tropical agricultural and
forestry products supplied by friendly less de-
veloped countries and not produced here in any
significant quantity, if our action is taken in con-
cert with similar action by the Conunon Alarket.
These tropical products are the staple exports of
many less developed countries. Their efforts for
economic development and diversification must be
advanced out of earnings from these products. By
assuring them as large a market as possible, we are
bringing closer the day when they will be able to
finance their own development needs on a self-
sustaining basis.
Safeguards to American Industry. If the au-
thority requested in this act is used, imports as
well as exports will increase; and this increase
will, in the overwhelming number of cases, be bene-
ficial for the reasons outlined above. Nevertheless
ample safeguards against injury to American in-
dustry and agriculture will be retained. Escape-
clause relief will continue to be available with
more up-to-date definitions. Temporary tariff re-
lief will be granted where essential. The power
to impose duties or suspend concessions to protect
the national security will be retained. Aiticles
will be reserved from negotiations whenever such
action is deemed to be in the best interest of the
Nation and the economy. And the four basic
stages of the traditional peril-point procedui-es and
safeguards will be retained and improved :
— the President will refer to the Tariff Com-
mission the list of proposed items for negotiations;
— the Tariff Commission will conduct hearings
to determine the effect of concessions on these
products ;
— the Commission will make a report to the
President, specifically based, as such reports are
based now, upon its findings of how new imports
might lead to the idling of productive facilities,
the inability of domestic producers to operate at
a profit, and the unemployment of workers as the
result of anticipated reductions in duties; and
— the President will report to the Congress on
his action after completion of the negotiations.
The present arrangements will be substantially
improved, however, since both the Tariff Commis-
sion recommendation and the President's report
would be broader than a bare determination of
specific peril points ; and this should enable us to
make much more informed use of these recom-
mendations than has been true in the past.
Trade Adjustment Assistance. I am also rec-
ommending as an essential part of the new trade
program that companies, farmers, and workers
who suffer damage from increased foreign im-
port competition be assisted in their efforts to ad-
just to that competition. When considerations of
national policy make it desirable to avoid higher
tariffs, those injured by that competition should
not be required to bear the fuU brunt of the im-
pact. Rather, the burden of economic adjustment
should be borne in part by the Federal Govern-
ment.
Under existing law, the only alternatives avail-
able to the President are the imposition or re-
fusal of tariff relief. These alternatives should
continue to be available.
The legislation I am proposing, however, pro-
vides an additional alternative called trade adjust-
ment assistance. This alternative will permit the
executive branch to make extensive use of its fa-
cilities, programs, and resources to provide special
assistance to farmers, finns, and their employees
february 72, ?962
237
in making the pconomic readjustments necessitated
by the imports resulting from tariff concessions.
Any worker or group of workers unemployed
or underemployed as a result of increased imports
would, mider this bill, be eligible for the following
forms of assistance :
1. Readjustment allowances providing as much
as 65 percent of the individual's average weekly
wage for up to 52 weeks for all workers, and for
as many as 13 additional weeks for workers over
60, with imemployment insurance benefits de-
ducted from such allowances to the extent
available;
2. Vocational education and training assistance
to develop liigher and different skills ;
3. Financial assistance for those who cannot
find work in their present community to relocate
to a different place in the United States where
suitable employment is available.
For a businessman or farmer adversely affected
by imports, there should be available :
1. Technical information, advice, and consulta-
tion to help plan and implement an attack on the
problem ;
2. Tax benefits to encourage modernization and
diversification ;
3. Loan guarantees and loans otherwise not
commercially available to aid modernization and
diversification.
Just as the Federal Government has assisted in
personal readjustments made necessary by mili-
tary service, just as the Federal Government met
its obligation to assist industry in adjusting to
war production and again to return to peacetime
production, so there is an obligation to render as-
sistance to those wlio suffer as a re,sult of national
trade policy. Sucli a iirogram will supplement
and work in coordination with, not duplicate,
what we are already doing or pro]:)osing (o do for
dei)re.ssed areas, for small business, for investment
incentives, and for the retraining and compensa-
tion of our unemployed workers.
This cannot lx» and will not be a subsidy pro-
gram of Government paternalism. It is instead
a program to afford time for American initiative,
American adaptability, and American resiliency
to assert themselves. It is consistent with that
part of the proposed law which would stage tariff
reductions over a 5-year period. Accordingly,
trade adjustment assistance, like the other provi-
sions of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, is de-
signed to strengthen the efficiency of our economy,
not to protect inefficiencies.
Authority to grant temporary tariff relief will
remain available to assist those industries injured
by a sudden influx of goods under revised tariffs.
But the accent is on "adjustment" more than "as-
sistance." Through trade adjustment prompt
and effective help can be given to those suffering
genuine hardship in adjusting to import competi-
tion, moving men and resources out of uneconomic
production into efficient production and competi-
tive positions, and in the process preserving the
employment relationships between firms and
workers wherever possible. Unlike tariff relief,
this assistance can be tailored to their individual
needs without disrupting other policies. Experi-
ence with a similar kind of program in the Com-
mon Market, and in the face of more extensive
tariff reductions than we propose here, testifies to
the effective but relatively inexpensive nature of
this approach. For most affected firms will find
that the adjustment involved is no more than the
adjustment they face every year or few years as
the result of changes in the economy, consumer
taste, or domestic competition.
The purpose of this message has been to describe
the challenge we face and th& tools we need. The
decision rests with the Congress. Tliat decision
will either mark the beginning of a new chapter
in the alliance of free nations — or a threat to the
growth of We-stem unity. The two great At-
lantic markets will either grow together or they
will grow apart. The meaning and range of free
economic choice will either be widened for the
benefit of free men everywhere — or confused and
constricted by new barriers and delays.
Last year, in enacting a long-term foreign aid
program, the Congress made possible a funda-
mental change in our relations with the develop-
ing nations. This bill will make possible a
fundamental, far-reaching, and unique change in
our relations with the other industrialized na-
tions— particularly with the other members of the
Atlantic community. As NATO was unprece-
dented in military history, this measure is un-
precedented in economic history. Rut its passage
will be long remembered and its l)enefits widely
distributed among those who work for freedom.
238
Department of State Bulletin
At rare moments in the life of this nation an
opportunity comes along to fashion out of the
confusion of current events a clear and bold ac-
tion to show the world what it is we stand for.
Such an opportunity is before us now. This bill,
by enabling us to strike a bargain with the Com-
mon Market, will "strike a blow" for freedom.
Balance of Payments
Excerpt From President's Economic Report ^
The program launched last year to reduce our
payments deficit and maintain confidence in the
dollar will, I am sure, show further results in
1962. I am hopeful that the target of reasonable
equilibrium in our international payments can be
achieved within the next two years; but this will
require a determined effort on the part of all of
us — government, business and labor. This effort
must proceed on a nimiber of fronts.
Export Expansion
An increase in the U.S. trade surplus is of the
first importance. If we are to meet our inter-
national responsibilities, we must increase exports
more rapidly than the increase in imports which
accompanies our economic growth.
Our efforts to raise exports urgently require
that we negotiate a reduction in the tariff of the
European Common Market. I shall shortly
transmit to the Congress a special message''
elaborating the details of the proposed Trade
Expansion Act of 1962 and explaining why I be-
lieve that a new trade policy initiative is impera-
tive this year.
To encourage American businessmen to become
more export-minded, we have inaugurated a new
export insurance program imder the leadership
of the Export-Import Bank,^ and we have stepped
' Economic Report of the President Transmitted to the
Congress January 1962, Together With the Annual Report
o1 the Council of Economic Advisers, pp. 13-16. The
report was presented to the Congress on Jan. 20; it is
for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov-
ernment Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C., price $1.25.
The President's report alone is also available as H. Doc.
278, 87th Cong., 2d sess.
' For text, see p. 231.
* For background, see Bijixetin of Nov. 20, 1961, p. 837.
up our export promotion drive by improving the
commercial services abroad of the U.S. Govern-
ment, establishing trade centers abroad, planning
trade fairs, improving the trade mission program,
and working with business firms on export oppor-
tunities through field offices of the Department of
Commerce and the Small Business Administra-
tion. Foreign travel to the United States, which
returns dollars to our shores, is now being pro-
moted through the first Federal agency ever
created for this purpose.
Prices and Productivity
Our export drive will founder if we cannot
keep our prices competitive in world markets.
Though our recent price performance has been ex-
cellent, the improving economic climate of 1962
will test anew the statesmanship of our business
and labor leaders. I believe that they will pass the
test ; our Nation today possesses a new vmderstand-
ing of the vital link between our level of prices
and our balance of payments.
In the long run, the competitive position of U.S.
industry depends on a sustained and rapid advance
in productivity. In this, the interests of economic
recovery, long-run growth, and the strength of the
dollar coincide. Modernization and expansion of
our industrial plant will accelerate the advance
of productivity.
Foreign Investment
To place controls over the flow of private
American capital abroad would be contrary to
our traditions and our economic interests. But
neither is there justification for special tax incen-
tives which stimulate the flow of U.S. investment
to countries now strong and economically devel-
oped, and I again urge the elimination of these
special incentives.
The new foreign trade program which I am
proposing to the Congress will help to reduce an-
other artificial incentive to U.S. firms to invest
abroad. The European Common Market has at-
tracted American capital, partly because Ameri-
can businessmen fear that they will be imable to
compete in the growing European market tmless
they build plants behind the common tariff wall.
We must negotiate down the ban-iers to trade be-
tween the two great continental markets, so that
February 12, 1962
239
the exports of our industry and agriculture can
have full opportunity to compete in Europe.
Governmental Expenditures Abroad
Military expenditures form by far the greater
part of our governmental outlays abroad. We are
discussing with certain of our European allies the
extent to which they can increase their own mili-
tary procurement from the United States to offset
our dollar expenditures there. As a result, the
net cost to our balance of payments is expected to
be reduced during the coming year, in spite of
increased deployment of forces abroad because of
the Berlin situation.
To curtail our foreign aid programs in order to
strengthen our balance of payments would be to
sacrifice more than we gain. But we can cut back
on the foreign currency costs of our aid programs,
and thus reduce the burden on our balance of pay-
ments. A large percentage of our foreign aid is
already spent for procurement in the United
States; this proportion will rise as our tightened
procurement procedures become increasingly ef-
fective.
We have sought to induce other advanced coun-
tries to undertake a larger share of the foreigii
aid effort. We will continue our efforts through
the Development Assistance Committee of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development to obtain a higher level of economic
assistance by other industrial nations to the less
developed countries.
Short-Term Capital Movements
Outflows of volatile short-term funds added to
the pressures on the dollar in 1960. Our policies in
1961 have diminished the dangers of disruptive
movements of short-term capital. For the first
time in a generation, the Treasury is helping to
stabilize the dollar by operations in the interna-
tional exchange markets. The Federal Reserve
and the Treasury, in administering their monetary
policy and debt management responsibilities, have
sought to meet the needs of domestic recovery in
ways which would not lead to outflows of short-
term capital.
During the past year, we have consulted pe-
riodically with our principal financial partners,
both bilaterally and within tlie framework of the
OECD. These consultations have led to close co-
operation among fiscal and monetary authorities in
a common effort to prevent disruptive currency
movements.
Strengthening the International Monetary System
The International Monetary Fund is playing an
increasingly important role in preserving inter-
national monetary stability. The reserve strength
behind the dollar includes our drawing rights on
the Fund, of which $1.7 billion is automatically
available imder current practices of the Fund. An
additional $4.1 billion could become available
under Fund policies, insofar as the Fund has avail-
able resources in gold and usable foreign cur-
rencies. Recently, the Fund has diversified its use
of currencies in meeting drawings by member
coimtries, relying less heavily on dollars and more
heavily on the currencies of countries with pay-
ments surpluses. However, the Fund's regular
holdings of the currencies of some important in-
dustrial countries are not adequate to meet po-
tential demands for them.
In a message to the Congress last February,* I
said: "We must now, in cooperation with other
lending comitries, begin to consider ways in wliich
international monetary institutions — especially
the International Monetaiy Fund — can be
strengthened and more effectively utilized, both
in furnishing needed increases in reserves, and in
providing the flexibility required to support a
healthy and growing world economy."
We have now taken an important step in this
direction. Agreement has been reached among ten
of the major industrial countries to lend to the
Fund specified amounts of their currencies when
necessary to cope with or forestall pressures which
may impair the international monetary sj'stem.^
These stand-by facilities of $6 billion will be a
major defense against international monetai-y
speculation and will powerfully reinfoire the ef-
fectiveness of the Fund. They will provide re-
sources to make our drawing rights in the Fund
effective, should we need to use them. Moreover,
the U.S. stand-by commitment of $2 billion will
augment the resources potentially available
through the Fund to other participants in the
agreement, when our balance of payments and re-
'Por text, see ibid.. Fob. 27, ]0<>1, p. 2S7.
' Ibid., Jan. 29, 1962, p. 1S7.
240
Depoftmenf of Sfofe Bulletin
serve positions are strong. I shall shortly submit
a request to Congress for appropriate enabling
legislation.
Secretary Rusk Interviewed
on "Today" Show
Following is the transcript of an interview of
Secretary Rusk by John Chancellor and Martin
Affronsky, videotaped for presentation on Jan-
uary 22 on the National Broadcasting Company^
television program '■''TodayP
Press release 47 dated January 22
Q. Mr. Secretary, hath you and President
Kennedy have said repeatedly that the United
States is growing stronger, as is the free world,
that the Soviet Union and the Com7nunist coali-
tion are growing weaker, relatively. Could you
document that happy estimate, sir?
A. "Well, there are many ways, Mr. Agronsky,
in which one could get into that question. Let me
just hint at certain of them, because time doesn't
permit a full discussion.
I think myself that the very existence of a Ber-
lin problem, a Berlin crisis, results from the failure
of the Commmiists to create a tolerable situation
in East Germany. The situation in East Germany
produced very large pressures upon the Soviet
Government, which they in turn have tried to
transfer over to us by their demands for a radical
change in the situation in West Berlin.
I think also that the economic vitality of the
Western World is something which is causing
people in Moscow to think very hard about the
situation —
Q. It^s heretical as far as they''re concerned.
A. The growth of the Common Market, the
enormous capacity of the Western World to in-
crease its gross national product and to get on with
the great jobs in front of it, is something which
suggests, I think, to Moscow that their competitive
position is not strong. For example, the United
States alone has since 1920, which was approxi-
mately the date of the beginning of the Soviet
Revolution — the United States alone has added
more to our gross national product than the total
present gross national product of the Soviet Union.
I think also that they are up against the fact
that other countries, independent countries, are
much more resistant to their type of penetration
than they had supposed. It's interesting to me,
for example, to note that not one of the many na-
tions that have become independent since World
War II has moved behind the Iron Curtain, and
no single country that I know of has elected com-
munism as its way of life or its form of govern-
ment.
Q. You mean given a choice between democracy
and communism.
A. If there's any choice — there is no question
about choice, and I think myself that the events of
these last years- and the events of this past year
have shown that freedom is indeed the wave of the
future and that we can move ahead with confidence
in this situation.
Assessment of Problems of Communist World
Q. Mr. Secretary, could you give us your assess-
ment of the current troubles in the Communist
toorld with — well, let me put it this way — with
their reference to war or peace?
A. Well, Mr. Chancellor, the struggle between
Moscow and Peiping has now become a matter of
public record for all the world to look at and to
talk about. There seems to be a variety of issues
which are separating these two capitals — the pre-
dominance of Moscow within the Communist
world. There is rivalry now reflected in the dis-
cussions among Communist parties throughout
the world, not only in Commimist countries but
in non-Communist countries, about the question of
Moscow supremacy.
There is a fundamental debate going on about
the difference between what in Moscow is called
competitive coexistence and the perhaps more
primitive and brutal aspects of Leninism as in-
terpreted, say, 25 years ago.
We, I think, ought not to suppose that these dif-
ferences are any comfort to us at the present time,
because this argument really is about how best to
get on with the world revolution of communism as
they see it. They're committed to that in Moscow ;
they're committed to that in Peiping. Their ar-
gument is about the difference in procedures by
which they would accomplish these purposes.
Fefaroory 72, 1962
241
I would be myself reluctant to suppose that we
are, in the short run anyhow, to get any comfort
out of this particular dispute that's going on —
partly because each side in this dispute within the
Communist world is going to be under pressures
to demonstrate that its particular technique will
sliow the most important advances, the most
startling gains for the Communist world. So my
guess is that, as far as we're concerned, we must
assume that they at least agree in the underlying
notion about what the world should look like, and
that we've got to meet it in both respects — in the
notion of competitive coexistence, in the notion of
a more belligerent and militant attitude as re-
flected in Peiping.
Q. Nevertheless, sir, would you not agree that
the scope of the de-Stalinization campaign in the
Soviet Union is an event of extreme importance
to us?
A. It is, Mr. Chancellor, and, as you who've
served your time in Moscow will know that — how
important these things can be. I don't myself
pretend to know the complete ramifications of this
problem that's going on- — that is being discussed
now within the Soviet Union and between them
and Moscow.
But let me point out that, although strong ef-
forts are being made to discount and degrade the
position of Stalin, no effort has been made thus
far to withdraw from or to retract from or to
make right the damage which Stalin did to the
world outside of the Soviet Union. In other
words, they are discounting the former hero but
they're keeping the loot of his efforts.
Safeguarding the Inter-American System
Q. Mr. Secretary, there has heen one rather dra-
matic and I might also say rather conspicuous
failure in foreign policy in your administration — ■
the administration of Mr. Kennedy — and that is
the result of the abortive invasion of Cuba. The
President has said * and you liave indicated that
weh^e drawn some rather important lessons from
that particular failure. What are those lessons
and how are we applying them in Latin America?
A. Well let me say first, Mr. Agronsky, that
the story of freedom has been a very long story
and there have been many episodes along the way
in which gallant men have run into failure in
their own time. I do not believe myself that this
story is by any means finished.
But I think that it is important for us now
that the time has come for the Organization of
American States, the governments of this hemi-
sphere, to say formally and publicly and in unison
what most of them have said privately. And that
is that what has happened in Cuba is wholly in-
compatible with the basic commitments of this
hemisphere, the basic charters of the inter- Ameri-
can system, and that what has happened in Cuba
is incompatible with the safety and the dignity
and the future of this hemisphere. And further,
that the Castro solution to economic and social
development is not the solution which is necessary
or is possible in this hemisphere.
Q. Is it your intention, sir, to so urge in your
forthcoming Latin American trip?
A. Yes, I think this conference at Punta del
Este will be very important from this point of
view, and I have no doubt whatever that the basic
principles of the inter- American system, and the
rejection of the Castro approach to these problems,
will be recorded there in very effective fashion.
Forums for Settling World Problems
Q. Sir, you have said in a recent speech that
we in the United States have earnestly wished to
extend the writ of the United Nations, its influence
and its capacity to act."^ The United States has
supported a UJf. action in the Congo, and that
situation, if we can make any prediction on it at
all, seems to be headed for some kind of stability.
Yet, sir, in Berlin, Cuba, South Viet-Nam, and
Laos the United States has chosen to act outside
the United Nations, and can you tell us the reasons
for that?
A. Yes, Mr. Cliancellor, I thinlv that one should
bear in mind that in the first place the United Na-
tions lias an agenda that is just about as full as
the traffic will bear. The present session of the
General Assembly, for example, had a hundred
items on its agenda.
Now much determines upon what the circum-
stances of a particular case would be. In Berlin,
for example, if that (luestion were bi'ought before
the United Nations, I think the United Nations
would ahnost certainly say that the parties pri-
' Bulletin of May 8, 1961, p. 659.
242
• Ihid., Oct 30, 1961, p. 702.
Department of State Bulletin
marily involved in that situation should discuss
it among themselves further. That, in fact, is now
being done. It may well be that, if that problem
develops into more of a crisis, it will ui fact be
put before the United Nations. You will recall,
I think, yourself, that, when the first Berlin
blockage was imposed back in the late 1940's, the
United Nations played a very key role there and
it was within the framework of the United Nations
that discussions were undertaken which led to the
lifting of that blockage with the loss in prestige
only to those who had initiated the blockade.
Now there are many forums, many situations,
in which problems can be discussed before they get
to the general world forum of the United Nations.
In the case of Viet-Nam, for example, the situa-
tion there is not one which is likely to be deter-
mined in debate but is likely to be detennined
more by what happens on the ground. And we're
working with the Government of South Viet-Nam
to put them in a position to do an effective job on
the ground.
Again that may come to the United Nations at
a certain stage. But I want to emphasize, Mr.
Chancellor, that almost every aspect of American
foreign policy comes forth for debate in the course
of a General Assembly such as the one that we have
just had. But that does not mean that the United
Nations is in a position to take all of these matters
off of our own shoulders.
The United Nations is basically its members,
and it can only do what its members try to ac-
complish. In the case of the Congo it was pos-
sible for the United Nations to interpose an
administration and a force to prevent, on the one
side, either chaos or, on the other side, a direct
engagement of the great powers in a great
struggle for the heart of Africa. We are very
much encouraged to believe that this can be
worked out in peace and with the agreement of
the Congolese leaders and without the injection of
the Congo into these great, turbulent, worldwide
problems that we think of as the cold war.
Maintaining Western Rights in West Berlin
Q. Sir, with reference to Berlin, while we
understand the necessity of diplomatic discretion
in the talks between Ambassador [Llewellyn £".]
Thompson and Foreign Minister [Andrei A.]
Gromyko, can you give lis some view that you
might be able to express on those talks?
A. Well, these talks are exploratory, to ti-y to
find out whether these are a real basis for nego-
tiation. The Soviet demands with respect to
West Berlin, which were initiated back in 1958
and which have been repeated on more than one
occasion since, are basically imacceptable to the
West.
The vital interests of the West, namely, our
presence in West Berlm, the freedom of the West
Berliners to work out their own relations with
others, and access to West Berlin, seem to be
causing the Soviet some trouble. Now basically
these two positions at the present time are in
direct confrontation. The problem is to discover
by responsible contacts whether we are on a col-
lision course or whether there is a possibility of a
peaceful settlement.
On the one side the West is determined that these
vital interests will be protected by whatever
action is necessary. But on the other side, and
because of this determination, it is felt that we
must maintain responsible contact to see whether
this matter can be adjusted by peaceful means.
Q. Mr. Secretary, I tvould like you to expand
on that question, and just one facet of it, more
accurately, and that is, you said whether we are
on a collision course or whether it will be deter-
mined by peaceful means. Is it your feeling, as
you begin this second year of your term as Secre-
tary of State, that we will avoid the collision
course?
A. WeU, Mr. Agronsky, I would like to be able
to make a prediction on that point. But this is
something that cannot be determined in one
capital or in Western capitals alone. This will
require decisions in Moscow and other places as
well.
There is no question in my mind that the West
is determined to maintain its vital positions there.
I do not myself believe that rational men on the
other side will press in upon these vital positions
to the point of a catastrophe. But we can't take
these things for granted, and that is why we're
talking these things over with them.
Strengthening Processes of Peaceful Settlement
Q. Mr. Secretary, you have let it be known to
me that you were intrigusd and interested by the
columnist Walter Lippmann's observation that we
have not yet discovered an effective substitute for
war or the threat of war in the solution of inter-
February 12, 1962
243
national problems. Wlmt is your feeling about
that, sir?
A. Well, I think Mr. Lippmann in his columns
and also in that very profound speech he made the
other day hero in Washington has raised a very
far-reacliing question on this. It has been the
concern of Secretaries of State over many years,
and that is, how to accommodate the processes of
law which tend to formalize and freeze the exist-
ing situation with the necessities of peaceful
change over time.
I don't think that we can say that we have passed
the threshold of peaceful change, because differ-
ences arise which one party or the other seems —
would seem — to be prepared to press by force if
necessai-y. But I do think that the processes of
peaceful settlement are being steadily strength-
ened. They're not wholly effective yet. Certainly
the influence of the United States is being brought
to bear in a massive way to try to make it possible
for peaceful change to occur in tliis present world
situation.
We're in a rather unique position in the sense
that almost eveiy dispute in the world comes to
us in one way or another, because the parties to
the dispute seek the support of the United States
or our assistance in its settlement.
Therefore our agenda in foreign policy is filled
with what might be called other people's disputes.
We hope that our friends abroad will make as
much effort to settle their disputes with their
neighbors as they expect us to use in settling our
disputes in our particular problems.
Q. Mr. Secretary, thanh you so much for so in-
teresting, illuminating an insight into the problems
of the world crisis and our approach to them.
A. It's been a pleasure to be here.
Letters off Credence
Syrian Arab Republic
The newly appointed Ambassador of the Syrian
Arab Republic, Omar Abou Riche, presented his
credentials to President Kennedy on Januai-y 25.
For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the
President's reply, see Department of State press
release 53 dated January 25.
Kenya Expresses Gratitude
for U.S. Famine Relief
Following is an exchange of letters between
President Kennedy and Ronald G. Ngala, Leader
of the House, Nairobi, Kenya.
White House press release dated January 22
President Kennedy to Mr. Ngala
January 20, 1962
Dear Mr. Ngala: Thank you for your very
kind letter regarding American famine relief for
Kenya.
The American people were deeply moved by the
reports of the suffering caused by the prolonged
di'ought and the recent disasti'ous floods.
We are most happy to know that our food and
assistance were timely and did much to alleviate
the intense hardsliip caused by these disasters. I
very much appreciate your thoughtf ulness in writ-
ing to me on this matter.
Sincerely,
John F. Kennedy
The Honorable
Ronald Ngala,
Leader of the House,
Nairobi, Kenya
Mr. Ngala to President Kennedy
November 30, 1961
The President of the United States of America,
The White House,
Washington, D.G.
U.S.A.
Dear Mr. President : On behalf of the Govern-
ment of Kenya, I would like to offer our most
heartfelt thanks for all that your Government has
done to assist us in famine relief. The misei-y and
suffering that has been caused by this terrible dis-
aster has been greatly alleviated by the generosity
of the United States of America.
Three-hundred thousand bags of Maize which
we have received, together with proportionate
amoimts of Milk Powder and Edible Oil, to say
nothing of the free use of Hercules aircraft of the
United States Air Force, amounts to an incredibly
generous contribution.
I would like to convey our deepest gratitude.
You re sincerely,
R. G. Ngala
244
Department of Stale Bulletin
Military, Economic, and Political Necessities in the Cold-War World
hy U. Alexis Johnson
Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs '
We have heard three thoughtful presentations
on the various facets of comnmnism and the threat
that it presents not only to us but to freedom
everywhere. These threats pose a challenge
wliich requires us to undertake many defensive
measures — militaiy, economic, and political — not
only liere in the United States but throughout the
world. However, I am sure that you will agree
that in our own society, as well as in our relations
with the rest of the world, we cannot confine our-
selves to simply the negative concept of countering
Communist threats, important though that is. To
do so would only court eventual disaster.
While there are some things that we must do
because of the threat, such as our military defense,
we need also to keep our eyes focused on the great
constructive tasks that face us within and with-
out this country. We need, for example, to con-
tuiue our eii'orts to secure equal rights and justice
for every American citizen, not because of com-
mmiism but because it is right and in accordance
with our own ideals to do so. Similarly, we sup-
port the liquidation of colonialism, not because it
is a good tactic against communism but rather be-
cause it is in accord with the oldest and deepest
of the impulses that foi-med this nation. Also
we are moved to ext«nd a helping hand to those
less fortmiate than ourselves, not just to fight
communism but because it lies deep within us as
individuals and as a nation that to do so is right.
There is, however, one field in which we are
forced to respond directly to the Communist chal-
lenge, and that is the field of defense. It is amply
clear to everyone that, unless we have sufficient
military power to deter and defend ourselves from
'Address made before an American Bar Association
seminar on communism at St. Louis, Mo., on Jan. 26
(press release 54 dated Jan. 25) .
februatY 12, 1962
626826—62 3
open militai-y attack, other aspects of our policy
would avail us little. The key question is, of
course, what is "adequate"' and what the balance
should be in the use of our finite resoui'ces. Since
World War II every administration in Washing-
ton has had to stniggle with this problem and to
make decisions that are truly "agonizing." In
one sense, in this age of intercontinental ballistic
missiles, within minutes able to deliver thermo-
nuclear warheads on any other part of the globe,
tliere can be no adequate defense. Yet in another
sense, it is entirely feasible and possible to have
such strength that the enemy knows, whatever
type of surprise attack he may laimch, we would
still be able to inflict devastating damage in re-
turn. This is the meaning of deterrence.
As you all know, the Soviet Union has made
progress in developing powerful intercontinental
missiles and high-yield warheads, progress which
has been overpublicized and overalarmist at times
but which nonetheless is real and significant. We
cannot wish away this development. At the same
time, we have never lost sight of the need to build
and perfect our own deterrent. As Deputy Secre-
tary of Defense [Eoswell L.] Gilpatric stated a
few months ago,
The de.structive power which the United States could
bring to bear, even after a Soviet surprise attack upon
our forces, would be as great as — perhaps greater than —
the total undamaged force which the enemy can threaten
to launch against the United States In a first strike. In
short, we have a second strike capability which is at
least as extensive as what the Soviets can deliver by
striking first. Therefore, we are confident that the
Soviets will not provoke a major nuclear conflict.
I know that this important statement was not
made lightly. You will note tliat it was reiterated
last week by Secretary [of Defense Robert S.]
McNamara.
245
Our manned bomber force is the largest and
most powerfnl in the workl. Our intercontinental
missile forces capable of striking the U.S.S.R.
are greater than are those of the Soviet Union
capable of striking the United States. And we
intend to preserve this favorable balance. The
total number of our nuclear delivery vehicles,
tactical as well as strategic, is in the tens of thou-
sands, and we have more than one warhead for
each vehicle. Present programs emphasize the
importance of less vulnerable, hardened, and
mobile imdersea missile systems.
I do not want to suggest that any nation could
gain from a general war or satisfy real political
objectives by resort to it. But we would never
choose this path while any honorable alternative
remained, and we must insure that the Soviets
would never do so. There is considerable evidence
that the Soviet leaders recognize full well that
general nuclear war would spell utter ruin for
themselves, even if it brought niin on others.
Power To Meet Limited Wars
Apart from the cai'dinal need to deter a direct
enemy attack on the United States or NATO
[North Atlantic Treaty Organization], it has be-
come increasingly clear that we need military
power to deter and defend against limited wars.
The Soviets, and even the Chinese Communists,
have shown a healthy awareness of the dangers
of overt limited aggression. Korea involved costs
and frustrations for us, but it taught the Com-
munists an important lesson : that we would de-
fend an invaded part of the free world and use
the necessary force to prevent its being seized.
Incidentally, it also acted as the catalyst to mak-
ing NATO an effective militaiy organization
which, together with our rearmament, forever
destroyed any Soviet hopes for cheap and easy
overt conquests. Although they did not vent their
frustrations in public hearings, I am sure that
those in the Kremlin who conceived the Korean
operation never received any medals.
However, in order (o insure that the Commu-
nists do not estimate that we can be paralyzed
from taking action to meet local limited attacks be-
cause of our unwillingness to risk all-out nuclear
war, we and our allies must have visible military
power which can deter or defeat such efforts. As
the President declared in his state of the Union
address:
. . . our strength may be tested at many levels. We
intend to have at all times the capacity to resist non-
nuclear or limited attacks — as a complement to our nu-
clear capacity, not as a substitute. We have rejected any
all-or-nothing posture which would leave no choice but
inglorious retreat or unlimited retaliation.
The third and in may ways the most difEcult
military necessity is to deter or defeat to the ex-
tent possible by military means revolutionary
guerrilla wars and subversion. In the Commtmist
lexicon these are called "wars of liberation." I
add the qualification of "to the extent possible"
not because we can be stinting in this regard but
because the kind of situation we face in the Re-
public of Viet-Nam today is not just a military
problem and it cannot be met by military comiter-
measures alone. However, similar aggressions
have in the past been defeated in Greece, Malaya,
and the Philippines, and there is no reason to be-
lieve it cannot and will not similarly be defeated
in South Viet-Nam.
^Aliile the Soviet Union has recently shown
some caution in situations of potential limited war
that could easily escalate to general nuclear war,
it has not been dissuaded from revolutionary and
subversive use of violence. The Chinese Com-
munists are pressing for more vigorous and overt
support to these so-called "national liberation
wars."
We are moving better to meet these military
needs. Our strategic nuclear offensive and de-
fensive forces deter general war and overt limited
wars. Our increased conventional military power
raises the level at which we might face the
choice of using nuclear retaliation or accepting a
local defeat. We now have 16 Army and 3 Ma-
rine combat-ready divisions. Our conventional
strength, including Naval and logistical support,
and our stepped-up Special Forces training in-
creases our ability to come to the aid of our friends
threatened by local external or internal Coninui-
nist violence. Military assistance programs play
a vital role in aiding our allies and other friends,
especially against these same dangers of local
Communist use of force.
Cooperation among free- world nations is an
important element in our strength. Tlio NATO
alliance, SEATO [Southeast Asia Treaty Organ-
ization], CENTO [Central Treaty Organization],
tiie Eio Pact, and various bilateral alliances all
meet imix)rtant regional defense needs.
Success in the field of militaiy policy is decep-
246
Department of State Bulletin
lively inconspicuous. It is much easier to focus on
the ei-uption of violence in one place than on its
successful deterrence in ten others. We should
also be aware that military power has an im-
portant indirect effect on our whole political posi-
tion in the world and vis-a-vis the Communist
powers. If by our resolve and effort we have built
up military strength able to meet the many pos-
sible levels and forms of aggression, our resolve to
use it if necessary is also more surely imderstood
and thus the likelihood that we will need to use
it is reduced. "SVe must, of course, reckon with the
ever-present possibility that the other side will
miscalculate our reaction and set in motion a chain
of events beyond his intention. One of the most
important tasks of diplomacy is to prevent such
miscalculation. However, particularly in an open
society such as ours, it is difficult for our diplo-
macy to be effective in this regard unless clearly
backed by public opinion. In other words, it is
not just what our diplomats or the Voice of
America say that is important but rather what we
say and do as a people and nation that is even
more important.
Free Enterprise vs. Communist Economic System
Let us now turn from the defensive necessities
of our military requirements to the positive oppor-
tunities in the economic and political fields.
Our own economic vigor and growth is an ob-
vious objective which needs no justification on
grounds of any external threat. Similarly, the
value of vigorous successful economies throughout
the free world is readily apparent. We stand for
economic growth and economic justice, not as a
ploy to oppose communism but because it is right
in itself that we should do so. These are among
the purposes for which governments are instituted
among men. N"onetheless, we cannot dismiss the
economic aspect of our international posture in
the cold war with this simple restatement of its
importance.
The Commimist leaders, as Marxists, place great
stock in economic development. They are im-
pressed with economic power and growth, are em-
boldened by any signs of faltering in Western
economies, and are respectful of economic strength.
But, quite apart from the distorted Marxist-Len-
inist economic view of human society and the
question of the effect of our actions on the Com-
munist leaders, many others in the world look at
the respective economic and scientific-technical
achievements of the United States, on the one
hand, and the U.S.S.R., on the other, as indicators
of the superiority of the free-enterprise or Com-
munist economic and political systems. With
many new countries emerging into national mde-
pendence and groping for economic stability and
advancement, tliis question looms large. Moderni-
zation of former colonial societies and develoi:)ment
of underdeveloped economies are much more im-
portant to many in the world than ideological
appeals or traditional ties.
In dealing with these matters we must, on the
one hand, recognize the importance of semantics
in this field while at the same time not allowing
ourselves to be misled by semantics. In much of
the newly independent world the term "capital-
ism" is, in the popular mind, virtually synonymous
with "colonialism," from which they have just
freed themselves. Accordingly, "capitalism" tends
to be a "bad word." As opposed to "capitalism,"
"socialism" tends to be a "good word." Accord-
ingly, a politician seeking popular favor tends to
talk in terms of "socialism," even though his actual
approach to specific problems might be as prag-
matic as our own. For example, in India almost
any politician will speak approvingly of "social-
ism," while in actual fact the proportion of the
Indian economy that is in the public sector is con-
siderably less than here in the United States and
the private sector of the economy is growing faster
than the public sector. I mention this simply to
point out that we must use care and discrimination
in jumping to any conclusions that when the term
"socialism" is employed in other free countries it
is necessarily being used synonymously with IMarx-
ism or communism. Of course, additional confu-
sion is caused by the Communist use of the term
"socialism," although it has often been said, with
some justice, that as practiced in the Soviet Union
and its satellites the system is in fact neither
"socialism" nor "communism" but closer to what
might be called "monopolistic state capitalism,"
exercising a power to exploit far transcending the
worst period of the early industrial revolution.
The Communists attempt to advertise and ex-
aggerate their own economic progress and to cast
aspersions at real or apparent weaknesses in our
economic system. They have assiduously sought
to cultivate an image of economic growth and of
an economic system superior to any other to which
February 12, 7962
247
/^
the new countries could aspire. We can combat
tliis to some degree by better information, but we
can best dispel it by better example.
Free-World Economic Cooperation
To meet and blunt the Conmiunist economic
challenge, and still more to create a strong free
world which will blunt the Communist political
and subversive challenges, we, as the greatest free
economic power, must assist in building the eco-
nomic strength of our friends and allies. There
is little new in this. Our own early economic
development was heavily based on British and
European capital. We can assist in this process
of development in conjunction with, not at the
expense of, building our own economic future. I
am sure that with this audience I need not elab-
orate the fact that this is not a matter of charity
or unrequited sacrifice on our part but rather a
matter of our own hard self-interest in our own
economic prosperity. It is not with the poor and
underdeveloped countries of the world that we
have our largest and most beneficial trade but
with the most prosperous and the most developed
countries. Accordingly, the chief elements of this
program of free-world economic cooperation are
growth and stability among the advanced nations,
the movement of adequate amoimts of capital to
the less developed countries, and reduction of the
barriers to the free movement of goods.
In his state of the Union address, the President
noted that our actions in devising a new approach
to trade "could well affect the unity of the West,
the course of the cold war, and the economic
growth of our nation for a generation to come." -
This is not an overstatement but may even be an
understatement, for what we do in this field in
1962 may set the pattern for our entire fiiture as
a nation.
Our friends in Europe are taking fundamental
initiatives to capitalize still furtlier on the remark-
able progress in economic and political unity which
tliey have achieved over the past decade and a
half. The European Economic Conununity — the
Common Market^ — has just moved into an impor-
tant new stage, beyond the "point of no return."
Great Britain and several other countries have
now applied for membership in tlie Common Mar-
ket to join in a process wliich goes beyond economic
unity and which includes political iniity as well.
' BULLKTIN of .7.111. 2!t. l!Mi2, p. l.">9.
248
We welcome without reserve these signs and sign-
posts of progress.
But we must recognize what this means for us
and for the world in which we live and with which
we trade. In the first half of this century Europe
had to adjust to the growth of a great unified
economic, political, and military power on this
continent. To a degree we are now being required
to do the same with respect to Western Europe.
Instead of seven or more very separate and dis-
united nations, each of which we heavily over-
shadow in size and strength, we are already work-
ing with a community, well on the way to a imity,
which is closely equal to and in some ways exceeds
our own in size and potential strength.
For example, the European Economic Com-
munity with the expected inclusion of the U.K.
will have a population exceeding our own by about
40 million, with a foreign trade considerably larger
than our own. In 1960 this area produced more
.steel and coal than the United States and not far
from the same number of automobiles Its over-
all rate of economic growth in terms of gross na-
tional production was in 1960 about double that of
the United States.
Opportunities in Competitive Trading System
This is not a threat to the United States but
rather a challenge and opportunity. It is an op-
portunity to show that the free economies of the
European Economic Community, the United
States, Canada, and Japan can in an open com-
petitive trading system maintain and increase the
enonnous lead which they now have over the
closed system of the Communists. It is an op-
portunity to accept and throw back the challenge
of Premier Khrushchev when he said. "We de-
clare war upon you ... in the peaceful field of
trade. We declare war; we will win over the
U.S."
However, it is obvious that to realize these new
opportunities the old ways of doing things and
the old sliibboledis will not l>e sufficient. It is
obvious that large adjustments must be made in
our thinking and in our economy. We cannot
deny the logic in nor the strength and vitality of
the economic system for which we stand. I think
it important to remind ourselves that, while tlie
Communists control one-third of the land area
and population of the glol>e, the free world
dramatically overshadows the Communists in
Department of State Bulletin
present and potential strength. For example, the
two-thirds of the world's population making up
the free world produces about 70 percent of the
world's steel, 8i percent of its petroleum, 80 per-
cent of its aliunuium, and 80 percent of its electric
power.
The aim is, of course, to utilize these great
potentials to further accelerate the expansion and
growth of the living standards of our own people
as well as the other free-world peoples. The
opportunities truly excite the imagination. For-
tunately, the adjustments that will be required by
freer trade immediately point toward higher
standards for the American worker. It is an
important and f imdamental fact, in spite of some
defeatist talk of our inability to compete in world
markets, that our commercial exports exceed our
imports by about $3 billion a year and that our
most successful export industries are those in
which the wage rates are highest. In general
wage rates are lowest in those industries that
claim to suffer the most from import competition.
It is surely not beyond our wit to make the ad-
justments that will be required. The President
yesterday submitted to the Congress a comprehen-
sive program in this whole field.^ I commend it to
you for most earnest study, not as partisans of any
particular interest but as partisans of these United
States.
The Communist bloc is, of course, not idle in
this field of trade. Although their trade is still
only a veiy small fraction of that of the free- world
countries, their trade outside the bloc has ap-
proximately doubled in the last 5 years. They
have particularly concentrated on purchasing
from economically weak countries goods which
tliose countries have difficulty in selling elsewhere.
In turn they usually demand that the country
accept Soviet bloc goods in payment, at inflated
prices. As of 1960 the Sino-Soviet bloc had ap-
proximately 300 trade agreements with 32 nations.
Somewhat over 200 of these agreements were with
less developed coimtries. The challenge that
faces us in this regard, of course, is our ability to
provide reasonably stable markets at reasonably
stable prices for the raw materials and foodstuffs
which are the very lifeblood of trade for these less
developed countries. To us a 25-percent change
in the price of rubber or wool may mean a few
' For text of President Kennedy's message on trade,
see p. 231.
cents' difference in the price of a tire or a suit.
To a country whose exports may consist of 50
percent or more of rubber or wool, just as ex-
amples, it may mean the difference between bank-
ruptcy and sufficient income to carry forward the
economic development programs of these coun-
tries. We cannot afford to be indifferent to tliis
situation, and the present administration has in-
dicated its willingness to examine these problems
on a pragmatic case-by-case basis.
International Development Assistance
Let us now turn to tliis question of foi'eign aid,
both in its military and economic aspects. First,
although we commonly use the term "aid" in this
comitry, I personally wish that it could be avoided.
If there's one thing above all others that the
newer nations of the world are seeking for them-
selves it is a sense of self-respect. To the degree
that we are able to show ourselves understanding
of this natural desire and avoid implications of
superior attitudes, it will assist in building with
these countries the friendly, cooperative relation-
ship that we are seeking. Thus I feel we should
emphasize that, while the initials of the name of
the new agency in this field spell "aid," its title
is in fact Agency for International Development,
for it is international development that is our
goal. This development, of course, must come
primarily from within the countries themselves
and by their own efforts. However, our coopera-
tion with them in assisting in furnishing those
elements in their development which they cannot
furnish themselves is often the key to their success
or failure. This may take different forms, pri-
marily technical advice, capital, or equipment.
In this endeavor we are no longer alone, for the
Western European comitries and Japan are in-
creasingly contributing in this field by economic
assistance through grants, loans, and investments.
Work is this field is being closely coordinated
through a variety of devices, including the De-
velopment Assistance Committee, a subordinate
body of the OECD [Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development], which meets in
Europe. In addition there are the consortia or-
ganized by the World Bank. For example, in
Jime 1961 under such a consortium five countries
other than the United States, along with the World
Bank, brought their total commitments to Paki-
stan's second 5-year plan to about $270 million;
February 72, 7962
249
and during this week the Pakistan consortium
has been meeting to consider still additional
commitments.
The Marshall plan dramatically illustrated
what could be accomplished in the developed area
of Europe. Indeed it is the very success of our-
selves and Europe in rebuilding its economy, as
well as its social and political system, that has
given rise to the Berlin crisis. Berlin was the focal
point for competition between the two systems.
The Communist system was finally forced to
admit its defeat in this competition by building
the wall.
The free-enterprise system of Japan has also
shown its ability to outproduce the Communist
system. In contrast to the drop in industrial pro-
duction in Communist Qiina the last 2 years, the
astonishing Japanese rate of growth has very con-
siderably exceeded even the most exaggerated
Communist claims for their territories. While
food production in Communist China has been
dropping heavily in per capita terms, it has been
rising in almost all of free Asia. Thus I think
that we can take heart that the efforts of the coun-
tries themselves and our assistance to them is gen-
erally being put to good use. As the economies
of these countries develop, not only will they be-
come more stable politically and less subject to
Commimist blandishments and influence, but, as
more prosperous trade partners, they will con-
tribute directly to our own economy. We are thus
making an investment in our own future. For
example, if, on a per capita basis, our exports to
the imderdeveloped free countries were raised to
only one-half of our present level with the de-
veloped countries, it would approximately triple
our present exports.
I suppose that it is still true that the most sin-
cere form of flattery is imitation. It was in 1955
that the Communist bloc began seriously to at-
tempt to imitate us in this field of foreign assist-
ance. Despite the formidable economic problems
still faced within the bloc, between 1055 and 1960
the bloc made approximately $4 billion in com-
mitments for economic assistance and probably at
least $1.5 billion for military assistance. They are
taking a gamble on extending their influence
through this means. The best way to assure that
this gamble fails is for us not to let any country
feel it can prosper only — or best — through ac-
cepting Communist assistance. We need not and
do not try to "outbid" the Communists, nor do we
permit any one to "blackmail" us into giving as-
sistance by threatening to turn to the Soviets.
However, if we are going to win in this economic
competition, we must continue to show our willing-
ness to help free countries to help themselves in
an atmosphere free of coercion. For this we need
not and should not necessarily expect gratitude
from the recipients. Wliat we can and do expect
is that they maintain their independence.
Free-World Unity Must Be Maintained
Military and economic requirements are impor-
tant aspects of our foreign policy, supplementing
our diplomatic activities. But the basic arena of
world action and conflict is political. Military,
economic, foreign infonnational, and diplomatic
moves and campaigns all contribute to our politi-
cal posture.
The Soviets also recognize the political founda-
tion of ideological and power conflict. They have
always integrated their overall strategy on this
basis. Displays or boasts of military prowess,
vaunting of scientific achievements such as the
first satellites and manned orbital flights, pro-
posals for disarmament, shoepounding at the U.N.,
and many other kinds of activities are calculated
moves in a political campaign designed to further
Soviet influence through the world. We certainly
do not want to imitate the methods of the Com-
munists, but we must understand their purposes
if we are effectively to deal with them.
The first political necessity of the cold war is
basic United States unity, the kind of national
unity which produces one clear American voice —
not a dissonant chorus. There may be differing
views on the relative priorities of particular prob-
lems or solutions. But the very real bipartisan —
really, above-partisan — unity on our fundamental
aims must be maintained. The Communists have
been singularly unsuccessful in attempting to di-
vide us; let us not, in our zeal to combat them,
provide unwitting service to their cause by divid-
ing ourselves.
After our unity comes the need for unity of the
alliances binding many nations of the free world
in common cause.
The NATO alliance has served as a bulwark
shielding the tremendous economic advances in
Western Europe which we have earlier noted. We
are at present faced with the Soviet challenge over
Berlin, but while this places pressure on us, the
250
Department of Sfofe Bulletin
very fact that the Soviets have been led to such
desperate straits reflects the pressures and strains
within the Communist camp. NATO has at-
tained a degree of unity and persevering effective-
ness greater than any peacetime coalition alliance
of modem times.
Southeast Asia has been rent by deep and re-
curring Communist pressures. SEATO, nonethe-
less, has provided a degree of stability that — even
if incomplete — would otherwise have been much
less. We are vigorously aiding our friends in
South Viet- Nam to repulse the Communist revolu-
tionary guerrilla warfare and local terror by which
they seek to sap tlie strength and subvert the power
of the Government. Laos has been torn, but we
are actively seeking to help the Lao establish a
truly neutral government which will reflect the
disparate elements of the country.
We are associated with the Central Treaty Or-
ganization, tying Turkey, easternmost member of
NATO, with Pakistan, westernmost partner in
SEATO, and embracing Iran. Bilateral treaties
bind us to Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Re-
public of China, the Philippines, Australia, and
New Zealand.
The Rio Pact brings us together with the coun-
tries of Latin America against any aggressor from
without. Canada and the United States have
very close ties to permit the fullest joint efforts in
the common defense.
There is another grouping to which we belong,
one less complete and more ambitious — the United
Nations. Perhaps the violence and virulence of
Communist objections to the strengthening of the
U.N. is one of the most telling tributes to its ad-
vance. The U.N. is a great challenge in its own
right; it is also a battleground, since the Com-
munists make it so. It is one where we can, and
must, continue to strive for a wider understanding
in the world of our goals — and a wider under-
standing of the goals of the Communist powers.
The overwhelming failure of the Communists at
the last session of the General Assembly to suc-
ceed in their long campaign to emasculate the po-
sition of the Secretary-General is witness to tlie
attitude of the overwhelming majority of the free
nations.
Negotiations are, of course, a political necessity.
In this world today it is probably no less necessary
to maintain lines of conmiunication with one's
enemies than with one's friends.
Disarmament negotiations are particularly im-
portant. Recognizing the great dangers of the
terrible new engines of war, we must do all we can
to chain them. Frankly, given the Soviet attitude
to date, there seems little hope that we shall make
significant progress in the near future toward dis-
armament. But we must keep trying, both to find
any suitable safeguarded steps which can be taken
and to make clear to all that it is not we who stand
in the way of progress in this field.
These are some of the political elements in our
policy. But they do not add up to a complete
picture. We must have, and we do have, a more
fundamental and far-reacliing positive goal which
goes beyond these important contributions toward
meeting the Communist threat. Our main and
positive political objective is the establishment of a
stable world of viable, free nations. In his state
of the Union speech, President Kennedy set this
forth clearly when he said :
Yet our basic goal remains the same: a peaceful world
community of free and independent states, free to choose
their own future and their own system so long as it does
not threaten the freedom of others.
Some may choose forms and ways that we would not
choose for ourselves, but it is not for us that they are
choosing. We can welcome diversity — the Communists
cannot. For we offer a world of choice — they offer the
world of coercion.
While the challenges we face are great, our re-
sources for meeting them are even greater. There
is much to do, but we as a people have always dem-
onstrated our ability to do what must be done. I
am confident that we will continue to do so.
Ambassador Bowles Visits Middle East,
Africa, South Asia, and Far East
White House press release dated January 25
The White House announced on January 25
that Cliester Bowles, the President's Special Rep-
resentative and Adviser on African, Asian, and
Latin American Affairs, will make a trip to the
Middle East, Africa, South Asia, and the Far
East at the President's request.
One major purpose of Ambassador Bowles'
trip will be to participate in the meetings of the
U.N. Economic Commission for Africa at Addis
Ababa, Ethiopia, and the U.N. Economic Com-
mission for Asia and the Far East at Tokyo, Ja-
pan. Ambassador Bowles will aJso chair a
February 12, 1962
251
regional conference of U.S. ambassadors and their
principal advisers in East and Southeast Asia, to
be held in early March at Baguio in the Philip-
pines.
In connection with his responsibilities as Presi-
dential adviser for these areas, Ambassador
Bowles will make a series of other stops en route
to these three meetings to discuss policies and op-
erations with the various U.S. ambassadors and
their staffs. In the course of the trip Mr. Bowles
will also meet with a number of heads of govern-
ment and otlier foreign officials to discuss problems
of mutual concern.
The Ambassador expects to depart Washington
February 8 and will return Marcli 19 at the con-
clusion of the ECAFE conference at Tokyo.
A Balance Sheet on U.S. Foreign Policy
hy Chester Bowles ^
A year ago this Saturday a new administration
took office at a time of great crisis and uncertainty
in our relations with the world. Mid-January
19G2 is, therefore, a fitting time for a stocktaking
of our successes and setbacks so that we may better
chart the course that lies ahead.
It is particularly important that we examine not
only the current crises but also the forces that have
created tliese crises. The dramatic news from
abroad that dominates the headlines reflects the
clash and ferment of powerful pressures which are
transforming the lives of men and nations in every
continent.
What is the significance of these forces ? How
are we to evaluate our response to them ? Above
all, how well have we been doing as a nation?
These are important questions to which thousands
of thoughtful citizens are seeking answers.
In many cases this essential democratic task of
review and appraisal is conducted soberly,
thoughtfully, and with a deep sense of history.
Other analyses, however, reflect misinformation,
fear, and lack of balance that leads them to assert
American omnipotence in one breath and impo-
tence in the next.
For instance, in a recent issue of a great maga-
' Addres.s made before the Detroit Press Club at Detroit,
Mich., on Jan. 10 (press release 20 dated Jan. 15). Mr.
Bowles is the President's Special Representative and Ad-
viser on African, Asian, and Latin American Affairs.
zine whose circulation runs into the millions at
home and abroad, a sweeping indictment of the
conduct of American foreign policy begins with
these words:
While Americans watch, the driving engine of commu-
nist aggression rolls relentlessly on, dealing us psychologi-
cal and political defeats in every corner of the world from
Laos to Cuba to Berlin. And as our record of cold-war
losses mounts, people ask : What's wrong? What has
happened to the experts who shape and carry out our
foreign policy? Why aren't ice fiyhting back effect ii'elyf
The author of this article proceeds to answer his
own question : "Time and again," he writes, "State
has demonstrated (1) unwillingness to face the
reality of an enemy bent on our desti-uction, (2)
inability to compete."
Such indictments can only provide fuel for the
frustrated extremists who have been proposing
that the United States withdraw from the United
Nations, abandon its alliances, undermine its for-
eign trade by raising tariffs, slash its national taxes
and budgets, and simultaneously lamich hostilities
against everyone with whom we disagree.
Under these circumstances indictments of this
kind cannot be disregarded. Are we in fact "los-
ing" the cold war? Is our Government stumbling
ineptly from failure to failure? Is it true that
the State Department is loiided with bumbling
incompetents while, as some say, "the driving
engine of communist aggression rolls relentlessly
on"?
252
Department of Slate Bulletin
Factors Shaping U.S. Policy
In order to put these questions in clear perspec-
tive, let us briefly consider, first, the global forces
with which our foreign policies must contend, and,
second, the foreign policy commitments made by
the Kennedy administration before assuming
office.
As the United States emerged from its long
period of isolation following the war, it has been
confronted with a world dominated by four revolu-
tions of unprecedented dimensions.
The first of these revolutions is the so-called
revolution of rising expectations that has resulted
in the formation of 42 new countries in the last
15 years and in the liberation of more than one-
third of all manltind from European colonial rule.
The second great revolution is the emergence of
the Soviet Union under communism as a major
industrial and military power that frankly seeks
to expand its totalitarian control.
The third revolutionary change is the awaken-
ing of China, the world's most populated nation,
to become a major political and military force in
Asia.
Fourth and finally, there is the sweeping revolu-
tion in science and teclmology that has provided
weapons which are already capable of destroying
much of civilization.
Tliese are the global forces that confronted the
Kennedy administration when it assumed office 1
year ago next week. Now what about the new
course of action in the conduct of our foreign re-
lations to which the new administration has
pledged itself?
Tliis course of action has been laid down in
President Kennedy's speeches and in his book The
Strategy of Peace, in the records and writings
of his key associates and advisers, in the foreign
policy sections of the party platform adopted at
the Los Angeles convention in 1960, in the debates
during the campaign itself, and finally in the in-
augural ' and stat« of the Union * addresses last
January. It may roughly be summarized as
follows :
1. To reappraise our entire defense structure
and our ability to fulfill our overseas commit-
ments, and to modernize and bring into balance
both our conventional and nuclear weajjons
systems.
•For text, see Buixetin of Feb. 6, 1961, p. 175.
' For text, see ihid., Feb. 13, 1961, p. 207.
2. To seek the basis for a safeguarded and effec-
tive worldwide disarmament program, bringing
the State Department, Pentagon, and Atomic En-
ergy Commission together on a common, national
arms control policy, under the leadership of a
newly formed Disarmament Agency.
3. To reorganize the foreign aid program so that
it might be placed on a continuing basis with a
new sense of direction, new standards, new pur-
poses, fresh personnel, and improved administra-
tion.
4. To develop a new approach to Latin America
in keeping with the tradition of the good-neighbor
policy so that the tragic betrayal of the Cuban
revolution would not be repeated elsewhere in this
hemisphere.
5. To review our relations with Europe and the
NATO alliance with a view to encouragmg the
economic and political integration of that con-
tinent and closer cooperation with the Atlantic
community.
6. To develop a fresh approach to the problems
of colonialism, identifying ourselves with the con-
structive forces of change which are now reshaping
Africa and Asia.
7. To fully recognize the crucial significance
of such key Asian nations as Japan and India
by strengthening our relations with them and
helping them to build deeply rooted democratic
and prosperous societies.
8. To make a new effort to resolve the complex
and explosive difficulties of Southeast Asia which
had been inherited from the postwar period.
9. To undertake a continuing effort to improve
our relations with the Soviet Union, fully recog-
nizing the obstacles involved wliile being prepared
to negotiate on any issues, limited or broad, while
there is a chance for progress.
This, then, is the background of challenge and
commitment against which the record of the Ken-
nedy administration's first year in office may
properly be judged.
In reviewing that record, it is crucially im-
portant to maintain a balanced perspective. As
Mr. Eoscoe Drummond wrote a few days ago, any-
one who dispenses verbal "tranquilizer pills" to the
public is "doing the American people an acute dis-
service." Our problems are very real, and we will
minimize them only at our peril.
Yet I believe that any honest and informed
examination of our foreign policy balance sheet
February 72, J962
253
will reveal a combination of successes, near-misses,
and disappointments tliat is far more favorable
than might be assumed from those who have so
bitterly attacked the record.
Shield of Military Defense
Let us begin by looking at the improvement in
the essential tools of foreign policy, the instru-
ments with which we work.
For instance, an adequate shield of military de-
fense is absolutely essential to the vigorous and
effective conduct of our world relationships. In
the past 12 months this administration has taken
several major steps to fulfill Secretary McNa-
mara's [Secretary of Defense Eobert S. McNa-
mara] promise to redress the worldwide military
balance and to make our Military Establisluuent
"a more effective servant of United States foreign
policy."
Specifically, we have increased by 50 percent the
number of strategic bombers that are prepared to
take off in 15 minutes in case of threatened attack.
We have increased our Polaris submarine force
goals by 50 percent. We are doubling our capacity
to produce Minuteman intercontinental ballistic
missiles. We have substantially increased the
number of combat-ready ground forc« units, es-
pecially the size of the antiguerrilla forces so
important in Asia. At the same time the admin-
istration has eliminated a great many obsolete
installations and has formed a imified strike com-
mand combining some of the best elements of the
Army and the Tactical Air Force.
As a result, a greatly improved balance has been
achieved between nuclear and conventional strik-
ing power. If naked aggression should occur we
are now far less likely to find ourselves confronted
with the Hobson's choice of all-out nuclear war
or abject surrender.
Foreign Aid
A second paramount tool of foreign policy,
operating behind our military shield, is our over-
seas assistance program. With the establishment
of the new Agency for International Development,
this administration has for the first time put our
massive aid program on a long-term, centralized,
businesslike basis.
Let us briefly consider some of the basic changes
in our AID operations.
A most important new development is the estab-
lishment of clearly defined objectives. Bitter
criticism of the aid programs in recent years had
created an increasingly negative response among
Americans. Although no one doubted that we
were opposed to the Communists, there was con-
siderable uncertainty about the kind of societies
we were striving to create.
The new program is designed not only to dis-
courage communism but positively to encourage
those governments which are determined to de-
velop their own resources, with increasing individ-
ual opportunity and justice and with maximum
freedom of choice. Every effort is being made to
persuade developing nations to undertake pro-
grams that will enable them ultimately to sustain
their own growth and thus free them from the
need for outside assistance.
To attain this goal the new assistance program
concentrates on countrywide planning rather than
individual project construction. It embodies the
realization that our assistance can never be truly
effective in many areas of the world without inter-
nal reforms and a greater measure of social justice.
Strong inducements are included to promote such
reforms and to encourage a greater proportion of
self-help. The new emphasis is on loans rather
than grants.
We have also taken steps to obtain increased
help from other Western nations in underwriting
the economic plans of the developing nations.
This effort is being promoted through OECD
[Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development], a new organization of some 20
Atlantic countries, plus Japan.
Overseas Information Program
A thiixi foreign policy tool we have sought to
strengthen and expand is the United States In-
formation Agency under the able leadership of
Ed Murrow.
USIA now maintains 219 posts in 99 countries.
Daily news reports and analyses are being broad-
cast over 87 radio transmitters, several of which
are of 250,000- watt strength. More are now being
built. Through other media, as well, substantial-
ly more information about the American people,
their Government, and its policies, in more lan-
guages and in more places, is being given out by
USIA than ever before.
Equally important, striking improvements have
254
Department of State Bulletin
been achieved in the quality and persuasiveness of
our overseas information work. America and
Americans are now being presented not as a self-
satisfied, smug people who have solved all their
problems but ratlier as members of a dynamic
democratic society aware of their own defects and
working to correct them, ready and anxious to
cooperate as partners with other non-Communist
peoples, proud of their great liberal traditions,
strong and determined to resist aggression while
always holding the door open to peaceful settle-
ments.
Reorganization of Overseas Operations
Tlie fourth and last aspect of our effort to im-
prove our vital tools of foreign policy has con-
cerned the strengthening of the State Department
itself and particularly the reorganization of our
overseas operations.
The initial step was to review the special quali-
ties now required of our ambassadors in an age
of greatly expanded and more complex foreign
operations. The time-honored practice of award-
ing a high proportion of ambassadorships to
wealthy campaign contributors is a political luxury
we can no longer afford. Almost without excep-
tion the 20-odd new noncareer ambassadors
appointed by the new administration are men with
extensive foreign policy experience, largely drawn
from university faculties and foundations. The
percentage of Foreign Service career ambassadors
appointed in 1961 was the highest in history.
A special effort has been made to promote out-
standing younger men in the Foreign Service, who
are likely to be more flexible and perceptive in
dealing with the problems of young and newly in-
dependent nations. Nearly all ambassadors now
speak the language of official discussion of the
country of their assignment.
A second step was to clarify the ambassador's
authority over the total United States program
in any country. Representatives of the Pentagon,
the Peace Corps, USIA, Food-for-Peace, AID,
and other Government departments such as Com-
merce, Labor, and Treasury are now operating un-
der his overall direction. The result in greatly
improved operations is already apparent.
A series of seven regional conferences has been
held in Asia, Africa, and Latin America to thrash
out specific obstacles to improved administration.
These conferences produced nearly 200 proposals
for administrative changes, a large number of
which have already been acted upon. The result
has been a substantial elimination of red tape,
the cutting down of needless reports, the speeding
up of communications and action from Washing-
ton, and far better coordination with the United
Nations and other specialized agencies.
U.S. Foreign Policy Strengtlis
I have thus far been discussing the operational
tools of foreign policy — the military, the Agency
for International Development, the United States
Information Service, and the State Department.
I believe that substantial progress has also been
made in many phases of policymaking itself. Let
me briefly review our efforts in specific coimtries
and regions.
In Latin America we have embarked on a bold,
fresh effort with the Alliance for Progress. This
dramatic new program can help create the kind
of continuing social and economic revolution
which has given our own country much of its
dynamic strength but which has been stifled in
many Latin American nations by strongly en-
trenched groups which oppose change in any
form.
As more just, democratic societies begin to
emerge, as economies expand, and as wealth is
distributed more broadly, there will be far less
likelihood of communism or any foreign totali-
tarian movement taking root in this hemisphere.
Indeed, the record since the war shows that no
free, prosperous, dynamic, and just society has
ever been subverted by communism from within.
Meanwhile, Castro's bloodthirsty, fanatic, and
irresponsible leadership has slowly reduced his
early appeal in most Latin American countries.
At the same time pressures within the Domini-
can Eepublic have forced out the notorious right-
wing Trujillo regime. In cooperation with the
Organization of American States, a potentially
explosive situation appears to have been brought
under control and a transition to orderly and
progressive government is under way.
In Africa, despite a succession of crises, con-
siderable progress has also been made. From a
high point in the summer of 1960 Soviet influence
has decreased in many areas, not the least of which
is the Congo itself. In Guinea, once considered a
Soviet pawn, the Government has recently dis-
missed the Soviet Ambassador. Nigeria and
February 12, 1962
255
Tanganyika have emerged as strong, free nations;
Uganda and Kenya soon will become independent.
The Congo, of course, continues to present diffi-
culties of vast proportions. Here the new admin-
istration has faced some of its most complex policy
choices, each with its own built-in risks.
For instance, we might have abandoned the
Congo as a hopeless mess and left it to work out
its own solution. This would have resulted in
continumg bloody chaos and the likely establish-
ment of a Communist stronghold in the heart of
Africa.
As an alternative we could have moved in mas-
sively with our own troops and resources. This
would have been extremely costly both in blood
and budgets. Almost certainly it would also have
produced a vigorous Soviet coimteraction.
The choice we made — all-out support for a coor-
dinated United Nations military and economic
effort — involves many obvious difficulties. Yet on
balance it appears both more promising and less
dangerous than either of the other two.
In the Far East, meanwhile, we have seen some
signs of improvement in the relations between
Japan and Korea and considerable improvement
in the relations of each of these key nations with
the United States. A series of Cabinet-level meet-
ings with the Japanese * served to strengthen our
relationship and to prepare for future coopera-
tion in a great many projects that the industriali-
zation and modernization of Japan will permit her
to undertake. In Koi'ea we have established
friendly ties with an energetic new government,
and we are working out new aid in defense agree-
ments.
In Southeast Asia the fighting in Laos has been
stopped, at least temporarily, while negotiations
in Geneva among the interested powers offer at
least some hope for a greater measure of stability.
In Europe we have seen the extraordinary de-
velopment of the Common Market as a prelude
to a strong anti-Communist united Europe.
Great Britain's decision to join the Common Mar-
ket may in retrospect turn out to be one of the
most significant events of the year.
This developing new community of nations has
a highly educated and technically skilled popula-
tion of 350 million, whose standard of living is
second only to that of the United States. Its
'For background, see ibid., Nov. 27, 1901, p. 890.
256
long-term economic and political implications are
staggering. By demonstrating the errors in Karl
Marx' analysis of economic and political forces,
it provides a powerful magnet for the unhappy
East European satellites. It also offers an ex-
ample to the underdeveloped areas of the world of
what free economies can accomplish working in
partnership.
In the United Nations we have scored a signal
success in obtaining the election by an overwhelm-
ing vote of an able and respected Acting Secre-
tary-General with full powers. This was
accomplished in the face of a savage Soviet at-
tempt to wreck the Organization with the troika
proposal. We have also been successful, I might
add, in keeping out Red China, pending a modi-
fication of its aggressive attitude toward Formosa
and its neighbors to the south.
In its first year the Kennedy administration has
also organized a new Disarmament Agency, set up
a greatly expanded Food-for-Peace effort wliich
has sharply increased our distribution of "surplus"
food i^roducts, and launched the dramatic new
Peace Corps, which is attracting thousands of
young men and women to the service of democracy
overseas.
This list of accomplislunents in the complex
field of foreign affairs achieved by a new admin-
istration in the space of a single year provides
a convincing answer to the reckless charge of
stagnation and incapacities within our National
Government.
The Soviet Record
Now let us briefly examine the Soviet record
to which many of tlie critics of this administra-
tion's record pay such extravagant tribute. How
does the outlook appear from the Kremlin ?
Certainly the Communist world is not happy
over the growing rift between Russia and China.
This division not only strikes at the very base of
Conununist cooperation and policymaking; it
opens up a genuine military problem in the Soviet
rear.
Although the erection of the Berlin barrier
creates extremely serious problems for the West,
it also provides striking evidence of the failure of
the Communist system in East Germany.
Similar failure is also revealed in the continu-
ing bitterness and political undependability, from
Department of State Bulletin
the Soviet point of view, of the peoples of Poland,
Hungary, and other satellite countries.
The sterility of Soviet policies in many other
parts of the world, notably in Africa, the Middle
East, Japan, and India, has also become increas-
ingly clear in recent months.
Where Have We Failed?
Now what about the less favorable side of our
balance sheet? "Wliat are the weaknesses?
Where have we failed ?
A frank review reveals several situations on
which no progress has been made and others where
our position has deteriorated.
Although we have successfully coordinated our
own approach to disarmament and succeeded in
shifting much of the onus for the present impasse
to the Soviet Union, no tangible gains have been
achieved. Indeed, the tempo of the arms race
has ominously increased.
Continuing Soviet intransigence on disarma-
ment and the stepped-up pressures on Berlin
appear to have been stimulated in some degree by
Soviet disappointments in Asia, Africa, and Latin
America and by the strengthening of the Com-
mon Market. But whatever the reasons, our
relations with Moscow remain tense and our
efforts to ease the tensions have thus far been
ineffective.
The end of the Berlin crisis is difficult to see.
To ease the danger of an open break, a new agree-
ment is needed which will in some way assure the
future of West Berlin. Tliis is necessary because
the future of that city, its very life, lies in the
morale of its people. Their morale, in turn, de-
pends on the protection of Berlin's economic and
political viability.
In our own hemisphere, while the Castro in-
fluence has considerably lessened, there is no doubt
that we suffered a serious setback last April.
In Southeast Asia the problems that confront
us continue to be grim. Although the fighting,
for the present at least, has stopped in Laos, it
has increased in intensity in Viet-Nam. The con-
tinuing crisis in these former French colonies has
its origins in the late forties and early fifties, when
the Communists were permitted to assume the
mantle of nationalism in a war of national
liberation.
In Laos our objective remains the creation of a
neutral and independent nation, pure and simple.
This objective is in line with reality. Had we
been willing to settle for such an objective sonie
years ago, both we and the war-weary Laotians
would be better off today.
In Viet-Nam the guerrilla depredations of the
Communists are reaching new heights. The situ-
ation there is not a happy one, and none of the
choices confronting us assure a happy solution.
We are working vigorously not only to strengthen
the Viet-Nam military and police capacity to deal
with this insurgent but to promote the essential
reforms which will give the people a cause for
which to fight.
The stability of East Asia is further endangered
by the continuing development of a bellicose at-
titude of Communist China. One of the primary
unfinished tasks of American foreign relations is
to devise a balanced long-range China policy. It
is not enough simply to oppose year after year
China's entrance into the United Nations. We
must counter the challenge in much greater depth
and devise programs that will enable us to deal
more effectively with all possible developments.
Some Fundamental Questions
An objective review of American foreign policy
in 1961 must also include several additional ques-
tions of a fundamental nature which still remain
unanswered : For instance, can we organize our re-
sources and muster the will necessary to fulfill
the extraordinary hopes that have been created by
the Alliance for Progress? Can we speed up our
overseas aid operations, cutting red tape, improv-
ing our standards, resisting pressures to preserve
right-wing dictators who have little eupport
among their people ? Above all, can we find some
means of breaking the deadlock on arms control
with agreement on effective inspection safeguards
that will lessen the chance of nuclear war ?
Resolutions for 1962
One thing at least is certain : 19G2 like 1961 will
have its full quota of challenges, its own surprises,
and its own hard decisions. As we prepare for
these clearly predictable trials, some New Year's
resolutions may be in order. Here are a few that
strike me as relevant and important :
Let us give more adequate attention to the long-
range forces which create the crises with which we
must deal.
February 72, 1962
257
Let us develop greater patience in dealing with
the swings of the political pendulum and resist the
temptation to see every issue in black-and-white
terms.
Let us put our aid program on a sound basis of
self-help in such a manner that nations will be
encouraged to produce not only more goods and
services but also a greater measure of social justice
and individual participation.
Let us not allow developing nations to turn the
possession of a local Communist minority into a
national asset, like oil, coal, or uranium, that auto-
matically qualifies them for maximum U.S. assist-
ance.
Let us use our increased military strength and
the advantages of the new European union to re-
invigorate the NATO defense system so that it will
indeed be a genuine counterbalance to Soviet
power.
Let us further improve and expand our infor-
mation and cultural programs both at home and
abroad.
In particular, let us strengthen the communica-
tions system between Washington policymakers
and the American people so that our foreign poli-
cies are better explained and more clearly under-
stood.
Let us also hope that our news media will be
more willing to report the accomplishments of our
National Government as well as the crises, the ef-
forts as well as the needs, and the disasters that
have been averted as well as the setbacks that have
occurred.
Above all, let us come to realize that we Ameri-
cans are not omnipotent, that we cannot mold
every situation to our wishes, that the United
States represents only 6 percent of the population
of this planet, and that we can never run it, even
if we wanted to do so.
The Kremlin cannot run it either. With an
angry China on its flank, an increasingly restless
youth, a set of unhappy satellites, and an economy
staggering under the burden of an immense war
machine, the Kremlin faces problems that I for one
would not exchange for our own. The Russians
are not all 10 feet tall.
Unhappily, this does not make our task any
easier or the danger any less. Indeed, the gi"ow-
ing difficulties with which the Kremlin must con-
tend may help explain the reckless military pres-
sure in Berlin and elsewhere.
What we Americans will need most in the try-
ing months ahead is a proper sense of perspective,
a clearer understanding of the scope and nature
of the challenge, and a keener appreciation of our
own great moral and material strength.
Our long-term national purpose is the purpose
of nearly all mankind : the gradual creation of a
world in which an increasing measure of individ-
ual dignity, self-government, and material welfare
may gradually become a reality. I believe that
the historians of our time will record that in 1961
we made a good beginning.
U.S. To Give Dominican Republic
$25 Million as Emergency Credit
Statement by President Kennedij
White House prcsa release dated January 22
The Government of the United States is en-
couraged by the present trend in the Dominican
Republic and the steps taken toward the restora-
tion of orderly democratic processes in that
country. The Dominican Republic people have
gone through a difficult period which has had un-
favorable, though temporary, economic repercus-
sions. I have reviewed these problems with the
United States Coordinator for the Alliance for
Progress, Mr. Teodoro Moscoso, who, along with
other experts, recently visited the Dominican Re-
public at my request.^
As a result of this review and in view of the
urgent nature of the Dominican Republic's bal-
ance-of-payment situation, the United States is
willing to make available up to $25 million as
emergency credit.
U.S. Military Assistance Team
Visits Dominican Republic
Press release 66 dated January 26
The Departments of State and Defense an-
nounced on Januai-y 26 that, at the invitation of
the Government of the Dominican Republic, a
United States military team headed by Brig. Gen.
William A. Enemark, USA, Director, Western
Hemisphere, Office of Assistant Secretary of
* For a White House announcement of the departure of
a faotlindinK mission to the Dominican Republic, see
Bulletin of .Ian. 20, 1962, p. 177.
258
DepartmenI of Sfafe Bulletin
Defense (International Security Affairs), De-
partment of Defense, will arrive in the Dominican
Republic on January 28 for a stay of several days.
The team will be prepared to survey with the
Dominican authorities the possibilities for a pro-
gram of military assistance and cooperation
within the framework of the democratic and con-
stitutional government being achieved in the
Dominican Republic.
President of Brazil Visits U.S.
White House press release dated January 20
President Joao Belchior Marques Goulart of
Brazil has accepted an invitation from President
Kennedy to visit the United States as a Presiden-
tial guest beginning February 20.
President Goulart will spend 2 days at Wash-
ington, where he will meet with President Ken-
nedy, Secretary of State Rusk, and other high
officials of the U.S. Government. He will spend
the following 3 days at New York as the guest of
the U.S. Government.
Depending on the time available and the pro-
gram to be organized, it is possible that at the end
of his official visit the President of Brazil might
spend several more days in the United States in a
private character in order to visit some industrial
and technological research centers of interest in
connection with Brazilian economic development.
GATT Cotton Textile Committee
Meets at Geneva
The Department of State announced on Jan-
uary 26 (press release 57) that W. Michael
Blumenthal, Deputy Assistant Secretaiy for
Economic Affairs, would serve as delegate and
chairman of the U.S. delegation ^ to the second
session of the Cotton Textile Committee of the
Greneral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade at
Geneva January 29-February 9.
The meeting will continue the work initiated
by the 19-nation Committee in its first session
October 23-27, 1961, and will consider recom-
mendations made by its technical subcommittee
concerning a long-term solution to the problems
involved in international trade in cotton textiles.
Current Treaty Actions
MULTILATERAL
Atomic Energy
Amendment of article VI.A.3 of the Statute of the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency (TIAS 3873). Done at
Vienna October 4, 1961."
Acceptance deposited: Holy See, January 11, 1962.
Automotive Traffic
Convention on road traflBe, with annexes. Done at
Geneva September 19, 1949. Entered into force
March 26, 1952. TIAS 2487.
Notifications received that they consider themselves
bound: Dahomey, December 5, 1961; Ivory Coast,
December 8, 1961.
Aviation
Convention on international civil aviation. Done at Chi-
cago December 7, 1944. Entered into force April 4, 1947.
TIAS 1591.
Adherences deposited: Gabon, January 18, 1962; Mauri-
tania, January 13, 1962.
Narcotic Drugs
Convention for limiting the manufacture and regulating
the distribution of narcotic drugs, as amended (61 Stat.
2230; 62 Stat. 1796). Done at Geneva July 13, 19.31.
Entered into force July 9, 1933. 48 Stat. 1543.
Notification received that it considers itself bound:
Dahomey, December 5, 1961.
Protocol bringing under international control drugs out-
side the scope of the convention limiting the manu-
facture and regulating the distribution of narcotic drugs
concluded at Geneva July 13, 1931 (48 Stat. 1543), as
amended (61 Stat. 2230: 62 Stat. 1796). Done at Paris
November 19, 1948. Entered into force December 1.
1949 ; for the United States, September 11, 1950. TIAS
2308.
Notification received that it considers itself bound:
Dahomey, December 5, 1961.
Trade and Commerce
Arrangements regarding international trade in cotton tex-
tiles^ Done at Geneva July 21, 1961. Entered into
force October 1, 1961. TIAS 4884.
Acceptances deposited: United Kingdom and Hong
Kong,' December 7, 1961.
Wheat
International wheat agreement, 1959, with annex. Opened
for signature at Washington April 6 through 24, 19.59.
Entered into force July 16, 1959, for part I and parts
III to VIII, and August 1, 1959, for part II. TIAS 4302.
Acceptance deposited: Italy, January 25, 1962.
BILATERAL
Ghana
General agreement for a program of scientific coopera-
tion In the field of biomediclne. Signed at Accra Jan-
uary 3, 1962. Entered into force January 3, 1962.
Paraguay
Cooperative mapping agreement. Signed at Asunci6n
January 16, 1962. Entered into force January 16, 1962.
^ For the members of the U.S. delegation, see Depart-
ment of State press release 57 dated Jan. 26.
' Not in force.
' Subject to understiindings.
February 12, 7962
259
List of Treaties by Subject '
TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS RELATING TO
DOUBLE TAXATION IN FORCE BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES AND OTHER COUNTRIES'
Argentina
Agreement for relief from double taxation on earnings
from operation of ships and aircraft. Exchange of
notes at Washington July 20, 1950. Entered into force
July 20, 1950. 1 UST 473; TIAS 2088; 89 UNTS 63.
Australia
Convention for avoidance of double taxation and preven-
tion of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income.
Signed at Washington May 14, 1953. Entered into
force December 14, 1953. 4 tJST 2274; TIAS 2880;
205 UXTS 253.
Convention for avoidance of double taxation and preven-
tion of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on estates
of deceased persons. Signed at Washington May 14,
1953. Entered into force January 7, 1954. 5 UST 92;
TIAS 2903 ; 205 UNTS 277.
Convention for avoidance of double taxation and preven-
tion of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on gifts.
Signed at Washington May 14, 19.")3. Entered into
force December 14, 1953. 4 UST 2264; TIAS 2879;
205 UNTS 237.
Austria
Convention for avoidance of double taxation with re.spect
to taxes on income. Signed at Washington October 25,
1956. Entered into force October 10, 1957. 8 UST
1699 ; TIAS 3923 ; 299 UNTS 123.
Belgium
Agreement relating to relief from double income tax on
shipping profits. Exchange of notes at Brussels Janu-
ary 28, 1936. Entered into force January 28, 1936. 49
Stat. 3871 ; BAS 87 ; 166 LNTS 333.
Convention for avoidance of double taxation and preven-
tion of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income.
Signed at Washington October 28, 1948. Entered into
force September 9, 1953. 4 UST 1647 ; TIAS 2833 ; 173
UNTS 67.
Convention modifying and supplementing income tax con-
vention of October 28, 1948. Signed at Washington
September 9, 1952. Entered into force September 9,
1953. 4 UST 1647 ; TIAS 2833 ; 173 UNTS 67.
Convention further supplementing income tax convention
of October 28, 1948. Signed at Washington August 22,
1957. Entered into force July 10, 1959. 10 UST 1358;
TIAS 4280.
Agreement extending to Belgian Congo and to Trust Ter-
ritory of Ruanda-Urundi income tax convention of
October 28, 1948, as modified and supplemented. Ex-
change of notes at Washington April 2, 1954, and
July 28, 1959. Entered into force July 28, 1959. 10
UST 1358; TIAS 4280.
Agreement for avoidance of double taxation on profits
' This is the second of a series of lists, by subject, of
bilateral treaties to which the United States is a party.
For a list of treaties of friendship, commerce, and nav-
igation, see Bui-usTiN of Sept. 25, 1961, p. 530.
"The following conventions and agreements have also
been signed but have not entered into force: Belgium —
estates and successions. May 27, 1954; Canada — estates,
Feb. 17, 1961; India— income, Nov. 10, 19.'J9, and under-
standings thereto, Apr. 1 and 7, liHU) ; I.srael — inc-ome,
Sept. 30, 1960; Japan — income — supplementary. May 7,
1960; United Arab Republic — income, Dec. 21, 1960.
from operation of aircraft. Exchange of notes at
Washington July 18, 19.53. Entered into force July 18,
1953. 4 UST 2030; TIAS 2858; 180 UNTS 9.
Brazil
Arrangement relating to relief from double income tax
on shipping profits. Exchanges of notes at Rio de
Janeiro March 5, May 31, and September 17, 1929:
March 11, August 21, and September 1, 1930. Entered
into force September 1, 1930. 47 Stat. 2620 ; EAS 16 ;
126 LNTS 465.
Canada
Arrangement relating to relief from double income tax
on shipping profits. Exchange of notes at Washing-
ton August 2 and September 17, 1928. Entered into
force September 17, 1928. 47 Stat. 2580; EAS 4; 95
LNTS 209.
Convention and protocol for avoidance of double taxation
and prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes
on income. Signed at Washington March 4, 1942. En-
tered into force June 15, 1942. 56 Stat. 1399 ; TS 983 ;
124 UNTS 271.
Convention modifying and supplementing income tax con-
vention and protocol of March 4, 1942. Signed at Ot-
tawa June 12, 1950. Entered into force November 21,
1951. 2 UST 2235; TIAS 2347; 127 UNTS 67.
Convention further modifying and supplementing income
tax convention and protocol of March 4, 1942. Signed
at Ottawa August 8, 1956. Entered into force Sep-
tember 26, 1957. 8 UST 1619 ; TIAS 3916 ; 293 UNTS
344.
Convention for avoidance of double taxation and preven-
tion of fiscal evasion in the case of estate taxes and
succession duties. Signed at Ottawa June 8, 1944. En-
tered into force February 6, 1945. 59 Stat. 915; TS
989 ; 124 UNTS 297.
Convention modifying and supplementing estate tax con-
vention of June 8, 1944. Signed at Ottawa June 12,
1950. Entered into force November 21, 1951. 2 UST
2247 ; TIAS 2348 ; 127 UNTS 57.
Colombia
Agreement for relief from double taxation on earnings
from operations of ships and aircraft. Exchange of
notes at Washington August 1, 1961. Entered into
force December 11, 1961. TIAS 4916.
Congo CI-eopoldville>
Income tax convention between the United States and
Belgium of October 28, 1948, as modified (TIAS 2833,
4280). Extended to the Congo by exchange of notes
between the United States and Belgium April 2, 1954,
and July 28, 1959 (TIAS 4380). Applicable to tie
Congo for taxable years beginning on or after January
1, 1959. (Further details under Belgium.)
Cyprus
Income tax convention between the United States and the
United Kingdom of April 16, 1945, as modified (TIAS
1546, 3165, 4124). Extended to Cyprus by exchange of
notes between the United States and the United King-
dom August 19, 1957, and December 3, 1958 (TIAS
4141). Applicable to Cyprus January 1, 1959. (F^irther
details under United Kingdom.)
Denmark
Agreement relating to relief from double Income tax on
shii)i>ing profits. Exchanges of notes iit Washington
May 22, August 0 and 18, October 24, 25, and 28, and
December 5 and 6, 1922. Entered into force December 6,
1922. 47 Stat. 2612; EAS 14; 113 LNTS 381.
Convention for avoidance of double taxation and preven-
tion of fiscal evasion with resi>eot to taxes on income.
Signed at Washington May 6, 1948. Entered into force
De<-eniber 1, 1948. 62 Stat. 1730; TIAS 1854; 26
UNTS 55.
260
Department of State Bulletin
Finland
Convention for aToidance of double taxation and preven-
tion of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on estates
and inheritance. Signed at Washington March 3, 1952.
Entered into force December 18, 1952. 3 UST 4464;
TIAS 2595 ; 177 UNTS 141.
Convention for avoidance of double taxation and preven-
tion of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income.
Signed at Washington March 3, 1952. Entered into
force December 18, 1952. 3 UST 4485; TIAS 2596;
177 UNTS 163.
France
Agreement relating to relief from double income tax on
shipping profits. Exchange of notes at Washington
June 11 and Julv 8, 1927. Entered into force July 8,
1927. 47 Stat. 2604 ; EAS 12 ; 114 LNTS 413.
Convention and protocol for avoidance of double taxation
and establishment of rules of reciprocal administrative
assistance in income and other taxes. Signed at Paris
Julv 25, 1939. Entered into force December 30, 1944.
59 Stat. 893 ; TS 988 ; 125 UNTS 2.59.
Convention for avoidance of double taxation and preven-
tion of evasion of taxes on estates and inheritances, and
modifying and supplementing the income tax conven-
tion of July 25, 1939. Signed at Paris October 18, 1946.
Entered into force October 17, 1949. 64 Stat. (3) B3;
TIAS 1982; 140 UNTS 23.
Protocol modifying the estate tax convention of October
18, 1946, and further modifying and supplementing the
income tax convention of July 25, 1939. Signed at
Washington May 17, 1948. Entered into force October
17, 1949. 64 Stat. (3) B28; TIAS 1982; 140 UNTS 50.
Convention further supplementing the income and estate
tax conventions of July 25, 1939, and October 18, 1946.
Signed at Washington June 22, 1956. Entered into
force June 13, 1957. 8 UST 843; TIAS 3844; 291
UNTS 101.
Germany, Federal Republic of
Convention for avoidance of double taxation with respect
to taxes on income.' Signed at Washington July 22,
1954. Entered into force December 20, 1954. 5 UST
2768 ; TIAS 3133 ; 239 UNTS 3.
Greece
Convention and protocol for avoidance of double taxation
and prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on
estates of deceased persons. Signed at Athens Febru-
ary 20, 1950, and July 18, 1953. Entered Into force
December 30, 1953. 5 UST 12; TIAS 2901; 196 UNTS
269.
Agreement to correct certain errors in English text of
estate tax convention of February 20, 1950. Exchange
of notes at Athens August 3 and 19, 19.54. Entered into
force August 19, 1954. 5 UST 1543; TIAS 3032; 222
UNTS 423.
Convention and protocol for avoidance of double taxation
and prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on
income. Signed at Athens February 20, 1950, and
April 20, 1953. Entered into force December 30, 1953.
5 UST 47 ; TIAS 2902 ; 196 UNTS 291.
Honduras
Convention for avoidance of double taxation and preven-
tion of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income.
Signed at Washington June 25, 1956. Entered into
force February 6, 1957. 8 UST 219; TIAS 3766; 279
UNTS 113.
Iceland
Agreement relating to relief from double income tax on
• Applicable to Land Berlin.
February 12, 1962
shipping profits. Exchanges of notes at Washington
May 22, August 9 and 18, October 24, 25, and 28, and
December 5 and 6, 1922. Entered into force December
6, 1922. 47 Stat. 2612; EAS 14; 113 LNTS 381.
Ireland
Arrangement relating to relief from double income tax on
shipping profits. Exchange of notes at Washington
August 24, 1933, and January 9, 1934. Entered into
force January 9, 1934. 48 Stat. 1842 ; EAS 56.
Convention for avoidance of double taxation and preven-
tion of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on estates
of deceased persons. Signed at Dublin September 13,
1949. Entered into force December 20, 1951. 2 UST
2294 ; TIAS 2355 ; 127 UNTS 119.
Convention for avoidance of double taxation and preven-
tion of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income.
Signed at Dublin September 13, 1949. Entered into
force December 20, 1951. 2 UST 2303 ; TIAS 2356 ; 127
UNTS 89.
Italy
Convention for avoidance of double taxation and preven-
tion of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on estates
and inheritances. Signed at Washington March 30,
1955. Entered into force October 26, 1»56. 7 UST
2977 ; TIAS 3678.
Convention for avoidance of double taxation and preven-
tion of fiscal evasion with resi)ect to taxes on income.
Signed at Washington March 30, 1955. Entered into
force October 26, 1956. 7 UST 2999; TIAS 3679.
Japan
Arrangement relating to relief from double income tax
on shipping profits. Exchange of notes at Washington
March 31 and June 8, 1926. Entered into force June 8,
1926. 47 Stat. 2578 ; EAS 3 ; 108 LNTS 463.
Convention for avoidance of double taxation and preven-
tion of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on estates,
inheritances, and gifts. Signed at Washington April 16,
1954. Entered into force April 1, 1955. 6 UST 113;
TIAS 3175 ; 238 UNTS 3.
Convention for avoidance of double taxation and preven-
tion of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on Income,
with exchange of notes. Signed at Washington April
16, 1954. Entered into force April 1, 1955. 6 UST
149 ; TIAS 3176 ; 238 UNTS 39.
Protocol supplementing income tax convention of April
16, 1954. Signed at Tokyo March 23, 1957. Entered
into force September 9, 1957. 8 UST 1445 ; TIAS 3901 ;
291 UNTS 332.
Netherlands
Convention with respect to taxes on income and certain
other taxes. Signed at Washington April 29, 1948. En-
tered into force December 1, 1948. 62 Stat. 1757 ; TIAS
1855 ; 32 UNTS 167.
Protocol supplementing income tax convention of April
29, 1948, to facilitate extension to Netherlands Antilles.
Signed at Washington June 15, 19.55. Entered into
force November 10, 1955. 6 UST 3696; TIAS 3366;
239 UNTS 342.
Agreement relating to application of income tax conven-
tion of April 29, 1948, as supplemented, to the Nether-
lands Antilles. Exchanges of notes at Washington
June 24 and August 7, 1952, September 15, November 4
and 10, 1955. Entered into force November 10, 1955.
6 UST 3703 ; TIAS 3367 ; 239 UNTS 346.
New Zealand
Convention for avoidance of double taxation and preven-
tion of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income.
Signed at Washington March 16, 1948. Entered into
force December 18, 1951. 2 UST 2378 ; TIAS 2360 ; 127
UNTS 133.
261
Nigeria
Income tax convention between the United States and the
United Kingdom of April 16, 1945, as modified (TIAS
1546, 3165, 4124). Extended to Nigeria by exchange of
notes between the United States and the United King-
dom August 19, 1957, and December 3, 1958 (TIAS
4141). Applicable to Nigeria for United States tax
January 1, 1959, and for Nigerian tax April 1, 1959.
(Further details under United Kingdom.)
Norway
Convention for avoidance of double taxation and preven-
tion of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on estates
and inheritances. Signed at Washington June 13, 1949.
Entered into force December 11, 1951. 2 UST 2353;
TIAS 2358; 127 UNTS 163.
Convention for avoidance of double taxation and pre-
vention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income.
Signed at Washington June 13, 1949. Entered into
force December 11, 1951. 2 UST 2323 ; TIAS 2357 ; 127
UNTS 189.
Convention modifying and supplementing income tax con-
vention of June 13, 1949. Signed at Oslo July 10, 1958.
Entered into force October 21, 1959. 10 UST 1924 ; TIAS
4360.
Pakistan
Convention for avoidance of double taxation and pre-
vention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income.
Signed at Washington Julv 1, 1957. Entered Into force
May 21, 1959. 10 UST 984 ; TIAS 4232 ; 344 UNTS 203.
Panama
Arrangement providing relief from double income tax on
shipping profits. Exchange of notes at Washington
January 15, February 8, and March 28, 1941. Entered
into force March 28, 1941. 55 Stat. 1363 ; EAS 221 ; 103
UNTS 163.
Sierra Leone
Income tax convention between the United States and the
United Kingdom of April 16, 1945, as modified (TIAS
1546, 3165, 4124). Extended to Sierra Leone by ex-
change of notes between the United States and the
United Kingdom August 19, 1957, and December 3, 1958
(TIAS 4141). Ai)plicable to Sierra Leone for United
States tax January 1, 19.59, and for Sierra Leone tax
April 1, 1959. ( Further details under United Kingdom.)
South Africa, Republic of
Convention for avoidance of double taxation and for estab-
lishing rules of reciprocal administrative assistance for
taxes on income. Signed at Pretoria December 13,
1946. Entered into force July 15, 1952. 3 UST 3821 ;
TIAS 2510; 167 UNTS 171.
Protocol supplementing income tax convention of Decem-
ber 13, 1946. Signed at Pretoria July 14, 1950. Entered
into force July 15, 1952. 3 UST 3821; TIAS 2510; 167
UNTS 171.
Convention with respect to taxes on estates of deceased
persons. Signed at Capetown April 10, 1947. Entered
into force July 15, 1952. 3 UST 3792 ; TIAS 2509 ; 167
UNTS 211.
Protocol supplementing estate tax convention of April 10,
1947. Signed at Pretoria July 14, 1950. Entered into
force July 15, 1952. 3 UST 3792; TIAS 2509; 167
UNTS 211.
Spain
Arrangement relating to relief from double income tax on
shipping profits. Exchange of notes at Washington
April 16 and June 10, 1930. Entered into force June 10,
1930. 47 Stat. 2584 ; EAS 6 ; 120 LNTS 407.
Sweden
Arrangement relating to relief from double income tax on
shipping profits. Exchange of notes at Washington
March 31, 1938. Entered into force March 31, 1938.
52 Stat. 1490 ; EAS 121 ; 189 LNTS 327.
Convention and protocol for avoidance of double taxation
and establishment of rules of reciprocal administrative
assistance in income and other taxes. Signed at Wash-
ington March 23, 1939. Entered into force November
14, 1939. 54 Stat. 1759; TS 958; 199 LNTS 17.
Switzerland
Convention for avoidance of double taxation with respect
to taxes on income. Signed at Washington May 24,
1951. Entered into force September 27, 1951. 2 UST
1751 ; TIAS 2316 ; 127 UNTS 227.
Convention for avoidance of double taxation with respect
to taxes on estates and inheritances. Signed at Wash-
ington July 9, 1951. Entered into force September 17,
1952. 3 UST 3972 ; TIAS 2533 ; 165 UNTS 51.
United Kingdom
Convention and protocol for avoidance of double taxation
and prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on
income.* Signed at Washington April 16, 1945, and June
6, 1946. Entered into force July 25, 1946. 60 Stat. 1377 ;
TIAS 1546; 6 UNTS 189.
Supplementary i)rotocol amending income tax convention
of April 16, 1945.' Signed at Washington May 25, 1954.
Entered into force January 19, 1955. 6 UST 37 ; TIAS
3165 ; 207 UNTS 312.
Supplementary protocol further amending income tax con-
vention of April 16, 1945.' Signed at Washington August
19, 1957. Entered into force October 15, 1958. 9 UST
1329 ; TIAS 4124 ; 336 UNTS 330.
Agreement relating to extension to specified British terri-
tories of income tax convention of April 16, 1945, as
modified.' Exchange of notes at Washington August 19,
1957, and December 3, 1958. Entered into force Decem-
ber 3, 1958. 9 UST 1459 ; TIAS 4141 ; 351 UNTS 368.
Convention for avoidance of double taxation and preven-
tion of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on estates of
deceased persons. Signed at Washington April 16, li)45.
Entered into force July 25, 1946. 60 Stat. 1391 ; TIAS
1547 ; 6 UNTS 359.
* Application of convention as modified extended to .\den,
Antigua, Barbados, Cyprus, Dominica, Falkland Islands,
G.Tmbia, Grenada, British Honduras, Jamaica, Montserrat,
Federation of Nigeria, Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasa-
laiul, St. Christopher, Nevis and Anguilla. St. Lucia, St.
Vincent, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Trinidad and Tobago,
British Virgin Islands.
262
Department of State Bulletin
February 12, 1962
Index
Vol. XLVI, No. 1181
Africa. Ambassador Bowles Visits Middle East,
Africa, South Asia, and Far East 251
Asia. Amliassador Bowles Visits Middle East, Af-
rica, South Asia, and Far East 251
Brazil. Tresident of Brazil Visits IJ.S 259
Communism
Military, Kconntuic, and Political Necessities in the
Cold-War World (Johnson) 245
Secretary Uusli Interviewed on "Today" Show . . 241
Congress, The
Balauce of Payments (excerpt from President's Eco-
nomic Report) 239
A New Foreign Trade Program (Kennedy) . . . 231
Cuba. Secretary Rusk Interviewed on "Today"
Show 241
Dominican Republic
U.S. Military Assistance Team Visits Dominican
Republic 258
U.S. To Give Dominican Republic $25 Million as
Emergency Credit (Kennedy) 258
Economic Affairs
Balance of Payments (excerpt from President's
Economic Report) 2.39
GATT Cotton Textile Committee Meets at Geneva . 259
List of Treaties by Subject (double taxation) . . 260
Military, Economic, and Political Necessities in the
Cold-War World (Johnson) 245
A New Foreign Trade Program (Kennedy) . . . 231
U.S. To Give Dominican Republic $25 Million as
Emergency Credit (Kennedy) 258
Foreign Aid
A Balance Sheet on U.S. Foreign Policy (Bowles) . 252
Kenya Expresses Gratitude for U.S. Famine Relief
(Kennedy, Ngala) 244
Military, Economic, and Political Necessities in the
Cold-War World (Johnson) 245
Germany. Secretary Rusk Interviewed on "Today"
Show 241
International Information. A Balance Sheet on
U.S. Foreign Policy (Bowles) 252
International Organizations and Conferences.
GATT Cotton Textile Committee Meets at
Geneva 259
Kenya. Kenya Expresses Gratitude for U.S. Fam-
ine Relief (Kennedy, Ngala) 244
Middle East. Ambassador Bowles Visits Middle
East, Africa, South Asia, and Far East .... 251
Military Affairs
Military, Economic, and Political Necessities in the
Cold-War World (Johnson) 245
U.S. Military Assistance Team Visits Dominican
Republic 258
Presidential Documents
Balance of Payments 239
Kenya Expresses Gratitude for U.S. Famine Relief . 244
A New Foreign Trade Program 231
U.S. To Give Dominican Republic .$25 Million as
Emergency Credit 258
Syria. Letters of Credence (Rich4) 244
Treaty Information
Current Treaty Actions 259
List of Treaties by Subject (double taxation) . . . 260
U.S.S.R. A Balance Sheet on U.S. Foreign Policy
(Bowles) 252
United Nations. Secretary Rusk Interviewed on
"Today" Show 241
Name Index
Agronsky, Martin 241
Bowles, Chester 252
Chancellor, John 241
Johnson, U. Alexis 245
Kennedy, President 231,239,244,258
Ngala, Ronald 244
Rich^, Omar Abou 244
Rusk, Secretary 241
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: January 22-28
Press releases may be obtained from the Office of
News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.
Release appearing in this issue of the Bulletin
which was issued prior to January 22 is No. 29 of
January 15.
No. Date Subject
47 1/22 Rusk ; interview on "Today."
*48 1/22 U..S. participation in international con-
ferences.
t49 1/24 Tubby: "Is Foreign Aid Really Neces-
sary?"
*50 1/24 Tubby : Georgia Radio and Television
Institute.
t51 1/24 Trezise : "The Case for American Trade
With Japan."
t52 1/24 Educational exchange agreement with
Ghana.
53 1/25 Syrian Arab Republic credentials (re-
write).
54 1/25 Johnson : "Military, Economic, and Po-
litical Necessities in the Cold-War
World."
t55 1/25 Rusk : OAS foreign ministers meeting.
56 1/26 U.S. military assistance team visits
Dominican Repulilic.
57 1/26 Delegation to GATT Cotton Textile
Committee (rewrite).
t58 1/27 Tubby designation, Geneva (rewrite).
*Xot printed.
tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin.
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in the world of the 1960's. . . . What we do affects everybody. In
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^"iflR 1 1962
Vol. XLVI, No. 1182 February 19, 1962
L'fPOSfTORY
REPORT TO THE NATION ON THE PUNTA DEL
ESTE CONFERENCE • by Secretary Rusk 267
AMERICAN REPUBLICS UNITE TO HALT SPREAD
OF COMMUNISM IN WESTERN HEMISPHERE •
Statements by Secretary Rusk and Texts of Resolutions . . 270
SECRETARY RUSK'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF
FEBRUARY 1 284
THE PRESIDENT'S TRADE PROGRAM— KEY TO
THE GRAND DESIGN • by Under Secretary McGhee . 289
THE CASE FOR AMERICAN TRADE WITH JAPAN •
by Philip H. Trezise 294
IITED STATES
REIGN POLICY
For index see inside back cover
THE DEPARTIVIENT OF STATE
Vol. XLVI, No. 1182 • Pubucation 7340
February 19, 1962
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Report to the Nation on the Punta del Este Conference
hy Secretary Rush ^
Good evening. Thank you for joining us. I
have reported to President Kennedy on tlie recent
meeting of inter- American foreign ministers in
Pmita del Este," and he has asked me to share this
report with you.
We met there with the other American Eepub-
lics to decide what we should do together to meet
the mounting Communist offensive in our hemi-
sphere. This offensive is worldwide, but there is
no part of it which concerns us more intimately or
more seriously than the systematic subversive at-
tack under way in the Americas, spearheaded by
the present regime in Cuba.
It is for that reason that I should like to talk to
you this evening about this conference and its re-
sults. First, a word of background. In August
1960, 17 months ago, there was a meeting of for-
eign ministers which discussed the Cuban prob-
lem in San Jose, Costa Rica.^ At that time the
foreign ministei-s agreed to condemn outside in-
tervention in the affairs of this hemisphere, and
they reafBnned in broad terms their faith in de-
mocracy and their rejection of totalitarianism.
But they were not then prepared to take concrete
steps aimed at the Communist offensive in gen-
eral and Cuba in particular. In fact Cuba was
not even named in the declaration, and some dele-
gations said that it should not be interpreted as
applying specifically to Cuba.
Communist Nature of Castro Regime
But during these past 17 months there has been
a far-reaching change in the attitudes of both
governments and peoples.
The Communist nature of the Castro regime has I
* Made over radio and television on Feb. 2 (press re-
lease 76; as-delivered text).
' See p. 270.
' For background and text of Declaration of San Jos6,
see BuiXEriN of Sept. 12, 1960, p. 395.
become more apparent to all — and so have its ag-
gressive designs.
The Castro regime voted consistently with the.
Commmiist bloc at the United Nations. It built
up its military strength with the help of Com-
munist arms. It used its embassies in Latin
America as centers of espionage and subversion.
Thirteen American governments broke off all dip-
lomatic relations with Cuba. It sought to intimi-
date, subvert, and harass free governments and
nations, as reported to our meeting by the Inter-
American Peace Committee of the OAS [Organi-
zation of American States] . And Castro himself,
in early December, publicly confessed what every-
one had come to know : that he is a Marxist-Lenin-
ist and would be until he dies.
At the same time it became apparent through-
out the Americas that Castroism was not the an-
swer to their hopes for economic and social prog- j
ress. They saw many Cubans who had originally
joined with Castro in the honest belief that they
were striking a blow for democracy and for eco-
nomic and social reform become disillusioned with
his dictatorship and his subservience to a foreign
power. And, perhaps most important of all, they
saw new hope and real action in President Ken-
nedy's Alliance for Progress,' a peaceful, construc-
tive, and cooperative effort by free men to achieve
rapid economic and social progress through free
institutions.
Accomplishments of Meeting
We met at Punta del Este against the back-
ground of these changes. What was accom-
plished ?
First, in a strong resolution that named names
and minced no words, we declared unanimously —
* For background, see iUd., Sept. 11, 1961, p. 459.
February 19, J 962
267
except for Cuba, of course — that the Castro-Com-
I munist offensive in this hemisphere is a clear and
' present danger to the unity and freedom of tlie
American Republics. Even as we met, reports
came in from several countries of efforts by small
Communist-led minorities to disrupt constitutional
government and the will of the majority.
Second, the ministers agreed, again unani-
mously, that the hemisphere is bound together by
two powerful ties: by its commitment to human
rights, social justice, and political democracy and
by its commitment to exclude from this hemi-
sphere the intervention of outside powers. On
these grounds we concluded, again unanimously,
"That the present Government of Cuba, which has
officially identified itself as a Marxist-Leninist
I government, is incompatible with the principles
and objectives of the inter- American system."
Third, on the basis of this unanimous conclu-
sion, a two-thirds majority decided "That this
incompatibility excludes the present Government
. of Cuba from participation in the inter- American
system." Seventeen had declared that "the pres-
ent government of Cuba has vohmtarily placed
j itself outside the inter- American system." In-
' eluded in this majority were those who felt them-
selves to be, and are, under special attack by Castro
communism.
Fourth, recognizing that the threat of Cuba is
an active threat to the security of the hemisphere
and not merely a matter of ideological incompati-
bility, the foreign ministers, once again unani-
mously, officially ejected the Cuban regime from
I the Inter-American Defense Board, where their
representatives had already been excluded from
confidential discussions. In addition we estab-
lished special machinery within the OAS to rec-
ommend joint action that can block Communist
I subversive activities before they reach the level
' of insurrection or guerrilla war.
Fifth, this meeting decided, again unanimously,
to prohibit trade and traffic in arms between Cuba
and the other American countries. No American
government is now selling arms to Cuba, but we
are determined to do everything necessary to stop
illicit trade or traffic to or from Cuba within this
hemisphere.
Sixth, the Council of the Organization of Amer-
ican States was asked to explore further trade
restrictions, applying to Cuba the same kind of
machinery that was applied last year to the Do-
minican Republic,'' and giving special attention
to items of strategic importance.
Seventh, and finally, the foreign ministers unan-
imously recognized that the struggle against com-
munism in this hemisphere is not merely a ques-
tion of a defense against subversion but of positive
measures as well — economic, social, and political
reforms and development, to meet the legitimate
aspirations of our peoples. In tliis spirit the gov-
ernments committed themselves anew to the great
constructive tasks of the Alliance for Progress.
Signs of Strength of OAS
The rollcall of votes on these resolutions pro-
vided a dramatic demonstration of two important
points.
First, that Cuba stands alone in the Americas.
No other nation voted with its delegates in opposi-
tion to any of these resolutions. We listened to
their longplaying records of invective and abuse
and then got on with our business. They made no
progress with their threats and pleas, they could
find no comfort in any differences among the rest
of us, and finally they withdrew altogether.
The other point is that honest debate was a sign
of strength in the Organization. Unless we know
that the votes which are cast represent the convic-
tions of the governments, the votes themselves
would fail to carry conviction. The fact that dif-
ferences were registered is an insurance that the
unanimity, when expressed, was genuine.
There was no disagreement over the incompati-
bility of the Cuban regime and the inter- American
system. But some governments sincerely felt that
additional legal and technical steps were necessary
before the exclusion of Cuba from participation in
the official agencies of the system could be finally
settled. Wliile they abstained on that vote, how-
ever, all joined in the condemnation of communism
and the present Cuban regune.
Those who spoke for our own Government were
united in their efforts and their satisfaction at the
result. President Kennedy's leadership and the
respect in which our neighbors hold him were evi-
dent throughout the conference.
We were fortunate in having as advisers to our
delegation the chairmen and ranking minority
"For biukgronnd, see ibid., Sept. 5, lOCO, p. 355, and
Feb. 20, 19C1, p. 273.
268
Department of Sfafe Bulletin
members of the Senate and House subcommittees
on inter- American affairs: Senator [WayneJ
Morse, Senator [Bourke B.] Hickenlooper, Con-
gressman [Armistead I.] Selden, and Congress-
man [Chester E.] Merrow. They were of gi'eat
help. We worked on a nonpartisan basis, with
full cooperation between the executive and legis-
lative brandies. Aiid every American can draw
satisfaction from the results of the conference.
But there was an even larger result. An in-
ternational organization such as the Organization
of American States, the OAS, can maintain its
vitality only if it faces up to the issues — no matter
how difficult — which tlie moving course of history
places on its agenda. Because the problems posed
by Cuba and the Communist offensive in this
hemisphere affected each government somewhat
differently, there has been some uncertainty about
whether the OAS was capable of taking hold of
this crucial issue on a collective basis. I believe
that uncertainty has now ended.
The OAS demonstrated that it is a living politi- ^
cal body capable of reconciling different points of j
view in order to move ahead together. It has
proved itself capable of boldly facing a problem
of utmost gravity and taking constructive steps
toward a solution. It has proved itself capable of
sustaining a lively debate on a matter of law and
procedure without losing its poise or its under-
lying unity. Above all, it has demonstrated how
democratic nations, bound together by commit-
ments of principle and geographic association,
can conduct serious business as friendly and digni-
fied partners.
No conference could, by itself, eliminate the
problem of communism in this hemisphere. But
the results of this conference were deeply reassur-
ing. The hemisphere has taken a long stride
forward.
No Quarrel With Cuban People
I might conclude with a point on which there
was, again, unanimity. An empty seat at the
OAS table is no cause for joy. The rest of us have
no quarrel with the Cuban people — only with the
regime which has fastened itself upon that coim-
try. Our Latin American friends are bound to
the Cuban people by powerful ties of culture and
tradition. We ourselves expelled colonialism from
Cuba and provided for its independence. And
that is why all delegations joined in a common
hope that we shall be able to welcome a free gov-
ernment of Cuba back into the family of the
hemisphere.
We talked at Punta del Este about defending the
hemisphere against the Communist threat, because
that was the subject of our meeting. But defense
is only a part of the job. Our main business is
the great creative task of building in these con-
tinents vibrant societies, firmly rooted in the loy-
alty and pride of their peoples, societies which are
secure from attack primarily because their own
people would not have it otherwise.
Thank you and good night.
February 19, 1962
269
American Republics Unite To Halt Spread of Communism in Western Hemisphere
The Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs,
Serving as Organ of Consultation in Application of the Inter-American
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, was held at Punta del Este, Uruguay,
January 22-31. The meeting was convoked hy a resolution of the Council
of the Organization of American States on December 4, 1961, to '■'■consider
the threats to the peace and to the political independence of the American
states that might arise from tlie intervention of extracontinental poioers
directed toward breaking American solidarity.''''
Following are statem,ents made hy Secretary Rusk upon his departure
for the meeting and at the sessions of January 25 and 31, together with
texts of the nine resolutions adopted on January 31 and explanatory state-
ments hy several delegations.
DEPARTURE STATEMENT, JANUARY 20
Press release 45 dated January 20
The Eighth Meetuig of Consultation of the
American Foreign Ministers, which will begin on
Monday in Punta del Este, Uruguay, is of para-
mount importance to the Organization of Ameri-
can States, in fact to the entire inter-American
system.
Meeting at the request of the Government of
Colombia, the ministers will be seeking agreement
on measures appropriate to the present situation ;
that is, one in which Cuba, a member government
of the Organization of American States, lias made
itself an accomplice to the Communist conspiracy
dedicated to tlie overthrow of the representative
governments of the hemisphei'e.
I am confident that the foreign ministers, rec-
ognizing the danger which this situation presents
to our free societies and the collective security of
the hemisphere, will find within the inter- Ameri-
can system the most effective possible means for
the protection and strengthening of the principles
upon which this system was founded.
STATEMENT OF JANUARY 25
Press release 55 dated January 25
It is a very great pei'sonal pleasure for me to
be here for my first meeting with my colleagues
of the Americas. The fact that I find among them
a number of old friends enliances that pleasure.
I join my colleagues in expressing our deep
appreciation to the Government of Uruguay for
the warm hospitality which we are enjoying in
this lovely place and for all the arrangements
which were made on relatively short notice to
make this meeting possible. Secretary of State
Stettinius once said that there might not have
been a Charter of the United Nations had it not
been for the weather and charm of San Francisco.
I am confident that Punta del Este is making its
own special contribution to the unity, strength,
and progress of the inter- American system.
For the second time in 6 montlis the nations of
the Americas meet here in pursuit of tlieir com-
mon goal — social progress and economic growth
within a community of free and independent na-
tions. But this time we come to take measures to
safeguard that freedom and independence so that
in the future we may devote all our efforts to so-
cial progress and economic growth.
We are assembled again on the eastern shore of
a vast continent. Across this continent millions of
our people are struggling to throw off tlie bonds
of hunger, poverty, and ignorance — to affirm the
hope of a better life for themselves and their chil-
dren. Ijast August we joined in a historic docu-
ment, the Charter of Punta del Este, setting forth
the goals, the machinery, and the commitments
270
Department of State Bulletin
necessary to transform that hope into reality.
Last August we joined hands in a great alliance —
the Alianza para el Progreso}
Since that time in every part of the hemisphere
we have moved forward with fresh energy in ful-
fillment of the pledges we solemnly undertook to
the people of the Americas. The task ahead is
vast. Everyone in this hall knows the mighty ef-
fort which will be required to break the ancient
cycle of stagnation and despair. But the need for
action is urgent. Across the world the winds of
change are blowing; awakening peoples are de-
manding to be admitted to the promise of the 20th
century. For Americans, north and south, this is
a historical challenge. As the 19th century saw
the Western Hemisphere enter the epoch of po-
litical independence, so the 20th century— if those
of us in this room, and the governments we repre-
sent, have boldness and faith — will see this hemi-
sphere enter the epoch of economic abundance.
Task of Development Measured in Years
The means by which we seek our ends are the
intelligence, decision, and will of the govern-
ments and people of the hemisphere. We cannot
hope to make progress unless the governments
of our nations faithfully meet the needs of their
peoples for education and opportimity, imless
we press steadily forward with the measures of
self-help and social reform which make develop-
ment possible and spread its benefits among all
the people. This work has already begun. Let
me say that it is unfinished business in the United
States itself. Many Latin American nations are
engaged in national plans and programs, inter-
nal reforms and action to build houses, schools and
factories, roads and dams. My own country has
already made large commitments for this fiscal
year and will have no difficulty in meeting the
more than $1 billion pledged to the first year of
the Alliance for Progress. We have together
established international machinery to stimulate
and review national plans.
This is a notable beginning. There is, of course,
much more to be done. Our task is to be measured,
not in the months of this year, but in the years of
this decade. I wish there were some way in which
we could transmit to you the depth of our affec-
tionate interest in the economic and social pros-
» Bulletin of Sept. 11, 1961, p. 459.
febtMaryj J 9, 1962
pects of this hemisphere. Perhaps you would for-
give me for a personal recollection. Like millions
of present-day North Americans, I spent my ear-
liest years in what people would now call under-
developed circumstances. We were prescientific
and pretechnical; we were without public health
or medical care; typhoid, pellagra, hookwonn, and
malaria were a part of the environment in which
providence had placed us. Our schools were prim-
itive. Our fathers and mothers earned a meager
living with backbreaking toil.
But the great adventure through which many
of us have lived has seen the transfonnation of
our lives in a short period — a transformation
brought about by the magical combination of edu-
cation, health, and increasing productivity. On
our farms we felt the impact of the indispensable
partnership among education, scientific research,
and the extension of knowledge to those who could
put it to practical use. Neighbor helped neighbor
to build a house, a barn, or to pass along news
about new prospects and new methods. They
joined together to build roads until public funds
could take over the burden. They pooled their
limited resources to hire a schoolteacher or a doc-
tor. Bits of capital began to accumulate, and this
was reinvested in growth and development. More
and more young people managed to get to the
university, and more and more of these brought
their learning back to the benefit of their own
people.
These changes did not take place without strug-
gle. Years of thought and work and debate were
required to prepare America for the necessary
steps of self-help and social reform. I remember
well the bitter resistance before Franklin
Eoosevelt was able to win support for the Tennes-
see Valley Authority, that immense network of
dams and power stations and fertilizer factories
and agricultural extension offices which has
wrought such miraculous changes in our South.
But a succession of progi-essive leaders, deter-
mined to bring about social change within a frame-
work of political consent, carried through an
"alliance for progress" within the United States.
Other parts of the hemisphere have experienced
similar improvements. What has been done for
some must now be done for all. It shall be our
common purpose to labor without cease to advance
the cause of economic progress and social justice
within the hemisphere— to advance the autono-
mous and peaceful revolution of the Americas.
271
Choosing the Road Into the Future
There are those in every land who resist
change — who see the society they know as the cli-
max of history, wlio identify their own status and
privilege with the welfare of their people, and
who oppose the vital land and tax reforms neces-
sary for the completion of our work. But their
resistance is doomed to failure. The 19th cen-
tury is over; and, in the 20th, people across the
eai'th are awakening from centuries of poverty
and oppression to claim the right to live in the
modern world. "The veil has been torn asunder,"
wrote Bolivar. "We have seen the light; and we
will not be thrust back into the darkness." No
one can hope to prolong the past in a revolution-
ary age. The only question is which road we mean
to take into the future.
This is not a question alone for this hemisphere.
It is a question faced everywhere in the world.
On the one hand are those who believe in change
through persuasion and consent — through means
which respect the individual. On the other are
those who advocate change through the subjuga-
tion of the individual and who see in the turbu-
lence of change the opportimity for power.
I do not believe that I have to argue the moral
superiority of free society anywhere in tlie Amer-
icas. I do not think, other things being equal,
that any rational person would prefer tyranny to
tolerance or dictatorship to democracy. But there
are some who doubt the capacity of freedom to do
the job, and turn in resentment and desperation
to totalitarian solutions. They are wrong. His-
tory shows that freedom is the most reliable means
to economic development and social justice and
that commimism betrays in performance the ends
which it proclaims in propaganda. The humane
and pragmatic methods of free men are not merely
the riglit way, morally, to develop an underdevel-
oped country; they are technically the efficient
way.
Failure of Communism To Meet Needs of People
We meet here at Punta del Este to consider the
tragedy of Cuba. There liave been many elements
in that tragedy. One was the failure of the dicta-
torship which preceded Castro to concern itself
with the elementary needs of a people who had a
right to be free. Another was the disillusionment
of the hopes which rode with Castro at the be-
ginning of his resistance movement. And now
we see the Cuban people subjected to a regime
which has committed itself to Marxist-Leninist
doctrines at the very time when this answer to
economic and social problems lias proved itself to
be brutal, reactionary, and sterile.
If there is one lesson which we in the Americas
can learn from observing what is happening from
East Germany to North Viet-Nam, it is that Cas-
troism is not the answer to economic and social
development. If there is tension in Berlin today,
it is because of the failure of the regime in East
Germany and the flight of tens of thousands of
its people toward freedom and expanding oppor-
tunity. It is worth noting tliat vast areas of the
world with remarkable natural resources have
failed to provide even the elementary needs of
food, contrasted with the surpluses which abound
throughout much of the free world. The needs of
the individual have been ruthlessly subjected to
the requirements of the power-hungry apparatus
of the state. Wliat we know in the free world as
the consumer is brushed aside, and men are called
upon to submit themselves to the requirements of
ambition and appetite.
"Wherever communism goes, himger follows.
Communist Chuia today is in the grip of a vast
and terrible famine, which, in turn, has led to
stagnation and decline of industry. There is
hunger in North Viet-Nam. Whatever contribu-
tion communism has appeared to make to indus-
trial development comes only because it does what
Marx charged 19th-century capitalism with doing,
that is, it grinds down the faces of the poor and
forces from their postponed consumption the cap-
ital necessary for arms and industry. Commu-
nism— once in power — has turned out to be the
most effective and brutal means known to history
for exploiting the working class.
Recognizing its failure in the imderdeveloped
world, recognizing that its greatest enemy is the
process of peaceful and democratic development,
communism in recent years has concentrafed— in
Asia, in Africa, in the Middle East, now in our
own hemisphere — on using the troubles of transi-
' tion to install Communist minorities in permanent
power. The techniques by which communism
seeks to subA-ert the development process are
neither mysterious nor magical. Khrushchev, Mao
Tse-tung, and "Che" Guevara have outlined tliem
in frankness and detail. They seek first to lay the
political basis for the seizure of power by wiiming
272
Department of State Bulletin
converts in sections of the populations whose liopes
and ami )it ions are thwarted by the existing order.
They then try to capture control of broadly based
popular movements aimed ostensibly at redressing
social and economic injustice. In some cases they
resort to guerrilla warfare as a means of intimidat-
ing opposition and disrupting orderly social prog-
ress. At every point the Communists are prepared
to invoke all the resources of propaganda and sub-
version, of manipulation and violence, to maximize
confusion, destroy faith in the democratic instru-
mentalities of change, and open up the way for a
Communist takeover.
As for its claim to social justice. Chairman
Khrushchev himself has given the most eloquent
testimony of the inevitability of monstrous in-
justice in a system of totalitarian dictatorship.
The crimes of Stalin — crimes fully acknowledged
by his successor — are the inescapable result of a
political order founded on the supposed infallibil-
ity of a single creed, a single party, and a single
leader. Under the banner of the classless society,
communism has become the means of establishing
what tlie Yugoslav Commimist Milovan Djilas
has termed the "new class" — an elite as ruthless in
its determination to maintain its prerogatives as
any oligarchy known to history.
Nothing shows more clearly the failure of com-
munism to bring about economic development and
social justice than the present condition of Europe.
The bankruptcy of communism is etched in the
contrast between the thriving economies of West-
ern Europe and the drab stagnation of Eastern
Europe — and it is symbolized in the wall of Ber-
lin, erected to stop the mass flight of ordinary
people from communism to freedom.
The proponents of free society need have no
apologies. We have moved far beyond the rigid
laissez faire capitalism of the 19th century. The
open society of the mid-20tli century can offer the
reality of what the Communists promise but do
not and cannot produce, because the means they
are using, the techniques of hatred and violence,
can never produce anything but more violence and
more hatred. Communism is not the wave of theA
future. Commxmists are only the exploiters of 1
people's aspirations — and their despair. They are
the scavengers of the transition from stagnation
into the modern world. The wave of the future is
the peaceful, democratic revolution symbolized for
the Americas in the Alliance for Progress — the
revolution which will bring change without chaos,
development without dictatorship, and hope
without hatred.
This is our faith. Because we have pledged our-
selves to this road into the future, we have no
more urgent obligation than to guarantee and pro-
tect the independence of the democratic revolu-
tion. Because communism has its own ambitions,
communism everywhere directs its most intense ]
effort to making democratic change impossible.
It is in this setting that I ask you to consider the
question of the purposes and methods of com-
mmiism in our hemisphere.
Cuba's Defection From Inter-American System
If the one striking development of the last years
in our hemisphere has been the rise of the Alliance
for Progress, the other striking development has
been the defection of Cuba from the inter-
American system.
Let us be clear about the character of the prob-
lem presented by Castro and his government. We
have no quarrel with the people of Cuba. As this
week we have welcomed a free Dominican Repub-
lic back into the inter-American community, so we
look forward to the day when a free and progres-
sive government will flourish in Ilabana and the
Cuban people can join with us in the common
undertakings of the hemisphere.
Many of us in this hemisphere had no quarrel
with the avowed purposes of the revolution of
1959. Many rejoiced in the aspirations of the
Cuban people for political liberty and social prog-
ress. Nor would we have any quarrel with changes
in the economic organization of Cuba instituted
with the consent of the Cuban people. Our hemi-
sphere has room for a diversity of economic sys-
tems. But we do condemn the internal excesses
of the Castro regime — the violations of civil jus-
tice, the drumhead executions, the suppression of
political, intellectual, and religious freedom. But
even these things, repellent as they are, have been
known to our continent. If kept within the con-
fines of one unhappy country, they would not con-
stitute a direct threat to the peace and the
independence of other American states. What we
cannot accept — and will never accept — is the use
of Cuba as the means through which extraconti-
nental powers seek to break up the inter-American
system, to overthrow the governments of other
countries, and to destroy the autonomous demo-
cratic evolution of the hemisphere.
February 19, 1962
273
The Castro regime has extended the global bat-
tle to Latin America. It has supplied communism
with a bridgehead in the Americas, and it has
thereby brought the entire hemisphere into the
frontline of the struggle between communism and
democracy. It has turned itself into an arsenal
for arms and ammunition from the Communist
world. With Communist help Dr. Castro has
built up the largest military establishment in
Latin America.
Within the United Nations the Cuban delega-
tion has aljandoned its brethren of the hemisphere
to play the smirking sycophant for the Commimist
bloc. Out of the 37 rollcall votes taken on the
most important issues in the last session of the
General Assembly, a majority of the members of
the Organization of American States voted to-
gether 35 times. But, of these 37 votes, Cuba voted
33 times with the Soviet bloc and only 5 times
with the OAS majority. Cuba opposed the reso-
lution appealing to the Soviet Union not to ex-
plode the 50-megaton bomb ; it was the only dele-
gation in the United Nations, besides the 10
avowed members of the Soviet bloc, to do so. In
the same manner Cuba alone joined the Com-
munist bloc to oppose the resolution calling for a
nuclear test ban treaty with international controls.
On several occasions Cuban representatives fol-
lowed other members of the Communist bloc in
walking out of the General Assembly when dele-
gates of states not approved by the Soviet Union
dared take the floor.
Previous OAS Actions Against Communism
At the seventh meeting of foreign ministers at
San Jose in August 1960, our governments to-
gether rejected any attempt on the part of the
Communist powers to exploit the political, eco-
nomic, or social troubles of any American state. ^
Since San Jose the Cuban government has alined
itself more flagrantly than ever with those dedi-
cated to the overthrow of the inter- American
system and the destruction of inter-American free-
dom. The Soviet-Cuban communique of Septem-
ber 20, lOfil, and the Chinese-Cuban communique
of October 2, 1961, both signed by President
[Osvaldo] Dorticos, proclaim an identity of views
on foreign policy between the Cuban and the So-
viet and Chinese Conmiunist regimes. Only a few
weeks ago Dr. [Kaiil] Roa, the Cuban Minister
' Ibid., Sept. 12, 1960, p. 305.
274
of Foreign Affairs, made clear once again that the
primary allegiance of the Castro government is
not to its brethren in the Americas but to its com-
rades beyond the Iron Curtain. "The socialist
camp, led by the invincible Soviet Union, is with
the Cuban revolution," Dr. Roa said. "We are
neither alone nor helpless. The world is with the
Cuban revolution, and the future belongs entirely
to the universal socialist society that is coming,
and of which, forever, Cuba already forms part."
When Dr. Castro himself said on December 2,
"I am a Marxist -Leninist and I shall be a Marxist-
Leninist until the last day of my life," he could
have surprised only those who have paid no atten-
tion to the evolution of the Castro regime. This
public oath of fealty to Marxism-Leninism under-
lines Dr. Castro's commitment to the Leninist use
of deception and violence, to the Leninist con-
tempt for free institutions, and to the Leninist in-
junction that obedience to the international
Communist movement is the highest duty.
Driven by this Marxist -Leninist faith, the Cas-
tro regime has dedicated itself, not to the struggle
for democracy within the hemisphere or even with-
in Cuba, but to the perversion and corruption of
this struggle in the interests of world communism.
Part III of the report, of the Inter-American
Peace Committee sets forth the ties of the gov-
ernment of Cuba with the Sino-Soviet bloc, its
subversive activities within the hemisphere, its
violations of human rights, and the incompatibil-
ity of its behavior with the Charter of the
Organization of American States.
Fourteeii years ago at Bogota the Ninth Inter-
national Conference of American States in its
Resolution XXXII on "The Preservation and
Defense of Democracy in America" declared that
"by its anti-democratic nature and its interven-
tionist tendency, the political activity of interna-
tional commimism or any other totalitarian
doctrine is incompatible with the concp]it of
American freedom." This resolution condemned
"interference by any foreign power, or by any
]iolitical organization serving the interests of a
foreign power, in the public life of the nations
of the American continent." The American Re-
publics solemnly resolved "to adopt, within their
respective territories wud in accordance witli their
respective constitutional provisions, the measures
necessai-y to eradicate and prevent activities di-
rected, assisted or instigated by foreign govern-
ments, organizations or individuals fending to
Department of State Bulletin
overthrow their institutions by violence, to foment
disorder in their domestic political life, or to dis-
turb, by means of j^ressure, subvei-sive propa-
ganda, threats or by any other means, the free
and sovereign right of their peoples to govern
themselves in accordance with their democratic
aspirations."
Three yeare ago at Santiago the foreign minis-
ters of tha American Republics reaffirmed the
Bogota resolution in the Declaration of Santiago,^
condemning "the methods of every system tending
to suppress political and civil rights and liberties,
and in particular the action of international com-
munism or any otlier totalitarian doctrine."
No one can doubt, on the basis of hard evidence
compiled by committees of the OAS and known
to eveiy observer in our hemisphere, that the
Castro regime has placed itself in a position of
systematic and contemptuous hostility to these
principles of our inter-American system. Beyond
the evidence evei-y delegate in this hall Itnows in
his mind and heart that those behind Castro hope
to overthrow his government and even' other gov-
ernment in Latin America. The Castro regime, by
repudiating the principles and philosophy of the
inter-American system and making itself the
American agent of world communism, has created
a clear and present danger to the prospects of free
and democratic change in every country in Latin
America. The time has come for the American
Eepublics to unite against Communist intei-ven-
tion in tliis hemisphere. We believe in the inter-
American system. We stand on the principles of
the Charter of the Organization of American
States. We are faithful to the ancient hope of a
hemisphere of free democracies, bomid together in
independence and common purpose. Else we
would reject that hope, foreake our faith itself,
exposed in its isolation to every gust of political
or ideological fanaticism.
The Alliance for Progress is the best way of
attacking the longrun sources of the Communist
appeal — poverty, himger, and ignorance. But
the Alliance cannot by itself provide a means of
warding off the shortrun Communist tactics of
disruption and subversion. Vitamin tablets will
not save a man set upon by hoodlums in an alley.
If the Alliance is to succeed, we need to protect
the democratic processes of change; we need a
shield beliind which constructive measures can
» For text, see ibid., Sept. 7, 1959, p. 342.
February 79, J 962
take effect in steady and secure progression. We
have seen the effect of Communist disruptive tac-
tics in other lands and other continents. Let us
take action now to guard our own continent and
our programs of democratic reform against those
who seek to i-eplace democracy by dictatorship,
those who would transform our fellowship of free
states into a bondage of satellites.
I am confident that this meeting of foreign
ministers will hearten the democratic forces of
this continent by making it clear that we will not
stand still while the enemies of democracy con-
spire to make democratic change impossible.
Against Dr. Castro's Communist allies let us re-
affirm our faith in our own good neighbors; let
us conmiit our minds and our hearts to the success
of our free Alliance for Progress.
Four Major Actions To Take Against Castro
What is our working task here at this meeting ?
I suggest we must move in four major directions:
First, we must recognize that the alinement of
the government of Cuba with the countries of the
Sino-Soviet bloc, and its commitment to extend
Communist power in this hemisphere, are incom-
patible with the purposes and principles of the
inter- American system and that its current activi-
ties are an ever-present and common danger to the
peace and security of the continent.
Second, we must now make the policy decision to
exclude the Castro regime from participation in
the organs and bodies of the inter- American sys-
tem and to direct, the Council of the Organization
to determine how best to give rapid implementa-
tion to this decision. Within our own competence,
since the Inter- American Defense Board was cre-
ated by a meeting of consultation, we can and
should now exclude the government of Cuba from
membership in the Inter- American Defense Board.
This step would correct at once the most obvious
incongruity arising from the participation of a
regime alined with the Sino-Soviet bloc in a body
planning the defense of the hemisphere against
the aggressive designs of international connnu-
nism.
Third, we must interrupt the limited but signifi-
cant flow of trade between Cuba and the rest of the
hemisphere, especially the traffic in arms.
Fourth, we must set in motion a series of indi-
vidual and communal acts of defense against the
various forms of political and indirect aggression
275
mounted against the hemisphere. The acts of po-
litical aggression wliich the Castro regime is com-
mitting have an immediate and direct impact in
the general Caribbean area near the focus of in-
fection. Yet with one exception there is not a
foreign minister present whose country has not
felt the impact of the interventionist activities
which constitute essential elements of the interna-
tional Communist design. We must find adequate
means to strengthen our capacity to anticipate
and overcome this constant gnawing at the secu-
rity of our peoples. In particular we should di-
rect the Inter- American Defense Board to estab-
lish a special security committee to recommend
individual and collective measures to the govern-
ments of the American states for their greater pro-
tection against any acts or threats of aggression,
direct or indirect, resulting from the continued
intervention of Sino-Soviet powers or others as-
sociated with them.
A Few Basic Facts To Consider
As we confront these decisions let us face, as
old friends and neiglibors, a few basic facts in our
situation. The weight of Communist aggressive
techniques is felt unequally among us ; the nature
of the Communist threat is understood in differ-
ent ways among our peoples; and the OAS itself
is confronted, as a body, with a form of aggressive
action relatively new in its history.
We have heard references to the intrusion of the
cold war into this hemisphere. There may be
some who wonder whether the Americas are be-
ing cauglit up, as innocent bystanders, in a strug-
gle among the giants.
But let us think clearly about what the cold war
is and what it is not. The Communist world has
dedicated itself to the indefinite expansion of what
it calls its historically inevitable world revolution.
The cold war is simply the effort of conunimism
to extend its power beyond the confines of the
Communist bloc and the effort of free men to de-
fend themselves against this systematic aggression.
The cold war would have been unknown to us had
the Soviet Union determined, at the end of World
War II, to live in peace with other nations in ac-
cordance with its commitments under the Cliarter
of the United Nations. The cold war would end
tomorrow if those who control the Communist
movement would cease their aggressive acts, in all
their many fonns. Nothing would be more grati-
fying to the citizens of my country than to have
the Soviet Union bring about the revolution of
peace by a simple decision to leave the rest of the
world alone.
But the cold war is not a contest between the So-
viet Union and the United States which the United
States is pursuing for national ends. It is a strug-
gle in the long story of freedom between those who
would destroy it and those who are determined to
preserve it. If every nation were genuinely in-
dependent, and left alone to work out its relations
with its neighbors by common agreement, the ten-
sions between Washington and Moscow would
vanish overnight.
Speaking last October before the 22d Commu-
nist Party Congress, Mr. Khrushchev said: "We
firmly believe that the time will come when the
children and gi'andchildren of those who do not
understand and do not accept communism vrill live
under communism."
This is his belief. Were it only his belief we
need not care ; but it is also the program of action
of the Commimist powers — and about that we
care a very great deal.
We know that the Communist effort to impose
their system on other nations and peoples will fail
and that the next generation will dwell in a com-
munity of independent nations, each freely pur-
suing the welfare of its people. We know this is
so because history confirms that freedom must win
because it is rooted in the nature of man and in his
relations with God.
Our problem today is to combine a sense of the
necessities of the harsh realities with the dreams
upon which civilized man has steadily built. A
shining future is waiting for us in this hemi-
sphere— a future in which every child will have a
decent chance for life, for education, for medical
care, for constructive labor and creative contribu-
tion; in which every Kepublic on this continent
will cooperate to improve lagging standards, to
elevate culture, and to raise man to his full dig-
nity in freedom.
We have the talents, the resources, and the as-
pirations. We need not retreat into the murky
shadows of a conspiratorial society developed on
the steppes of central Asia, because we can move
ahead in the great tradition of a civilization which
was born in tlie free discourse of the early Medi-
terranean world more than 2,000 years ago, was
nourished in Western Europe, and came to this
276
Departmenf of State Bulletin
hemisphere to be extended by Bolivar and San
Martin, by Marti, Jefferson, and Lincohi.
Our task today is not to let a petty tyrant who
has appeared among us divert us from these great
tasks but to put him in his pLace while we proceed
with the great adventure upon which we are em-
barked together.
STATEMENT OF JANUARY 31
Press release 70 dated February 2
Mr. Chairman, I should like to take just a mo-
ment or two to express to my fellow foreign min-
isters my very deep personal esteem and great
satisfaction about the sense of unity which has
moved us here at this meeting. We have spent
almost 2 weeks together. Our subject has been
nothing less than an historical struggle over the
principles on which our societies are based.
We have been discussing the Communist offen-
sive in this hemisphere, an ofi'ensive which is a
worldwide offensive, an offensive which is engag-
ing American forces in some fashion in every con-
tinent, an offensive aimed at us all — at our
ti-aditions, our institutions, our governments, and
our respective ways of life.
We have agreed here on a very great deal ; and
there is no doubt in my mind that this organiza-
tion and the nations which make it up have come
a long way in defining both the creative and the
defensive tasks which we must undertake if our
societies, challenged by this offensive, are to con-
tinue to develop in harmony with their past.
We have had some difficulty on only one point :
how to give effect to the simple fact which we all
recognize, namely that the official character and
policies of the present government of Cuba are in-
compatible with the presence and participation of
that govermnent in the principal business of the
Organization of American States.
"Wlien we return to our foreign offices, we shall
return to a troubled world, a turbulent world, to
such matters as Berlin and Laos, Viet-Nam, the
Congo, and the many other points where the strug-
gle to maintain the prmciples of independence and
human freedom goes forward. There is one lesson
that derives from our experience with these prob-
lems and in dealing with the Communist offensive
over the past 17 years. Communism works un-
ceasingly to exploit every difference of view, every
difference on national perspective within the free
Secretary Rusk Comments on Vote
To Exclude Cuba From OAS System
statement hy the Secretary^
Press release 66 dated January 31
We have witnessed a remarkable unanimity
among the democratic nations of the hemisphere In
the deep concern they have manifested concerning
the existence of a Marxist-Leninist government In
Cuba which is now an accomplice of international
communism. Moreover, these same democratic
governments have reaffirmed their determination
to demonstrate the superior results of democratic
methods to achieve the social and economic develop-
ment to which the peoples of their countries aspire.
With respect to the action resolving that the incom-
patibility between the Marxist-Leninist government
of Cuba and the principles and purposes of the
inter-American system excludes the present gov-
ernment of Cuba from participation in the organs of
the system, we have seen a vivid demonstration
of the democratic process of a vigorous community
of nations. Once again the Organization of Amer-
ican States has shown its capacity to provide pro-
tection to the member states that reqvilre assistance,
this time from the subversion of the Communist
conspiracy working through Cuba, even though
many of these nations which require protection are
not the most populous in the hemisphere.
' Issued to news correspondents on Jan. 31 at
Punta del Este, Uruguay following the affirmative
vote of the OAS foreign ministers to exclude the
present government of Cuba from participation in
the Inter-American system.
world. The friends of freedom must stand to-
gether. For wherever freedom is threatened,
every man is threatened. But this does not mean
that we must be unanimous on all points. This is
not a meeting of the Warsaw Pact. This is a meet-
ing of the organization of free and independent
American states.
I would wish to say just a word about Cuba. I
had intended to say more, but the representative
of that government has demonstrated today the
principle of self-exclusion. We have listened here
as I have listened in many forums over many
years to the mixture of threats and half-truths
and untruths, to corrupt statistics and corrupt
definitions of democracy and legality, which are
the hallmark of Communist public oratory. The
representative of the Cuban government has told
us that we shall see a system of police states spread
February 79, 7962
277
throughout this continent. The figure on the knee
of the ventriloquist, of course, says what the ven-
triloquist says. In party congresses, in public
declarations, the leaders of this world conspira-
torial movement have made it eminently clear that
they do mean to do what they can to bring about
their world revolution.
That effort must fail. It shall surely fail, be-
cause the strength to guard against it is in the
hearts of men throughout the world, because we
have a different vision of the future. We see a
hemisphere which will remain true to its historical
commitment, to human rights and to democracy,
as we understand it and as men have been talking
about these concepts for more than 2,000 years —
a hemisphere in which each nation develops its
own version of a productive, modem society, con-
sistent with its culture and its traditions and its
aspirations, and cooperating freely with its
friends across international borders. And we see,
as others have seen at this meeting, a Cuba re-
leased from its nightmare and returned to the
family of American states.
I can assure my colleagues that, in the policies
of President Kemiedy and of the American peo-
ple, behind this vision of the future lies the
strength, the resources, and the faith of the people
of my country.
Thank you.
TEXTS OF RESOLUTIONS <
■■ Communist Offensive in America '
1. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American
Republics, convened in their Eighth Meeting of Consulta-
tion, declare that the continental unity and the democratic
institutions of the hemisphere are now in danger.
The Ministers have been able to verify that the sub-
versive offensive of communist governments, their agents
and the organizations which they control, has increased
in intensity. The purpose of this offensive is the destruc-
tion of democratic institutions and the establishment of
totalitarian dictatorships at the service of extracontinen-
tal powers. The outstanding facts in this intensified
offensive are the declarations set forth in official docu-
ments of the directing bodies of the international com-
munist movement, that one of its principal objectives is
the establishment of communist regimes in the under-
developed countries and in Latin America ; and the exist-
' The following resolutions were adopted in General
Committee during the evening of Jan. 30 and the early
morning of Jan. 31. They were incorporated in the Final
Act, which was adopted unanimously in i)lenary session
on Jan. 31.
'Adopted by a vote of 20 to 1 (Cuba).
ence of a >Iarxist-Leninist government in Cuba which is
publicly aligned with the doctrine and foreign policy of
the communist powers.
2. In order to achieve their subversive purposes and
hide their true intentions, the communist governments
and their agents exploit the legitimate needs of the less-
favored sectors of the population and the just national
aspirations of the various peoples. With the pretext of
defending popular interests, freedom is suppressed, demo-
cratic institutions are destroyed, human rights are vio-
lated and the individual is subjected to materialistic
ways of life imposed by the dictatorship of a single party.
Under the slogan of "anti-imperialism" they try to estab-
lish an oppressive, aggressive, imperialism, which sub-
ordinates the subjugated nations to the militaristic and
aggressive interest of extracontinental powers. By
maliciously utilizing the very principles of the Inter-
American system, they attempt to undermine democratic
institutions and to strengthen and protect political pene-
tration and aggression. The subversive methods of com-
munist governments and their agents constitute one of
the most subtle and dangerous forms of intervention in
the internal affairs of other countries.
3. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs alert the peoples of
the hemisphere to the intensification of the subversive
offensive of communist governments, their agents, and the
organizations that they control and to the tactics and
methods that they employ and also warn them of the
dangers this situation represents to representative demo-
cracy, to respect for human rights, and to the self-deter-
mination of peoples.
The principles of communism are incompatible with the
principles of the Inter-American system.
4. Convinced that the integrity of the democratic rev-
olution of the American states can and must be preserved
in the face of the subversive offensive of communism, tie
Ministers of Foreign Affairs proclaim the following basic
political principles :
a. The faith of the American peoples in human rights,
liberty, and national independence as a fundamental rea-
son for their existence, as conceived by the founding
fathers who destroyed colonialism and brought the
American Republics into being ;
b. The principle of nonintervention and the right of
peoples to organize their way of life freely in the political,
economic, and cultural spheres, expressing their will
through free elections, without foreign interference. The
fallacies of communist propaganda cannot and should not
obscure or hide the difference in philosophy which these
principles represent when they are expressed by a demo-
cratic American country, and when communist govern-
ments and their agents attempt to utilize them for their
own benefit ;
c. The repudiation of repressive measures which, under
the pretext of isolating or combatting communism, may
facilitate the appearance or strengtliening of reactionary
doctrines and methods which attempt to repress ideas of
social progress and to confuse truly progressive and dem-
ocratic labor organizations and cultural and political
movements with communist subversion ;
d. The affirmation that communism is not the way to
achieve economic development and the elimination of
278
Department of State Bulletin
social injustice in America. On the contrary, a demo-
cratic regime can encompass all the efforts for economic
advancement and all of the measures for improvement
and social progress without sacrificing the fundamental
values of the human being. The mission of the peoples
and governments of the hemisphere during the present
generation is to achieve an accelerated development of
their economies and to put to an end to iwverty, injustice,
illness, and ignorance as was agreed in the Charter of
Punta del Este ; and
e. The most essential contribution of each American
state in the collective effort to protect the Inter-American
system against communism is a steadily greater respect
for human rights, improvement in democratic institutions
and practices, and the adoption of meastires that truly
express the impulse for a revolutionary change in the
economic and social structures of the American Re-
publics.
il. Special Consultative Committee on Security
Against the Subversive Action of international
Communism °
Whereas :
International communism makes use of highly complex
techniques of subversion in opposing which certain states
may benefit from mutual advice and support ;
The American states are firmly united for the common
goal of fighting the subversive action of International
communism and for the preservation of democracy in the
Americas, as expressed in Resolution XXXII of the Ninth
International Conference of American States, held In Bo-
gota, in 1048, and that for such purpose they can and
should assist each other, mainly through the use of the
institutional resources of the Organization of American
States ; and
It is advisable, therefore, to make available to the
Council of the Organization of American States a body
of an advisory nature, made up of experts, the main pur-
pose of which would be to advise the member governments
which, as the case may be, require and request such
assistance,
The Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs, Serving as Organ of Consultation in
Application of the Inter- American Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance,
Resolves :
1. To request the Council of the Organization of Amer-
ican States to maintain all necessary vigilance, for the
purpose of warning against any acts of aggression, sub-
version, or other dangers to peace and .security, or the
l^reparation of such acts, resulting from the continued
intervention of Sino-Soviet powers in this hemisphere,
and to make recommendations to the governments of
the member states with regard thereto.
2. To direct the Council of the Organization to establish
a Special Consultative Committee of experts on security
matters, for the purpose of advising the member states
that may di'sire and request such assistance, the following
procedures being ol)sorved :
a. The Council of the Organization shall select the
member.ship of the Special Consultative Committee on
Security from a list of candidates presented by the gov-
ernments, and shall define immediately terms of reference
for the Committee with a view to achieving the full pur-
poses of this resolution.
b. The Committee shall submit reports to such member
states as may request its assistance ; however. It shall not
publish the.se reports without obtaining express authori-
zation from the state dealt with in the report.
c. The Special Consultative Committee on Security
shall submit to the Council of the Organization, no later
than May 1, 1962, an initial general report, with pertinent
recommendations regarding measures which should be
taken.
d. The Committee shall function at the Pan American
Union, which shall extend to it the technical, administra-
tive, and financial facilities required for the work of the
Committee.
e. The Committee shall function for the period deemed
advisable by the Council of the Organization.
3. To urge the member states to take those steps that
they may consider appropriate for their individual or
collective self-defense, and to cooperate, as may be neces-
sary or desirable, to strengthen their capacity to counter-
act threats or acts of aggression, subversion, or other dan-
gers to peace and security resulting from the continued
intervention in this hemisphere of Sino-Soviet powers, in
accordance with the obligations established in treaties
and agreements such as the Charter of the Organization
of American States and the Inter- American Treaty of Re-
ciprocal Assistance.
111. Reiteration of the Principles of Nonintervention
and Self-Determination'
Whereas ;
This meeting has been convoked by a resolution of the
Council of the Organization of American States that in-
voked Article 6 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance ;
It is necessary to maintain the principles of noninter-
vention and self-determination set forth in the Charter
of the Organization of American States, because these
principles are a basic part of the juridical system that
governs relations among the republics of the hemisphere
and makes friendly relations among them possible;
In the Charter of the Organization of American States
and in the Declaration of Santiago, signed in August 1959,
all the governments of the American States agreed volun-
tarily that they should result from free elections;
The will of the people, expressed through unrestricted
suffrage, assures the formation of governments that repre-
sent more faithfully and without yielding to the interests
of a privileged few the basic aspirations to freedom and
social justice, the constant need for economic progress,
° Adopted by a vote of 19 to 1 (Cuba), with 1 abstention
(Bolivia).
'Adopted by a vote of 20 to 1 (Cuba).
February 19, 1962
279
and the call of brotherhood that all our peoples feel
throughout the hemisphere ;
Formation by free elections of the governments that
comprise the Organization of American States is therefore
the surest guarantee for the peace of the hemisphere and
the security and political independence of each and every
one of the nations that comprise it ; and
Freedom to contract obligations is an inseparable part
of the principle of the self-determination of nations, and
consequently a request by one or more countries that
such obligations be complied with does not signify inter-
vention,
The Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs, Serving as Organ of Consultation in
Application of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance
Resolves :
1. To reiterate its adherence to the principles of self-
determination and nonintervention as guiding standards
of coexistence among the American nations.
2. To urge that the governments of the member coun-
tries of the Organization of American States, bearing in
mind the present situation, and complying with the princi-
ples and aims set forth in the Charter of the Organization
and the Declaration of Santiago, organize themselves on
the basis of free elections that express, without restric-
tion, the will of the people.
iV. Holding of Free Elections >
Whekeas :
The preamble to the Charter of the Organization of
American States proclaims that the true significance of
American solidarity and good neighborliness can only
mean the consolidation on this hemisphere, within the
framework of democratic institutions, of a system of
individual liberty and social justice based on respect for
the essential rights of man ;
The same charter reaflirms, among its principles, the
requirement that the political organization of the Ameri-
can states be based on the effective exercise of repre-
sentative democracy, even as it reasserts the fundamental
rights of the individual ;
The Charter couiirms the right of each state to develop,
freely and naturally, its cultural, political, and economic
life, while respecting in this free development the rights
of the individual and the principles of universal morality ;
The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance
affirms as a manifest truth, that juridical organization is
a necessary prerequisite of security and peace, and that
peace is founded on justice and moral order and, conse-
(luently, on the international recognition and protection
of human rights and freedoms, on the indispensable well-
being of the i)eople, and on the effectiveness of democracy
for the international realization of justice and stnurity;
and
According to the principles and attributes of the demo-
cratic system in this hemisphere, as stated in the Dec-
laration of Santiago, Chile, the governments of the
American republics should be the result of free elections,
and perpetuation in power, or the exercise of power
without a fixed term and with the manifest intent of
perpetuation, is incompatible with the effective exercise
of democracy ;
The Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs, Serving as Organ of Consultation in
Application of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance
Resolves :
To recommend that the governments of the American
states, whose structure or acts are incompatible with the
effective exercise of representative democracy, hold free
elections in their respective countries, as the most effec-
tive means of consulting the sovereign will of their peoples,
to guarantee the restoration of a legal order based on
the authority of the law and respect for the rights of the
individual.
V. Alliance for Progress'
Whereas :
The American states have the capacity to eradicate the
profound evils of economic and social underdevelopment ;
Resolution XI of the Fifth Meeting of Consultation of
Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Resolution V of the
Seventh Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign
Affairs declare that economic cooperation among the
American states is necessary for the stability of democ-
racy and the safeguarding of human rights, and that
such cooperation is essential to the strengthening of the
solidarity of the hemisphere and the reinforcement of
the inter-American system in the face of threats that
might affect it ; and
In view of the fact that all the nations of the Americas
have recognized their urgent need for economic and social
development, it is necessary that they intensify immedi-
ately their self-help and cooperative efforts under the
Alliance for Progress and the Charter of Punta del Este,
on the basis of the adoption of vigorous reforms and
large-scale internal efforts by the developing countries
concerned and a mobilization of all the necessary finan-
cial and technical resources by the highly developed
nations,
The Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs, Serving as Organ of Consultation in
Application of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance
Declares ;
1. That the preservation and strengthening of free and
democratic institutions in the American republics require,
as an essential condition, the prompt, accelerated execu-
tion of an unprecedented effort to promote their economic
and social development for which effort the public and
private, domestic and foreign financial resources necessary
to those objectives are to be made available, economic
and social reforms are to be established, and every neces-
sary internal effort is to be made in accordance with the
provisions of the Charter of Punta del Este.
2. That it is essential to promote energetically and
vigorously the basic industries of the Latin American
countries, to liberalize trade in raw materials by the
'Adopted by a vote of 20 to 1 (Cuba).
"Adopted by a vote of 20 to 1 (Cuba).
280
Department of Slate Bulletin
elimination of undue restrictions, to seek to avoid violent
fluctuations in their prices, to encourage tlie moderniza-
tion and expansion of services in order that industriali-
zation may rest on its own appropriate bases, to mobilize
unexploited natural resources in order to increase national
wealth and to make such increased wealth available to
persons of all economic and social groups, and to satisfy
quickly, among other aspirations, the needs for work,
housing, land, health, and education.
VI. Exclusion of the Present Government of Cuba
From Participation in the Inter-American System'"
Whekeas :
The inter-xVmerican system is based on consistent ad-
herence by its constituent states to certain objectives and
principles of solidarity, set forth in the instruments that
govern it ;
Among these objectives and principles are those of re-
spect for the freedom of man and preservation of his
rights, the full exercise or representative democracy,
nonintervention of one state in the internal or external
affairs of another, and rejection of alliances and agree-
ments that may lead to intervention in America by extra-
continental powers ;
The Seventh Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs, held in San Jose, Costa Rica, condemned
the intervention or the threat of intervention of extra-
continental communist powers in the hemisphere and
reiterated the obligation of the American states to observe
faithfully the principles of the regional organization ;
The present Government of Cuba has identified itself
with the principles of Marxist-Leninist ideology, has
established a political, economic, and social system based
on that doctrine, and accepts military assistance from
extracontinental communist powers, including even the
threat of military intervention in America on the part
of the Soviet Union ;
The Report of the Inter-American Peace Committee to
the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of For-
eign Affairs establishes that :
The present connections of the Government of Cuba with
the Sino-Soviet bloc of countries are evidently incom-
patible with the principles and standards that govern the
regional system, and particularly with the collective secu-
rity established by the Charter of the OAS and the Inter-
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance ;
The above mentioned Report of the Inter-American
Peace Committee also states that :
It is evident that the ties of the Cuban Government with
the Sino-Soviet bloc will prevent the said government from
fulfilling the obligations stipulated in the Charter of the
Organization and the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance ;
Such a situation in an American state violates the
obligations inherent in membership in the regional sys-
tem and is incompatible with that system ;
The attitude adopted by the present Government of
Cuba and its acceptance of military assistance offered by
extracontinental communist powers breaks down the effec-
tive defense of the inter-American system ; and
No member state of the inter-American system can
claim the rights and privileges pertaining thereto if it
denies or fails to recognize the corresponding obligations.
The Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs, Serving as Organ of Consultation in
Application of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance
Declares :
1. That, as a consequence of repeated acts, the present
government of Cuba has voluntarily placed Itself outside
the inter-American system.
2. That this situation demands unceasing vigilance on
the part of the member states of the Organization of
American States, which shall report to the Council any
fact or situation that could endanger the peace and
security of the hemispliere.
3. That the American states have a collective interest in
strengthening the inter-American system and reuniting it
on the basis of respect for human rights and the principles
and objectives relative to the exercise of democracy set
forth in the Charter of the Organization ; and, therefore.
Resolves :
1. That adherence by any member of the Organization
of American States to Marxism-Leninism is incompatible
with the inter-American system and the alignment of such
a government with the communist bloc breaks the unity
and solidarity of the hemisphere.
2. That the present Government of Cuba, wliich has of-
ficially identified itself as a Marxist-Leninist government,
is incompatible with the principles and objectives of the
inter-American system.
3. That this Incompatibility excludes the present Gov-
ernment of Cuba from participation in the inter-American
system.
4. That the Council of the Organization of American
States and the other organs and organizations of the
inter-American system adopt without delay the measures
necessary to carry out this resolution.
VII. Inter-American Defense Board"
Whekeas :
The Inter-American Defense Board was established
pursuant to Resolution 39 of the Third Meeting of Con-
sultation of Foreign Ministers, held in Rio de Janeiro in
1942, recommending the immediate meeting of a commis-
sion composed of military and naval technicians appointed
by each of the governments to study and to suggest to
them measures necessary for the defense of the
hemisphere ;
The Inter-American Defense Board, on April 26, 1961,
resolved that the participation of the Cuban regime in
defense planning is highly prejudicial to the work of the
Board and to the security of the hemisphere ; and
The present Government of Cuba is identified with the
aims and policies of the Sino-Soviet bloc.
"Adopted by a vote of 14 to 1 (Cuba), with 6 absten-
tions (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico).
February 19, 7962
62T860— 62 3
"^ Adopted by a vote of 20 to 1 (Cuba).
281
The Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs, Serving as Organ of Consultation in Aj)-
plication of the Inter- American Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance,
Resolves :
To exclude immediately the present Government of
Cuba from the Inter-American Defense Board until the
Council of the Organization of American States shall de-
termine by a vote of two thirds of its members that
membership of the Government of Cuba is not prejudicial
to the work of the Board or to the security of the
hemisphere.
VIII. Economic Relations'^
Whekeas:
The Report of the Inter-American Peace Committee to
the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of For-
eign Affairs states, with regard to the intense subversive
activity in which the countries of the Sino-Soviet bloc
and the Cuban Government are engaged in America, that
such activity constitutes "a serious violation of fimda-
mental principles of the inter-American system" ; and
During the past three years 13 American states have
found it necessary to break diplomatic relations with the
present Government of Cuba,
The Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs, Serving as Organ of Consultation in Ap-
plication of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance
Resolves :
1. To suspend immediately trade with Cuba in arms
and implements of war of every kind.
2. To charge the Council of the Organization of Ameri-
can States, in accordance with the circumstances and with
due consideration for the constitutional or legal limita-
tions of each and every one of the member states, with
studying the feasibility and desirability of extending the
suspension of trade to other items, with special attention
to items of strategic importance.
3. To authorize the Council of the Organization of
American States to discontinue, by an affirmative vote
of two-thirds of its members, the measure or measures
adopted pursuant to the preceding paragraphs, at such
time as the Government of Cuba demonstrates its com-
patibility with the purposes and principles of the system.
IX. Revision of the Statute of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights"
WnEitEAS :
The Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs, by Resolution VIII, created the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, and charged it
with furthering respect for human rights in the American
states ;
Notwithstanding the noble and persevering effort car-
" Adopted by a vote of Ifi to 1 (Cuba), with 4 absten-
tions (Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico).
" Adopted by a vote of 19 to 1 (Cuba), with 1 abstention
(Uruguay).
rled on by that Commission in the exercise of its man-
date, the inadequacy of the faculties and attributions
conferred upon it by its statute have made it difficult
for the Commission to fulfill its assigned mission;
There is a pressing need for accelerating development
in the hemisphere of the collective defense of human
rights, so that this development may result in interna-
tional legal protection of these rights ; and
There is an obvious relation between violations of
human rights and the international tensions that work
against the harmony, peace, and unity of the hemLsphere ;
The Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs, Serving as Organ of Consultation in
Application of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance
Resolves :
To recommend to the Council of the Organization of
American States that it revise the Statute of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, broadening
and strengthening the Commission's attributes and facul-
ties to such an extent as to permit it effectively to further
respect for these rights in the countries of the hemisphere.
EXPLANATORY STATEMENTS
Statement of Honduras
Honduras wishes to have the explanation of the posi-
tion it adopted in voting for Resolution VI, Exclusion of
the Present Government of Cuba from Participation in the
Inter-American System, recorded in the Final Act.
With regard to the observations of a juridical nature
made by several distinguished foreign minister.s, Hon-
duras maintains the existence of sufficient bases in the
letter and in the spirit of the treaties and conventions of
the regional system.
In the last analysis, however, in view of the threat to
the peace and security of the hemisphere, in view of the
threat to the dignity and freedom of the inhabitants of
the Americas, and in view of the political presence of the
Soviet Union in America, the Delegation of Honduras,
aware of the juridical doubt that might arise, has not
hesitated to give the benefit of the doubt to the defense
of democracy in America.
Statement of Argentina
In view of the statement made by the Representative
of Uruguay at the second plenary session, held on January
31, 1962, the Delegation of Argentina wishes to record
that it reiterates the juridical views expressed by Dr.
Miguel Angel CArcano, Minister of Foreign xVffairs and
Worship, at the ninth session of the General Committee,
In explanation of his vote on Resolution VI of this Final
Act.
Statement of Colombia
The position of Colombia has been defined in the two
statoments that will be shown in the minutes of the second
plenary session of this Eighth Meeting of Consultation,
and tliat refer to general policy and to Resolution VI.
282
Department of State Bulletin
statement of Mexico
The Delegation of Mexico wishes to make it a matter
of record in the Final Act of the Eighth Meeting of Con-
sultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, that, in its
opinion, the exclusion of a member state is not juridically
possible unless the Charter of the Organization of Ameri-
can States is first amended pursuant to the procedure
established in Article III.
Statement of Haiti
My country is proud to have participated in these dis-
cussions, which have taken place in an atmosphere of
calm, of courtesy, and of mutual respect.
Haiti came to Punta del Este with the firm intention
of defending the principles of nonintervention and self-
determination of peoples, with all that they imply. Haiti
remains firmly attached to these intangible principles,
which guarantee an order of mutual respect in relations
among peoples of different languages and cultures.
Here Haiti has become persuaded that "the fallacies of
communist propaganda cannot and should not obscure or
hide the difference in philosophy which these principles
represent when they are expressed by a democratic Ameri-
can country, and when communist governments and their
agents attempt to utilize them for their own benefit."
This is the sole reason for the change in the position
and attitude of my country, which is honored to have had
a modest part in resolving a problem which jeopardized
the peace, the solidarity, and the unity of the hemisphere.
Statement of Ecuador
The Delegation of Ecuador wishes to state in the
record that the exclusion of a member state from the
inter-American system could only be accomplished through
the prior amendment of the Charter of the Organization
of American States to grant the power to exclude a state.
The Charter is the constitutional juridical statute that
prevails over any other inter-American instrument.
Statement of Ecuador on Resolution VIII
Ecuador abstained from voting. Inasmuch as sanctions
are being applied, by invoking the Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance, sanctions that begin with the suspension of
traffic in arms with the possibility of being extended to
other items, with special attention to items of strategic
importance, a concept that might include basic necessities
of which the Cuban people should not be deprived and
thus make the present situation more critical.
Of course. Ecuador, as a peace-loving country, reaffirms
its faith in peaceful methods to settle controversies be-
tween states and condemns illegal traffic in arms.
Statement of Brazil
In view of the statement made by the Representative of
Uruguay at the plenary session held on January 31,
1962. the Delegation of Brazil reaffirms the validity of the
juridical bases of the position taken by its country with
respect to Resolution VI of the Eighth Meeting of Con-
sultation, which position was explained at length by the
February J 9, 1962
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Brazil in statements made
at the sessions of the General Committee held on January
24 and 30, 1962.
Statement of Uruguay
The Delegation of Uruguay wishes to state in the record
that, in adopting its position in the Eighth Meeting of
Consultation, far from violating or forgetting the juridical
standards applicable to the Cuban case, it adhered strictly
to them, as befits its old and honorable tradition of being
a defender of legality. The bases for this position were
explained at the plenary session held on January 31, as
will be shown in the minutes of that session.
President Proclaims Embargo
on Trade With Cuba
WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT
White House press release dated February 3
The President announced on Febinicary 3 an em-
bargo upon trade between the United States and
Cuba. He said that on humanitarian grounds ex-
ports of certain foodstuffs, medicines, and medical
supplies from the United States to Cuba would be
excepted from this embargo.
The President acted under the authority of sec-
tion 620 (a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.
He stated in his proclamation that the embargo
was being imposed in accordance with the deci-
sions of the recent meeting of foreign ministers of
the inter-American system at Punta del Este,
Urugua}^^
The President pointed out that the embargo will
deprive the government of Cuba of the dollar ex-
change it has been deriving from sales of its prod-
ucts in the United States. The loss of this income
will reduce the capacity of the Castro regime, inti-
mately linked with the Sino-Soviet bloc, to engage
in acts of aggi-ession, subversion, or other activi-
ties endangering the security of the United States
and other nations of the hemisphere.
PROCLAMATION 3447^
Embakgo on All Trade With Citba
Whekeas the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Min-
isters of Foreign Affairs, Serving as Organ of Consulta-
tion in Application of the Inter-American Treaty of Re-
' See p. 2T0.
' 27 Fed. Reg. 1085.
283
ciprocal Assistance, in its Final Act resolved that the
present Government of Cuba is incompatible with the
principles and objectives of the Inter-American system ;
and, in light of the subversive offensive of Sino-Soviet
communism with which the Government of Cuba is pub-
licly alined, urged the member states to take those steps
that they may consider appropriate for their individual
and collective self-defense ;
Whebeas the Congress of the United States, in section
620(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (75 Stat.
445), as amended, has authorized the President to estab-
lish and maintain an embargo upon all trade between the
United States and Cuba ; and
Whereas the United States, in accordance with its in-
ternational obligations, is prepared to take all necessary
actions to promote national and hemispheric security by
isolating the present Government of Cuba and thereby re-
ducing the threat posed by its alinement with the Com-
munist powers :
Now, THEREFOHE, I, JoHN F. KENNEDY, President of the
United States of America, acting under the authority of
section e20(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (75
Stat. 445) , as amended, do
1. Hereby proclaim an embargo upon trade between the
United States and Cuba in accordance with paragraphs 2
and 3 of this proclamation ;
2. Hereby prohibit, effective 12 :01 a.m.. Eastern Stand-
ard Time, February 7, 1962, the importation into the
United States of all goods of Cuban origin and all goods
imported from or through Cuba ; and I hereby authorize
and direct the Secretary of the Treasury to carry out
such prohibition, to make such exceptions thereto, by li-
cense or otherwise, as he determines to be consistent with
the effective operation of the embargo hereby proclaimed,
and to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to perform such functions ;
3. And further, I do hereby direct the Secretary of
Commerce, under the provisions of the Export Control
Act of 1949, as amended (50 U.S.C. App. 2021-2032), to
continue to carry out the prohibition of aU exports from
the United States to Cuba, and I hereby authorize him,
under that Act, to continue, make, modify or revoke ex-
ceptions from such prohibition.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and
caused the Seal of the United States of America to be
affixed.
Done at the City of Washington this third day of
February In the year of our Lord nineteen hun-
[seal] dred and sixty-two, and of the Independence of
the United States of America the one hundred and
eighty-sixth.
By the President :
Dean Rusk,
Becretarp of State.
ffLJ L^
Secretary Rusk's News Conference
of February 1
Presa release 69 dated February 2
Secretary Rush: I have just returned this after-
noon from a meeting of the foreign ministers of
the Organization of American States at Punta del
Este in Uruguay.^ I do not have a formal and
prepared statement, but I should like to make a
few comments before we begin our questions.
The general subject of that meeting was the
problem of Communist penetration in this hemi-
sphere, with particular attention to the situation
of Castro Cuba. Although we were very much
preoccupied by the problem of Conmiunist pene-
tration, there was no question whatever that the
foreign ministers appreciated the fact that the
great tasks of the hemisphere lay not in these de-
fensive questions but rather in the great creative
effort in front of us in building in this hemisphere
vital democracies which will make such penetra-
tions impossible.
I came away from that meetmg with a profound
sense of the unity of the hemisphere on this prob-
lem, and of the enormous movement which has
occurred in the last, say, 18 months in recognizing
the nature of the problem and the importance of
moving as a hemisphere to try to deal with it
more adequately.
Questions Considered at Punta del Este
We had before us a number of questions. If
one were to ask what the United States hoped
might come out of that meeting, I might just re-
mind you briefly of the four points that I men-
tioned in my opening address to the ministers of
foreign affairs of the inter-American Republics.
I urged first that we must recognize that the aline-
ment of the government of Cuba with the coun-
tries of the Sino-Soviet bloc and its commitment
to extend Communist power in this hemisphere are
incompatible with the purposes and principles of
the inter- American system and that its current ac-
tivities are an ever-present and common danger
to the peace and security of the continent.
Second, we urged that we sliould now make the
policy decision to exclude the Castro regime from
participation in the organs and bodies of the inter-
Amei'ican system. Third, that we must interrupt
' See p. 270.
284
Department of State Bulletin
the limited but significant flow of trade between
Cuba and the rest of the hemisphere, especially in
the traffic in arms. And with respect to the traffic
ill arms, although we know that none of the mem-
bers of the hemisphere are selling arms to Cuba,
traffic — illicit traffic — in arms from Cuba to other
countries is going on, and we intend to interrupt
that traffic. Aiid fourth, that we should establish
some cooperative machinery to make it possible for
us to work together to meet political and indirect
aggression mounted against the hemisphere, and
in that connection we urged the establishment of
a special security committee to recommend indi-
vidual and collective measures to the governments
of the American states.
Accomplishments of Conference
Xow, from the point of view of what we hoped
to accomplish, I think that these were matters
which were in the minds of a great many govern-
ments, and we can report that those elements were
effectively accomplished at Punta del Este. It
might be of some interest to you to know what,
in fact, did happen there because I am not certain
that that information has been fully reported.
There was, for example, a unanimous resolution
on the nature of the Communist offensive in Latin
America. I think you would find that a more
interesting document than most intergovernmen-
tal documents, a thoughtful and imaginative state-
ment of the problem which makes it, I think, quite
clear that Castroism is not the answer for the
political or the economic development of this
hemisphere of free societies.
Then, by 19 votes, we established a Special Con-
sultative Committee on Security, working under
the Council of the Organization of American
States.
There was a reaffirmation of the holding of free
elections. I might say that, although that might
sound as though it were simply a routine reaffirma-
tion of well-known doctrines, it was impressive to
see the warmth which the conference gave to the
new Foreign Minister of the Dominican Republic
because of the democracy in that country.
There was a unanimous reaffirmation of and
stimulation to the Alliance for Progress, as free
men's answer to the problem of economic and so-
cial development, rather than a Castro Communist
kind of intervention.
We had some difficulty of a juridical and tech-
nical nature on the point of the exclusion of the
present government of Cuba from participation
in the organs and bodies of the inter-American
system. I should like to comment on that just
a bit because it is, I think, understandable that
attention is focused on points of disagreement
rather than on major points of agreement.
There was unanimity, as recorded by votes, with
two general ideas. That is that Marxist-Leninism
is incompatible with the inter-American system
and that the present government of Cuba is in-
compatible with that system. In our talks, dis-
cussions, and negotiations it was entirely clear that
there was unanimity on the broad notion that this
incompatibility was inconsistent with or contrary
to the participation of the present government of
Cuba in the organs and bodies of the inter-Ameri-
can system.
How to give effect to that general conclusion did
lead to a discussion of some very important but
highly complex and highly teclinical juridical
questions. There were moments when the remarks
seemed to be well taken that there seemed to be
a discourse between Sir Francis Bacon and St.
Thomas Aquinas.
There were some who felt that, since there was
an adequate legal base already existing, indeed, a
variety of legal remedies available, there was no
impairment to a policy decision that Cuba is ex-
cluded from the inter- American system or that
the present government of Cuba is so excluded.
There were some others who felt that there ought
to be additional juridical means provided before
that political decision should be taken.
There were 17 votes for the proposition that, as
a consequence of repeated acts, the present gov-
ernment of Cuba has voluntarily placed itself out-
side the inter- American system. There was ima-
nimity on the point of incompatibility. There
were six abstentions on the point of the present
exclusion of the present government of Cuba from
participation in the inter-American system. This
was not so much a question of policy as it was a
question of procedure and the juridical base. But
it was obvious that all those who took part recog-
nized, fundamentally, the contradictions between
Marxist-Leninism and the basic principles of our
hemispheric system.
In a case where the legal problem did not seem
to appear to anyone — for example, in the case of
the Inter-American Defense Board, which had
been created by the foreign ministers and there-
February 19, 1962
285
fore was at the disposal of the foreign ministers —
there was unanimity that the present government
of Cuba should be ousted from that Board.
In the case of economic relations we used pri-
marily the formula which had been used in the
case of the Dominican Republic. We immedi-
ately suspended trade in arms and implements
of war and then charged the Council of the Or-
ganization of American States to study the matter
further and to make recommendations as to the
possibility of extending this ban to other items,
with special attention to items of strategic im-
portance. That resolution got 16 votes. There
were 4 abstentions, and it is my impression that
the abstentions were based upon the hope that
the priority given to items of strategic impor-
tance would be made effective and that trade rela-
tions which had to do with the health or the
basic situation of the Cuban people themselves
would not be unduly affected.
There is no question that the present govern-
ment of Cuba was and is isolated in this hem-
isphere. They were not joined by any other
government on the negative votes which they cast
against all of these resolutions. It is also useful
to recall that, on the last day of the conference,
they themselves demonstrated the notion of with-
drawal, self-exclusion, by taking themselves out
of the conference. I do believe that this meeting
represented a considerable milestone in the devel-
opment of the OAS system and the recognition
of the nature of the threat to the hemisphere.
Differences on How To Solve Problem
Now, we had some differences on which consid-
erable time was spent, but there was no effort to
impose solutions. This was a negotiation among
independent governments and independent na-
tions— each foreign minister doing liis duty as
he saw it from the point of view of his own
people.
I think we might recall that the nations of the
hemisphere were in somewhat different positions
during this meeting. Many in and around the
Caribbean area — and remember that the United
States is a Caribbean country — felt especially con-
cerned, interested, and, some of them, directly
threatened by the Castro regime, and they felt
very strongly that the Organization should move
promptly under the Rio Treaty itself to take such
actions as may be necessary to limit the impact
of this threat. There were othei-s, somewhat more
remote from that situation, who were not as di-
rectly and immediately concerned.
From the point of view of the United States,
looking at the purposes of the OAS system, the
important countries were those who felt tl^em-
selves threatened. Even though some of them
might have been the smaller covmtries, we felt
that it was important for the OAS to give sup-
port to those smaller coimtries who were threat-
ened by this development. Even while we met at
Punta del Este reports came in, some of which
have been made public, about incidents or acts of
violence which demonstrated the very threat that
we were talking about.
So that I think it is also important to bear in
mind that this question is very much involved in
the internal political situation in each country.
We did not feel that it was up to us to tiy to insist
that governments cast votes without regard to the
pressing and important situations which they had
in their own homelands.
I think that, under the circumstances and the
spirit of unanimity wliich was acliieved on all of
the underlying points, the meeting was a great
success for the OAS as a whole.
Now I will be glad to take your questions.
Juridical and Political Views
Q. Mr. Secretary, you have explained earlier in
your discourse that these six votes were based pri-
marily on juridical and technical difficulties and
then later on you recognise that the question in-
volved internal political situations in these coun-
tries, which seems somewhat of a contradiction.
I toonder if you would care to comment on reports
that these were really not so much piridical hut
were policy differences and the fact that a major
segment of the hemisphere didn't approve of the
exclusion part is likely to have a divisive effect
in the OAS in the future.
A. You will recall that, back in December — on
December 4th — when the call of this meeting oc-
cui'red, there were a number of countries who ab-
stained or voted against the call of the meeting.
There were some countries wlio did not believe that
the situation called for the application of the Rio
Treaty, the treaty of mutual assistance in the
hemisphere.
I think this different concept of the meeting had
some political bearing on the discussion that oc-
286
Department of Slate Bulletin
curred at our conference. If you look throu<jrli the
resolutions that were actually passed, I think you
will see that an attempt was made not to insist
that the provisions of the I\io Tre<aty were literally
being applied, although the conference was meet-
ing luider the l\io Treaty and that treaty provided
a wholly adequate base for any measui'es that were
taken.
But that difference of view that was expressed
in early December did make itself felt during the
discussions. No, I think that there is no basic
contradiction between the idea that countries have
a dill'ei'ent juridical view and at the same time have
a ditlerent political view. After all, the combina-
tion of these two points, juridical and political,
is not imknown, and I think all of us combine the
two from time to time.
Q. Mr. Secretary, if Cuba or C astro'' s Cuba is
now to he excluded from the inter- American sys-
tem because of the incompatiiility of the Com-
munist regime with that system, does this in any
way affect our treaty arrangements with Cuba?
I refer specifically to the treaty under which we
maintain a base at Guantanamo since the purpose
of that base now is to protect the inter-American
system.
A. The treaty with respect to Guantanamo came
into existence long before the creation of the inter-
American system, and I would not suppose that
the participation or the nonparticipation of the
present government of Cuba in the OAS would
affect that treaty.
Illicit Traffic in Arms
Q. Mr. Secretary, does the exclusion of arms
trade in any ivay affect the shipment of arms to
Cuba from Communist countries?
A. No. These resolutions were dealing with re-
lations within the hemisphere. The resolution to
which I referred would not, in itself, affect that
trade.
Q. I was about to ask — / understood in your
earlier statement, Mr. Secretary, that you spoke
of arms trade from other countries that you hoped
to interrupt.
A. No, I think I referred to the fact that so
far as we know there is no trade in arms from any
countries of the American system to Cuba, but we
believe that there is illicit traffic in arms from
Cuba to some of these other countries. And, of
course, that would bo included in this resolution.
Q. Mr. Secretary, are you contemplating now
specific steps which would shortly be taken to cut
off thvi illicit trade in arms from Cuba to other
countries?
A. Well, that is a matter which will be coming
up in the Council of the Organization and mi-
doubtedly will be a matter of concern to this spe-
cial security committee which we directed the
Council to establish at our recent conference.
Q. Is our Navy now working to stop any of this
traffic?
A. Well, I think that you can assimie that all
of the governments most immediately concerned
are taking such measures as they can take to be
sure that this illicit traffic does not go forward.
Action To Be Taken By OAS Council
Q. Mr. Secretary, what is the im,mediate jurid-
ical situation in the OAS Council xuhen it returns?
A. Well, they have been instructed by these res-
olutions to do a number of things ; but more par-
ticulai'ly in connection with the resolution on
exclusion, they have been directed to adopt "with-
out delay" the measures necessary to carry out
this resolution, and this resolution in effect says
that this incompatibility excludes the present gov-
ernment of Cuba from participation in the inter-
American system. I would suppose the Comicil
would be meeting fairly soon, because "without
delay" is fast.
Q. Mr. Secretary, would you say that the illicit
arms shipments from Cuba reflect the Communist
arms shipments to Cuba tvhich are then reex-
ported?
A. The reexport of arms from Cuba to other
coimtries in the hemisphere, to subversive or illicit
groups, is of course very much on our minds in tliis
situation.
Q. Mr. Secretary, the suggestion has been made
that the conference has tended to embarrass the
regimes of those countries that abstained at Punta
del Este, especially reports from Argentina that
there is some turmoil there as a result of it.
Would you care to comment on this question of
whether those coimtries have been emiarrassed, or
the governments of those countries?
February J 9, 1962
287
A. Well, I tliink I should say that at the confer-
ence we were fully aware of the fact that the in-
ternal situation m each country varied somewhat
and tliat tliis issue of Cuba was much involved in
the internal political and public opinion situations
in the different countries.
We did not ourselves attempt to judge those by
trying to insist m any way that governments vote
against their best judgment and appreciation of
their own position. There is considerable variety,
country by country, if you go doAvn the list, in the
impact of this kind of problem within their own
political and constitutional system. We tried at
the conference not to take the responsibility of
trying to press people to make judgments that
might be unwise from the point of view of their
own situation.
U.S. Trade With Cuba
Q. Mr. Secretary, I have a two-part question.
The first part : Do you favor the cutting off of this
remaining trade between the United States and
Cuba?
A. Well, I wish to get into that now that I am
back, and I suspect that you will be hearing some-
thing about that in due course.
Q. The second part is how do you square that,
even the reconsideration of what remains, trade in
food and medicine, with the Presidenfs statement
that our quarrel is not with the Cuban people, so
we don't want to punish them?
A. That is something that will have to be con-
sidered, because in a certain sense one has to think
about the balances in these trade arrangements.
We know from highly reliable intelligence sources
that dollars and foreign exchange are being used
by the Castro government to promote subversion
in other countries, and if trade produces foreign
exchange reserves which can be used by the present
government of Cuba to strengthen subversive ac-
tivities in other countries we think we have to
take that into accomit.
Q. Mr. Secretary, isn't a good part of that dol-
lar reserve coming from trade with Canada now?
Are we to suggest to the Canadian Government
that this trade between Canada and Cuha be
stopped?
A. This is something we will have to take up
after this meeting. I don't want to comment on
that today.
288
Q. Mr. Secretary, on that point, if you will elab-
orate on that, to what extent would all the resolu-
tions accepted at the Punta del Este conference be
effective without the active participation by
Canada?
A. Well, of course, we do hope that other coun-
tries having seen the clear expressions of policy
and attitude of the Organization of American
States would consider — and I am not now re-
ferring to any single country — would consider
whether they might not aline their policies with
the policies of the inter-Anierican system. I
think we will find that a nmnber of countries will
be looking at it from that point of view.
Q. Thank you very m-uch, Mr. Secretary.
U.S. and U.K. Propose Recess
for Test Ban Talks
Departinent Statement
Press release 59 dated January 29
Due to the Soviet Union's rejection of a renewed
U.S.-U.K. appeal that serious negotiations be re-
sumed at the Geneva conference toward agreement
on a controlled test ban treaty, the United States
and the United Kingdom recently indicated their
willingness to consider the test ban question in
the context of general disarmament negotiations
as the only alternative for the attainment of that
goal.^ But, despite the long-held Soviet position
that international controls to verify a cessation of
nuclear testing could be accepted only within the
framework of general and complete disarmament,
the Soviet Union now seems determined to close
this last avenue to agreement. This is the meaning
of the Soviet Government's rejection of the U.S.-
U.K. offer to search for an accommodation on the
test ban question in the context of disarmament.
In view of this situation, the United States and
the United Kingdom today proposed that the Ge-
neva test ban conference recess until a common
basis for negotiations can be reestablished. The
delegations of the two countries expressed the hope
that such a basis for negotiations could be quickly
reestablished either through conversations at the
forthcoming 18-nation disarmament conference or
through other diplomatic channels. At tlie same
time, tlie United States and the United Kingdom
have informed the Soviet Government that their
' Bulletin of Feb. 5, 1962, p. 205.
Department of State Bulletin
representatives are prepared to attend future meet-
ings if such meetings could help serve to break the
present deadlock.
The recess proposal was made in the firm con-
viction that no common basis for negotiation now
exists in view of the Soviet Unions expressed un-
willingness to continue serious efforts at the con-
ference toward the objective of reaching a test
ban agreement imder effective international safe-
guards. Both the U.S. and the U.K. Governments
have made it clear that they cannot accept the
Soviet proposal of November 28, 1961 — which calls
for a halt to nuclear weapon tests on the terms of
an unverifiable paper pledge— as the basis for the
continuation of the current Geneva conference.
The United States and the United Kingdom
believe that the rejection of a vei'ified test ban
agreement both as an independent measure and
as an early measure in a disarmament program
fully establishes the fact that, pious words to the
contrary, the Soviet Union docs not want an ef-
fective test ban treaty now or at any time in the
foreseeable future. Nevertheless, both the United
States and the United Kingdom intend to pursue
their efforts to reach the widest possible area of
agreement in the 18-nation disarmament confer-
ence scheduled to commence on March 14 at Ge-
neva, including agreement on a verified test ban
treaty, which they consider to be a matter of
greatest priority.
The President's Trade Program — Key to the Grand Design
Tyy George C. McGhee
Under Secretary for Political Affairs ^
To some of you it may seem odd that I, the
Under Secretary for Political Affairs, should be
asked to discuss the background and implications
of President Kennedy's proposals for new trade
legislation.^ To others of you, I am sure, this will
not seem odd at all. The origins of our present
trade problems are political as well as economic.
The trade policies of this nation have both political
and economic implications, domestically and in-
ternationally.
In fact the new trade legislation proposed by
the President has far-reaching implications of
many kinds. Tlie decision on this proposal will
deeply affect our domestic economic life for years
to come. This decision will also vitally affect al-
most every aspect of our international relations — •
political, economic, military, psychological, and
* Address made before the Associated Btisiness Publica-
tions Forum at New York, N.Y., on Jan. 31 (press re-
lease 65).
' For text of the President's message on trade, see
Bulletin of Feb. 12, 1962, p. 231.
SO forth. I will try to illustrate these implications
later.
A good place to begin, I suppose, is at the be-
ginning— the beginning of the United States of
America. One of the most important elements
in the decision of the Thirteen Original Colonies
to foi-m a federation under the American Consti-
tution was their determination to eliminate arti-
ficial trade barriers among the individual Colonies
and to permit a free flow of trade across State
lines.
This determination has been a major factor
ever since in maintaining the political unity and
integrity of the United States. It has played an
even greater role in making the United States the
richest and most economically powerful country
in the world today.
For the first 150 years of our national history,
our international trade was a constant source of
controversy in our domestic politics — sometimes
the only major source of controversy. At first the
issues were relatively simple. The infant indus-
tries, primarily in the Northeast, wanted tariff
februafy 79, 1962
289
protection against the competition of the okler and
more efficient industries of Great Britain and other
nations of Western Europe. The consumers, in-
cluding some of the industrial producers them-
selves, wanted to buy goods as cheaply as possible.
Most manufactured goods came from abroad. The
farmers, especially in the South and West, wanted
to sell their surpluses abroad, such as cotton and
tobacco. From the administration of Andrew
Jackson to the Civil War, the South and AYest
usually controlled our trade and tariff policies.
The New Trading World
After that the basic issues did not change, but
both the political and economic aspects of our
tariff policies became much more complicated be-
cause of the reconstruction period, the rapid
growth of American industrial power, and our
westward expansion. Although some industries
and areas were directly affected, it became in-
creasingly difficult for the average citizen to de-
termine where his real interests lay. Today this
difficulty has been compounded many times, partly
because of the conaplexity of American economic
life and partly because of the diversification of
our international mterests.
In our efforts to climb out of the great depres-
sion one of the most important and far-reaching
measures adopted was the repeal of the existing
restrictive tariff legislation and the adoption of
the Trade Act of 1934, sponsored by Secretary of
State Cordell Hull. This legislation, which has
been extended and improved several times, has
served American interests very well. However,
even this legislation has now become obsolete for
a variety of reasons, including the following:
First, the emergence of the European Common
Market and the prospective enlargement of this
market by the adherence of the United Kingdom
is creating an entirely new trading world. Under
present legislation we are unable to adapt our-
selves to this new trading world.
The President does not now have nearly enough
bargaining authority to negotiate on behalf of the
American people with the expanding Common
Market, a market larger than our own in popula-
tion and potentially larger in purchasing power.
Because of our most-favorcd-nation treaties, the
effects of such a negotiation would involve many
other nations. The President also lacks authority
to negotiate directly with these other nations —
with such rising industrial nations as Japan, with
the partly industrial members of the British Com-
monwealth, with our neighbors in Latin America,
and with the lesser developed countries of Asia
and Africa.
Present legislation permits the President to re-
duce tariffs only by a very limited amount, and it
also requires hun to negotiate such reductions on a
reciprocal, item-by-item basis. Many nations do
not like to negotiate in this manner, and the new
European Common Market will eventually become
incapable of negotiating in this manner.
Therefore, unless the President is given broader
and more flexible bargaining authority, we will be
denied full access to the new trading world. We
can continue to restrict impoi*ts into this country,
but we can do little to provide increased opportu-
nities for American industrial and agricultural
exports.
Need for Policies Consistent With U.S. Respon-
sibilities
Second, in the period since 1934 the United
States has been catapulted from a position of
political isolation and relative economic isolation
to a role involving major political and economic
responsibilities.
To give one example, we have assumed respon-
sibility for helping a great many less developed
countries to maintain their political independence
and to achieve economic and social advancement.
We are spending a great deal of money for this
purpose, in various kinds of loans and grants.
However, a large part of this money may be
wasted unless we are able to help the less devel-
oped countries to establish a mutually beneficial
trading relationship with the rest of the world.
It does very little good to provide aid to a coim-
try for the purpose of increasing its production
of a basic commodity which is already a glut in
world markets. It does very little good to help a
less developed country establisli new industries
unless tliese countries have a reasonable prospect
of selling their surplus industrial products abroad
at some future date.
It docs very little good to build up a new na-
tion's economy unless that nation has a reasonable
assurance of being able to import the goods it will
need to sustain its economj'. Finally, it does very
little good for us to support the political inde-
pendence of now nations if we are willing to let
290
Department of State Bulletin
them become economically dependent upon the
Communist bloc.
In all these ways our major role in the world
will be undermined unless we are able to develop
trade policies that are consistent with that role.
Economic Component of Cold-War Struggle
Third, this nation and other free nations have
been engaged for many years in an unprecedented
struggle for national survival — a kind of world
civil war that is sometimes called the "cold war.''
This struggle has many different facets, and it is
easy to concentrate almost exclusively upon one
or two facets and to ignore the others.
Thus far, this struggle has involved the threat
of devastating military force, as well as the oc-
casional application of limited military force, both
overtly and covertly. For the most part, however,
the struggle is being fought by a wide variety of
nonmilitary techniques — political, economic, dip-
lomatic, psychological, and so forth.
The economic component of this struggle is a
very important one. The Sino-Soviet bloc seems
determined to make as many free nations as pos-
sible, especially the less developed nations, eco-
nomic dependencies of the Communist empire
through various aid and trade arrangements. The
bloc also seems determined to subject the Western
industrial world to ruinous competition wherever
it can. The bloc is also eager to acquire strategic
goods — manufactured goods and raw materials —
which it does not possess in adequate quantity or
quality.
Finally, of course, the Sino-Soviet rulers are
determined to prove to the entire world the su-
periority and mvincibility of the Communist
political and economic system, to prove that the
industrial nations cannot survive with their sys-
tems of political democracy and private enterprise,
and to prove that the less developed nations can
fulfill their aspirations only by adopting a Com-
munist-type political and economic discipline.
Our present trade legislation does not give the
United States the tools needed to meet this multi-
pronged Communist threat. We cannot protect
our own national security adequately, nor can we
adequately help to protect the independence of
other free nations.
I turn now to the last, but not the least, reason
why present trade legislation is inadequate. We
have a domestic economic interest in accelerating
growth, preventing inflation, and maintaining a
sound balance in our international payments. A
long-term solution to these problems can be
achieved only if we are able to develop and main-
tain the full potential of our trading relationships
with Western Europe and the rest of the world.
For example, we may need to increase our imports
considerably, and it is equally clear that we will
need to expand our exports to an even greater ex-
tent. We simply camiot do these things imder
existing trade legislation.
The President's Legislative Proposals
I do not wish to undertake an elaborate descrip-
tion of the President's legislative proposals. In
brief, as I have said, they give him much broader
and much more flexible bargaining authority.
This is to be used in the first instance in develop-
ing a trading and general economic partnership
with the European Common Market — a partner-
ship of equals. We can then extend the benefits
of this partnership to the industrial and lesser
developed nations in other parts of the free world.
The legislative proposals also call for much
broader and more adequate forms of protection
for American businessmen, industrialists, farmers,
and laborers than are available imder present leg-
islation. The President would be empowered to
use several different kinds of protection where
protection is clearly needed. The experience of
the European Common Market has, however, dem-
onstrated that the need for protection is much
less than a great many people seem to think. The
reduction of artificial barriers to trade helps a
great many more people than it hurts.
Even the people it hurts are not hurt nearly so
much as they are hurt every year by normal
changes in domestic production and marketing
methods. The tiny segment of industry, agricul-
ture, and labor that may be seriously injured by
increased foreign competition can be temporarily
protected by tariff restrictions, can be assisted in
adjusting to new economic conditions, or can re-
ceive other selective forms of protection.
One of the most important aspects of the Presi-
dent's new trade proposals is that they will permit
the United States Government to give economic
protection wherever this protection is needed
without disturbing or stagnating the remainder
of the national economy. Our Government will no
longer be required to use an atomic bomb to kill
a mouse.
February 79, J 962
291
Keystone of National Strategy
The real challenge of the trade program, how-
ever, lies in the fact that it provides the keystone
to our whole forward national strategy — the
"grand design" of the world we seek to create.
This is a concept going beyond the current crises
of the cold war.
The adoption of the proposed trade legislation
will permit the United States to cooperate in
buOding a solid economic foundation underneath
the Atlantic community system, which the "grand
design" envisages as the hard core of the security
and economic well-being of the entire free world.
Together, North America and Western Europe in-
clude some half billion people, have about 90 per-
cent of the industrial and technological potential
of the free world, and have several times the pres-
ent gross national product of the entire Com-
munist bloc. The resources of the Atlantic com-
munity are essential to defend and build the free
world.
The Atlantic commimity is already a "going
concern." We already have the 15-member North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, which possesses
needed military power and has become a useful
instrument of political consultation. We also have
the new Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development,^ an institution which has 20
members, including several neutral nations.
The OECD was formed only a few months ago,
but it has already proved its usefulness as an in-
strument for coordinating some of the economic
and financial activities of the member govern-
ments. It can also help to make available larger
amounts of economic and technical assistance to
the less developed areas and to insure the moi'e ef-
fective utilization of this assistance.
The institutions of the Atlantic community are
already strong and can be made much stronger
and more useful. However, no institution can be
stronger than its foundations. The indispensable
foundation of a strong and dynamic At]ai:itic com-
munity is a close trading partnership between the
United States of America and the enlarged Euro-
pean Common Market.
Unhappily, however, as we build we must also
defend. Only through increased trade can the
increased economic growth needed to provide for
the defense of the free world be assured. The
cost of our nuclear deterrent, the increased build-
up of conventional military forces now under way
in the NATO, and the continued military assist-
ance to other free-world nations would otherwise
become an increasing burden. We cannot, without
a large favorable balance of trade, maintain our
forces overseas. Without trade with us, nations
willing to do so caimot generate the resources re-
quired to buy arms and build up their defenses.
Trade is the lifeblood of our national security.
But no matter how strong are their defenses,
the Atlantic nations cannot survive as a "rich
man's club." Cooperation with other free-world
nations is also a \dtal element of our "grand de-
sign." Increased economic strength and imity in
the Atlantic community facilitates that coopera-
tion. It enables us to offer additional help to the
other free nations of the world and thus to
strengthen our ties with these nations.
Wlaen I speak of "other nations," I include such
important trading partners as Canada and Japan.
I include also the other nations of the British
Commonwealth. I include Latin America, with
which the United States has special and long-
standing ties through the OAS [Organization of
American States] and with which we are embarked
on a great Alliance for Progress.*
Finally, and very importantly, I include the
newly emerging and lesser developed nations of
Asia and Africa. Together the industrialized na-
tions of the free world can help them to achieve
the ultimate goal which they and we share — which
is to enable the less developed nations to i-etain
their independence and to achieve self-sustaining
economic growth through their own production
and trade, without the need for continued
assistance.
Developing a Real Community of Interests
Our ultimate political goal is strength and unity
in the free world — the creation of what the Presi-
dent has called a community of free-world nations.
In the long run unity among free nations caimot
be assured by force, by psychological strategy, or
even by diplomacy. Unity will ultimately depend
upon the development of a real community of
interests, involving all of the varied activities and
aspirations of man. Trade is the warp and woof
of such a community.
' For b.ickRroiind, see ibid., Jan. 2, 1961, p. 8, and Oct.
16, 1961, p. 655.
292
' For background, see ihid., Sept. 11, 1961, p. 459.
Department of State Bulletin
Trade is the one most universal common de-
nominator among the pursuits of man. Trade
provides strength through independence. The at-
traction to free-world nations of participation in
the trade of the free world, which aggregates $115
billion a year, dwarfs the opportunities offered by
the $4-billion trade between the free world and
the bloc.
The adoption of the new trade legislation can
have a tremendous psychological impact through-
out the world. It will demonstrate that the Ameri-
can people are prepared to practice the principles
of free competitive enterprise that we have
preached for so many years. It will demonstrate
that the empirical mixture of public and private
enterprise developed by Western societies is su-
perior to totalitarian systems.
It will also demonstrate the ancient fallacies of
Communist theory and strategy. The Communists
have always maintained that the conflicts among
the nations of the so-called capitalist world —
and the conflicts among special interests within
these nations — -will eventually bring Western civi-
lization to a state of disintegration and decadence.
The European Common Market, with its high
rate of economic growth, is already confounding
the Communist theories. We can join in confound-
ing Commimist theory still more. We can prove
conclusively that communism is neither desirable
nor inevitable. We can prove that it is not even
an economic system fathered by Marx and Lenin
but is rather a new form of feudalism dressed up
in the psychology of Pavlov and the technology
of the Western industrial revolution.
All that I have said adds up to one fact. The
enactment of the new trade legislation proposed
by President Kennedy will enable the Government
and people of the United States to take a power-
ful new initiative in domestic and international
affairs. For many years, under various adminis-
trations, the American people have worried about
specific and dangerous crises — in China, Korea,
Berlin, Hungary, Suez, Lebanon, Cuba, Laos, the
Congo, and Viet-Nam. For years they have de-
manded the United States "seize the initiative."
And this is, however, not always easy to do.
The peaceful householder is rarely able to take
the initiative against the burglar. But we now
have an opportunity. We can and must take ad-
vantage of it to seize the initiative. By doing so,
we can accomplish a combination of results that
will far overshadow the significance of particular
crises and will help us to reduce the number and
diminish the proportions of future crises.
I do not want to imply that the new trade legis-
lation will automatically solve the problems of
American domestic life nor all the problems of
our international relations. This is not a panacea.
It is merely a set of tools. But it is a set of tools
that we cannot afford to do without.
We have a world to gain- — not for ourselves
alone but for the cause of peace and freedom, for
the things that gave this nation birth and nurtured
it. Our ultimate goal, as stated by President Wil-
son when we entered the First World War, is a
universal concert of free peoples that shall en-
circle the globe and "make the world itself at last
free". As President Wilson also said on that oc-
casion, God helping us, we can do no other.
United States and Ghana Conclude
Educational Exchange Agreement
Press release 52 dated January 24
Ghana and the United States concluded on
January 24 an agreement for the establishment of
a program of educational exchange between the
two countries. The agreement was signed at
Accra by A. J. Duowana-Hammond, M.P., Min-
ister of Education, for Ghana and by Ambassador
Francis H. Russell for the United States.
The agreement authorizes the exchange of pro-
fessors, scholars, teachers, students, and trainees
of all kinds and in all fields. It also authorizes
the establishment of a binational commission to
plan and administer the program in Ghana. The
initial program will be a modest one, the United
States having made available the equivalent of
$100,000 in foreign currency.
Ghana will be the second country in sub-
Saharan Africa, after Ethiopia, to conclude an
educational exchange agreement with the United
States. Forty-three nations now have active
agreements for educational exchange with this
country.
The agreement was concluded under the re-
cently enacted Fulbright-Hays Act (P.L. 256-87) .
The new act broadens the scope of the original
exchange legislation and provides more liberal
terms for the participating country.
February 19, J 962
293
The Case for American Trade With Japan
by Philip n. Trezise
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Ajfairs'^
The subject I intend to discuss with you tonight
is that of trade between the United States and
Japan more particularly and wliy such trade ex-
ists. This is a moderately controversial topic to
wliich I hope I can contribute some light, without
heat.
Probably the most common and the most widely
accepted justification for trading with Japan is
that otherwise Japan might take a neutralist or
leftist course or enter into a political accommoda-
tion with the Chinese Communists and the Soviet
Union.
I believe that this line of argument, although it
is necessarily oversimplified, is essentially correct.
There is undoubtedly a close causal cormection be-
tween the state of Japan's external trade and the
country's domestic political well-being. One can
see readily how a serious blow to trade could lead
through a chain of events to a political disaster
for the free world in northeast Asia. Since the
United States occupies so dominant a place in
Japan's total trade picture, our policies are par-
ticularly relevant here. We would be shortsiglited
indeed if we failed to give due account to this
factor in United States-Japanese relations.
At the same time, the "trade in order to keep
Japan on our side" argument is only a part of (ho
story. In some respects it is a troublesome one. In
thus focusing on political considerations we tend
to agree with the proposition that trade is a kind
of imavoidable evil. We seem to say that we pro-
vide access to our market, reluctantly, as one of
tlie prices for sustaining our political ])osition in
the world. Trade becomes another kind of foreign
economic aid, closely related to the tensions of the
cold war. If those tensions ever were relaxed.
' Address made before the Japan Society, Inc., at New
York, N.Y., on Jan. 25 (press release 51 dated Jan. 24).
presumably we would consider it reasonable and
desirable to reduce or abandon some parts of our
foreign commerce.
In fact tlie political case for trade, althougli it
is certainly not inaccurate or irrelevant, need not
stand alone. I think that it is demonstrable that
our trade with Japan would exist inde|5endently
of any political requirements. It would do so be-
cause it makes the United States more prosperous,
because it creates jobs and wealth, and because it
coincides with our interest in promoting our own
economic well-being. All of us benefit in one
fashion or another from international trade. This
applies just as much to trade with Japan as to
trade with any other of our commercial partners
abroad.
Story of Postwar Japan
In examining our trade with Japan it is useful
to consider what lias happened to the Japanese
economy in recent years and what the prospects
for the future may be. Expeiience tells us that
the volume of our foreign commerce varies
directly with the level of economic acliievement
of other nations. Ti-ade between the industrial-
ized and richer countries is far greater than trade
between rich and poor countries or among the
poorer countries themselves.
Japan, for the past decade, has been in the
process of growing richer at a more rapid pace,
probably, than any other country in the world.
It is seldom recalled nowadays that, when
World War II ended, Japan was as nearly pros-
trate as a modem industrial nation could be. Its
great cities were in ruins; its industries were
shattered; the Empire was lost. There was even
reason to believe that the very bonds that hold a
society together might have been weakened beyond
294
Oeparfmenf of Sfafe Bulletin
repair. The outlook, at the most optimistic, was
for a full generation of hardship, while the
Japanese people painfully rebuilt and reorganized
their shattered countiy.
Tliis bleak and despairing prospect lasted only
briefly. ^Vithhi 5 years after the surrender, it
had become clear that Japan could hope to earn
its own way in the world. In the 1950's this hope
was more than realized. During this decade the
Japanese people, without Empire or colonies, with
unusually scanty domestic natural resources, and
without extraordinary foreign aid, built a new
economy far more boimtiful than any Japan had
ever had m the past and one that was expanding
at a rate rarely if ever matched under similar
conditions anywhere.
Eecently the Goveriunent of Japan estimated
that gross national product for the fiscal year
ending April 1 will have grown 10 percent in real
terms over the previous year. The growth rate
last year, in turn, was more than 13 percent, and
in the year before that nearly 18 percent. These
rates of expansion, under conditions of compara-
tive price stability and coming after a full decade
in which average amiual growth rates were in the
area of 9 percent, can only be called phenomenal.
Some of the specific details of the Japanese ac-
complishment are equally remarkable. In 1950
the Japanese iron and steel industry, which, as
you know, is heavily dependent upon imports of
raw materials, produced 4.8 million tons of crude
steel. By 1960 this figure was 22.3 million tons.
In calendar year 1961 it passed 28 million tons
and Japan became the fourth greatest steel pro-
ducer in the world, with only the United States,
the Soviet Union, and the Federal Kepublic of
Gennany ahead of it.
Another Japanese industry almost completely
dependent upon imports for its raw materials is
the petroleum refining industry. At the begin-
ning of the last decade, Japan's refining capacity
was about 69,000 baiTels per day. By 1960
capacity was up more than 9 times to 640,000
barrels per day and imports of crude oil, inci-
dentally, were up more than 15 times over 1950.
Consumption of electric power increased by
150 percent during the 1950's. Textile produc-
tion, most of it for domestic use, grew by 280
percent. "\^niole new industries came into being,
as, for example, in petrochemicals and in elec-
tronics.
Japan was suddenly pi'ojected into the durable
consumer goods age. Television became a major
industry, and Japanese consumers bought more
television sets than any people outside of the
United States and the United Kingdom. Elec-
trical appliances — refrigerators, washing ma-
chines, even dishwashers — found an important
place in the consumption pattern. Ownership of
an automobile, while still uncommon enough, is
sufficiently general as to make it an open question
whether Japanese cities in their present form can
survive.
Capping everything else — and what is seldom
remarked upon — the Japanese farmer began pro-
ducing rice in quantities that now make Japan
mainly self-sufficient in this basic cereal grain.
This accomplishment, in a land of small farms and
in the face of a shrinking farm area, is possibly
the most stai'tling of all. It reflects, of course, the
possibilities inherent in the application of modern
technology to small-farm agriculture. The lesson
in it for Asia and Africa may well be a revolution-
ary one.
Looking back on the postwar period, the wisdom
of our occupation policies is more than ever ap-
parent. The occupation under General MacArthur
set the stage for Japanese rehabilitation and
growth. "VVliere it could have easily restrained or
pi'evented Japanese progress, it fostered and
furthered the possibilities for growth and develop-
ment.
But neither occupation policies nor postwar
American economic assistance provided the essen-
tial expansive force. The achievement was a Jap-
anese achievement. Its basic ingredients were, I
think, hard work, a pattern of frugality in the
Japanese community, a general receptivity to
change, and an extraordinarily adventuresome
business leadership.
Japan's Growth as Market for U.S. Goods
I find the story of postwar Japan a very exciting
one in itself. The recovery and growth of Japan
under democratic institutions bears out better than
anyone could have expected our belief that free-
dom and economic progress are compatible phe-
nomena.
However, my point now is that the ingredients
which have made for Japan's perfonnance are still
there. So far as one can see, the potential for
economic growth has not been exhausted. Unless
February 79, J 962
295
external factors come into play, the supposition
must be that the Japanese economy will continue
to expand at a rapid pace for some years to come.
This implies a big and a steadily expanding
market for somebody's exports.
If the past is any guide, we should have a prom-
inent, probably a dominant, place in that market.
We sell Japan about a third of all her imports,
and this proportion reflects advantages that we
should on the whole be able to maintain.
The dimensions of the Japanese market are not
always fully appreciated in the United States.
In calendar 1961 we sold to Japan about $1.7 bil-
lion worth of commodities. Japan was far and
away our largest customer, next to Canada. The
data are incomplete, but it seems that after Japan
our next largest foreign customer was the United
Kingdom, which purchased from us goods worth
about $1.2 billion.
"Within the $1.7-billion figure are some notable
individual items. For example, we seem to have
sold Japan upwards of $250 million worth of raw
cotton, about $100 million worth of soybeans, and
$65 million in wheat and other grains. Our coal
mines found a market for 5 million tons of coking
coal in the booming Japan steel industry. Our
exporters of iron and steel scrap sold to Japanese
mills more than $200 million worth of raw ma-
terial. Machinery exports to Japan ran in excess
of $150 million.
1961 was a boom year in Japan, one in which
our exports to Japan exceeded our imports from
Japan by some $700 million. This level of export
surplus was extraordinary, but we do customarily
run a favorable trade balance with Japan and the
longrun curve of our export trade has been con-
sistently upward. During the 1950's our expoils
to Japan grew from $416 million to $1.3 billion,
or almost 220 percent. For a comparison, our
sales to the most rapidly growing part of Western
Eui'ope — the countries now organized in the Com-
mon Market — rose from $1.6 billion to $3.4 billion
or about 110 percent.
Tlie outlook, then, is that Japan will grow as a
market for American goods. Tliis will be true
for raw materials, for agricultural products, and
for industrial producers' goods. It will be in-
creasingly the case, also, for a broad range of
consumer manufactures and luxury items. As
personal incomes rise in Japan and as restrictions
on imports are removed, opportunities for sales of
such items as cameras, toys, textiles, and leather
and plastic goods — I select these examples ad-
visedly— will increase. I would not wish to ex-
aggerate tlie immediate prospects or to understate
the advantages that Japanese producers will con-
tinue to enjoy in their own market, but I would
observe that there is already widespread concern
in Japan over the prospective influx of "cheap"
American consumer goods. The point, of course,
is that, even in categories where Japan has in a
broad sense a substantial comparative advantage,
individual American products will or can be
highly competitive.
At all events, any sensible concern for our ex-
port trade and for our balance of payments means
that we must attend to the Japanese market.
Only a policy intended to hurt ourselves would
justify measures that would serve to reduce our
trade or to diminish our access to the booming and
expanding economy of Japan.
Imports From Japan Stimulate U.S. Industry
Now, of course, if we could go along increasing
our sales of goods to Japan while the Japanese
refrained from trying to sell to us, we would have
what some people w^ould consider the best of all
possible situations. But as the world happens to
be constructed, Japan cannot hope to finance its
imports in anything like their present volume, to
say nothing of a higher future volume, unless it
has substantial dollar earnings from sales to the
United States.
This is not a matter of crude bilateralism. The
American market is so large a part of the world
market and Japanese production and trade pat-
terns are of such a character that Japan must con-
tinue to look on this country as its lai'gest single
customer. If, for any reason, Japan's ability to
sell in the United States were to be markedly
diminished, the adjustment process would involve
a sharp decline in domestic business activity in
Japan and, in sequence, a reduction of purcliases
from abroad, including purchases from the United
States.
In short, if we are to sell to Japan, we must also
buy from Japan. This is a fact of international
trade that seems sometimes to sit badly with us.
I wonder, however, if it is really as onerous as
is sometimes suggested. The proposition that im-
ports are a burden is true in tlie same sense that
tlie grocery bill is a burden. Still, despite the
pain of paying the grocery bill, we find it desir-
296
Department of Stale Bulletin
able to have the groceries. Tlie same thing can
be said of imports, including imports from Japan.
The American consumer, who is not the most vocal
element in our society, has registered his approval
of Japan's sales to us with his pocketbook vote,
and the volume of our purchases from Japan has
increased fairly steadily.
Furthermore, some imports from Japan have
had an evident stimulating effect on U.S. industry
and consequently upon the employment of Ameri-
can labor. Postwar Japan has been responsible
for a number of innovations which deserve more
attention than they have received in this country.
Let me cite a few cases.
In the optical field, for instance, Japanese man-
ufacturers have offered us a whole range of fine-
quality equipment, some of it reflecting highly
ingenious improvements on what had existed
before. Has it been a bad thing for our camera
addicts that the Japanese industry has offered
them cameras highly competitive with the better
European products and with those of our own in-
dustry ? One would judge that the customers do
not think so, for Japanese cameras have had
steadily increasing acceptance in this country.
Moreover, it seems obvious that the impact of Jap-
anese cameras has been to give impetus to sales
of photographic film and to domestic employment
in the film producing and in the film processing
industries. In a dynamic society nothing stands
still. Imports can displace domestic production
temporarily and locally, but they can also lead
through a chain of actions to the expansion of
domestic industry.
It would be an interesting bit of analysis to
examine in detail the effect on the American
housebuilding industry, or better still upon the
do-it-yourself industry, of commodities such as
hardwood plywood and ceramic tile from Japan.
The effect on housing costs, from the consumer's
point of view, has surely been favorable. The
result almost certainly has been to widen the mar-
ket and to increase employment in the building
trades and in a variety of other activities.
A most impressive case has been the small tran-
sistor radio. If I am correctly informed, this
product was in the first instance a Japanese inno-
vation, although it was based on technology devel-
oped in the United States and licensed to Japanese
companies. The astonishing rise in Japanese
sales of this item in the United States within
a brief period suggests very strongly that the
American market was created by the product.
This having happened, however, our own industry
responded by developing a competitive product.
During the first half of 1961 Japanese exports of
transistor radios were off by half a million units
as against the same period in 1960. During the
same period factoi-y shipments from U.S. firms
of directly competitive radios increased by more
than a million units. Here there seems to have
been an almost classic case of the kind of competi-
tive response that we associate with an enterprise
system and from which we have obtained a new,
widely sold product and new jobs as well.
One could nm through many more commodities
imported from Japan and argue that the Ameri-
can consumer, and often related American indus-
tries, have been the gainers for imports. We need
not think of our purchases from Japan as acts of
political necessity or even as the unavoidable
means of sustaining our exports. Imports are
part of a desirable process in which we get from a
highly productive and increasingly inventive in-
dustrial economy in Japan a great many useful
things which make our lives more comfortable and
our economy stronger.
It would be naive, of course, to think, because
we gain as a nation from trade, that there are no
specific problems in our commercial relations with
Japan. I believe that I encountered most of them
over a period of 4 years. I can assure you that
they are frequent and difficult.
Basically, I suppose, import competition, from
Japan or anywhere else, is looked upon as quanti-
tatively and qualitatively different from ordinary
competition. American producers are no different
in this respect than other producers, including
Japanese producers. Given this imiversal atti-
tude, we have to recognize that imports, partic-
ularly when their impact is concentrated on one
industrial sector or a few communities, appear to
be an unfair and unreasonable intrusion. Nobody
can blame a worker for being aggrieved if he feels
that he has been displaced from his job by a prod-
uct from abroad. Nor can we fail to sympathize
with a businessman who finds his sales and profits
slipping away in the face of import competition.
As a community we can at least provide in com-
mon for assistance where workers, firms, or in-
dustries which have enjoyed protection from
imports have been injured after that protection
has been reduced.
This is what the President is proposing in the
February 19, 1962
297
adjustment assistance provisions of the new trade
legislation that is being sent forward to the Con-
gress.^ For the first time in the history of our
tarift' legislation the executive branch is proposing
that we try to deal with the local impact of imports
on the basis that the conununity as a whole has
an obligation to assist those who may have been
affected by actions taken on behalf of the whole
community. We are overdue for such a reform.
Apart from this item of elementary justice that
is included in the bill, the new trade legislation
promises to focus the country's attention on our
import and export business as never before. We
can hope that the great debate now shaping up
will bring forth a trade policy law suited to the
times. Let us also hope that the debate will en-
lighten and educate us about our interests in trade
with other nations. As we come to understand the
issues better, most of our unfounded feai-s, I tliink,
will fall away. The idea will gain more accept-
ance that in buying — as well as selling — abroad
we enrich rather than harm ourselves. Nothing,
I think, could do more to smooth over the diffi-
culties and frictions in our trade with Japan than
a wider public understanding of this not very
revolutionary proposition.
Is Foreign Aid Really Necessary?
hy Roger W. Tubby
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs '
In the spring of 1961 Adlai Stevenson took a
trip to South America.^ At a dinner just before
he was leaving. Bob Hope introduced him by say-
ing: "Adlai 's going to South America to visit
the friends of the United States — and he will be
back the same day." Things weren't quite that
bad then, and in any event they have improved
considerably since.
It is safe to say that we can count among our
friends all of the free-world nations and a clear
majority of the non-Communist nations. This is
not because we inspire love, or because of our
many military alliances, or because of our foreign
aid program. It is largely because they share
with us a desire that there be a peaceful world
of free and independent states.
Your Department of Commerce and Industry
in a recent booklet said tliis :
New frontiers in government, in culture, recreation.
' For text of President's message on trade, see Bulletin
of Feb. 12, 1062, p. 231.
" Address made before the Oklalioma Press Association
at Olilahoma City, Olila., on Jan. 20 (press release 49
dated Jan. 24).
' For Ambassador Stevenson'.s report to Secretary Rusk
on his trip, see Bulletin of Aug. 21, 1961, p. 311.
industry and all the other exciting areas of state endeavor
challenge young Oklahoma.
And young Oklahoma — looking back on a history which
but 50 short years ago was being enacted on the stage
of an Indian commonwealth — steps forward to meet the
challenge.
Now there is another challenge which tliis State
and tliis nation must step forward to meet, and
that is the long-range protection of our freedom
tlirough relatively new devices such as our foreign
aid programs. I have been asked to answer the
question "Is foreign aid really necessary?"
This is a fair question, one wortliy of a thought-
ful and dispassionate answer. I would like at
the outset to approach it with a somewhat dif-
ferent question: What would the world be like
today if the United States had not provided for-
eign aid at the end of the Second World War
when nmch of Europe laj' devastated, when Japan
and the Philippines and other areas were strug-
gling up from the rubble of war?
West Germany and Franco A-ery likely would
have been lost, and with their loss all the rest of
Europe would be gone or in serious jeopardy.
Very [probably, had we not provided aid, our coun-
try and the rest of the free world would today
298
Department of State Bulletin
be in a vulnerable and even perilous position.
Indeed, mucli of what is now the free world would
have been taken over by the Communists.
I think it is safe to say that had it not been
for the Marsliall plan, the point 4 program, the
subsequent programs of the International Coop-
eration Administration — all now embraced in the
new Agency for International Development — we
would in 1962 be looking out upon this kind of
current world scene :
Italy and Greece would be firmly under Com-
munist control.
Iran would be a puppet state of the Soviet
Union and so, too, would Iraq. The rich Middle
Eastern oil fields would be lubricating Communist
industrial and military machinery.
Russia would control the Bosporus and would
be astride the lifelines of the Mediterranean.
India, all of Indocliina, Burma, Thailand, and
much of Africa would be dancing to tunes called
in Moscow. Latin America, even now threat-
ened, would be in far greater danger.
What U.S. Aid Has Done
Instead, West Europe is free and prosperous.
So is Japan. Most of the coimtries of Asia,
Africa, and Latin America are independent, and
their economies are improving. Instead of the
United States' attempting to stand nearly alone,
desperate for lack of supplies or markets or mili-
tary allies, we now have numerous strong and
loyal friends. Much of this has been due to our
foreign aid programs; not a single country which
has received substantial U.S. assistance has gone
Communist.
You recall that in early 1948 large areas of
Greece were held by Communist forces. They
were at the gates of Athens.
Across the Adriatic Sea from Greece, a new
democratic government in Italy faced an election
in a chaotic country — an election which was nearly
won by the Communists.
Across the Alps in France there were mass un-
employment, serious disiiiptions of the economy,
unstable government. — and the danger of Com-
munist takeover.
On the other side of the English Channel, the
British people were struggling against terrible
odds to repair the dreadful damage of war all
across the island.
Western Germany lay prostrate, and the Krem-
lin moved to strangle the city of Berlin with tlie
blockade of '48.
It was a situation in Europe that was made to
order for the Kremlin, and the Kremlin made the
most of it by promoting strikes and riots, by sab-
otaging recovery through its puppet Communist
parties, by political maneuver, and by massive in-
jections of propaganda.
Elsewhere in the world the situation was not
less alarming. The forces of Nationalist China
were giving way before the Communists; the
French were fighting a desperate losing war in
Indochina; the Communists controlled much of
Malaya and the Philippines. In Indonesia a new
state was emerging with difficulty and uncertainty ;
the subcontinent of India had been divided with
millions uprooted and the long struggle for Indian
and Pakistan national security and stability was
just beginning; Iran and Turkey were imder
heavy Soviet pressure, with Russian troops still
in Iran. There were other areas of danger and
potential danger in the Middle East, North Af-
rica, and elsewhere.
This cliallenge had to be met by the prompt
exercise of resolution, determination, imagination,
and the expenditure of money.
This necessity mothered the invention of spe-
cifically tailored projects in the area of interna-
tional cooperation which we lump together under
the somewhat misleading label of "foreigii aid."
I say the title is misleading because it implies
aid to others without recognition that in aiding
otliers we aid ourselves.
It is clear, too, that the program has achieved
far more than merely checking the voracious Com-
munist appetite for infiltration, subversion, and
expansion. Even if there had been no Communist
pressure, there would be vastly more poverty,
hunger, ignorance, and disease had we failed to
recognize the need to share our technical and pro-
fessional know-how with less developed nations.
Take health. In 1950 malaria was prevalent
among about 1.2 billion people. By 1960 the dis-
ease had been completely eradicated in regions
with a total of 258 million people and nearly erad-
icated in areas with 66 million people. An addi-
tional 505 million persons were actively protected
by antimalaria operations. In the last 10 years
smallpox has disappeared from many areas. Yel-
low fever has been pushed back into the jungle.
Mortality from cholera and tuberculosis is rapidly
declining.
February 79, J 962
299
Other significant gains have been made in edu-
cation, food production, resource development,
transportation, and communications, thanks in
part to our foreign aid programs.
I don't want to become Biblical, but all of this
is like bread cast upon the waters. It has been
and will be returned to us manyfold by the multi-
plications of the military strength, economic vi-
tality, and the generally improved health, educa-
tion, and welfare of free nations.
Disparity Between Rich and Poor
Of the 3 billion people alive this year, 1 billion
are behind the Iron Curtain — a world stretching
from the Brandenburg Gate to the Yellow Sea.
There are 2 billion people in the non-Communist
world. Of this 2 billion, twice as many people live
in the economically less advanced as in the more
advanced nations.
Any child born today has, therefore, a 2 to 1
chance of being born in one of the less developed
nations of the world — in fact a 2 to 1 chance of
being born in a nation where the average per
capita annual income is less than $50 or $60 per
year. Such widespread poverty can no longer be
brushed aside as merely one of the less attractive
facts of life.
Apart from moral considerations we live in a
time when the disparity between the rich and poor
nations endangers the security of the world.
Modem means of communication have made it
possible to reacli vast numbers of illiterate people
and to imbue them with new ideas and new hopes,
a new sense of unity and new expectations. The
last few years have seen the crumbling of old co-
lonial structures imder which millions of the less
developed peoples have lived.
The crumbling of these .structures, together with
the social changes occurring in the less developed
nations, has unleashed great new forces. These
forces spring from the eager desire of millions of
people to advance politically, economically, and so-
cially, and to do so as rapidly as possible.
These winds of change carry an enormous po-
tential for good or evil. They pose for the West-
em World a fateful question : Can we through wise
and generous policies assist in channeling these
forces toward constructive purposes? Or will
they be directed toward ends that are not only
self-destructive for the new nations but which can
place in jeopardy the most precious values of civil-
ization to which we are committed ?
Congress has declared its policy in this regard
in the preamble to the Act for International De-
velopment, under which the Kennedy administra-
tion has reoriented our foreign aid program, from
which I quote in part :
. . . peace depends on wider recognition of the dignity
and interdependence of men, and survival of free institu-
tions in tlie United States can best be assured in a world-
Tfide atmosphere of freedom. . . .
The Congress declares it to be a primary necessity, op-
portunity, and responsibility of the United States ... to
help make a historic demonstration that economic growth
and political democracy can go hand in hand.
Foreign Aid Not a Giveaway
Now no one in Government or elsewhere has
proposed that we convert the free world into one
vast asylum for the care of the underprivileged,
the underfed, the underpaid, or the underdevel-
oped. Under the new hardheaded leadership of
Fowler Hamilton, the new AID agency is stress-
ing self-help, is shifting emphasis from grants to
development loans — loans that are repaid in dol-
lars— and is emphasizing the value of education.
Programs are being worked out on a coimtry-by-
country basis with the aim of broadening the coun-
try's own efforts to strengthen its own economic
and social structure.
This is not now and never has been a "giveaway"
program. As a matter of fact very nearly 80 per-
cent of the amount our country spends on economic
aid returns here in the form of purchases of goods
and services from United States firms.
The record shows that money we have granted
or loaned to free- world nations flows back to Okla-
homa in volume, through purchases of pumps,
valves, chemicals, and oil-field equipment valued
in the millions of dollars.
The record shows that the return impact of our
overseas aid has been beneficially felt in Bartles-
ville, Duncan, Enid, Muskogee, Tulsa, and Okla-
homa City. In all these cities, and for Oklahoma
as a whole, our foreign aid program has had some
beneficial impact. But of course tliis benefit is
purely a byproduct, and the main impact has been
on the new frontiers abroad.
It is important to think of our aid program not
in terms of economic theorj', political ideology, or
sociological do-goodism. It is helpful to tliink in
300
Department of State Bulletin
the concrete terms of better health, better schools,
better industrial and agricultural production, and
generally better standards of living for all free
nations, who in turn become better customers for
our products — as we have seen from our steady
rise in trade with countries we have helped.
At random I have selected a few specific exam-
ples of gains made through various types of in-
ternational cooperation:
India. The cost of malaria to the economy of
India in loss of manpower, in medical expenses,
and in other ways has been estimated in the past
to be as high as $500 million a year. U.S. assist-
ance enabled India to more than double the num-
ber of its malaria control units in 3 years. Under
an accelerated program it is expected that the
disease will be virtually eradicated from India by
1965.
Israel. "With U.S. technical aid Israel's beef
cattle herd was increased from 1,000 head in 1948
to 15,000 head in 1959 ; the dairy cattle herd from
18,000 head to 44,000 head during the same period.
Lebanon. The fii-st high-grade milk, packaged
in paper cartons, to make its appearance in the
Middle East went on the market in Beirut in 1956.
It came from new, modern, commercial pasteuriz-
ing plants set up as a result of interest aroused in
modern dairying by a U.S. technical assistance
project.
Korea. In the Republic of Korea a nationwide
smallpox inoculation campaign, in which a million
and a half children were inoculated, helped bring
about a drop in smallpox cases from 10,085 in
1949-51 to only 5 in the first 9 months of 1958.
Ethiopia. A simple change to row planting of
corn, taught by U.S. technicians, instead of broad-
cast planting increased production from 18 bushels
an acre to 30 bushels.
Taiwan. U.S. aid to China in 7 years boosted
railway passenger mileage 72 percent, freight ton-
nage mileage 96 percent, highway passenger mile-
age 340 percent, and highway freight tonnage
mileage 280 percent.
Philiffines. The Labor Education Center of
the University of the Philippines, established in
1954 with U.S. assistance, has sponsored more than
60 workers' education seminars. More than 3,500
trade unionists were trained in such subjects as
trade union administration, labor legislation, shop
steward functions, grievance procedures, and
labor-management relations.
Turkey. With U.S. aid a network of some
17,000 miles of all-weather road has been put into
operation. The U.S. Bureau of Public Roads di-
rected on-the-job training for some 3,000 Turks,
and nearly 100 engineers and management per-
sonnel have been trained in the United States.
The cost of transporting produce and other ma-
terials by motor truck in Turkey is figured now
at 10 cents per ton-mile, compared with $1 per
ton-mile by oxcart.
Necessity, Opportunity, Responsibility of Aid
To sum up my answer to the question of foreign
aid:
Basically it boils down to three words: neces-
sity, opportunity, responsibility.
The necessity. Freedom is threatened around
the globe by a combination of three factors: (1)
the rising expectations of nations newly awakened
to the possibility of a better life, (2) the inability
of many of their governments to meet their in-
sistent demands for progress unless they get some
outside help, and (3) the persistent pressures by
the Communists to exploit and take over these
coimtries.
Without outside help many of them would suf-
fer economic stagnation or collapse, chaos or revo-
lution—all of which invite a takeover by a dic-
tator.
If we are to keep these underdeveloped nations
from falling under totalitarian control, we must
help them. For the free world to lose them would
mean not only tragic human loss but it would also
mean :
— the weakening of the free world and the
strengthening of the Communist world ;
— the gradual loss of U.S. friends abroad and
our eventual isolation ;
— the loss of key commodities and materials for
which the United States and other free nations
depend in large part or in whole on imports;
— the loss of markets for U.S. goods.
We need, as the President has said,^ first of all
to be economically and militarily strong in this
country. We need also strong and free allies.
And we need countries, whether committed to us
or not, who are independent of Communist
domination.
• Ibid., Jan. 29, 1962, p. 159.
February J 9, 1962
301
If we make wise use of our resources and our
intelligence in the next decade, we and the other
"have" nations are capable of helping more than
half of the people of the underdeveloped nations
to get on their feet economically so that they will
no longer need large amounts of outside aid.
We have the opportunity, too, to create ever-
expanding markets for U.S. goods and opportuni-
ties for U.S. investment. This means more jobs
at home, better business.
Finally, we have the opportunity to create a
world in which tensions are reduced and true peace
can flourish.
We have a great responsibility to do what we
can to help the people of these nations in their own
striving for a more decent life and to help pre-
serve them from totalitarian takeover. We have
spent $85 billion on foreign aid in 16 years; this
has helped preserve the free world.
The average annual cost of these aid programs,
economic and military, has been around 1.5 per-
cent of our gross national product — a relatively
modest amount of insurance, especially consider-
ing the grim alternatives.
I think we should be at least moderately opti-
mistic about the days and years ahead. We, and
the increasingly effective association of free peo-
ples, have the will, the resources, and the capabil-
ity constantly to strengthen our position. We
have already dramatically shown what can be
done through free-world cooperation since the end
of the last great war. We have far greater poten-
tial for progress today.
Austria Makes Additional Pension
Payments to Former Persecutees
PreHS release 61 dated January 29
The Department of State has received informa-
tion that the Austrian Government has now made
arrangements for the payment of pensions to
former employees of the Austrian Social Insur-
ance Institutes retroactively to May 1, 1950, on
the basis of article 26 of the Austrian State
Treaty, irrespective of whether the claimant had
at that date fulfilled tlie normal pension eligibil-
ity requirements (age, disability) under the reg-
ulations of service.
Payment of such pensions has heretofore been
subject to the claimant's meeting the normal pen-
sion eligibility requirements mentioned above.
Beneficiaries who are receiving pensions at the
present time, who have not heretofore received
retroactive payments for the full period dating
back to May 1, 1950, may wish to contact the
social insurance institute concerned.
Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy
87th Congress, 1st Session
Impact of Imports and Exports on Employment (Steel
and Aluminum). Hearings before the Subcommittee on
the Impact of Imports and Exports on American Em-
ployment of the House Education and Labor Committee.
August 14-21, 1961. 330 pp.
Investigation and Study of the Administration, Operation,
and Enforcement of the Export Control Act of 1949,
and Related Acts. Hearings before the House Select
Committee on Export Control. October 25-December 8,
1961. .584 pp.
Food and People. Two study papers prepared for the
Subcommittee on Foreign Policy of the Joint Economic
Committee. November 30, 1961. 74 pp. [Joint
Committee print]
Foreign Economic Policy. Hearings before the Subcom-
mittee on Foreign Economic Policy of the Joint Eco-
nomic Committee. December 4-14, 1961. 524 pp.
Study Mission to Africa, September-October 1961. Re-
port of Senators Albert Gore, Philip A. Hart, and
Maurine B. Neuberger. January 14, 1962. 18 pp.
[Committee print]
87th Congress, 2d Session
The State of the Union. Address of the Presiilent before
a joint session of the Senate and the House of Repre-
sentatives. H. Doc. 251. January 11, 1962. 13 pp.
Study of Foreign Policy. ReiJort to accompany S. Res.
246. S. Rept. 1118. January 15, 1962. 3 pp.
Regional and Other Documents Concerning United States
Relations With Latin America. Materials prepared for
the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the
Hou.se Foreign Affairs Committee. January 15, 1962.
204 pp. [Committee print]
Refugee Problem in Hong Kong. Report of a special sub-
committee of the House Judiciary Committee. H. Rept.
1284. January 16, 1962. 49 pp.
Foreign Economic Policy for the 1960's. Retxirt of the
Joint Economic Committee with minority and other
views. January 17, 1962. 50 pp. [Joint Committee
print]
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Program. Message from
the President. H. Doc. 314. January 2."), VMVl. 13 pp.
Investigation of Immigration and Naturalization Mat-
ters. Reiwrt to accompany S. Res. 263. S. Rept. 1144.
January 25, 19(i2. 7 pp.
Authorizing the Purchase of United Nations Bonds.
Message from the President. H. Doc. 321. January 30,
1962. 3 pp.
302
Department of State Bulletin
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings^
Adjourned During January 1962
U.N. ECAFE Committee for Coordination of Investigations of the Phnom Penh, Cambodia . . . Jan. 3-8
Lower Mekong Basin: 16th (General) Session.
CENTO Scientific Council Lahore Jan. 4-5
IMCO Maritime Safety Committee: 5th Session London Jan. 8-11
CENTO Symposium on the Role of Science in the Development of Lahore Jan. 8-13
Natural Resources With Particular Reference to Iran, Pakistan,
and Turkey.
GATT Cotton Textile Committee: 2d Ses.sion of the Technical Geneva Jan. 8-13
Subcommittee.
WHO Standing Committee on Administration and Finance . . . Geneva Jan. 8-15
U.N. Special Fund: 7th Session of the Governing Council .... New York Jan. 9-15
U.N. Trusteeship Council: 28th Session New York Jan. 10-11
FAO Special Meeting on Desert Locust Control in the Eastern Rome Jan. 15-19
African Region.
U.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: 21st Session Geneva Jan. 15-19
CENTO Economic Experts Ankara Jan. 15-20
OECD Economic PoUcy Committee: Working Party III (Balance Paris Jan. 16-17
of Pavmeiits).
OECD Oil Committee Paris Jan. 16-17
WHO E.xecutive Board: 29th Session Geneva Jan. 16-30
OECD Tourism Committee Paris Jan. 18 (1 day)
NATO Petroleum Planning Committee Paris Jan. 18-19
FAO Desert Locust Control Technical Advisory Committee: 10th Rome Jan. 22-26
Ses.=ion.
GATT Working Group on Marketing of Butter Geneva Jan. 22-26
GATT Panel of Experts on Residual Import Restrictions .... Geneva Jan. 22-26
U.N. ECAFE Committee on Trade: 5th Session Bangkok Jan. 22-29
Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Punta del Este, Uruguay . . . Jan. 22-31
the American States.
OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party II (Economic Paris Jan. 23-24
Growth).
GATT Cotton Textile Committee: 2d Session of the Statistical Geneva Jan. 24^26
Subcommittee.
NATO Planning Board for Inland Surface Transport Paris Jan. 25-26
OECD Committee for Scientific Research Paris Jan. 30-31
NATO Industrial Planning Committee Paris Jan. 30-31
In Session January 31, 1962
Conference on Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests (not Geneva Oct. 31, 1958-
meeting).
5th Round of GATT Tariff Negotiations Geneva Sept. 1, 1960-
International Conference for the Settlement of the Laotian Ques- Geneva May 16, 1961-
tion.
United Nations General Assembly: 16th Session New York Sept. 19, 1961-
OAS Group of Experts on Compensatory Financing of Export Re- Washington Jan. 5-
ceipts.
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights: 14th Session of the New York Jan. 8-
Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection
of Minorities.
ICAO Communications Division: 7th Session Montreal Jan. 9-
ITU CCITT Plan Subcommittee for Africa Dakar Jan. 22-
UNESCO Conference on Development of Information Media in Paris Jan. 24-
Africa.
' Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Jan. 30, 1962. Following is a Ust of abbreviations : CCITT,
Comity consultatif international t^Wgraphique et t^l^phonique ; CENTO, Central Treaty Organization ; ECAFE, Eco-
nomic Commission for Asia and the Far East ; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe ; ECOSOC, Economic and Social
Council ; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization ; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ; ICAO, Inter-
national Civil Aviation Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Orgamzation; ITU, Inter-
national Telecommunication Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OAS, OrganizaUon of American
States; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United
Nations Educational, ScienUflc and Cultural Organization; WHO, World Health Organization; WMO, World
Meteorological Organization.
February 19, J 962 303
Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings
in Session January 31, 1962 — Continued
North Pacific Fur Seal Commission: Scientific Committee ....
WMO Commission for Instruments and Methods of Observation:
3d Session.
GATT Cotton Textile Committee: 2d Session
U.N. ECOSOC Regional Seminar on the Participation of Women
in Public Life.
United Nations Wheat Conference
U.N. ECAFE Committee on Industry and Natural Resources:
14th Session.
-Continued
Ottawa Jan. 29-
New Delhi Jan. 29-
Geneva Jan. 29-
Singapore Jan. 30-
Geneva Jan. 31-
Bangkok Jan. Si-
ll. N. Security Council Turns Down
Soviet Bid for Debate on Congo
Statement hy Adlai E. Stevenson
U.S. Representative in the Security Council ^
Before I proceed to my point of order, Mr. Pres-
ident, I want to also welcome the new members.
It is especially agreeable to me to welcome anyone
who has not been here as long as I have. I am
sure they will all make major contributions to the
cause of peace and security, and I hope that I will
also agree with them — and, of course, vice versa.
The Acting Secretarj'-General, Mr. President,
and the United Nations Command, in the judg-
ment of my delegation, are acting vigorously and
skillfully to carry out their mandates. The Gov-
ernment of the Congo, as well as the Secretary-
General and his associates, should, in our
judgment, be left alone to continue their work.
Yet while efforts from many quarters are begin-
ning to produce promising results, the Soviet Un-
ion, which has declined to pay its share of the
costs and otherwise support the United Nations
Operation in the Congo, has also insisted on a
meeting which, so far as I can ascertain, no one
who has supported the United Nations activities
for the benefit of the people and the central
government wants to have.
Even Prime Minister [Cyrille] Adoula has
made his position very clear. lie does not consider
it in the interests of the Congolese themselves to
have a Council meeting at this time, and he regrets
that such action should have been taken by a
friendly government without prior consultation
with the legal goverimient of the Congo and at a
time when he plans a trip to New York to speak
to the General Assembly on the situation in the
Congo. Prime Minister Adoula concludes that
such a meeting can only create confusion and dam-
age to the Congolese people.
And now his views have also been strongly en-
dorsed by the Conference of African States
meeting in Lagos.
Wlien the views of the Congolese Government
became Imown, my delegation had assumed that
the Soviet representative would withdraw his re-
quest for this meeting. In the memorandum re-
questing this meeting, the Soviet representative
implied his purpose was to support the central
government. When the central government sug-
gested this meeting would actually be troublesome,
we would have thought that the Soviet delegate
would have drawn the obvious conclusions. Evi-
dently he has not been disposed to do so. And,
Mr. President, the party whose interests are most
concerned about the Kepublic of the Congo is, of
course, the Republic of the Congo. Its views
should be our guide as to whether its problems
should not be discussed by the Security Council,
and it has made its position very clear.
Accordingly, Mr. President, if there are no
further congratulatory speeches about the new
members, as I gather you have indicated, I hereby
formally move the adjournment of this meeting
under Rule 33. This motion, according to the
rules, is not debatable, and I request that it be put
innnediately to the vote.^
'Made in the Security Council on Jan. 30 (U.S./U.N.
pre.ss release 3910).
' The U.S. motion for adjournment was carried by a
vote of 7 to 2 (Rumania, U.S.S.R.), with 2 abstentions
(Ghana, U.A.R.).
304
Deparfment of State Bulletin
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Bills of Lading
International convention for unification of certain rules
relatini; to bills of lading, and protocol of signature.
Dated at Brussels August 25, 1924. Entered into force
June 2, 1931 ; for the United States December 29, 1937.
51 Stat. 233.
Accession deposited: Ivory Coast, December 15, 1961.
Copyright
Universal copyright convention. Done at Geneva Septem-
ber 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 1955.
TIAS 3324.
Extension to: Isle of Man, Fiji, Gibraltar, and Sara-
wak, November 29, 1961.
Fisheries
Declaration of understanding regarding the International
Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries of
February 8, 1949 (TIAS 2089). Done at Washington
April 24, 1961.'
Ratification advised by the Senate: January 31, 1962.
Status of Forces
Agreement between the parties to the North Atlantic
Treaty regarding the status of their forces. Signed at
London June 19, 1951. Entered into force August 23,
1953. TIAS 2846.
Extension to: Isle of Man, January 30, 1962.
Sugar
International sugar agreement, 1958. Done at London
December 1, 1958. Entered into force January 1, 1959;
for the United States October 9, 1959. TIAS 4389.
Accession deposited: Nigeria, December 12, 1961.
Telecommunications
Telegraph regulations (Geneva revision, 1958) annexed
to the international telecommunication convention of
December 22, 1952 (TIAS 3206), with appendixes and
final protocol. Done at Geneva November 29, 1958.
Entered into force January 1, 1960. TIAS 4390.
Notification of approval: Israel, November 30, 1961.
International telecommunication convention with six an-
nexes. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered
into force January 1, 1961 ; for the United States
October 23, 1961. TIAS 4892.
Ratification deposited: Overseas Territories for the in-
ternational relations of which the Government of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland are responsible (Aden (Colony and Pro-
tectorate), Basutoland, Bechuanaland Protectorate,
Falkland Islands (Colony and Dependencies, includ-
ing South Georgia, South Orkney, South Shetlands,
South Sandwich Islands, and Graham Land), Fiji
(including Pitcairn Island), The Gambia, Gibraltar,
Hong Kong, Malta, Mauritius, St. Helena (including
Ascension Island and Tristan da Cunha), Seychelles,
Swaziland, Tonga (Protected State), Western Pacific
High Commission Territories (British Solomon Is-
' Not in force.
lands Protectorate, Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony
(including The Phoenix and Northern Line Islands
group). The Southern Line Islands), The Anglo-
French Condominium of the New Hebrides, Zanzibar
(Protectorate) ), December 9, 1961.
Accession deposited: Upper Volta, January 16, 1962.
Weather
Convention of the World Meteorological Organization.
Done at Washington October 11, 1947. Entered into
force March 23, 1950. TIAS 2052.
Accession deposited: Mauritania, January 23, 1902.
BILATERAL
Canada
Convention for avoidance of double taxation and preven-
tion of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on the estates
of deceased persons. Signed at Washington February
17, 1961.'
Ratification advised by the Senate: January 31, 1962.
Cyprus
Memorandum of understanding regarding the grant, sale,
and use of proceeds from the sale of 40,000 metric tons
of wheat under title II of the Agricultural Trade De-
velopment and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68
Stat. 457; 7 U.S.C. 1721-1724). Signed at Nicosia
January 15, 1962. Entered into force January 15, 1962.
Dominican Republic
General agreement for economic, technical, and related
assistance. Signed at Santo Domingo January 11, 1962.
Entered into force January 11, 1962.
Iran
Agreement concerning the closeout of the collection ac-
count of the agricultural commodities agreement of
February 20, 1956, as amended January 29 and 30, 1957,
and as supplemented February 13, 1957 (TIAS 3506,
3749, and 3767). Effected by exchange of notes at
Tehran March 29 and Julv 2, 1961. Entered into force
July 2, 1961.
Japan
Agreement regarding the settlement of postwar economic
assistance to Japan, and exchanges of notes. Signed at
Tokyo January 9, 1962. Enters into force on the date of
exchange of written notifications that each Government
has complied with all legal requirements.
Liberia
Agreement supplementing the agreement of May 23 and
June 17, 1961 (TIAS 4788), concerning the furnishing
of military equipment and materials to Liberia. Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at Monrovia January 18
and 23, 1962. Entered into force January 23, 1962.
Mexico
Agreement amending agreement for acceptance by the
United States of certificates of airworthiness for air-
craft manufactured by Lockheed-Azciirate, S.A., of
June 26 and July 19, 1961 (TIAS 4861). Effected by
exchange of notes at Washington January 19 and 30,
1962. Entered into force January 30, 1962.
Spain
Agreement concerning the closeout of the collection ac-
counts of the agricultural commodities agreement of
April 20, 1955, as amended October 20, 1955, and Jan-
uary 21, 1956 (TIAS 3246, 3455, and 3485). Effected by
exchange of notes at Madrid October 18 and November
6, 1961. Entered into force November 6, 1961.
February 79, 7962
305
Turkey
Agreemeut amending the agricultural commodities agree-
ment of July 20, 1001, as amended (TIAS 4819 and
4874). Effected by exchange of notes at Ankara Jan-
uary 3, 1962. Entered into force January 3, 1962.
Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agree-
ment of July 29, 1961, as amended (TIAS 4819 and
4874). Effected by exchange of notes at Ankara Jan-
uary 5, 1962. Entered into force January H, l'.Mj2.
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultur-
al Organization
Agreement relating to a grant of funds for the protection
of temples and monuments from inundation as a result
of the construction of the Aswan high dam (Nubian
project). Effected by exchange of notes at Paris Jan-
uary 11 and 19, 1962. Entered into force January 19,
1962.
DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE
Confirmations
The Senate on January 29 confirmed the following
nominations :
George W. Ball to be Under Secretary of State.
John O. Bell to be Ambassador to Guatemala.
Chester Bowles to be the President's special representa-
tive and adviser on African, Asian, and Latin American
affairs, and Ambassador at Large.
John H. Bums to be Ambassador to the Central African
Republic.
John M. Cabot to be Ambassador to Poland.
Ansley J. Coale to be the representative of the United
States on the Population Commission of the Economic
and Social Council of the United Nations.
William A. Crawford to be Minister to Rumania.
Frederick G. Dutton to be an Assistant Secretary of
State.
Parker T. Hart, now Ambassador to the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia and Minister to the Kingdom of Yemen, to
serve concurrently and without additional compensation
as Ambassador to the State of Kuwait.
William J. Handley to be Ambassador to the Republic
of Mali.
Ridgway B. Knight to be Ambassador to the Syrian
Arab Republic.
Henry R. Labouisse to be Ambassador to Greece.
George C. McGhee to be Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs.
Armin H. Meyer to be Ambassador to the Republic of
Lebanon.
William E. Stevenson to be Ambassador to the
Philippines.
Raymond L. Thurston to be Ambassador to Haiti.
No.
Date
59
1/29
60
1/29
61 1/29
•62 1/30
Checl< List of Department of State
Press Releases: January 29-February 4
Press releases may be obtained from the Office of
News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.
Releases appearing in this issue of the Bulletin
which were issued prior to January 29 are Nos. 45
of January 20 ; 49, 51, and 52 of January 24 ; and
55 of January 25.
Subject
Developments at Geneva test ban talks.
U.S. participation in international con-
ferences.
Pension payments to former em-
ployees of Austrian Social Insurance
Institutes.
Mrs. Forrester appointed interna-
tional economist. Bureau of Economic
Affair.s.
Cultural affairs (India and Pakistan).
Cleveland : "Crisis and Clarity."
McGhee : "The President'.s Trade Pro-
gram— Key to the Grand Design."
Rusk : exclusion of Cuba from OAS.
Bowles : "The Four Global Forces That
Help Write the Headlines."
Achilles : "Peaceful Coexistence and
United States National Security."
Rusk : news conference.
Rusk : OAS foreign ministers meeting.
Bowles : regional foreign policy brief-
ing conference, St. Paul, Minn, (ex-
cerpts).
Bowles : "A Foreign Policy Balance
Sheet of 1961."
Visit of Prime Minister Adoula (re-
write).
Attorney General Kennedy to visit
Bangkok.
Itinerary of Attorney General Kennedy.
Rusk : report to the Nation.
Rowan : "New Directions in Foreign
Policy."
Members of Prime Minister Adoula's
party.
•63
t64
65
66
t67
1/30
1/30
1/31
1/31
2/1
168 1/31
69
70
•71
*72
•73
•74
•75
76
t77
2/2
2/2
2/1
2/1
2/2
2/2
2/2
2/2
2/3
•78 2/3
♦Not printed.
tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin.
306
Department of State Bulletin
February 19, 1962
American Republics
American Republics Unite To Halt Spread of Com-
munism in Western Hemisphere (Ruslf, texts of
resolutions)
Report to the Nation on the Punta del Este Confer-
ence (Ruslv)
Secretary Rusk Comments on Vote To Exclude
Cuba From OAS System
Secretary Rusli's News Conference of February 1 .
Atomic Energy- U.S. and U.K. Propose Recess for
Test Ban Talks .
Austria. Austria Makes Additional Pension Pay-
ments to Former Persecutees
Central African Republic. Burns confirmed as
Ambassador
Claims. Austria Makes Additional Pension Pay-
ments to Former Persecutees
Congo (Leopoldville). U.N. Security Council Turns
Down Soviet Bid for Debate on Congo (Steven-
son)
Congress, The. Congressional Documents Relating
to Foreign Policy
Cuba
American Republics Unite To Halt Spread of Com-
munism in Western Hemisphere (Rusk, texts of
resolutions)
President Proclaims Embargo on Trade With Cuba
(text of proclamation)
Report to the Nation on the Punta del Este Confer-
ence (Rusk)
Secretary Rusk Comments on Vote To Exclude
Cuba From OAS System
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of February 1 .
Department and Foreign Service. Confirmations
(Ball, Bell, Bowles, Burns, Cabot, Coale, Craw-
ford, Dutton, Hart, Handley, Knight, Labouisse,
McGhee, Meyer, Stevenson, Thurston) ....
Economic Affairs
The Case for American Trade With Japan
(Trezise)
President Proclaims Embargo on Trade With Cuba
(text of proclamation)
The President's Trade Program — Key to the Grand
Design (McGhee)
Educational and Cultural Affairs. United States
and Ghana Conclude Educational Exchange
Agreement
Foreign Aid. Is Foreign Aid Really Necessary?
(Tubby)
Ghana. United States and Ghana Conclude Educa-
tional Exchange Agreement
Greece. Labouisse confirmed as Ambassador . .
Guatemala. Bell confirmed as Ambassador . . .
Haiti. Thurston confirmed as Ambassador . . .
International Organizations and Conferences
American Republics Unite To Halt Spread of Com-
munism in Western Hemisphere (Rusk, texts of
resolutions)
Index Vol. XLVI, No. 1182
Calendar of International Conferences and Meet-
ings 303
Report to the Nation on the Punta del Este Conf er-
270 ence (Rusk) 267
Secretary Rusk Comments on Vote To Exclude
267 Cuba From OAS System 277
U.S. and U.K. Propose Recess for Test Ban Talks . 288
277
„o , Japan. The Case for American Trade With Japan
(Trezise) 294
288 Kuwait. Hart confirmed as .Embassador .... 306
Lebanon. Meyer confirmed as Ambassador . . . 306
302 Mali. Handley confirmed as Ambassador .... 306
Philippines. Stevenson confirmed as Ambassador . 306
Poland. CaI)ot confirmed as Ambassador .... 306
„„f, Presidential Documents. President Proclaims Em-
bargo on Trade With Cuba 283
Rumania. Crawford confirmed as Minister . . . 306
304 Syria. Knight confirmed as Ambassador .... 306
Treaty Information
302
Current Actions 305
United States and Ghana Conclude Educational Ex-
change Agreement 293
270 U.S.S.R.
U.N. Security Council Turns Down Soviet Bid for
283 Debate on Congo (Stevenson) 304
U.S. and U.K. Propose Recess for Test Ban Talks . 288
267 United Kingdom. U.S. and U.K. Propose Recess for
Test Ban Talks 288
277
„oA United Nations
284
Coale confirmed as U.S. Representative on
ECOSOC Population Commission 306
U.N. Security Council Turns Down Soviet Bid for
„„„ Debate on Congo (Stevenson) 304
oUt)
Name Index
Ball, George W 306
294 Bell, John O 306
Bowles, Chester 306
^^ Burns, John H 306
Cabot, John M 306
289 Coale, Ausley J 306
Crawford, William A 306
Dutton, Frederick G 306
293 Handley, William J 306
Hart, Parker T 306
298 Kennedy, President 283
Knight, Ridgway B 306
293 Labouisse, Henry R 306
McGhee, George C 289,306
Meyer, Armin H 306
306 Rusk, Secretary 267,270,277,284
306 Stevenson, Adlai E 304
Stevenson, William E 306
Thurston, Raymond L 306
Trezise, PhiUp H 294
270 Tubby, Roger W 298
U.S. tOVERNMENT PRINTIN6 OFFICE: 19C2
the
Department
United States
Government Printing Office
DIVISION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS
Washington 25, D.C.
PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID
PAYMENT OF POSTAGE, $300
(GPOl
OFFICIAL BUSINESS
President Kennedy's
New Foreign Trade Program
The text of the President's message to the Congress on trade, Janu-
ary 25, 1962, is contained in this 28-page booklet.
Publication 7338
15 cents
Of
state
ABC's of Foreign Trade
Tliis 33-pag6 illustrated booklet is a basic primer on the subject of
foreign trade with particular emphasis on United States trade policy.
As stated by Secretary of State Dean Rusk, "Wliat we do about
trade policy will be a test of our ability to meet the test of leadersliip
in the world of the 1960's. . . . "VVliat we do affects everybody. In
trade, as in so many other matters, leadership has been placed upon
us by our own capacities and accomplislmients. We can exercise it
wisely or badly, but exercise it we mvist."
Publication 7321
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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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^962
L.
Vol. XLVI, No. 1183
February 26, 1962
E
FICIAL
EKLY RECORD
PRESIDENT ASKS FOR AUTHORIZATION TO PUR-
CHASE U.N. BONDS • President Kennedy's Message to
Congress and Statements by Secretary Rusk and Ambassador
Stevenson 311
PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE AND U.S. NATIONAL SE-
CURITY • by Theodore C. Achilles 324
CRISIS AND CLARITY • by Assistant Secretary Cleveland . . 330
SUMMARY OF NEW TRADE LEGISLATION 343
THE NEW TRADE EXPANSION ACT • by Leonard Weiss . 340
ITED STATES
REIGN POLICY
For in€iex see inside back cover
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Vol. XliVI, No. 1183 • Publication 7343
February 26, 1962
For sale by the Suiierlntendent of Documents
U.S. Government Prlntlnc Office
Washinpton 25, D.C.
Price:
52 issues, domestic $8,50, foreign $12.25
Single copy, 25 cents
Use of funds for printing of this publica-
tion approved by the Director of the Bureau
of the Budget (January 19, 1061).
Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and items contained herein may
be reprinted. Citation of tlie Department
or State Bulletin as the source will be
appreciated. The Dilletin Is indexed In the
Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.
The Department of State ItULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Public Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public
and interested agencies of the
Government with information on
developments in the field of foreign
relations and on the work of tlie
Department of State and the Foreign
Service. The liVLLETiy includes se-
lected press releases on foreign policy,
issued by the White House and the
Department, and statements and ad-
dresses made by the President and l»y
the Secretary of State and other
officers of the Department, as well as
special articles on various phases of
intertuitional affiiirs and the func-
tions of the Department. Informa-
tion is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to
which the United States is or may
become a party and treaties of gen-
eral internatioiuil interest.
Publications of the Department,
United Nations documents, and legis-
lative material in the field of inter-
national relations are listed currently.
President Asks for Authorization To Purcliase U.N. Bonds
FoUoioing is the text of a message to Congress
from President Kennedy on January 30 transmit-
ting a suggested hill ''''To promote the foreign
policy of the United States hy authorizing the
purchase of United Nations bonds and the appro-
priation of fvmds therefor" {8. 2768), together
with statements made hefore the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee in support of the hill hy Sec-
retary Rush on Fehruary 6 and hy Adlai E. Stev-
enson, U.S. Representative to the United Nations,
on Fehruary 7.
MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT KENNEDY'
To the Congress of the United States:
I am transmitting herewith for the considera-
tion of tlie Congress a suggested bill to promote
the foreign policy of the United States by author-
izing the purchase of United Nations bonds and
tlie appropriation of funds therefor. Tliis bill
would authorize the appropriation of up to $100
million for the purchase of United Nations bonds.
Tlie United Nations is faced with a financial
crisis due largely to extraordinary expenditures
which it incurred in fulfilling the pledges in its
charter to secure peace, progress, and liuman
rights.'^ I regard it as vital to the interests of
our country and to the maintenance of peace that
the capacity of the United Nations to act for peace
not be inhibited by a lack of financial resources.
Some membei-s have failed to pay special as-
sessments levied for peacekeeping operations in
the Middle East and in the Congo, claiming that
these assessments are not binding upon them. The
^ H. Doc. 321, 87th Cong., 2d sess. ; for a pamphlet pre-
pared by the Department of State for the Senate Foreign
Relations and House Foreign Affairs Committees on U.N.
operations and financing, see "Information on the Opera-
tions and Financing of the United Nations," Joint Com-
mittee print, Feb. 6, 1962.
" For background, see Bulletin of Jan. 15, 1962, p. 96.
shortage of operating funds thus created has re-
duced the working capital fund of the United
Nations to zero and compelled it to hold back on
the payment of bills and borrow from United
Nations agencies.
Prudence and good management require all in-
stitutions— public or private, national or interna-
tional— to keep their affairs in good financial
order. The Secretary General of the United Na-
tions, therefore, urged the adoption of, and the
members approved by a large majority, a three-
point plan to relieve the cash deficit and to avoid
the need for makeshift financing of emergency
operations designed to keep or restore tlie peace:
Point 1 is to cover anticipated expenses for the
United Nations operation in the Congo and for
the United Nations Emergency Force in the Mid-
dle East through the end of the present fiscal
year. The 16th General Assembly approved a
new appropriation for these purposes, assessed
against all members.
Point 2 is to resolve all doubt as to whether
delinquent members must pay special assessments
for the Congo (ONUC) and Middle East
(UNEF) operations, or face tlie loss of their vot-
ing rights. To this end, the United Nations
General Assembly requested from the Interna-
tional Court of Justice an advisory opinion as to
whether these special assessments, like regular
assessments, are "expenses of the Organization,"
legally binding on all members by the terms of
the United Nations Charter.
It is the opinion of the United States that special
assessments voted by a two-thirds majority of the
General Assembly are obligatory. We anticipate
a decision by early stunmer of this year. If our
view, which is shared by most of the members
of the United Nations, is confii-med by the Court,
then all members will have to pay their dues or lose
their right to vote in the General Assembly. It
February 26, 1962
311
is only fair that members tliat participate in the
privileges of membership should participate also
in its obligations.
Even if the Court's opinion goes as we believe
it should, the United Nations would still be faced
with a serious cash problem, aggravated by any
further delays in collecting back dues from those
who have not been willing to pay the special
assessments. Consequently,
Point 3 of the United Nations financial plan is
to acquire a special fund to relieve the present
cash deficit by paying off current bills and debts,
and by setting aside a reasonable reserve to help
finance United Nations peacekeeping operations
in future emergencies.
For this purpose the General Assembly has au-
thorized the Secretary General to issue $200 mil-
lion worth of United Nations bonds repayable at
2 percent interest over a 25-year period with an-
nual repayments charged against the budget of the
United Nations. All members are assessed a share
of that budget.
If this program is successful, the United Na-
tions will be in a vastly improved financial posi-
tion. It is my judgment that this plan is sound
both for the United Nations and for its members.
These bonds will be repaid with interest at the
rate of approximately $10 million a year, as part
of the regular assessment. Every nation — includ-
ing the Soviet Union- — will thus be required to pay
its fair share or lose its vote. And the United
States will be obligated, in the long run, to meet
only 32 percent of these special costs instead of
the nearly 50 percent we are presently contribut-
ing to the special operations of the United Nations.
I ask that the Congress act now to back the
United Nations by authorizing the purchase of
these bonds. Failure to act would serve the inter-
ests of the Soviet Union, which has been particu-
larly opposed to the operation in the Congo and
which voted against this plan as part of the con-
sistent Communist effort to undermine the United
Nations and undercut its new Secretary General.
For without the bond issue, either the United Na-
tions' executive arm will wither or the United
States will be compelled to pay a larger share of
the costs of operation than is reasonable for any
one member of an international organization.
The central purpose of the United Nations is to
keep the peace wherever possible and to restore
the peace whenever it is broken.
The United Nations has i-eceived the support
of both political parties since its inception.
By emergency action the United Nations turned
back aggression in Korea.
By emergency action the United Nations
brought a halt to war in the Middle East over 5
years ago, and ever since has safeguarded the
annistice lines.
By emergency action the United Nations has
prevented large-scale civil war and avoided
great-power intervention in the Congo.
We shall spend this year nearly one-half of the
Federal budget for national defense. This au-
thorization represents an investment of one-tenth
of 1 percent of that budget in the peacekeeping
capacity of the United Nations.
Whatever its imperfections, the United Nations
effectiveness and existence are an essential part
of the machinery to bring peace out of this world
of danger and discord.
I earnestly hope that the Congress will give
early and favorable consideration to this request.
John F. Kennedy
The White House,
January 30, 1962.
A BILL To promote the foreign policy of the United States by
authorizing the purchase of United Nations bonds and the
appropriation of funds therefor
lie it cnartcd hij the Senate and Bouse of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress asscm-
hlcd. That there is hereby authorized to be appropriated
to the President, without fiscal-year limitation, out of any
money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated,
$100,000,000 for the purchase of United Nations bonds.
Sec. 2. Amounts received from the annual repayment
of principal and payment of interest due on such bonds
shall he deposited into the Treasury of the United States
as miscellaneous receipts.
STATEMENT BY SECRETARY RUSK
Press release 81 dated February 6
I welcome the opportunity to appear before you
on behalf of legislation to authorize the United
States to purchase up to $100 million worth of
United Nations bonds.
My remarks will be addressed to two separate
kinds of questions that have been raised about this
proposal. One kind of question is raised by a
small minority which is opposed to the principle of
the United Nations and our position of leadei*ship
312
Department of State Bvlletin
in it. The second kind of question is raised by
some -who regularly support the United Nations
and M-ant to be assured that we are proposing the
soundest possible solution to its present financial
crisis.
The proposal itself appears to be a narrow and
rather technical one. A large majority of the
members of the United Nations have voted ap-
proval for a three-point plan to resolve the present
financial crisis of the United Nations. One of
these steps is a $200-million bond issue to overcome
the cash deficit and permit the U.N. to put its
financial house in order. The bonds are to be re-
paid over 25 years in equal installments at 2 per-
cent interest. So the narrow question seems to be
whether the bond issue is a sound way to meet an
immediate and practical problem. "We believe that
it is and hope that you will agree with us after we
have had an opi:)ortunity to present our case in
detail.
But this proposal also raises basic questions of
foreign policy. "We are discussing the financial
viability of the United Nations in the yeai-s ahead
and therefore its capacity to serve as an effective
instrument for peace and world order. So we
necessarily are discussing the kind of world we
shall be living in. The proposal to invest in some
bonds therefore goes to the heart of our foreign
policy.
I therefore must dwell briefly on the broad ques-
tion of the role of the U.N. in United States foreign
policy — and the role of United States foreign
policy in the U.N.
U.S. Foreign Policy and the U.N.
At the very outset I should like to recall that
support for the United Nations has never been a
partisan political question. The charter itself is
the product of American leadership and bipartisan
endeavor. The proposals made at Dumbarton
Oaks were the subject of full consultation witli
Members of the Congress from both sides of the
aisle. The charter won overwhelming approval
of the Congress. It seems clear to us that the
people of this country do not think in pai'tisan
terms when they think of the United Nations. It
is precisely because of such very broad public sup-
port and bipartisan congressional attitudes that
the United States has been able to maintain a
position of leadership in U.N. affaii-s.
We cannot too often recall the purposes of the
United Nations, as set forth in the preamble to
the charter:
"to save succeeding generations from the scourge
of war";
"to reaffirm faith in fundamental human
rights" ;
"to establish conditions under which justice and
respect for the obligations arising from treaties
and other sources of international law can be
maintained"; and
"to promote social progress and better standards
of life in larger freedom."
Peace, human dignity, the rights of the individ-
ual, the rule of law, social well-being in larger
freedom — these are the purposes of the United
Nations.
They are not, of course, specifications for insti-
tutional machmery. They do not add up to a blue-
print or a master plan for resolving all the in-
herited quarrels and sins of the centuries. Much
less do these words provide any way to predict
future problems or solve them when they arise.
The preamble to the Charter of the United Na-
tions is simply a statement of goals derived from
the idea that man is born free, capable of exerting
conscious thought and free will toward the mastery
of his physical and social environment.
That being said, it is true that we live in a
woi'ld in Avhich nobility of purpose is not yet tlie
determinant factor in world affairs. It therefore
is in the context, of an imperfect, real world that
we must assess the relevance and utility of the
United Nations to United States foreign policj'.
Two Views of Human Society
In that world there are two views about the
future of human society. One is the view still
professed, though with decreasing certainty I
think, by the doctrinal heirs of Karl Marx. It
is a view of a drab one- world of gray uniformity,
held together by coercion in the name of an ideol-
ogy based on an analysis of human history which
left out of accoimt the human mind and will.
The other is a view of a pluralistic world — a
world of color, variety, and movement, held to-
gether by consent in the name of an ideology which
interprets human history as the story of man's
effort to master his environment, to improve his
society, and to perfect his behavior.
The first view — however repugnant — is easy to
February 26, J 962
313
grasp, for it is a monotone product of a single
mold. The other view is much more difficult, for its
essence is diversity. It is not so tidy as a unifoi'm
world, and its behavior is unpredictable precisely
because it will be influenced by flesh-and-blood
men.
The United Nations — in its charter, its member-
ship, and its operations — denies the first view of
the future world and conforms with the second.
The charter is a creation of the human mind, an
act of will. It is not the result of any "iron laws"
of history.
The General Assembly is living proof that the
world is still made up of stimulating differences in
cultural, racial, religious, political, and personal
elements. It makes a mockery of the concept of a
uniform one-world.
The operations of the U.N. are based on con-
sent, illumined by debate, and confirmed by ma-
jority decision expressed by men, most of whom
demonstrate daily their independence of mind and
spirit. If it does not always perform exactly
the way we want it to, that is the price of a world
in which independence Ls valued as highly by
others as it is by us.
So the United Nations, theoretically and prac-
tically, fits with the view of a diverse world
struggling to master its own problems by con-
scious thought, by deliberate act, and by majority
consent, which is always difficult and sometimes
elusive. The basic objective of U.S. policy mani-
festly is to help steer the world toward a valida-
tion of that view.
Instruments of U.S. Foreign Policy
In our dealings with the world about us we
must, of course, use all the instruments available
to us.
The first instrument is national diplomacy to
protect and extend the national security. But to
think of national security entirely in terms of
militaiy power is too limited a conception. Na-
tional power is compounded of military, political,
economic, and moral strength.
We camiot, and do not, turn over to others the
protection of our vital national interests. But it
is in the interest of our national security to in-
crease our national power and influence by associ-
ating with others in common purpose and
enterprise. Thus we make common cause with
our NATO allies in defense of the West. Thus
we make common cause with the other members
of the Atlantic community to promote our own
prosperity and to further self-sustainmg growth
in the less developed world.
In similar vein we make common cause with
the other Republics of the Western Hemisphere,
not only in defensive alliance against Communist
penetration but in mutual assault on poverty and
traditionalism. Both purposes call for common
institutions which we help to build and help to
strengthen.
So we seek to build regional organizations which
add to the national power and expand the world
of consent, both absolutely and in relation to the
world of coercion.
At the universal, or near-universal level, the
United Nations and its associated agencies are the
instrvunents with which we work toward an ulti-
mate world community at peace, under law, in
freedom, and with expanding human welfare.
The United Nations has been in business for 16
years. Ambassador Stevenson will be here tomor-
row, prepared to testify out of first-hand experi-
ence on the current state of its health.
Inevitably the United Nations must reflect in
large measure the deep divisions of the contem-
porary world. But it also reflects the even deeper
trends toward international community and the
still deeper aspirations of peoples for peace, jus-
tice, and a more decent condition for man.
Indubitably the United Nations shares the risks
and the weaknesses of the world environment in
which it operates. But that simply means that
it is relevant to the real world of the 1960"s.
Indeed I cannot imagine the 1960"s without
something very much like the United Nations.
Nor can I see any hope for a future world in
haniiony with our views without a central place
for the United Nations.
We shall continue, of course, to serve our vital
national interests through bilateral as well as mul-
tilateral diplomacy. We shall continue to work
with and seek to strengthen the concerts of nations
joined in more limited communities based on con-
sent and dedicated to common enterprise. But
our ultimate hopes would lack all substance with-
out the United Nations, for the United Nations
foreseen in the charter is tlie vision we hold of
the future.
It is in this perspective that the United Nations
plays such an important role in United States
314
Department of State Bulletin
foreign policy and wliy U.S. foreign policy lays
such store by the United Nations.
Meeting U.N. Financial Crisis
During tlio IGth General Assembly the financial
situation of the United Nations became intoler-
able. The organization had been forced to borrow
money from other U.N. accounts. It was holding
back on the payment of substantial bills. The
working capital fund was drawn down to zero.
Some members were in arrears, only to a minor
extent on regular assessments but to a serious ex-
tent on the two peace-and-security assessments.
The financial crisis is due directly to the con-
tinuing high cost of policing the armistice lines in
the Middle East and especially to the cost of the
Congo operation, which has been running at an
average rate of about $10 million a month. Both
were unexpected emergencies which had to be met
with immediate action to preserve the peace.
Some members contested the binding nature of
assessments passed for such emergencies and so
far have declined to pay their shares. Some of
the smallest members simply felt imable to pay,
or at least to pay promptly.
There is nothing imprecedented in a financial
crisis caused by hea\^ miexpected expenditures.
It happens time and again to business and other
organizations — and to families and individuals as
well. But a sound institution cannot operate on
an unsound financial basis. A solution had to be
foimd.
Toward the end of the last General Assembly
the Acting Secretary-General [U Thant] con-
sulted key member governments on how to put his
financial house in order. Out of these consulta-
tions came a three-part plan to put the U.N.'s
financial house in order. After careful study the
executive branch detennined that this was a sensi-
ble plan and, indeed, the best that could be devised
luider the circumstances. We therefore voted
with a large majority of the membership in favor
of supporting tlie plan — subject, as in any such
U.N. action, to the constitutional processes of each
member government. The bill before you is of
course a first step in the U.S. procedures for par-
ticipation. All three parts of the plan received
the overwhelming support of the General Assem-
bly— by margins of about 5 to 1. Only the Soviet
bloc and three other members voted against the
bond issue.
The first point in that plan was to vote a special
assessment to carry forward the Congo ^ and Mid-
dle East ■* operations through June 30, 1962.
The second point was to seek an advisory opin-
ion from the International Court of Justice to
settle once and for all the question of the obliga-
tory nature of Congo and Middle East assessments
voted by two-thirds of the General Assembly. An
affirmative opinion should induce nations which
have not paid to make full payment on their out-
standing assessments. The United States expects
to present arguments in the case before the Court.
The third point in the financial plan is to issue
$200 million worth of U.N. bonds, repayable over
a period of 25 years with interest at 2 percent, to
permit the U.N. to meet the currently estimated
costs of peace-and-security operations from July
1, 1962, to December 31, 1963.= This assumes a
continuation of the present spending rate for these
purposes and that back bills will be paid substan-
tially from collection of arrearages.
This proposal raises at least two basic questions.
Wliat were the alternatives open to us and to the
United Nations? Wliy did we decide to support
the U.N. bond plan in the Assembly as the best
way to help the organization get over its financial
difficulties during the next year and a half?
One suggestion advanced was that the five per-
manent members of the Security Council should
defray the entire cost of the U.N. peacekeepuag
operations. An obvious weakness with this pro-
posal is that it tends to weaken rather than
strengthen the principle of collective financial re-
sponsibility of all the members of the U.N. for
operations favored by two-thirds of the Assembly.
Moreover, we certainly could not count on the
Soviet Union to participate in a loan to liquidate
costs of peacekeeping operations when it has re-
fused to pay assessments for the same purpose.
Such a proposal therefore would have meant in
effect a special scale for the United States far in
excess of the present 331/^ percent authorized by
law, and with the U.S.S.R. continuing its policy
of fiscal erosion in the U.N.
Another possibility would have been to attempt,
in the same way as we have over the past several
years, to finance the peace-and-security operations
by the normal "pay as you go" financial resolu-
' U.N. doc. A/RES/1732 (XVI).
* U.N. doc. A/RES/1733 (XVI).
° U.N. doc. A/RES/1739 (XVI) and Corr. 1.
February 26, J 962
315
tions. We concluded that this would have required
the United States to offer to pay even more than
the 471/2 percent it has paid, through assessments
and voluntary contributions, toward the Congo
budget m 1961.
Six Factors Favoring Bond Plan
These and other possibilities were studied care-
fully, in prolonged negotiations in the General As-
sembly's Budgetary Committee. In our judgment
the U.N. bond issue is the most rational and busi-
nesslike way in which to provide the United Na-
tions with the necessary loans to carry on its
peace-and-security business. Wliy is this the case ?
In the first place the U.N. bond issue does not
relieve the Soviet Union or any other country in
arrears from the obligations of paying what they
owe on the UNEF [United Nations Emergency
Force] and Congo assessments. Because the bond
issue will be repaid out of the regular budget, it
bolsters the principle of collective fuiancial
responsibility for U.N. operations.
A second important fact is that the bond issue
would be large enough to put the U.N. finances on
a firmer footing starting July 1, 1962.
Thirdly, the U.N. bond issue has a significant
effect on our own contributions. By having the
bond issue repaid within the regular budget, we
would be contributing to U.N. peacekeeping op-
erations not on the basis of our present 471/2 per-
cent share but rather 32.02 percent. Under the
Secretary-General's plan it will not be necessary
to ask Congress for appropriations for Congo
operations during fiscal 1963.
Fourth, it is our hope that those members of the
international community who do not happen to bo
members of the U.N. but who in fact benefit from
the charter will help resolve the organization's im-
mediate financial problem by purchasing U.N.
bonds.
Fifth, the plan provides that all members pay
the interest and amortization charges for the bonds
on the basis of the regular scale of assessments,
which, for us, means paying one-third rather than
close to half of the peacekeeping costs.
Sixth, because the repayment period is 25 years,
most members ought to be in a position to under-
take payment without undue hardship.
In my judgment the financial plan adopted by
the General Assembly is sound in itself and the
best alternative open to it. The bond issue is cen-
tral to that plan and is a better method, from our
point of view, than the methods used for financing
U.N. peace-and-security operations in the past
several years.
The issue before us can be put simply : Is the
United States prepared to lend the United Nations
up to $100 million of the money it needs to restore
its financial integrity and meet the immediate fu-
ture in a financially responsible manner ? A great
deal depends upon that answer.
It seems to me overwhelmingly plain that our
national interests allow us no choice. Both our
short-range and long-range mterests — both the
real world of today and the better world we fore-
see for tomorrow — demand that we use, improve,
and strengthen the machinery, procedures, and
prestige of the United Nations.
There is no more important or urgent step in
that direction than to do our full share toward
resolving the present cash crisis of the United Na-
tions so it can put its financial house in order and
get on with its pressing business in an atmosphere
of stability and confidence.
U.S. Support of Plan in General Assembly
May I conclude, Mr. Chairman, with the reflec-
tion that the financing plan advanced by the
United Nations seems to me to meet the concerns
expressed by the many Members of the Congress
with whom I discussed this matter last year.
After many meetings with congressional commit-
tees on U.N. financial affaii-s, I came away with
the clear impression that Members of the Congress
were anxious to see U.S. support for active steps
to collect arrearages and to apportion the costs of
peacekeeping operations on a more responsible
basis. The Department of State shared these con-
cerns. We therefore worked actively within the
U.N. in support of the plan which gained the
approval of the General Assembly.
We were careful, of course, to be quite explicit
on the point that the executive branch cannot
commit the Congress. In this connection I should
lilve to quote several sentences from the statement
made by the U.S. representative on the Fifth
Committee of the United Nations prior to the
vote on the bond resolution:*
' For a statement made by Philip M. Klutznlck on
Dec. 15, 1961, see U.S. delos;ntlon press release 3S90.
316
Department of Stale Bulletin
The position of the United States must be clarified.
Only tlie Congress can autliorize the purchase of such
bouils. It will not convene until after the lirst of the
year. The United States delegation believes that the
character of the crisis is such that all states members
should be prejiared to take extraordinary steps. Nor-
mally, we would feel compelled to abstain or vote against
a proposal of this kind until it had received the blessing
of the Congress. For the reason we have stated the
Unite<l States, subject to the conditions here expressed,
will vote for this proposal.
These are the basic thoughts which I wanted to
leave with you as you start your deliberations on
a bill which the administration considers of the
greatest importance to our whole concept of world
affairs and the destiny of those who will follow us.
Ambassador Stevenson will discuss with you
the United Nations at work in this highly imper-
fect world. Assistant Secretary Cleveland and
Ambassador Klutznick will develop for you, in
full detail, the plan worked out by the Secretaiy-
General and approved by the General Assembly
to resolve the financial crisis of the United
Nations.
I shall be glad to try to answer any questions
you may have.
STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR STEVENSON
Press release 83 dated February 7
The occasion for these hearings is the Presi-
dent's request for a United States subscription to
the United Nations bond issue. This raises a nmn-
ber of questions of fact and of policy. Underlying
these financial questions is the more basic question
of the purposes which these expenditures are in-
tended to serve and the effectiveness of the United
Nations in promoting those purposes.
It hardly needs saying that, if the continuation
of the United Nations is contrary to the true inter-
ests of the United States, $1 would be too much
for us to spend on it. On the other hand, a vig-
orous and effective United Nations is an important
ingredient in the prescription for peace and se-
curity and, therefore, the freedom of the American
people. If the United Nations, even in its present
imperfect form, were ever subtracted from the
arsenal of our diplomacy, I think many times its
cost in dollars would then have to be added to our
defense arsenal. Nor do I care to contemplate the
possible loss of life in avoidable conflict.
So I support the purchase of United Nations
bonds which the President has recommended. The
financial situation of the United Nations convinces
me that prompt steps are necessary to assure the
fijiancial soundness and continued vigor of the
organization. I believe this bond issue, proposed
by Secretary-General U Thant and approved by
the General Assembly, is the best means yet pro-
posed for this purpose and that the share of the
bonds which the United States proposes to buy is
realistic.
If members of the committee wish to direct
questions about the financial details, I will do my
best to answer them. But Ambassador Klutznick
from the United States Mission to the United Na-
tions, who has followed this matter closely for the
United States from the outset and who has nego-
tiated very ably in our behalf, will be available to
the committee to discuss the bond issue in all its
aspects. I understand he will be accompanied by
xVssistant Secretary Cleveland, who is also well
informed on the financial details.
I shall confine myself to one observation on the
matter of cost. Comparing the amount which we
are asked to lend the United Nations with its value
to this country, I believe that, even if we had to
give the $100 million, instead of lending it, in
order to help keep the organization alive and
vigorous, it would be worth the cost many times
over, for $100 million is an investment of only
abotit one-tenth of 1 percent of our Federal budget
in the peacekeeping capacity of the United Na-
tions. And I am sure you have often heard that
on a per capita basis each American spent only
$1.06 on the United Nations in 1961 contrasted
with about $300 on defense.
With that preliminary I should like to supple-
ment the able statement of the Secretary of State
with some views of my own as to the value of the
United Nations to the United States. For that is
the underlying question.
Value of U.N. to United States
We are aU aware of the part which the Senate
played in the creation of the United Nations, going
back to the Fulbright resolution and the Connally
resolution in the fall of 1913. At the charter con-
ference in 1945 I was privileged to be present as
an adviser to the Secretary of State, and I remem-
ber vividly the important work of Senator Con-
February 26, J 962
317
nally and Senator Vandenberg and of Congress-
man Bloom and Dr. Eaton as members of our
United States delegation and in the ratification
debate the following summer.
Later I served as chairman of the United States
delegation to the Preparatory Commission in Lon-
don, which worked out the detailed structure and
procedures of the organization. Then in 1946 and
1947 it was my privilege to be a delegate to the
first two sessions of the General Assembly. After
that I thought politics would be less of a strain,
and now after a year back at the United Nations
I still think so !
In 1948 came the second great Senate debate on
the United Nations. This produced the Vanden-
berg resolution, reaffirming our country's support
of the United Nations and setting forth several
policy objectives to advance the United Nations'
purposes.
The question then was whether the United Na-
tions could be effective without great-power agree-
ment. At least two dozen Soviet vetoes in the
Security Council had caused great dismay about
the United Nations. Some thought they would
end its usefulness. It was widely suggested that
we should shift to other means, such as military
aid and regional arrangements, to gain the ends
of peace and freedom for which we had originally
looked so hopefully to the United Nations.
The great wisdom of the Vandenberg resolution
(Senate Resolution 239, 80th Congress) flowed
from the realization of its authors that these dif-
ferent courses of action were not alternatives ; that
we did not have to choose between them. In fact
it was equally vital to pursue them all. So the
resolution helped to lay the basis not only for
NATO and other regional arrangements — wliich
as Senator Vandenberg said were "within the
Charter but outside the veto" — but also for re-
newed efforts to make the United Nations Organi-
zation itself a more effective instrument of its
declared purposes.
In this historical framework the United Nations
in terms of our foreign policy is, to begin with, a
standard — a statement of the basic aims which the
United States holds in conmaon with most of the
nations of the world, however much we may differ
with some of these nations on other questions.
Not only our actions in the United Nations but
all our actions on the world stage must be aimed
at the fulfillment of those basic charter aims — or
must at all events be consistent with them.
Secondly, the United Nations is itself one means
for carrying those aims into effect. It is not the
sole means. Indeed, the charter itself is full of
references to others. Article 33 calls for bilateral
negotiation, arbitration, judicial settlement, and
so forth, as the first obligations of nations involved
in a dispute. Article 51 safeguards the inherent
right of nations to individual and collective self-
defense. Articles 52 to 54 deal with regional ar-
rangements. Similarly the articles dealing with
economic and social matters, and with the adminis-
tration of non-self-governing territories, consti-
tute among other things pledges by tlie members
themselves, simply as individual signatories of the
charter, to follow certain standards of conduct and
to promote certain aims.
But the United Nations Organization is the
mstrument specifically created to work full time
for the achievement of the charter's purposes. The
General Assembly, the Security Council, the Eco-
nomic and Social Council, the Tiiisteeship Coun-
cil, the Secretariat, and the International Court
of Justice — these six basic organs and their various
subsidiary bodies are designed for those purposes
and no other. ^Vliatever the imperfections which
this United Nations Organization displays, the
light of the charter usually shines a little brighter
upon its proceedings than it does upon many of
the actions in the world outside.
Furthermore, the veto problem which concerned
the authors of the Vandenberg resolution has been
overcome to a degree that was barely nsible 14
years ago.
The world doesn't stand still. There have been
very many events of importance since the United
Nations was founded which were not clearly fore-
seen. It is therefore fair to ask whether the United
Nations is able to cope with the new forces which
we find in the world and whether it can do so in
a manner consistent with the purposes of the
United States.
My belief is that the United Nations is an asset
of incalculable value in coping with those new
forces. It is doing so, and gives promise of con-
tinuing to do so, in a way which is manifestly
consonant with the fundamental interests of the
United States. This does not blind one to imper-
fections and mistakes which are inevitable in so
complex an enterprise.
318
Deportment of State Bulletin
Let me recall briefly, then, some of the main
forces which have been shaping world events in
the past 10 yeai-s and which provide the environ-
ment in which the United Nations has functioned.
And let us see how the U.N. has responded.
U.S. strength and Influence
Of all the new developments of the past decade
the one which has exerted the greatest impact on
the United Nations has been the independence
movement. It has added greatly to the member-
ship. It has affected the agenda and the decisions
of the organization. To appraise it properly it
is best to consider first the other major forces with
which the independence movement has interacted.
First I would place the continued strength and
influence of the United States. We have remained
not only a great military and economic power but
also, more fimdamentally, a nation committed to
certain imiversal moral ideals. Wliat is still more
important is our enduring determination to work
toward an ever greater realization of those ideals,
both at home and abroad. This is surely the deep-
est source of our national strength. If the United
States had ceased to exert its share of moral and
ethical leadership during the past decade, the
world today would be a very tragic place.
In all the worlv of the United Nations the
United States continues to carry its portion of re-
sponsibility. We do not control the United
Nations. We never have. We have never aspired
to. The very idea of one-power control would de-
feat the purpose of the organization.
But our position in the United Nations is pre-
emment. We are the host counti-y to its head-
quarters. In accordance with our national prod-
uct we are the largest single contributor to its
regular budget. Almost nothing happens in which
the United States is not interested, and on virtu-
ally all vital questions we and the majority of
members find common ground.
Indeed, in all the history of the United Nations
I know of not one case in wliich the United Na-
tions has injured the vital interests of the United
States.
Relations With Soviet Union
Second, since the death of Stalin and the end
of the war in Korea, the leaders of the Soviet
Union have not sponsored any new large-scale mil-
itary aggression. And they have opened a few
chinks in their closed society through which the
Russian people may begin to get rid of some of
their poisonous suspicions of the world outside.
These latter developments, however limited, must
be counted a substantial gain for the whole world.
The United Nations has had something to do
with this. It has been a factor in inducing the
Soviet Union to shift away, in great part, from
overt Korea-style aggi-ession. There is the mem-
ory of the support which the United Nations gave
to the defense of the Republic of Korea. Wliat is
more, bomb-rattling has never been popular in the
United Nations. Wlienever the Soviets have
shown this ugly face in the United Nations debates
they have been least effective in getting votes and
political support.
There is intense interest in disarmament at the
United Nations. Every year this subject is de-
bated at great length. And one can predict that
this issue will soon replace colonialism as the major
preoccupation.
But disarmament is a hard subject to debate any-
where, especially between a free society like ours
and a closed society such as the Soviet Union. It
is also a highly technical subject, and many people
aroimd the world who yearn for peace do not
imderstand the teclmical difficulties. This leaves a
wide field for demagogy, and Moscow has done its
best to exploit that field in the United Nations.
In view of all this we have made out fairly well
in the disarmament debates. The thorny issue has
always been inspection and verification. Last fall
the General Assembly once again supported our
view on tliis issue in several key votes. In two
instances it did not, and we voted against the
resolutions.
After long and patient negotiation we have
finally reached agreement on the principles of dis-
armament, and this winter we also agreed on the
composition of a new Disarmament Commission so
that negotiations will be resumed in mid-March
after almost 2 years.
More public education is necessai-y all over the
world. But if our position is sound and if we con-
tinue to advocate it patiently, the woi-ld will accept
it. We should not be too provoked by occasional
disappointing votes which do not and cannot con-
trol our policy.
Througli the United Nations the Soviet Union
has also participated in a nimtiber of peaceful ac-
February 26, ?962
319
tivities. It is a member of the International
Atomic Energy Agency, wliich resulted from
President Eisenhower's proposal in the General
Assembly of 1953. The Soviets have joined to
some extent in the work of several of the special-
ized agencies, and they contribute every year to the
U.N. technical assistance program. Their contri-
bution is smaller than it should be, but it marks a
reversal from their earlier opposition.
Also we have finally got a basis on which the
Soviet Union will join in the United Nations
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.''
Thus far tlie very gradual opening of the closed
Soviet society has aroused little interest at the
United Nations. Sooner or later this development
should receive increasing attention as members
grasp the significance for world peace of nearly
total control over information — and misinforma-
tion— by a power which also possesses great armed
forces and nuclear weapons.
Stirrings in East European Satellites
Third among the important forces of this past
decade have been certain stirrings among the
satellite nations of Eastern Europe. Despite the
tragedy of Hungaiy, these stirrings reflect a very
durable aspiration which is expressing itself in
minor but meaningful ways even now.
Eesolutions every year since 1956 have placed
the United Nations squarely on record against the
repression of the Hungarian people and the sup-
pression of their national independence. These
debates and resolutions and reports on Hungary
have caused the Soviet Union to pay a much
higher price in public esteem than it would other-
wise have paid.
The voices which call for justice have not been
stilled at the United Nations, even when the
perpetrator of injustice is a great power.
Emergence of Communist China
Fourth, Communist China has emerged as an
oppressive and disruptive influence in its own
sphere and around the world. Despite extraordi-
nary pressures to have the Peiping regime
accepted as a respectable nation, it remains a
maverick in international afl'airs. It has been
kept out of the councils of the United Nations
and remains largely beyond the reach of U.N.
influence. The General Assembly censixred it in
1950 for its aggression in Korea and again an-
nually since 1958 for its brutality in Tibet —
albeit without visible result.
The General Assembly has repeatedly rejected
the Peiping regime's claim to take over the U.N.
seat of the Republic of China.* Last December
the vote was 48 to 37, which was a wider margin
than the year before.
The United States has continued to take the
lead on this issue. Perhaps the vigor with which
we have pleaded our case has had something
to do with the result. But the main author of the
exclusion of Communist China from the United
Nations has been Communist China itself, with its
continued addiction to violence at home and
abroad. The leaders in Peiping have damaged
their own case even more by explicitly demanding
that the U.N. acknowledge their so-called "right''
to conquer the 11 million people on Formosa by
armed force. A substantial majority of the Assem-
bly seems in no mood to bow to such an arrogant
demand.
There is reason to hope that if the Chinese Com-
mmiists really want to sit in the United Nations,
and if the majority of U.N. members persevere in
their judgment, this will influence the Chinese
Communists in the right direction. But, as this
committee knows, quite a number of friendly coun-
tries who have proved their hostility to commu-
nism openly differ with us on this question and
there are always present all of the elements of
crisis over this issue.
Economic Forces at Work in Free World
Fifth, during the past decade creative economic
forces have been working in nearly all parts of the
non-Communist world. Two trends stand out : in
free Europe the great movement for economic
unity culminating in the Common Market, and in
the less developed countries the potent revolution
of rising expectations.
Nearly a billion people of the emerging nations
have been marching out of the shadows on to the
stage of history — people wlio no longer accept the
proposition that hunger, disease, and poverty are
the immut able destiny of man. They are demand-
ing economic progi-ess and social reform. Tliis
demand must be met in ways which promote the
' For background, see Bulletin of Jan. 29, 1962, p. 180.
320
' For background, see ibid.. Jan. 1.5, 19C2, p. 108.
Department of Stale Bulletin
future prospects of freedom and political matur-
ity. Our conscience and our security both require
us to respond to this challenge.
An increasing soui'ce of investment and tech-
nical knowledge for the emerging nations will be
free Europe, itself invigorated by growing eco-
nomic unity and linked together in the OECD.
But another important channel into which the
United States and Europe and other coimtries can
profitably channel an increasing share of their
development aid is the United Nations.
The United Nations technical assistance pro-
gram, its Special Fund for preinvestment surveys
and for research and training programs, and the
woi'k of the family of specialized agencies — all
these provide at small cost an arsenal of skills,
drawn from many countries, to meet the needs of
the emerging nations. These skills are put to work
where they are needed, under international
auspices which are beyond any suspicion of
political strings.
This aspect of United Nations work is largely
unheralded in this country. It is less dramatic
than political controversy, but it may mean more
in the long run in our search for world peace and
justice.
Last September President Kennedy recognized
this when he proposed to the General Assembly a
United Nations Decade of Development, which
was unanimously agreed to by the Assembly.^
Independence n^ovement and Attendant Perits
Now I come back to the most dramatic of the
forces of the past decade and the one which has
exerted by far the greatest impact at the United
Nations: the independence movement, which has
descended like an avalanche on the old empires of
Africa and Asia. It has been largely peaceful,
but there have been some tragic episodes of vio-
lence and the danger of further violence will be
with us for years to come.
The independence movement has increasingly
occupied the center of the stage at the United Na-
tions and has greatly added to its membership.
A few simple figures suggest the magnitude of
this transformation.
In 1946, when the General Assembly first met,
'For text of President Kennedy's address before the
General Assembly on Sept. 2.'5, 19G1, see ihuL, Oct. 16, 1961,
p. 619 ; for text of a resolution adopted by the Assembly
on Dec. 19, 1961, see U.N. doc. A/KES/1710 (XVI).
only 4 out of the 51 founding members had gained
their independence since the start of the Second
World War in 1939. Today, out of 104 members,
39 have become independent since 1939. That is
more than one-third of the membership. This
process is not yet complete. In the coming decade
there may bo as many as 20 or more new nations
seeking membership in the United Nations.
The American people have rejoiced to see the
people of the old colonial empires attain their in-
dependence. This movement is in our tradition.
It fulfills on a grand scale that prophetic phrase
in our Declaration of Independence that "all
men" — not just Americans, but a7l men — are
created equal and have "unalienable rights."
The United Nations has been midwife at the
birth of many of the new nations and has striven
with some success to ease the birth pains. This aid
is desperately needed, because there are many per-
ils in this swift transition.
One such peril exists in the apparent strategy
of the Soviet Union, one of whose chief preoccupa-
tions is driving wedges between the nations of
Africa, the Middle East, and Asia on the one hand
and those of the West on the other. They fan
distrust and racial hatred among the emerging
countries and hope to move into the vacuum cre-
ated by the departing rulers. The defeat of that
strategy in Africa, particularly in the Congo, is a
great contemporary drama of the United Nations.
There are other dangers as well, not all of them
made in Moscow. There are dangers of extremism
and war; of the Balkanization of Africa into units
too weak to stand alone; of adamant resistance to
the winds of change in southern Africa; and of
efforts by some parties to whip these same winds
of change into hurricanes. From all these dangers
flows the further danger that these aspiring peo-
ples could be cut off by war and hatred and fear
from the friendship and aid of the free world.
There is still another supposed danger which
is more imaginary than real. That is the specter
of the alleged "Afro- Asian neutralist bloc" in the
United Nations gangmg up with the Soviet bloc
to outvote the West.
Nearly half of the 104 members of the United
Nations today are from Africa, the Middle East,
and Asia. The assertion that all these countries
vote together against the United States has no
basis in fact.
Nations do not vote according to their size or,
February 26, 7962
321
in any automatic or mechanical way, according to
their geographic i-egion. Generally each of them
votes on the issues and in its own interest as it
sees those interests. Our posture in the United
Nations is based on the belief, so amply justified
year after year, that the interests wiiich we hold
in common with the great majority of nations —
regardless of size, power, population, race, or re-
gion— are so much stronger than the interests
which divide us that we generally find common
ground with them on the vital issues. To find
that common ground, consistent with United
States interests in and out of the United Nations,
is the real burden of our diplomacy.
Therefore I do not feel any great anxiety about
the principle, however vexing, of "one nation, one
vote" in the General Assembly. Our adherence
to this principle was foreshadowed as early as 1943
in the Connally resolution of the Senate, which
called for a general international organization to
keep the peace and to be based on the sovereign
equality of all members, large and small. Our
experience indicates that, even with the much en-
hanced influence and responsibility of the General
Assembly of today, this highly democratic princi-
ple is workable and not inconsistent with the in-
terests of the United States. Moreover, no one
has found a suitable alternative.
Actually there is a great power which is regu-
larly outvoted in the Assembly, but it is not the
United States. It is the Soviet Union, whose
aims and actions so often inspire widespread dis-
tnist. That has been true in the most recent
sessions of the Assembly. But I am not going to
belabor you with cases in point unless you so
desire.
The underlying reason for the basic identity of
interest between the United States and the ma-
jority at the United Nations is not far to seek.
Unlike the Soviet Union, our purpose is not con-
quest but community — a conununity in which the
small and weak need not fear the big and power-
ful.
U.N. Defends Freedom of Small Nations
The whole history of the United Nations could
he told as a series of attempts, more or less success-
ful, to uphold the independence of small and vul-
nerable nations. Iran, Greece, Indonesia, Israel,
Korea, Egypt, Lebanon, and Laos, and finally, the
Congo — all these are nations wliose independence
was threatened in one way or another from the
outside and which got some measure of help from
the United Nations in their hour of trouble.
The one case wliich has presented the organiza-
tion with its greatest challenge has been the
Congo. If the United Nations had not been avail-
able to answer the appeal of the new Congolese
GoveiTunent in 1960, it seems certain that there
would have been a direct confrontation there be-
tween the great powers. The Soviet Union had
smuggled aircraft and trucks and technicians into
the Congo, against the resolutions of the United
Nations, in an attempt to turn the Lumimaba gov-
ernment to its purposes. It was the United Na-
tions, acting as the instrument of the world
community on the request of the legitimate gov-
enmient, that prevented this attempt from
succeeding.
The U.N. acted also to prevent secessions which
would have carved the Congo into little spheres
of influence, whether under Russian or European
sponsorship. It has struggled to preserve for that
tortured nation one of the greatest gifts it inlier-
ited from its former Belgian ruler: its unity. It
begins to look as if the Congolese Govermnent, in
partnerehip with the U.N., can begin to repair
some of the ravages of the past 2 years and turn
its attention to the great task of building a viable
independent nation.
This United Nations action in the Congo is
somethmg quite new in histoiy. The vacumn of
power which was left by the sudden departure of
the former colonial ruler has been filled not by a
new imperial master far worse than the old but
by the community of nations, acting to help a new
fellow member to cross the dangerous gulf to
independence.
The capacity of the United Nations to take such
effective action has been developed not by revision
of the charter but by adapting the present charter
to the urgent requirements that arose. For ex-
ample, the authority of the General Assembly,
and its ability to use that authority effectively on
urgent matter's of war and peace when the Secu-
rity Council is tied up with the veto, is one such
adaptation.
A second is of equal importance: the growth of
significance of the Office of the Secretary-General.
Contrary to the Soviet contention Mr. Hammar-
skjold was never a usurper. But more and more
over the years the General Assembly and the
322
Department of State Bulletin
Security Council made decisions which required
large-scale esecuti\e action. He showed that he
could meet that need as well as serve a uniquely
valuable diplomatic function. His successor,
U Thant of Burma, a man of admirable qualities,
has shown tliat he too is a man of action and a
faithful and able servant of the community.
It would be foolish to contend tliat the United
Nations has been doing a flawless job or that it
cannot be improved. There have been mistakes
in the Congo. There have been some recent votes
in the General Assembly which we consider un-
wise and ill-considered. There is an unwillingness
in some cases to see the tragic implications of the
use of anned force, as in the recent case of the
Indian seizure by force of Goa, on which I was
moved to speak forcefidly in the Security
Council.!"
But it scarcely serves a useful end to judge the
United Nations solely by the points at which it
has failed. I often wonder whether those who
judge it in this way would be happier if the United
Nations had stood aside completely from the real,
tough events of the world, where failure is always
a possibility.
Unifying Purpose Behind U.N. Efforts
Underlying all the questions at issue in the
United Nations is the more basic question : Wlaat
is the unifying purpose behind those efforts?
What is the game we are playing ?
As far as the United States is concerned, I be-
lieve the game at the United Nations is exactly our
national style. It is a game in which it is not neces-
sary to defeat and crush an opponent in order to
score a point. In fact the highest points are scored
wheii a great action is taken with the greatest
unanimity.
The United Nations is dedicated by its charter
"to be a center for harmonizing the actions of na-
tions" in pursuit of certain common aims. The
goals are clearly set forth — the promotion of inter-
national peace and security, the prevention of
war, collective action against aggression, peaceful
settlement of disputes, cooperation for economic
and social progress in lai-ger freedom, observance
of international law and justice, and the advance-
ment of dependent territories toward self-govern-
ment and self-determination.
'° Bulletin of Jan. 22, 1962, p. 145.
February 26, 1962
Taken together these aims constitute an enor-
mous harmony of interest — a framework of stand-
ards of conduct within which a great deal of dis-
agreement and friction can be contained and an
immense wealth of talent and resources combmed
for the common good.
We in the United States have — and I hope we
always will have — that spirit of liberty which, as
Judge Leai-ned Hand said, "is the spirit that is not
too sure that it is right." But in the United Na-
tions there are others who are much too sure that
they are right. It is that quality in the Soviet
Union, and in the other totalitarian powers, and
imfortunately to a certain extent in some of the
nations of the non-Communist world — that quality
of superrightness, and of intolerance and unwill-
ingness to listen and leam, which is to a great ex-
tent at the root of the world's troubles, because it
gives rise to impatience and anger and to violent
solutions.
Seen in that light the United Nations possesses
an incalculable civilizing value for the nations of
the world. It teaches tolerance. It teaches free
and frank exchange in open debate. It teaches
accommodation. And the exhausting process of
trying to muster the necessary two-thirds majority
for a resolution, in a parliamentary body of
over 100 sovereign nations, is a most civilizing
experience.
It requires the kind of skill in which our country,
with its great internal variety and nearly two cen-
turies of representative government, is extraordi-
narily rich. By contrast the delegates of the
Soviet Union, which has no democratic tradition
at home, have had to try to acquii'e it at the United
Nations by painful hard knocks.
I don't think the Soviets can ever really succeed
at the United Nations imtil they have outgrown
the notion that success consists in crushing some-
body else. Among the non-Commimist nations,
both old and new, we sometimes find either a too
stubborn resistance to inevitable change and
growth or at the other extreme an insistence on
forcing the pace in an atmosphere of violence and
hatred. But both these tendencies would be far
greater than they are if it were not for the effect
of United Nations diplomacy in wearing down the
sharp corners of national policies.
This basic character of the United Nations
would be congenial to the United States in any
323
era. But in the present era we face dangers which
make it a vital necessity.
If we were to neglect our own responsibilities
in the United Nations, or if it degenerated because
of financial failure or for any other reason into
what Dag Hammarskjold called a mere "static
conference machinerj^," then it would fail of its
real purposes and might even be perverted to serve
the purposes of its enemies. I do not think that is
going to happen. I do not think the faithful
members, including this country, will let it liappen.
Eather I expect that the United Nations will con-
tinue to adapt to changing requirements and that
it will prove far more creative and enduring in the
drama of our time than the seemingly efficient but
actually vei-y primitive institutions of communism.
And as an American I believe that, -v^hatever
the storms we may face in the years ahead, the
United Nations will remain one of the chief ele-
ments in our country's security. For through its
processes we can make the most of those common
aims which bind us to the vast majority of man-
kind.
Peaceful Coexistence and U.S. National Security
ly Theodore O. Achilles
Special Assistant to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs'^
You have already heard peaceful coexistence
discussed penetratmgly and eloquently by four
speakers of unusual distinction. It is not easy
to follow in their footsteps, but I am glad to have
been asked to speak on peaceful coexistence and
U.S. national security. That is an aspect of the
problem of direct concern not only to us as a
nation but to each of us individually. It might
be a matter of life or death for us.
The relationship between peaceful coexistence
and our national security depends very largely
upon the extent to which it is a firm policy of the
Soviet Government or merely a tactic. A lot
depends upon the answer to this question, and
it is not an easy one to answer. The phrase was
coined by the Kussians, not by us. Yet tlie con-
cept that any form of relationship between na-
tions should be peaceful is fundamental to our
own foreign policy and always has been. Co-
existence between nations is in a sense inevitable,
unless one of them becomes nonexistent, but the
phrase is not a very happy one, particularly in a
rapidly changing world. The words "peaceful
competition" would better express our idea of re-
lations with the Soviet Union.
' Address made before the Stanford University Foreign
Policy Institute at Palo Alto, Calif., on Feb. 2 (press
release 68 dated Jan. 31 ) .
The basic Soviet objective, as revealed by its
leaders for half a century, remains totally un-
changed— worldwide Soviet domination, by peace-
ful means if possible. The Peiping regime has
had a shorter life, but its basic objective has never
changed — its own worldwide domination, through
inevitable conflict.
Certainly their tactics change. A favorite de-
vice of the Kremlin is to play alternately upon
the world's emotions of fear and hope. Periods
of threats of nuclear destniction alternate with
periods of apparent reasonableness, with emphasis
on "peaceful coexistence" and "relaxation of ten-
sions." The world is learning to be less deceived
by these abrupt shifts in the Kremlin's tune and
to study its motives more sharply and realistically.
Many books have been written about their strat-
egy, tactics, and methods. One of the best I have
seen is Protracted Conflict by Strausz-IIupo and
others of the Foreign Policy Eesearch Institute.
It well describes the Soviet long-range view of the
struggle, its all-embracing strategy, its integrated
use of force and the threat of force, economic war-
fare and assistance, negotiation, espionage, con-
spiracy, subversion, and confusion as methods.
Wliere does peaceful coexistence fit into this pic-
ture? Lenin had advocated coexistence as a tactic
in time of weakness, but tlie current intensive ex-
324
Departmenf of State Bulletin
port sales of the plirase began only in the late
fifties. This was at a time when Moscow sought
(o appear reasonable, when it believed its policies
could be pursued better by soft words than by
tlu-eats. It was coined in Moscow for export to
replace the concept of "cold war." "Let us get
away from this concept of a cold war," said the
Kremlin. "Let ns all follow policies of peaceful
coexistence." They have souglit to implant the
idea that the two concepts are different. In attack-
ing rex-ent statements by the President and other
American leaders, they have charged tliem with
"going back to the worst days of the cold war."
Oddly enough — or not so oddly to those who
fully understand Soviet tactics and their piracy
of democratic concepts — "peaceful coexistence"
comes much closer to our concept of international
relations than theirs. "Cold war" is a much better
description of their policy than of ours. We seek
peaceful relations, cooperation, and competition;
tliey seek total victory, preferably through other
means than total war.
In this sense their use of the phrase "peaceful
coexistence" must be considered strictly tactical.
It is designed to delude the free world, to keep it
oif balance, to lull it into complacency, to inhibit
the free world while preser\ing a free hand for the
Communist conspiracy. Let us not be deceived.
Let us never forget basic Soviet objectives.
Their concept of negotiations is completely dif-
ferent from om-s. Ours is to find mutuality of
interest as a basis for mutually satisfactory solu-
tions of problems. Theirs is to advance one more
step toward their ultimate objective.
To what extent is the concept of peaceful co-
existence more than a devious tactic, a weapon, or
an anesthetic? To what extent can we consider it
a policy of the Soviet Government ?
Lenin advocated coexistence with capitalist
states as a desirable tactic for theU.S.S.R. in time
of weakness, a tactic for buying time — time to
develop strength. The U.S.S.R. has grown pro-
digiously in strength since Lenin's time, but it still
finds coexistence useful as a tactic. Has it become
more than that ? Have pressures developed within
the Soviet Union, within the Kremlin itself, which
make at least the "peaceful" part of the conce])t
something more fundamental, something impor-
tant to Russian national interests?
Certainly since Lenin's day the hydrogen bomb,
the multimegaton bomb, has become a fact of life.
It is certainly something which those who deter-
February 26, 7962
G2S674 — 62 3
mine our militai-y and foreign policy have long
since taken carefully into account. Presumably
the Kremlin has also given it much thought. The
powers that be in the Kremlin, dedicated to ad-
vancing Soviet national interests above all things,
must have contemplated the cfi'ecls of nuclear war
upon "Mother Russia," upon the citadel of Soviet
communism and upon the industrial structure they
have exerted such effort to build.
Peiping shows less concern with thermonuclear
weapons. China has enormous human resources
spi-ead thin over vast areas. The oriental mind
thinks in vei-y long-range terms.
Moscow's preoccuiaation with nuclear war, how-
ever, as yet shows no signs of inhibiting its predi-
lection for "wars of national liberation," brushfire
wars which it can persuade others to fight for it by
proxj' as in Laos or Viet-Nam, nor for the use of
nuclear blackmail to frighten the West from time
to time.
Rift in Communist World
There are undoubtedly internal pressures work-
nig to some extent, however limited, upon the
Kremlin. These are probably contradictory. On
the one hand, too great a relaxation of tensions,
too great a relief from fear of war, would under-
mine the Soviet regime and make more difficult
the allocation of resources to war production at the
expense of consumer goods. On the other, there
is no doubt of the strong desire of the Soviet peo-
ple for peace and a better life. The slight im-
provements since Stalin's death in relaxation of
control and in the standard of living mean so much
to the Russian people that they would be hard
even for the Kremlin to reverse.
In any event, Moscow is sure to continue vigor-
ously its struggle for the minds of people in the
uncommitted, the lesser developed nations. Tliis
is basic to its concept of peaceful coexistence as it
is to oure of cooperation and peaceful competition.
Nevertheless there can be no doubt as to the
reality of the rift, in the Communist camp during
the last 2 years. A central element in that grow-
ing rift has been this question of peaceful co-
existence. Peiping insists that world domination
can come only through violent struggle. Moscow
insists that the same end can be achieved by other
means.
On January 17 an article in Pravda, the Soviet
Union's most authoritative newspaper, stated
325
flatly that peaceful coexistence had been made
necessary by a "scientific and teclmical revolution
in the military field produced by the creation of
thermonuclear weapons which threaten mankind
with imprecedented losses and destruction." The
article continued :
. . . the principle of peaceful coexistence is not a
tactical maneuver on the part of the Soviet Government,
as the bourgeois politicians try to present it, but a funda-
mental program point of the socialist states' foreign po-
litical activities. . . .
Peaceful coexistence is a dialectical process in which
a most acute class struggle between socialism and capi-
talism combines organically with tie cooperation of the
states of the two opix>sing systems for the sake of pre-
serving peace.
Khrushchev himself has described coexistence
as "more than the mere absence of war, more than
a temporary and unstable truce between wars; it
is a coexistence of two opposing social systems,
based on a mutual renunciation of recourse to war
as a means of settling international disputes."
Wliile these could, of course, be mere words to
delude the "West, the vehemence of the dispute
within the Communist camp over the issue is un-
mistakable. For almost 2 years the quarrel over
this issue has been carried on with a virulence that
we can be confident has not been staged for our
benefit.
Communist Menace Remains
We in this country can well understand the
compelling consideration that underlies the Soviet
concern over the disastrous outcome of a nuclear
war. From the free world's point of view the
struggle for man's future can far better be waged
by nonmilitaiy means than by nuclear war. And
we can have some confidence that Moscow's aver-
sion to nuclear war is real.
But one decisive point must bo made. Soviet
concern over the consequences of a new war is, and
will continue to be, directly proportional to our
capability and our will to produce the conse-
quences that they fear. Any relaxation— any
demonstration of uncertainty or a lack of will on
our part — and the Soviets could come to malve a
different estimation of the likely outcome of one
or another gamble.
If we can succeed in keeping the Soviet leader-
ship convinced that war in this day and age is
simply unthinkable, will that mean that we can
look forward to an era of tranquillity ? Can we,
in other words, hope that Khrushchev's brand of
peaceful coexistence — in contrast to Stalin's —
gives reason to believe that the menace that the
Communist conspiracy has long posed for us is
in process of disappearing ?
The Soviet leaders themselves have given us the
answer : Most decidedly not. I could cite an un-
ending number of Sovdet statements that avow
in lucid and passionate terms that now, as before,
peaceful coexistence, even without war, does not
mean "peace" as we imderstand the term but re-
lentless struggle against us and our way of life.
Here is how Pravda put it a scant 2 weeks ago :
Peaceful coexistence does not exclude, but presupposes
revolutionary change in society; it does not retard, but
speeds up the world revolutionary process ; it does not
preserve the capitalist regime, but promotes the decom-
position and disintegration of capitalism.
And further :
. . . i)eaceful coexistence of states with different re-
gimes is not the abandonment of the class struggle on the
world scene, but the selection of such deployment areas
for the struggle as are best suited for the interests of all
mankind.
I would have you think on the phrase "selection
of the best deployment areas." "Wltat does this
mean ? The Soviets again have told us : It means
the continued use of all the methods of penetration
and subversion that have become so familiar to us.
It means that in every part of the world continued
relentless efforts are to be made with every means
short of actual war to tear down the bastions of a
free society.
Meeting the Communist Cliallenge
The Soviets still seek and hope to "bury" the free
world. The challenge is as stark and deadly as
ever. How shall we meet it ?
Given the secrecy of the Soviet and Red Chinese
systems, decisions reached by a handful of men,
completely controlled press, and exclusion of for-
eign observers, our judgments concerning Soviet
or Red Chinese policy must always be tentative.
Given the importance of the answer, we must con-
sider it with extreme care. Our judgment can
never depend on what they say, only on what they
do, and that over a long enough period of time to
form a clear pattern.
To the extent that the Kremlin i-eallv believes
326
Department of State Bulletin
that peaceful coexistence— the avoidance of war
and the waging of the struggle by other means —
serves its basic national interests, we share with it
a conunon interest in the avoidance of war.
Obviously this common interest is one of very
great importance, one which must be utilized and
developed by all practicable means. Let us hope
for the best.
Given the nature of Soviet and Red Chinese
objectives, policies, and tactics, however, we must
also be prepared for the worst. Until their ob-
jectives and their power structure change suffi-
ciently for the instinctive human desires of their
peoples for peace and freedom to be reflected in
their policies, we must maintain our guard.
Until then the free world, and especially the
United States, must maintain adequate force to
deter or, if necessary, to wage general war and to
assist other nations to put out the "brushfire" wars
which Moscow and Peiping are so fond of fighting
by proxy. I do not wish to dwell on the military
side, but in the past year our defense budget has
been increased by 15 percent and our production
rate of Polaris submarines and Minuteman mis-
siles increased by 50 percent. We are constantly
seeking to strengthen the free world against the
peaceful-coexistence tactic of indirect aggression
through subversion.
Until then we must wage the cold war, or
peaceful coexistence, at least as vigorously as they
do. We must get the cold war out of the trenches.
We must understand clearly what we are up
against. It is surprising how few Amei'icans
really understand Soviet or Chinese objectives,
strategy, tactics, and methods. No wonder so few
people elsewhere do.
Today policies of military containment and
negative "anticornmunism" are no longer enough.
It is not enough merely to be against something
or to react. We must act ; we must be positive and
dynamic. We must get on with the job of helping
to sliape the kind of world we would want to see
if Marxist-Leninism had never existed.
In a changing world we must know cleai'ly wliere
we want to go, the kind of world we want future
generations to live in, the direction we want his-
toi-y to take.
Our basic goal was stated simply liy tlie Presi-
dent in his state of the Union message on Jan-
uai'y 11 : ^
■ Bulletin of Jan. 29, 1962, p. 159.
February 26, 1962
... a peaceful world community of free and inde-
pendent states, free to choose their own future and their
own system so long as it does not threaten the freedom
of others. ... a free community of nations, independent
but interdependent.
Our basic purposes as a nation have not changed
since they were set down in our Constitution:
"... to form a more perfect Union, establish
Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for
the common defence, promote the general Welfare,
and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves
and our Posterity." What we seek is the kind of
international environment which will best assure
the achievement of these purposes by us and by all
others who share them, an environment in which
peojjle with values and purposes such as ours can
flourish.
U.S. Leadership in a World of Change
We must be prepared to lead. Someone has said
that the United States has been dragged kicking
and screaming into a position of world leadership.
Wiether we like it or not, we are there. Our ma-
terial strength is unquestionable, and we must
never cease to keep it growing. We should not
imderestimate our moral streng-th. In our nearly
two centuries of nationhood we have developed
political doctrine and national, human, and spirit-
ual values of enormous moral force. Let us seek
constantly to develop that force and to use it more
effectively.
But we cannot be rigid. Nor would we wish to
impose our system upon anyone. This is a chang-
ing world and one in which population growth,
communications, science, and technology are con-
stantly accelerating the rate of change. We can-
not sit still on the stati(,<i quo, however comfortable
it may be. We must recognize and understand the
forces of change, tlie national and human motives
behind them, the desire of all men for a decent
livelihood, for freedom, for dignity, for oppor-
tunity, for a better life for their children than they
have had.
We must work with and seek to guide these
forces. We must do our utmost to see that inevita-
ble changes, however swift, are constructive and
brought about by peaceful means.
We must keep pace with change and seek out
new ways of dealing with new situations. In the
last 40 years we have seen the world changed by
327
a centrifugal revolution, now almost complete, of
the breakup of the old colonial empires into fledg-
ling nations. The admission of 53 new ones in 16
years has vastly changed the United Nations. We
must find ways of guiding this new situation, and
these new nations, along constructive paths.
In the last 15 years there has been developing a
centripetal revolution, a drawing together of na-
tional governments to deal more effectively with
problems with which none of them can deal ade-
quately alone. Today's economic, military, and
scientific problems, and many political ones, far
transcend national frontiers.
This is an age of experimentation, political as
well as technical, and we must keep up — lead, if
we can. Within little more than a decade the na-
tions of Western Europe, with our strong encour-
agement and suppoi-t, have made fantastic strides
toward economic and political unity. In NATO,
Canada and we have joined our European allies
in the most effective defensive miity yet achieved
in peacetime. In the last year the Canadians and
we have again joined with them and with other
European nations in the OECD, the new Organ-
ization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment, with a view to harmonizing economic poli-
cies and coordinating assistance in the develop-
ment of other nations.
The new European Economic Community, the
so-called Common Market, has combined into one
economic unit 170 million people, a population
about equal to our own. The Community's gross
national product, although substantially less than
ours in dollar terms, has been growing twice as
fast as ours. Total imports into the European
Economic Community in 1960 approached $20 bil-
lion, and exports were about the same. Great
Britain and other European nations are negoti-
ating participation in this economic conmiunity.
Within another year it may contain some 250
million people.
The development of a common market, a single
economic unit, of this size, composed of advanced
industrial nations and our best customers, is some-
thing wo obviously cannot ignore, whether we like
it or not. We do like it. Over the last 15 years
three different Presidents and seven different Con-
gresses with completely bipartisan support liave
declared it to be the national policy of the United
States to encourage it.
This development presents us with an luiprece-
dented challenge and unprecedented opportunity.
328
If we accept this challenge, this opportunity, by
working out a mutually profitable partnership
with the Common Market, our factories and farms
can increase their sales to our richest, fastest
growing market. Our exports will increase, and
our balance-of-payments position will improve.
We will have forged a vital new link in the de-
velopment of the free world.
If we hang back, if we fail to meet the challenge
and seize the opportunity, we will cut ourselves
off from our major allies ; they will go ahead with-
out us. Our exports will suffer, our farm sur-
pluses increase, our balance of payments worsen, I
and Moscow and Peiping take heart from a new
source of weakness and friction in the free world.
For these reasons the new trade expansion pro-
gram which the President submitted to the Con-
gress last Thursday is of paramoimt importance
to our own future and to that of free men every-
where. As the President stated in his message
of January 25 to the Congress : ^
. . . the combined output and purchasing power of the
United States and Western Europe — nearly a trillion
dollars a year — is more than twice as great as that of
the entire Sino-Soviet world. Though we have only half
the population, and far less than half the territory,
we can jk>o\ our resources and resourcefulness in an open
trade partnership strong enough to outstrip any challenge,
and strong enough to undertake all the many enterprises
around the world which the maintenance and progress of
freedom require. If we can take this step, Marxist pre-
dictions of "capitalist" empires warring over markets and
stifling competition would be shattered for all time —
Communist hojses for a trade war between these two
great economic giants would be frustrated — and Commu-
nist efforts to split the West would be doomed to failure.
Building a Community of Free Nations
At the heart of the kind of world we seek to
build, in our own interest and that of all free
men — not merely as the answer to the Communist
challenge— lies the Atlantic community. The na-
tions of Western Europe, Canada, and ourselves
are bound by deep ties of common heritage, tra-
dition, values, and mterest. All of us are seeking
new forms of unity, new methods of dealing to-
gether with problems which none of us can solve
alone.
Yet this community of free nations we seek must
go far beyond tlio Atlantic. Wo and other Atlan-
tic nations have close ties with the nations of
• For text, see iMd., Feb. 12, 1962, p. 231.
Department of Slate Bulletin
Latin America, Japan, Australia, New Zealand,
and other countries. What we are seeking is an
expanding community, originally of nations which
can deploy substantial resources beyond their bor-
ders, expanding in depth of unity and in breadth
of association. It must help to expedite the devel-
opment of less developed nations, to serve as an
irresistible magnetic force which pulls them to-
ward it in their own true interests. As tliis com-
mmiity develops it will have many variations of
association in different fields. It must be flexible,
free to evolve as experience in this unchartered
field shows best. A community secure against
Sino-Soviet control must be able to assure prog-
ress by its members sufficient to convince them and
others that their aspirations can be fulfilled better
within its framework than without.
It must and will develop the strength which
comes from miity with freedom, the strength of
diversity, of free men working together in their
common interest.
In the process we must maintain communica-
tions with the Soviets, always ready to negotiate
but not counting too much on negotiations except
wliere the strength of the Western position makes
it in the Russian national interest to conclude a
mutually satisfactory agreement. They respect
strength, and as the free world develops it ma-
terially and morally through growing unity, they
will respect it more.
We must build new faith and vigor into the cult
of freedom. We must prove that the wave of the
future is freedom and not tyraimy. We must
demolish the myth the Commvmists have sought
to develop, not without some success, that every-
thing on their side of the Curtain is untouchable
and that all controversies between us, win, lose, or
draw, must be settled within the free world.
As we make our goal clear and as we progress
toward it, its appeal will certainly not be limited
to the free world. On the contrary, it cannot help
but touch responsive chords in the peoples who
have lost their freedom, includmg those of the
Soviet Union and Red China. Hopes for freedom,
dignity, and opportunity are basic, human, instinc-
tive, and universal. In the long run achievement
of our basic goal through peaceful competition
should help fulfill the aspirations of the people of
the Communist world, defeating the ambitions of
their leaders.
That, ladies and gentlemen, is my view of the
relation between peaceful coexistence and U.S.
national security. Our basic goal is the American
answer, the positive, constructive, and dynamic
answer, to the Communist challenge. As the
President has said : ■* "We will not reach that goal
today, or tomorrow. We may not reacli it in our
own lifetime. But the quest is the greatest ad-
venture of our century."
U.S., U.K. Propose Foreign Ministers
Meeting; Explain Test Preparations
Joint Statement
WhUe House press release dated February 8
It is the joint view of the United States and
the United Kingdom Governments that the exist-
ing state of nuclear development, in which the
recent massive Soviet tests are an important fac-
tor, would justify the West in making such further
series of nuclear tests as may be necessary for
purely military reasons.
The United States and United Kingdom Gov-
ernments have therefore decided that preparations
should be made in various places, and as part of
these the United Kingdom Government are mak-
ing available to the United States Government the
facilities at Christmas Island.
The two Governments are, however, deeply con-
cerned for the future of mankind if a halt camiot
be called to the nuclear arms race. The two Gov-
ernments are, therefore, determined to make a new
effort to move away from this sterile contest.
They believe that a supreme effort should be made
at the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee
which will begin meetings on March 14 at Geneva,^
and that the Heads of Government of the United
States, United Kingdom, and Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics should assiune a direct and
personal interest in these negotiations. The Pres-
ident and the Prime Minister have, therefore,
addressed a joint commvmication to Chairman
Khrushchev proposing that this meeting be ini-
tiated at the foreign-minister level and that their
foreijm ministers should meet before the confer-
ence starts and also be prepared to return as per-
sonal participants in the negotiations at appropri-
ate stages as progress is made.
* Ihid., Jan. 29, 1962, p. 159.
' Bulletin of Feb. 5, 1062, p. 205, footnote 2.
februatY 26, ?962
329
Crisis and Clarity
hy Harlan Cleveland
Assistant Secretary for Inteimjational Organization Affairs'^
In between your liincli and your back-to-work
movement you liave asked me to say how the
United Nations fits into United States foreign
policy. It is a timely question. For the Nation
is beginning to debate whether to loan the United
Nations a sum that a major soap company might
spend on TV advertising in a year — and tlius no
mean investment.
Somebody suggested last week that the U.N.
required "surgeiy rather than poultice." Wliat
is proposed in the U.N. bond issue ^ is, of course,
not a poultice but a transfusion. As for surgery,
we might better say of the United Nations Organi-
zation, wliich works for us today in several of
the world's crisis spots, what General Marshall
once said in another context : "You don't operate
on a man while he's carrj'ing a piano upstairs."
The Aims of U.S. Foreign Policy
To answer your question requires, first, a glance
at our aims, then a quick look at the kinds of
trouble these aims get us into, and then a thought-
ful look at the place of the U.N. in this scheme
of things.
Our aims can be readily, almost too automati-
cally, put into verbal capsules :
We are helping to bind the "North" into a
workable and prosperous community of free
industrial nations.
Wo are helping to develop the world's "South"
' Address made before the Rochester City Club at
Rochester, N.Y., on Jan. 31 (press release 64 dated
Jan. 30).
' For text of President Kennedy's message to Con-
gress on the U.N. bond i.ssne and staleinonts by Secretary
Ru.sk and Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson, see p. 311.
so it can be partners with the older industrial
powers.
We are helping to build enduring bridges be-
tween North and South through aid, trade, and
a shared sense of responsibility for rapid but
peaceful change.
We are by these means helping to make the
free world hum with the cheerful and contagious
noises of success — and subvert oppression else-
where by demonstrating that free choice works
better and feels better than coercion.
Crises and Opportunities
The crises and opportunities we face from day
to day in the Department of State fall generally
into four kinds. Each is important; but some
are more important to us, and some are more
important to others.
First are the immediate confrontations of the
great powers: directly, Berlin, Korea, nuclear
testing; and, indirectly, Viet-Nam.
Second there are latent confrontations of the
great powers: situations which could lead to a
toe-to-toe power rivalry if \\& don't do something
to prevent it. Laos, Congo, and the Caribbean
are the obvious current examples.
Third there are '■'■other people^s disjnttes." Per-
haps West New Guinea is in our minds this after-
noon; but it could as well be Kashmir or the
Arab-Israel war. We are in the middle on most
of these kinds of disputes and manj' more be-
sides— because the middle is where power is
plugged into world politics and we cannot escape
the con.scquences of our own power. Our interest
in all such disputes has this in common : They all
hold latent dangers of spreading into larger con-
flicts. We could not escape the later, larger con-
330
Department of Slate Bulletin
flicts, so we have to try (o limit or help settle the
earlier, smaller ones.
In a fourth category wo can line up the whole
constructive task of building the kind of world
coimnunity ive want to live in. We help in many
ways to build free institutions inside other peo-
ple's societies, and we help to fashion an intricate
web of relations between and among these so-
cieties— trade pacts, public and private exchange
of persons, technical and scientific conferences,
political dialog, and, where necessary, military
arrangements.
Where the U.N. Fits in
Where does tlie United Nations fit in? From
our point of view (and what other point of view
is there for us?) the United Nations fits in as an
important instrument of our foreign policy.
What makes it complicated, of course, is that it
serves also as an instnunent of the foreign policies
of 103 other nations.
As Adlai Stevenson said the other day, the U.N.
was built for trouble and thrives on it. This year
the U.N. is doing such important and troublesome
things that Americans have taken to argumg about
it among themselves. Wliy does it suddenly seem
so important? Simply because the United Na-
tions has something significant to do with each of
our four categories of foreign policy trouble.
Even in the immediate and direct confronta-
tions of great powers, the U.N. has a useful, if
limited, role. It serves as a court of world judg-
ment, not to be ignored merely because it is unen-
forcible in power terms. In this forum of world
opinion we find it useful to state our case for the
education of "nth countries"' whose strength is the
intangible power of a talkative kibitzer. The U.N.
has also served as a diplomatic arena in which to
explore solutions to great-power differences; the
Jessup-Malik agreement to end the Berlin block-
ade was worked out in the U.N.'s corridors, and so
was the recent agreement to get disarmament
talks going again.
Wlien it comes to the latent confrontations, the
U.N. can become (as it is in the Congo) an op-
erational "third party," to provide policing force
and nationbuilding help where it would be too
dangerous to world peace for the great powers to
provide the needed police or aid in competition
with each other.
Wiat I have called "other people's disputes''
find the United Nations working in its peacemak-
ing role — factfinding, conciliating, and mediating,
and thus avoiding the need for the United States
to take a direct hand as "third party." The Sec-
retary-General of the United Nations is tiding this
week to conciliate the Indonesians and the Dutch
on West New Guinea.
Getting national leaders to play it cool — to talk
out their differences and not to "rmnble" — is a
prime function of the world organization. For
in a world of nuclear weapons the unleashing of
force, at any level, is a dangerous matter. In the
heavy water of international politics every leader
must act to avoid a chain reaction.
On every continent men and governments have
inherited old quarrels, some embedded in the acci-
dents of a colonial past, others deriving simply
from the history of nations and i"egions. In a
number of cases it is unsafe to let the status quo
persist. Explosive sentiments and political pres-
sures build up on each side. The temptation
grows to have it out, come what may. The
world in which we live thus places upon us
all — individual citizens as well as those who bear
political responsibility — the challenge of stretch-
ing the human capacity for conciliation and com-
promise and of removing systematically from the
world scene these old festering quarrels, quarrels
which not only threaten us all with war but divert
the energy and attention of men from the construc-
tive tasks which lie to hand.
We need on the world scene an interval of con-
ciliation, a time when men, conscious that others
are doing the same, seek to free themselves fi'om
painful memories and antagonisms and release
their strength for the acts of creation which their
situation demands. In such an interval a much
greater effort should be made to alter, by negotia-
tion and peaceful change, situations whose con-
tinuation is unsafe for us all.
That is why, as Adlai Stevenson made clear in
the General Assembly debate on Angola last week,
we hope all members of the U.N. will turn to this
problem with renewed interest and attention, con-
scious that the very fate of their institution hinges
on heightened restraint in the use of force and a
heightened effort to solve international problems
by negotiation.
Finally, in the broad task of community-build-
ing the United Nations is heavily engaged in tech-
nical, economic, scientific, financial, educational,
February 26, 1962
331
and social welfare programs, on which close to
90 percent of all United Nations (and specialized
agency) personnel are in fact engaged. Here
again the U.N. provides a useful if limited sub-
stitute for competitive aid from East and West,
which can tear a young country apart (as the So-
viets and other outside forces have tried to do in
the Congo) rather than help build it as a viable
nation.
Other Concerts of Nations
Because we happen to be talking about the
United Nations, let us not fall into the doctrinal
error which is too common among the U.N.'s
friends as well as its foes. People keep talking
about the U.N. as if it were the only international
peacemaking and community-building enterprise
in which we are or should be involved. There are,
of course, others, and tliey are crucially important
too.
The Atlantic community was born first as a con-
cept. But the Marshall plan, the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development, have put in-
stitutional flesh on its bones. And the prospective
partnership between the Europe^an Common Mar-
ket and the great common market of North Amer-
ica is, for many of us, the most exciting single job
of institution-building now in progress.
The Organization of American States is also
engaged in building with new enthusiasm a very
special community, based on the long tradition of
hemispheric solidarity, newly reinforced by the
Alliance for Progress and the menace of a frankly
Communist beachhead in the Caribbean.
Our problem is not to choose one or another of
these interlocking concerts of nations — the re-
gional, the Atlantic, and the almost-global.
Rather our task is to woi'k through each grouping
for such purposes, and at such times, as seem ap-
propriate from the standpoint of our own national
interest.
Public Consent the Source of U.S. Policy
About the U.N., which is our focus today, we
must ask ourselves : Is peace so certain ; are we so
secure; are our alliances so strong; can we escape
so many disputes; do we have so many dependable
bucket brigades; are we and our hundred-odd
neighbors such paragons of righteousness; is our
skin so thin, our conscience so dulled, and our as-
pirations for our world so modest that we can
afford to dispense with the peacekeeping and na-
tionbuilding capacities of the United Nations?
Evidently not. But in any event the U.N., like
the mountain, is "there." The U.S. cannot ignore
it. The real question about the U.N. is this : "Will
its unique capacities be used, or will they be
wasted ?
Wliether we waste or use this imperfect world
instrument will be determined not so much by how
valuable an instnmient it is or why there are
grumblings about it but by wliat kind of people
we are.
The ultimate source of U.S. policy lies in the
consent of the people. Without this consent, the
United States cannot join in a trading partner-
ship with the 200 million customers of Western
Europe or build the Atlantic alliance into a com-
munity, or bridge the great north-south division
of the world, or meet the Sino-Soviet bloc on our
own terms. Wliere does consent come from?
From leadership certainly, but ultimately from
the kind of people we ai-e.
In his state of the Union message,' President
Kennedy said of the United Nations :
... it should have in the future, as it has had in the
past since its inception, no stronger or more faithful
member than the United States of America.
I believe there is strong public consent for this
aiSrmation.
U.N. Actions a Major Issue of American Politics
People are stirred by the "U.N. issue" this year.
For the first time in its short history the present
and future actions of the United Nations have
become a major issue of American politics.
The Korean war was controversial enough. But
that war, in which we fought under a U.N. flag as
U.N. executive agent for aims prescribed in U.N.
resolutions, was nevertheless viewed by most
Americans as essentially an American show. But
now, after several generations of sentimental talk
about organizing world peace and enforcing the
rule of law, two really significant peacekeeping
forces of a truly international character have been
placed and maintained in the field : 5,000 men,
drawn from 7 countries, to keep watch over the
Gaza Strip and the Israeli-Egyptian border; and
16,000 men in the Congo, drawn from 21 countries
" Bulletin of Jan. 29, 1962, p. 159.
332
Department of State Bulletin
and backed by a United States Air Force airlift.
The U.N. is thus a proper subject for political
controversy because it is doing nioi-o things, on a
larger scale, more vital to our national interest,
than ever before — and because the going is getting
rough. We have discovered that international
peacekeeping is practical and realistic — on a small
scale, to be sure, but big enough to restrain a small
international war, as in the Middle East, and pre-
vent a large civil wai", as in the Congo.
Wliat happened in the Congo was that we Amer-
icans helped put the U.N. in so as to avoid our
having to enter Central Africa with our own power
to counter an active Soviet thrust there. The
essential aim of our policy, invented by a Repub-
lican administration but supported and carried
on by a Democratic administration — was to
enable a moderate central government to be estab-
lished to govern the whole of the Congo. No
moderate government could survive imless it pre-
vented the secession of [Moise] Tshombe's comer
of Katanga and knocked the props from under the
Communist-supported separatists led by [An-
toine] Gizenga in the north.
The government of Joseph Kasavubu and Cy-
rille Adoula is gi-adually making the grade. This
is good news. It is quite directly a residt of U.S.
policy, the policy of the moderate Congolese lead-
ers, and the policy of the United Nations.
In the Congo moderation required bold actions,
since the going was uphill all the way. It was
bound at best to look rather messy. The U.N.'s
role, while quite legal, is without precedent. The
names of the protagonists are still strange to most
Americans, the geography is fuzzy in our minds,
our own Government's policy the subject of con-
siderable crossfire at home and abroad. But if tlie
chronic Congo crisis seems a bit disorderly as you
watch it develop from week to week, ask your-
selves whether you really would have preferred
the alternative of putting our own military forces
into Central Africa.
Peacekeeping, then, turns out to be practical.
But it also turns out to be hard on the nerves. It
was more comfortable to think of "Peace" as a
cartoonist's image, a lovely, fresh young maiden
in a pure white gown, mouthing sweet nothings
while clutching her olive branch and adjusting
her halo. But when this ethereal creature had to
whip out her six-shooter and use it to defend lier
right to walk a policeman's beat on the streets of
Elisabethville, most Amei-icans did a double-take.
Perhaps we will need several months to de-
cide— as I believe events are already helping us to
decide — ^that what was wrong with this picture
was not tlie U.N.'s actions (or U.S. support of
them) but our own obsolescent image of what in-
ternational peacekeeping would mean.
Common Aims of U.S. and U.N.
Peacekeeping by the U.N. — in the Middle East
and the Congo and potentially elsewhere — quite
obviously matters to us. It engages and promotes
our national interests and therefore arouses our
national concern. Is there a danger that this
"Girl of the Golden West" might turn her six-
shooter against us ?
The answer is "No." But it is not a passive
"No" — a complacent assurance that the world's
troubles will pass us by. The answer is an activist
"No," the kind that says the U.N. will work for
our kind of world rather than against it because
we are willing to work hard to build just that kind
of organization. In pursTiing this aim we have
three major factors going for us :
Firet : The Charter of the United Nations is our
hind of charter.
The charter is, indeed, an eloquent restatement
for our time of the doctrines Jefferson and his col-
leagues wrote for their time in our Declaration of
Independence and our Constitution. It does not
say we have nothing to lose but our chains. It
says we have everything to gain from building the
institutions of freedom. That is why we can live
with the charter and why the Soviets, as they re-
peatedly show by their actions, cannot.
Second: The U.N.^s '■'■capacity to acV depends
crucially on our support.
The U.N. has developed an executive arm to op-
erate on behalf of this charter. The League of
Nations was mostly a conference center ; its Secre-
tariat was organized primarily to set up meetings
among its members. The United Nations Secre-
tariat organizes meetings too — an appalling num-
ber of them. But the U.N. Secretariat also acts
in its own right when the U.N.'s members tell it
to do so.
What often goes unnoticed is this : The Soviets
boycott nearly all the main executive operations of
the United Nations. In the world of symbolism
the U.N.'s actions are taken in the name of global
February 26, 1962
333
universality. But in the real world the U.N. in
action is the non- Soviet world in action.
The United States, Britam, other Common-
wealth countries, Nationalist China, Japan,
France, and other European countries are assessed
69.6 percent of the U.N.'s re^ilar budget. The
same countries support 73.6 percent of tlie U.N.
Emergency Force, and 97.8 percent of the Pales-
tine refugee program. The same countries, minus
France and Belgiiun, support. 80.3 percent of the
Congo operation. The Soviets quite naturally do
not want to pay for the U.N.'s peacekeeping op-
erations; it would be a strange world in which the
burglars cheerfully contributed to the upkeep of
the police force.
Without the support of the Western Powers,
and particularly of the United States, the U.N.
would quite suddenly lose its "capacity to act"
and revert to being a conference center. Its ex-
ecutive arm could not be used against us because
it would largely cease to exist. Let those who
complain about our paying a very sizable share of
the U.N.'s cost ask themselves whether they really
want it otherwise.
Third : In the General Axnemhly and the Secu-
rity Council the United States is nearly always in
the majority, usually decisively so.
"One countiy, one vote'' does jjrcsent a potential
danger that leaders from many small countries
will not measure up responsibly to the important
responsibilities they vote on but do not have the
physical and financial power to carry into action.
It is true that the African and Asian delegates
sometimes go overboard — by our standards — on a
symbolic issue involving colonialism, racial dis-
crimination, or nuclear issues. But it is also true
that the Afro-Asians are seldom a cohesive bloc.
The leaders of each nation feel strongly about
their independence, and their independent spirit
has frustrated every effort to mold the Afro-
Asians into a homogeneous unit under extremist
leadership. Wlien the Europeans and Latin
Americans and the others are mixed in, it is a rare
occasion indeed when a two-thirds majority of
General Assembly votes can be mobilized against
us.
On the record, when it comes to action by the
U.N. — as contrasted to talking at the U.N. — the
newly independent nations have turned out to be
impressively sober.
The 15th General Assembly, in 1960, was sup-
posed to be the low point — sure sign of the deterio-
ration of the Assembly into swirling majorities —
a noisy circus for shoepounding, heckling, and
chicken feathers. In the end Chairman Khrush-
chev, after 6 wasted weeks away from the Krem-
lin for a wrecking foray on the bank of the East
River, gave up and went home.
The 16th General Assembly convened against
a dark backdrop: the Bizerte crisis, the wall in
Berlin, the resumption of nuclear testing, the Bel-
grade conference, fighting in Katanga, the death
of Dag Hammarskjold, and aggressive Soviet pro-
nouncements that now was the time for radical
surgery in the U.N. — meaning the troika. Some
of our own starker pundits solemnly prepared the
last rites : The U.N. was ready once again for the
grave.
But when the Assembly adjourned for Christ-
mas (a quaint custom in which the non-Cliristian
world has acquiesced without a murmur) , the U.N.
was still there, still holding its record as the most
extravagantly lauded and most frequently buried
institution of our time, still imperfect, but some-
how a little bit stronger and a lot more durable
than most people thought.
In the midst of the crisis of succession, the
President of the United States addressed the Gen-
eral Assembly.'' He focused on the integrity of
the Secretariat. He called for a fresh start on
disarmament, for new efforts to preserve outer
space for peaceful purposes, for economic and so-
cial progress in a U.N. Decade of Development.
What happened?
• A new Secretary-General — not a three-
headed troika — was appointed, and his Office was
nuiintained unimpaired. °
• Disarmament talks got under way again,
with the important addition to the scenery of a
major emphasis on building international peace-
keeping machineiy while dismantling national
warmaking capacity. °
• The U.N. took on a whole new function, to
develop and supervise an international outer space
program.'
' Ibid., Oct. IG, 19C1, p. 019.
"Ihid., Nov. 27, 1961, p. 904.
" Thid., Doe. IS, 1901, p. 1023.
' Ibid., Jan. 29, 1962, p. ISO.
334
Department of Slate Bulletin
• Tlie U.N. Decade of Development was pro-
claimed,* and some of the first actions — a new
international food-for-peace program " and a 1963
conference on science and teclinology for the less
developed areas— were started.
• And for good measure the Assembly con-
founded the prophets of doom by decisively beat-
ing down a renewed effort by the Soviets to get
an admission ticket for their boisterous allies in
Peiping."
Maintaining U.S. Leadership in U.N.
In spite of the successes of the season just past
it is becoming harder to get our way in the U.N. —
as it is in the world as a whole. Our leadership
in the U.N., and in the world at large, requires
more fmids, more militaiy strength, and more
organized brainwork — and, above all, more astute
politics — on our part than ever before.
It's rough, but we cannot quit. We couldn't let
go if we wanted to. Besides, we are not made
that way. "God Almighty hates a quitter," said
a great Republican President half a century ago.
The verb seems out of keeping with the Almighty,
but the sentiment appeals to us as authentically
American.
Some of ovxr compatriots may seem to lack a
lively interest in, or a deep knowledge of, the
complex issues of world politics. A few of our
compatriots may even lack that trast in their
fellow Americans that holds a community to-
gether and produces these miracles of cooperation
that make us the world's premier power. But
moments of crisis are moments of clarity, and in
moments of clarity the Americans are never afraid
of each other nor yet of the unknown; they are
only afraid of inaction. The cynical voices, and
the fearful ones, share the distinction of having
been forgotten in each of the grander moments
of American history.
There is this year, some say, a "crisis of confi-
dence" in the United Nations. If so, the central
issue will, with your help, become crystal clear
and the American reaction will once again be in
character. The arguments you will be hearing
about whether we should buy some U.N. bonds
will all boil down to a simple issue, clai'ified by the
sense of crisis. The question before the house —
both Houses — is whether during the next 18
months the United States is willing to lend, at 2
percent interest, $100 million to the United Na-
tions for peacekeeping and nationbuilding.
You, the leaders of Rochester, and your fellow
Americans in a hundred other centers of opinion-
making, will largely decide whether to loan the
United Nations an amount nearly as large as the
several States collect from the sale of himtins and
fishing licenses. If the issue is whether the United
States exercises its leadership in the United Na-
tions or abandons the U.N.'s leadership to others,
can there be any real doubt of the outcome ?
Prime Minister Adouia of Congo
Visits Washington
Cyrille Adouia^ Prime Minister of the Republic
of the Congo {Leopoldville) , visited Washington
on February 6 and (?, tohere he talked with Presi-
dent Kennedy and with officials of the U.S. Gov-
ernment, the International Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development, and the International
Monetary Fund. Folloioing are texts of toasts
given by President Kennedy and the Prime Minis-
ter at a business luncheon at the White House on
February 5.^
White House press release dated February 5
President Kennedy
Gentlemen, I am sure you all join me in wel-
coming to this country the guest of honor and the
members of his Government. I don't think that
any head of state of a new country has faced the
difficulties and the challenges which have pressed
upon him with so much force in the last few
months.
The difficulties of our revolutionary experience,
and the experiences of every other people coming
into independence since the end of "World War
Two, pale in comparison to the problems which
the Congo has faced and which press upon the
Prime Minister and his supporters.
What makes him especially welcome is the cour-
age and the fortitude, the persistence and the
judgment with which he has met these chal-
' For background, see ihid., Dec. 4, 1961, p. 939.
» Ihid., Jan. 22, 1962, p. 150.
"■ Ibid., Jan. 15, 1962, p. 108.
' For a list of the members of the Prime Minister's
party, see Department of State press release 78 dated
Feb. 3.
February 26, 1962
335
lenges — which would have overwhelmed a lesser
people, a lesser country, a lesser man, a lesser
government.
Prime Minister, we welcome you here for many
reasons. The success of the Congo is tied up,
really, we believe, witli the success of the United
Nations. If you fail, and the Congo should fail,
it would be a serious blow for the United Nations,
upon which this country has placed so many hopes
for the last 17 years. And because of the intimate
association between the United Nations and your
Government, we are particularly glad that you are
here to address them.-
We are also glad to welcome you because of your
own qiuxlities, because you have set a course for
your nation — of being independent, of being
African, of being free, of being inialined, of gov-
erning under most adverse conditions, tlirough
parliamentai-y democracy, at a time when some
other new nations have been forced by 6\'ents to
move away from democratic processes.
We welcome you because of your own extraor-
dinary record — rising because of your own ef-
forts to a position of preeminence, wliere you have
won the support of people, both within and with-
out your country — and because of your own per-
sonal qualities.
We are vitally interested in the succeas of the
Congo because we believe the success of your coim-
try is essential to the success of a free Africa. We
believe strongly in the unity of free states, able to
choose their own destiny and able to decide their
own fate.
So, Prime Minister, we welcome you here.
Many years ago one of our distinguished Presi-
dents— you examined his portrait this morning in
President Lincoln's bedroom — Andrew Jackson,
said, "Our Federal Union, it must be preserved."
We recognize your strong conviction that the
same policy should follow for your own country,
that the Congo must be preserved. And as a faith-
ful member of the United Nations, we support,
through the United Nations, the implementation
of that policy.
So we welcome you here, and I hope that all of
you will join me in saluting the people of the
Congo, the country, and its distinguished Prime
Minister.
Prime Minister Adoula^
Mr. President, I am almost embarrassed in hav-
ing to reply to your magnificent speecli — a speech
which was so short and yet so complete, so full.
I will also speak very briefly and I will say that
it is true that the Congo has gone through a period
of grave difficulties. It is true also that there are
people in the Congo, also of good will, who have
decided to fight to surmount and overcome tliose
difficulties.
However, I must say, Mr. President, that there
is one thing which you have left out of your speech,
and this is that all tliose eiforts of the people of
the Congo, all the efforts of the Government, of
Parliament, of the population itself, would not
have availed very much if we had been left to
ourselves. Fortunately for us, we have found in
the world people of great understanding, people of
great friendship. We have found comitries which
have heljjed us and which have helped us con-
tinuously— without ulterior motivation. This help
has enabled us to try.
I must tell you perhaps something, Mr. Presi-
dent, which appears to be a secret. In your speech
you seemed to speak of a superman somewhere in
the Congo, someone who had succeeded all by him-
self in overcoming ii-resistible obstacles and in
reestablishing something that has to be reestab-
lished— peace in the Congo. This, Mr. President,
is not true. There is no such man. There is no
man who could ha\-e done that by himself. There
is only a common man who wanted to sei-ve his
comitry and who accepted the difficult task of
forming a government only because he knew that
there were people in the world who are ready and
willing to help him.
This help, Mr. President, has come primarily
from you, from your Government, from your
counti-y, through the United Nations Organiza-
tion. Tliis is a help which you have given us by
helping the United Nations from its very begin-
nings— by helping the United Nations to carry
out the directives of the Security Council and the
General Assembly's directives, which you have
lielped to forge.
You have done that in the past, Mr. President,
and I am quite certain that your administration
stands ready to continue such a policy in the pres-
ent— a policy of help to others, continuous, will-
" Prime Minister Adoula addressed the U.N. General
Assembly on Feb. 2.
336
' As interpreted from the French.
Department of State Bulletin
ing help witli no ulterior motivation. This is what
you have done for the Congo. This is the help
which is necessary.
Now there was a time when people used to say
about American policy that it was a naive policy,
that Americans are people who believe everybody,
who can get fooled easily, who sometimes behave
like a bull in a china shop. Today, Mr. President,
no one can say that about American policy. This
time you have scored a bull's eye, and this time
you have proven that your policy is positive, that
it is realistic, and I am certain that your policy is
going to reach its goal and greatly increase the
prestige of the United States in the woi'ld.
Another question which is mentioned is that of
neutralism. Now here is nonalinement. You have
to understand nonalinement to mean simply that
each country wishes to remain independent and
free — free and independent to defend its own
principles, free and independent to be able to I'ec-
oncile various interests, to reconcile and compro-
mise its own interests with those of its friends,
and not only of its friends, also all of the people
in the entire woi'ld. That is what we mean by
nonalinement. That is why I believe that this
must be the policy not only of the Congolese Gov-
ernment but also of the entire Congolese people.
I must interrupt my speech because if I did not,
if I let myself be carried away, I would repeat —
speaking about you, Mr. President — the kind
words which you have addressed to me. There is
no necessity, however, to do that, because evei-y-
one knows who you are and there is no need to
repeat sometliing which was said so well.
So all I can say at this moment, Mr. President,
is that in the name of our people first of all, in the
name of our Government, in the name of our Chief
of State, we say thank you to the United States.
We can thank you — we say thank you for a help
which has been efficacious, spontaneous, and sin-
cere. We thank your administration for it, Mr.
President, because we are quite sure, as I repeat
it, that our efforts would have been to no avail if
it had not been for the moral and material help
which we have received from you.
We hope that this help will continue. We say
it in all frankness. We say, at the same time, that
our people as a people which understands reality
will never forget to say thank you to the United
States. It will not be like some other peoples
which are willing to receive aid only to criticize
later those who are helping. Thank you,
Mr. President.
I ask you now to raise your glass and drink to
the President of the United States and to the
prosperity of the American people.
Our Responsibility as Citizens
hy Mrs. Katie Louchheim
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs ^
I am delighted to be here and grateful for this,
opportunity to meet and talk with you. You have
given me a challenging assignment. There is, to
my mind, no more important subject than our re-
sponsibility as citizens. In a free society respon-
sibility is implicit in citizenship; it is the price
we pay for freedom. "Liberty means responsi-
bility," Bernard Shaw wrote. And that responsi-
bility requires both work and thought, and the
thinking may be harder than the work.
We live in an age of almost teiTifyingly rapid
change. In the 17 years since the end of World
War II — in less than a generation — we have seen
the world's population increase by close to 50 per-
cent and our own country's population by nearly
30 percent. We have seen man build the capacity
for destroying his world with all its millions.
With no regions left to explore on this planet, our
own generation is exploring the great empty
spaces around it and expects soon to explore the
moon. Not inconceivably, our children or grand-
children may explore Venus or Mars.
This is a revolutionary age, whether we like it
or not. The map of our own planet has been
changing so fast that last month's atlas is out of
date. The colonial empires we learned about in
school have all but vanished. In their place 42
new nations have come into being. In these new
comitries, and in many older nations too, profound
social changes are also taking place — what has
been called the "revolution of rising expectations."
People long ill-fed and ill-housed are beginning to
demand a share in the better life which a new
teclmology makes possible. People silent for cen-
turies are making themselves heard.
Here in the United States we fought our Revo-
' Address made before the National Conference of the
Ladies Auxiliary of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the
United States at Washington, D.C., on Feb. 8 (press
release 87 dated Feb. 7) .
February 26, 1962
337
lution and won our independence nearly two cen-
turies ago. We have had time for a gradual
political, teclmical, and social evolution. Even
so, it is not too easy for us to adjust to the greatly
accelerated pace of the past few years. Think
how difficult it must be for a feudal society like
the ancient empire of Ethiopia, or a tribal society
like little Western Samoa in the South Pacific, to
leap over several hundred years into the middle of
the 20th centuiy. But the leaders of these new
nations are detennined to make that giant leap.
As Secretary of State Dean Rusk said to the
foreign ministers of the Americas at Pimta del
Este recently : ^
No one can hope to prolong the past in a revolutionary
age. The only question is which road we mean to take
into the future.
This is not a question alone for this hemisphere. It
is a question faced everywhere in the world. On the one
hand are those who believe in change through persuasion
and consent — through means which respect the individual.
On the other are those who advocate change through the
subjugation of the individual and who see in the turbu-
lence of change the opportunity for power.
Which road the new nations, and some of the
older nations, take depends to a considerable ex-
tent on us. It depends on whether we in the
United States can demonstrate that a free society
can solve its pressing problems both democratically
and efficiently. We share with other countries all
over the world tlie problem of an exploding pop-
ulation. We share with them the problem of
changing family relationships, changing ways of
life, and changing values. We share with them
the problem of urbanization, of unplanned metro-
politan sprawl. Eio de Janeiro and Calcutta are
trying to cope with a flood of impoverished rural
newcomers, unused to city ways and untrained for
city jobs; so are New York and Chicago. If our
educational problems are less staggering than
Africa's or Asia's, still we have them : not enough
classrooms nor enough teachers for our growing
numbers of children, and, as President Kennedy
reminded us recently, far more illiterates than we
should have. These are just some of our common
problems, differing only in degree and stage of
development. Automation is not yet a tlireat to
the Ghanaian worker's job as it is already to many
American workers, but it may be, sooner t ban we
realize.
' Bulletin of Feb. 19, 1962, p. 270.
338
Understanding Domestic and Foreign Issues
Our major domestic problems and our foreign
policies and programs are in this way closely re-
lated. The Washington correspondent of the New
York Tirnes, James Reston, wrote a week or so
ago:
The cold war will probably be settled, If it ever is, not
by the society with the biggest weapons . . . but by the
society that has the greatest capacity to adjust to the
scientific, social and political revolutions of the age. . . .
The ability of the United States to take the lead in this
process of adjustment is vital to its own security and the
security of the rest of the free world, but this whole
process cannot proceed much faster than the development
of public understanding in this country.
It is our responsibility as citizens to develop tliis
understanding in ourselves and in our conmiuni-
ties. It is our responsibility as citizens to help
solve our domestic problems and in so doing to
strengthen our country for leadership in the free
world. It is our responsibility — and it is within
our power as women, that power which, as the
Ladies^ Home Journal reminds us, should never be
underestimated.
How do we go about developing an understand-
ing of the complex domestic and foreign issues
confronting us ? James Reston of the New York
Times made what seems to me an excellent sugges-
tion, which I will pass along to you. In every city,
town, and village, he suggests, study groups should
be formed in churches, schools, service clubs,
PTA's, and other organizations. "It is not enough
merely to listen to lectvtres — the fastest-growing
indoor spectator sport in America today," he
emphasized. The study groups must really study
and discuss : first, the problems of their own com-
munities— schools, jobs, public assistance, medical
care for the aged, housing; and then move on to
more complicated matters like international trade,
foreign aid programs, or United Nations bonds.
They should get the facts in each situation and
analyze the diffex-ent possible courses of act ion and
intelligently support — or intelligently oppose —
community. State, and national programs.
This sort of analysis is in the best American
tradition. We have often felt impelled to turn
the bright light of self-examination on particular
needs. Indeed it is one of the things about us that
impresses foreign visitors. Many of the foreign
women visitors I see in my job have mentioned to
me, after a month or two here, how surprised and
Department of Sfafe Bulletin
pleased they were at the frank criticism by Ameri-
cans in all walks of life of abuses or unhealthy
situations. They admit that they imagined Amer-
icans to be standardized, homogeneous, and com-
placent; on the contrary, they find in us a
great diversity of opinion and a perpetual soul
searching.
But our responsibility is not limited to analysis
and criticism, however intelligent, nor to support-
ing or opposing through the ballot box. It is also
our responsibility to play an active i^art in im-
proving our communities. For generations
Americans, both men and women, have been join-
ing organizations to this end. A sense of service,
of concern and responsibility for others and for
the community, has been characteristically Amer-
ican since the earliest days of our nation. The
American woman volunteer is a unique institution.
You know that, of course, because you are that
unique institution. Each one of you, I am sure,
is on the board of a dozen community organiza-
tions. You give more hours than there are in the
week to your PTA's, your hospitals, playgrounds,
senior citizens' centers, churches. All our many
community welfare activities depend on your vol-
untary services. You have changed the faces of
your hometowns. You are the hubs in our wheels
of progress.
Assisting Government Programs
Many American voluntary organizations have
taken on responsibilities beyond the conunimity
and the Nation. They reach out to help the student
in Nigeria, the farmer's wife in India, the rural
schoolteacher in Chile, the leper in Viet-Nam.
Some women's groups have responded to requests
to share our techniques of vocational education or
of citizenship abroad. Others open their doors
here at home to the foreign visitor coming for
study and observation. They conduct orientation
sessions, workshops, and seminars to explain our
political and social way of life; they invite visitors
to their meetings to watch how they work. Most
foreign visitors, especially women, put the work-
ings of American volimtary organizations high on
the list of things to see here. Members of newly
formed women's organizations in Africa, for in-
stance, are eager to learn our organizing tech-
niques. They want to laiow how a woman's club
puts across a school bond issue, gets Main Street
mended, or trains volunteers as nurses' aides. In
this generous sharing of their experience our vol-
untary organizations have become a valuable
adjunct to the Government's program for helping
other people help themselves.
All citizens have a responsibility and an oppor-
tunity to assist that program, directly or indi-
rectly. As I said earlier, American leadership
will stand or fall by our success or failure in
solving our domestic problems. Secretary Rusk,
a few months ago, remarked that "the biggest
single burden we carry on our backs in our foreign
relations in the 1960's is the problem of racial
discrimination here at home." Most of the people
of the new nations — indeed something like three-
fifths of the world's people — are not white. In
their eyes the spirit of democracy is only as real
and meaningful as it is in practice. "WHien we
preach liberty and freedom for all, we must not
only mean it but live it.
As women, as leadere of our communities, we
have a responsibility and an opportunity to in-
fluence the conduct of community life so that visi-
tors, especially those from the newer nations, feel
welcome in all neighborhoods and all public
places — and so that they realize all our own citi-
zens are equally welcome. Let us so influence our
communities that our newspapers and the world's
newspapers carry no ugly stories of discrimi-
nation.
You may be interested in the reaction of a visitor
from Panama. Last spring my office sponsored
the visit of 12 Latin American women whose spe-
cial interest was social welfare. The Panamanian
member of the group was of mixed African and
Indian ancestry. She came to the United States
with much hesitation, afraid that she might have
unhappy experiences. Luckily her experience
was happy; she was warmly received wherever
she went. At the end of her stay she said to me :
"I know now that what matters in the United
States is not the color of a person's skin, but the
person himself." This is the way it should be.
Let us make it true everywhere.
In this world precariously balanced between
autocracy and freedom, what each one of us does
may tip the scales. It might well make the differ-
ence between defeat and victory. It is a challeng-
ing responsibility, this responsibility of free
citizens — a responsibility we are fortunate to have.
February 26, 7962
339
The New Trade Expansion Act
iy Leonard Weiss'^
I gather that what you would like me to do is to
explain the new Trade Expansion Act proposed by
President Kennedy on January 25 to tlie Con-
gress.^ I imderstand you would like to know what
the act provides, what it would do, and how it
would work.
The President's proposals may be considered for
purposes of simplification as consisting of essen-
tially two parts : first, that providing for new au-
thority to reduce tarifi's and, second, that providing
for ways to deal with increased competition from
imports and any problems of domestic readjust-
ment which might arise.
Authority To Reduce Tariffs
Let us look at the first part— the authority to
reduce tariffs and procedures for canning out this
authority.
The new trade bill would provide the President
with essentially four types of new tariff authority :
1. authority to reduce duties in relation to any
other country;
2. special authority to reduce or eliminate duties
in relation to the European Economic Community,
the EEC, popularly called tlic Common Market;
3. special authority to reduce or eliminate duties
in relation to the less developed countries ; and
4. authority to eliminate low duties.
' Address made before the National Council of American
Importers at New York, N.Y., on Fel). 8 (press release 86
dated Feb. 7). Mr. Weiss is Director of the Office of
International Trade, Department of State.
' For text of the President's message on trade, see
Bulletin of Feb. 12, 1902, p. 231 ; for text of a bill "To
promote the general welfare, foreign policy, and security
of the United States through international trad<> a^ree-
ment,s and through adjustment assistance to domestic
industry, agriculture, and labor, and for other purposes,"
see H.R. 0000, 87th Cong., 2d sess.
As regards the first authority, the President
would be authorized to reduce in a trade agree-
ment duties existing on July 1, 1962, by 50 percent.
The act has been so drawn that duties "existing"
on July 1, 1962, include those reduced duties to
which the United States is committed under inter-
national agreement as of that date, even though
those reduced duties may not yet actually be in
effect. Accordingly the 50-percent authority
would be applicable to those duties which will be
reduced pursuant to the current Geneva tariff
negotiations but which may not come into effect
until some time after July 1, 1962, because of the
staging process.
In addition to this authority available in ne-
gotiations with any other country, the bill pro
vides special authority to deal with the Common
Market. The Common Market presents a special
problem for our exporters. As a result of the com-
plete elimination of tariffs internally among the
member states of the EEC, coupled with the main-
tenance of a common tariff against the outside, our
exporters have a special hurdle to overcome which
they do not face elsewhere. If our exporters are
to get over this hurdle, a simple 50-percent reduc-
tion in the external tariff of the Common Market
may not be good enough. Thoy may need a
greater reduction or even complete elimination of
the particular tariff concerned if they are to pre-
serve, to say nothing of expand, their position in
the market.
Naturally, if we are to seek such substantial duty
reductions and eliminations from the EEC, we
must bo prepared to grant comparable tariff con-
cessions to tlio EEC on their imports into the
United States. Accordingly, the act authorizes
the President in an agreement with the EEC to
reduce tariff's by more than 50 percent or to elimi-
nate them completely in those cases where the
340
Department of Stale Bulletin
United States and tlie EEC together account for
80 percent or more of the world export vahie of
all articles within a specified category as defined
in the act.
This special autliority goes one step farther in
relation to agricultural products. In the case of
such products, even if the 80-percent trade cover-
age test could not be met, the President would be
authorized in an agreement with the EEC to re-
duce by more than 50 percent or to eliminate the
duty on an agricultural commodity if he deter-
mines that such action w^ould help maintain or
expand U.S. exports of such an article.
Any tariff concessions which we might grant to
the EEC under this authority would be extended
to imports from other countries. Such generaliza-
tion is in accordance with our traditional policy of
most- favored-nation treatment, which is explicitly
reaffirmed in the new proposed legislation. Thus,
tariff reductions or eliminations under the 50-
percent or the other authorities to which I have
referred, as well as under the EEC authority,
would be extended to other countries.
This authority in relation to the EEC has been
drawn in the way it has to protect our position in
the EEC market in commodities where we have an
obvious comparative advantage. The fact that we
and the EEC have dominated 80 jxjrcent of the
world export value in a commodity reflects the
advantage we have over other suppliers in such
commodities. We want to be sure that these ad-
vantages are not frustrated and our exports cur-
tailed as a result of the internal elimination of
tariffs within the EEC while tariffs are main-
tained against the outside. At the same time, be-
cause we do enjoy a strong competitive position,
as reflected by our dominance in world exports in
these commodities, we can make substantial duty
reductions and even eliminations with reasonable
confidence that our domestic industry will not face
undue difficulties from imports, including imports
from other countries to wliich concessions to the
EEC would be generalized.
As I indicated, the act also provides a special
authority in relation to the less developed coun-
tries. One of the most compelling problems which
these countries face is to expand their exports so
that they can earn the means to support their eco-
nomic development, so urgently needed to raise
living standards and promote political stability.
Accordingly the act authorizes the President to
reduce or eliminate duties or other import restric-
tions on tropical agricultural and forestry com-
modities not produced in significant quantities in
the United States. This authority is conditional
upon tlie EEC's taking comparable action on a
nondiscriminatory basis so as to encourage the
maximum possible reduction of restrictions
against the trade of the less developed countries.
Finally the act authorizes the President to elim-
inate tariff's on those products where the duty is
already 5 percent or less. In such instances the
duty generally does not serve any significant pro-
tective fmiction and is simply a nuisance to the
trade and an administrative impediment.
How This Authority Would Be Applied
The foregoing is the authority which the act
provides to the President to reduce or eliminate
duties. In exercising this authority the President
must first seek the advice of the Tariff Commission
as to the economic effect of reductions or elimina-
tions in duties on U.S. finns and workers engaged
in the production of the articles concerned. In
advising the President the Tariff Commission will
be expected to take into account the probability
of significant idling of productive facilities, pro-
longed and persistent inability to operate at a
profit, and unemploj'ment or underemployment in
domestic producing firms. As under present pro-
cedures, the Tariff Commission may hold public
hearings in preparing its advice to the President.
Under the proposed bill the President would not
be permitted to make duty reductions or elimina-
tions on any items on which escape-clause action
has been taken pursuant to the present escape
clause or to the modified escape clause in the pro-
posed act. Nor may the President reduce or elimi-
nate tariffs on items on which restrictions have
been imposed pursuant to the national security
provision which is contained in the present re-
ciprocal trade agreements act and which is re-
tained in the proposed bill.
The bill also provides, as does the present act,
for the withholding of tariff concessions from the
U.S.S.R. and from countries which are dominated
or controlled by international communism.
As is the case imder the present act, the new act
would provide for the staging of tariff reductions
or eliminations. In general the tariff reductions
or eliminations are to take effect in not less than
five equal annual installments. They may take
February 26, 7 962
341
effect in unequal intervals and amounts, provided
the sum of reductions at any one time does not ex-
ceed what would occur under five equal install-
ments. This feature permits smaller reductions
initially and larger ones toward the end of the
period. No staging is required for reductions of
not more than 25 percent of the existing rate or for
actions taken under the tropical-products or low-
duty authority.
Dealing With Effects on Domestic Producers
So much for the authority to reduce and elimi-
nate tariffs and for the way in which this au-
thority would be applied. Now I would like to
turn to those features of the new bill designed to
deal with the effect of impoits on domestic
producers.
Perhaps in no respect is the present legislation
so defective as with regard to the provisions de-
signed to safeguard domestic industry from seri-
ous injury. These provisions satisfy no one. For
those concerned about imports, the present provi-
sions don't go far enough. They are felt to be
unduly time-consuming and insufficiently restric-
tive to protect domestic interests. For those con-
cerned with the promotion of a liberal trade policy,
the present provisions are felt to go too far. They
are considered unreasonably to inhibit tariff re-
duction and to create widespread uncertainty and
generally to raise the question whether the existing
act is more a vehicle of trade liberalization or trade
restriction.
The proposed bill tries to face up to this prob-
lem and come up with a constructive solution. It
accepts the premise that action in the national in-
terest to reduce trade barriers entails a national
responsibility to assist those who may be adversely
affected. It does not expect individual groups to
bear the burden of a policy felt to be in the interest
of the nation as a wliole. It seeks, however, to
meet this burden in a positive rather than negative
way, consistent with a dynamic rather than static
economy. It seeks, where possible, to make our
producers more competitive in their present fields
of activity. Where this may not be possible, it
seeks to facilitate their adjustment to other fields
where they can be competitive. In these waj's it
attempts to provide for a more efficient use of our
resources, for a higher level of national growth,
and, in last analysis, for a better livelihood for our
people.
With these fundamental conceptions and pur-
poses in mind, the proposed bill provides assist-
ance to facilitate the adjustment of domestic pro-
ducers to conditions which may result from action
under the legislation to reduce or eliminate tariffs.
This assistance is essentially of two types : that for
firms and that for workers. In addition, in
extraordinary cases where such assistance may be
inadequate to mitigate the difficulties involved, the
bill provides for temporary tariff relief or other
increased restrictions.
Assistance for Firms and Woricers
The adjustment assistance for firms is of three
types. First, provision is made for technical as-
sistance to an affected firm. Such assistance
includes information, mai'ket and other economic
research, managerial ad^'ice and counseling, train-
ing, and assistance in research and development.
Secondly, provision is made for direct loans and
guarantees of loans where necessary to provide
financial assistance which otherwise might not
be available. Thirdly, provision is made for var-
ious forms of tax relief, such as the special carry-
back of operating losses.
As regards workers, the act provides for three
types of assistance. First, it provides for readjust-
ment allowances in the form of compensation for
partial or complete imemployment. Secondly, it
provides for retraining of workers so that they can
shift into other types of employment. Thirdly,
it provides for relocation allowances to assist a
family in moving from an area where employment
may be lacking to an area where employment may
be available. These facilities are over and above
those which may already be available to firms,
workers, and communities under existing legis-
lation.
The assistance provided under the bill would lie
administered through existing agencies, blatters
relating to assistance to firms would be referred to
the Department of Commerce and other interested
agencies, including the Small Business Adminis-
tration. Matters relating to assistance to workers
would be referred to the Department of Labor
and other interested agencies.
To advise the President and tlie administering
agencies on the development of programs for ad-
justment assistance to firms and workers, the bill
would establish an interagencj* Adjustment As-
sistance Advisor}' Board. This board would con-
342
Deparfmenf of State Bulletin
sist of the Secretary of Commerce, as chairman,
and the Secretaries of the Treasury, Agriculture,
Labor, Interior, and Health, Education, and "Wel-
fare, and the Administrator of the Small Business
Administration. The President may appoint to
the board such other officials as he deems appro-
priate. In addition, the chairman of the board
may appoint for any industry an industry com-
mittee composed of members representing em-
ployers, workers, and the public. Such commit-
tees would be for the purpose of advising the
board with regard to the provision of adjustment
assistance.
Tariff Relief or Other Restrictions
As I indicated above, extraordinary circum-
stances may develop in which adjustment assist-
ance to firms and workers may not be adequate to
mitigate the difficulties involved. With this con-
tingency in mind, the bill provides for increased
tariffs or other import restrictions for a temporary
period. Before such increased restrictions could
be imposed the President must find :
first, that as a result of a concession imports
liave increased so as to cause or threaten on a
widespread basis in the industry (a) the signifi-
cant idling of productive facilities, (b) prolonged
and persistent inability to operate at a profit, and
(c) unemployment or underemployment of work-
ers; and
secondly, that reasonable efforts in the industry
to adjust have been made and have not substan-
tially mitigated the conditions in question and that
adjustment assistance to firms or workers is or
would be inadequate to mitigate substantially these
conditions.
In making these findings, the President would
first obtain the advice of the Tariff Commission.
The Tariff Commission would be expected gen-
erally to hold hearings and obtain information in
the way it does now under the escape clause. As
is presently the case, applications for increased
tariffs or other restrictions under this provision
would be made in the first instance directly to the
Tariff Commission by the industry concerned.
The President would make the ultimate decision
as to the relief to be granted.
As I said, action under this provision is to be on
a temporary basis. Accordingly any increase in
duty or other import restriction taken imder this
provision shall be for a period not to exceed 4
years. The President is authorized to extend the
period if he determines that the national interest
so requires.
This, briefly, is the nature of the President's
proposal for new trade legislation. I would be
glad to answer any questions which you may have.
Summary of New Trade Legislation
The following summary of President Kennedy''s
new trade legislation was prepared in the Office of
International Traded
Title I - Title, Effective Date, and Purposes
1. Title. "Trade Expansion Act of 1962."
2. Effective Date. July 1,1962.
3. Statement of Purposes. The statement out-
lines the essential general welfare, foreign policy,
and security purposes of U.S. trade policy and the
objective of promoting these pui-poses through
international trade agreements affording mutual
benefits. It refers explicitly as among its pur-
poses to the strengthening of economic and politi-
cal relations with the European Economic Com-
munity and with other foreign countries, the
assisting of less developed countries, and the
coimtering of Communist economic penetration.
Tlie statement also refei-s to the provision of trade
adjustment assistance as a purpose of the new act.
Title II - Trade Agreements
1. Tariff Reduction Authority. The bill pro-
vides the President with the following types of
authority to reduce United States tariffs in trade
agreements entered into not later than June 30,
1967:
(a) General Authority. In relation to coun-
tries generally, the President is authorized to
reduce existing duties by 50 percent.
(b) EEC Authority. In negotiations with the
EEC, the President is authorized to exceed the 50
percent limitation and to reduce tariffs to zero on
products within categories of which the U.S. and
the EEC together account for 80 percent or more
of world exports as measured in a representative
' For text of the President's message of Jan. 2.5 on trade,
see Bulletin of Feb. 12, 1962, p. 2.31 ; for an address by
Leonard Weiss on "The New Trade Expansion Act," see
p. 340.
February 26, 1962
343
period. Intra-EEC trade and intra-Communist
bloc trade are excluded from the measurement of
world exports. Tariff reductions or eliminations
under this authority may be made on agricultural
products whicli do not meet the SO percent "dom-
inant supplier" rule, provided the President finds
that such action will tend to assure the maintenance
or expansion of U.S. exports of such products.
(c) Special Authority for Tropical Agricul-
tural and Forest Commodities. Tlie President is
authorized to reduce or eliminate tariffs on any
tropical agricultural or forest commodity or pri-
mary products thereof if the EEC agrees to take
similar action on a nondiscriminatory basis and if
the commodity or product is not produced in sig-
nificant quantities in the U.S.
(d) Low-Duty Authority. The President is
authorized to eliminate tariffs on products which
are dutiable at a rate of 5 percent or less.
2. Prerequisites to Negotiations
(a) Tarijf Commission Advice Prior to Nego-
tiations. The President must furnish the Tariff
Commission with a list of the products or product
categories on which negotiations are proposed.
Within 6 months of receipt of the list, the Tariff
Commission is required to advise the President
as to the economic effect of reductions or elimina-
tions of duties. The Tariff Commission may hold
hearings in the course of its investigations. The
President may not enter into a trade agreement
until he has received the advice of the Tariff
Commission or until the expiration of the
G-month period, whicliever is the earlier.
(b) Reserve List. The President is required
to reserve from trade agreement negotiations any
product subject to an escape clause or national
security action taken under this or prior trade
agreement acts. He may also reserve such addi-
tional products as he deems appropriate.
(c) Notice. Tlie President is required to give
public notice of intention to enter into trade agree-
ments and provide opportunity for presentation
of public views, including views on tlie reservation
of any article from the negotiations.
(d) Transmission to Congress. The President
must transmit to the Congress any trade agree-
ment entered into under this act, stating in the
light of the advice received from the Tariff Com-
mission and other relevant considerations his
reasons for entering into the agreement.
3. National Security Provision
(a) Suspension of Benefits to Communist
Countries. Tlie bill continues the existing pro-
vision that the President shall deny the benefits
of trade agreement concessions to the U.S.S.R.
and to countries wliich are dominated or controlled
by international communism.
(b) Safeguarding National Security. The bill
repeats practically verbatim the present provision
of the trade agreements legislation relating to
national security. Under this provision the
President is required to restrict imports when he
determines that an article is being impoiled into
the United States in such quantities or under
such circumstances as to threaten to impair the
national security.
4. General Provisions
(a) Most-Favored-Nation Principle. All tar-
iff reductions made under this act will be gen-
eralized on a most- favored-nation basis except for
the discriminatory action specifically authorized
with respect to the Communist bloc. This MFN
principle applies not only to the general negoti-
ating authority but also to the special authority
for negotiations with the EEC, the tropical prod-
ucts authority, and the low-duty authority.
(b) Suspension of Benefits. As in present leg-
islation, the President is authorized to suspend
trade agreement benefits to any country which
discriminates against U.S. commerce or engages
in other actions which in the opinion of the Presi-
dent tend to defeat the purposes of this act.
(c) Staging Requirements. Tariff reductions
made under this trade agreements authority are
in general to take effect in not less than five equal
annual installments. They may take effect in un-
equal intervals and amounts provided the siun
of reductions at any one time does not exceed
what would occur under five equal installments.
No staging is required for reductions of not more
than 25 percent of the existing rate or actions
taken under the tropical products or low-duty
autliority.
(d) Status of Existing Escape Clause and Na-
tional Security Actions. Past actions taken to
grant relief under the escape clause and national
security provisions of prior legislation will con-
tinue in effect except that escape clause actions
taken more than 3 years before the effective date
344
Department of Sfafe Bullefin
of the new act will terminate 1 year thereaft«r
unless extended by the President.
Title III - Adjustment Assistance
1. Forms of Adjustment Assistance. The bill
provides the following forms of adjustment assist-
ance to meet difficulties due to increased imports
of like or directly competitive articles as a result
of tariff concessions :
(a) Asshtance to Firms. This includes: (1)
technical assistance, (2) various forms of finan-
cial assistance, and (3) tax relief in the form of
special carryback of operating losses.
(b) Assistance to Workers. This includes: (1)
readjustment allowances in the form of compensa-
tion for partial or complete unemployment, (2)
retraining of workers for other types of employ-
ment, and (3) relocation allowances to assist fam-
ilies in moving to an area where employment may
be available.
(c) Assistance to Industries. In extraordinary
cases where the foregoing types of assistance may
be inadequate to mitigate the difficulties involved,
the President is authorized to apply increased
duties or other import resti'ictions. Under this
authority, the President may increase the duty for
any article to a rate not more than 50 percent
above that existing on July 1, 1934, or may impose
a duty not to exceed 50 percent ad valorem on a
free-list item. Such extraordinary relief will ex-
pire at the end of 4 years unless the President
determines that the national interest requires its
extension for a longer period. This form of relief
may be provided in addition to or as a substitute
for other forms of adjustment assistance.
2. EligibiUty for Adjustment Assistance
(a) Procedures. Petitions for determination of
eligibility to apply for adjustment assistance for
firms and workers will be filed with the President.
Before making a determination as to eligibility,
the President must secure advice from the Tariff
Commission on the extent to which imports of
like or directly competitive articles have increased
as a result of a tariff change made in a trade agree-
ment. As regards extraordinary relief for indus-
tries, applications are to be filed with the Tariff
Commission, which will advise the President
whether the adverse conditions set forth below
exist. The President will make the ultimate deter-
mination as to the granting of extraordinary
relief.
(b) Standards. A firm will be eligible to apply
for adjustment assistance if increased imports re-
sulting from a trade agreement concession are
determined to be causing or threatening to cause
any one of the following three conditions: (1)
significant idling of the productive facilities of
the firm, (2) prolonged and persistent inability
of the firm to operate at a profit, or (3) unemploy-
ment or underemployment of a significant number
of the workers of the firm. Only the third stand-
ard as to unemployment or underemployment as
a result of increased imports due to a tariff conces-
sion is applicable to detemiination of the eligibil-
ity of workers of a firm or an appropriate
subdivision thereof to apply for adjustment
assistance. All three standards must be met to
determine eligibility of an industry to obtain
extraordinary relief.
3. Administration. Adjustment assistance will
be administered through existing agencies and pro-
grams of the executive branch. Matters relating
to assistance to firms will be referred to the De-
partment of Commerce and other interested agen-
cies, includmg the Small Business Administration.
Matters relating to assistance to workers will be
referred to the Department of Labor and other
interested agencies. An interagency Adjustment
Assistance Advisory Board chaired by the Secre-
tary of Commerce will be established to advise
the President and the administering agencies on
the development of programs for adjustment as-
sistance to firms and workers.
februaty 26, 1962
345
THE CONGRESS
Status of U.S. Trade Relations With Yugoslavia and Cuba
Statement by Secretary Rusk '
I am very pleased to have this opportunity to
discuss further with you our policies and prob-
lems in the field of export controls. In your letter
of January 18,^ Mr. Chairman [Kepresentative A.
Paul Kitchin], you raised two important general
questions. Several additional points were raised
by the committee staff. I would like to discuss
now those basic questions raised in your letter,
and I am prepared at your pleasure to respond to
the questions provided by the committee staff.
U.S. Policy Toward Yugoslavia
First, Mr. Chairman, with regard to your ques-
tion on the status of our relations with Yugo-
slavia: Last October, before this committee, I
indicated that our policy is similar to that toward
trade with any friendly European or neutralist
country and that Yugoslav requests for eco-
nomic and technical assistance are considered on
their merits. I also indicated that the develop-
ments within that country which are encouraged
and facilitated by our policy are definitely in the
interests of the United States and the free world.
The facts continue to bear out the usefulness of
that policy.
The decision, taken more than a decade ago, to
provide assistance and support to Yugoslavia, an
avowedly Communist counti-y which had broken
away from the Soviet bloc, was imaginative and
courageous. At that time it was recognized that
this decision involved the risk that our assistance
would ultimately strengthen the Soviet bloc, in
the event Yugoslavia, by desire or necessity, re-
turned to the bloc. It was also apparent, however,
that this decision provided an opportunity to de-
termine whether peaceful evolutionary changes
could occur in Communist countries, whether a
Communist country could break away fi-om Mos-
•Made before the House Select Committee on Export
Control on Feb. 5 (press release 80).
' Not printed.
cow's domination and establish its independence,
and whether the West could establish relations
with such a country more fruitful than those lim-
ited relations we had come to expect with the mem-
bers of the Soviet bloc. The results of our policy,
based on that decision and carried out over a
decade, have more than met our expectations.
The independence of Yugoslavia has been fii-mly
established. Yugoslav support was withdrawn
from the civil war in Greece. The Trieste ques-
tion was resolved. Border and minority issues
with Austria were shelved. Albania was geo-
grapliically isolated from the Soviet bloc, thus
permitting its ultimate defiance of Moscow. And
finally, during the ensuing decade the Yugoslavs
developed a politicoeconomic system which differs
markedly from that of the Soviet Union. Yugo-
slavia remains the outstanding example of suc-
cessful defiance by a Communist country of Soviet
imperialism. It has shown the world that escape
from the Soviet system is possible and that devel-
opment in close cooperation with the West pro-
duces results superior to those possible under the
tutelage of the Soviet Union.
These developments have resulted in closer and
more constructive relations between Yugoslavia
and the West. These developments have also be-
come institutionalized in Yugoslavia and would be
difficult to reverse. We can confidently expect con-
tinuing benefit to the West from Yugoslavia's
position. We can also expect this important area
in the Balkans to continue to be denied to the
Soviet Union if our policy continues to acknowl-
edge, support, and respect the independence the
Yugoslavs are determined to maintain.
Yugoslavia Strengthening Ties With West
In explniiiing our policy toward Yugoslavia we
are frequently asked questions that i-eveal a con-
cern about its basic relationship to the United
346
Deparfmenf of State Bulletin
States. We are reminded that Yugoslavia is not
an ally, despite United States aid. We are asked
whether Yugoslavia is truly a friendly coimtry.
And we are reminded that Yugoslavia is, after all,
still a Commimist country. To this I would say
that we would make a mistake if we were to limit
our attention to those things which our policy is
not designed to achieve and wluch we have never
cont<?niplated it would achieve. Our trade and
aid policies are not designed to purchase friend-
ship or to purchase allies. The Yugoslav Govern-
ment remains Communist. It frequently holds
positions on international issues with which we
cannot agree. Nevertheless our relations are pro-
ductive and have expanded greatly since 1948 as
a result of our policy and Yugoslavia's response
to our policy. Trade with Yugoslavia has in-
creased. Cultural and other contacts have in-
creased. Our diplomatic relations with Yugo-
slavia are friendly and frank.
The Yugoslav Government has cooperated in
making our assistance effective. The Yugoslavs
have shown good faith in their commitments to us
and have made it possible for us to accord Yugo-
slavia, in the field of foreign trade, the same treat-
ment accorded Western European countries. We
have continued to evaluate carefully and critically
all information from whatever source in assessing
Yugoslavia's actions since 1948. In this connec-
tion, section 143 of the Mutual Security Act of
1954, which was retained in the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961, requires the President in furnishing
assistance to Yugoslavia to continuously assure
himself, in the words of the act, "that Yugoslavia
continues to maintain its independence, [and] that
Yugoslavia is not participating in any policy or
program for the Commimist conquest of the
world. . . ." We have established no information
which would in any way cast doubt on Yugo-
slavia's independence or wliich would suggest
Yugoslav participation in such international Com-
munist programs. On the contrary, we are aware
that Yugoslavia not only competes in a real sense
with the Soviet bloc in commercial and cultural
activity in the underdeveloped areas of the world
but also serves as an example of the dangers that
are inherent in close association with, or overde-
pendence on, the Soviet bloc.
We have encouraged a situation in which Yugo-
slavia has preferred to strengthen its ties with the
West and weaken them with the East. Less than
30 percent of its trade is with the Soviet bloc. Its
sources of capital, raw materials, training, equip-
ment, spare parts, and even militai-y supplies are
largely in the West. We know that this is desir-
able and that it has produced tangible benefits for
this comiti-y. The alternative which is sometimes
urged is to treat Yugoslavia in our trade and other
policies as a member of the Soviet bloc. Such an
alternative would be sterile and defensive, without
the promise of real gain. We believe the question
answers itself as to whether we would prefer that
the Yugoslavs fall back into dependence on the
Soviet bloc and thus reorient their counti-y toward
the East. We are convinced that the present
policy, supported by three administrations and
fully tested by time and events, is effective and
in the interests of this countiy.
Yugoslav Record on Commitments to U.S.
By describing as fully as I have the general
considerations underlying our policy toward
Yugoslavia, I do not mean to ignore a more spe-
cific question which the committee has raised
concerning exports to that coimti-y. If I may
characterize the concern of the committee as I
understand it, it is that important equipment or
materials shipped from the United States to
Yugoslavia may be either diverted to Cuban or
Soviet-bloc destinations or reexported to such
destinations after delivery in Yugoslavia.
The question of possible diversions, transship-
ments, or reexports of U.S. commodities is not
limited to Yugoslavia. The Department of Com-
merce devotes gi-eat effort in its operations to mini-
mizing the possibility of such transactions involv-
ing any country. While that Department is better
able to provide you with information in this com-
plex area than I am, and while it has, I know,
already provided the committee with a great deal
of information, I believe that it would be appro-
priate for me to comment on this subject as it
relates to trade with Yugoslavia particularly.
I undei-stand the committee has expressed con-
cern at the matter of jet aircraft sales to Yugo-
slavia, which I discussed briefly at the time of my
previous appearance before this committee. We
have asked our Embassy to confirm with the
Yugoslav Government the arrival of all the jet
aircraft purchased in this country by the Yugoslav
Government. As I indicated in my previous testi-
mony, these sales, made since 1959, have comprised
February 26, 1962
347
in all 78 F86-E fighters, 70 TV-2 jet trainers, and
130 F8G-D all-weather fighters. The Yugoslav
Government on January 27 officially confirmed
that these aircraft are all -within Yugoslavia.
Wliile we have obtained this specific assurance
from the Yugoslav Government in response to the
committee's interest in tliis case, I should point
out that the contractual obligations originally en-
tered into between the Yugoslav and the United
States Governments provide a guarantee against
reexport, as do all such sales contracts arranged
by the United States Department of Defense.
I think we miist recognize frankly that some
people have questioned whether the assurances of
the Communist government in Yugoslavia can be
trusted. We consider that the matter of govern-
mental assurances in undertakings with the Yugo-
slav Government does not differ essentially from
the nature of such problems with other non-Soviet-
bloc countries. These agreements cannot be
policed at all times, but the extent to which indi-
vidual agreements are carried out does generally
become known. The touchstone in international
relations among non- Soviet-bloc nations must be
the confidence which one government is able to
place in tlie commitments of another government,
and the degree of confidence will depend on the
previous record of performance of the country
concerned. Our assessment of the recoi'd is in
every case based on all our information from the
many sources available to this Govenmient. I
can state frankly that the Yugoslav record with
regard to its commitments to this Government has
been good.
"VYe liave discovered only one irregularity in the
handling by Yugoslavia of goods of United States
origin. This case, involving borax shij^ped in
1957, was brouglit promptly to the attention of the
Yugoslav Government, wliich cooperated in stop-
ping the transshipment then in progress. "We liave
the categoric written assurance of the Yugoslav
Government that transsliipment of United States-
origin goods will not take place, and we have no
evidence of any irregularity since the one case of
record in 1957. We continue to give these matters
the attention demanded by our responsibilities in
this field and to make every effort to ascertain,
through our own independent channels, that our
interests are safeguarded. We have no evidence
of any kind which would indicate that our confi-
dence in the Yugoslav commitments might be
misplaced.
Finally, let me say tliat since I last appeared be-
fore you we have reviewed with the President our
policy toward Yugoslavia in the light of all re-
cent developments and inf oiTnation, including that
discussed previously with this committee. We
have satisfied ourselves, Mr. Chairman, tliat our
policy toward Yugoslavia continues to serve our
national interest.
Control of Trade With Cuba
I am pleased to have this opportunity to discuss
trade with Cuba as well. It is a particularly
timely subject in the light of the decisions taken
at the meeting of foreign ministers at Punta del
Este.'' The foreign ministers declared the Marx-
ist-Leninist government of Cuba incompatible
with the principles and objectives of the inter-
American system and excluded the Castro regime
from the inter-American system. The foreign
ministers further voted to suspend immediately
all trade with Cuba in arms and implements of
war and instructed the Coimcil of the OAS [Or-
ganization of American States] to study the feasi-
bility and desirability of extending the suspension
to other items, with special attention to items of
strategic importance.
As you know, we have been concerned that the
Castro regime contmues to earn badly needed hard
currency from the sales of its exports to this coun-
try. The President proclaimed, therefore, on
February 3, 19G2, the prohibition of all Cuban
imports into the United States.*
Regarding the status of our trade with Cuba,
I should like to recall that the United States in
1960 undertook two economic measures with re-
spect to a hostile Castro regime already allied
with the Sino-Soviet bloc and bent on a con-
spiracy to destroy the inter-American system.
The U.S. set the Cuban sugar quota at zero to in-
sure reliable sources of supply for this product.*
The United States further placed all goods except
foods, medicines, and medical supplies under vali-
dated license control toward Cuba.* The United
' Bulletin of Feb. 19, 1962, p. 270.
'For a White House announcement and text of procla-
niatiou, see ibid., p. 283.
" Bulletin of Jan. 2, 1961, p. 18.
'/hi(?., Nov. 7, 1960, p. 715.
348
Department of State Bulletin
States actions effected a marked drop in the vol-
ume of trade that had been steadily decreasing
because of the deliberate shift by Cuba of its
trade to the Sino-Soviet bloc.
Total United States trade with Cuba in 1961
was less than one-twentieth of its value in 1958,
and in the 3 years since Castro came to power
total annual U.S. trade with Cuba has declined
more than a billion dollars. In 1958 United
States exports to Cuba were valued at $547 million
and U.S. imports from Cuba totaled $528 million.
This past year our exports to the Castro regime
were an estimated $14 million and our imports
from Cuba were an estimated $35 million.
Deterioration of Cuban Economy
Tlie decision by the Castro government to com-
munize the Cuban people has resulted in the con-
tinuing deterioration of the Cuban economy.
The exjDerienced middle- and upper-level mana-
gerial and technical talent has fled the Cuban
tyranny and has not been replaced. An ill-suited
system of state controls has been imposed on an
industrial and agricultural base organized for free
enterprise. Castro Communist central planners
and administrators have confessed gross misman-
agement of the Cuban economy. The drastic shift
in external trade from the United States to the
Sino-Soviet bloc has produced shortages in raw
materials, industrial equipment, spare parts, con-
sumer goods, and foreign exchange. The Sino-
Soviet bloc has failed to make up these shortages.
"We would expect that increased control of trade
with Cuba by the United States and the Latin
American countries will make evident to the mem-
ber governments of NATO and other states
friendly to the United States and to the objectives
of the free world the need to reexamine their
trade policies and the extent of their commerce
with the Castro Communist government of Cuba.
Our allies are cooperating in the prevention of
unauthorized transshipment of U.S.-origin goods
to Cuba through their territory. The imposition
of licensing and related controls by other coun-
tries on the transshipment of U.S. products has
greatly assisted the United States to keep to a
minimum violations of U.S. export controls. The
United States intends to maintain a vigilant watch
to insure that U.S.-origin goods are not trans-
shipped to the Castro Communist regime.
I should like to conclude my testimony with
assurances to members of this committee that all
aspects of our relations with Cuba will take into
account both the incompatibility of the Castro
govermnent with the inter-American system and
the undiminished Cuban intention to undermine
established governments in Latin America and to
replace them with Marxist-Leninist regimes.
First Report of Disarmament Agency
Transmitted to Congress
Message From President Kennedy
White House press release dated February 1
To the Congress of the United States:
I have the honor to transmit the first annual
report of the United States Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency.^
The Agency was established by the Act of Sep-
tember 26, 1961, and has thus been in existence for
only four months. This report, submitted pur-
suant to law, describes not only its own initial
activities, but also the work of predecessor agen-
cies which it is continuing.
The existence of this new Agency is a source
of strength to me, in the performance of my re-
sponsibility to pursue a new type of world security
which will increase our own prospects of living in
peace and freedom. I know that this goal is the
desire of the Congress and the American people
to leave no stone unturned in their search for a
peaceful world.
This report of activities indicates that the new
Agency is moving surely toward the achievement
of greater effectiveness and flexibility in disarma-
ment negotiations. The development of this
kind of skill and responsibility is essential to the
serious pursuit of security through disarmament.
On March 14, our representatives will meet with
the rejjresentatives of 17 other nations in a foriun
established by resolution of the United Nations
General Assembly to seek to negotiate a compre-
hensive disarmament treaty program. "Wlien I
appeared before the United Nations last Septem-
ber,^ I submitted a program for general and com-
plete disarmament in a peaceful world. It is
my hope and expectation that the forthcoming
conference will make significant progress toward
' H. Doc. 326, S7th Cong., 2cl sess.
' Bulletin of Oct. 16, 1961, pp. 619 and 650.
februaiy 26, 7962
349
the achievement of the goal of disarmament with
effective methods of insuring compliance.
Never before in the history of man has the
importance of arms control and disarmament been
so great. For this reason, I urge your support
of this Agency in the great and difficult tasks
which it will face m the future.
John F. Kennedy
The White House,
February 1, 1962.
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Narcotics
Convention relating to the suppression of the abuse of
opium and other drugs. Signed at The Hague Janu-
ary 23, 1912. Entered into force December 31, 1914;
foir the United States February 11, 1915. 38 Stat. 1912.
Notiflcatimi received that it considers itself bound:
Ivory Coast, December 8, 1961.
Protocol for limiting and regulating the cultivation of the
poppy plant, the production of, international and whole-
sale trade in, and use of opium. Done at New York
June 23, 1953.'
Notification received that it considers itself bound:
Ivory Coast, December 8, 1961.
Trade and Commerce
Proces-verbal of rectification concerning protocol amend-
ing part I and articles XXIX and XXX, protocol amend-
ing the preamble and parts II and III, and protocol of
organizational amendments to the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 3,
1955. Section B entered into force October 7, 1957.
Signature: ^ Cuba, December 14, 1901.
Acknowlcdfied apijlicahle rights und obligations of
United Kingdom: Tanganyika, January 10. 1962.
Sixth protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts
of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade. Done at Geneva April 11, 1957.'
Signature: Burma, December 1, 1961.
Acknowledged apitlicable riglitu und obligations of
United Kingdom : Tanganyika, January 10, 1962.
Seventh protocol of rectifications and modifications to
texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade. Done at Geneva Novenil)er 30, 1957.'
Signature: Burma, December 1, 1901.
Ach-noirlcdgcd tiiiiilifabic rights and obligations of
United kingdom: Tanganyika. January 16, 1902.
Protocol rcliiling to negotiations for cslablislimcnt of new
schedule III — Brazil — to the General .Vgreenient on
Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 31, liKJS.'
Signature: New Zealand, December 4, 1961.
' Not in force.
' Pertains only to rectifications included in proces-
verbal which concern protocol amending part I and
articles XXIX and XXX and protocol amending preamble
and parts II and III.
Acknowledged applicable rights and obligatiotis of
United Kingdom: Tanganyika, January 10, 1962.
Eighth protocol of rectifications and modifications to textsl
of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and|
Trade. Done at Geneva February 18, 1959.'
Signiitures: Burma, December 1, 1961 ; Federal Republici
of Germany, November 9, 1961.
Acknowledged applicable rights and obligations of
United Kingdom: Tanganyika, January 16, 1962.
Ninth protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts
of .schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade. Done at Geneva August 17, 1959.'
Signature: Burma, December 1, 1961.
Acknowledged applicable rights and obligations oy
United Kingdom: Tanganyika, January 16, 1962.
Procfes-verbal extending and amending declaration of
November 22. 1958 (TIAS 4461), on provisional ac
cession of the Swiss Confederation to the Genera
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva
December 8, 1961.
Signatures: Austria (subject to ratification), Greece'
Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and Switzerland. Decern
ber 9, 1961 ; Canada, December 29, 1961 ; Chile
December 20, 1961 ; Denmark. January 16, 1962.
Entered into force: December 31, 1961.
Procte-verbal extending declaration of November 12, 195!
(TIAS 4498), on provisional accession of Tunisia to thi
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done a:
Geneva December 9, 1961.
Signatures: Austria (subject to ratification) anc-
Sweden, January 17, 1962; Cuba, December 21, 1961
Denmark, January 10, 1962 ; Japan and Tunisia, Jan
uary 8, 1962.
Entered into force: January 8, 1962.
Whaling
Amendments to paragraphs 6(1), 7(a), 7(e), 9(a), 9(b)
and 12(b) of the schedule to the International Whalin}
Convention of December 2, 1940 (TIAS 1849)
Adopted at the 13th meeting of the Internationa
Whaling Commission, London, June 23, 1961. Enteret
into force September 27, 1961.
BILATERAL
Brazil
Agreement amending the agreement of January 5, 1961
as amended (TIAS 4755 and 4814), relating to "the settle
ment of the debt arising from the agreement of
August 20, 1954 (TIAS 4755), relating to the purchase
of rare earth .sodium sulphates and manganese ores
Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Decem
ber 19 and 21, 1961. Entered into force December 21
1961.
Cyprus
Agreement for financing certain educational exchange pro-
grams. Signed at Nicosia January IS, 1962. Entered
into force January 18, 1962.
Germany, Federal Republic of
Agreement for application to Land Berlin of agreement of
December 11. 1958 (TIAS 4145), for reciprocal recog-
nition of certificates of airworthiness for imi)orted air-
craft. Effected by exchange of notes at Bonn May 24,
1961, and January 23, 1962. Entered into force Janu-
ary 23, 1962.
Ghana
Agreement for financing certain educational exchange pro-
grams. Signed at Accra January 24, 1962. Entered
into force January 24, 1962.
Thailand
Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace Corps
program in Thailand. Effected by exchange of notes
at Bangkok November 20 and 28, 1961. Entered into
force November 28, 1901.
350
Department of State Bulletin
February 2C, 1%2
Index
Vol. XLVI, No. 1183
Atomic Energy. U.S., U.K. Propose Foreign Min-
isters Meeting ; Explain Test Preparations . . . 329
Communism. Peaceful Ck)existence and U.S. Na-
tional Security (Achilles) 324
Congo (Leopoldville). Prime Minister Adoula of
Congo Visits Washington (Adoula, Kennedy) . . 335
Congress, The
First Report of Disarmament Agency Transmitted
to Congress (Kennedy) 349
President Asks for Authorization To Purchase U.N.
Bonds (Rusk, Stevenson, text of message to
Congress) 311
Status of U.S. Trade Relations With Yugoslavia
and Cuba (Rusk) 346
Cuba. Status of U.S. Trade Relations With Yugo-
slavia and Cuba (Rusk) 346
Disarmament
First Report of DisarmamentAgency Transmitted
to Congress (Kennedy) 349
U.S., U.K. Proi)ose Foreign Ministers Meeting ; Ex-
plain Test Preparations 329
Economic Affairs
The New Trade Expansion Act (Weiss) .... 340
Status of U.S. Trade Relations With Yugoslavia
and Cuba (Rusk) 346
Summary of New Trade Legislation 343
Presidential Documents
First Report of Disarmament Agency Transmitted
to Congress 349
President Asks for Authorization To Purchase UN.
Bonds 311
Prime Minister Adoula of Congo Visits Washington . 335
Public Affairs. Our Responsibility as Citizens
(Louchheim) 337
Treaty Information. Current Actions 350
U.S.S.R. Peaceful Coexistence and U.S. National
Security (AchiUes) 324
United Kingdom. U.S., U.K. Propose Foreign Min-
isters Meeting ; Explain Test Preparations . . . 329
United Nations
Crisis and Clarity (Cleveland) 330
President Asks for Authorization To Purchase U.N.
Bonds (Rusk, Stevenson, text of message to
Congress) 311
Yugoslavia. Status of U.S. Trade Relations With
Yugoslavia and Cuba (Rusk) 340
Name Index
Achilles, Theodore C 324
Adoula, Cyrille 335
Cleveland, Harlan 330
Kennedy, President 311,335,349
Louchheim, Mrs. Katie 337
Rusk, Secretary 312, 346
Stevenson, Adlai E 317
Weiss, Leonard 340
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: February 5-11
Press releases may be obtained from the Office of
News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.
Releases appearing in this issue of the Bulletin
which were released prior to February 5 are Nos.
64 of January 30 and 6S of January 31.
No. Date Subject
*79 2/5 U.S. participation in international
conferences.
80 2/5 Rusk: trade relations with Yugoslavia
and Cuba.
81 2/6 Rusk : U.N. bond issue.
t82 2/6 Ball : "Toward an Atlantic Partnership."
83 2/7 Stevenson : U.N. bond issue.
*84 2/7 McClintock sworn in as Ambassador to
Argentina (biographic details).
*S5 2/7 Cabot sworn in as Ambassador to Poland
(biographic details).
86 2/7 Weiss : "The New Trade Expansion Act."
87 2/7 Mrs. Louchheim : "Our Responsibility as
Citizens."
*S8 2/8 Steeves sworn in as Ambassador to
Afghanistan (biographic details).
*89 2/8 Coombs : remarks at dinner for president
of Athens College, Greece (excerpts).
*90 2/8 Attorney General's itinerary, Febru-
ary 18-20.
*91 2/8 Bowles' itinerary.
*92 2/8 Visit of King Saudi.
*96 2/9 Cleveland: "The Missing Link" (ex-
cerpts).
♦97 2/9 Annual honor awards ceremony.
*Not printed.
tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin.
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TREATIES IN FORCE
January 1, 1962
Department
of
ate
This publication is a guide to treaties and other international
agreements in force between the United States and other countries
at the beginning of the current year.
The list includes bilateral treaties and other agreements, ar-
ranged by country or other political entity, and multilateral
treaties and other agreements, arranged by subject with names of
countries which have become parties. Date of signature, date of
entry into force for the United States, and citations to texts are
furnished for each agreement.
Documents affecting international copyright relations of the
United States are listed in the appendix.
Information on current treaty actions, supplementing the infor-
mation contained in Treaties in Force, is published weekly in the
Department of State Bulletin.
Publication 7327
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and Other International Agreements of the United States in Force on
January 1, 1962
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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
^^3^3' /^30
Vol. XLVI, No. 1184
March 5, 1962
iCIAL
EKLY RECORD
ITED STATES
tElGN POLICY
U.S. AND U.K. EXCHANGE MESSAGES WITH U.S.S.R.
CONCERNING DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS
AT GENEVA (Texts) 355
TOWARD AN ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP • by Under
Secretary Ball 364
THE FOUR GLOBAL FORCES THAT HELP WRITE
THE HEADLINES • by Chester Bowles 371
NEW DIRECTIONS IN FOREIGN POLICY • by
Carl T. Rowan 378
U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY URGES PORTUGAL TO
PROMOTE SELF-DETERMINATION FOR
ANGOLA • Statements by Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson
and Text of Resolution 385
FAO MEMBER NATIONS STUDY WORLD FOOD AND
AGRICULTURAL PROBLEMS • Article by Ralph W.
Phillips and Walter W. Sohl 392
For index see inside back cover
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Boston Public Library
Superintendent of Documents
APR 1 ? 1962
Vol. XLVI, No. 1184 • Publication 7347
March 5, 1962
DEPOSITORY
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington 25, D.O.
Pbice:
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Single copy, 26 cents
Use of funds for printing of this publica-
tion approved by the Director of the Bureau
of the Budget (January 19, 1961).
Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and Items contuliied herein may
be reprinted. Citation of the Depaetment
OF State Bulletin as the source will be
appreciated. The Bulletin Is Indeied In the
Renders' Guide to Periodical Literature.
The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly piibUcation issued by the
Office of Public Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public
and interested agencies of the
Government with information on
developments in the field of foreign
relations and on the work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service. The BULLETIN includes se-
lected press releases on foreign policy,
issued by the White House and the
Department, and statements and ad-
dresses made by the President and by
tlie Secretary of State and other
officers of tlie Department, as well as
special articles on various phases of
international affairs and the func-
tions of the Department. Informa-
tion is included concerning treaties
and intertuitional agreements to
which the United States is or may
become a party and treaties of gen-
eral international interest.
Publications of the Department,
United Natiitns documents, and legis-
lative material in the field of inter-
national relations are listed currently.
U.S. and U.K. Exchange Messages With U.S.S.R.
Concerning Disarmament Negotiations at Geneva
Following is the text of a -message of Febru-
ary 7 from President Kennedy and British Prime
Minister Harold Macmillan to Nihita S. Khru-
shchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of
the U.S.S.R., together with Mr. Khrushchev's
reply of Febntary 10 and a mesmge of Febni-
ary H from President Kennedy to Mr. Khru-
slichev.
U.S.-U.K. MESSAGE OF FEBRUARY 7
White House press release dated February 12
February 7, 1962
Dear Mk. Chairjian : We are taking the un-
usual step of addressing this message to you in
order to express our own views, as well as to
solicit yours, on what we can jointly do to increase
the prospects of success at the new disarmament
negotiations which will begin in Geneva in March. ^
We are convinced that a supreme effort must be
made and the three of us must accept a common
measure of personal obligation to seek every ave-
nue to restrain and reverse the mounting arms
race. Unless some means can be found to make at
least a start in controlling the quickening arms
competition, events may take their own course and
erupt in a disaster which will afflict all peoples,
those of the Soviet Union as well as of the United
Kingdom and the United States.
Disarmament negotiations in the past have been
sporadic and frequently inteiTupted. Indeed,
there has been no sustained effort to come to grips
with this problem at the conference table since
the three months of meetings ending in June of
I960,- over a year and a half ago. Before that,
no real negotiations on the problem of general
disarmament had taken place since negotiations
came to an end in September 1957.^
It should be clear to all of us that we can no
longer afford to take a passive view of these nego-
tiations. They must not be allowed to drift into
failure. Accordingly, we propose that we three
accept a personal responsibility for directing the
part to be played by our representatives in the
forthcoming talks, and that we agree beforehand
that our representatives will remain at the con-
ference table until concrete results have been
achieved, however long this may take.
We propose that our negotiators seek progress
on three levels. First, they should be instructed
to work out a program of general and complete
disarmament which could serve as the basis for the
negotiation of an implementing treaty or treaties.
Our negotiators could thus build upon the com-
mon ground which was found in the bilateral talks
between the United States and the U.S.S.R. which
took place this summer, and which were reflected
in the Statement of Agreed Principles of Septem-
ber 20, 1961.^ Secondly, our negotiators should
attempt to ascertain the widest measure of dis-
armament which would be implemented at the
earliest possible time while still continuing their
maximum efforts to achieve agreement on those
other aspects which present more difficulty.
Thirdly, our negotiators should try to isolate and
identify initial measures of disarmament which
could, if put into effect without delay, materially
improve international security and the prospects
for fm-tlier disarmament progress. We do not
' For text of a letter transmitted on Jan. 17 by the
United States and the U.S.S.R. to U Thant, Acting Sec-
retary-General of the United Nations, see Bulletin of
Feb. 5, 1962, p. 20.5, footnote 2; for a joint U.S.-U.K.
statement, see ibid., Feb. 26, 1962, p. 329.
• For background, see ihid., July 18, 1960, p. 88.
° For a statement by Henry Cabot Lodge reviewing the
London meetings of the U.N. Disarmament Subcommittee,
see iUd., Oct. 28, 19.57, p. 667.
* For text, see xbiH., Oct. 9, 1961, p. 589.
tAatzh 5, 1962
355
believe that these triple objectives need conflict
with one another and an equal measure of urgency
should be attached to each.
As a symbol of the importance which we jointly
attach to these negotiations, we propose tliat we
be represented at the outset of the disarmament
conference by the Foreign Ministers of our three
countries, who would declare their readiness to
return to participate personally in the negotiations
as the progress made by our permanent repre-
sentatives warrants. We assume, in this case, the
foreign ministers of other states as well will wish
to attend. The status and progress of the con-
ference should, in addition, be the subject of more
frequent communications among the three of us.
In order to give impetus to the opening of the
disarmament negotiations, we could consider
having the Foreign Ministers of our three coun-
tries convene at Geneva in advance of the opening
of the conference to concert our plans.
At this time in our history, disarmament is tlie
most urgent and the most complex issue we face.
The threatening nature of modern armaments is
so appalling that we cannot regard this problem
as a routine one or as an issue which may be use-
ful primarily for the scoring of propaganda vic-
tories. The failure in the nuclear test confer-
ence,= which looked so hopeful and to the success
of which we attached such a high priority' in the
Spring of 1961, constitutes a discouraging back-
ground for our new efforts. However, we must
be resolved to overcome this recent setback, with
its immediate consequences, and forego fruitless
attempts to apportion blame. Our renewed effort
must be to seek and find ways in which the compe-
tition between us, which will surely persist for the
foreseeable future, can be pursued on a less dan-
gerous level. We must view the forthcoming dis-
armament meetings as an opportunity and a chal-
lenge which time and history may not once again
allow us.
We would welcome an early expression of your
views.
John F. Ivennedy
and
Harold Macmillan
■^For text of a U.S.-U.K. report submitted on Dec. 19,
1961, to the U.N. Disarmament Commission regarding the
Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear
Weapon Tests, see ihid., .Tan. 8, 1962, p. 63 ; for a Depart-
ment statement of Jan. 29, liRa, see ihiiL, Feb. 19, liK52,
p. 288.
MR. KHRUSHCHEV'S REPLY OF FEBRUARY 10
Unofficial translation
Esteemed Mr. President, Esteemed Mr. Prime Min-
ister: I am writing to you on a question which, as can
be seen from your message of 7 February this year, is
upiJermost in your minds, too. I could not but feel
plea.sed that you are also considering the role to be
played in the solution of the disarmament problem by
the recently established 18-nation committee which is be-
ginning its deliberations in Geneva on 14 March 1962,
and of which our countries are members. This is already
enjoined on us by the fact that the governments of tlie
countries represented on this committee have been en-
trusted by decision of the 16th session of the U.X. General
Assembly with a question of such vital importauce to the
peoples as general and complete disarmament.
There is no need to prove that the development of the
international situation in the future will depend to a
great extent on how matters proceed in the committee.
Will it be able to rise to a level from which the distant
and the difficult will appear near and real? Will it cope
with its great task of drafting an agreement on general
and complete disarmament? Or will the new dLsarma-
ment body begin stumbling from its first steps on the
same diSBculties on which its predecessors came to grief?
Such are the questions to which the answers are being
.'bought now by all to whom the future of mankind is not
indifferent. And these questions agitate the people all
the more and the greater because the arms race is ever
growing, swallowing the labor and property of hundre<ls
of millions of i)eople, and the danger of a new \\ar is
growing, finding material expression in a vast arms
buildup.
It seems to me that all this must be borne in mind if
we are to correctly assess the importance which the dis-
armament talks resuming in Geneva acquire in the ob-
taining conditions.
You will agree with me, I think, that a definite amount
of preparatory work has been accomplished for these
negotiations. For the first time in the entire history of
negotiations the disarmament body has a fairly clear-cut
mandate — the basic principles of general and complete dis-
armament approved by the U.N. General Assembly. Also
hopeful is the fact that the disarmament body now in-
cludes representatives of all three principal groups of
states in the world — the socialist, those belonging to the
military blocs of the Western Powers, and the neutral.
These are unquestionably positive points.
At the same time, we cannot but be aware that really
strenuous efforts will still be reciuired to make the dis-
armament negotiations hear the expected fruit. Suflice it
to compare the Soviet program for general and complete
disarmament with the other proposals put forward at the
16th session of the U.N. General .Vssembly in opposition
to our iirogram to see what mountains must yet be re-
moved on the way to agreement.
The Soviet Government considers it necessary to see tn
it in advance that the work of the IS-nation committee
should not get in a rut and be reduced in the linal analysis
356
Department of State Bulletin
to verbal exchanges between functionaries. There have
been too many inglorious failures by various former dis-
armament committees, subcommittees, and commissions
for us to fail to draw the necessary lessons from this.
In our opinion, the most important thing now is for
the 18-nation committee to make a powerful and correct
start in its work, to get a good Impetus which would
enable it to work productively, with a high yield.
Who have it in them to make such a start? Who can
cut most quickly through the routine notions and differ-
ences which disarmament negotiations amass like a roll-
ing snowball the moment they begin? It seems to us
that this should be done above all by those who are
vested with the greatest confidence of the people and who
have all the powers.
Guided by these considerations, the Soviet Government
proposes that the work of the 18-nation committee be
opened by the heads of governments (states) represented
on the committee. For this, the heads of government
should arrive in Geneva by 14 March and themselves ac-
complish the most important and complex part of the work
which awaits the IS-nation committee at the start. It may
be that this idea will seem rather unusual at first, but you
will agree that it is quite justified by the greatness of the
aim and the conditions in which the disarmament com-
mittee is beginning its work.
Direct contacts between national leaders — meetings,
conferences, exchanges of messages, personal participa-
tion in the work of the most representative international
bodies — have become an established international practice
in our days. And this is understandable. The smaller
the distances between states and the more terrible the
weapons of destruction become, the greater becomes the
responsibility of statesmen, and the more sagacity and
wisdom is required in solving both major international
issues and those which, at first glance, seem of secondary
importance, but which are frequently rooted in questions
of war and peace.
This is doubly true of the question of disarmament,
which affects the most sensitive interests of the states
and the interests of national securit.v, and whose solution
requires special circumspection, flexibility, and boldness.
I shall not conceal that I received your joint message
when I was working on this message to the heads of gov-
ernment of the states represented on the 18-nation dis-
armament committee. It is gratifying that our reasoning,
on the whole, runs in the .same direction. I fully share
your thought that the heads of government should be
personally responsible for the direction of disarmament
negotiations and that the state of affairs in the 18-nation
committee should be the subject of a broader exchange
of opinions between us.
But why should we take only half the step and limit
ourselves to being represented by foreign ministers at
the start of the disarmament committee work? If one
Is consistent, one would, proceeding from our considera-
tions, inevitably arrive at the same proposal that is being
put forward by the Soviet Government : to begin the
work of the disarmament committee at the highest level.
The work of the 18-nation committee could begin at the
highest level even if not all the heads of governments
(states) belonging to this committee want to or do take
part ; this need not bo an obstacle to our participation in
its work. It goes without saying that the foreign ministers
of our countries must also take part in the work of the 18-
nation committee, both with the heads of government and
in the subsequent period of the committee's work.
Thu.s, there is much in favor of our proposal for the
participation of the heads of government in the work of
the 18-nation committee. Of course, there may be people
who will take our proposal to mean that the Soviet Union
is again raising the question of a summit meeting and
will start considering whether or not conditions exist for
such a meeting at this time. I want to explain in advance
that I am speaking here not of a meeting at the summit,
as It is generally understood, but of participation by the
heads of government in the work of the 18-nation com-
mittee established by the United Nations, not of consid-
ering a wide range of international questions, but of talks
on one specific issue — disarmament. And the claim that
conditions are not yet ripe to consider the problem of dis-
armament can only be advance<l by those who are com-
pletely uninterested in its solution.
One cannot of course expect that the heads of govern-
ment will from the .start be able to accomplish such work
in Geneva that it will only remain to sign a treaty on
general and complete disarmament. But even if their
efforts result only in giving the right direction to further
negotiations and outlining the contents of a treaty on
general and complete disarmament, this would be a tre-
mendous shift for which the people have long been wait-
ing. It seems to me that it will be worthwhile, very
much so, to make such an attempt which if successful,
which the Soviet Government sincerely hopes it will be,
promises to become a turning point in international rela-
tions and bring mankind closer to the realization of its
age-old dream of peace.
It is no secret to anyone that talks on the heads of
government level are not infrequently held on the question
of increasing military preparations. But if this is so,
what objections can there be to holding the opening meet-
ings of the 18-nation committee at the highest level, in
order to work well for such a noble goal as disarmament.
History would not pardon us if we let slip an opportunity
to consider the disarmament problem at such a prestigious
forum as a specially held meeting of the heads of govern-
ment of 18 states.
I hope that you will correctly understand the motives
which have prompted the Soviet Government to suggest
that the work of the 18-nation committee should begin at
the level of heads of government (state) and that you will
regard this proposal favorably. I have addressed analo-
gous messages to all the heads of government (state) of
the countries represented on the 18-nation disarmament
committee.
Yours sincerely,
N. Khrushchev
Chairman of the V.B.S.R. Council of Ministers
February 10, 1962
March 5, 7962
357
PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S MESSAGE OF FEB-
RUARY 14
White House press release dated February 14
Febrtjart 14, 1962
Dear ]\Ir. Chairman : In reading your letter of
Febi-uary 10, 1962 I was gratified to see that you
have been thinking along the same lines as Prime
Minister Macmillan and myself as to the impor-
tance of the new disarmament negotiations which
will begin in Geneva in March. I was gratified
also to see that you agree that the heads of gov-
ernment should assume personal responsibility for
the success of these negotiations.
The question which must be decided, of course,
is how that pereonal responsibility can be most
usefully discharged. I do not believe that the
attendance by the heads of government at the out-
set of an 18-nation conference is the best way to
move forward. I believe that a procedure along
the lines of that outlined in the letter which Prime
Minister Macmillan and I addressed to you on
February 7 is the one best designed to give impetus
to the work of the conference.
I agree with the statement which you have made
in your letter that there exists a better basis than
has previously existed for successful work by the
confei'ence. The Agreed Statement of Principles
for Disarmament Negotiations which was signed
by representatives of our coimtries on September
20, 1961 and which was noted with approval by
the 16tli General Assembly of the United Nations
represents a foundation upon which a successful
negotiation may be built.
As you have recognized, there still exist sub-
stantial differences between our two positions.
Just one example is the Soviet unwillingness so far
to accord the control organization the authority to
verify during the disarmament process that agreed
levels of forces and armament are not exceeded.
The task of the conference will be to attempt to
explore tliis and other differences which may exist
and to search for means of ovei'comiiig them by
specific disarmament plans and measures. This
does not mean that the conference should stay with
routine procedures or arguments or that the heads
of government should not be interested in the nego-
tiations from the very outset. It does mean that
much clarifying work will have to be done in the
early stages of negotiation before it is possible for
heads of government to review the situation. This
may be necessary in any case before June 1 M-hen
a report is to be filed on the progress achieved.
I do not mean to question the utility or perhaps
even the necessity of a meeting of heads of govern-
ment. Indeed, I am quite ready to participate
personally at tlie heads of government level at any
stage of the conference when it appears that such
participation could positively affect the chances of
success. The question is rather one of timing.
I feel that until there have been systematic negoti-
ations— until the main problems have been clari-
fied and progress has been made, intervention by
heads of government would involve merely a gen-
eral exchange of governmental positions which
might set back, rather than advance, the prospects
for disarmament. It is for these reasons that I
think that meetings at the highly responsible level
of our Foreign Ministers as well as the foreign
ministers of those other participating states who
wish to do so would be the best instrument for the
opening stages.
A special obligation for the success of the con-
ference devolves upon our two Governments and
that of the United Kingdom as nuclear powers.
I therefore hope that the suggestion made in the
letter of Prime Minister Macmillan and myself
to you, that the Foreign Ministers of the three
comitries meet in advance of the conference in
order to concert plans for its work, will be accept-
able to the Soviet Government.
John F. Kennedy
Secretary Rusk Interviewed
on ''Washington Viewpoint"
Follotoing is the transcript of an intervieio of
Secretary Rusk by Ann Corrich and James Snyder
of the W estinghouse Broadcasting Company on
the radio program ^'■Washington Viewpoint on
Fehnmry 12.
Press release 93 dated February 13
Good evening. This is xinn Corrich with Jim,
Snyder at the State Department in Washington.
Our guest on "Washington Vieiopoinf" this eve-
ning is President Kenyiedy''s top man in the
Cabinet — Dean Rusk, Secretary of State. Secre-
tary Rusk is a Phi Beta Kappa, Rhodes Scholar,
and former educator. He was discharged from
the Army as a colonel after World War II and
358
Department of Stale Bulletin
for 6 years held key positions in the State Depart-
ment binder the Truman administration. He had
been president of the Rockefeller Foundation for
8 years when President Kennedy ashed him to
join the New Frontier.
Secretary Busk, for the last J^S hours interna-
tional attention has ieen concentrated on the ex-
change of the American U-2 pilot Powers ^ for
the Russian spy Rudolf Abel. The Russians claim,
they released Powers to itnprove relations toith the
United States. Is this just a propaganda play on
tlie part of the Russians, or do you think it indi-
cates any real desire on their part to come to solid
agreement on outstanding East-West differences?
A. Well, we are glad, of course, that Mr. Pow-
ers and Mr. Pryor- have been returned to this
country. One of the great duties of the Depart-
ment of State is to try to protect Americans abi'oad
and when they're being held abroad, under these
circumstances, to try to effect their release. And
we were glad that these private negotiations,
through the able assistance of Mr. [James B.]
Donovan, succeeded in this case. I would not
myself think that an incident of this kind moves
us vei-y far on the great issues that divide the Com-
munist and the free world. It is of some advan-
tage to get uimecessary irritations out of the way,
and when people are being held in each other's
country, this is an irritation we can do without.
But I would not draw any conclusions from this
return of Mr. Powers with respect to questions
like Berlin or Southeast Asia.
Q. What significance do you give, Mr. Secre-
tary, to the timing of the release of Powers?
A. Quite frankly I wouldn't attach any jjar-
ticular importance to that. These informal dis-
cussions had been going on for quite a long time.
This could have happened much earlier. It could
have been delayed further. I wouldn't myself try
to draw too many conclusions about the success of
these discussions at this particular moment.
Q. Mr. Secretary, whafs the State Depart-
menfs attitude toward Powers? Is it possible our
Government might take some action against him
' Francis Gary Powers was released by the Soviet Gov-
ernment to American authorities at Berlin on Feb. 10; for
background, see Bulxetin of May 23, 1900, p. 816, and
May 30, 1060, p. 851.
' Frederic L. Pryor, an American student, had been held
by the East German regime.
on the basis of his testimony before the Russian
court?
A. Mr. Snyder, I wouldn't want to speculate
about that. He is, as you know, now being inter-
viewed by representatives of the Government.
These are not matters that are the direct responsi-
bility of the Department of State, and I just
wouldn't want to get into it.
Disarmament Conference
Q. Another point, sir. Khrushchev noiv pro-
poses that the March H disarmament conference
in Geneva be a sutmnit conference of 18 nations.^
Noio last week a joint American-British state-
ment * suggested that U.S., British, and Soviet
heads of government take a direct and person/il
interest in the negotiations. Does this mean all
sides are willing to return to the summit again,
that we just disagree on how big the meeting
shoidd be and when it should take place?
A. Well, last week the Prime Minister of the
United Kingdom and President Kennedy pro-
posed that the March 14th discussions on disarm-
ament start, in effect, at the foreign-minister level
and that the three of us who had been negotiating
on nuclear test bans in Geneva earlier might well
send their Foreign Ministers there 2 or 3 days
early in order to try to find a more satisfactory
basis for the negotiations. We did this because
we thought that it was important to make a major
new effort to move these disarmament discussions
forward. I think we ought to remind ourselves
that back in September in negotiations between
Ambassador Stevenson and Ambassador Zorin in
New York there was a substantial agreement on
a number of underlying principles affecting dis-
armament.^ There was a disagreement on one
very important point, and that is whether or not
armed forces which are retained in the course of
disarmament would be subject to inspection or
verification. We feel that it is very important
that in the process of disarmament there be con-
stant verification, so that no one would be in the
position of being a dupe or a victim as the dis-
armament steps go forward.
Well now, with quite a few agreed principles
already established, we believe that what is now
' See p. 355.
* For text, see Bulletin of Feb. 26, 1962, p. 329.
' lUd., Oct. 9, 1961, p. 589.
March 5, J 962
359
called for is some systematic, serious, hard and
determined, quiet negotiation, to translate these
agreed principles which have been endorsed by
the United Nations General Assembly into reality
and fact. And we do not believe that this kind
of negotiation can best be carried on at a heads-
of-govemment level because, among other things,
there are problems of time, there are problems
of commitment. But these ought to be explored
first through other channels, with a possibility the
heads of government may be able then to remove
any remaining points of difference or put final
conclusions into operation.
Q. Then your attitude toward summit meetings
really hasri't changed from, say, 6 months ago?
A. No. I think that there's a general approach
in this country, and indeed in many other coun-
tries in the West, that summit meetings ought to
be handled with considerable care and advance
preparation, that it is important that when the
summit meets it be successful, and that there are
considerable dangers and disadvantages if a sum-
mit meets and ends in disagreement and an in-
crease in tensions.
Q. Mr. Secretary, when the nuclear test ban
talks collapsed at Geneva the xoeeh before laM,
Senator Henry Jachson said that that loas the
straw that hroJce the cameVs hach. ^'■American
patience is now exhausted,^'' he said. "We shoidd
resuTne atmospheric testing very soon." Are we
now extending our patience with our suggestions
on the disarmament conference? Are we willing
to wait for March Hth and further developments
before deciding on whetlier to reswme testing in
the air?
A. I think the President has made it clear ^ that
in the first place we are making preparations for
atmospheric testing, and that he will at the right
time make that decision on the basis of security
interests of the United States and the free world.
I don't think there's anytiiing to be added to that
at this point.
Situation in Berlin
Q. Mr. Secretary, despite all the unusual
activity with the Russians recently — the many
nonhostile contacts and exchanges, in normal dip-
" Ibiil., Feb. 26, 1962, p. 329.
360
lomatic channels, specifically the Thompson-
Gromyko talks^the cold-war atmosphere seems
unchanged and in Berlin the Russians have been
trying to nip away at our access to the air corri-
dors. How do you classify all of this activity?
Are there any grounds for optimism on our sidef
A. Well, I do not like to be a pessimist. On
this particular subject of Berlin, I think one would
have to say quite frankly that tliere is now no
basis for agreement in sight. The Soviets have
made some far-reaching proposals about the situ-
ation in West Berlin and at the same time have
tried to draw East Berlin out of the possibility of
discussion. In effect tliey're saying that East Ber-
lin is a part of East Germany and there's nothing
more to talk about as far as East Berlin is con-
cerned; but they insist upon talking about West
Berlin, and what they've been saying would in-
volve some major invasions of vital interest to
the West and some basic rights of the West and of
West Berliners. We have been discussing that
matter with them for, as you know, some time, but
thus far I could not report that any significant
progress has been made. I think the principal
point is that it continues to be discussed. The dis-
cussions are serious and direct, but one cannot
report agreement.
Attorney General Kennedy's Trip
Q. Mr. Secretary, in a little different vein — the
Presidenfs brother, Attorney General Kennedy,
has been criticized on making his current round-
the-world tnp on grounds that he is an amateur
and untrained in diplomacy. He has been ac-
cused of meddling and been accused of making
corrmiitments with the Japanese on textiles, for
instance, lohich rightfully are in the province of
tlie President and his Secretary of State. What
is your answer to those criticisms?
A. Well, those criticisms have been rather lim-
ited in number. T^et me make it very clear that
the Attorney General undertook this visit to a
number of countries at my specific request and
urging. lie had had invitations — insi-stent invi-
tations— from a number of other governments, in-
cluding high law officials of other governments.
Each one of the great departments of Government
here regularly finds that its own business carries
it beyond our national frontiei', and since January
I have asked, I think, every one of my Cabinet
Depanment of State Bulletin
colleagues, with the possible exception of the Post-
master General, to undertake one or more missions
abroad. The Attorney General is eminently quali-
lied for this mission on which he is embarked, both
as to its good-will aspects and in terms of the
particular points of business which he and I have
agreed he might well talk about with other govern-
ments. I'm very jjleased and enthusiastic about
this trip.
Q. Have you authorised hi?n to make convmit-
mentu in certain areas mhich you have pyr agreed
upon.''
A. "Well, the question of making commitments
is not quite the point. There are certain points
of business which he will be discussing with other
governments. This is normal when Cabinet col-
leagues travel abroad, and it's the sort of thing
that is discussed with a constant stream of Cabinet
officers from other governments — other than for-
eign ministers, I might say — who come through
Washington all the time. This is a normal
operation.
Punta del Este Conference
Q. Despite yo'ur efforts to explain the Punta del
Este Conference to the American fcople as a sig-
nificant achievement,^ there is some rumbling in
Congress — Senator Hugh Scott, for example, has
described tlie conference as a weeh of American
concessions. Are you concerned that such criti-
cism might affect the chances of approval of the
Alliance for Progress appropriation?
A. Oh, I don't think so. I think that if any-
one were to look at the reports made to the
Congress by Senator [Wayne] Morse and Sena-
tor [Bourke B.] Hickenlooper and Congi'ess-
man [Armistead I.] Selden and Congressman
[Chester E.] Merrow, who were with us at Punta
del Este, they would get this meeting in proper
perspective. There were one or two points on
which there were differences of view among the
American governments represented there, but
when one looks at the entire action taken there,
the views registered on one pomt after another,
with a high degree of unanimity on most of them,
I think one is impressed with the fact that the
hemisphere has moved very considerably on this
' For Secretary Rusk"s report to the Nation and back-
ground, see iUa., Feb. 19, 1962, pp. 267-284.
point in the last 18 months, not only as to govern-
ments but as to public opinion. I think it is be-
coming widely recognized now, tliroughout Latin
America, that the early bloom of the early Castro
revolution has worn off and that Castroism is not
the answer to economic and social development
here in this hemisphere. No, I think that the
Punta del Este meeting was a meeting of great
significance in this respect.
Q. Where do we go from here in our campaign
to isolate Cuia and Castro? Is our principal
weapon now the Alliance for Progress?
A. Well, the Alliance for Progress is more than
an answer to Castro. The Alliance for Progress
is an effort to energize and mobilize the free peo-
ples of this hemisphere to get on with the great
historic task of economic and social development.
I think that this is catching on in country after
country in a very encouraging way. It is not
going to be easy, because in each country steps
are going to have to be taken, and intrinsic inter-
ests are going to have to give way, and major re-
forms be undertaken, in order to get the Alliance
moving at full speed. But, nevertheless, it is on
the move, and we have been greatly encouraged by
the response in these past several months to these
prospects and possibilities. The American con-
tribution to it will be large, but actually only
marginal in terms of the total effort being made
throughout the hemisphere. Economic and social
development cannot be imported into a country.
It has to come from within the country itself, and
the resources which can be put in from the outside
are only a fraction of those which must be mobil-
ized within each country for this great task.
Q. What is your reaction to the suggestions that
have been made that we should rethink our Alli-
ance for Progress plans in view of the voting pat-
tern at Punta del Este?
A. Well, I don't think that the voting pattern
at Punta del Este provides any basis for that kind
of review. Eemember that all the governments
were unanimous in declaring that this present
regime in Cuba is incompatible to the inter- Amer-
ican system. They were vmanimous in moving
to interrupt the trade and traffic in arms between
Cuba and the inter- American countries. They
were unanimous in throwing Cuba off the Inter-
American Defense Board. And other measures
were taken with very substantial majorities. For
March 5, T962
361
example, 17 of them declared that Cuba had taken
itself out of the inter- American system, and 19 of
them voted to set up a special security commit-
tee to arrange cooperative action to interrupt sub-
versive and other types of activities being fostered
out of Cuba. So that the degree of unanimity, of
solidarity there, I think, gives great encourage-
ment and support to the Alliance for Progi-ess,
rather than the other way aroimd.
U.N. Bond Issue
Q. Mr. Secretary, there's been a great deal of
indecision up on Capitol Hill about the adnmiis-
trat!on''s request for authority to buy up to $100
million in United Nations bonds.^ The other day
Republican Senator [George Z>.] Aiken of Ver-
mont, who has been a longtime supporter of the
V.N., suggested that maybe the answer would be
for the United States to loan the U.N. $lfi million
or so. If it develops that the administration finds
it carCt get the bond issue proposition through
Congress, would you consider the loan proposi-
tion?
A. Well, the bond issue itself is a loan. The
question as to the amoimt of the loan and the
duration of the cost is one that we're now discuss-
ing with the Congress. The pur|50se of the bond
issue is to provide fuiancing for the Congo and
the Near East operations through 1963. I must
say that when we went to the General Assembly
this year we thought that there was a very clear
mandate to try to do two things — one was to assist
the Secretary-General to collect the an-earages
which are past due by many govermnents to both
these funds, and the other was to ti-y to get the
costs in the Congo, for example, distributed fairly
and evenly throughout the membership. Now we
think the Secretary-General's plan and the action
taken by the General Assembly would go a long
way toward doing both these things. The refer-
ence of the question of the compulsory character
of these assessments to the World Court," we think,
will clarify that problem and open the way for
many govei-nments to pay their aiTearages. The
bonds would be repaid as part of the general
" For text of the President's message to Congress on
the U.X. bond issue and statements made by Secretary
Rusk and Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson before the Sen-
ate Foreign Relations Committee, see ifttd., Feb. 26,
19G2, p. 311.
•U.N. doc. A/RES/1731 (XVI).
budget of the U.N., in which our proportion is
32 percent, rather than almost 50 percent, as we
have been paying thus far in the Congo. So we
think there are very large advantages to the
United States 'v\ the Secretary-Generars propos-
als, and we hope very mufh that the Congress will
see it our way.
Q. But many inemhers of Congress, including
Senator Aiken and Senator Jackson of Washing-
ton, have very real reservatioiis about setting a
precedent by this approach. Do you feel you can
overcome those reservations?
A. This matter of a precedent is a little difficult
to handle. The General Assembly itself was
aware of this and in its resolution on the subject
made a point of declaring that this bond issue
would not be considered, or should not be con-
sidered, as a precedent for financing future oper-
ation expenses of the U.N. But that is not
completely conclusive, of course. This will have
to be something that governments will have to take
into account if they're called upon to think about
this question again. It is not intended as a prece-
dent for future financing, but that is a point which
will need to be watched very carefully in the years
ahead.
Q. Mr. Secretary, last week xohen you testified
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
you said that you regretted that so many other
issues had been mixed in with the bond proposal.
What did you mean by that? What are some of
these other issues?
A. Well, I think there have been questions and
complaints or criticisms of the U.N. bond proposal
from several different points of view. For ex-
ample, the questions which I very much respect
and feel that we must meet on their merits are
those which are raised among people who have
regularly and consistently supported the United
Nations over the yeai-s but who do believe that the
precise methods and the terms and the arrange-
ments ought to be looked at very carefully. We
have no possible objection to questions of that sort
because they are in the constructive direction and
come from those who are not trying simply to un-
dermine the United Nations.
There have been other complaints that have
come from a rather small minority which simply
is opposed to the United Nations and our partici-
362
Department of State Bulletin
pation in it. I believe that there's every indication
in polls and otherwise that the American people
are stanchly in support of the U.N. and recognize
the importance of the U.N. to our foreisrn policy
and to our national interest. I do think that when
the bond issue was first made public it happened
to come at a time when tlie situation in the Congo
had created a considerable amount of debate and
distress, in the middle of a violent phase of that
situation, and that the so-called Katanga debate
did have its repercussions on the U.N. bond issue.
But now that Adoula [Cyrille Adoula, Prime
Minister of the Republic of the Congo] and
Tshombe [Moise Tshombe, president of Katanga
Province] are moving apparently toward an
agreement and the situation there is much more
in order, I tliink that aspect of it will not be so
important. But it did come under several cross-
fires at tlie time it became public.
U.S. Role in Viet-Nam
Q. Mr. Secretary, one que fit ion on South Viet-
Nam. We have committed ourselves in South
Yiet-Nam in a situation that is now described as
a war. While we haven't actually committed
American troops, our involveinent is such that the
question arises, could you tell us why is it necessary
to take such risks in South Viet-Naf)i, and how
far are we prepared to go?
A. Well, the war that is going on there is a
systematic and large-scale effort by the Govern-
ment to deal with some 20,000 guerrillas who have
been supported, have been supplied, and have been
furnished leaders by the North Vietnamese. Our
effort there has been to assist this Government of
South Viet-Nam and its ai-med forces to deal with
this problem themselves, to win their own war
against these guerrillas. And this means help not
only in the military field, in terras of transporta-
tion, mobility, and equipment, but it also means
economic help for village programs that will make
it possible for the Vietnamese Government to win
the battle of the villages as well as the battle with
the armed elements of the Viet Cong guerrillas.
I wouldn't be able to predict exactly what the fu-
ture may hold in that, but we have reason, I think,
to be encouraged that the additional measures
which have been taken in the last few months M-ill
increasuigly show good success.
Perspective on U.S. Foreign Policy
Q. A fn/d question, sir. You''ve presided over
American foreign policy through 13 of the most
nerve-racking months in the history of this coun-
try. And the months ahead donH promise to he
much better. If you could talk personally to every
American, what counsel would you, give them on
maintaining perspective on our foreign policy in
this crisis-a-week existence that we lead?
A. I think the American people do know that
our main business is to build a kind of decent world
oi-der in which independent nations can live out
their own lives as they see fit, and to cooperate
freely across national frontiers in the interest of
getting common jobs done and moving ahead on
common interests. Thei-e is enormous strength in
getting this basic job done, because it means that
we have allies and friends and coworkers in every
part of the world. Indeed, the main business of
the Department of State, as far as mass is con-
cerned, is concerned just with this matter of build-
ing a constructive world order.
It's encouraging to me, it's very significant to
me, that no one of the countries which has become
independent since World War II, for example, has
gone behind the Iron Curtain. It's encouraging
that these newly independent countries have
shown themselves resistant to forces that would
attempt to take over their independence or move
in on them. And I think that the great historical
forces that are at work in the world tilt the course
of history in favor of freedom. This has been
the course of history in the past, and I think it is
bound to be the course of history in the future.
These ideas of freedom are deeply rooted in human
nature, and we find evidence everywhere that peo-
ple are not prepared to abandon their freedom
to foreigii control or this international Commu-
nist conspiracy. This is being felt inside the bloc
itself in increasing forms. So I would think that
if we tend to our knitting, we get on with our
main job, we create vibrant societies here and in
other free countries, there will be no problem of
effective competition with the Soviet bloc.
March 5, 7962
363
Toward an Atlantic Partnership
hy Under Secretary Ball '
I am assuming that as observers of world affairs
you do not limit your interest to day-to-day de-
velopments— to what is called in the jargon of the
press "hard news." You are concerned also with
those deeper forces that shape events and with the
political strategy that guides our own efforts to
control, or at least to influence, the play of those
forces.
If this assumption be correct — and I am certain
that it is — then I can, with some confidence, forgo
the dubious pleasure of trying to illumine last
week's headlines and direct my brief remarks
today — more fruitfully, I hope — at a concept of
major importance that has been the subject of
much thought and an even greater amount of con-
versation— the concept of the Atlantic partner-
ship.
In order that these comments may be three-
dimensional I should like to give them some depth
in time, if not in wisdom.
During the 19th century, with the assistance of
a growing technology, we Americans conquered
a frontier and consolidated it into a vast nation.
During the whole of that century we played only
a limited role in world affairs. We could afford
to cultivate our own garden, to occupy ourselves
with the taming of a rich and vast continent, since
British seapoM-er was playing much the same pro-
tective role for us then that our rockets and
strategic airpower play for Europe today. We
were a growing giant, a healthy, confident, not
always very graceful giant, who had not yet tested
his muscles away from home.
Western Europeans throughout this fateful
100 yeai-s were having quite a different experience.
They had no virgin continent to develop. Instead
' Address made before the World Affairs Council of
Philadelphia at Philadelphia, Pa., on Feb. 0 (press release
82; as-delivered text).
they applied much of their capital and adminis-
trative talent to the building of world empires.
For many European nations the expansion and
consolidation of colonial systems provided the
same outlet for their energies as did the conquest
of the frontier for America.
Colonial systems, however, had only a limited
survival value. They were conceived in an age of
slow sea transport, but they could not flourish in
a world of instantaneous communications and al-
most instantaneous transportation. Two world
wars weakened the power base on which colonial
structures rested. What began with marching
armies ended with powerful ideas that proved
corrosive to empires — the ideas of nationalism, of
self-determination, of the right of all men to first-
class citizenship in political systems of their own
choosing.
In the decade and a half since the end of the
Second World War, we have seen the cumulative
impact of these convergent forces. During that
period the shape of the world has been altered —
and power and influence on the world scene have
been redistributed — as much as in the two
preceding centuries.
Two Major World Developments
I do not have the time, nor do j'ou have the
patience, for me to attempt any comprehensive
inventory of the changes that have taken place.
But there are two major developments that are
particularly relevant to the subject I promised to
talk about today.
First, over the whole of the free world colonial
systems have been liquidated. Out of the old co-
lonial systems has come a great flowering of small
nations. Born weak and sometimes prematurely,
they have, more often than not, been economically
underdeveloped and imderindustrialized. But
364
Department of State Bulletin
they have displayed a common quality — the qual-
ity of determination to establish and maintain
their national identities and to apply within their
own societies the tools and techniques that modem
technology has provided.
For the newly independent peoples of the world
the shattering of colonial structures has operated
like a kind of atomic fi-ss'ion to release enormous
energies — energies which, if channeled in con-
structive directions, can mean a new order of life
for millions of individuals in these newly created
countries.
In spite of the forebodings of political Cas-
sandras, the shattering of these colonial structures
did not mean the disappearance or even the dim-
inution of the strength of Europe. Instead the
European nations turned their efforts to the con-
struction of a whole new European system which —
this time like a kind of atomic fusion — ^has gen-
erated energies that have already transformed the
economic map of that continent.
The extraordinary speed of these simultaneous
developments has tended to obscure their magni-
tude. ^Mio could imagine in 1945 when the United
Nations was created that in a little over 16 years
it would have not 51 members but 104 ? And there
are more to come.
And wouldn't it have seemed equally fantastic
16 years ago, when Western Europe was all bricks
and rubble, that it could be rebuilt, reshaped,
transformed so profovmdly in spirit that France
and Germany, ancient enemies, would be drawn by
their own free will into a community more co-
hesive than any ever produced by the conquerors
of the past ?
But if so much can happen in 16 years, what can
the next 16 years bring forth ?
"When that question is posed in terms of tech-
nical advances — no matter how bizarre — our
imagination is not hobbled by an ingrained skep-
ticism. We seem to accept the fact that men soon
may be rocketing to the moon. We seem even able
to imagine the awful horror of thermonuclear war.
Why then should we be so defeatist when we
regard the future of our social, economic, and even
political institutions? Why should we be so un-
imaginative when we face the fundamental prob-
lem of how we must organize the power of the
free world, how we must combine our energies
effectively, not merely to defend what we have but
to create an abundance for eveiyone at a time when
man's productivity seems for the first time capable
of almost unlimited expansion ?
I think perhaps that this timidity would shrink
considerably if we realized how much we have
already accomplished toward building the power
and unity of the free world. What has already
happened in Europe belies the Marxist prediction
that the capitalist countries would weaken and
stagnate as a result of their internal and external
contradictions. Europe has in fact steadily grown
stronger and more united; at the same time, the
Communist bloc is displaying an obvious insta-
bility and its own inherent contradictions of a
kind Marx never envisaged.
But if Europe, throughout these turbulent post-
war days, has made great progress toward unity,
we in America, under the weight of our new re-
sponsibilities as world leader, have made just as
striking progress toward maturity. We have man-
ifested this coming of age in at least two ways:
First, %ve have turned our hacks on isolationhm
forever. We have recognized that isolationism
can be no more than a nostalgic fantasy in a world
of swift transport and communications, where
every man is every other man's close neighbor.
Through the NATO alliance we have combined
our military strength with that of our European
friends in a manner unthinkable before the war.
And we have made a start at perfecting procedures
for maintaining a continuing and comprehensive
dialog with our friends, the existence of which
insures we need not face the problems of war and
peace in disarray.
Second — and quite as hnfortant — we have he-
gun to face the implications of economic interde-
fendence. Through the OECD [Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development], we
have begun to take far-reaching steps toward eco-
nomic cooperation. We are concerting our mone-
tary policies with those of our European friends;
and the OECD will certainly play an important
role in the administration of standby credit ar-
rangements that have recently been developed to
assist countries in balance-of-payments difficulties.
We have begim frank discussions and reviews of
our domestic economic policies, recognizing that,
unless we are all committed to policies of adequate
growth, distortions and imbalances can play havoc
with our international economic relations.
Finally, we have developed new mechanisms for
coordinating: our efforts with those of our Euro-
tAarch 5, 1962
365
pean friends to bring about more effective aid to
the underdeveloped nations.
Foundations of Partnership
But many will ask why it is that, faced as we
are with massive common responsibilities and pos-
sessing together most of the economic strength of
the free world, America and Europe have not gone
faster and farther in forging an Atlantic partner-
ship.
The answer, it seems to me, is that the logic of
history lias compelled an essential phasing. It has
been necessary for Europe to move toward sub-
stantial internal cohesion in order to provide the
solid foundations ujwn which the structure of an
Atlantic partnership can be erected.
Let me explain what I mean.
During the whole of the postwar period we
Americans have been disturbed by the enormous
disparity between our own resources and those of
any other nation of the free world. We have been
proud tliat the United States was a world leader,
but we have sometimes foimd it less than satisfac-
tory to be a world leader isolated by the possession
of too large a portion of total wealth, power, and
resources.
As we have felt the increasing weight of the
burdens and responsibilities of leadership — in-
creased geometrically by the existence of a real
and present danger from Communist ambitions —
we have wished, sometimes wistfully, for a closer
and stronger Atlantic partnership. Yet a strong
partnerehip must almost by definition mean a col-
laboration of equals. When one partner possesses
over 50 pei"cent of the resources of an enterprise
and the balance is distributed among 16 or 17
others, the relationship is imlikely to work very
well. And so long as Europe remained frag-
mented, so long as it consisted merely of nations
small by modern standards, the potentials for true
partnership were always limited.
It was in recognition of this fact that since the
war we have consistently encouraged the powerful
drive toward European integration. We have
wanted a Europe united and strong that could
serve as an equal partner in the achievement of
our common endeavors — an equal partner com-
mitted to the same basic values and objectives as
all Americans. For our European friends, like
ourselves, believe in the preservation and extension
of freedom. We are all dedicated not only to
defending the free world but to assisting the less
fortunate nations to attain the level of economic
and political strength that will give them self-
respect and independence.
From time to time we have heard timid voices
complaining that a united Europe might become
a neutralist "third force." Such views rest on
a misunderstanding of the neutralist phenomenon.
European neutralism — as distinct from historic
neutrality— is a thing of the past. At its peak,
a decade ago, it was an expression of weakness,
not strength. It sprang from a belief that Europe
could no longer play a significant role in the power
contest between the United States and the Com-
munist bloc. Persuaded that they could not in-
fluence the outcome by taking sides, its advocates
assumed a role of Olympian detachment from the
battle, measuring out equal amounts of criticism
for each side. As the nations of Western Europe
have grown stronger and more united, the voices
of neutralism that produced such a frightful
cacophony 10 years ago have been largely stilled.
But there are a few who profess fear of a strong,
united Europe for still a different reason. They
see the specter not of a neutralist third force but
of a third force that will go a separate way from
ours and will seek its own interest to our detri-
ment. A powerful continental entity, they argue,
will be tempted to try a new kind of balance-of-
power politics, to play the East against the West,
to sell its weight and authority to tlie highest
bidder, to serve its own parochial and selfish
objective.
Such a prediction, I am persuaded, misconceives
the nature of the forces at work on lx)th sides of
the Atlantic. It overlooks the vitality and solidity
of our common heritage. It ignores the reality
of our common objectives. It rejects, in fact, the
very interdependence of the members of the
NATO alliance on which our national security is
now base<l.
To my mind we have everything to gain by tlie
construction of a strong and united Europe.
Europe united will almost certainly display a
deeper and stronger feeling of responsibility for
the defense of Western values than will the indi-
vidual nation states in a Europe weak and frag-
mented. Unity builds strength. The experience
and awareness of strength engender not only the
ability but the will to influence events. And for
Europeans, as for Americans, the will to influence
366
Department of State Bulletin
events is merely another way of expressing a sense
of i-esponsibility.
And so I can say quite confidently to you today
that the farther Europe proceeds down the road
toward unity, the more we can expect our Euro-
pean friends to play an affirmative and respon-
sible role in our common concerns — provided, of
course, (liat we Americans are prepared to resiiond
concretely with an adequate expression of our own
deep desire to build an Atlantic partnership.
We can, therefore, be gratified by two recent
events that could contribute significantly to the
success of this broad policy.
Earlier this month the countries of the Euro-
pean Community agreed on a common agricultural
policy and took the decisive decision to pass to
the second stage under their treaty. In entering
the second stage the Community begins a period
in which an increasing number of actions no longer
depend on the unanimous vote of its member gov-
ernments but on a qualified majority. This is
the start- of a true European identity, and it has
seemed to many Europeans that it represents the
point of no return in the building of a imified
Europe.
A second event of prophetic implications was
the application of the United Kingdom to join
the European Community. It would not be ap-
propriate for me to attempt to predict what may
be the outcome of the negotiations that are now
under way between the United Kingdom and the
member nations of the Community. The prob-
lems involved in these negotiations are complex.
The prospective step holds profound implications
for the British people.
It is enough for our purjDOses to take note of
the size and shape of the expanded community
that will emerge if these negotiations are carried
to a successful conclusion. This expanded com-
munity will have a population somewhat larger
than our own. Based on the experience of the
states presently members of the Conamunity, it
may easily have a rate of growth twice our own.
Such an expanded commimity will clearly repre-
sent an economic and trading unit of size and
importance comparable to that of the United
States.
"Wliat this expanded community will mean to
America is clear enough. It will mean the crea-
tion of a potential partner commanding resources
not incommensurate with those which we ourselves
command. It will mean, in other words, the crea-
tion of a new entity in Europe that holds the
potential of playing an effective role with us in an
Atlantic partnership of equals committed to the
achievement of great common objectives.
But if such a partnership is to fulfill its his-
toric purpose, we shall ourselves have to adopt and
pursue policies adequate to this great oppor-
tunity, and we shall have to equip the President
with the powers that will enable him to deal
competently with this new world environment.
Significance of New Trade Program
And this brings me finally to the subject which
I am sure you expected me to talk about today —
the extraordinary initiative of President Kennedy
in asking Congress for legislation that would en-
able him to give a new dimension to this Atlantic
partnership in the area of international trade.^
Just as we are moving toward greater stability
in international payments through the consulta-
tive mechanisms of the OECD, just as the mem-
bers of the Atlantic partnership have taken a
common commitment for adequate growth rates,
just as we are working together, through the De-
velopment Assistance Committee of the OECD,
in concerting our efforts for the underdeveloped
world, so we can now by common action bring
about the expansion of international trade for the
benefit not only of ourselves and of Europe but of
the whole free world.
I cannot emphasize enough that the trade ex-
pansion bill ^ which the President has sent to Con-
gress is not merely a grant of new authority to
the President to assist him in commercial rela-
tions; it has a larger meaning as providing a new
field of action for the Atlantic partnership.
Political Urgency of Liberal Trade Policy
I shall not attempt to rehearse for you the
economic arguments m favor of more liberal trade
or even the compelling commercial reasons why
American producers must have adequate access
for their exports to this great and burgeoning
new market. All of this has been said with bril-
liancei and persuasion in President Kennedy's
^ For text of the President's trade message to Congress,
see Bulletin of Feb. 12. 1962, p. 2.31.
' H.R. 9900, 87th Cong., 2d sess. ; for a brief summary of
the bill, see Bulletin of Feb. 26, 1962, p. 343.
Alorch 5, 7962
367
message. These arguments will be heard again
and again during the months to come.
What is important, I think, is that you under-
stand the sense of political urgency that character-
izes this great undertaking, that you appreciate its
meaning as another and indispensable step toward
the strengthening of the West.
If the American people understand what is at
issue here I am sure that they will approach this
new enterprise not with timidity or misgivings
but with something of the same excitement and
urgency that Europe has displayed in building
the Common Market. It has been the combina-
tion of the excitement of political progress to-
ward a goal of unity and strength and the pros-
pect of a new economic frontier that has given
much of the djmamism to the extraordinary de-
velopments of the Common Market.
This, I think, provides a new imperative for
Americans : to recognize that change is the order of
the day, that in a swiftly moving world we cannot
withdraw from great affairs, we cannot insulate
the United States from world competition, we
cannot retire into an economic chrysalis — or we
shall stagnate.
America did not grow great by standing still.
We are and have long been the great innovators,
the great experimenters, the great merchant ad-
venturers. American business by and large has
sought change, not resisted it. It has carried on
an endless search for new materials, new tech-
nologies, new ways and means of making things,
doing things, selling things.
It is this same spirit of creative movement that
America must now bring to bear in the great ad-
venture of the Atlantic partnership ; for that part-
nership is, and must remain, the hard core of our
world position.
These are the terms in which the President has
designed the trade legislation now before the Con-
gress. These are the terms in which I hope you
will view that legislation and give it the support it
deserves.
A Cooperative Adventure in Growth
How do the President's proposals contribute to
this objective? We shall shortly be confronted
with two economic giants, two great common
markets, flanking the shores of the Atlantic.
These two markets represent common concepts
of government, common ways of doing business.
There are still some significant differences in liv-
ing standards and technologj'. But the similari-
ties are much more striking than the differences ;
and the similarities will grow greater with the
years. Even the commercial policies and tariff
structures of the two common markets are much
alike. On both sides of the Atlantic, import
licensing and the other paraphernalia of govern-
mental control are at a minimum. On both sides
tariffs are roughly equal in height. While the
United States at the start offers lower tariffs for
some items, the European Common Market begins
with lower tariffs for others.
The challenge which the President's program
offers to the American people and to Europe is to
make transatlantic trade not an exercise in eco-
nomic warfare but a cooperative adventure in
growth. The President's purpose is to prove
Stalin's prediction of 1953 forever wrong, when
he forecast that the capitalist nations of the world
would soon be at one another's throats in the
struggle for world markets.
With this in mind the President has requested
the Congress to give him the power, in negotiations
with the European Economic Community, to re-
duce tariffs without limit on these products for
which the two markets account for 80 percent or
more of free- world trade. Such a move will estab-
lish the basis for an increased two-way exchange
of industrial goods, a trade in which the United
States has already exhibited its great competitive
strength with about $15 billion yearly of exports
to world markets. At the same time the President
has asked for added powers that may make it
possible to increase trading opportunities for agri-
cultural products in both markets. Instead of
acting as the major source of discord between the
two markets, as Communist ideologj' insists, trade
will form the cement which binds our political
systems more closely together.
All these measures, however, would be harmful
and even dangerous if they were taken without
regard for the needs of third countries. The ac-
cession of the United Kingdom to the Common
Market, for instance, will completely restructure
the pattern of world trade. As one of the world's
principal trading nations, the United Kingdom
will be reordering its trading relations with other
European countries outside the Common Market,
with members of the Commonwealth established
on every continent in the world, and with many
developing countries outside the Commonwealth.
368
Department of State Bulletin
The nations directly involved in the great adven-
ture in Europe, including the United Kingdom
and the European Community members, have
manifested their sensitivity to the needs of these
third countries and their determination to safe-
guard these needs.
President Keimedy's trade proposals are in-
tended not only to help meet tliese needs but to
open entirely new opportunities for a mutually
profitable exchange of goods between the United
States and third countries. Tariff reductions ne-
gotiated by the United States with the European
Economic Community would be applied by both
parties on a nondiscriminatory basis. More than
that, the President would have the power to reduce
tariff rates on any product by as much as 50 per-
cent, so that products which are of particular
interest in the trade between the United States and
third countries could be the subject of interna-
tional negotiation.
The President's proposals contain still another
provision indicative of the United States' concei'n
to increase mutually advantageous trading oppor-
tunities for the developing world. This is the pro-
vision that would authorize the President, in
concert with the European Economic Community,
to reduce and even eliminate tariffs on tropical
agricultural products. We would hope — and there
are some grounds for the hope — that the exercise
of powers of this kind might eliminate some of the
unnecessary impediments that exist in the market-
ing of agricultural products from nations in Latin
America, Africa, and the Far East.
Implications of Freer Trade for U.S. Economy
With these proposals for movement toward a
freer mterchange of goods in world markets, we
must remain alert to their implications for the
domestic economy. Some of these implications
are clear enough. Greater opportunities for
United States exports, even when matched by in-
creased volumes of United States imports, cannot
fail to add to the vitality and growth of America.
Over the vital years of our history our economy
has lived and flourished by the principle that in-
creased competition means increased productivity
and that increased productivity means higher
wages and higher profits. That principle is Just
as sound today as it was in earlier decades.
Fortunately we Americans are a restless and
creative breed, quick to sense an opportimity where
March 5, J 962
629537—62 3
it exists and quick to respond. Our history has
been one of rapid change and rapid adjustment.
If we are to hope to maintain the highest living
standards in the world, this pattern of adjustment
and change must continue.
Here and there in the American economy, how-
ever, a period of time and a helping hand may be
needed to speed the shift of productive resources
and to seize the opportunities of widening mar-
kets. In recognition of this fact the President's
proposals stipulate that tariff reductions should
be stretched out over a period of years. More
than that, they set forth programs which would
be available to accelerate the transition of Amer-
ica's resources to more productive pursuits. For
instance they would provide assistance in certain
cases for the retraining and relocating of labor
and assistance in the financing of new capital fa-
cilities for industry. Always the objective is to
provide a lubricant, not a crutch, to deploy the
labor and capital of America in the most produc-
tive possible pursuits, and to insure that goods and
services are generated by the American economy
in a volmne sufficient to produce the world's
highest living standards.
Opportunity That Lies Ahead
Those whom history has charged with the
solemn responsibility of America's destiny in these
fateful days must carry out that responsibility
with vigilant attention both to the perils and op-
portunities of this shrinking globe. Of the perils
that beset us in a world which has harnessed the
power of the exploding sun for good or evil, I
need hardly speak to you today. We are all
aware — all the time — of the danger that threatens
when aggi'cssion and technology combine. We are
constantly reminded of that danger ; it has become
a kind of brooding omnipresence for 20th-century
man.
But we would do well to focus with equal in-
tensity on the opportunities that are ours if we
have the energy and imagination to seize them.
Within the next few months we shall have an op-
portunity never available to us before — the op-
portunity to chance a new effort of collaboration
in a new field with a coequal partner on the other
side of the Atlantic, a partner with which we share
a common heritage of history, culture, and values.
A decade ago such an opportunity would have
seemed fantastic. Today it is ours if we have the
369
imagination and the exuberance of spirit to act
with courage and decision.
It is always a temptation in concluding any pub-
lic statement to indulge in the familiar liyper-
boles — to talk of a crossroads of history, a
watershed, a landmark, a milestone. At this mo-
ment I find it hard to reject tlaese cliches, moth-
eaten though they may be; for the opportunity
that lies ahead for America in an effective Atlantic
partnership has implications for the future of an
importance that we can today only dimly perceive.
U.S. Protests Soviet Harassment
of Traffic in Berlin Air Corridors
Press release 104 dated February 15
Following is the text of a memorandum de-
livered hy the American Embassy at Moscow on
February 15 to the Soviet MinisPry of Foreign
Affairs. Identical notes were also delivered on
the same date by the Em^bassies of the United
Kingdom and France.
On February 14, 19G2, Soviet aircraft on three
occasions seriously threatened by close approacli
United States aircraft flying in the North Corridor
to Berlin in accordance with quadripartitely
agreed flight rules, under flight plans on which
customary flight information had been made avail-
able to the Soviet element of BASC [Berlin Air
Safety Center]. The necessary flight infonnation
for the Soviet aircraft had not been submitted by
the Soviet element in BASC.
Prior to that, on February 8, 9, and 12, Soviet
authorities in BASC sought to reserve the use of
a number of flight levels in the Berlin Air Corri-
dors for Soviet aircraft during a specified time.
They were informed in BASC that Allied aircraft
would continue to fly in accordance witli estab-
lished procedures and that Soviet authorities
would be held fully responsible for flight safety.
The air corridors are for tlie use of the aircraft of
the Four Powers in accordance with established
procedur&s which also specify procedures for
crossing the corridors (DAIE/p(45)7l, para 8).
BASC has the role of insuring flight safety in cacli
case for avoiding interference. It has carried out
this role under these procedures for many years.
Any effort by one of the Four Powers to arrogate
to itself the exclusive use of fliglit levels for any
period of time is entirely unacceptable. Such a
practice would amount to an arbitrary limitation
on the free use of air corridoi"s by the aircraft of
the Three Western Powers as guaranteed by quad-
ripartite agi-eements.
The attempt to force changes in established pro-
cedures in this manner is incompatible with Soviet
Foreign Minister Gromyko's apparent agreement
in talks with President Kennedy and Secretary
Rusk that both sides should refrain from "actions
which miglit aggravate international tensions" and
with the explicit commitment to this effect in the
joint statement of September 20, 1961,' on prin-
ciples for disarmament negotiations.
Air access to Berlin along the Three Corridors
from West Germany is and has been unrestricted
since the end of World War II in 1945.
Rights with respect to air access to Berlin de-
rive from precisely the same source as do the rights
of the U.S.S.R. in East Gennany and East Berlin,
namely, the joint military defeat of the German
Reich and the joint assumption of supreme au-
thority over Germany. These riglits are confirmed
by the circumstances under which tlie Four Pow-
ers entered Germany, by their subsequent discus-
sions and agreements, and by open and established
practice over a period of 15 yeai-s.^
Reports of the air directorate of the Allied Con-
trol Council and the decisions of the Council itself
regai'ding fliglit in the corridors reveal both the
nature of the rights of the respective parties and
arrangements as to the exercise of these rights.
The United States Government attaches the ut-
most importance to the maintenance of tlie free
use of tlie air corridors as well as to the observance
of established procedures. By their actions on
February 14 tlie Soviet Union is running the
gravest risks. The United States Government ex-
pects the Soviet Government to insure that its
authorities proliibit such aggi'essive and danger-
ous behavior by Soviet aircraft, and that they
refrain from demands to reserve the use of fliglit
levels in the air corridors. United States aircraft
will continue to fly in the corridors as necessary
and in accordance with establislied procedures.
The United States Government M-ill take the
necessary steps to insure the safety of such flights
and will hold the Soviet Government responsible
for the consequences of any incidents which might
occur.
' For text, see Bulletin of Oct. 9, 1961, p. 589.
'For background, see ihld., Sept. 18, 1961, p. 477, and
Sept. 25, 19G1, p. 511.
370
Department of State Bulletin
The Four Global Forces That Help Write the Headlines
hy Chester Bowles^
It is a great pleasure for me to be here in the
Twin Cities. Thanks in large measure to an in-
ternationally minded press, radio, and television
and to such organizations as the Minnesota "World
Affairs Center, this forward-looking area has
taken an exceptionally responsible interest in the
conduct of our foreign relations.
Acting in this tradition, the senior Senator from
Minnesota, Hubert Hiunphrey, recently inserted
in the Congressional Record a remarkable speech
by Walter Lippmann before the Women's Na-
tional Press Club in Washington. In tliis address,
Walter Lippmann remarked that a friend of his
had written him that "Another year of frustra-
tion, confusion, and compromise is about over."
Mr. Lippmann commented that "in every year
of which there is any historical record, there has
been much frustration and confusion and compro-
mise. Anyone who thinks he can get away from
frustration, confusion, and compromise in politics
and diplomacy should make arrangements to get
himself reborn into a different world than this
one."
Mr. Lippmami is quite correct. The United
States alone cannot control the future course of
world events. We are not omnipotent, and it is a
dangerous illusion to think that we can run this
planet wholly to our own taste.
But while we cannot control events, we can at
least influence them, and often decisively. Using
the wide range of powerful political and economic
instruments which our varied society provides, and
with a reasonable measure of good fortune, we
can do much to help shape a more rational and
prosperous world community.
' Address made before a regional foreign jjolicy briefing
conference at St. Paul, Minn., on Feb. 2 (press release 67
dated Feb. 1). Mr. Bowles is the President's Special
Representative and Adviser on African, Asian, and Latin
American Affairs.
Yet the biggest bombs, the most generous aid
programs, and the most skillful speeches in the
United Nations General Assembly will avail us
nothing if we fail to imderstand the fundamental
forces which are moving peoples and governments
and shaping the history of our times.
The first of these forces is what we have come
to know as the revolution of rising expectations —
the surge of the billion or more people who live
in Africa, Asia, and Latin America toward a
gi-eater measure of freedom, prosperity, and
opportunity.
Second I would list the rise of the Soviet Union
to its present status as a major military and indus-
trial power bent on extending its influence
throughout the world.
The third major force we face is the transfor-
mation of mainlarid China, which is making its
growing strength felt not only in Asia but in most
parts of the world.
Fourth is an ever-expanding science and tech-
nology. The new nuclear weapons have provided
us and the Russians with the power to destroy
most of the world, while simultaneously scientific
and teclinological advances have opened up untold
opportunities for constructive progress in medi-
cine, industry, and scores of other fields.
Wherever we turn in the international field, we
see events being shaped and crises created by these
four massive forces, either singly or, more fre-
quently, in combination. We will ignore them
only at our peril.
Revolution of Rising Expectations
Let us therefore examine each in turn and try
to assess their impact on the day-to-day conduct
of our international relations.
The most complex of these forces — and the most
perplexing to most American.s — is the revolution
of rising expectations.
March 5, J 962
371
More than a billion people in Asia and Africa
have won their freedom since World War II.
Since 1945, 44 new nations have been born. These
newly independent peoples, joined by millions
more in newly awakened Latin America, are now
dreaming great dreams. Suddenly they have come
to see that their ancient afflictions — disease, injus-
tice, illiteracy, hunger, and poverty — are not part
of God's plan for the unfortunate but evils to be
fought and overcome. This realization is a heady
brew which, once tasted, cannot be recorked.
These people now know that the means exist by
which their lives can be improved, and they are
determined to improve them.
But why should we be concerned? How do
these distant turbulent continents with all their
built-in confusions and frustrations affect the se-
curity of the United States ?
The answer can be simply stated : If the United
States should be cut off from Asia, Africa, and
Latin America, it would face political and eco-
nomic isolation that would gravely threaten our
national survival. Forced back on ourselves, we
would be cut oft' from such essential raw materials
as manganese, tin, copper, zinc, and rubber.
With only 6 percent of the world's people in an
increasingly antagonistic world, we would rapidly
become a garrison state in full retreat from the
future.
The decline of our European allies would be
even more acute, for the new, burgeoning Common
Market is even more dependent than we on free
access to the markets, minerals, and petroleum of
the developing continents. That is what Lenin
meant when he said, "The road to Paris lies
through Calcutta and Peking" and what Stalin
meant when he added, "The backs of the British
[i.e. the West] will be broken not on the river
Thames, but on the Yangtze, the Ganges, and the
Nile."
Only when the Kremlin becomes convinced that
it cannot control these developing and politically
decisive continents can we expect to see a funda-
mental change of Soviet policy that will make pos-
sible an casing of the cold war. And only as we
succeed in creating the basis for a working eco-
nomic partnership with the new Africa, Asia, and
Latin America as free nations, with a common
interest in world stability, can we assure our na-
tional security.
But beyond our purely economic and political
stake in the future of these continents, we have a
humanitarian stake as well : a moral injunction to
help in the great task of lifting the burdens of
poverty from our fellow human beings. This call
stems from the deepest values of our Judeo-
Christian tradition.
Economic interdependence and humanitarian
concern, however, are only a part of our interest.
Of greater importance to our immediate security
is the fact that these nations are coromunism's
prime targets.
I need hardly argue the importance of halting
the spread of communism. Yet I believe it would
be seriously wrong to measure our interest in an
underdeveloped country solely in terms of its
vulnerability to the Communist threat. Surely
a local Communist minority should not be given
the status of a kind of natural resource, like oil or
uranium, exchangeable for dollars at the U.S.
Treasury.
The revolution of rising expectations is not a
Communist plot. Had there never been a Marx,
a Lenin, a Stalin — or even the idea of communism
itself — there would still be this natural flow of
pent-up desires riding the tides of political, eco-
nomic, and social change that have so completely
altered our own Western World in less than two
centuries.
Dangerous though commimism is to us, in es-
sence it is a sterile and parasitic ideology feeding
on the unfulfilled desires of two-thirds of man-
kind for a better life.
It was not a Communist Party congress but our
own Continental Congress that lit the fuse of
today's explosive global revolution toward free-
dom. It was not the men in the Kremlin but
Thomas Jefferson, Tom Paine, and Patrick Henry
who gave life to the bold words that have stirred
the hearts of millions in Asia, Africa, and Latin
America today.
Objective of Dealings With Developing Countries
Our interests in the underdeveloped lands are
many. Yet our objective in our relations with
them is, I think, essentially one. It is not, as some
Americans suggest, to "win friends" for the United
States. Implicit in this notion is the assumption
that we can secure another country's friendship
simply by pouring in more and more dollars. The
very idea is deeply offensive both to friendship
and nationhood.
What, then, is our objective in our dealings with
372
Deparfmenf of Sfafe Bulletin
the developing countries? Our primary, central
purpose, as I see it, is to help the countries of
Africa, Asia, and Latin America toward expand-
ing economic security and opportunity, toward
greater social justice and orderly political growth,
so that they will have the maximum freedom of
choice through which to create their own inde-
pendent futures within the framework of their
own cultures.
We seek this objective without ulterior motive.
Unlike the Communists, we have no desire to con-
trol or dominate these new nations, nor do we want
to shape them in the image of the United States.
Rather, we believe that the strength of the kind
of world we want to live in lies in its diversity and
freedom of choice.
I view our ability to deal intelligently with the
transformation of Asia, Africa, and Latin Amer-
ica as the greatest challenge the United States
must face in this decade.
It is a challenge to our ability to understand
the hopes and fears of hundreds of millions of
men and women who seek to build a better world
for themselves and their children.
It is a challenge to our understanding of when,
where, and how to assist them in their drive for
widened economic opportunities, deeply rooted
political freedom, and increased social justice.
It is a challenge to our capacity to recognize and
strengthen the long-term goals and purposes that
we share with the people and governments of these
nations.
And it is a challenge to our patience as well as
our toughness, to our compassion as well as our
intelligence, in dealing with the irritations, ex-
cesses, obstinacy, and shortsightedness that inevi-
tably characterize the actions of societies in the
throes of national revolution.
How do we face this challenge? How well have
we succeeded thus far? What else do we need to
do?
I think that on the whole we have responded
rather well. Unfettered by the doctrinaire rigidi-
ties of the Communists, we have been able to draw
on the rich resources of our own pluralistic society
to pursue our objective in a variety of ways.
Through the delicate channels of diplomacy we
have worked for the peaceful transformation of
remaining colonies into independent nations.
Through the United Nations we have contrib-
uted to the preservation of the peace and sover-
eignty of new nations.
Through our information and cultural exchange
programs we have developed ties of understanding
and respect between our own people and those of
the developinff countries.
Above all, through our economic and technical
aid programs we have provided the essential re-
sources and skills needed to encourage scores of
nations on the road to self-sustaining growth.
Importance of Self-Help in Economic Development
We have been carrying out aid programs around
the world for more than a decade now. In many
areas — India, for example — we can point to solid
economic progress and stable democratic govern-
ment. In other areas the picture is less bright.
Political instability and unrest are all too frequent
in countries that statistically appear to be making
significant economic progress.
Why is this so ? Primarily, I believe, because of
our failure to recognize soon enough that the most
important element in economic development is
people.
Too often in the past we have not been suffi-
ciently concerned with whether the benefits from
our assistance have filtered through the privileged
few at the top to the great majority of people still
living in povei-ty. There already exists an ex-
plosive gap between these two groups in many of
the new and awakening countries, and the first
steps toward economic development, if unguided,
actually can widen this gap. A steadily rising
gross national product can be accompanied by just
as steadily rising frustration and bitterness.
The questions we must therefore ask ourselves
as we extend economic assistance are clear :
Do most of the people have a sense of sharing
in their country's economic growth ? Do they have
a feeling of individual participation, of increasing
social justice? Do they believe that the new roads
and schools and factories are actually theirs, a
product of their aspirations and decisions and
labor?
To achieve the widest sense of popular partici-
pation in a country's growth means in fact to
mobilize all of its potential resources. Tax re-
fonn, for instance, in order that those most for-
tunate should pay their fair share of a nation's
tax revenues, is more than a matter of social jus-
tice. An effective tax program can also stimulate
productive investment and expand consumption.
Similarly, land reform can bring about increased
March 5, 1962
373
agricultural production by providing incentives to
individual farmers.
The United States has an obligation, I believe,
to insist on such measures of genuine self-help.
Indeed, without them it is difficult to justify the
contribution which we require our own citizens to
make through their taxes to promote development
abroad.
Perspective in Relations Witli New Nations
Now let us turn to some of the political conse-
quences of the revolution of rising expectations.
Why do so many of the new countries call them-
selves neutral or uncommitted? What does this
mean to us?
Historical analogies are often flimsy reeds to
lean upon, but the present world situation offers
some striking parallels between the views of some
of the new "neutralist" nations and the attitudes
that shaped American foreign policy in the early
years of our independence.
Our nation was bom into a world sharply di-
vided between the two superpowers of that age,
England and France. In fact, had France not
served as a midwife at our birth, as part of her
effort to undermine Britain, there is a serious ques-
tion whether the infant United States could have
survived its birth pains. As the British-French
struggle continued during the first years of our
existence, our leaders recognized their debt of
honor to France. Yet our internal problems were
so enormous and pressing that we soon withdrew
into a strict neutrality.
As an onlooker who could benefit from the
struggle, we played one power against the other.
We took all we could get from both sides — and we
antagonized both so deeply that we narrowly
avoided war with France in the l790's and even-
tually went to war with Britain in 1812.
In spite of our war with England, however, it
was the British Fleet that gave us our escape from
reality during the 19th century. Behind this
shield we prospered and filled out our mighty
country. In so doing, we convinced ourselves that
our military prowess alone had carried us through
the century, and we gave no credit to British di-
plomacy and the British Fleet.
Today wo see many aspects of our early national
life reflected in the actions of others. The new,
young nations who have won their struggles
against colonialism have outlooks mucli like ours
at the turn of the 18th century. Whether we like
it or not, concern with internal development has a
much higher priority in these countries than does
taking sides in the cold war. They are more in-
terested in treading carefully between today's
great powers and getting as much help as they can
without entangling commitments.
There are, of course, many differences between
the United States of nearly two centuries ago and
the new and awakening countries today. But the
apparent similarities are sufficient to give us
greater perspective in our relations with these na-
tions. Such perspective will not eliminate the dif-
ficulties of these relations. But it should improve
the chance for mature and responsible action on
our part. And it should give us a deeper under-
standing of our obligation to assist the people of
the great developing continents.
Rise of the Soviet Union
Let me now turn to the second great force we
face in today's world — the rise of the Soviet Union
to industrial and military eminence.
All over the world the Ck)mmunist movement
poses a relentless challenge to the strength of our
will, to the firmness of our purpose, and the per-
ceptiveness of our intelligence. It would be na-
tional suicide if we failed to recognize Soviet
power and drive in our determination of policy.
Yet the Russians are not 10 feet tall. Indeed,
during the past 15 years they have made some
monumental miscalculations in the political and
economic areas. Looking out from the Kremlin
at their past mistakes, the leaders of the Commu-
nist world must have some rather unhappy
memories.
At the end of World War II Stalin — and many
Americans as well — were convinced that it was
only a question of time before all of Europe would
drop into Communist hands. In the ensuing 15
years, however, the Communists liave gained only
one country — Czechoslovakia — seized in a Com-
munist coup in 1948. In the same period they
withdrew from eastern Austria, which has been
returned to freedom; the one-time Soviet monolith
was split severely by Yugoslavia's defection; and
tiny Albania today is engaged in a fierce ideolog-
ical conflict with the Kremlin.
How could they have handled their affairs so
badly as to liave such a poor record at the end of
a decade and a half ?
374
Department of State Bulletin
First, their brutal crushing of non-Communist
governments in their East European satellites
alerted the world to their expansionist aims. Next,
they performed the classic Russian maneuver to-
ward the Mediterranean in Greece and Turkey and
were rewarded for their troubles by the Truman
doctrine.
Shortly thereafter the Marshall plan went into
action to assist Western Europe to rebuild from
tlie rubble. This was followed by the Soviet at-
tempt to seal off Berlin; the Berlin airlift was
improvised to put a halt to that threat.
At this point we decided that the seriousness
of the Soviet threat was constant enough to cause
us to depart from tradition, and we built and
joined the North Atlantic alliance.
The net effect of the Kremlm's continuous in-
doctrination efforts in Eastern Europe has led
them to build a wall to keep East Berliners from
fleeing the "workers' paradise." There is no more
revealing commentary on the ineffectiveness of
Communist education.
They have fared no better in other areas. Of
the six newly freed countries in Asia wliere the
Communists underwrote revolutions — the Philip-
pines, Indonesia, French Indochina, Malaya,
Burma, and India — they had partial success only
in Indochina, where they could focus their drive
against a white colonial power.
In the Middle East the Soviets have been rub-
bing their hands in anticipation for the entire
15 years, but their successes have been small. Al-
though the area remains clouded over by uncer-
tainty and conflicts, the Soviets have no Middle
Eastern allies or satellites to show for their efforts.
In Africa the Commimists must have felt cer-
tain they would pick up at least one satellite
among the multitude of newly born nations of the
past decade. Wliile there have been some irritat-
ing speeches from African capitals and some very
shaky relationships, African nationalism has
thus far resisted Soviet blandishments. Recently
Guinea, one of their most promising targets, sent
the Soviet Ambassador back to Moscow.
With the smgle exception of Cuba, conununism
has failed in Latin America as well. And Presi-
dent Kennedy's Alliance for Progress offers us a
positive opportunity to eliminate the threat of
communism among our neighbors.
In retrospect, then, it appears that the Soviets
have reaped a small harvest after 15 years of in-
tensive seedinjr.
Yet this does not make the Soviet threat any
less dangerous. Despite the demonstrated steril-
ity of Marxist-Leninist dogma, the Soviet Union
is a very powerful country whose accomplishments
still find adjnirers among many of the world's
less favored people. Its failures thus far may
well produce, not mellowness, but a rash determi-
nation to make greater efforts in the future, what-
ever the risks.
Mainland China
Now what about the third major force — main-
land China?
We have seen Communist China emerge as the
paramoimt power in East Asia, a dynamic, land-
hungry, resource-hungry nation of exploding pop-
ulation with clearly expansionist aims.
Can this powerful new China be persuaded to
adopt a more moderate course, or will a head-on
conflict become inevitable?
As a result of the Chinese revolution, we see
today a bitter rivalry for the leadership of the
world Communist movement, a rivalry expressed
in the recuiTent ideological disputes between Pei-
ping and Moscow. But the primary source of
tension runs far deeper than ideology. Let us
consider the full implications as the Kremlin
must see them.
An overriding need of Communist China is for
more arable land. With less than two arable acres
available for each farm family, with almost no
commercial fertilizer, and with a population that
is increasing by 16 million every year, the Chinese
Conununists face moimting difficulties in feeding
their own people. Indeed, it may be argued that
this economic and political time-bomb is the single
most explosive factor in all of East Asia.
Although it represents a serious challenge to
the food-surplus nations of Southeast Asia, it pre-
sents a particularly difficult problem for the Soviet
Union. It is the Soviets, after all, who have a vast
expanse of fertile, imderpopulated land adjacent
to Cliina. There are times when distant relatives
can be more troublesome than enemies. And a
horde of 650 million hungry, ideological relatives
is struggling for a bare existence along the Soviet's
4,500-mile border.
Another vital need for China is a large, con-
stant supply of basic natural resources. They
have been working strenuously to increase their
output of coal and steel, but their need for exten-
sive oil production is still unmet.
March 5, 1962
375
As the Chinese move west in seai-ch of i-esources,
however, the Soviets are moving east into the same
general area in pursuit of resources for themselves.
This offers the intriguing possibility that central
Asia, once largely a sparsely populated, unused
territory, will one day be the scene of further
sharp differences between the Soviet Union and
China.
As for ourselves, one of the major imiinished
tasks of American foreign relations is to devise
a balanced long-range China policy that will en-
able us to deal more effectively with all possible
developments. One such possibility that must be
averted is a Chinese push into the fertile valleys
of Southeast Asia. The constiiiction of an effec-
tive counterweight to China in this region is of
urgent priority on our agenda.
Advance of Science and Technology
Let me turn now to the fourth great force I
mentioned earlier — the rapid advance of science
and technology.
The speed with which new scientific discoveries
are being turned into teclmological developments —
many of which are awesome in their destructive
potential — is almost beyond our comprehension.
The world today is spending more than $100 bil-
lion a year on weapons of destruction, and no end
is in sight. The concept of arming for peace
sometimes truly sounds like a page out of Alice
in Wonderland or Orwell.
But the alternative — refusing to arm against
growing Soviet military power — is even more ab-
surd. Yet each step on our present course makes
the problems of achieving disarmament and peace
more difficult.
Tlie character and speed of deliveiy of nuclear
weapons make it inevitable that teclmology on
each side of the cold war work overtime, and at
forced draft, to outwit technology on the other
side. The pi-emimn is growing steadily on seizing
a temporary advantage to forestall a new teclmo-
logical breakthrough from a probable opponent.
The outlook is for an endless series of attempts
to unbalance new temporary balances, with overall
costs in money and danger projecting upward geo-
metrically. The perilous elements of surprise,
speed, miscalculation, and accident are inlierLMit in
the weapons technology of the decade we arc
entering.
As if these factors were not enougli, we can add
the deadly picture of our cold-war strategists
psychoanalyzing each other's intentions across the
Iron Curtain. It is hard to imagine a greater ele-
ment of instability.
The core of our dilemma springs from the fact
that arms races throughout histoiy usually have
ended in war, while unpreparedness and unilateral
and unsafeguarded disarmament have always
ended in national catastrophe.
The central question facing us is how to operate
from both perspectives at once and pursue simul-
taneously the policies of rearmament and disarma-
ment, of anns and ai"ms control. Yet we must
labor relentlessly in both vineyards at the same
time if we are to sun'ive.
We have made progress in both areas during
the past year. The administration has taken sev-
eral major steps to fulfill Secretai-y McNamara's
[Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara]
promise to redress the worldwide militaiy balance
and to make our Military Establishment "a more
effective servant of United States foreign policy."
At the same time the Pi-esident has laid the
foimdation for a safeguarded and effective world-
wide disarmament program, bringing the State
Department, Pentagon, and Atomic Energy Com-
mission together on a coimnon, national arms-con-
trol policy, imder the leadership of a newly formed
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.-
Although we have successfully coordinated our
own approach to disarmament, no tangible gains
have yet been made in breaking the deadlock. In-
deed, the tempo of the arms race has ominously
increased. This situation, obviously, needs our
close and continuing attention if we are to keep
science and tecluxology from literally tearing our
world to pieces.
We Must Rise to the Crises of Our Era
These, then, are the major external forces that
are shaping the history of our times: the revolu-
tion of rising expectations, the rise of the Soviet
Union and of China, and the rapid advances of
science and technology. Tlicse are massive forces
which reflect an era in woi'ld affairs that is williout
precedent in the long course of human history.
It is not always easy for us to see beyond the
day-to-day headlines to the bigger issues that con-
f roiit us. Yet much will depend on our ability to
° For backKrouiul, see Buixetin of July 17, 1061, p. 90,
and Oct. 10, 1901, p. WO.
376
Deparfmenf of Slafe Bulletin
abandon sloganizing and concentrate on positive
ways to meet the major forces in our world.
No period in history provides such awesome
dangers as does our fast-changing world of today ;
nor does any period offer such exhilarating oppor-
tunities for the individual to grow, for his dignity
to become a reality, and for hiunan energies to be
released for the common good.
This task we face is not an easy one, nor is it
likelj' to be completed within any foreseeable pe-
riod of time. But peace and freedom have never
been cheap. If our efforts are to succeed, we must
be prepared to rise to the unprecedented crises of
our era.
As Thomas Paine once said: "Heaven knows
how to put a proper price upon its goods; and it
would be strange indeed, if so celestial an article
as Freedom should not be highly rated."
VOA Begins Lao and Thai Language
Service Broadcasts to Southeast Asia
Sfatem-ent hy Secretary Rusk ^
On behalf of the President of the United States
and the American people I extend warmest greet-
ings to you. These new Voice of America broad-
ca.sts which we inaugurate today are dedicated
to the cause of better understanding and friend-
ship between our country and yours. At no time in
the long and troubled history of mankind have
friend-ship and understanding between nations
been more important than at the present time.
The events taking place in Southeast Asia and
their impact on the lives of both our peoples is a
matter of deep concern to me because of the seri-
ous implications these events have for the entire
world and also because during my travels to your
part of the world I have come to have a special
respect and admiration for your friendly people.
I believe that these Voice of America broadcasts
will enable all of you to know and understand
Americans better. I welcome these broadcasts be-
cause they will serve as a constant reminder that
we are united in a common effort to preserve our
basic rights and freedoms and that together we
shall continue to seek ways to improve life for
our peoples. These broadcasts will be more than
a source of facts and a source for news of events at
home and abroad. In these programs we will
strive to reveal not only our problems and iuspira-
tions as a people but the values we respect, some-
thing of our daily lives and history, and a sense of
our objectives and our determination to support
the legitimate aspirations of other peoples.
King of Saudi Arabia
Visits Washington
Saud ihn Ahd al-Asiz Al Saud, King of Saudi
Araiia, visited Washington on February 13
and IJ/,. Following is the text of a joint com-
7numque released on February 13 following official
conversations at the White Ilou^e between Presi-
dent Kennedy and King Saud}
White House press release dated February 13
On Februai-y 13, His Majesty King Saud and
President Kennedy held official conversations at
the AVhite House, during which Saudi Arabian-
American relations and international affaire were
discussed in a spirit of frankness and cordiality.
King Saud and the President ai'e confident that
this additional opportunity to become better ac-
quainted personally can only result in greater
mutual understanding between Saudi Arabia and
the United States.
President Kennedy Sends Greetings
to People of Viet-Nam
Message From the President
White House press release dated February 5
February 5, 1962
On the occasion of your New Year's celebra-
tion, my fellow Americans and I extend our very
best wishes for the prosperity and well-being of
the Government and the people of Viet-Nam.
In your struggle against the aggressive forces
of communism, the sacrifices that you have will-
ingly made, the courage you have shown, the bur-
dens you have endured have been a source of
inspiration to people all over the world.
Let me assure you of our continued assistance
in the development of your capabilities to main-
' ilade over the Voice of America's inaugural broadcast
on Feb. 17 (press release 107).
' For a list of the members of the official party and the
program for the visit, see Department of State press re-
lease 92 dated Feb. 8.
March 5, ?962
377
tain your freedom and to defeat those who wish
to destroy that freedom.
We in America sincerely hope that the year of
the Tiger will see peace come again to Viet-Nam.
We know that courage and dedication to peace
and freedom will prevail — and that prospects for
Viet-Nam will brighten during the coming year.
And we look forward confidently with you to
the day when your country will again be at
peace — united, prosperous, and free.
New Directions in Foreign Policy
hy Carl T. Rowan
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs ^
The subject of new directions in foreign policy
on which I have been invited to discourse carries
a connotation I should like to demolish at the out-
set. For I do not think it very finiitful to talk
about foreign policy as though it were a super-
market or a dress shop, where part of the propri-
etor's strategy in showing a profit is to be always
ready with something new, something to catch
the customer's eye, something to give him the
"momentary suspension of disbelief" the poets
talk about while he makes what the merchandising
specialists call an "impulse purchase."
Yet while I am engaged in this metaphor I
ought to say that a lot of Americans sometimes
behave as though the problems of foreign policy
would indeed yield to one flashy expedient or an-
other. We should arm ourselves to the teeth and
tell the world to go hang. We should pull out of
the U.N. and thus get our own way more often.
We should seek out all homegrown Communists
(usually without being too careful about wlietlier
our suspicions are well foimded) and proceed to
suspend all their rights as citizens. We should
raise tariffs. We should cut way back on spend-
ing for the welfare of our citizens. We should
get as tough as the Russians and say to the devil
with world opinion. And so on.
I say many Americans do this. But of couree
not all of them do, or our history would bo quite
different from what it is. The fact is, of course,
' Address made before the Indianapolis World Affairs
Council at Indianapolis, Ind., on Feb. 4 (press release 77
dated Feb. 3 ; as-delivered text) .
that we have solved or diminished many of our
problems, which are now history, by facing them
squarely and realistically, not as we wished they
had been but as they were. We have learned, too,
that gadgets do not always work as advertised and
that generally speaking we get what we pay for.
We are not likely to get many cutrate bargains in
the global competition in wliich we are now
engaged.
Complexity of Foreign Policy
It is a further fact that foreign policy and all
that goes into it simply will not hold still wliile
we simplify it for easy comprehension and diges-
tion. This would be so even if we were on tlie best
of tei-ms with the more than 100 countries with
which we have diplomatic and, to varying extents,
economic, cultural, and military relations. But
considering that histoiy has now pushed power
and influence in tliis world into a rather distinct
polarization between the United States and the
Soviet Union, with all that this implies in differ-
ing objectives and methods, foreign policy for us
is a thing of almost infinite complexity.
It proceeds at a thousand levels in a thousand
ways toward the identification, assessment, :uid
solution of a thousand problems, of which precious
few may ever entirel}' disappear. Its large goals
are plain enough : a peaceful world in which men
and nations are free to pursue their aspirations
in freedom, a world in which the benefits of man's
intelligence are available to all in adequate
measure and in whicli no one is curbed or hurt by
378
Department of Stale Bulletin
political institutions except as representative gov-
ernment and due process of law require and per-
mit it.
But to attain all this in an imperfect world
requires, on its face, not glib and oversimplified
one-shot solutions, new or old, but a continuing
arduous calling for the highest order of sophisti-
cation, an effort which comes hardest of all, per-
haps, to a nation like ours which lived so long
without having incurred the direct scars of war
and which, to use the current vernacular, has
pretty well "got it made."
In the field of foreign policy it is virtually im-
possible to look around and say that this or that
is new. We do not stand on new groimd at all but
only on ground that is higher than it was because
of building we have done in the past. If there is
anything new, it is found in the fresh perspectives
which the greater elevation of experience affords.
Under these circumstances, then, I doubt that
any of my listeners will be surprised by any item
I shall mention in response to an invitation to dis-
cuss new directions in foreign policy.
Western European Economic Unity
Consider the posture in which we today face
Western Europe. The Old World is changing
before our eyes. Great colonial empires crumble,
and the nations of Europe seek new foundations
of strength. We have learned, I am happy to say,
that we Americans cannot watch the unfolding
show in the role of mere spectators. The Com-
mon Market is dramatically recasting the eco-
nomic mold of the better part of Western Europe,
even as that area deliberately shapes a new po-
litical form for the complex of nations whose
rivalries led to two world wars. And this is hap-
penhig with our steadfast encouragement, for we
have learned, at great cost in men and treasure,
that wars these days cannot be confined neatly to
a prescribed battlefield.
We have encouraged all this, I say, even as we
recognize that we are helping to create a large
and resourceful economic competitor. But rather
than view this as our price for the stabilization of
Europe, we are simultaneously preparing to meet
this new competition in the time-honored manner
of our own economy, devoted as it is to the freest
possible flow of competitive goods and capital.
This is not a sudden change of course, a new di-
rection, if you will, but merely a response we must
make if we are not to become stagnant and decline
as a world power. As President Kennedy said
recently before the NAM [National Association of
Manufacturers] : ^
The Communist bloc, largely self-contained and Isolated,
represents an economic power already by some standards
larger than that of Western Europe and gaining to some
degree on the United States. But the combined output
and purchasing power of the United States and Western
Europe is more than twice as great as that of the entire
Sino-Soviet bloc. Though we have only half as much
population and far less than half as much territory, our
coordinated economic strength will represent a powerful
force for the maintenance and growth of freedom.
But will our strength be combined and coordinated —
or divided and self-defeating? Will we worli together on
problems of trade, payments, and monetary reserves — or
will our mutual strength be splintered by a networlc of
tariff walls, exchange controls, and the pursuit of nar-
row self-interest in unrelated if not outright hostile pol-
icies on aid, trade, procurement, interest rates, and
currency ?
Reforms in Less Developed Areas
Or consider our multiple programs of assistance
to nations which for a variety of reasons are un-
able by themselves at this time to meet the "revolu-
tion of rising expectations," now a somewhat
shopworn phrase but still admirably precise.
One might be tempted, for example, to call the
Alliance for Progress in Latin America a "new
direction." In reality, however, it is a careful, and
I may say prayerful, result of our evaluation of
events and programs that have gone before. Our
new emphasis on the necessity that political and
economic leadership in the nations we would assist
actively join us in an effort of constructive and
timely change and development is our recognition
of the fact that without this kind of cooperation
the game is lost before it begins. And perhaps our
insistence on social and economic reforms is a new
direction in that it reflects new understanding of
the forces that motivate the burgeoning masses of
the lesser developed areas.
It would have been nice if the United States and
the Latin American leaders had found before now
the coincidence of events and vision to which we
have now come. Unfortunately, however, the ex-
ample of Cuba was needed first. In foreign policy
our new directions grow out of old one*— and our
ability to learn and profit from the mistakes and
troubles of the past.
' Bm-MTIN of Dec. 25, 1961, p. 1039.
March 5, 7962
379
There is a new direction in our policy toward
Africa, but it is a matter of intensity and pace
as well as direction. It is, if I may say so, the
deliberate policy of this acbninistration to upgrade
the quality and amount of attention paid to this
continent wliich, with Latin America and Asia,
poses so many challenges to the nations of the
world which, with us, have "got it made."
Fundamental to that policy is our belief in the
dignity of the African person and our supjwrt
for the principle of self-government. We are
helping the new nations of this continent to form
governments and societies that are consonant with
the cultures, beliefs, and histories of their people —
governments that are truly independent. And we
are providing help in creating the economic
strength that will enable these governments to re-
main independent and grant freedom to their
people.
The list is lengthy. We are, for example, con-
tinually ti-ying to understand the true character
and role of neutralism. We are trying for an
evolution of our military alliances, notably
NATO, which will at once insure the common
defense as we now comprehend the phrase while
reaching for an understanding of the other impli-
cations of Atlantic union.
We are striving to know how men can avoid
fighting what might truly be the "last war" for
the sobering reason that there would be no one
left to fight another.
And we are doing all this and much more while
confronting a resourceful enemy whicli, in as
short a time as the last 5 years, we have come
to know as having many faces and techniques.
Finally, we have learned that the real enemy
is not a person or a country at all. It is a set of
conditions which no man invented but which we
are in a race to solve on terms worth living with.
The absence of food, shelter, care, and opportunity
is the ultimate foe. New understanding of these
natural enemies of liuman freedom and of the way
in which they are exploited by the advocates of
tyranny, suggests for us a new step, if not a new
direction, in the way of international cooperation.
Making the U.N. More Effective
We are striving, against fierce Communist op-
l)osition on an international level and against
vocal opposition at home, to malce the United
Nations a more effective keeper of the peace and
builder of nations. We cling to the hope that in
this imperfect body men shall be able to create
a body of common law, if you will, that can be-
come the rules of sanity and civility under which
men live in peac«.
That is why the United Nations bond issue*
coming up before Congress is so imjiortant. We
can raise many technical arguments about the per-
centage of U.S. contribution to the United Na-
tions, or the low interest rate, or how effective this
will be in forcing the Soviet Union to "pony up"
its share. But when all the technical arguments
are over, the fundamental questions are these:
Do we want the U.N. to die ?
Do we want to lose this one imperfect hope of
leading men and nations away from the law of
the international jungle?
Do we want to cast aside this one sane restraint
on international behavior?
We in Washington say no to all these questions.
In a letter last week, Henry Cabot Lodge as-
serted that but for the U.N. we might be directly
involved in another Korea in the Congo. He
pointed out that we lost 140,000 lives in Korea.
How much dollar value can we put on 140,000
lives? I know; it depends on whether the life is
ours, or a son's, or that of a stranger in a faraway
land.
Any way I figure it, the bond issue is a bargain
for all of mankind.
The Need To Know What We Are Defending
Let me close with a word of caution : We must
not look for new directions in foreign policy as
though we were looking for the key that unlocks
the door to eternal tranquillity. There is no such
key, and there is no such perfect foreign policy.
George Sokolsky wrote a column the other day
that should be read by all those Americans who
cry for quick, easy, cheap, final solutions to the
problems we face in the world today. He said :
This country face.s war under oiroum.stances very dif-
ferent from those in 1041. The enemy is a different one.
Then we organized against Germany and Japan and our
allies were strong; today our enemy is Soviet Russia and
our allies are weak, their great empires no longer exist-
ing. Then, we and our allies possessed enormous wealth ;
' For backgrouml. see ibiil., Feb. 26, 1962, p. 311.
380
Department of Stale Bulletin
now, the economic capacity of our enemy is as great as
ours. Then we could dictate the terms of war and peace ;
today, we have to negotiate for survival.
Therefore, one who understands the problem that we
have to meet must realize that we must meet the enemy
as a united nation or we shall collapse by disunion. Noth-
ing is easier, in a free country, than to find flaws in the
operations of a free government. Of course. President
Kennedy makes mistakes ; of course, the Congress makes
mistakes ; of course, the Cabinet is not the best that could
be chosen. Perfection is to be sought for and found in
Heaven. But what we are dealing with is the hell of war
and our imperfections have to be met with goodwill and
have to be corrected swiftly and courageously to meet our
current dangers.
Finally, let me mention one new direction that
has been impo.sed upon us by the awesome new
developments in weapons. In the past, disputes
could be settled and adversaries controlled by mili-
tary power. Nations and people learned to hate
the enemy as a prelude to crushing him. In our
thermonuclear age conflict has become a thing of
far greater subtlety.
As much as shrewd battlefield strategists, we
now need political expertise, diplomatic astuteness,
psychological shrewdness, technical and scientific
skill — and most of all a knowledge and apprecia-
tion of what we are defending.
General David M. Shoup, Commandant of the
Marine Corps, simimed up what I am saying in
two eloquent paragraphs of testimony before the
Stennis subcommittee last week. He said :
We teach them (Marines) what there is in this country
that is worth living for, worth fighting for, worth giving
your life for. I might state right here that inasmuch as
there has been some controversy over this, Mr. Chairman,
I would like to proceed to tell you again that we don't
teach them hate.
Hate I consider is an internal sin. And hate is closely
associated with fear. I think fear breeds defeatism, and
that is a disea.se that we cannot afford in this country if
we are going to maintain our position in the family of
freedom-loving people.
So I would have to say that one new direction
of foreign policy flows from an understanding that
the best servant of the cause of freedom in today's
world is not necessarily the man who danans the
enemy in the most provocative tones. "VVliether
the directions of foreign policy be old or new, we
must proceed with knowledge that the race is long,
the course arduous, the demand for endurance
great. It is our task to confer in unity and
strength. Only then can we be sure of victory in
the end.
Depreciation ScFieduies Announced
for Hosiery, Knitwear Equipment
White House press release dated February 15
The President on February 15 announced new
depreciation schedules for machinery and equip-
ment used in the hosiery and knitwear segment of
the textile industry. On the average the new
depreciable lives will be more than 40 percent
shorter than those which have been used as guide-
lines since 1942, as prescribed in Internal Revenue
Service Bulletin "F."
At the same time the President announced that
the Internal Revenue Service has completed its
detailed revision of depreciation guidelines for
machinery and equipment used in spinning and
weaving mills. A general revision by broad cate-
gories, covering about 90 percent of the equipment
used in spinning and weaving mills, was put into
effect last October.^
The two actions complete the planned deprecia-
tion revision for the textile industry, which was
undertaken as part of the President's overall pro-
gram of assistance to that industry, announced
May 2, 1961.^ The revised guidelines, designed to
bring depreciation schedules into line with present-
day rates of obsolescence of equipment, will enable
the industry to speed modernization of its equip-
ment to meet foreign competition and provide
more jobs for American workers.
For four major types of equipment used by
hosiery and knitwear manufacturers, new depre-
ciable lives of 9 years have been established, com-
pared with the 15 years previously in effect.
These are: knitting machines, loopers, seaming
machines, and twist setting machines. Other new
depreciable lives include: boarding machines, 8
years, compared with the 15 years previously used ;
and dryers, 10 years compared with the 20 to 25
years. For collection system equipment — an item
not in u.se in 1942 and therefore not covered by
Bulletin "F" — a useful life of 10 years has been
set.
The new schedules of depreciable lives for
hosiery and knitwear will go into effect for taxable
years for which returns are due to be filed on or
after February 16, 19G2, as will the new schedules
for a group of miscellaneous equipment used in
' Bulletin of Oct. 30, 1961, p. 730.
' Ibid.. May 29, 1961, p. 825.
March 5, J 962
381
the textile industry. The more detailed schedules
for spinning- and weaving-mill equipment will be
usable on tax returns due to be filed on or after
October 11, 1961.
In most cases textile manufacturers of all types
will be able to shift to more rapid depreciation
schedules on existing, as well as new, equipment.
The depreciation timetable for existing equipment
will be determined by an Internal Eevenue Serv-
ice formula.
President Concurs on Several
Recent Escape-Clause Cases
White House press release dated February 9
The President on February 9 concurred in re-
cent findings of the United States Tariff Com-
mission that no formal investigations should be
instituted at this time to determine whether tariffs
should be reduced on imports of lead and zinc,
spring clothespins, stainless steel flatware, and
safety pins.
The President accepted the judgments of the
Tariff Commission that there is no present justi-
fication for reopening any of the escape-clause
actions in the cases cited, which resulted in in-
creased duties. Therefore, the liigher duties now
in effect will continue to apply, without reduction
or modification.
The President's decisions were reached after
consultation with the Trade Policy Committee.
The Tariff Commission studies were made pur-
suant to Executive Order 10401, which requires
periodic review of affii-mative actions taken under
escape-clause procedures.
State Advisory Committee
Holds Fourth Meeting
The Department of State announced on Febru-
ary 15 (press release 103) that representatives of
29 State Governors met at the Department on that
day ^ with members of the Office of the Chief of
Protocol and other interested divisions of the De-
partment to discuss ways of expanding and mak-
ing more meaningful the travel of foreign diplo-
matic representatives stationed in this country as
' For an Agenda and a list of the names of the par-
ticipants, see Department of State press release 103 dated
Feb. 15.
382
well as of other high-level foreign visitors and
guests of the United States. Angier Biddle Duke,
Chief of Protocol, presided over the meeting, and
introductory remarks were delivered by Under
Secretary Ball.
This was the fourth such meeting of State Gov-
ernors' representatives, who together constitute
the State Advisory Committee to the Chief of
Protocol. This committee was organized in the
spring of 1961 by the Chief of Protocol at the
request of the President.^ Its purpose at that time
was primarily to provide a group of men with
whom State Department officials could meet and
whom the Office of Protocol could at any time
consult regarding ways of assuring incident-free
travel of diplomats and visitors from African and
Asian countries. The committee's work in this
field has had considerable results.
At this meeting methods were explored to ex-
pand the work of the committee to include en-
couraging and facilitating the travel of all foreign
diplomats and high-level foreign officials traveling
in the United States. Mr. Ball indicated that
sound relations between sovereign states are usu-
ally founded on accurate mutual knowledge and
that the work of the individual States in helping
foreign government representatives and visitors
to gain a better imderstanding of this country can
be invaluable.
Representatives of several States reported on
visits they had received from foreign dignitaries
since the last meeting of the State Advisory Com-
mittee in September 1961. Particular mention
was given to the visit of Robert Matthia, Chief of
Protocol of the Republic of Togo, who toured the
United States in December of last year.
Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy
87th Congress, 1st Session
Impact of Imports and Esport.s on Employment (Tex-
tiles). Hearings before the Subcommittee on the Im-
pact of Imports and Exports on American Employment
of the House Committee on Education and Labor.
Part 4. July 10-21. 19«1. 292 pp.
Export of Strategic Materials to the U.S.S.R. and Other
Soviet I?loc Countries. Hearing before the Subcom-
mittee To Investig.ite the Administration of the Internal
Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the
Senate Judiciary Committee. Part 1. October 23, 1961.
131 pp.
' For background, see Bulijitin of May 15, 1961, p. 732 ;
July 3, 19()1, p. 32; and Oct. 2, 1961, p. 552.
Department of State Bulletin
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings^
Scheduled March Through May 1962
lA-ECOSOC: 1st meeting of National Directors of Immigration Customs San Salvador Mar. I-
and Tourism of Central America, Mexico, and the United States.
U.N. ECAFE Committee for the Coordination of Investigations of the Tokyo Mar. 4-*
Lower Mekong Basin: 17th (Special) Session.
ICAO European- Mediterranean Aeronautical Fi.xod Telecommunications Paris Mar. 5-
Network Panel.
ICAO Panel on Origin and Destination Statistics: 4th Session Montreal Mar. 5-
Caribbean Organization: Ministerial Meeting on Trade and Movement of Georgetown, British Guiana . . Mar. 5-
Persons.
WMO Working Group on the Guide to Agricultural Meteorological Prac- Geneva Mar. 5-
tices.
UNESCO/ECLA/OAS/ILO/FAO Conference on Education and Economic Santiago Mar. 5-
and Social Development in Latin America.
U.N. ECOSOC Committee for Industrial Development: 2d Session . . . New York Mar. 5-
U.N. ECE Working Party on River Law Geneva Mar. 5-
U.N. Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation: 11th Ses- New York Mar. 5-
sion.
U.N. Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space New York Mar. 5-
U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East: 18th Session . . Tokyo Mar. 6-
International Lead and Zinc Study Group: Special Working Group . . . Geneva Mar. 8-
CENTO Liaison Committee Lahore Mar. 12-
ICAO Air Traffic Control Automation Panel Montreal Mar. 12-
International Lead and Zinc Study Group: Statistical Committee . . . . Geneva Mar. 12-
GATT Expert Group on Consular FormaUties Geneva Mar. 12-
U.N. ECE Working Party on Construction of Vehicles Geneva Mar. 12-
ITU CCIR Study Group IV (Space Systems) and Study Group VIII (Inter- Washington Mar. 12-
national Monitoring).
Caribbean Organization Council Georgetown, British Guiana . . Mar. 13-
WMO Regional Association I (Africa): 3d Session Addis Ababa Mar. 14-
U.N. Disarmament Committee: 1st Meeting Geneva Mar. 14-
International Lead and Zinc Study Group: 5th Session Geneva Mar. 15-
WMO Working Group on the Synoptic Use of Meteorological Data From Washington Mar. 15-*
Artificial Satellites.
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights: 18th Session New York Mar. 19-
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Status of Women: 16th Session .... New York Mar. 19-
U.N. ECE Coal Committee (and working parties) Geneva Mar. 19-
UNESCO Meeting of Advisory Committee on Educational Projects in Santiago Mar. 20-
Latin America.
CENTO Civil Defense Experts Lahore Mar. 21-
U.N. ECE Steel Committee: Working Party on Steel Statistics .... Geneva Mar. 22-
ICAO Legal Subcommittee Montreal Mar. 26-
WMO Commission for Synoptic Meteorology: 3d Session Washington Mar. 26-
IMCO International Conference on the Prevention of Pollution of the London Mar. 26-
Sea by Oil.
U.N. ECE Steel Committee: 27th Session Geneva Mar. 26-
UNESCO Conference of Ministers of Education of Africa Paris Mar. 26-
ICEM Executive Committee: 19th Session Geneva Mar. 27-
Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences: 7th Meeting of Turrialba, Costa Rica .... March
Technical Advisory Council.
Inter-American Indian Institute: Governing Board Mexico, D.F March
' Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Feb. 13, 1962. Asterisks indicate tentative dates and places.
Following is a list of abbreviations: ANZUS, Australia-New Zealand-United States; CCIR, Comite consultatif inter-
national des radio communications; CENTO, Central Treaty Organization; EGA, Economic Commission for Africa;
ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECLA, Economic
Commission for Latin America; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization;
GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; lA-ECOSOC, Inter-
American Economic and Social Council; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ICEM, Intergovernmental
Committee for European Migration; IDB, Inter-American Development Bank; ILO, International Labor Organization;
IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; NATO,
North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OAS, Organization of American States; OECD, Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development; PAHO, Pan American Health Organization; SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization; U.N.,
United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; UPU, Universal Postal
Union; WHO, World Health Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.
March 5, 7962 383
Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings — Continued
Scheduled March Through May 1962 — Continued
ICEM Council: 16th Session Geneva Apr. 2-
UNESCO Conference on Education in Asia Tokyo Apr. 2-
ILO African Advisory Committee: 2d Session Tananarive Apr. 3-
Inter- American Nuclear Energy Commission: 4th Meeting Mexico, D.F Apr. 3-
U.N. Economic and Social Council: 33d Session New York Apr. 3-
ITU CCIR Study Group I (Transmitters) and Study Group III (Fixed Geneva Apr. 4-
Service Systems).
IDB Board of Governors: 3d Meeting Buenos Aires Apr. 5-
GATT Working Party on Tariff Reduction Geneva Apr. 5-
ILO Committee on Statistics of Hours of Work Geneva Apr. 9-
ILO/WHO Committee on Occupational Health: 4th Session Geneva Apr. 9-
U.N. EGA Community Development Workshop on Social Welfare and Abidjan Apr. 11-
Family and Child Welfare.
IAEA Symposium on Reactor Hazards Evaluation Techniques Vienna Apr. 16-
FAO Poplar Commission: 17th Session of Executive Committee Ankara Apr. 16-
U.N. Committee on Information From Non-Self-Governing Territories: New York Apr. 16-
13th Session.
U.N. ECAFE Regional Seminar on Development of Ground Water Bangkok Apr. 24-*
Resources.
U.N. Economic Commission for Europe: 17th Session Geneva Apr. 24-
ITU CCIR Study Group VII (Standard Frequencies and Time Signals) . Geneva Apr. 25-
ITU CCIR Study Group V (Propagation, Including the Effects of Earth Geneva Apr. 25-
and Troposphere).
U.N. EGA Workshop on Urbanization Addis Ababa Apr. 25-
CENTO Military Committee London Apr. 26-*
SEATO Council of Ministers: 8th Meeting Paris Apr. 26-
PAHO Executive Committee: 46th Meeting (undetermined) Apr. 29-
CENTO Ministerial Council: 10th Meeting London Apr. 30-
IMCO Interagency Meeting for Coordination of Safety at Sea and Air . London Apr. 30-
GATT Committee III on Expansion of International Trade Geneva Apr. 30-
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Commodity Trade: Special Working Rome Apr. 30-
Party.
U.N. ECOSOC Social Commission: 14th Session . . New York Apr. 30-
OECD Agricultural Committee Paris April
OECD Ministerial Meeting Paris April
FAO Desert Locust Control Committee: 7th Session Addis Ababa* April
2d U.N. ECAFE Symposium on the Development of Petroleum Resources Tehran May 2-
of Asia and the Far East.
UNESCO Executive Board: 61st Session Paris May 2-
NATO Ministerial Council Athens May 3-
U.N. Commission on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Wealth and New York May 4-
Resources: 4th Session.
ITU Administrative Council: 17th Session Geneva May 5-
ANZUS Council: 8th Meeting Canberra May 7-
lAEA Symposium on Radiation Damage in Solids and Reactor Materials . Venice May 7-
15th International Film Festival Cannes May 7-
ILO Chemical Industries Committee: 6th Session Geneva May 7-
IMCO Maritime Safety Committee: Subcommittee on Code of Signals . London May 7-
NATO Planning Board for Ocean Shipping: 14th Meeting Washington May 7-
International Seed Testing Association: 13th Congress Lisbon May 7-
FAO Committee on Commodity Problems: 35th Session Rome May 7-
ITU CCIR Study Group II (Receivers) Geneva May 7-
ITU CCIR Study Group VI (Ionospheric Propagation) Geneva May 7-
GATT Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions Geneva May 7-
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on International Commodity Trade and FAO Rome May 7-
Committee on Commodity Problems (Joint Session).
15th World Health Assembly Geneva May 8-
8th International Hydrographic Conference Monte Carlo May 8-
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Narcotic Drugs: Committee on Illicit Geneva May 8-
Traffic.
International Cotton Advisory Committee: Committee on Extra-Long Washington May 9-
Staple Cotton.
UPU Executive and Liaison Committee Bern May 11-
Intcrnational Cotton Advisory Committee: 21st Plenary Meeting . . . . Washington May 14-
Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Law: Uth Session (resumed) . . . Bru.ssels May 14-
Executive Committee of the Program of the U.N. High Commissioner for Geneva May 14-
Refugees: 7th Session.
U.N. Special Fund: 8th Session of the Governing Council New York May 14-
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on International Commodity Trade: 10th Rome May 14-
Session.
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Narcotic Drugs: 17th Session Geneva May 14-
8th Inter- American Travel Congress Rio do Janeiro May 15-
19th International Conference on Large Electric Systems Paris May 16-
384 Department of State Bulletin
GATT Council of Roprcspntatives Geneva May 21-
ICAO Airworthiness Committee: 5th Session Montreal May 21-
Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission: Annual Meeting San Diego or Quito May 24-
NATO Civil Aviation Plannins Committee Paris May 25-
ICAO Meteorological Operational Telecommunication Networlv Kuroiie Paris May 28-
Panel.
WHO Executive Board: 30th Session Geneva May 28-
ILO Governing Body: 152d Session (and its committees) Geneva May 28-
IMCO Maritime Safety Committee: Subcommittee on Subdivision and London May 28-
Stability.
International Rubber Study Group: 16th Meeting Washington May 28-
WMO Executive Committee: 14th Session Geneva May 29-
U.N. Trusteeship Council: 29th Session New Yorlv May 31-
U.N. General Assembly Urges Portugal To Promote
Self-Determination for Angola
Following are statements tnade hy Adlai E.
Stevenson, U.S. Representative to the General
Assembly, in plenary session during debate on the
situation in Angola, together with the text of a
resolution adopted hy the General Assembly on
January 30.
STATEMENT OF JANUARY 25
U.S. delegation press release 3914
We have been often reminded during tliis long:
debate that it is now nearly a year since Angola
became a center of trouble and tragedy in Africa,
and hence an object of urgent concern both in
the Security Coimcil and in the General Assem-
bly. Important events have taken place during
that period. All may be quiet now in Angola,
but little has happened to avert the danger of
further alarming tragedy at some future time.
xVnd nothing has happened to lessen the duty of
this Assembly to further a just and peaceful solu-
tion in accordance with the charter.
Wliat the details of that solution ought to be
is not the issue. But the broad character of the
solution should be determined by the force of
history and by the charter, which is our common
standard.
In the view of the United States delegation,
three great principles are involved.
First is the principle of self-determination. In
the first meeting on this subject last winter^ I
' For background, see BtTLLETiN of Apr. 3, 1961, p. 497.
emphasized the belief of the United States that
it was imperative for Portugal to speed up the
economic and social advancement of the inhabit-
ants of Angola toward full self-determination.
That that is the duty of Portugal and that that
is the right of the Angolans remains the un-
changed view of my Government.
Second, and equally vital, is the duty of the
Assembly to propose peaceful means of avoiding
further conflict. This duty lies upon the Gov-
ernment of Portugal and upon all member states
of the United Nations.
These two principles of self-determination and
of peaceful settlement are interconnected, and it
is our responsibility to assure that both are
accomplished.
Finally, there is a third principle, whose ful-
fillment depends upon the other two and which
is perliaps the highest ideal of the cliarter: the
ideal of peaceful cooperation among equals for
the common good. The future is full of the pos-
sibilities of such peaceful and creative cooperation
between Portugal and Angola. But those possi-
bilities cannot be realized unless the present rela-
tionship gives way to one based on full and
voluntary acceptance by all those directly
concerned.
These have long been the views of the United
States. They rest not on trivial or accidental
circumstances but on fundamental and long-range
considerations: our national tradition of anti-
colonialism, our friendship and alliance with Por-
tugal, and our fidelity to the charter. These are
March 5, /962
385
manifestly not extreme but moderate and progres-
sive views, and we trust that will be coMiitcd in
their favor.
Our most earnest wish is that as members of
the United Nations we shoidd work together to
assist in the great inexorable movement toward
freedom and self-determination and also to keep
tliat movement in the creative paths of peace —
difficult thougli those paths often seem. Dedi-
cated together to achieve peaceful change through
the processes of the charter, members must not
individually plunge in haste, or in despair, into
the use of force and tlie abyss of war.
Report of Subcommittee on Angola
Ovir feelings tliat peaceful change should take
place along these lines are confirmed by the re-
port. ^ of the subcommittee on Angola, which was
submitted since our last debate. This report
amply reflects the wisdom and diligence of the
distinguished representatives of Bolivia, Daho-
mey, Finland, Malaya, and Sudan. We have
noted with satisfaction and applaud the repeated
expressions of thanks of the Assembly for a
document whicli is most useful to us in our
consideration of this question.
The report, would be still more useful and more
complete if the subcommittee had been enabled
to visit Angola. We regret that Portugal decided
not to permit tliis. If there are sliortcomings in
the report, these certainly arise in part from the
hampering circumstance.
We were glad to note that the Portuguese Gov-
ernment did receive Dr. [Carlos] Salamanca in
Lisbon, in his capacity as chairman of the subcom-
mittee, and provided him with information and
with an insiglit into the Portuguese policy in
Angola, which is duly reflected in the report. We
note also that the Portuguese Government is co-
operating with an inquiry on labor conditions in
Angola which is now being conducted in Angola
by the International Labor Organization. We
believe that, moving forward froui these steps,
the Portuguese Government would be wise now,
in the same spirit of cooperation, to accept a
United Nations visit to Angola.
In any case, Mr. President, whatever the lim-
itations of the present report, it contains much
which deserves the attention and (liouglit of the
Assembly. It notes the tragic price wliicli has
= U.N. doc. A/4!)78.
already been paid : ". . . the loss of thousands of
lives, the fliglit of nearly 150,000 refugees from
the territory, and the creation of 'a veritable at-
mosphere of war.' "
On the more positive and liopeful side, the re-
port notes the announced reforms initiated by the
Portuguese Government in Angola. Although
tlie subcommittee refrained from making any
judgment as to the adequacy of these steps, it did
note that "they would seem to reflect some aware-
ness by the Government of Portugal of the need to
adjust its policies to the realities of the situation
and the opinion of the international community."
And the report, adds the view that "rapid measures
by the Government of Portugal can still preserve
the positive elements of past policies and achieve-
ments."
I would conclude this discussion of the report
by reading one last brief passage :
The Sub-Committee believes that the recognition of the
personality of Angola, the primacy of the interests of the
inhiibitants of the territory, the acceptance of the prin-
ciple of self-determination to Angola and the need for
immediate steps to prepare Angola for self-government
are not antithetical to the vital interests or the historic
mission of the Portuguese people. Such steps are, on
the other hand, fully consistent with the recognition of
racial equality and the proclaimed philosophy of Portugal.
With that sentiment the United States is in
complete accord. It is worth remembering espe-
cially that, whatever other difficulties may exist
in this case, we do not have to contend with racial
superiority or racial separation. In fact, as the
subcommittee suggests, there is great potential
common ground between the contending forces in
Angola.
Reforms Announced by Portugal
Mr. President, as an olil friend and ally of
Portugal, the United States is by no means deaf
to the complaint of the distingiiislied representa-
tive of Portugal that tliere lias been little attempt
to assess the positive features of the Portuguese
presence in Africa. That may be, althougli, as
I just noted, the report of the subcommittee ac-
knowledges that such positive elements exist and
should be presen'ed.
In any case it is not tlie elimination of Portu-
guese relationships with Angola, or with Africa,
that should be our goal. Rather we sliould strive
to create conditions mider wliich the people of
Angola, building on the positive elements of tlie
386
Department of Sfafe Bulletin
past, can detei-mine their own destiny, including
their future rehitions with the Portuguese nation.
It is m the light of this goal that the world will
wish to evaluate the measures of reform announced
by Portugal on Soplcmber 8, 19(il. It is note-
worthy that Portugal announced this reform pro-
gram less than 5 months after the passage of the
first United Nations resolution on the Angolan
problem. That Assembly resolution 1603, adopted
last April 20, urged Portugal among other things
"to consider urgently the introduction of measures
and reforms in Angola for the purpose of the im-
plementation of General Assembly resolution
1514 (XV)."
Thus the present reforms are a forward move-
ment responsive to the Assembly's request. If they
are carried out and expanded they could contrib-
ute to the future of peace and freedom in Angola
which we all seek. We hope they are the firet
step toward self-determination for the Angolan
people. We cannot now tell how effective they
will be and would urge Portugal to keep the
United Nations fully and promptly informed
about the significance and meaning of these re-
forms as they are implemented.
Steps Initiated by U.S.
Now let me inform the Assembly briefly con-
cerning the steps which the United States has
taken on its own initiative to further the purposes
of the United Nations on the question of Angola.
First, we are convinced, based on our own his-
torical experience, that any relationship among
people not based on mutual consent is fundamen-
tally unsound and ultimately doomed to failure.
Whatever may have been the justification or bene-
fits of colonialism in the past, its era is over and
it must give way to the superior right of peoples
to determine for themselves how they should be
governed.
We have therefore consistently encouraged
Portugal over the past year, not only in the United
Nations but also outside it, to advance its policies
in Angola at a rate which would make possible a
constructive and harmonious solution. We have
made clear to the Portuguese Government our view
that this solution must embrace full self-determi-
nation for the people of Angola and have sought to
persuade them to modify their policies and make
adjustments to this end.
Second, as we informed the Assembly last De-
cember, the United States has pointed out to the
Portuguese Government that the diversion to tlie
lighting in Angola of any NATO military equip-
ment supplied to Portugal by the United States
would be inconsistent with our military defense
agreement with Portugal. We sought and ob-
tained at that time the assurance of Portugal that
no such equipment would be emi)loyed there.
Moreover, in accordance with the desire of this
body to seek a peaceful solution in Angola, we liave
taken the further step of instituting measures to
prevent the commercial export of arms for use
by those at conflict.
Tliird, the United States lias told Portugal that
it is ready to give sympathetic consideration to
any request by Portugal for material aid in educa-
tion, vocational training, and work rehabilitation
in Angola. This ofl^er is designed to encourage
progress toward self-detennination. It is in har-
mony with one of the findings of the subcommittee,
which emphasized "the need for a rapid and
massive expansion of educational facilities in order
to enhance the economic, social, and political ad-
vancement of the territory."
Finally, for those Angolans who have taken
refuge in the Congo, we have given and will con-
tinue to give material aid through the United
Nations. And we are prepared to support a
United Nations educational program for young
Angolan refugees.
Responsibility of U.N. in Angola
The Assembly now once more faces the problem
of determining what its own further role toward
the events in Angola should be. In so doing the
Assembly and its member states must constantly
keep in mind the repercussions which will be cre-
ated elsewhere in the future by what it and they
do here and now.
The root of the problem in Angola is change —
the inevitable, continuous modification of man's
relationship with other men. It is such progress
that is necessary to a healthy and growing world.
The new status of the Angolaii people which will
inevitably unfold in Angola, just as it has un-
folded or is unfolding in most of the rest of Africa,
is an integral part of this process of change.
The charter, the instrument from which the role
of the General Assembly derives, provides a way
in which we may encourage the realization of
such change by peaceful processes. Chapter XI
March 5, 7962
387
establishes the principle that the political, eco-
nomic, social, and educational advancement of the
inhabitants of these territories shall take place
by peaceful means. It also imposes obligations
on the administering authorities, foremost among
which is that of promoting to the utmost the well-
being of the inhabitants of these territories and,
in this context, to develop self-government.
It is precisely the question to what extent Por-
tugal has lived up to these obligations under the
charter, with respect to the people of Angola,
which has given rise to recent events in that terri-
tory. Violence of the sort that is reported to
have taken place in Angola is ugly and abhorrent
and is the very thing which due application of
the principles of the charter, and especially those
of chapter XI, was designed to avoid. Had these
principles in fact been applied in Angola, as they
have elsewhere in so many places and with such
conspicuous success, it is highly unlikely that we
would now be considering the item before us in
its present context.
None can or would wish to contest the right
of the people of Angola to maintain their strug-
gles to determine their own political destiny.
And it would be futile to expect their desires not
to be furthered by other means if the franchise
is not made progressively available. But the re-
sponsibility the rest of us have to the Angolans
and to the Portuguese is to use our influence with
them to assure that the processes of peace prevail
over the coimsels of violence. And the responsi-
bility we have to ourselves and to each other is
to conduct our own individual policies toward
the same peaceful, not violent, end. This was
the commitment we made when we signed the
charter, and it is fundamentally upon our adher-
ence to tliis commitment that the efficacy of this
organization depends.
The United Nations stands for peaceful change.
We, its individual members, have a responsibility
not to employ force in situations such as prevail
in Angola. This responsibility falls on all of us :
on Portugal not to repress with force the just
aspirations of the people of Angola under the
pretext of its rightful and essential responsibility
for the maintenance of law and order; on the
rest of us not to intervene with force to press the
changes in Angola. There are not two laws of
the charter on such questions. There is only one,
and it is equally binding on us all. As for itself.
the United States will continue to exert all its
influence toward resolving the issue of Angola
within the terms of the charter, by peaceful means.
We earnestly trust that others will take the same
attitude. In this process of change, but by peace-
ful means, lies the responsibility of the United
Nations.
Strengthening U.N.'s Peacekeeping Machinery
I am sure that members of the iVssembly will
recognize that we are faced here with a problem
which goes far beyond the particular one of An-
gola. For a moment I would like to depart from
the specific problem of Angola to deal with this
larger aspect. A profound dilemma confronts the
United Nations in attempting at the same time to
facilitate change and to keep the peace. Both of
these are imperative responsibilities which the
United Nations must not and cannot escape. They
are moreover mutually dependent and comple-
mentary. Without peaceful change, tensions will
build up which will eventually explode in the use
of force. On the other hand, whenever force is
used to effect change, the very foundations of this
peacekeeping organization, on which the security
of all of us in whole or in part depends, are
dangerously shaken.
There unhappily still exist in the world many
situations which individual nations or groups of
nations consider to be unjust and intolerable.
Some of these are vestiges of the colonial system.
Others are threats to peoples, not long ago free,
who no longer control their own destiny or whose
freedom is in jeopardy. Still others are concerned
with territorial claims of one nation against an-
other, claims of one new nation against another,
claims of one new nation against another as well
as against the older powers. In each of these
cases one party, or sometimes both parties, is likely
to feel that the present situation is luijust, out-
rageous, humiliating, and must be changed at all
costs. Men and nations always run the risk of
thinking their grievances unique, their impatience
justified. If the numerous instruments of peace-
ful change and peaceful settlement do not provide
a .solution acceptable to them, there is a great
temptation to claim that the possibilities of peace-
ful settlement have been exhausted, that the situa-
tion can no longer be tolerated, and that there is
"no alternative" to a resort to force. But in 10C2
both the risks and our responsibilities must be
388
Department of Slate Bulletin
pondered with the greatest of care. Even in 1045,
before the age of atomic weapons had really be-
gun, men and nations concluded that the holocaust
of war was too terrible to be an instrument of pol-
icy and created this organization with its ways
and means for tackling the grievances, disputes,
and injustices which vex us.
The provisions of the charter are exceedingly
clear. Article 2, paragraph 3 states that "All
Members shall settle their international disputes
by peaceful means. . . ." This organization, over
the 16 years of its life, has built wisely upon re-
lated charter provisions. We have available a
wide range of instruments through which peace-
ful change can be facilitated and peaceful settle-
ment effected.
The Secretary-General and his senior staff have
given excellent service in the conciliation of dan-
gerous and destructive conflicts. We have estab-
lished United Nations "presences" in various
areas — sj'mbols of the organization — symbols
which have helped dampen down explosive situa-
tions and give effect to quiet conciliation. Rap-
porteurs or special representatives have been
appointed for the detailed negotiations necessary
in complex disputes. Notable successes have been
achieved in apparently intractable cases. The
United Nations facilitated the independence of
Indonesia in 1948 and 1949. Peace, though un-
easy, has been kept in Palestine with the aid of
the United Nations Emergency Force and the
United Nations Truce Supervision Organization.
Aggression was repelled in Korea. An observer
corps helped stabilize a situation of turbulence in
Lebanon. We are now engaged in a major and
increasingly hopeful operation in the Congo which
is providing new proof of our peacekeeping
capability.
Relying on Principles of Charter
Such United Nations machinery for stability,
peace, and change should be used to the maximum,
and we may want during the coming months to
see whether it can be strengthened and made more
quickly responsive to the needs of this dangerous
interval in human history when an old order is
dying and a new one struggling to be born.
But, Mr. President, we will make little progress
either in improving our machinery or in making
effective use of that which we already have unless
we bring to this all-important task a new will, a
new determination, to build the work of peaceful
settlement and of peaceful change through this
organization into the very fabric of our mutual
relationships. In a world living imder a nuclear
sword even our small quarrels can escalate into
general catastrophe. We are dealing, Mr. Presi-
dent, with a major question of political will — the
will to effect peaceful and orderly change, the will
to take action which will strengthen the capacity
of this organization to cope with the heavy respon-
sibilities placed upon it.
If anyone in our world feels his case is special,
so unique that international procedures can be
ignored and obstacles crushed by military force,
let him consider the risks. Can exceptions be made
from standards of conduct we have all accepted
without risking that they will be followed in other
cases? Can anyone believe that the use of force
can be prohibited in certain types of national dis-
putes if it is allowed in others ?
In our interdependent world what is done in one
place, however remote, reverberates around the
globe and the implications grow as they travel.
No longer is it possible to rely on localized
conflicts.
If one of us takes the law into his own hands,
he may force the hand of others who also feel they
have a special cause. How can a government
justify to its people not using force to settle its
grievances if its neighbors are doing so? Such
anarchy in an age of enormous armaments and nu-
clear weapons is literally impossible. Either the
anarchy must be prevented and peaceful proce-
dures employed, or we shall destroy ourselves.
National injustices, whether they be remnants
of colonialism or disputes among new or among
old states, must not be allowed to threaten the
destruction of our United Nations Organization,
with its developing but still fragile peacekeeping
machinery and the hopes of all mankind for a
world of law and order. The use of force in colo-
nial questions is no more justified than in any other
question, and any effort to establish a dual stand-
ard of conduct with respect to them could not fail
seriously to endanger the entire structure of the
United Nations. And those who would suffer
most from a weakening of the United Nations
would be those who need the United Nations
most — those small states who do not have strong
allies or the physical resources for unilateral self-
defense in a modern world. If such states choose
March 5, 1962
389
to achieve their own ambitions and settle their own
disputes by force or to condone others in doing
so, they risk finding, when they themselves are
threatened, that the great international instru-
ment which might have saved them has been para-
lyzed by their own action or inaction.
The charter provides the most extensive ma-
chinery the world has ever seen for the peaceful
settlement of disputes and for the adjustment of
differences among states. Members of the United
Nations are bound to avail themselves of this
machinery and not to resort to the use of armed
force when this macliinery does not provide a quick
or a desired result. In view of the alternative
prospect, with the ever-expanding potential of
modem arms and armaments, I submit that it is
both compulsoi-y and expedient to rely on the
principles of the charter and to use to the full
the machinery and processes of the United Nations
for effecting peaceful change. Wliere states re-
sort to force instead, they can expect vigorous
opposition from the United States, whoever they
may be.
Peaceful Progress and Peaceful Change
Mr. President, in Angola the broad character
of the solution is clear. It does not lie in a fruit-
less attempt to repress inevitable change. Nor
does it lie in the fomenting of \'iolence and extrem-
ism. It lies rather in the processes of peaceful
progress and peaceful change. And it is not too
late to set those processes in motion.
The greatest responsibility lies upon Portugal
and upon those who contend against her — upon
Portugal to accept the goal of self-determination,
and upon both to work in good faith toward the
goal, abjuring force. A corresponding responsi-
bility lies upon every member of the United Na-
tions to make every effort to advance this process,
to discourage the use of force, and to encourage
recourse to the extensive machinery of peaceful
settlement provided in the charter.
We hope that the General Assembly will adopt
a resolution embodying these principles and that
Portugal in its wisdom will respond, not only to the
voice of the community of nations but to its own
highest self-interest. Thus both the United Na-
tions and Portugal will have contributed a bright
page to the history of the growth of human free-
dom.
STATEMENT OF JANUARY 30
U.S. delegation press release 3917
The United States delegation believes that the
resolution which the Assembly adopts at the con-
clusion of this long debate on Angola should, first,
reflect the worldwide concern over Portugal's pres-
ent policies toward Angola and, second, should
appeal to that Government to heed the call of this
Assembly and grant self-determination to the
people of Angola. The resolution should, we
think, take note of the announcement by Portugal
of a program of reforms and express its hopes for
speedy and effective application of these and other
reforms. And, finally, the resolution should offer
concrete and realistic suggestions whicli, if ac-
cepted by the Government of Portugal and the
other members of the United Nations, could indeed
lead to the ending of what we call the "situation in
Angola." This resolution should, we believe, re-
flect moderation and responsibility. This is the
approach which we believe will have the greatest
effect on Portugal. And obviously our hope for
speedy progress in Angola depends upon Portugal.
"V^Hiile the resolution sponsored by the 45 dele-
gations does not meet all of these hopes and ex-
pectations, it does, in our judgment, meet most
of theTii. and the United States delegation is fully
appreciative of the long hours and the diligent
hard work devoted to its drafting. We welcome
the spirit of constructive responsibility which is
reflected in the text before us.'
However, it would be surprising indeed to ex-
pect everyone to be completely satisfied, wliere so
many views have to be reconciled in one document.
I must, therefore, say that, while the United States
delegation believes the draft resolution is intended
to be constructive and to lead toward the peaceful
develojiment of self-determination which most of
us su])port, we have certain reservations about its I
phraseology. For example, operative paragraph
3 does not recognize that some of the measures
taken by Portugal were the necessary ingredients
of law and order, which is of course the first duty
of any government. IMoreover, paragraph 4 does
not make allowance for cases wliich would subject
the perpetrators in any area to arrest by the re-
sponsible authorities. Doubtless both sides need
to exhibit more tolerance and refrain from actions
U.iN. Uoc. A/L. 384/Rev. 1 and Add. 1.
390
Department of State Bulletin
whic'li ciin only load to more fisjlitinij and violence
and bloodshed. I am glad to note, however, that
relative calm appears to exist at this moment in
most of Angola. Finally, with regard to operative
paragraph 9, we consider this language too sweep-
ing.
But our principal difficulties center around op-
erative paragraphs G(b) and 7. Our major
concern relates to the mandate given by this reso-
lution to the Special Committee of 17. As the
Assembly well ImoM's, imder the terms of its Res-
olution 1699 [December 28, 1961], the Assembly
has established a committee of seven members to
provide information on Portuguese territories, in-
cluding Angola. In addition, the resolution we
are now considering properly renews the mandate
of the subcommittee on Angola. We believe that
the subcommittee on Angola has performed its
task with competence, dignity, and diligence, and
"we have eveiy reason to believe that it will cai-ry
out its future work in this same manner. Thus
we see no need to designate or direct still a third
committee, the Committee of 17, to apply itself
to the situation in Angola. We believe, on the
contrary, that this proliferation of committees
will inevitably lead to unnecessary duplication and
the creation of confusion rather than efficiency
and coherence. The attention of three committees
focused on Angola is, we fear, likely then to hinder
rather than to advance the progress we all desire.
Our second reserv-ation in paragraph 7 concerns
its failure to mention self-detenTiination. Our
views are simple. We feel strongly that it is not
within the spirit or the letter of the charter for
the Assembly to prejudge for the people of An-
gola the outcome of their progress of self-determi-
nation. The people of Angola are entitled to
exercise an unqualified right of self-determination
and, of course, to independence, if that is their
choice. Accordingly, we would have preferred to
see paragraph 7 bi-ought into conformity with the
preamble, with operative paragraph 2, and with
article 73 of the charter, which, in our opinion, re-
flect more accurately what the goal of this resolu-
tion is, as well as the main conclusions of our
debate.
For these reasons we would request you, Mr.
President, to put to the vote separately the phrase
contained in paragi-aph 6(b) "through the Special
Committee of seventeen members established im-
der resolution 1654 (XVI)"'' — to quote the lan-
guage of the resolution — and the whole of opera-
tive paragraph 7. The United States will, for
its part, for the reasons that I have briefly ex-
plained, vote against the inclusion of the last half
of paragraph 6(b) and paragraph 7 of the resolu-
tion as sponsored by the 45 delegations.^
TEXT OF RESOLUTION'
The General Assembly,
Having considered the situation in Angola,
Recalling its resolution 1603 (XV) of 20 April 11)01 and
the Securit.v Council resolution of 9 June 1961,'
Having examined the report of the Sub-Committee on
the situation in Angoln appointed under resolution 1003
(XV),
Deploring the lack of co-operation and assistance by
Portugal in the full and efCective discharge of the Sub-
Committee's task as called for in the aforementioned res-
olutions,
'Noting with deep regret Portugal's refusal to recognize
Angola as a Non-Self-Governing Territory and its failure
to take measures to implement General Assembly resolu-
tion 1514 (XV)' of 14 December 1960 entitled "Declara-
tion on the granting of independence to colonial countries
and peoples",
Ccmvinccd that the continued refusal of Portugal to
recognize the legitimate aspirations of the Angolan peo-
ple to self-determination and independence constitutes a
permanent source of international friction and threatens
international peace and security,
1. Expresses its appreciation of the work of the Sub-
Committee on the situation in Angola and commends to
the Portuguese Government, for urgent consideration and
effective implementation, the observations, findings and
conclusions set out in the Sub-Committee's report ;
2. Solemnly reafflrms the inalienable right of the An-
golan people to self-determination and indeijendence ;
3. Deeply deprecates the repressive measures and
armed action against the people of Angola and the denial
to them of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and
* For text, see Biilletin of Jan. 8, 1962, p. 76.
° Deletion of the phrase in operative paragraph 0(b)
and the whole of operative paragraph 7 was approved by
the General Assembly on Jan. 30.
"U.N. doc. A/RES/1742 (XVI) (A/L. 384/Rev. 1, as
amended) ; adopted on Jan. 30 by a vote of 99 to 2 (South
Africa, Spain), with 1 abstention (France). Iceland
and Portugal were absent. A draft resolution (A/L. 383)
sponsored by Poland and Bulgaria, calling for sanctions
against Portugal, was defeated on the same date by a vote
of 26 to 43, with 32 abstentions.
' U.N. doe. S/4835 ; for text, see Btn.LEn.v of July 10,
1961, p. 89.
' For text, see ibid., Jan. 2, 1961, p. 27.
March 5, 7962
391
calls upon the Portuguese authorities to desist forthwith
from repressive measures against the people of Angola ;
4. Appeals to the Government of Portugal to release im-
mediately all Angolan political prisoners wherever they
may be held ;
5. Urges the Government of Portugal to undertake,
without further delay, extensive political, economic and
social reforms and measures and in particular to set up
freely elected and representative political institutions
with a view to transfer of power to the people of Angola ;
6. Decides to continue the Sub-Committee on the situa-
tion in Angola appointed under resolution 1603 (XV) :
(a) To continue the performance of its tasks ;
(b) To study ways and means to secure the imple-
mentation of the present resolution and to report thereon
to the Security Council and to the General Assembly;
7. Requests Member States to use their influence to se-
cure the compliance of Portugal with the present
resolutions ;
8. Requests all States Members of the United Nations
and members of the specialized agencies to deny to Por-
tugal any support and assistance which may be used by
it for the suppression of the people of Angola ;
9. Requests the Government of Portugal to submit a
report to the General Assembly at its seventeenth session
on the measures it has undertaken in the implementation
of the present resolution ;
10. Recommends to the Security Council, in the light of
the Council's resolution of 9 June IWil and of the present
resolution, to keep the matter under constant review.
FAO Member Nations Study World Food and Agricultural Problems
ELEVENTH SESSION OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION
OF THE UNITED NATIONS, ROME, OCTOBER 30-NOVEIVIBER 24, 1961
by Ralph W. Phillips and Walter W. Sohl
Some 600 of the world's agricultural leaders
assembled at the Rome, Italy, headquarters of the
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations from October 30 to November 24, 1961, to
participate in the 11th session of the FAO
Conference.
This governing body of FAO serves both as a
legislative body, dealing with program, budgetary,
constitutional, and administrative matters, and as
a forum examining international agricultural
problems. The 11th session climaxed 2 years of
growth in FAO's activities, aimed at assisting
member countries in the improvement of agricul-
tural production, distribution, and utilization.
Highlights were Conference acceptance of the
largest regular budget in the Organization's his-
• Dr. Phillips is Director, International
Organizations Division, Foreign Agricul-
tural Service, Department of Agriculture.
Mr. Sohl is an officer in the Bureau of
International Organization Affairs, Depart-
ment of State.
tory, approval of a World Food Program for the
multilateral tise of surplus foods, examination of
progress made in marshaling the world's agricul-
tural resources in the struggle against himger, and
admission of a substantial number of new member
countries.
John P. Duncan, Jr., Assistant Secretary of
Agriculture for Marketing and Foreign Agricul-
ture, led the U.S. delegation.^
This report summarizes some of the major ac-
tions of the Conference.
Admission of New Members
At the outset of the 11th session, FAO had 82
full members. The number was increased to 99 by
the election of 16 new members - and by the return
of Syria as a member following its separation
from the United Arab Republic.
' For names of other members of the U.S. delegation,
see Bulletin of Nov. 27, 19(51, p. 908.
^Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville),
Congo (Leopoldville), Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast,
Kuwait, Malagasy Republic, Mali, Mauritania, Niger,
Rumania, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Upper Volta.
392
DepaT\men\ of Sfo/e Bulletin
Four dependent territories ^ were elected to
associate membersliip, while a fifth ■* already held
this status. Jamaica and Tanganyika are to as-
sume full membership when, as independent na-
tions, they adhere to the FAO Constitution. Thus
there will be 101 member countries and 3
associate members.
Program of Work and Budget
After reviewing the program of work proposed
for 1962 and 1963, the Conference approved a
budget of $31,185,000 for the biennium. This will
provide for work in the fields of animal produc-
tion and health, agricultural application of atomic
energy, plant production and protection, fisheries,
forestry, land and water development, nutrition,
rural institutions and services, economics, com-
modities, and statistics. Also it will cover the
related library, information, publication, adminis-
trative, and other services. The budget for the
regular program for the current biennium repre-
sents an increase of $9,648,150 over the budget of
$21,536,850 voted in 1959 for the 1960-61 biennium.
The Conference established six technical com-
mittees (agriculture, economics, fisheries, forestry,
information, nutrition) to undertake a teclinical
review of the work of the Organization in the past
and the impending biennium, and also for a longer
range period, as a basis for planning. These com-
mittees began their work on October 30, one week
before the main Conference discussions began on
November 6. This was a departure from the
practice followed in earlier Conferences of start-
ing after the formal opening of the Conference.
Besides providing additional time for the tech-
nical review of FAO activities, this innovation
made possible the completion of the review before
formal action had to be taken leading to adoption
of the overall program of work and budget.
World Food Program
The most notable addition to FAO's activities
was that of a multilateral program of assistance to
developing countries, based on the utilization of
surplus foods. Conceived by the United States
Government as a part of its Food-for- Peace effort,
this subject attracted more attention than any
other. As a result of resolutions adopted by the
Conference, and later by the U.N. General Assem-
bly,^ the basis for a World Food Program
emerged.
This program, which is to be conducted on an
experimental basis for 3 years, will utilize volun-
tary contributions of food, services (e.g. ship-
ping), and funds, with a target figure of $100
million. The aim is to obtain one-third of the
total in cash, from which administrative and other
costs are to be financed.
Attention will be given to meeting emergency
food needs and emergencies inherent in chronic
malnutrition (which could include establishment
of food reserves) , assisting in preschool and school
feeding, and implementing pilot projects in which
food aid can contribute to economic and social
development.
The program will be undertaken jointly by
FAO and the United Nations, in cooperation with
other organizations as appropriate. It will be
carried out under the guidance of a 20-country,
joint U.N./FAO Intergovernmental Committee.
Ten members — Argentina, Brazil, Canada, France,
Ghana, India, Indonesia, the Netherlands, the
United Arab Republic, and the United States —
were designated by the FAO Council immediately
after the Conference. Shortly thereafter the U.N.
General Assembly approved the establishment of
the joint program and the Economic and Social
Council (ECOSOC) designated Australia, Co-
lombia, Denmark, Morocco, Nigeria, New Zealand,
Pakistan, Thailand, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia as
members of the Intergovernmental Committee.
This Intergovernmental Committee met at
Rome February 12-19, 1962, to develop adminis-
trative and operational plans for the program,
which are to be approved by the FAO Covmcil and
ECOSOC in concurrent meetings at New York
in April 1962. Following that a pledging con-
ference will be convened jointly by the Secretary-
General of the U.N. and the Director General of
FAO.
The program will be administered by the joint
FAO/U.N. unit located at Rome. Projects under-
taken, in response to requests from recipient
countries, are to be carried out in accord with the
FAO Principles of Surplus Disposal.
' British Guiana, Jamaica, Mauritius, and Tanganyika.
' Rhodesia and Nyasaland.
° For a statement made by Richard N. Gardner in Com-
mittee II of the U.X. General Assembly on Dec. 8, 1961,
see BtJLLCTiN of Jan. 22, 1962, p. 150; for text of U.N.
resolution, see U.N. doc. A/RES/1714 (XVI).
March 5, 1962
393
Progress in Other Phases of the FAO Program
Tlie regular program of FAO has many phases;
so only a very few can be mentioned here as
examples.
FAO has had under way for 4 years a World
Seed Campaign, which was bi-ought to a climax
with a World Seed Year in 1961 and a review in
the Conference of progress made by member coun-
tries. Also FAO released its new publication
(Agricultural Studies No. 55) on Agricultural
and Horticultural Seeds in the three official
languages of the Organization — English, French,
and Spanish. Tliis 531-page volume provides
member countries with a summary of basic infor-
mation on the production, control, and distribu-
tion of seeds. The U.S. Department of Agricul-
ture, as its contribution to the World Seed
Campaign, devoted its 1961 Yearbook to Seeds.
Copies of the Yearbook were presented to each
delegation to the Conference. The World Seed
Campaign will be concluded with an International
Technical Meeting on Seed Production, Control,
and Distribution in 1962.
The Freedom-From-Hunger Campaign, which
had been initiated by FAO in I960,'' to extend
through 1965, was re^newed. Primarily aimed at
increasing food production, this campaign has the
accompanying goals of improving food distribu-
tion, nutrition, and general levels of living. The
Conference noted the progress made in prepara-
tion for a World Food Congress in 1963, wherein
the problems of food and population will be ex-
amined. Also it noted that work is progressing
on a series of publications aimed at making avail-
able to member countries analyses of various
phases of the food-and-population problem.
However, in spite of expressions of interest by
developing countries, the Conference found that
little real progress had been made to date in get-
ting projects under way in those areas where the
heart of the campaign was expected to reside and
where action is most urgently needed. Since spe-
cific project proposals have not been forthcoming,
sufficient interest has not been stimulated in most
of the developed countries which should, if the
campaign is to succeed, be giving active support
to field activities. On the other hand, a substantial
number of countries have made contributions to
the headquarters costs of the campaign. These
costs relate primarily to administrative arrange-
" For background, see Bulletin of Jan. IS, 19G0, p. 04.
ments, publicity, and promotion of interest in field
projects.
A new venture for FAO was the assimiption
of leadership jointly with the World Health Or-
ganization ("WHO) of the Codex Alimentarius,
which had been initiated by a European group.
This effort to develop generally acceptable re-
gional and international food standards could, in
the long run, have very beneficial effects on the
handling of food products in international trade
and through greater assurance to consumers that
they ai"e receiving high-quality products. A
Codex Alimentarius Commission was set up by
the Conference to carry out the work, and it is
expected to have its first meeting during 1962.
At the outset this work is to be financed by volun-
tary contributions, for which a tmist fund is being
established. FAO has already been working ac-
tively on standards for daiiy products, and imtil
such time as the Codex AUTnentarhts Commission
has made sufficient progress to enable it to effec-
tively handle the dairy products standards, work
will continue separately on a Code of Prmciples
for Milk and Milk Products.
Another venture approved by the Conference is
a special program of agricultural education and
training in Africa, for which $825,000 was allo-
cated in the regular budget for the next 2 years.
It is designed to provide the developing African
countries with a limited number of agricultural
education advisers, specialists on training in vari-
ous fields of food and agriculture, and a cadre of
agricultural educators who will cooperate with
experts provided by the International Labor Or-
ganization (ILO) and the United Nations Edu-
cational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO) in educational planning missions.
One further activity should bo mentioned as
evidence of interest in Africa, from which conti-
nent 28 countries are now full members of the
Organization. The Conference examined tlie re-
port of an African survey which F.VO had carried
out. This report highlighted the need for furtlier
information on African conditions as a prerequi-
site for undertaking operations in that continent.
The African survey was essenlially a preliminary
factfinding operation and not a bhieprint for de-
velopment. The report called for cooperation
with the United Nations, ILO, UNESCO, and the
Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) in an
integrated approach to improve nu'al living stand-
394
Department of State Bulletin
ai'ds and airricultiiral production. Tho Confer-
ence I'csolution wliicli evolved rccoq;nizcd the role
to bo played by other United Nations agencies and
invited FAO to assist in the coordination of tech-
nical iissistance.
Technical Assistance Activities
In addition to the above-mentioned and many
other facets of its regular pi'ogram, the Confer-
ence reviewed the very substantial tecluiical assist-
ance activities which FAO contiiiues to operate
under the Expanded Program of Technical As-
sistance (ETAP) and the United Nations Special
Fund.
During 1961 FAO carried out ETAP projects
costing $9,649,175 and will probably have a
slightly higher allocation of ETAP funds in 1962.
Under this program 660 experts served and 278
fellowships were awarded in 1961.
FAO had, at the time of the Conference, under-
taken to execute 65 Special Fund projects costing
$46,456,600. These projects, 38 of which were al-
ready under way, will be carried out over the next
2 to 5 years. In Januai-y 1962, 14 further projects
costing $10,442,600 were assigned to FAO, bring-
ing the total to $56,899,200. In addition a total
of $4,813,100 has been allocated for headquarters
and servicing costs.
FAO also collaborates with the United Na-
tions Children's Fund (UNICEF) in many
jointly assisted projects in countries and receives
allocations from UNICEF to cover the costs of
field personnel that are not provided for under
ETAP projects. UNICEF funds totaling $503,-
184 were allocated for this purpose in 1961. The
regular budget of FAO for 1962-63 includes
$1,200,000 for headquarters costs in connection
with jointly assisted projects, and further alloca-
tions are expected from UNICEF. However,
some basic questions of financial relationships be-
tween FAO and UNICEF remain unresolved.^
The Conference also approved, within the reg-
ular budget, an allocation of $400,000 for the bi-
ennium for technical assistance activities. There
were substantial differences of opinion, however,
regarding the desirability of including such funds
in the regular budget. These funds are to be used
in 1962-63 for assistance to countries and the pro-
vision of fellowships on agricultural development
planning.
' For background, see iUd., Mar. 9, 1959, p. 350.
Reorientation of FAO Activities
In tlie Conference review of the program of
work much attention was given to the problems
arising from the rapid expansion of teclinical as-
sistance activities in recent years and particularly
following the advent of the United Nations
Special Fund.
The staff employed under the regular program
has substantial responsibility for planning, staff-
ing, and supervising field programs carried out
under funds allocated through ETAP, the Special
Fimd, and UNICEF, and to a more limited extent
under other funds. In recent years the emergence
of new countries has resulted in increased demands
upon FAO for technical assistance, including as-
sistance in the field of agricultural development
planning. Also there has been an increasing
tendency to emphasize those activities financed
under the regular budget that benefit developing
countries, at the expense of activities which bene-
fit all member countries. Hence some imbalances
have developed within the overall program of
FAO, which threaten to become more serious.
The Conference therefore requested the FAO
Council and its Program Committee to study this
problem and to recommend steps aimed at main-
taining a proper balance in the progi'am as a
whole, while providing essential assistance to the
developing countries.
In relation to the long-range development of
FAO in the service of its member countries, this
is probably the most important action taken by
the Conference.
World Situation and Outlook
During the course of the week-long plenary
debate on the world situation and outlook in food
and agi'iculture, delegates from about 85 member
nations made statements. Altliough many of these
tended to emphasize specific problems in their
respective countries, the statements covered a
rather wide range of problems relating to the
international agricultural situation, most of which
were followed up in detail in meetings of an ap-
propriate conmiission of the Conference.
There was much comment on the declining
prices of farm commodities and deteriorating
terms of trade that had been experienced during
the 1950-60 decade. It was noted that, with cer-
tain exceptions such as coffee and cocoa, there had
been signs of stabilization in farm commodity
March 5, 7962
395
prices during 1961. However, the consensus was
that prevailing price levels were too low. In this
connection, the whole question of price support
and stabilization measures was discussed fully.
This included review of a set of guiding principles
of agricultural stabilization and support policies,
which are now to be circulated to governments so
they may indicate if they are prepared to accept
them.
The Conference noted that 48 member countries
had accepted another set of principles — the FAO
Principles of Surplus Disposal — and the Director
General was again requested to invite otlier gov-
ernments to adhere to these principles.
Attention was also given to the agricultural
commodity aspects of regional economic integra-
tion, and considerable concern was expressed over
the possible impact these regional measures and
policies might have on trade in agricultural com-
modities. Governments and the Director General
were requested to keep this problem under review.
The problems of population growth in relation
to long-term food supplies came in for a gi"eat deal
of attention. Al.so the Conference provided the
occasion for the second McDougall INIemorial Lec-
ture. It was given by John D. Eockefeller III on
"People, Food, and the Well-Being of Mankind."
Comments from the newly developing countries
relating to current food problems generally placed
much greater emphasis on malnutrition than vipon
food shortages in terms of caloric intake. Particu-
lar note was taken of the need for more adequate
protein supplies, especially animal proteins includ-
ing fish, in many countries.
Constitutional Changes
The Conference adopted a number of amend-
ments to the constitution and rules of the Organi-
zation, including the few mentioned below.
Membership in the FAO Council was increased
from 25 to 27 countries, the two additional seats
being allocated to the African region.
The term of oiBce of the Director General was
fixed at 4 years, with reappointment possible for
two successive 2-year terms. The constitution had
not previously contained a specific provision re-
garding this point.
Term of office in tlie Council's Committee on
Constitutional and Legal Matters was fixed at 2
years, to avoid consideration of redesignation at
each regular Coimcil session.
Provisions regarding composition of delegations
were altered to enable each member government to
designate alternates instead of only one alternate.
Provision was made whereby each session of the
Conference may establish committees for the con-
sideration of technical activities of the Organiza-
tion, to meet prior to the next session of the
Conference, at such time as the Council decides.
Also the agenda of these committees is to be de-
termined by the Council. Under this revised rule,
the Conference then established six technical com-
mittees to be convened in advance of the 12th ses-
sion of the Conference.
The Conference also took action to establish a
Regional Fisheries Advisory Commission for the
South West Atlantic, to abolish an International
Chestnut Commission (leaving its work to a
Working Party on Chestnut, of the European
Forestry Commission), and to complete the task
of bringing the constitution and rules of various
subsidiary bodies into line with principles estab-
lished by the 9th session of the Conference.
Elections
The only major elections before the Conference
were those for the Independent Chairman of the
Council and for filling of vacancies on the Council.
Louis Maire of Switzerland was reelected for
a second 2-year term as Independent Chairman of
the Council.
Countries elected or reelected to fill vacancies
in the Council were :
For perind November J961 to November 1963: C.-imeroon ;
For period November 1961 to December 31, 196'i: Argpn-
tina, Austria, Belgium. Ceylon, Chile, Indonesia, Ire-
land, Madagascar, Philippines ;
For period January 1, 1963, to November 1965: Brazil,
Canada, Iran, Italy, Lebanon, Morocco, Nigeria, Pana-
ma, United States.
Conclusion
Each Conference in a series such as this tends to
take on characteristics peculiar to that session.
Some dominant features of the llth session of the
FAO Conference wei-e :
The accession to membership of many countries,
which will bring the total to 101 full mombei-s as
soon as two associate members adhere to t lie consti-
tution— plus 3 that will continue as associate
members;
The voting of the largest single increase in the
regular budget of the Organization ;
396
Department ot State Bulletin
Initiation of a World Food Program, jointly
with the United Nations, on an experimental basi?,
for the multilateral utilization of surplus foods;
Recognition that technical assistance activities
are growing so large as to create imbalances, thus
leading to a need for study of the possibility of
some reorientation in the overall program of
FAO;
Growing emphasis on problems of the newly
emerging countries of Africa ;
Demonstration of increased interest in tlie sub-
stantive activities of tlie Organization; and
On the whole, a healthy, businesslike approach
by the Conference to the many and often complex
matters before it.
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Agriculture
Protocol of amendment to the convention on the Inter-
Ameriean Institute of Agricultural Sciences of January
15, 19i4 (58 Stat. 1169). Opened for signature at
Washington December 1, 1958.'
Ratification deposited: Mexico, February 14, 1962.
Atomic Energy
Amendment to article VI.A.3 of the Statute of the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency (TIAS 3873). Done
at Vienna October 4, 1961.'
Acceptances deposited: Belgium, February 14, 1962 ;
Thailand, Febniary 9, 1962.
Narcotic Drugs
Convention for limiting the manufacture and regulating
the distribution of narcotic drugs, as amended (61 Stat.
2230; 62 Stat. 1796). Done at Geneva Julv 13, 1931.
Entered into force July 9, 1933. 48 Stat. 1543.
Xotification received' that it cotisiders itself liound: Ivory
Coast, December 8, 1961.
Protocol bringing under International control drugs out-
side the scojie of the convention limiting the manufac-
ture and regulating the distribution of narcotic drugs
concluded at Geneva July 13, 1931 (48 Stat. 1543), as
amended (61 Stat. 2230; 62 Stat. 1796). Done at Paris
November 19, 1948. Entered into force December 1,
1949 ; for the United States, September 11, 1950. TIAS
2308.
Notification received that it considers itself bound:
Ivory Coast, December S, 1961.
Slavery
Slavery convention signed at Geneva September 25, 1926,
' Not in force.
March 5, 7962
as amended (TIAS 3532). Entered into force March !),
1927 ; for Uie United Slate.s .March 21, 1929. 46 Stat.
2183.
Notification received that it considers itself hound:
Ivory Coast, December 8, 1961.
Telecommunications
International telecommunication convention with six an-
nexes. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entere<l
into force January 1, 1960 ; for the United States October
23, 1961. TIAS 4892.
Ratification as associate member deposited: British East
Africa (Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Tangan-
yilia (Territory Under United Kingdom Trusteeship),
and Protectorate of Uganda), November 30, 1961.
Trade and Commerce
Declaration on relations between contracting parties to
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the
Polish People's Republic. Done at Tokyo November 9.
1959. Entered into force November 16, 1960. TIAS
4649.
Signature: Cuba, December 21, 1961.
Acknowledged applicable rights and obligations of
United Kingdom: Tanganyilsa, January 16, 1962.
Declaration on provisional accession of Tunisia to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at
Tokyo November 12, 1959. Entered into force May 21,
1960. TIAS 4498.
Signatures: Cuba, December 21, 1961 ; Ghana, November
10, 1961; Japan, January 8, 1962.
Acknoivledged applicable rights and obligations of
United Kingdom: Tanganyika, January 16, 1962.
Declaration on provisional accession of Argentina to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at
Geneva November 18, I960.'
Signatures: Ceylon, December 4, 1961 ; Ghana, Novem-
ber 10, 1961.
Declaration on extension of standstill provisions of article
XVI : 4 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
Done at Geneva November 19, I960.'
Signature: Ceylon, December 4, 1961.
Declaration giving effect to provisions of article XVI :4 of
the General .Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at
Geneva November 19, I960.'
Signatures: Austria (with reservation and subject to
ratification), January 17, 1962; Federal Republic of
Germany (subject to ratification), November 13, 1961 ;
Italy, January 10, 1962.
Acknowledged applicable rights and obligations of United
Kingdom: Tanganyika, January 16, 1962, with respect
to the following :
Fourth protocol of rectifications and modifications to an-
nexes and to texts of schedules to the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 7,
19.5.5. Entered into force January 23, 1959. TIAS 4186.
Protocol amending preamble and parts II and III of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at
Geneva March 10, 1955. Entered into force October 7,
1957. TIAS 3930.
Protocol amending part I and articles XXIX and XXX
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done
at Geneva March 10, 1955.'
Protocol of organizational amendments to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva
March 10, 1955.'
Agreement on the Organization for Trade Cooperation.
Done at Geneva March 10, 19.55.'
Protocol of rectification to the French text of the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva
June 15, 1955. Entered into force October 24, 1956.
TIAS 3677.
Fifth protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts
of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade. Done at Geneva December 8, 1955.'
397
Sixth protocol of supplementary concessions to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva
May 23, 1956. Entered into force for the United States
June 30, 1956. TIAS 3591.
United Nations
Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the Inter-
national Court of Justice. Signed at San Francisco
June 26, 1945. Entered into force October 24, 1945.
59 Stat. 1031.
Admission to membership: Tanganyika, December 14,
1961.
War
Geneva convention relative to treatment of prisoners of
war;
Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of
wounded and sick in armed forces in the field ;
Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of
wounded, sick, and shipwrecked members of armed
forces at sea ;
Geneva convention relative to protection of civilian per-
sons in time of war.
Dated at Geneva August 12, 1949. Entered into force
October 21, 1950 ; for the United States February 2,
1956. TIAS 8364, 3362, 3363, and 3365, respectively.
Notiflcation received that it considers itself bound:
Upi)er Volta, November 7, 1961.
Ratifications deposited: Colombia, November 8, 1961;
Paraguay, October 23, 1961.
Edmond C. Hutchin.son to be Assistant Administrator
for Africa and Europe, Agency for International
Development.
Seymour J. Janow to be Assistant Administrator for
the Far East, Agency for International Development.
Robert MeClintock to be Ambassador to Argentina.
(For biographic details, see Department of State press
release 84 dated February 7.)
Teodoro JIoscoso to be Assistant Administrator for
Latin America, Agency for International Development.
John M. Steeves to be Ambassador to Afghanistan.
(For biographic details, see Department of State press
release 8S dated February 8.)
C. Allan Stewart to be Ambassador to Venezuela. ( For
biographic details, see Department of State press release
109 dated February 20.
The Senate on the same date confirmed the following
to be representatives of the United States to the 16th
session of the General Assembly of the United Nations :
Adlai E. Stevenson
Francis T. P. Plimpton
Charles W. Yost
Philip M. Klutznick
Jonathan B. Bingham.
BILATERAL
Guinea
Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of
19.54, as amended (68 Stat. 4.55; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709),
with exchanges of notes. Signed at Conakry February
2, 1962. Entered into force February 2, 1962.
Korea
Agreement rescinding certain provisions of the agreed
minute of November 17, 1954, relating to continued co-
operation in economic and military matters, as amended
(TIAS 3396). Effected by exchange of notes at Seoul
January 30, 1962. Entered into force January 30, 1962.
Viet-Nam
Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agree-
ments of October 28, 1960 (TIAS 4637), and March 25,
1961 (TIAS 4722). Effected by exchange of notes at
Saigon January 24, 1962. Entered into force January
24, 1962.
DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE
Confirmations
The Senate on February 5 confirmed the following
nominations :
William S. Gaud to be Assistant Administrator for the
Near East and South Asia, Agency for International
Development.
Cliecl( List of Department of State
Press Releases: February 12-18
Press releases may be obtained from the Office
of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.
Releases appearing in this issue of the Bulletin
which were issued prior to February 12 are Nos. 67
of February 1, 77 of February 3, and 82 of Feb-
ruary 6.
Subject
Rusk : interview on "Washington View-
point."
McGhee : "Will Clayton— World States-
man."
U.S. participation in international
conferences.
Coppock : "The United States in a Com-
petitive World Economy."
U.S.-Japan scientific committee (re-
write).
U.S. mission in Port-of-Spain termi-
nated.
Harriman : Traffic Club of Washington,
D.C. (excerpts).
Martin : National Farm Institute.
Fourth meeting of State Advisory Com-
mittee to Chief of Protocol ( rewrite) .
U.S. memorandum to U.S.S.R. on Ber-
lin air corridors.
U.S.-Japan educational and cultural
committee.
Ball : "The Less Developed Countries
and the Atlantic Partnership."
Rusk: VOA's Lao and Thai language
service broadcasts.
•Not printed.
tlleld for a later issue of the Bulletin.
No.
Date
93
2/13
*94
2/14 ]
*95
2/12
t9S
2/14
t99
2/14
tioo
2/14
♦101
2/14
tl02
103
2/15
2/15
104
2/15
*105
2/16
tl06
2/16
107
2/17
398
Department of Sfafe Bulletin
March 5, 1962
Index
Vol. XLVI, No. 1184
Afghanistan. Steeves confirmed as Ambassador . . 398
Agriculture. FAO Menilter Nations Study World
Food and Agricultural Problems (Phillips and
Sold) 392
American Principles. New Directions in Foreign
Policy (Rowan) 378
Angola. U.N. General Assend)ly Urges Portugal
To Promote Self-Determination for Angola (Ste-
venson, text of resolution) 385
Argentina. McClintock confirmed as Ambassa-
dor 398
China, Communist. The Four Global Forces That
Help Write the Headlines (Bowles) 371
Congress, The. Congressional Documents Relating
to Foreign Policy 382
Cuba. Secretary Rusk Interviewed on "Wash-
ington Viewpoint" 358
Department and Foreign Service. Confirmations
(Bingham, Gaud, Hutchinson, Janow, Klutznick,
McClintock, Moseoso, Plimpton, Steeves, Steven-
son, Stewart, Yost) 398
Disarmament
Secretary Rusk Interviewed on "Washington
Viewpoint" 358
U.S. and U.K. Exchange Messages With U.S.S.R.
Concerning Disarmament Negotiations at Geneva
(texts of messages) 355
Economic Affairs
Depreciation Schedules Announced for Hosiery,
Knitwear Equipment 381
New Directions in Foreign Policy (Rowan) . . . 378
President Concurs on Several Recent Escape-Clause
Cases 382
Toward an Atlantic Partnership (Ball) .... 364
Educational and Cultural Affairs. State Advisory
Committee Holds Fourth Meeting 382
Europe. Toward an Atlantic Partnership (Ball) . . 364
Foreign Aid
The Four Global Forces That Help Write the Head-
Lines (Bowles) 371
Gaud, Hutchinson, Janow, and Moseoso confirmed
as Assistant Administrators, AID 398
Germany. U.S. Protests Soviet Harassment of
Traffic in Berlin Air Corridors (text of memo-
randum) 370
International Information. VOA Begins Lao and
Thai Language Servi<'e Broadcasts to Southeast
Asia (Rusk) 377
International Organizations and Conferences
Calendar of International Conferences and Meet-
ings 383
FAO Member Nations Study World Food and Agri-
cultural Problems (Phillips and Sohl) .... 392
Laos. VOA Begins Lao and Thai Language Service
Broadcasts to Southeast Asia (Rusk) .... 377
Non-Self-Governing Territories. U.N. General
Assembly Urges Portugal To Promote Self-
Determination for .\ngola (Stevenson, text of
resolution) 385
Portugal. U.N. General Assembly Urges Portugal
To Promote Self-Determination for Angola (Ste-
venson, text of resolution) 385
Presidential Documents
King of Saudi Arabia Visits Washington .... 377
President Kennedy Sends Greetings to People of
Viet-Nam 377
U.S. and U.K. Exchange Messages With U.S.S.R.
Concerning Disannament Negotiations at Geneva . 355
Public Affairs. State Advisory Conmiittee Holds
Fourth Meeting 382
Saudi Arabia. King of Saudi Arabia Visits Wash-
ington (text of joint communique) 377
Thailand. VOA Begins Lao and Thai Language
Service Broadcasts to Southeast Asia (Rusk) . . 377
Treaty Information. Current Actions 397
U.S.S.R.
The Four Global Forces That Help Write the Head-
lines (Bowles) 371
Secretary Rusk Interviewed on "Washington
Viewpoint" 358
U.S. and U.K. Exchange Messages With U.S.S.R.
Concerning Disarmament Negotiations at Geneva
(texts of messages) 355
U.S. Protests Soviet Harassment of Traffic in Ber-
lin Air Corridors (text of memorandmn) . . . 370
United Kingdom. U.S. and U.K. Exchange Mes-
sages With U.S.S.R. Concerning Disarmament
Negotiations at Geneva (texts of messages) . . 355
United Nations
Bingham, Klutznick, Plimpton, Stevenson, and Yost
confirmed as U.S. Representatives to 16th General
Assembly 398
New Directions in Foreign Policy (Rowan) . . . 378
Secretary Rusk Interviewed on "Washington
Viewpoint" 358
U.N. General Assembly Urges Portugal To Promote
Self-Determination for Angola (Stevenson, text
of resolution) 385
Venezuela. Stewart confirmed as Ambassador . . 398
Viet-Nam
President Kennedy Sends Greetings to People of
Viet-Nam 377
Secretary Rusk Interviewed on "Washington
Viewpoint" 358
Name Index
Ball, George W 364
Bingham, Jonathan B 398
Bowles, Chester 371
Corrick, Ann 358
Gaud, William S 398
Hutchinson, Edmond C 398
Janow, Seymour J 398
Kennedy, President 355,358,377
Khrushchev, Nikita S 3.56
Klutznick, Philip M 398
Macmillan, Harold 355
McClintock, Robert 398
Moseoso, Teodoro 398
Phillips, Ralph W 392
Plimpton, Francis T. P 398
Rowan, Carl T 378
Rusk, Secretary 3.58,377
Saud ibn Abd al-Aziz Al Saud 377
Snyder, James 3.58
Sohl, Walter W 392
Steeves, John M 398
Stevenson, Adlai E 385, 398
Stewart, C. Allan 398
Yost, Charles W 398
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTIHG OFFICE: 1962
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TREATIES IN FORCE
January 1, 1962
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This publication is a guide to treaties and other international
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ranged by country or other political entity, and multilateral
treaties and other agreements, arranged by subject with names of
countries which have become parties. Date of signature, date of
entry into force for the United States, and citations to texts are
furnished for each agreement.
Documents affecting international copyright relations of the
United States are listed in the appendix.
Information on current treaty actions, supplementing the infor-
mation contained in Treaties in Force, is published weekly in the
Department of State Bulletin.
Publication 7327
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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
/Ut^xi<L,
Vol. XLVI, No. 1185
March 12, 1962
E
FICIAL
EKLY RECORD
TRADE AND AID— ESSENTIALS OF FREE-WORLD
LEADERSHIP • Address hy Secretary Rusk 403
THE LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES AND THE
ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP • by Under Secretary Ball . 412
POLICY FOR THE WESTERN ALLIANCE— BERLIN
AND AFTER e by McGeorge Bundy 419
THE UNITED STATES IN A COMPETITIVE WORLD
ECONOMY • by Joseph D. Coppock 426
GATT MEMBERS CONCLUDE LONG-TERM COTTON
TEXTILE ARRANGEMENT (Text) 430
ITED STATES
REIGN POLICY
For index see inside back cover
THE DEPARTIVIENT OF STATE
Vol. XLVI, No. 1185 • Publication 7348
March 12, 1962
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Oovemment Printing OITice
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Price:
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Use of funds for printing of this publica-
tion approved by tlie Director of the Bureau
of the Budget (January 19, 1961).
Note: Contents of tills publication are not
copyrighted and Items contained herein may
be reprinted. Citation of the Department
OF State Bulletin as the source will bo
appreciated. The Bi'lletin Is Indexed in the
Readers' Qulde to Periodical Literature.
The Department of State BULLETIN,
a tveekly publication issued by the
Office of Public Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public
and interested agencies of the
Government with information on
developments in the field of foreign
relations and on the icork of tlie
Department of State and the Foreign
Service. The BULLETIN includes se-
lected press releases on foreign policy,
issued by the White House and the
Department, and statements and ad-
dresses made by the President and by
the Secretary of State and other
officers of the Department, as well as
special articles on various phases of
internationtil affairs aiui the func-
tions of the Department. Informa-
tion is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to
which the United States is or may
become a party and treaties of gen-
eral interruitional interest.
Publications of the Department,
United Nations documents, and legis-
lative miitertal in the field of inter-
national relations are listed currently.
Trade and Aid— Essentials of Free-World Leadership
Address by Secretary Busk ■
Some years ago a visiting finance minister was
being photographed with our Secretary of the
Treasury. He stepped a little to one side, saying
to the photographers, "I don't want it to appear
that I have my hand in the Secretary's pocket."
I know there are some who feel that a Secretary of
State, appearing before a gathering of American
businessmen, sliould show some of the same deli-
cacy. There are some who look upon the Depart-
ment of State as the lobbyist of every people except
our own. This false notion has no believers be-
yond the water's edge. If we are compelled to
call upon our own people for the effort required
to protect our freedom and our practical interests
in our foreign relations, so must we be insistent
with others about the extra effort and the addi-
tional sacrifice which they, too, must make in the
common interest.
The promotion of trade has been a major element
in our foreign policy since before our Republic
was bom. From the time when Benjamin Frank-
lin first went abroad to solicit aid and trade and
political support for the American Colonies, our
diplomacy has sought to enlarge our trade, msure
the supply of those things we need and markets
in which to sell to pay for them. Patterns in both
trade and diplomacy have changed with the times,
but in every foreign office throughout the world
practical matters of trade are vital and sensitive
paits of the daily business.
Trade is essentially restless, for there is no such
thing as enough. We need not be surprised, there-
fore, that great trading partners who exchange
vast quantities of goods and services are neverthe-
less constantly engaged in negotiations to handle
' Made before the Chamber of Commerce of Charlotte,
N.C., on Feb. 21 (press release 113).
the lesser frictions which inevitably accompany
so vigorous and dynamic a relationship.
The changes in the world about us raise new
challenges both for the businessman and for diplo-
macy. For a decade and a half after World War
II the United States was relatively comfortable in
its trading position. It had no difficulty in selling
what it could produce. Competition abroad was
negligible because i-ecovery from the damage of
war was incomplete. The Departments of State
and Commerce were not compelled to seek out
trading opportunities because their problems had
more to do with allocating goods in short supply
to a world in desperate need of them. Now, with
the vigorous recovery of other industrial nations,
the scene has changed. Competition is there to be
met, salesmanship is an art to be revived, and ques-
tions of price, quality, delivery, service, and
credits have resumed their historical importance.
We in government are moving, as well, to adjust
our actions and habits of mind to changing cir-
cumstances. Trade promotion is a central task;
our ability to find markets for our products —
industrial and agricultural — is critical to our
ability to buy what we need to sustain a vigorous
growth in our own economy. And we must sell
more than we buy in order to sustain our defense,
aid, and other commitments abroad as our part in
the struggle for freedom.
This evening I should like to speak of two pro-
posed legislative measures that are essential if the
United States is to fulfill the role which history
has thrust upon it — tlie role of a strong and wise
leader of the free world. Each of these measures
directly concerns a field in which you are practiced,
the field of economics. Yet each relates fully as
much to our capacity for political leadership. One
March 12, 1962
403
of these measures is concerned with expanding
trade among free-world nations, the other with
providing the resources of capital and experience
to enable the less developed nations to maintain
political independence and achieve a more nearly
adequate level of life.
Europe's 20th-century Renaissance
Let me speak first of the Trade Expansion Act
of 1962, a legislative proposal which the Presi-
dent sent to Congress only a month ago." This
measure was designed to take account of one of
the great constructive undertakings of our time —
Europe's 20th-century renaissance. For a thou-
sand j-ears the homeland and base of Western
civilization has been rent by division and devas-
tated by war. Now, virtually for the first time
since the breakup of Charlemagne's empire, mil-
lions of inhabitants of that historic peninsula
called Europe are translating the dream of Euro-
pean unity into a reality. The European Eco-
nomic Community, or Common Market, is bring-
ing together by their own voluntary act millions
of gifted and resourceful people commanding vast
resources of skill and productive capacity.
The implications of this extraordinary develop-
ment for the confrontation between the free world
and the Communist bloc are unmistakable. In
the curious new physics of political imity the
whole not only can be, but almost always is,
greater than the sum of its parts. Compared to
the coming into its own of Western Europe such
successes as the Commimists have managed to ob-
tain in the past dozen years are peripheral and —
we may hope — destined to prove transitory.
Is it vainglorious for us to infer that the old
Contment, as we tend to think of Europe, has
taken a leaf from our own historical experience,
that it is translating into political reality our own
motto, as it were, E Pluribus Unum'i I think
not. I believe we may take great encouragement
and gratification from this manifest will of our
European friends to apply principles tested in
our own national experience to bring about a
strong and united Europe.
The European Economic Community is far
more than a mere customs union. But even in its
' For text of the President's message, see Bulletin of
Feb. 12, 10(32, p. 231; for a .summary of the bill (H.R.
9900), see ibid., Feb. 26, 1962, p. 343.
purely commercial aspects it has a profound
significance for us. The emergence of the Com-
munity means that we shall have on the two sides
of the Atlantic Ocean two immense trading areas,
two common markets, so to speak: the common
market of the United States and the Common
Market of Europe.
A New Trading World
These are the essential facts of the new trading
world now being created. With the common mar-
ket of the United States we are familiar — a trad-
ing area of 50 States among which trade flows
freely and without tariffs or other obstructions
but which is surrounded by a common external
tariff. The Common Market of Europe comes to
many of us as a new idea, but it should not; in
its commercial aspects it is not far different from
what we have known on our own continent — a
common market presently of six states but on the
verge of expansion, where internal trade can flow
freely without tariff or other obstructions, the
whole surrounded by a common external tariff.
I need hardly remind you that the existence of
these two great trading areas — which between
them will account for almost 90 percent of the in-
dustrial production of the free world — will ma-
terially transform the trading world to which we
have been accustomed. For American business,
agriculture, and labor it should mean great eco-
nomic opportunity.
After all, the European Common Market is in
many ways tailormade for our type of industrial
enterprise. We are the only industrial nation of
the free world that has developed its industrial
plant and its industrial techniques to serve a great
mass market. Now for the first time we shall
have the opportunity of utilizing our accumulated
technical know-how, our experience with mass pro-
duction and mass distribution, to establish our
products in a market growing twice as fast as our
own. It is a market which offers almost untold
possibilities for expansion, for the European con-
sumers are only just beginning to enjoy many of
the modern consumer goods which Americans take
for granted.
I recognize that American businessmen will not
be able to enjoy the opportunities offered by this
market without effort. Our industrialists will
have to show ingeiuiity and resourcefulness. It
will not bo enough merely to attempt to sell our
404
Deparfmenf of S/ofe Bulletin
surplus products in Europe. We shall have to
design products for use under very different social
and physical conditions.
We shall have to apply our genius for distribu-
tion, for merchandising, to an entirely new market
and shall have to learn to deal with habits and
tastes different from those of America. The cre-
ation of this great market, the existence of these
two great markets on opposite shores of the At-
lantic, offer the possibility of a great expansion
of transatlantic trade— provided that both we and
our European friends are prepared to lower the
level of the trade barriers that now divide us.
A great deal has been said in the last few months
to the effect that American industry and agricul-
ture will be imder a disadvantage in dealing with
the Common JNIarket. In a sense this is true. A
manufacturer in Detroit selling to a customer in
Hamburg will, of course, be under some disad-
vantage as against a manufacturer in Rome; he
will have to sell his goods over a common external
tariff while the manufacturer in Rome will not.
But of course such advantages and disadvantages
are reciprocal, since the manufacturer in Hamburg
selling to a customer in Detroit will be at a simi-
lar disadvantage as against a manufacturer in
North Carolina.
We start from a position in which the average
levels of the external tariff walls of these two
great markets — the United States and Europe —
are not too far different. The expansion of trans-
atlantic trade will depend to a considerable extent
upon our ability and will, by agreement between
ourselves and the Common Market, to reduce both
of these walls. If we can bring this about we will
have given further recognition to the fact of eco-
nomic interdependence among the great industrial
areas of the world — a fact which we have already
recognized with the creation of the OECD, the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment. We would at the same time have taken
a long further step toward the development of an
effective Atlantic partnership.
Need for Trade Expansion Act
The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 is the instru-
ment which the President will need in order to
achieve this result. It would authorize the gi-adual
elimination of tariffs by the United States in re-
turn for concessions by the EEC on those products
in which the United States and the EEC together
supply 80 percent of world trade — products in
which we have shown we can compete. On others,
tariff reductions of 50 percent would be authorized,
and these reductions would also be made recipro-
cally with nations outside the EEC. Tariff' reduc-
tions negotiated with our principal trading
partners will be extended to other nations on a
most-favored-nation basis. There are provisions
for preserving domestic industries essential to de-
fense and for helping others meet import compe-
tition through adjustment assistance and other
devices that would help keep American business
and woi'kers competitive and self-sustaining.
This broad new authority will enable us to bar-
gain with the EEC and, by removing impediments
to trade, expand export opportunities for all free-
world nations. Our own industries — which now
employ some 3 million workers directly producing
for export — will have access to growing markets.
Increased exports will enable our competitive in-
dustries to increase their employment, investment,
and profits, thereby stimulating the entire
economy.
Here in North Carolhia, in 1960, you exported
over $600 million worth of agricultural and manu-
factured products; 93 firms in the State employing
63,000 workers had export sales of more than
$25,000 each. You exported in 1960 some $200
million of tobacco products and $80 million of
textiles.
To those who argue that our wages are too high
for us to compete in world markets, let me point
out that our exports exceed our imports by over
$5 billion. In the machinery and vehicles indus-
tries, in which our workers are among the highest
paid, we exported in 1960 four times as much as
we imported. We exported more machinery and
vehicles to the EEC comitries than we imported
from them. Our coal miners receive one of the
highest hourly wages in American industry, yet
we are the world's lowest cost producer of coal.
American agriculture is especially competitive on
world mai'kets, and export markets are particu-
larly important to American farmers. The pro-
duce of one-sixth of our harvested cropland is sold
abroad ; in tobacco the figure is one-third.
It is true that some of our producers, particu-
larly those in handicraft or labor-intensive indus-
tries, are not competitive on world markets. On
the one hand, we cannot allow the future of the
free world — and this is what is at stake — to be
March 12, 1962
405
forfeited for a small minority. On the other, we
cannot callously stand by while this minority is
injured. It need not be. In the case of an indus-
try very important to you in North Carolina, cot-
ton textiles, we were able to negotiate an agree-
ment^ with major importing and exporting
countries to ease the problem. Another way to
ease the adjustment, a way entirely in keeping
with the dynamism of the American economy, is
to provide tax relief, loans, and technical assist-
ance to enable threatened producers to broaden or
shift their pi-oduction, introduce new processes, or
modernize their plants, as well as through read-
justment and relocation allowances to permit
workers to learn new skills, which may be required
as their employers shift to new products or proc-
esses, or find new jobs. Such trade adjustment
assistance is provided for imder the new Trade
Expansion Act.
Actually, experience with such assistance in
other countries indicates that when businesses and
workers fully understand the necessity to meet
competition they are usually able to do so without
help. This has been the case imder the European
Common Market; producers deprived of protec-
tion have forgotten their first misgivings and
have become competitive and are making higher
profits. Far from suffering from unemployment.
Western Europe today faces a shortage of labor.
Competition from abroad can lend a healthy
incentive to domestic manufacturers and open
their eyes to new opportunities. The postwar
trend among American motorcar manufacturers
was toward an all-purpose, eight-cylinder family
car, with ever diminishing choice offered the
purchaser. European imports did much to show
that a two-car-per-f amily market existed, together
with a demand for much greater diversification.
Detroit is now offering far more variety in its
products and — quite apart from the great ad-
vantages reaped by the consumer — is doing very
well for itself.
/
Benefits to U.S. From New Trade Program
I started out by indicating that I was going to
speak of sacrifices our country should be pre-
pared to make. But the Trade Expansion Act
does not fall in that category. Its passage by
Congress will mean a great deal to other peoples;
' For text, soe p. 431.
but it will also mean a great deal to us. I am
referring not to our stake in the health and co-
hesion of the free world — though that is beyond
price — but to cash in our pockets. It will enable
us to expand our markets in Europe. It will open
important new markets for our products abroad,
and increased trade will give our economy added
vigor. We can expect significant new investment
and the development of new products, which in
turn will further expand our markets, domestic
as well as foreign. Moreover, though we some-
times forget it, we are all consumers as well as
producers. And certainly there can be no ques-
tion but that the lowering of trade barriers will
go far to insure that 180 million American con-
sumers will obtain the best quality and widest
varieties of goods at prices derived from vigorous
competition.
I shall say one thing more on this subject.
Either we believe in capitalism, in the freedom of
individual enterprise, or we do not. And we do
not if we hold with massive government inter-
vention to distort and freeze the operation of the
market. If we look to government to rig the
game, we may as well look to it to play the hands.
If we mean to discourage the forces of free enter-
prise all around the world, I can think of no
better way of doing itr— without even stirring
from our chairs — than to shrink from competition
behind unrealistic tariff walls.
'\^^^ere there must be sacrifice is in respect of
that large part of the human race which, while it
will benefit from wider trade, cannot look to that
alone for rescue.
Objectives of Foreign Aid
Caiv I, in a few minutes, say anything you do
not know about the necessity for our foreign aid
programs? I am not going to talk about the i
abilit}' of the Communists to exploit liunian
misei-y, or about the readiness of the U.S.S.R. and
Communist China to move into the "have not"
countries with their own aid programs as levers of
ideological and political influence. I feel it is
really not worthy of us to employ such a justifica-
tion of our foreign aid. If we act in accord with
what is worthy of us, we can leave it to the Com-
munists to do the worrymg.
We have been coming to the aid of our hard-
pressed follows on a scale imprecedonted in Iniman
history. It began with a massive contrllnition to
406
Deporfmenf of SfoJe Bullefin
tlie victims of World War II— througli UNRRA,
the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Ad-
ministration. I would not wish to think about
what might liave liappened to such counti'ies as
Austria, Italy, and France without tliis immedi-
ate assistance. Our next objective was the revival
of Europe's economy — which the Marshall plan
dramatically achieved. AVith that, and with our
veiy large programs of aid to other war-wrecked
countries — tlie Philippines, Korea, Japan — we dis-
covei-ed that what we were actually embarked upon
was nothing less than an attack upon mankind's
ancient enemir'= — want, sickness, ignorance, hope-
lessness. We were inspired, if by nothing else, by
a realization that tlie exigencies of the mid-20th
century left us no choice but to do what we could
to bring a decent world order into being. To that
end we have been carrying on various programs —
point 4, economic support for the common military
burdens of our alliances, the Development Loan
Fimd, Food for Peace. We have come a fair dis-
tance. No one, however, can travel far abroad
without being struck, to say the least, by the sig-
nificance of the task remaining.
To bring about the Decade of Development the
President lias called for during the sixties,^ we
have felt the need to concert the forces of the in-
dustrialized West. On our own side we have
created a new agency in which for the first time
the administration of all our programs of foreign
assistance is combined. The Agency for Interna-
tional Development, a part of the Department of
State, will, we believe, enable us to cany out more
quickly, more effectively, and less expensively the
work we have undertaken. It is our determination
to manage it, not in a hardhearted but in a hard-
headed way.
Main Features of U.S. Aid Program
First, we know that our loans or gi'ants to
another country can be no more than the extra, if
critical, push. Economic and social development
cannot be exported from one country to another.
The main drive and the basic resources must come
from within the country itself. None knows that
better than we who have seen the transformation
of the life of our own Southland within our own
personal experiences. We have witnessed the mag-
ical partnership of education, improved health,
and rising productivity; the partnership of educa-
' Bulletin of Oct. 10, 1961, p. G19.
March 12, J 962
tion, research, and extension; the partnership be-
tween opportunity and a personal and family
yearning for a more decent existence. Develop-
ment means advance on a broad front, an advance
which can be achieved only by an entire people
moving together. Education means, among other
things, a more productive individual. Rising pro-
ductivity means a more adequate tax base for
schools and roads and the other necessities of pub-
lic investment. Health is basic to work, and work
is the indispensable ingredient in progress.
If we press others beyond our borders to conduct
their public affairs with honesty and efficiency, it
is because we know fi'om our own experience that
inefficiency and corruption are social wastes which
no one can afford. If we press for the mobilization
of local capital resources and adequate taxes, it is
because we know that, otherwise, the great task of
development will fail. If we urge the political
and psychological mobilization of entire peoples
in the effort, it is because we know that only an
interested and dedicated people will succeed in
rapid development under free institutions.
If we are resistant to those who would rely
solely upon the threat of communism as a basis
for our assistance, it is because we know that out-
side funds alone cannot meet that threat — and
there are not enough funds to waste in such
futility.
Second, we are moving rapidly toward aid
which is related to longer range plans for eco-
nomic and social progress. I have already spoken
of the need to move on a broad front. Hit-or-miss
pi-ojects, including projects designed to meet
crises, are unlikely to make an enduring contribu-
tion. A solid structure of growth must have solid
foundations — and this means doing first things
first. This is why education and technical train-
ing have been emphasized more strongly, why
potable water seems more urgent than a sports
stadium, why housing is more attractive than
monuments.
A third feature of our present program, thanks
to Congress, is that we are able to make long-range
financial commitments — subject to annual appro-
priations— in support of long-range planning by
other governments. It is a powerful means for
encouraging long-range commitments by those
being assisted and yields larger harvests in self-
help and realistic priorities.
I do not, by any tone of voice, mean to imply
that an indifferent, halfliearted performance is the
407
rule among governments -with which we are co-
operating. Far from it. Most of them are doing
an admirable job under trying and difficult circum-
stances— far more trying and recalcitrant than we
at a distance might suppose. It takes time to train
teachers and extension workers. It takes unusual
dedication for the educated to tui-n aside from lu-
crative urban opportunities to go into the villages
and the countryside to serve as development mis-
sionaries. Old habits change slowly, and grudg-
ingly. We in North Carolina have forgotten the
violent agitation which resisted the first hookworm
campaigns in this and neighboring States. But it
is deeply encouraging to see governments and
peoples gearing themselves for the great task of
moving toward the imlimited promise of the mod-
ern age.
Finally, our aid programs are related to the
combined effort of our vigorous partners of the
industrialized West and of other nations in posi-
tion to help. The burden of development is more
than we can bear alone, and there is no reason why
we should try. Indeed, there are important po-
litical reasons why aid across national frontiers
should be as broadly based and as widely shared
as possible. We attach the greatest importance
to the movement of the OECD countries toward
appropriating approximately 1 percent of gross
national product committed to aid for underde-
veloped countries. We are deeply gratified to see
regional and other arrangements through which
underdeveloped countries are helping each other.
And we have profound respect for the mobiliza-
tion of broad support for such purposes by the
specialized agencies of the United Nations. We
are glad that Congress has given us the means,
through our present aid program, for encourag-
ing others to take an increasing share in this great
adventure.
Looking to the World of the Future
I am fully aware of the fact that we have in-
vested heavily in all types of foreign aid since
1945 and that we have done so despite the fact
that we have much unfinished business in our own
society. We have done so because these programs
are an essential part of the main business of the
Nation — our commitment to freedom and to a
decent world community of independent states,
freely cooperating with each other in matters of
common interest.
It is a matter of some importance that no one
of the countries which have become independent
since World War II has fallen behind the Iron
or Bamboo Curtain, that no nation has willingly
embraced communism as the result of a free elec-
tion. It is of some consequence that the large
majority of smaller countries members of the
United Nations stoutly resisted the effort to de-
stroy that organization through the troika pro-
posals. It is reassuring to observe that Soviet
blandishments and aid have not destroyed the stub-
born insistence upon national independence by
those who have been assiduously courted. It is
of interest to see the Communist bloc less mono-
lithic than Soviet leaders wish, with differences
appearing which are deeply rooted in such old-
fashioned notions as national feeling, national
interest, and national independence.
We can move through this period of tension and
turmoil with safety and with confidence if we keep
our eyes steadily upon the kind of world which is
coming into being, and must come into being, in
response to the aspirations of ordinary people in
all parts of the world. It is necessary to be critical
of our efforts; it is sometimes fashionable to be
cynical about them. But we are a nation of
builders and are at our best in building, even
though we know that building is more difficult
than tearing down.
The man whose birthday we celebrate tomorrow
would, I am certain, have us plan in farseeing
terms. Wliile most of his contemporaries were
guided by their local provincialism, Washington
had his mind not merely on the Thirteen Colonies
alone but on the almost trackless continent beyond
them. It was he who in 1790 caused to be designed
for the infant Republic of a few million souls a
Capital City so grand in its conception, so ample
in its scope, that for generations its unfilled spaces
provided amusement for the scoffers. Even Jef-
ferson, no mean visionary himself, would have
settled for a district a tenth the size. But not
Washington. The years rolled by, the Nation
spread to the Pacific, spanned the continent with
iron rails, commenced to climb skyward, became a
world power. And at last, a century after the
death of its first President, it had grown up to the
Capital ho had prepared for it.
With the pace of change what it is today we
cannot expect to look 100 years ahead. We shall
do very well to perceive dim shapes 20 years hence.
408
Department of Sfafe Bulletin
But I believe we must try to do that, to foresee
what the city of man may look like then, not
making too much of the difficulties that lie in the
way but conscious, as Washington would have
been, of the possibilities. In that way we shall
realize them and in the process find allies in all
comers of the earth — the men and women of many
lands who want the kind of world sketched out in
the U.N. Charter, a world of peace and human
dignity, of creative endea%'or, of expanding fron-
tiers for the Iiujnan spirit.
U.S., U.K. Pledge Redoubled Efforts
To Reach Nuclear Test Ban Agreement
Press release 112 dated February 21
The following report was submitted on Febru-
ary 21 by the United States and the United King-
dom to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations for circulation to members of the U.N.
Disarmament Commission \^U.N. doc. DC/ 196/
Add.l].
The Governments of the United Kingdom and
the United States now wish to supplement their
report of December 19, 1961,^ to the United Na-
tions Disarmament Commission on the progress of
the Geneva test ban negotiations.
During the short recess before negotiations were
resumed on January 16, 1962, the two Govern-
ments made an intensive review of the situation in
the Conference. As a result of this review, the
Governments of the United Kingdom and the
United States reached the following conclusions:
(1) that the Soviet proposal of November 28,
1961, for a declaratoiy ban on nuclear weapon
tests without international control, would not as-
sure, if accepted, that testing had in fact ceased.
The Soviet draft agi-eement was a paper pledge,
valueless in halting the nuclear anns race which
liad been revived when the Soviet Union unilater-
ally resumed atmospheric testing in August 1961.
It was also inconsistent with General Assembly
Eesolutions 1648 (XVI) and 1649 (XVI), ^ both
of which express the views of the members of the
General Assembly on the need for appropriate in-
ternational controls.
(2) that the parties to the test ban negotiations
were therefore faced with two alternatives; either:
(a) to resume negotiations on the previously
agreed basis that a test ban treaty should contain
appropriate international controls; or (b) to seek
an accommodation between the Soviet and West-
ern positions within the framework of general and
complete disarmament. Of the two alternatives,
the United States and United Kingdom Govern-
ments vastly preferred the first. Their policy has
been and is now directed toward achieving an ef-
fectively controlled test ban at the earliest possible
time.
The Soviet Union immediately rejected the pro-
posal to resume negotiations directed toward a
treaty bannmg tests under international control.
The Soviet Representative at Geneva reiterated
his insistence that the Soviet Union would not ne-
gotiate a nuclear test ban under international
controls.
Thus, there remained as the only avenue to
agreement the alternative of negotiating for a test
ban in the context of general disarmament negotia-
tions. The Soviet Union, beginning with Chair-
man Khrushchev's talks with President Kennedy
at Vienna on June 4, 1961,^ had repeatedly urged
this course of action. Indeed, in an aide memoire
handed at that time to the President of the United
States b}' the Chairman of the Coimcil of Minis-
ters, the Soviet Government declared : ^
The Soviet Government is known to have repeatedly
stressed, that, provided the Western Powers accept the
proposal on general and complete disarmament, the Soviet
Government is, for its part, prepared to accept uncon-
ditionally any proposals of the Western Powers on control.
The Soviet Government reiterates this readiness and is
prepared in this case to sign a document which would in-
clude the proposals of the Western Powers on the (luestion
of the cessation of nuclear tests.
The United Kingdom and the United States op-
posed this course of action believing that the most
expeditious and effective way to reach final agree-
ment on a test ban treaty was to keep the test ban
talks separate from other disarmament discussions.
But with flat Soviet refusal to continue negotia-
tions to achieve agreement on an internationally
controlled test ban, the words of the Soviet Gov-
ernment in its aide memoire of June 4, 1961, con-
tained the one remaining hope for progress.
Negotiations on general and complete disai-ma-
' For text, see Buixetin of Jan. 8, 1962, p. 63.
' For U.S. statements and texts of resolutions, see iVid.,
Dee. 4, 1961, p. 936.
' For background, see ibxH., June 26, 1961, p. 991.
' For text of an unofficial translation, see ibid., July 3,
1961, p. 22.
March 12, 1962
409
ment were scheduled to begin on Marcli 14, 1962, at
Geneva. In view of tliis fact, the United Kingdom
and the United States proposed to the Soviet Gov-
ernment on January 16, 1962, that, if indeed the
Soviet Union had rejected the very concept of a
separate internationally controlled test ban, the
Geneva Conference might adjourn "while the ques-
tion of an appropriately controlled test ban is con-
sidered, in relation to general disarmament and
the corresponding international controls, by the
eighteen-nation Disamiament Committee."
Tlie two GovenimentnS made clear tliat they were
reluctantly compelled to believe that the only al-
ternative left open was to consider the test ban
issue in the context of general disarmament be-
cause the Soviet Union had insisted it would dis-
cuss international controls only in this context.^
In this connection, the two Governments noted
Point 8 of the Agreed Principles for Disarmament
Negotiations," which reads as follows :
8. States participating in the negotiations should seelc
to achieve and implement the widest possible agreement at
the earliest possible date. Efforts should continue with-
out interruption until agreement upon the total programme
has been achieved, and efforts to ensure early agreement
on and implementation of measures of disarmament
should be undertaken without prejudicing progress on
agreement on the total programme and in such a way
that these measures would facilitate and form part of
that programme.
The United States and the United Kingdom de-
clared that once disarmament negotiations were
resumed they would work for the conclusion of a
nuclear test ban treaty as a matter of the highest
priority.
They also suggested, in res-ponding to questions
from the Soviet Representative, that at the ap-
propriate time their Governments expected to
propose the establishment of a subcommittee of
the 18-nation Disarmament Committee to examine
the relationship of a nuclear test ban to other
measures of disarmament. The United Kingdom
and the United States made clear they favored a
subcommittee composed of the three governments
which had been negotiating at Geneva, in view
of the long history of the test ban conference.
The two Governments also made clear that they
did not regard a test ban as a precondition to
progress in disarmament nor did they agree that
a test ban could come about only as a consequence
of the final abolition of nuclear weapons and their
manufacture at the last stage of general and com-
plete disarmament.
Tiie Soviet Union declared in response that the
only alternative open to the United States and
United Kingdom was to remain in Geneva and
negotiate upon the Soviet November 28 proposals
for a pledge to end testing without international
controls.
Clearly, the Soviet Union thereby blocked all
chances to reacli agreement on the basis of inter-
national control envisaged by the Conference of
Experts in 1958 and by subsequent teclmical
working groups, and as reaffirmed in United Na-
tions Resolutions 1648 (XVI) and 1649 (XVI).
This being the case, the United Kingdom and the
United States had no recourse but to propose a
recess of the Geneva Conference until a common
basis for negotiations could be re-established.'
The two Governments expressed their hope that
such a common basis could be quickly reinstituted
through conversations with the Soviet Union
either at the forthcoming eighteen-nation Dis-
armament Conference, through diplomatic chan-
nels, or througli informal contacts among their
delegations at Geneva. The two Governments
made clear that they would keep members of their
Delegations at Geneva availal)le for any such con-
sultations the Soviet Union might desire.
So long as the Soviet Union maintains its pres-
ent position, the ITnited States and the United
Kingdom are bound to conclude that the Soviet re-
jection of a test ban agreement, both as an inde-
pendent, internationally controlled agreement and
as an early measure in a disarmament program,
clearly indicates that the Soviet Union does not
want, now or at any time in the foreseeable future,
an effeetive test ban. Nevertheless, the two Gov-
ernments declare tlieir intent to pursue, as a matter
of high priority, their efforts to reach the widest
possible area of agreement on disarmainont meas-
ures in the eiglileen-nation Disarmament Com-
mittee, including agreement on an effectively veri-
fied test ban treaty.
The United States and the United Kingdom
earnestly hope the Soviet Union will reconsider
the position which led it to begin anew the nuclear
arms race by unilaterally resuming nuclear test-
Tor a Department statement of .Tan. 1(!, ]9()2, see
ibiil., Feb. 5, 1002, p. 20.^.
° For background and text, see ihid., Oct. i), llXil, p. .580.
' For a Department statement, see ihid., Feb. 10, ]0('>2. p.
288.
410
Department of State Bulletin
ing, and which now leads it to oppose an inter-
nationally controlled test ban agreement. To this
end, the United Kingdom and the United States
reaffirm their desire to re-establish a common
basis for negotiations either at the eighteen-nation
Disarmament Conference, through diplomatic
channels, or through members of their test ban
delegations now present at Geneva. The United
States and United Kingdom pledge to redouble
their efforts to reach an adequately controlled
agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapons
tests.*
U.S. Prepares New Proposals for Space
Research With Soviet Union
Following is an exchange of messages between
President Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev,
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the
U.S.S.R., regardiiig the space fight on February
20 of Lt. Col. John H. Glenn, Jr.
President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev
White House press release dated February 21
February 21, 1962
Dear Mr. Chairman : I thank you warmly for
your message of congratulations on Colonel
Glenn's successfid space flight, and I welcome your
statement that our countries should cooperate in
the exploration of space. I have long held this
same belief and indeed put it forward strongly in
my first State of the Union message.^
We of coui-se believe also in strong support of
tlie work of the United Nations in this field and
we are cooperating directly with many other coun-
tries individually. But obviously special oppor-
timities and responsibilities fall to our two
countries.
I am instructing the appropriate officers of this
Government to prepare new and concrete pro-
posals for immediate projects of common action,
and I hope that at a very early date our representa-
tives may meet to discuss our ideas and yours in a
spirit of practical cooperation.
John F. Kj:nnedy
' For an exchange of messages with the U.S.S.R. on the
disarmament negotiations at Geneva, see ihid.. Mar. 5,
1962, p. 3.55.
' For test, see Bulletin of Feb. 13, 1961, p. 207.
Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy
February 21, 1962
The President
The 'White House, Washington
Dear Mb. President : On behalf of the people of the
Soviet Union and myself personally I congratulate you
and the American people on the occasion of the success-
ful launching of a spaceship with a man on board.
One more step has been taken toward ma.stering the
cosmos and this time Lieutenant Colonel John Glenn,
a citizen of the United States of America, has been added
to the family of astronauts. The sueces.sful launching of
spaceships signalizing the conquest of new heights in
science and technology in.?i)ires legitimate pride for the
limitless potentialities of the human mind to serve the
welfare of humanity. It is to be hoped that the genius
of man, penetrating the depth of the universe, will be
able to find ways to lasting peace and insure the pros-
perity of all peoples on our planet Earth which, in the
space age, though it does not seem so large, is still dear
to all of its inhabitants.
If our countries pooled their efforts — scientific, techni-
cal and material — to master the universe, this would be
very beneficial for the advance of science and would be
joyfully acclaimed by all peoples who would like to see
scientific achievements benefit man and not be used for
"cold war" purposes and the arms race.
Please convey cordial congratulations and best wishes
to Astronaut John Glenn.
N. Khrushchev
Secretary General of CENTO
Visits Washington
The Department of State announced on Feb-
ruary 23 (press release 117) that the Secretary
General of the Central Treaty Organization,
Abbas Ali Khalatbary, would visit Washington
for a short period beginning February 24. Dur-
ing his stay the Secretary General was to confer
with Secretary Rusk, Secretai^ of Defense Robert
S. McNamara, USIA Director Edward R. Mur-
row, and other key Washington officials.
Dr. Khalatbary expected to attend the opening
session of the CENTO Economic Committee,
which met at Washmgton February 26 to 28.^ The
members of the Central Treaty Organization's
Economic Committee are Iran, Pakistan, Turkey,
the United Kingdom, and the United States. The
headquarters of CENTO, including the Economic
Committee, is at Ankara, Turkey.
^ See p. 43a
/March 12, J 962
411
The Less Developed Countries and the Atlantic Partnership
hy Under Secretary Ball '
There were long centuries after the fall of Eome
when Western civilization seemed to be standing
still. Progress was an unfamiliar idea to medieval
man. He had, in fact, only a vague sense of the
passage of time. He marked the clianging of the
seasons, the cycle of life and death in his own fam-
ily or within a limited circle of friends or enemies.
That was about all.
Those days now seem quaint and remote. We
live in a world of fantastic change, accelerating
change. Not much more than a half-centuiy ago
man developed the internal combustion engine.
Then he learned to fly. Now we talk matter-of-
factly of putting men into orbit, shooting rockets
to the moon, bouncing the banalities of our tele-
phone conversations against insensate satellites.
Most of us, I am sure, have the disturbing feeling
that science comics are continually finding their
way into the front-page headlines.
Too much is happening too fast. In the area
of scientific and technological progress we have
almost lost our capacity for surprise. Change is
the reigning sovereign of the day. And while we
must often stretch our imaginative faculties to
comprehend the new wonders constantly emerg-
ing, most of us have learned to achieve this tour de
force with a considerable measure of grace.
But if we modern-day Americans can accept the
breathtaking pace of scientific advance without
turning a hair, we are far less prepared to accept —
or even to recognize — the equally rapid pace of
change in the political and economic structure of
a world in ferment.
I talked only last week with a man wlio has liad
a distinguished career, both in science and busi-
' Address made before the eighth umiual Conference on
International Affairs of the Cincinnati Council on World
Affairs at Cincinnati, Oliio, on Feb. 16 (press release 106).
ness. His conversation ranged with knowledge
and assurance over the technical aspects of inter-
planetary rocketry. He thought it likely, he said,
that there would soon be several breakthrouglis in
nuclear research. He seemed on a first-name basis
with most of the satellites that have been laimched
from Cape Canaveral, and he spoke with enthu-
siasm and facility of the vast dimensions of man's
physical environment. Here, I thouglit, was an
impressive example of a true 20th-century Ameri-
can— imaginative, confident, at home in a world
which I personally find strange and unfamiliar.
And then rather abruptly the conversation
shifted, as conversations will, to political and eco-
nomic matters. My friend showed as much as-
surance in these fields as in the field of science.
He had a patented prescription for the ills of the
day, precise, dogmatic, emphatic. "\Miat we must
do, he said, is to repeal the graduated income tax,
get rid of social security, raise tariffs, pull our
forces back from around the world, cut out foi'eign
assistance, and cultivate our own garden — or, as
he put it, get back to our business.
Quite frankly I was puzzled by this experience.
I liad not expected to find embodied in the same
personality a 20th-century man of science and an
18th-century man in politics and economics.
Listening to my friend, I had the strange feeling
that, in his scheme of things, we still lived under
the protection of the British Fleet and tliat, if we
did not interfei'e in world affairs, Napoleon's army
would cause us no trouble.
I recognize, of course, that it is difficult to chart
the course of a mainstream of history while it is
still in full flood. The ultimate meaning of to-
day's great events is for historians of the future
to define. But if we are to know where we are
going, if we are to direct our jiolicies with any
412
Department of State Bulletin
degree of confidence, we must seek, so far as we
can, to sort out the dominant forces at work in
the world, to try to determine tlieir implications —
for good or evil — and not be put off by slogans
of our own making, however comforting it might
be to give them credence.
Major Developments Affecting Foreign Policy
Tonight, therefore, I should like to suggest cer-
tain of these major developments that must be
taken into account in designing a modern-day
foreign policy. The three developments I shall
mention have acquired full visibility only in the
brief decade and a half since the war.
First, we have seen the aggressive intentions of
international conmiunisra combined with the
potential of modern technology and the manpower
of two great nations — the Soviet Union and
China — within a power system that involves al-
most one-third the population of the world. And,
although the center of this system is showing signs
of strain, we have no reason to predict its
dissolution.
Second, we have seen the breaking up of the
great colonial structures, worldwide in scope, that
were brought to full flower during the 19th cen-
tury. We have watched the transformation of
former colonial possessions into a whole geography
book of new states — proud, stimulated by their
new-found independence, and eager to share in a
more abundant life.
Third, we have seen the principal former colo-
nial powers yielding their empires willingly or
unwillingly, then finding a new outlet for their
energies in the construction of a new European
system — the Common Market.
It is of the second and third of these develop-
ments— the creation of the newly independent
countries, on the one hand, and the promise and
reality of a new Europe, on the other — that I
shall speak to you tonight, although the first, the
brooding Commimist menace, will necessarily play
an unspoken role in most of what I have to say.
There is good reason why I should talk tonight
both about the former colonial powers that have
joined together to build a imited Europe and the
former colonial possessions that have emerged
upon the world as new states. Each of these
developments has a special relevance to the central
theme of your conference — the underdeveloped
coxmtries and the cold war.
The relations of the United States with the for-
mer colonial powers of Europe have played a
major role in our foreign policy thi-oughout our
history. Today we are bound together — we and
they — not only by a military alliance but by the
inexorable logic of economics and politics. The
six powers that have formed the European Eco-
nomic Community — together with the United
Kingdom, which has applied for membership —
command massive resources. The United States
and the expanded European Community account
for close to 90 percent of free-world industrial
production and 90 percent of free- world industrial
trade.
With the strength of the free world now clus-
tered in two great centers, we and our Atlantic
partners must of necessity work together to ful-
fill the common responsibilities that history has
imposed upon us: to guard the security of the
free world and the values of fre« men, and to
help provide the capital, technical help, and finally
even the market opportunities for the less de-
veloped nations of the world.
This proposition seems clear enough. Yet one
encounters from time to time the view that there
is some kind of contradiction between the con-
cept of an Atlantic partnership on the one hand
and our need to develop bonds of friendship and
confidence with the less developed nations of the
world on the other. The impression is sometimes
given that the United States must choose between
lines of policy that are mutually exclusive: We
must elect either to develop a strong transatlantic
base of power on which to build the strength of
the free world or, alternatively, we must identify
ourselves with the ideals and interests of those
newly emergent nations that may represent the
balance of power of the future — and turn our
backs on Europe.
End of Colonial Era
Such a formulation, it seems to me, poses a false
dilemma, a dilemma based upon an obsolete as-
stunption and an imperfect comprehension of the
direction of events. The problem for us today is
to pursue both courses with equal vigor. After
all, for the powers that now constitute the Eu-
ropean Conmiunity and for the United Kingdom,
which has applied for membership in that Com-
munity, the colonial era is fast becoming a part
of history.
March J 2, 1962
413
The past decade and a half has seen a remark-
able process of the dismantling of empires. Great
Britain, by remarkable acts of free will, has
yielded hegemony over huge portions of the globe.
Not only that ; she has actively assisted her former
colonial possessions to achieve the perilous transi-
tion from dependency to statehood.
The sovereign nation of Indonesia has replaced
the Dutch East Indies. The Republic of the
Congo, sorely beset by growing pains, now oc-
cupies the principal Belgian territories in the
heart of Africa. France has transformed most
of her empire into a commonwealth of free nations.
And the end of the long struggle in Algeria is
hopefully in sight.
One can say, therefore, that colonialism in the
free world is largely a completed chapter of his-
tory. This fact, however, is not so remarkable as
the manner in which this change has occurred.
The great transformation from dependence to sov-
ereignty has been achieved in a fantastically
brief period of time and under conditions that
have, in a majority of cases, made possible the
retention of strong and continuing bonds of
friendship between the former colonial power and
the newly emerging state.
Undoubtedly anticolonialism will evoke deeply
felt emotions for many years after the colonial age
has finally ended. To the extent that those emo-
tions express themselves in a fierce determination
on the part of the new nations to maintain their
integrity and independence, they can continue to
be a strong, positive force in the world. But today
colonialism as an institution is growing and
spreading only behind tlie Iron Curtain — and
there in a singularly despotic form; in the free
world it has no future.
Considering the transformation that has been
wrought in the structure of relations between
the countries engaged in building a united
Europe and their former colonial territories, we
can safely conclude that the dilemma to which
I referred earlier is without validity. We need
not turn our backs on the nations that are build-
ing a new Europe in order to demonstrate that we
support the aspirations of the less fortunate peo-
ples everywhere who are demanding not only polit-
ical independence but a better economic life. For
the aims of our European friends are essentially
the same as ours, and it is to everyone's interest
that we combine our energies for the same ob-
jectives. It is, I am convinced, by building an
effective Atlantic partnership that we can best
assist in the achievement of this goal.
Obligations to Less Developed Nations
Let us make an agenda of what must be done
if the industrialized states on both sides of the
Atlantic are to fulfill their obligations to the
poorer nations of the world.
First, tliey must provide assistance in the form
of capital, experience, and technical help, as they
are now doing. If that assistance is to be effective,
it must be recognized as a common task for the
industrialized nations, most of which are active
members of the Atlantic partnership. The task
is clearly too big for any one nation, even the
United States.
Second, they must serve as customers for an in-
creasing amoiuit of production of the less de-
veloped countries. If those coimtries are to
achieve a decent level of life, if they are ever to
attain the goal of self-sustaining economic growth,
then they must be able to earn foreign exchange
in the markets of the world. And those markets
can be found primarily in the great consuming na-
tions— whicli means again those nations that have
attained a high level of economic advancement.
Third, if the Atlantic nations are to supply not
only aid but market opportunities, they must
themselves achieve and maintain a decent and
stable rate of economic growth. Experience has
all too often shown that violent fluctuations in
world demand can do grave economic damage, par-
ticularly to countries that depend for their liveli-
hood on the sale of raw materials.
Further Development of Atlantic Partnership
To accomplish these three items of our agenda — ■
all ^'ital if the less developed comitries are to at-
tain their aspirations — will require further de-
velopment of the Atlantic partnership.
Already we have made substantial progress m
this direction.
Consider, for example, the last point first — the
achievement of an adequate and stable rate of eco-
nomic gi-owth. We learned in the dark days of the
depression that disaster was quite as indivisible
as prosperity. Nations, at least the large indus-
trial nations, are no longer economic islands.
What liappens to one must, of necessity, have a
major inii)a('t on the others.
414
Department of State Bulletin
We see this today in dramatic fiushion in our
own balance-of-paynients deficit. That deficit is,
as we all know, the reflection of an imbalance in
free- world accounts; it is the mirror image of sur-
pluses in a handful of otlier major nations.
We have recognized this interdependence among
the world's key currencies. Within the past few
weeks the industrializetl Atlantic nations liave
taken a nimiber of unprecedented steps. They
have, for example, agreed upon the creation of a
new $6-billion pool of currencies, to act as another
major line of defense against any pressures which
may be exerted on key currency .-
The recognition of interdependence is useful, of
course, only as we reflect that recognition in action.
Within the past year particularly we have moved
effectively on this front. We have begun to
develop an efficient mechanism for concerting
our domestic economic policies. Through the
OECD — the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development — we are perfecting tech-
niques of consultation, not only in monetary mat-
ters but in a whole range of fiscal and other do-
mestic policies. The OECD is the first truly
Atlantic organization in the economic field, just
as NATO is the Atlantic organization in the field
of defense. Included in its membership are not
only the United States and Canada but the prin-
cipal nations of Western Europe. Through the
OECD we have achieved already an unparalleled
range of mutually helpful actions, and we are only
at the beginning.
The maintenance of economic health in an inter-
dependent world implies necessarily that there
must be a large measure of agreement on the part
of the principal indu.strial powers to pursue do-
mestic policies that will result in an adequate and
steady rate of economic growth. Such an agree-
ment was reached last December, when ministers
representing the members of the OECD adopted as
their common target a 50-percent increase in their
combined gross national products over the present
decade.^
I need hardly argue with you in Cincinnati the
indivisible nature of w^orld prosperity. Your city
is indeetl in the mainstream of world trade. You
send your products to the comers of the earth.
You buy products from everywhere. You have
learned by your own observation, thei'efore, that
' Bulletin of .Ian. 29, 1962, p. 187.
' For background, see ibid., Dec. 18, 1061, i<. 1014.
if the nations of the free world are to maintain
a sound and steady growth, trade between them
must proceed on a healthy basis.
European Common Market
It is in this area — the area of international
trade — that we can see a major role for the At-
lantic partnership. All of you here, I am sure,
are generally aware of the profound changes that
are taking place in the size and shape of the trad-
ing world. The six nations of the European Eco-
nomic Community — the Common Market, as it is
called — already control an important share of
world trade. It would not be appi'opriate for me
tonight to speculate as to when or whether the
United Kingdom will complete arrangements with
the present member nations to join the European
Community. But if those arrangements can be
concluded, the changes in the trading world will
be very vast indeed. After all, Great Britain's
trading interests are worldwide. The system of
Commonwealth preferences under which much of
that trade is conducted covers a considerable part
of world commerce; it includes the trade of na-
tions in both hemispheres and on all six continents.
I cannot tell you tonight how Commonwealth
preferences may be altered by Britain's accession
to the Common Market; this is a matter for nego-
tiation largely between Britain and the Economic
Community, though it is one in which we ourselves
have a major interest. But we can be certain that
the existing arrangements will undergo some
major changes.
Apart from the possible effect on Britain's trad-
ing relations with the Commonwealth, the creation
of an expanded Community will have far-reaching
significance. This significance can be best under-
stood if we consider that our new trading world
will contain two major elements: the common
market of the United States on one side of the
Atlantic and the Common IMarket of Europe on
the other. I say the common market of the United
States, for that is, in effect, what we Americans
created on this continent; — a vast common market
of 50 States among which trade flows freely and
without obstruction but which is surrounded by a
common external tariff. The Common Market of
Europe which we are about to see come into being
will consist of an as yet undetermined number of
coimtries among whom trade will flow freely and
March 72, J 962
415
without obstruction but the whole area of which
will be surrounded by a common external tariff.
Wliat will be the implications of that develop-
ment? Quite clearly as the European Common
Market comes fully into being — which will take
place some time within the next 7 or 8 years — a
manufacturer in Cincinnati selling to a customer
in Diisseldorf will be under some disadvantage as
against a manufacturer in Milan ; he will have to
sell his goods over a common external tariff, while
the manufacturer in Milan will not. But, of
course, advantages and disadvantages are re^'ipro-
cal, since a manufacturer in Diisseldorf selling to
a New York customer will be at a similar disad-
vantage as against a manufacturer in Cincinnati ;
he will have to sell his goods over the barrier of
our own external tariff, while the producer in Cin-
cinnati will not.
Implied in these facts, of course, is another op-
portunity for the Atlantic partnership. For the
first time in history we shall have in the European
Commimity a trading partner with many of the
characteristics of the United States — a trading
partner with a developed industrial economy, a
population larger than ours, and a market similar
in many ways to our own. More than that, we
begin with a situation where the tariff walls for
industrial products surrounding these two great
trading areas are at roughly the same height.
It seems clear enough from these facts that if
we can, by agreement between us, reduce the level
of the common tariff on both sides of the ocean,
we shall, by such a bargain, benefit not only one
another but the whole free world.
Advantages of Expanding U.S. Trade
Tliere are many reasons why such an agreement
should prove advantageous to the United States.
Our trade with the expanded Community is pres-
ently very much in our favor. Our exports of all
products to that area are 50 percent higher than
our imports. Most Europeans are only just be-
ginning to enjoy many of the consumer goods
which Americans have known for years. Their
demands are increasing. On a different plane
Europe is undergoing a revolution of rising ex-
pectations quite as profound as that which is
sweeping the less developed countries. The Euro-
pean market, in brief, offers an almost unlimited
potential for growth.
Moreover it is the kind of market well suited
to American production. "VVliereas European in-
dustry has been developed over the years to serve
small, narrow national markets, we alone in the
free world have designed our industrial plant for
mass consumption. But until now the only mass
market available to us was the United States.
Tlie development of the European market for
American products will not be easy. It will make
heavy demands on our vested capital of imagina-
tion and ingenuity. It will require us to do much
more than merely ship abroad the surplus of the
goods we produce for Americans. It will mean
much greater attention to the tailoring of prod-
ucts expressly for European tastes or designed for
European conditions. It will require a consider-
able effort of merchandising of a kind few Amer-
ican firms have ever attempted in Europe, since
the potential of limited national markets has in
the past not seemed to justify the trouble.
The prime objective of the Trade Expansion
Act which the President has just sent to the Con-
gress * is, as you know, to assist American indus-
try and agriculture to gain access to this new
Common Market by reducing or eliminating the
trade disadvantage that may result from the com-
mon external tariff.
I shall not attempt tonight to discuss the de-
tails of that legislation. You will hear much dis-
cussion of it over the next few weeks. But I am
confident that with the support of cities such as
Cincinnati — with your vast industrial production
already pouring into Europe and with your great
stake in our agricultural export crops — we should
be able not only to increase the flow of world
trade but to enlarge the job and business oppor-
tunities for all Americans.
In the European Common Market we shall have
for the first time a trading partner with whom we
can negotiate trade arrangements on a basis of
equality. In the past we have had to make agree-
ments with not one but 30 or 40 nations in order
to bring about an appreciable change in the level
of international protection. But with a trading
partner that for the first time can speak with one
voice regarding the conditions of access to a
market that may in time rival our own, we should,
' For text of President Kennedy's trade message to Con-
gress, see ibid., Feb. 12, 1962, p. 231 ; for a summary of
the bill (U.K. 0900), see Hid., Feb. 20, 19G2, p. 343.
416
Department of Stale Bulletin
if the President is equipped with appropriate
tools, acliieve a sigiiilicant breakthrougli to a
hierher level of international trade.
Advantages to Underdeveloped Nations
But you may ask quite properly : Granting that
the trading arrangements we can make with
Europe may be a significant exercise in Atlantic
partnership, wliat does this have to do with the
imderdeveloped nations? There are several an-
swere to this question.
First, an increase in the level of consumption
made possible by a heightened flow of inter-
national commerce will mean a greater demand
for the raw materials of the new countries, as well
as a more stable demand.
Second, all agreements for reducing common
external tariifs on both sides of the Atlantic will
be nondiscriminatory. We will not abandon the
most-favored-nation principle, which has long
been a tenet of American trading policy.
Third, the Presidents trade proposals contain
specific provisions to improve the trading position
of the less developed countries, particularly with
respect to tropical agricultural products.
I come finally to a most significant area in which
the Atlantic partnership can be effective — the im-
provement of cooperative arrangements for the
supplying of capital and other forms of assistance
to the less developed nations. Here we have, par-
ticularly over the past year, made considerable
strides in transforming foreign assistance from a
series of uncoordinated national efforts into a new
effort of cooperation. Discussions with other in-
dustrialized countries of the OECD and with
Japan have led to the expansion of aid by other
nations. Consultations on the terms and methods
of providing assistance have created new interna-
tional imderstanding on these difficult issues. And
as a part of the same trend, it has been possible
to organize groups of nations, so-called consortia,
jointly to extend aid to India and to Pakistan and
to consider similar approaches to the needs of
other countries. These steps are only the begin-
ning in a process which will lead to another strong
link in the Atlantic partnership.
I have sought in these few minutes to provide a
few examples in support of the thesis which I put
forward at the outset of my remarks — that our
effoi"ts of partnership with the other Atlantic na-
tions, far from being inconsistent with our rela-
March 12, 1962
63039S— 62 3
tions with the underdeveloped countries, are in
fact a necessary means by which we nmst fulfill
our obligations to those countries. These are two
lines of policy which we must simultaneously
pursue.
New Nations Closer to Lincoln Than to Lenin
Nor is there any doubt that these two lines of
policy bear directly on the first of the three de-
velopments that I mentioned at the beginning of
these remarks — the emergence of a Sino-Soviet
power bloc with world ambitions. A year ago Mr.
Walter Lippmann, describing a recent interview
with Mr. Khrushchev, referred to that part of the
discussion which had dealt with the revolutionary
movement among small nations. Mr. Lippmann
wrote :
Mr. Khru.shchev spoke specifically of three of them —
Laos, Cuba and Iran. But for him these three were
merely examples of what he regards as a world-wide and
historic revolutionary movement — akin to the change from
feudalism to capitalism — which is surely destined to bring
the old colonial countries into the Communist orbit. I
could detect no doubt or reservation in his mind that this
will surely happen, that there is no alternative, that while
he will help this manifest destiny and while we will op-
pose it, the destiny would be realized no matter what
either of us did.
None of us in America share this sense of the
ineluctable course of history. Being free men we
have never been historical determinists, and I
think that Pi'esident Kennedy spoke eloquently
for people far beyond the borders of the United
States when he addressed these comments to Mr.
Khrushchev : ^
I believe, Mr. Chairman, that you should recognize that
free peoples in all parts of the world do not accept the
claim of historical inevitability for Communist revolution.
What your government believes is its own business ; what
it does in the world is the world's business. The great
revolution in the history of man, past, present and future,
is the revolution of those determined to be free.
Certainly the history of the past two decades has
borne out the President's words. In their national
revolutions the new statesmen of the new nations
with very few excejDtions have looked to the Amer-
ican revolution — to Jefferson, not Dzerzhinski, to
James Madison and not Karl Marx. For it was
indeed we Americans who fired the shot heard
around the world. If today that shot comes back
in louder and louder echoes — and sometimes in
= Ibid., May 8, 1961, p. 661.
417
ricochets — most of the new nations are still singing
our song. They are closer to Lincoln than Ijenin.
This, I think, should be a source of confidence
to us at a time when events do not always seem to
be moving our way. If we can mobilize the vast
resources of the advanced economies of the free
world through an Atlantic partnership and if to-
gether we can create a stable world economic en-
viromnent and utilize oui' combined resources to
assist those nations recently graduated from colo-
nialism to achieve the political and economic
growth that will enable them to maintain their in-
dependence, we shall have gone much of the way
toward insuring a safe future not only for our-
selves but for freedom and free men everywhere.
President Kennedy Congratulates
President of Finland on Reelection
Following is the text of a message from Presi-
dent Kennedy to Vrho K. Kekkonen, President of
the Republic of Finland.
White House press release dated February 17
February 16, 1962
Dear Mr. PREsroENx: I congratulate you on
your re-election as President of the Kepublic of
Finland. It is my sincere wish and that of the
people of the United States that you will enjoy
a successful term of oflice. I look back with satis-
faction upon your visit to the United States,^ which
did much to reinforce the traditional bonds of
friendship between our two nations. May that
friendship flourish and be strengthened still fur-
ther during your presidency in these challenging
years.
Please accept my warm greetings and best
wishes.
Sincerely,
JouN F. Kennedy
' Bulletin of Nov. 6, 1961, p. 760.
Presidents of Cameroon and Cyprus
To Visit United States
Cameroon
White House press release dated February 16
The President of the United States announced
on Februaiy 16 that ^Vlunadou jiiliidjo. President
of the Federal Kepublic of Cameroon, has accepted
the President's invitation to visit the United
States. Beginning on March 13 President Ahidjo
will spend 5 days in the United States as tlie guest
of President Kennedy. The first 2 days of the
visit will be spent in Washington.
This will be the first visit to the United States by
President Ahidjo since his country became inde-
pendent under his leadership on January 1, 1960.
Cyprus
White House press release dated February 21
President Kennedy announced on February 21
that His Beatitude Makarios III, President of the
Republic of Cyprus, has accepted the President's
invitation to visit the United States as a Presiden-
tial guest beginning June 5, 1962.
President Makarios will spend 2 days in "Wash-
ington and the following 3 days in another city
as a guest of the U.S. Government. The Minister
of Foreign Affairs of Cyprus, Spyros Kyprianou,
will accompany Archbishop Makarios.
Letters of Credence
Philippines
The newly appointed iVmbassador of the Philip-
pines, Emilio Abello, presented his credentials to
President Kennedy on February 20. For texts of
the Ambassador's remarks and the President's re-
ply, see Department of State press release 110
dated February 20.
418
Department of Sfafe Bulletin
Policy for the Western Alliance — Berlin and After
hy McGeorge Bundy
Special Assistant to the President ^
The title which I have offered for these remarks
is large and general, and it may seem somewhat
pretentious. I\Iy intent is in fact the ojoposite.
It is to talk of the forces that shape our policy
rather than about that policy itself. Specifically,
I do not wish to attempt this evening a formula-
tion of American policy toward the immediately
important problem of the freedom of Berlin.
That has been done and will be done again, in
the course of the crisis, by the President and the
Secretary of State.
"Wliat I want to do is something quite differ-
ent— to sketch the larger context of continuing
Western purpose and opportunity within which
this Berlin crisis is taking place. The crisis in
Berlin is many things: It is clearly a test of
Western will and of Soviet ambition ; it is a con-
test for freedom and hope in the lives of 2 million
brave people in West Berlin; it is a test of the
understanding and fairness of mind of neutral
statesmen.
But Berlin is also a test of a larger sort : It is a
test of the relations among the Western nations
most concerned, and this, I believe, is its central
meaning. The object of our policy in Berlin
must be to advance the ends of our policy toward
Europe as a whole. So while I avoid specific
issues in the formulation of a common allied posi-
tion for the political and military defense of free-
dom in West Berlin, I believe that in discussing
the wider purposes of the Western alliance I may
still be making observations which are relevant
to the inmiediate crisis.
But before getting into my subject, I want to
offer a couple of warnings. Firet, let me remark
' Address made before the Economic Club of Chicago,
at Chicago, III., on Dee. 6.
that in speaking specifically of the Atlantic al-
liance tonight I intend no slight to our other great
connections in this hemisphere, in Asia, in the
Mediteri'anean, and in Africa. The time has long
passed when the United States could emphasize
one part of the world as against another ; we have
the task, rather, of seeking to frame and execute
policies in all parts of the free world which will
help to concert and harmonize the varied interests
of many proud and independent peoples. There
are stubborn differences and deep-seated causes of
tension among nations all of which we wish to
count as friends. It is natural that some Ameri-
cans should have more concern with one part of
the problem and some with another. But that is
not the position of the United States Government
in this administration. The New Frontier has
shown a fresh and greater interest in the problems
and opportunities of the developmg nations; it
also cares for Europe. These are complementary,
not conflicting, purposes, and the view of our rela-
tions with Europe which I am going to try to
sketch is fully consistent with enthusiastic and
enlightened attention to other continents as well.
It is, in a sense, a policy for Europe after the
age of colonialism; the Atlantic commimity itself,
as it grows in strength and prosfierity, can and
should grow also in its contribution to the welfare
of other parts of the world.
My second warning is about the nature of our
European affairs themselves. The relations of the
United States to Westarn Europe are convention-
ally divided into three categories: the economic,
the military, and the political. This is a sensible
and practical division, but it is well to recognize
that it is unreal. The underlying meaning of
effective action in all three categories is political,
in that it affects the fundamental course of power
Marzh 72, 1962
419
and purpose among the nations concerned. The
briefest glance at the record since World War II
will underline the point. The Marshall plan was
an economic undertaking; its immediate object
was the economic recovery of the participating
nations, all of them gravely weakened in this field
by the events of the Second World War. But the
larger purpose of the Marshall plan was politi-
cal— it was the maintenance of freedom in West-
ern Europe against the combined threat of com-
munism and chaos. The decision in the Congress
of the United States always rested on this political
assessment, and the pooling of programs by the
European states themselves would not have been
possible in the absence of deeply urgent political
concern.
The point can be proved as easily on the mili-
tary side. The level of our military assistance in
1949, the formulation of a Supreme Conunand
under General Eisenhower in 1950, the "great de-
bate" on sending troops to Europe in the follow-
ing months, and each of a series of major military
decisions which followed in the 1950's — all of
these, in fascinatingly varied ways, had political
origins and political consequences which trans-
cended their immediate military meaning. If it
is convenient to separate the European problem
into distinct elements, it is also dangerous, and
it will be important to bear in mind at each stage
that we are talking about aspects of a single, inter-
connected i^olicy for the West.
Economic Policy
With these warnings let me turn at once to the
economic sector. Here the great fact for present
policymakers Ls the splendid success of the Euro-
l^ean Common Market. This success is, in the first
instance, economic in the strict sense of the word.
The Common JMarket works, and it works as be-
lievers in the American system always asserted
that it would. It is a fact, and no longer only a
tlieory, that the enlargement of markets, the low-
ering of internal barriers to trade, and the expec-
tation of further stable progress in these directions
liave given new and dramatic economic strength
to the central states of free Europe. The separate
postwar miracles of Germany, France, and Italy
are now entering a second stage— tlie Common
Market miracle — and I am sure that it is not nec-
essary for me to say to this audience that men
wlio make decisions on investment, throughout the
world, have radically revised their preferences in
the light of this new phenomenon. Great Britain
has announced its desire to join. It is not at all
unreasonable to believe that this decision, if it is
followed by productive negotiations among all
concerned, may be a more powerful reason for
remembering 1961 than any of the immediate
crises which now seem to mark this year.
Our Government has welcomed both the growth
of the Common Market and the prospective acces-
sion of Great Britain to it. In this attitude, in
the Eisenhower administration as in this one, we
have had a fundamentally political purpose. We
believe in the reunion of Europe — and I shall have
more to say on our reasons for this view later on.
But for the moment what needs to be remarked
about the success of the Common Market is that it
presents us with a major challenge and a major
opportunity in terms of our own foreign economic
behavior. We must now decide whether we are
prepared to compete fairly and openly in the mar-
ketplace of the free world, and in the face of this
new major friendly rival, or whether our agelong
conviction that open markets are good for man's
freedom and prosperity must now be abandoned
in restriction and timidity.
Nothing can be gained by pretending that this
challenge does not exist. In the years after World
War II the undamaged and enormously produc-
tive American economy established itself in the
world's markets in such a way that effective export
is now an element in the livelihood of millions of
our citizens, in all parts of the country and in an
astonishing range of fields of production. This
is a proud accomplishment, and it must not be
cut short.
Our export surplus in the last 8 years lias run
at an average level of $5 billion a year. This sur-
plus does much more than make jobs for Ameri-
cans— it pays for our international security.
Without it our alliances would grow anemic, our
overseas strength could not be sustained, both our
aid programs and our foreign investment would
wither, our leadership in the free world would be
weakened, and our high claims for the economic
effectiveness of a free society would sound hollow.
It would be melodramatic to say that we must
export or die, but it is the precise and straight-
forward truth that we cannot stand still where
wo are. Our export surplus is no longer an auto-
matic consequence of seemingly effortless economic
420
Department of State Bulletin
superiority; our international economic position
will now get better or woi-se, depending upon the
energy and direction of our response to tlie pres-
ent challenges of a new pattern of world trade.
And while there are many elements in this new
pattern, the one which should properly attract
our first attention is the problem of our relation
to the emerging European economic giant.
The central and decisive question is whether
we and Europe are hoth willing and able to meet
a fair, competitive test. In this country, because
of our extraordinary advantages, some of our in-
dustries— and I make no distinction here among
capital, management, and labor — have grown soft.
Not all of our markets, abroad or at home, have
been won by effective demonstration of produc-
tivity, efficiency, and economy. Now our per-
formance faces a new and growing challenge.
This administration does not propose to turn
away from this challenge. We do not believe that
there can be an economic "forti"ess America." We
do not suppose that America, of all nations, need
fear fair competition. On the contrary, we be-
lieve that the emergence of a great new center of
production and trade can be good for all of us.
We propose to steer toward closer and stronger
trade relations in the open market of freedom —
and not to turn away in fear or narrow self-
interest from the prospect of zestful and mutually
beneficial expansion of exports and imports alike
among the great free trading nations.
I do not wish to suggest that there are no
pi-oblems in this policy. It has always been true
that the common interest in free trade implies
pressures upon the special interests and established
expectations of specific groups. "Wliat has always
been irritating about any simple schoolbook satis-
faction with the theory of free trade is that it may
imply a cavalier disregard for jobs, for property,
and for human beings themselves. That is not
the frame of mind of this administration. We are
concerned not with schoolbook theory but with
what happens in the real world. Moreover, we do
not suppose that sudden revolution is the key to
success. Really important changes in trade pat-
terns are most effective when they take place over
a periotl of several years. Adjustment assistance
in unusual cases can and should be used to ease the
transition. But with such sensible provisos as
these, we are sure that a bold policy of economic
self-confidence will be justified by its practical
consequences for the prosperity of all Americans.
Trade is not a one-way street, of course, and we
shall have interests of our own to advance in re-
turn for increased access to our own great market.
A common market can be opened or closed, as
different parts of our own histoi-y demonstrate,
and we are in no position to attempt a policy of
unilateral free trade with a partner which does
not reciprocate. For example, we must obtain
reasonable access to this new great market for
agricultural as well as industrial products.
American trade is of course not limited to
Europe, and American political responsibilities do
not end at the boundaries of the North Atlantic
alliance. In framing our economic policy toward
the new Europe we must and will take full account
of the trading needs of other friends — in Latin
America, in Japan, and in other areas which have
not so far had historic access to the European mar-
ket. The "grand design" for prosperous and ex-
panding trade in the free world is clear and simple,
but each step forward will require complex and
careful arrangements to safeguard the multiple
interests of nations and people who could easily
be gravely damaged by simple assumptions defined
in narrow terms.
But this is not the place for a technical account
of our proposed response to the new challenge of
the Common Market. I have said enough, per-
haps, to make it clear that we are entering a new
and major phase in the determination of our trad-
ing policy and practice. The precise result of the
debate cannot be predicted. But that it is impor-
tant is clear, and for those who think in terms of
the promise of the Atlantic community, the essen-
tial direction is equally plain. We must move
toward partnership, not toward protection.
Military
The Common Market gives promise of provid-
ing a lasting source of energy and prosperity to
the economic life of Western Europe. The mili-
tary security of the area is not yet so plainly
assured. Policy here has two great aspects — con-
ventional strength and nuclear posture. For us
in the United States the main purpose is what it
has been since the first days of NATO — to assist
in the creation of a general military position which
will in fact deter Soviet aggression while it sus-
tains the self-confidence of the people of the
Western nations.
In our view today this double objective requires.
March J 2, 7962
421
as a matter of urgency, a major reinforcement of
the conventional strenj^tli of the North Atlantic
alliance. We have of course a special concern
with the crisis in Berlin, but our policy is not
limited to, or defined by, any single moment of
trial. The free nations of Europe, in numbers,
skill, and energy, are more than a match in them-
selves for the Soviet Union. It is not sound, in
our judgment, that they should still be gravely
and heavily outnumbered and outmatched in their
conventional military strength. Europe, we be-
lieve, has a need to look strongly to its self-defense
in the levels of force below the nuclear threshold.
We see no way in which the United States can
do this job for Europe, but as we have been
leaders for many years in stressing the need for
nuclear strength in Europe, so today it seems im-
portant that M-e should leave no doubt of our pres-
ent sense of need in the conventional field as well.
Nuclear weapons must remain and be improved as
the ultimate deterrent and as the instrument of
retaliation in the face of massive aggression. But
they will not serve all of the needs of free men
through all time, and the European shield requires
major new conventional strength.
But let me emphasize again that the concern
of this administration for conventional reinforce-
ment is in no sense an indication of a lack of
interest or belief in effective nuclear dispositions.
The free- world nuclear deterrent today is more
than adequate to NATO's military purposes. Not
only does NATO have the full support of the
extraordinarily powerful strategic forces available
to the United States and the United Kingdom; it
is in its own right a major nuclear power. In-
human threats of attack on so-called "hostages"
are likely to bounce back against the interest of
those who make them. Europe could not bo at-
tacked without provoking a highly destructive
response from NATO nuclear forces, as well as
others outside the theater.
But it is time to advance our plans for future
NATO nuclear strength. There is a clear and
growing concern in Europe as to whether these
dispositions will be fully responsive to European
needs and desires. The basic position of this
Government on this point was stated by the Presi-
dent in a major address at Ottawa last spring.^
He there emphasized the United States willing-
ness to consider establishment of a NATO sea-
' For text, see Bcti.letin of June 5, 19C1, p. 839.
422
based, nuclear deterrent force, multilaterally
owned and controlled. He offered to commit five
Polaris submarines — or even more in appropriate
circumstances — to NATO. The immediate pre-
occupation of senior officers in all governments
with preparation against hazard in Berlin has
delayed the further consideration of this major
problem, but it is the view of the United States
Government that a constructive and effective solu-
tion is both important and possible. Europe
secure in reliance upon a NATO deterrent will
have a posture as against Soviet threats which
cannot but strengthen the unity and self-confi-
dence of the Western alliance as a whole.
Political
In turning to specifically political matters I
repeat again that all of these matters are matters
of politics. If we can find a new trading relation
to the Common Market and if we can develop a
new cooperative strength in both conventional
and nuclear weapons, we shall have done much to
advance our basic policy of partnerehip with a
revived and strengthened Europe. But there re-
mains a specifically political problem — the politi-
cal problem of the separate Western European
sovereign states. Here our purpose is at some
distance from our means — for that purpose is the
political vmity of Western Europe, and plainly it
is not we Americans who can make this great
event come to jiass. Great sovereignties like
England, France, Germany, and Italy will not be
melted into a new nation of Europe by a wave of
any American wand. Yet our attitude is in no
sense irrelevant. The steps toward European
unity which have occurred since 1947 are neither
few nor trifling, and each of them has depended
in large measure upon the sj'mpathy and even the
support of the Government of the United States.
It will bo this way in the future, too.
And the line of development in Europe is clear.
Tho European destiny does now require a new
political connnunity. Tho road upon which the
six central nations embarked at Kome is not a
dead end but a through way, and the next moves
are already beginning. It is not an accident, in
my judgment, that we find an increasing harmony
of view on specific political problems between
Bonn and Paris. Nor is this harmony a danger,
in the large sense, to tho United States.
Indeed, I believe that it would bo bettor for the
Department of Stale Bulletin
United States if the relation between our voice
and tiiose of our principal partners in the alliance
of free men could be less unequal. As it is now,
we are the only great power, in the full 20th-
century sense, on the side of freedom. The
United Kingdom retains great influence by virtue
of its historic achievements and its continuing
comiection with the Conmionwoalth. The voice
of France will always be heard in the world, and
it is a voice of uncommon eloquence and personal
authority in these years of General de Gaulle.
The growing importance of Italy and of Germany
is equally plain. But all these voices speak in the
context of levels of power which simply do not
compare with those of the United States and the
Soviet Union, and the difference inevitably affects
the discourse. Partial dependency, as against
equal mutual reliance, is not good for the pride
or the judgment of free men, and when one power
is very much stronger than its allies there is an
unhealthy tendency to seek special and unique
connections at the major center. It would be
better if Western Europe were one great power.
A glance at the fimdamental indices of popula-
tion, production, and I'esources will show that only
internal political divisions stand between Western
Europe and this new role.
It is of course a hazardous business to predict
the form of political relationship which the
United States might have with an entity which is
only now beginning to come into existence. But
my own belief is that the most productive way of
conceiving the political future of the Atlantic
community is to think in teiTns of a partnership
between the United States, on the one hand, and a
great European power, on the other. This part-
nership would be directed to the constructive and
defensive tasks which must be discharged if a
genuine community of free nations is to be
created: aid to less developed areas, defense
against Communist aggression. It would not be
an ingrown white man's club; it would rather
look outward to larger burdens and opportunities.
Each of these great powers would, of course,
have close associates and friends : Canada and the
Latin American states on our side, the Common-
wealth and the less unified European neighbors on
theirs. And they would all be joined together
with other free nations in the wide range of com-
mon endeavors and enterprises which characterize
the free world. Such a partnership makes more
sense than a full-blown Atlantic union, which is
still constitutionally and psychologically out of
range for the people of the United States, and
it makes more sense than what we have today.
What might happen in such a new partnership is
perhaps best foreshadowed by the extraordinary
relation which was created in World War II be-
tween Great Britain and the United States. Even
then there was an uneven balance of power, but
magnanimity and good judgment led to the main-
tenance of an essentially equal relationship. This
was good for both sides, and it has not been to
the advantage of the United States that the rela-
tive power of Great Britain has much declined
since 1945. Wliat I am suggesting, in short, is
that the partnership of freedom now requires the
re-creation of a great central political force in
Western Europe. To this general end Americans
of both parties, through three administrations,
have given their support, and I believe that his-
toi-y will prove the wisdom of this unbroken
purpose.
We have in prospect, then, a new Europe, with
the economic strength, the military self-confi-
dence, and the political unity of a true great
power. Since great states do not usually rejoice
in the emergence of other great states, we shall do
well to note briefly why it is that in this case we
can feel such confidence. The immediate answer
here is in the current contest with the Soviet
Union. It is certainly true that we and the free
men of Europe have a common interest in the
resistance of Communist expansion. By the same
token we cannot suppose that the Soviet Union
has now suddenly abandoned its 15-year-old
preoccupation with the division and weakening
of the Atlantic community. But in the end our
confidence in Europe rests on deeper and more
solid political ground. These peoples are our
cousins by history and culture, by language and
religion. We are cousins too in our current sense
of human and social purpose. It is in Western
Europe and in North America that the true op-
portunities of the modern world are now being
opened for the first time. These societies are
moving together into the age of everyman — the
age in which a happy combination of work and
leisure, of social activity and individual responsi-
bility, can offer to all citizens what the greatest
of past societies have achieved only for a few.
For this aspiration there is required, certainly, a
steady advance in material prosperity. But there
is required also something harder, deeper, and
March 72, 7962
423
decisive — a conviction, throughout the civil so-
ciety, that its end is man and Iiis possibilities. It
is because we have this inherited commitment, in
common with Europe, that we can be confident of
the wisdom of our purpose that Europe shall gain
in strength. This is what we have for the 20th
century, from the Greeks and the Eomans, the
Jews and the Christians, from the traditions of
law, civility, and science, and the ideals of liberty,
fraternity, and equality which have become the
tuning forks of the conscience of man.
I have gone a wide circle in these remarks, and
I do not deny that the new Europe will surely not
be finished in a day. If the picture I have drawn
goes beyond nationalism and colonialism, it is not
because these forces have expired but only because
they are so plainly remnants of a waning past,
essentially irrelevant to the true present mission
of Europe. But I assure you that in this wide-
ranging sketch I have never departed from the
subject of Berlin. For the defense of Berlin is
also the defense of Europe, and the defense of
Europe is the defense of the United States. This
is true for the general reasons of respect for free
men and resistance of aggression which I stated
at the outset, but it is true in a larger and deeper
sense because of the role of Germany in the Euro-
pean future, and I would like to end with a few
words on this great topic.
In each of the three areas of traditional analy-
sis the role of Germany is central. In the Com-
mon Market the German role is indispensable; as
for the military defense of Europe, it has been
plain since 1950 that it could not be managed
without responsible German participation; and
the politics of European union are very largely
the politics of the new Germany— a constitutional
democracy increasingly integrated in the Euro-
pean whole.
Nothing in the cynical propaganda of inter-
national communism is more dangerous and de-
structive than the shameless attempt to deny to
the Federal Eepublic of Germany the credit of its
extraordinary political achievement in rebuilding
from the ashes of the Nazi disgrace a decent, peace-
ful, and liberal society. And by the same token
nothing is more important to the Atlantic com-
munity than that Germany should persist in this
basic course. For that there is required a con-
tinued understanding and partnership, both in the
broad purposes to which I have spoken this eve-
ning and in the confrontation of immediate
424
hazards like that which now exists in the Soviet
threat to Berlin.
The free men of Germany liave accepted the
restraints of partnership. In return they have
received our pledge of peaceful support for the
union of Germany. This was not a hard pledge
for us to give ; the debate among Americans dur-
ing World War II over the usefulness of dividing
Germany was always unequal, and it was deci-
sively settled in favor of union long before tho
new German government emerged. Tlie division
of Germany is a mordant sorrow to the Germans
and a danger to mankind. It takes no super-
human wisdom to understand the simple truth — a
truth beyond cold-war rivalries — that to insist
upon the division of Germany is to insist upon a
permanent threat to the peace of Europe. We
cannot prevent the Soviet Union from assuming
the grave responsibility of this dangerous insist-
ence upon division, but we can and must maintain
our own peaceful purpose of reunion.
There are other ways in which Germany is
threatened today, but most of them have the mark
of this issue of division versus union : the mark of
a dangerous and destructive insistence upon direct
humiliation of the free Germans. To this we
must be opposed. There are ways, we believe, in
which the reasonable interests of a reasonable
Soviet Government can be met; that is why we
believe in negotiation. But we can never accept
any settlement which undermines the trust, and
the commitment to freedom, of the people of the
Federal German Eepublic.
Germany is thus a central concern. This does
not make Germany all-powerful in the alliance.
We cannot grant — and no German statesmen have
asked — a German veto on the policy of the West.
A partnership of free men can never move at the
call of one member only. We can expect to have
differences — honest and friendly — with all our
allies. We can expect them to take account of our
position even as we take account of theirs. But it
remains a fundamental purpose of our policy in
Europe— and at Berlin— that the free people of
Germany shall not have any legitimate cause to
regret their trust in us.
Wliat is deeply ironic in the present crisis is
that our interest and purpose are precisely in pre-
venting what the Soviet Union claims to fear; it
is not our defense of Berlin, but the Soviet attack
upon it, which threatens to revive a German na-
tionalism of the sort that we all wish to keep in
Department of Stale Bulletin
the past. Not in the European Community, but
in unanchored detachment, Germany might again
threaten the peace of lier neighbors. Not in re-
union, but in anguished, wall-marked division, is
the temptation to adventure.
So the crisis in Berlin is the present touchstone
of our policy for Germany, and our policy for
Germany is the present touchstone of our policy
for Europe. What we do in the immediate crisis
we do not only for its own sake but for the sake of
a larger purpose. As we face the hazards of con-
frontation, as we work for effective negotiation,
we have the right and duty to bear in mind that
what we are defending, in Berlin, in Germany, and
in Europe, is the balance of hope and purpose for
the great society of freedom.
United States Agrees To Support
Tunisian Development Effort
The Department of State annomiced on Feb-
ruary 21 (press release 114) that the Secretary of
State for the Plan and Finances of Tunisia,
Ahmed Ben Salah, accompanied by his advisers,
had taken part in discussions that week with offi-
cials of the Department of State and the Agency
for International Development, including the As-
sistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, G.
Mennen "Williams, and the Administrator of AID,
Fowler Hamilton. As a result of these discus-
sions agreement was reached that the United
States will support Tunisia's long-term economic
development effort. It is expected during the
coming weeks that fonnal agreement on the nature
and extent of this U.S. assistance will be reached.
Dr. Pico Named Special Representative
of President in Dominican Republic
The White House announced on February 21 the
appointment of Eafael Pico as Special Eepre-
sentative of the President in the Dominican Ee-
public. Dr. Pico will assist in fashioning a strong
economic development program and in creating
the institutional framework for more effective
govermnent operations.
It was expected that Dr. Pico would arrive at
Santo Domingo on February 22 and immediately
begin to organize the U.S. AID mission in that
country.
U.S.-Japan Committee Called Model
for Scientific Cooperation
Remarks hy Secretary Rusk ^
I have received a very favorable report from
Ambassador [Edwin O.] Eeischauer on this first
meeting. I believe that scientific, cultural, and
educational exchanges contribute greatly to the
betterment of relations between states, to inter-
national understanding, and to the furthering of
man's knowledge. I therefore have a keen inter-
est in the results of this first science meeting in
Tokyo.
I note that the Committee has selected the sub-
jects of cancer research, animal and plant biogeog-
raphy and ecology of the Pacific area, and sci-
entific investigation of the Pacific Ocean as goals
in developing concrete forms of joint research.
Our Government looks forward to the next meet-
ing of the Committee and stands ready to receive
more specific recommendations for mutually sup-
ported projects.
After my talks with Dr. Kelly, I am convinced
that we are embarked on a course of action which
will bring great scientific benefits. I believe we
are creating a structure which will add to the
scientific knowledge of both Japan and the United
States, and a model for both nations in their
broader relations with scientists the world over.
The foremost task of our age is the establish-
ment of a viable and a just peace in which each
individual can contribute to tlie welfare and bet-
terment of himself, his family, and his neighbor.
Many of the world's statesmen are engaged in the
pursuit of this goal. But this search is not the
task simply of statesmen and governments. Sci-
entists also have a role to play. Working together
across international boundaries, they can materi-
ally aid our efforts to secure an enriched life for
all mankind.
I look forward to the splendid results which I
know will flow from these efforts so well begun.
' M.ade on Feb. 14 (press release 99) to Harry C. Kelly,
cbairman of the U.S. delegation to the United States-
Japan Committee on Scientific Cooperation, after Dr.
Kelly had presented to the Secretary the official report of
the first meeting of the Committee, held at Tokyo, Dee. IS-
IS. For test of a joint communique issued at the close
of the first meeting, see Bulletin of Jan. 8, 19G2, p. 66.
March 12, J 962
425
The United States in a Competitive World Economy
6y Joseph D. Coppock
Director^ Foreign Economic Advisory Staff ^
It is a pleasure to be here this evening as you
assemble to honor your fellow citizens who have
distinguished themselves by rendering special vol-
untary services to your commiuiity. I congi-atu-
late you on these fine achievements.
In thinking about this occasion I found myself
wondering what has happened to private charity
in the United States in recent years. With gov-
ernments, especially the Federal Government,
being pressured into doing so many things for
people that they used to do for themselves, it would
not be surprising to find that charity had declined,
despite our generally increasing prosperity.
Here are some facts. In 1960 Americans made
charitable contributions of $8,400,000,000. This
compares with $4,600,000,000 in 1950 and $1,200.-
000,000 in 1940. Even after allowing for an in-
crease in prices since 1940, the increase in giving
is notable. At present about half of the gifts go
to religious institutions and about half to hos-
pitals, education, and various welfare projects.
United Fimd contributions rose from $193 million
in 1950 to $458 million in 1960, with Illinois the
sixth highest State. National Red Cross contribu-
tions rose from $64 million in 1950 to $87 million
in 1960.
Gifts abroad by individual Americans rose from
$129 million in 1940 to $238 million in 1950 to
$333 million in 1960. Interestingly, these figures
rcpi'esent a declining percentage of total giving —
from 12 percent in 1940 to 6 percent in 1950 and to
4 percent in 1960. Private institutional gifts
abroad, mainly by religious groups, amounted to
another $300 million in 1960.
'■ Address made before the annual meeting of the Unitwl
Fund of Decatur and Macon County at Decatur, 111., on
Feb. 15 (press release 98 dated Feb. 14).
Clearly Americans are still willing to make
large voluntary gifts, both at home and abroad.
You can be proud of your own community's
achievements and of your fellow citizens' achieve-
ments.
I would be painting too rosy a picture, however,
if I did not point out that we Americans are better
able to give than we have ever been before — or
than any nation has ever been. Most of us do not
feel especially prosperous, probably because we are
always comparing ourselves with families other
than the Joneses, but we are well off by practically
any numerical comparison it is possible to make.
In fact the expected increase in the U.S. output
in 1962 is $50 billion, which is greater than the
value of the total output of every other country in
the world, with the exception of the Soviet Union,
the United Kingdom, Germany, and France.
Total U.S. output was over $500 billion in both
1960 and 1961. The State of Illinois alone pro-
duced output worth $30 billion in 1960. Only
eight foreigiTi countries produced this much out-
put— the four I just mentioned plus Canada,
Japan, Italy, and India, all four of which barely
surpassed Illinois. 'Wliile per capita real income
in the United States rose by 50 percent from 1940
to 1960, charitable contributions rose from only 1.2
percent to 1.6 percent of the total. In short, we
can afford our cliarity.
It is always interesting to speculate on the rea-
sons for the wealth or poverty of an area. "Why
is Illinois one of the most prosperous areas in the
entire world? For one thing it has over 10 mil-
lion people, a large percentage of whom are
liealthy, educated, energetic, dependable, and am-
bitious. Also, only a handful of countries have
the quantity or quality of farmhuul tluit Illinois
426
Department of State Bulletin
has. Then think of your mineral resources, your
transportation system, industrial establishments,
business firms, financial institutions, educational
institutions, hospitals, churches, civic and cultural
establishments. In addition no region in the
world is so well placed as Illinois in tlie middle of
a great rich market, unbroken by political bound-
aries. I am sure that all of you are proudly aware
of the fact that the center of U.S. population has
moved into the State of Illinois.
In recounting the factors underlying the pros-
perity of tliis State I have reserved to the last the
greatest of them all — the unmatched political sys-
tem under which we live, the system of liberty
under law, the system that encourages individual
initiative and yet facilitates cooperative action.
I would be remiss, at this time and in this place, if
I did not pay respect to the memory of our greatest
political figure — Abraham Lincoln — who led us
safely through the valley of the shadow of death
of our political institutions.
But we do not live in the world of Lincoln. We
live in a world of satellites, intercontinental mis-
siles, explosives of fantastic force, radiation
hazards, instant communication.
Military Power and International Cooperation
These scientific forces inevitably make the vari-
ous segments of mankind more dependent on each
other- — more subject to each other's bad behavior
as well as good. Meanwhile, local istic, national-
istic passions make the various segments of man-
kind more independent of each other. These
atomistic, anarchistic, antagonistic political forces
are held in clieck by only two things. One is mili-
tary might, principally that of the great powers.
The other is the spirit of cooperation which ex-
tends across national borders and which manifests
itself in such diverse forms as the United Nations
at one extreme and a convention to preserve
migratory birds at the other.
The checkreins represented by military power
and international cooperation are tenuous, how-
ever; the peace which we enjoy under the atomic
stalemate is a fragile one. Atomic power is not
going to remain the monopoly or oligopoly of the
great powers forever. Widespread possession of
atomic weapons is an awesome prospect.
While preserving our military posture, it is the
avenue of international cooperation that holds the
greater promise of reducing the risk of war and
preserving national identities. If international
cooperation is to perform tliis feat, it must take a
variety of forms, not simply getting together to
try to settle bitter disputes after they have broken
out. International cooperation can function and
does function in many difl'erent fields. The Or-
ganization of American States is an example of
political cooperation. Tlie North Atlantic Treaty
Organization is the most prominent example in the
political-military field. The International Bank,
the International Monetary Fund, the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and the Euro-
pean Economic Community are major illustra-
tions of intergovernmental economic cooperation.
Thousands of businessmen work with their
counterparts in other countries. Scores of scien-
tific, religious, and educational groups work to-
gether internationally. Indeed the facts of inter-
national cooperation are far ahead of our thinking
about the general idea.
International Trade and the Common Market
Tonight I wish to speak in some detail about a
particular kind of international economic coopera-
tion. It is, in fact, the most important kind of
international economic cooperation. It is not aid,
it is not investment, it is not technical assistance ;
it is international trade, trade carried on almost
entirely by businessmen. National governments
have it within their power, however, to bar goods
from other countries or to welcome them. They
have it within their power to harass international
movements of goods or to facilitate them.
Not only do national govermnents have it within
their power to resti'ict or promote trade ; they are
heavily engaged in the use of tariffs, quotas, sub-
sidies, export credits, et cetera. The effects are
never confined to one country. Restrictive actions
often evoke sharp retaliatory actions by other
countries, as did our Tariff Act of 1930. Expan-
sive actions evoke cooperative responses, as did our
initiative in negotiating the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade in 1947. Obviously the
actions which evoke cooperative responses are the
ones we should take and to which we should re-
spond, unless there are overriding reasons to the
contrary.
The year 1962 is a year of decision for U.S.
trade policy. One reason is that the Trade Agree-
ments Act expires on June 30. A much more
important reason is that the European Economic
March J 2, 7962
427
Community — the Common Market — is in the proc-
ess of becoming a great free trading area, com-
parable with the United States itself. As you
know, the United Kingdom has applied for mem-
bership, and other countries are expected to join
the original six : France, Germany, Italy, and that
complex familiarly known as Benelux — Belgium,
the Netherlands, and tiny Luxembourg. The Eur-
opean Economic Community was created by the
Treaty of Rome in 1957 and began operations in
1958. It is designed to bring about the full eco-
nomic integration of Western Europe by 1970.
One of the main features is the eventual complete
elimination of trade barriers within the Conunu-
nity; another is the establishment of a common
external tariff.
We Americans can take much satisfaction in
the emergence of this European economic union.
It represents the achievement of one of the goals
of our Marshall plan aid after World War II,
specified explicitly at the request of the U.S.
Congress. Even more important, it represents
political cooperation among countries — in partic-
ular, France and Germany — which have so often
been at odds with each other and shaken the world
as a result of their quarrels. The Common Market
provides economic cement for our NATO alliance.
This emerging economic unit symbolizes a
change in the relative economic position of the
United States. The postwar honeymoon is over.
We face stiffer competition with our friends. We
face an expanding international economic drive
by the Soviet Union. The European Economic
Commimity has both minus elements and plus ele-
ments for us. The principal minus element for
the United States is the disadvantage to which
our exports to Europe will be subject as a result
of the elimination of the internal European tariffs.
For example, before the Common Market went
into effect American and German manufacturers
encountered the same French tariff on particular
items, but with the Conunon Market in full effect
the Gennan manufacturers will not have to con-
tend with a French tariff at all, whereas the
American manufacturers will be faced by the Com-
mon Market tariff.
This is a real disadvantage, but it can be offset
by some plus elements. One plus element is the
expansion in European demand for American
goods which is almost certain to result from in-
creasing European prosperity, especially if our
producers really push their wares. Another po-
tential plus element is reduction in the Common
Market external tariff.
Trade Expansion Act of 1962
It is this possibility— of reduction in the Com-
mon Market external tariff — that the U.S. Govern-
ment can do the most about. We can do something
about it by a tried and true method, namely, by
reducing our own tariffs in return for reductions
in theirs. This is the method of international co-
operation. We cannot reduce their barriers by
raising or threatening to raise ours.
If the United States is to negotiate important
reductions in the European tariff, the President
of the United States has to have the power to
make reductions in the U.S. tariff which will be
important to the Europeans. The concessions on
both sides must be large, certain, and lasting —
not small, subject to withdrawal, and temporary.
The President has asked Congress for this
needed authority in the proposed Trade Expan-
sion Act of 1962, H.R. 9900, now before Congress.-
The new bill resembles the old Trade Agreements
Act, originally passed in 1934, in many respects,
but it also has some new features. It resembles
the old act in asking for general authority to re-
duce tariffs by up to 50 percent in return for sim-
ilar reciprocal concessions. It differs from the old
act in authorizing the President to reduce tariffs
to zero on products within categories of which the
United States and the European Economic Com-
munity together accoimt for 80 percent or more
of world exports. He would do this only for sim-
ilar reductions by the Europeans, of course. This
is the very important authority needed to deal with
the Europeans.
Another provision is designed to help the less
developed countries. The act would permit the
President to reduce or eliminate tariffs on primary
agricultural commodities, provided the European
Economic Commimity would do the same and pro-
vided the commodities were not produced in sig-
nificant quantities in the United States. The less
developed countries will need fewer loans or grants
if they can export more.
These are the basic powers that would be
granted the President imder the new act. Other
• For text of President Kennedy's message on trade, see
Bulletin of Feb. 12, 1962, p. 231.
428
Department of State Bulletin
sections of the act are designed to cushion or re-
lieve possible domestic economic disturbances
which might stem from tarilT reductions or quota
increases. These provisions are much more ex-
tensive than they liave been in previous versions
of the Trade Agreements Act. First, the Presi-
dent must get the opinion of the Tariff Commis-
sion on the economic cfTccts of proposed reductions.
Second, the reductions resulting from the negotia-
tions are to be applied in five equal annual stages,
unless the reductions are very small. Third, firms
or workers seriously advei'sely affected by tariff
reductions may obtain "adjustment assistance," to
enable them to adapt more readily to the changed
conditions. If whole industries are seriously ad-
versely affected by increased imports, the Presi-
dent could raise the tariffs or apply other import
restrictions, as well as authorize adjustment as-
sistance. It is especially imfwrtant that these
cushioning measures not defeat the basic purpose
of trade expansion.
In tariff debates in the United States it has been
customary to overstate the possible negative effects
of tariff reductions and to understate the certain
positive benefits. American consumers and pro-
ducers who buy from abroad gain from lower
tariffs. Also imports help restrain inflation, and
they provide competition for domestic products.
Our economic system is geared to stand competi-
tion, although people sometimes forget it. Im-
ports enable foreigners to earn dollars with which
to pay off their loans and to reduce their need for
aid. Imports also enable foreigiiers to buy our
exports. Exports cannot expand very much for
very long if imports do not expand. Loans, gifts,
and foreign-owned monetary reserves can finance
exports only within fairly narrow limits.
What Exports Mean to Illinois
Most Americans are more aware of imports that
compete or might compete with domestic goods
than they are of American exports. I should like
to take a few minutes to tell you what exports
mean to you in concrete terms. I could give you
the facts on a national basis, but instead I am
going to give you the facts for this very section of
Illinois, the 22d Congressional District, composed
of the counties of Champaign, Coles, DeWitt,
Douglas, Logan, Macon, Moultrie, and Piatt.
Exports of manufactured goods from this dis-
trict amounted to $62,700,000 in 1960. Machinery,
electrical equipment, chemicals, fabricated metal
products, and food products were the main groups
of exports. Twenty-one companies in this district
exported goods worth more than $25,000 each.
Twelve thousand workers were employed in these
21 companies — half of the total manufacturing
workers in the 22d District. Exports per worker
in these companies amounted to $5,240 in 1960.
Agricultural exports from these eight counties
are estimated at $42,600,000 for the crop year
1960-61. That is $4,250 per farm for the 10,062
commercial farms. The most important agricul-
tural export was soybeans, as might be expected
from the "soybean capital" of the world.
These figures show what exports mean to you
directly — in terms of incomes and jobs. For Illi-
nois as a whole, exports of manufactured goods
were worth $1,407,800,000 in 1960; agriculture ex-
ports, $320 million. For the United States, manu-
facturing exports were nearly $15 billion and
agricultural exports nearly $5 billion. So you in
central Illinois are not alone in your direct inter-
est in exports.
Political Logic of Trade Expansion
Now back to the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.
If a strong Trade Expansion Act is not passed,
the President will not have the tariff bargaining
power to negotiate reductions in the external tariff
of the European Economic Community. If that
external tariff is not lowered, American manu-
facturers and farmers will not be able to export
as much as they otherwise would. If trade be-
tween the United States and Europe is restricted,
the economic basis of the North Atlantic alliance
is impaired.
This political logic is clear; so Congress is al-
most certain to pass some kind of a trade agree-
ments act. The danger is that as the act goes
through the congressional process it will be
riddled with amendments which will make it im-
possible for the President to negotiate truly large
bargains and make them stick. Congressmen are
bound to be pressured, even hounded, by a few
groups who fear import competition, but they are
rarely pressured by the many people who stand to
gain from lower tariffs.
The most likely crippling amendments are of
two types. One would severely limit the Presi-
dent's power to negotiate, in percentage terms or
by commodity groups or by procedural delays.
March 12, 1962
429
The other would make it easy or even mandatory
for the Tariff Commission, on the basis of an
appeal by adversely affected groups, to raise a
tariff or impose an import quota after a reduction
had been negotiated. These versions of the so-
called peril-point and escape-clause provisions
would nullify the act in practice. The act already
provides numerous safeguards to help firms or
workers who are adversely affected, as I stated
earlier.
You may get some assurance about the safe-
guards from the fact that the man who has been
in charge of the preparation of the bill, as a spe-
cial assistant to the President, is Howard Peter-
sen, a classmate at DePauw University of your
own Congressman, the Honorable William L.
Springer. Moreover, Mr. Petersen is a Eepubli-
can and a banker.
In fact, the Trade Agreements Act has had
fairly wide bipartisan support. In 1955 Senate
Democrats voted 37-6 for it and Senate Repub-
licans voted 38-7 for it, while House Democrats
voted 186-35 for it and House Republicans voted
109-75 for it. In 1958 Senate Democrats voted
36-6 for it and Senate Republicans 36-10 for it,
while House Democrats voted 184—39 for it and
House Republicans 133-59 for it. Senator [Paul
H.] Douglas, Senator [Everett M.] Dirksen, and
Congressman Springer all voted with the major-
ity. These were the final votes. On earlier key
votes, Senator Douglas and Congressman Springer
supported President Eisenhower's request for
authority, but Senator Dirksen opposed it. Dem-
ocrats were more inclined to support the President
than Republicans. President Kennedy is asking
for more bargaining power than President Eisen-
hower did ; so the issue is wide open again.
Ijet me conclude by putting the proposed Trade
Expansion Act of 1962 in the broad perspective
of our international relations. We are faced with
a strong, determined, clever antagonist in the form
of the Soviet Union and international commu-
nism. This antagonist is probing all the time,
looking for soft spots, in Latin America, Europe,
Africa, Asia, and the Far East. Do we push these
coimtries into the hands of the Communists, re-
stricting their access to our markets? Or do wo
give them increased opportunities to sell — and
buy — in the United States and thus strengthen
their bonds with this country and other countries
of (ho free world ? The answer should be clear.
GATT Members Conclude Long-Term
Cotton Textile Arrangement
White House press release dated February 15, for release Febru-
ary 16
WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT
The President on February 16 released the text
of the long-term cotton textile arrangement con-
cluded at a meeting of the Cotton Textiles Com-
mittee of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade held at Geneva, Switzerland, January 29-
February 9, 1962. Ninet«en nations, representing
the principal cotton textile exporting and import-
ing nations of the free world, participated in
drafting the arrangement.
The arrangement is for a period of 5 years be-
gmning October 1, 1962. It is similar to an
earlier agreement covering a period between Oc-
tober 1, 1961, and October 1, 1962,i which has
enabled importing countries threatened by or sub-
jected to market disruption in any of 64 cate-
gories of cotton textiles to restrain imports to the
level of fiscal year 1961.
Under the terms of the new arrangement, an
importing nation threatened by or subjected to
market disruption on any item or category of cot-
ton textiles may freeze imports for 1 year to the
level of the first 12 of the preceding 15 months.
If tliis market condition persists the freeze may be
extended for yet another year. Following that, in-
creases may be limited to 5 percent a year. In
all cases the decision is made unilaterally by the
importing nation.
Accompanying the agreement will be an under-
taking by those nations which have maintained
quantitative restraints on cotton textile imports
to expand access to their markets in order to
relieve pressures elsewhere.
The 6 years during which the current agree-
ment and the proposed agreement will be in force
will permit the American cotton textile industiy
to plan their production and to sharpen their com-
petitive position with the confidence that foreign
imports will not disrupt their activities. It marks
the conclusion of another step in the seven-step
program announced by the President on May 2,
1961, for assistance to the American textile
industry.^
' For text, see Bulletin of Aug. 21, 19C1, p. 337.
' lUd., Mny 20, 19C1, p. 825.
430
Department of State Bulletin
Both industry and labor advisers to the U.S.
delegation at Geneva expressed satisfaction with
the terms of the agreement.
TEXT OF AGREEMENT^
Long-Term Cotton Textile Arrangement
Recognizing the need to take co-operative and con-
structive action viith a view to the development of world
trade;
Recognizing further that such action should be designed
to facilitate economic expansion and promote the devel-
opment of less-developed countries possessing the neces-
sary resources, such as raw materials and technical
skills, by providing larger opportunities for increasing
their exchange earnings from the sale in world markets
of products which they can efficiently manufacture ;
Noting, however, that in some countries situations have
arisen which, in the view of these countries, cause or
threaten to cause "disruption" of the market for cotton
textiles ;
Desiring to deal with these problems in such a way
as to provide growing opportunities for exports of these
products, provided that the development of this trade
proceeds in a reasonable and orderly manner so as to
avoid disruptive effects in individual markets and on
individual lines of production in both importing and
exporting countries ;
Determined, in carrying out these objectives, to have
regard to the Declaration on Promotion of the Trade of
Less-developed Countries adopted by Ministers at their
meeting during the nineteenth session of the Contracting
Parties in November 1961 ; *
The Participating Countries have agreed as follows :
Article 1
In order to assist in the solution of the problems re-
ferred to in the Preamble to this Arrangement, the par-
ticipating countries are of the opinion that it may be
desirable to apply, during the next few years, special
practical measures of international co-operation which
will assist in any adjustment that may be required by
changes in the pattern of world trade in cotton textiles.
They recognize, however, that the measures referred to
above do not affect their rights and obligations under the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (hereinafter
' The negotiation of this arrangement was concluded
in Geneva on an ad referendum basis on February 9, 1962
by representatives of the following governments : Aus-
tralia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, India, Japan, Norway,
Pakistan, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom
(also representing Hong Kong), United States, and the
member states of the European Economic Community
(Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy,
Luxembourg, and Netherlands).
* For statements made by members of the U.S. dele-
gation at the meeting and text of the declaration, see
BuiiETTN of Jan. 1, 1962, p. 3.
referred to as the GATT). They al.so recognize that,
since these measures are intended to deal with the spe-
cial problems of cotton textiles, they are not to be con-
sidered as lending themselves to application in other
fields.
Article 2
1. Those participating countries still maintaining re-
strictions inconsistent with the provisions of the GATT
on imports of cotton textiles from other participating
countries agree to relax those restrictions progressively
each year with a view to their elimination as soon as
possible.
2. Without prejudice to the provisions of paragraphs
2 and 3 of Article 3, no participating country shall intro-
duce new import restrictions, or intensify existing im-
port restrictions, on cotton textiles, insofar as this would
be inconsistent with its obligations under the GATT.
3. The participating countries at present applying im-
port restrictions to cotton textiles imported from other
participating countries undertake to expand access to
their markets for such cotton textiles so as to reach, by
the end of the period of validity of the present Arrange-
ment, for the products remaining subject to restrictions
at that date, taken as a whole, a level corresiMjuding to
the quotas oi>ened in 1962, for such products, a.s increased
by the percentage mentioned in Aimex A.
Where bilateral arrangements exist, annual increases
shall be determined within the framework of bilateral
negotiations. It would, however, be desirable that each
annual increase should correspond as closely as possible
to one-flfth of the overall increase.
4. The participating countries concerned shall admin-
ister their remaining restrictions on imports of cotton
textiles from participating countries in an equitable man-
ner and with due regard to the special needs and situ-
ation of the less-developed countries.
5. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 3 above,
if, during the licensing period preceding the entry into
force of this Arrangement, a specific basic quota is nil or
negligible, the quota for the succeeding licensing period
will be established at a reasonable level by the partici-
pating importing country concerned in consultation with
the participating exporting country or countries con-
cerned. Such consultation would normally take place
within the framework of the bilateral negotiations
referred to in paragraph 3 above.
6. Participating countries shall, as far as possible, elim-
inate import restrictions on the importation, under a
system of temporary importation for re-export after
processing, of cotton textiles originating in other partici-
pating countries.
7. The participating countries shall notify the Cotton
Textiles Committee as early as possible, and in any ease
not less than one month before the beginning of the
licensing period, of the details of any quota or import
restriction referred to in this Article.
Article S
1. If imports from a participating country or countries
into another participating country of certain cotton tex-
tile products not subject to import restrictions should
cause or threaten to cause disruption in the market of the
March 72, 7962
431
importing country, that country may request the partici-
pating country or countries whose exports of such prod-
ucts are, in the judgment of the importing country,
causing or threatening to cause market disruption to con-
sult with a view to removing or avoiding such disruption.
In its request the importing country will, at its discretion,
indicate the specific level at which it considers that ex-
ports of such products should be restrained, a level which
shall not be lower than the one indicated in Annex B.
The request shall be accompanied by a detailed, factual
statement of the reasons and justification for the request ;
the requesting country shall communicate the same infor-
mation to the Cotton Textiles Committee at the same time.
2. In critical circumstances, where an undue concen-
tration of imports during the period specified in paragraph
3 below would cause damage difficult to repair, the re-
questing participating country may, until the end of the
period, take the necessary temporary measures to limit
the imports referred to in paragraph 1 above from the
country or countries concerned.
3. If, within a period of sixty days after the request has
been received by the participating exporting country or
countries, there has been no agreement either on the re-
quest for export restraint or on any alternative solution,
the requesting participating country may decline to ac-
cept imports for retention from the participating country
or countries referred to in paragraph 1 above of the cotton
textile products causing or threatening to cause market
disruption, at a level higher than that specified in Annex
B, in respect of the period starting on the day when the
request was received by the participating exporting
country.
4. In order to avoid administrative diflSculties in en-
forcing a given level of restraint on cotton textiles sub-
ject to measures taken under this article, the participating
countries agree that there should be a reasonable degree
of flexibility in the administration of these measures.
Where restraint is exercised for more than one product
the participating countries agree that the agreed level
for any one product may be exceeded by 5 per cent pro-
vided that the total exports subject to restraint do
not exceed the aggregate level for all products so re-
strained on the basis of a common unit of measurement
to be determined by the participating countries concerned.
5. If participating countries have recour.se to the meas-
ures envisaged in this Article, they shall, in introducing
such measures, seek to avoid dairiage to the production and
marketing of the exporting country and shall co-oi)erate
with a view to agreeing on suitable procedures, particu-
larly as regards goods which have been, or which are
about to be, .shipped.
6. A participating country liaving recourse to the pro-
visions of tills Article shall keep under review the meas-
ures taken under this Article with a view to their relax-
ation and elimination as soon as possible. It will report
from time to time, and in any case once a year, to the
Cotton Textiles Committee on the progress made in the
relaxation or elimination of .such mea.sures. Any par-
ticipating country maintaining measures under tins Ar-
ticle shall afford adequate opportunity for consultation
to any participating country or countries affected by such
measures.
7. Participating importing countries may report the
groups or categories to be used for statistical purposes to
the Cotton Textiles Committee. The participating coun-
tries agree that measures envisaged in this Article .should
only be resorted to sparingly, and should be limited to
the precise products or precise groups or categories of
products causing or threatening to cause market disrup-
tion, taking full account of the agreed objectives set out
in the Preamble to this Arrangement. Participating coun-
tries shall seek to preserve a proper measure of equity
where market disruption is caused or threatened by im-
ports from more than one participating country and when
resort to the measures envisaged in this Article is
unavoidable.
Article 4
Nothing in this Arrangement shall prevent the applica-
tion of mutually acceptable arrangements on other terms
not inconsistent with the basic objectives of this Arrange-
ment. The participating countries .shall keep the Cotton
Textiles Committee fully informed on such arrangements,
or the parts thereof, which have a bearing on the opera-
tion of this Arrangement.
Article 5
The participating countries shall take steps to ensure,
by the exchange of information, including statistics on
imports and exports when requested, and by other prac-
tical means, the effective operation of this Arrangement.
Article 6
The participating countries agree to avoid circumven-
tion of this Arrangement by trans-shipment or re-routing,
substitution of directly competitive textiles and action by
non-participants. In particular, they agree on the follow-
ing measures:
(a) Trayis-shipmcnt
The participating importing and exix)rting countries
agree to collaborate with a view to preventing circum-
vention of this Arrangement by trans-shipment or re-
routing and to take aiipropriate administrative action to
avoid such circumvention. In cases where a participating
country has reason to believe that imports shipped to it
from another participating country and puriKirting to
have originated in that country did not originate there. It
may request that country to consult with it with a \iew
to assisting in the determination of the real origin of
the goods.
(b) Substitution of directly compctitire textiles
It is not the intention of the participating countries
to broaden the scope of this Arrangement beyond cotton
textiles but, when there exists a situation or threat of
market disruption in an importing country in terms of
Article 3, to prevent the circumvention of this Arrange-
ment by the deliberate substitution for cotton of directly
competitive fibers. Accordingly, if the Importing partici-
pating country concerned has reason to believe that im-
ports of products in which this substitution has taken
place have increased abnormally, that Is that this substi-
tution has taken place solely in order to circumvent the
provisions of tills Arrangement, that country may request
the exporting country concerned to investigate the mat-
432
Department of Slate BulleI'm
ter and to consult with it witli a view to reaching agree-
ment upon measures designed to prevent such circumven-
tion. Such request shall lie accompanied by a detailed,
factual statement of the reasons and justification for the
request. Failing agreement in the consultation within 60
days of such request, the importing participating country
may decline to accept imports of the products concerned
as provided for in Article 3 and, at the same time, any
of the participating countries concerned may refer the
matter to the Cotton Textiles Committee which .shall make
such recommendations to the parties concerned as may be
appropriate.
(c) 'Son-participants
The participating countries agree that, if it proves
necessary to resort to the measures envisaged in Article 3
above, the participating importing country or countries
concerned shall take steps to ensure that the participat-
ing country's exports against which such measures are
taken shall not be restrained more severely than the
exports of any country not participating in this Arrange-
ment which are causing, or threatening to cause, market
disruption. The participating importing country or coun-
tries concerned will give sympathetic con.sideration to
any representations from participating exporting coun-
tries to the effect that this principle is not being adhered
to or that the operation of this Arrangement is frustrated
by trade with countries not party to this Arrangement.
If such trade is frustrating the operation of this Arrange-
ment, the participating countries shall consider taking
such action as may be consistent with their law to prevent
such frustration.
Article 7
1. In view of the safeguards provided for in this Ar-
rangement the participating countries shall, as far as
possible, refrain from taking measures which may have
the effect of nullifying the objectives of this Arrangement.
2. If a participating country finds that its interests are
being seriously affected by any such measure taken by
another participating country, that country may request
the country applying such measure to consult with a view
to remedying the situation.
3. If the participating country so requested fails to take
appropriate remedial action within a reasonable length
of time, the requesting participating country may refer
the matter to the Cotton Textiles Committee which shall
promptly discuss such matter and make such comments
to the participating countries as it considers appropriate.
Such comments would be taken into account should the
matter subsequently be brought before the Contractino
Parties under the procedures of Article XXIII of the
GATT.
Article 8
The Cotton Textiles Committee, as established by the
Contracting Parties at their nineteenth session, shall be
composed of representatives of the countries party to this
Arrangement and shall fulfill the responsibilities provided
for it in this Arrangement.
(a) The Committee shall meet from time to time to
discharge its functions. It will undertake studies on trade
in cotton textiles as the participating countries may de-
cide. It will collect the statistical and other information
necessary for the discharge of its functions and will he
empowered to request the participating countries to
furnish such information.
(b) Any case of divergence of view between the par-
ticipating countries as to the interpretation or application
of this Arrangement may be referred to the Committee
for discussion.
(c) The Committee shall review the operation of this
Arrangement once a year and report to the Contracting
Parties. The review during the third year shall be a
major review of the Arrangement in the light of its opera-
tion in the preceding years.
(d) The Committee .shall meet not later than one year
before the expiry of this Arrangement, in order to consider
whether the Arrangement should be extended, modified or
discontinued.
Article 9
For purposes of this Arrangement the expression "cot-
ton textiles" includes yarns, piece-goods, made-up articles,
garments, and other textile manufactured products, in
which cotton represents more than 50 per cent (by
weight) of the fiber content, with the exception of hand-
loom fabrics of the cottage industry.
Article 10
For the purposes of this Arrangement, the term "dis-
ruption" refers to situations of the kind described in the
Decision of the Contracting Parties of 19 November 1960,
the relevant extract from which is reproduced in An-
nex C.
Article 11
1. This Arrangement is open for acceptance, by signa-
ture or otherwise, to governments parties to the GATT or
having provisionally acceded to that Agreement, provided
that if any such government maintains restrictions on the
import of cotton textiles from other participating coun-
tries, that government shall, prior to its accepting this
Arrangement, agree with the Cotton Textiles Committee
on the percentage by which it will undertake to increase
the quotas other than those maintained under Article XII
or Article XVIII of the GATT.
2. Any government which is not party to the GATT or
has not acceded provisionally to the GATT may accede to
this Arrangement on terms to be agreed between that
government and the participating countries. These terms
would include a provision that any government which is
not a party to the GATT must undertake, on acceding to
this Arrangement, not to introduce new import restric-
tions or intensify existing import restrictions, on cotton
textiles, insofar as such action would, if that government
had been a party to the GATT, be inconsistent with its
obligations thereunder.
Article 12
1. This Arrangement shall enter into force on 1 October
1962 subject to the provisions of paragraph 2 below.
2. The countries which have accepted this Arrangement
shall, upon the request of one or more of them, meet
within one week prior to 1 October 1962 and, at that meet-
ing, if a majority of these countries so desire, the provi-
sions of paragraph 1 above may be modified.
March 72, 7962
433
Article IS
Any participating country may withdraw from this
Arrangement upon the expiration of sixty days from the
day on wliieh written notice of such withdrawal is re-
ceived by the Executive Secretary of GATT.
Article H
This Arrangement shall remain in force for five years.
Article 15
The Annexes to this Arrangement constitute an integral
part of this Arrangement.
Annexes
Annex A
(The percentages in this Annex will be communicated
in due course.)
Annex B
1. (a) The level below which imports or exports of
cotton textile products causing or threatening to cause
market disruption may not be restrained under the pro-
visions of Article 3 shall be the level of actual imports or
exports of such products during the twelve-month period
terminating three months preceding the month in which
the request for consultation is made.
(b) Where a bilateral agreement on the yearly level of
restraint exists between participating countries concerned
covering the twelve-month period referred to in para-
graph (a), the level below which imports of cotton textile
products causing or threatening to cause market dis-
ruption may not be restrained under the provisions of
Article 3 shall be the level provided for in the bilateral
agreement in lieu of the level of actual imports or exports
during the twelve-month period referred to in para-
graph (a).
Where the twelve-month period referred to in para-
graph (a) overlaps in part with the period covered by
the bilateral agreement, the level shall be :
(i) the level provided for in the bilateral agreement,
or the level of actual imports or exports, which-
ever is higher, for the months where the i>eriod
covered by the bilateral agreement and the twelve-
month period referred to in paragraph (a) over-
lap ; and
(ii) the level of actual inipdrts or exports for the
months where no overlap occurs.
2. Should the restraint measures remain in force for
another twelve-month period, the level for that period
.shall not be lower than the level .specified for the preced-
ing twelve-month period, increased by 5 per cent. In
exceptional cases, where it is extremely difficult to apply
the level referred to above, a percentage between 5 and 0
may be applied in the light of market conditions in the
importing country and other relevant factors after con-
sultation with the eximrting country concerned.
3. Should the restraining measures remain in force for
further periods, the level for each subsequent twelve-
month period shall not be lower than the level specified
for the preceding twelve-month period, increased by 5
per cent.
Annex C
Extract from the Contracting Parties'
Decision of 19 November 1960
"These situations [market disruption] generally con-
tain the following elements in combination :
(i) a sharp and substantial Increase or potential in-
crease of imports of particular products from
particular sources ; ■
(ii) these products are offered at prices which are 1
substantially below those prevailing for similar
goods of comparable quality in the market of the
importing country ;
(iii) there is serious damage to domestic producers or J
threat thereof; ^
(iv) the price difl:erentials referred to in paragraph
(ii) above do not arise from governmental inter-
vention in the fixing or formation of prices or
from dumping practices.
In some situations other elements are also present and
the enumeration above is not, therefore, intended as an
exhaustive definition of market disruption."
Annex D
For the purposes of applying Article 9, the following
list of the groups or sub-groups of the S.I.T.C. is sug-
gested. This list is illustrative and should not be con-
sidered as being exhaustive.
SITC Rev. BTN
I Cotton yarns and fabrics 651. 3 55. 05
.4 .06
652 . 07
.08
.09
58.04A
II Cotton made-up articles
and special fabrics ex 653. 7 ex 46. 02
ex 654 ex 58.01-03
ex 655 ex 58. 05-10
ex 650 ex 59.01-17
ex 657 ex 60. 01
ex 62. 01-05
ex 6."i. 01-02
III Cotton Clothing ex 841 ex 60. 02-06
ex 61.01-11
ex 65. 03-07
Annex E
Interpretative Notes
1. Ad. Articles, paragraphs
In Canada, there is no legislation whereby import.s may
be limited in a precise quantitative manner as envisaged
in this paragraph. The provision available for limiting
imports in order to avoid injury or a threat of injury to a
domestic industry is contained in Stvtion 40.\(7)(c) of
the Customs Act which authorizes the application of .sjie-
cial values for duty purposes. These special values cannot
be used to achieve a precise level of imports. Accord-
434
Depoffmenf of Sfafe Bulletin
ingly, the participating countries recognize that, should
Canada find it necessary to take action to limit imports
pursuant to this arrangement, it would not be in a posi-
tion to ensure that imports would not fall below the mini-
mum level as defined in this paragraph.
2. Ad. Article 9
Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 9, any coun-
try which is applying a criterion based on value will be
free to continue to use that criterion for the purposes of
Article 9.
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
U.S. Files Statement on Financial
Obligations of U.N. IVIembers
Press release 111 dated February 20
The Department of State announced on Feb-
ruary 20 that the United States Government had
filed its written statement with the International
Court of Justice that day in the advisory pro-
ceeding on financial obligations of members of the
United Nations.^
The U.N. General Assembly has asked the
Court - for an advisoi-y opinion on the question
whether assessments levied by the Assembly on
U.N. members to pay for peacekeeping operations
in the Congo and the Middle East are legally bind-
ing under article 17 of the United Nations
Charter.
The United States has consistently taken the
position that such assessments create a legal ob-
ligation on member states to pay. The Legal
Adviser of the Department of State, Abram
Chayes, will present oral argument to the Court
at The Hague when oral hearings are held by the
Court this spring.
World Bank Reports Total Reserves
of $651.7 IVIillion
The International Bank for Keconstruction and
Development on February 1 reported that its re-
serves had risen by $49.9 million in the first 6
months of the current financial year to a total of
$651.7 million.
The additions to reserves in the 6-month period
• For background, see Buixetin of Feb. 26, 1962, p. 311.
'U.N. doc. A/RES/1731(XVI).
ending December 31, 1961, are made up of net
earnings of $34.9 million, which were placed in
the supplemental reserve against losses on loans
and guarantees, and loan commissions of $15 mil-
lion, which were credited to the special reserve.
On December 31 the supplemental reserve totaled
$443.1 million and the special reserve was $208.6
million.
Gross income, exclusive of loan commissions, was
$89.9 million. Expenses totaled $55 million and
included $47.6 million for mterest on the Bank's
funded debt, bond issuance, and other financial
expenses.
During the period the Bank made 19 loans
totaling $399.9 million — in Colombia, Costa Rica
(2 loans), Ethiopia, Finland, India (4 loans),
Israel, Japan, Kenya, Peru, Philippines (2 loans),
South Africa (2 loans), Trinidad and Tobago,
and Venezuela. This brought the total number
of loans to 311 in 59 countries and raised the gross
total of loans signed to $6,190.4 million. By De-
cember 31, as a result of cancellations, repayments,
and sales of loans, the poi'tion of loans signed still
retained by the Bank had been reduced to $4,477.4
million.
Disbursements on loans were $240.9 million,
making total disbursements $4,560.6 million on
December 31.
The Bank sold or agreed to sell the equivalent
of $84.8 million principal amounts of loans. At
December 31 the total amount of such sales was
$1,097.9 million, of which all except $69 million
was without the Bank's guarantee.
Repayments of principal received by the Bank
amounted to $47.7 million. Total principal repay-
ments amounted to $956.4 million on December 31 ;
this included $486.2 million repaid to the Bank
March 72, 7962
435
and $470.2 million repaid to the purchasers of bor-
rowers' obligations sold by the Bank.
On December 31 the outstanding funded debt of
the Bank was $2,425.6 million, reflecting a net
increase of $197.1 million in the past 6 months.
During the period there was a gross increase in
borrowings of $321.1 million. This consisted of
an Italian lire public bond issue in the amount of
Lit 15 billion (US$24 million) ; the private place-
ment of an issue of $100 million of U.S. dollar
bonds; the drawing down of Sw Fr 50 million
($11.6 million) from the Swiss franc borrowing of
October 1961 ; the drawing down of US $120 mil-
lion and the balance of DM250 million ($62.5 mil-
lion) of the German borrowing of August 1960;
and the delivery of $3 million of bonds which had
been subject to delayed delivery arrangements.
The funded debt was decreased by $124 million as
a result of the maturing of $105 million of bonds,
the redemption of Sw Fr 50 million ($11.6 mil-
lion), and sinking and purchase fund transactions
amounting to $7.4 million.
During the first 6 months of the fiscal year, the
Dominican Republic was readmitted to member-
ship in the Bank with a capital subscription of
$8 million, and Laos (capital subscription $10 mil-
lion), New Zealand ($166.7 million), Nepal ($10
million), and Cyprus ($15 million) became mem-
bers of the Bank. Tlie subscribed capital of the
Bank amounted to $20,445.3 million on Decem-
ber 31, 1961.
United States Delegations
to International Conferences
CENTO Economic Committee
The Department of State announced on Febru-
ary 23 (press release 115) that William M. Roun-
tree would serve as chairman of the U.S.
delegation to the 10th session of the Economic
Committee of the Central Treaty Organization
(CENTO), held at Washington February 26-28,
and that he would also serve as conference chair-
man. Howard R. Cottam, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs, served as vice chairman of the
delegation.
Advisers to the delegation were as follows :
John P. Ferris, Bureau of Near East and South Asia,
Agency for Intcrnntionnl Povclopmont
Berger A. Indseth, Deputy Economic Coordinator, Agency
for International Development, Ankara
John H. Kaiifmann, Director, Office of Greek, Turkish,
Iranian, and Cyprus Affairs, Agency for International
Development
Myron Brockway Lawrence, Bureau of Economic Affairs,
Department of State
John W. McDonald, Economic Coordinator, Agency for
International Development, Ankara
Matthew D. Smith, Jr., Officer-in-Charge, CENTO Affairs,
Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs,
Department of State
The keynote address at the opening session was
given by Walt W. Rostow, Counselor and Chair-
man of the Policy Planning Council, Department
of State. Frank M. Coffin, Deputy Administrator,
Agency for International Development, addressed
the visitors at an official luncheon on February 28.
The United States participates in CENTO ac-
tivities and is a member of the Economic Com-
mittee. The Committee is responsible for
advancing economic cooperation designed to de-
velop and strengthen the joint economic and
financial resources of the regional member coun-
tries, Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey. The United
States and the United Kingdom have provided
financial and technical assistance in various fields,
particularly communications and transportation.
An example of U.S. support for the CENTO pi'O-
gram is the microwave telecommimications project
which will link Tehran, Karachi, and Ankara in
one of the longest and most modern networks in
the free world.
Current U.N. Documents:
A SeSectecil Bibliography
Mimeographed or processed documents {such as those
listed helow) may be consulted at deiiiisitorii libraries in
the United States. U.N. printed publications may be
purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations,
United Nations Plaza, N.Y.
Security Council
Letters concerning the situation in the Dominican Re-
public. S/4»92, November 21, lOGl, 5 pp.; S/4S)90,
November 24, 19(il, 3 pp.: S/o013, December 7, 1961,
2 pp. ; S/.501.">, December 8, 1901, 2 pp.
Letter dated November 24 from the pennanent represent-
ative of Tunisia addressed to the President of the
Securitv Council, concerning the situation in Algeria.
S/5000. November 24, 19G1. 1 p.
Report of the Sub-Committee on the Situation in Angola.
S/4993. November 27, 19C1. 143 pp.
Communications, letters, notes verbale, and reports on
the situation in the Congo. S/5003, November 27, 1961,
436
Department of Slate Bulletin
2 pp.; S/-1940/A{ld. 14, November 29, 19G1, 6 pp.;
S/4»40/Ad(i. 15 and Corr. 1, November 30, 1961, 11 pp. ;
S/5009. November 30, 1961, 3 pp. ; S/5010 and Corr. 1,
December 1, 1961, 6 pp. ; S/4940/Add. 16, December 6,
1961, 16 pp. ; S/5025, December 15, 1961, 14 pp. ; S/503.5,
December 19, 1961, 9 pp. ; S/4940/Add. 18, December 20,
1961, S pp.; S/5038, December 21, 1961, 4 pp.;
S/4940/Add. 19, December 22, 1961, 3 pp.
Note verbale dated September 13 from the Secretariat
General of the League of Arab States addres.sed to the
U.N. Secretariat, transmitting texts of letters exchanged
on August 12 between the prince of the State of Kuwait
and the Secretary General of the Arab League. S/5007.
November 30. 1961. 13 pp.
Letters concerning Indian action against Portuguese prov-
inces in India. S/u016, December 8, 1961, 2 pp. ; S/5028.
December 18. 1961, 5 pp.; S/.o029. December IS. 1961,
2 pp. ; S/5030. December 18, 1961, 2 pp. ; S/5034, Decem-
ber IS, 1961, 2 pp.
Letter dated December 11 from the Secretary General of
the Organization of American States addressed to the
Acting Secretary-General concerning an OAS meeting
of ministers as Organ of Consultation. S/5036. De-
cember 20, 1961. 4 pp.
General Assembly
Report on the sixth session of the Executive Committee of
the High Commissioner's Program, Geneva, Novem-
ber 6-10, 1961. A/AC.9G/146. November 14, 1961.
38 pp.
Letter dated November 11 from the Chairman of the
U.N. Commission for Ruanda-Urundi to the President
of the General Assembly concerning the investigation
of the circumstances of the death of the Prime Minister
of Burundi. A/4970. November 15, 1961. 4 pp.
Report of the Working Group of Fifteen on the examina-
tion of the administrative and budgetary procedures of
the United Nations. A/4971. November 15, 1961. 37
pp.
Letter dated November 16 from the permanent represent-
ative of India to the President of the General Assembly
requesting inclusion of an additional item in the agenda
of the 16th session entitled United Nations Year for
International Cooperation. A/4972. November 16,
1961. 4 pp.
Economic and Social Council
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East. Re-
port of the first session of the Conference of Asian
Economic Planners. E/CN.11/571. October 12, 1961.
64 pp.
Second tabulation of answers to the questionnaire of
August 11, 1960, on development of international travel
and tourism. E/3438/Add. 2. October 19, 1961. 79 pp.
Technical Assistance Committee. Budget estimates for
the secretariat of the Technical Assistance Board for
the year 1962. E/TAC/110. October 23, 1961. 36 pp.
Commission on the Status of Women. Occupational out-
look for women. E/CN.6/374/Add. 2. November 7,
1961. 12 pp.
Social Commission. Planning for balanced social and
economic development in the Uzbek Soviet Socialist
Republic. E/CN.5/346/Add. 5/Rev. 1. November 10,
1961. 54 pp.
Statistics of official contributions in 1960 for international
economic assistance to underdeveloped countries.
E/3556/Add. 1, November 13, 1961, 2 pp.; Corr. 1,
November 15, 1961, 1 p.
Application of the Convention on the Privileges and
Immunities of the Specialized Agencies to the Inter-
national Development Association. E/3559. Novem-
ber 13, 1961. 5 pp.
TREATY INFORMATION
United States and Luxembourg
Sign FEN Treaty
Press release 116 dated February 23
A treaty of friendship, establishment, and navi-
gation between tlie United States and Luxembourg
was signed on February 23 at Luxembourg. The
American Ambassador, James Wine, signed the
treaty for the United States, and Eugene Schaus,
Minister of Foreign Affairs, signed for Luxem-
bourg.
The new treaty, whicli consists of 19 articles
and a protocol, resembles in many particulars the
comprehensive treaties of friendship, establish-
ment, and navigation which the United States has
entered into with more than 20 countries in recent
years. Like those treaties it contams detailed
provisions on personal and property rights and
the conduct of business activities. In brief each
country undertakes by those provisions: (1) to
extend to the nationals and corporations of the
other treatment no less favorable than it gives to
its own nationals and corporations with respect
to carrying on a wide range of commercial, finan-
cial, and industrial pursuits ; (2) to safeguard the
persons, property, and interests of nationals of
the other country; (3) to observe the rule of non-
discrimination in the tax treatment of nationals
and enterprises of the other country; and (4) to
apply exchange restrictions only in accordance
Avith carefully defined standards of reasonable
treatment.
This new treaty with Luxembourg is not a com-
mercial treaty and as such does not include pro-
visions for the regulation of trade in goods
between the two countries or detailed articles on
shipping matters. Its provisions on the latter
subject are limited to a commitment to avoid
flag discrimination (i.e. discrimination based on
the nationality of the vessel) against goods on the
ocean segment of their journey from the terri-
tories of either treaty partner to the other.
The United States is highly gratified at the suc-
cessful negotiation of this treaty, which is the first
March 12, 1962
437
of its kind to be entered into between the United
States and Luxembourg. Its signature is testi-
mony of the growing economic and cultural ties
between the two countries and the mutual ad-
vantage they perceive in providing a formally
agreed basis for the further development of such
ties between them. The treaty is, moreover, the
sixth international agreement regulating mutual
relations in establishment matters to be signed
with members of the European Economic Com-
munity and as such completes a uniform pattern
for such relations between the United States and
the member states of the Community.
The treaty will be submitted to the Senate for
advice and consent to ratification as soon as pos-
sible. After the constitutional procedures of
the two countries have been completed, it will enter
into force 1 month after the exchange of
ratifications.
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Atomic Energy
Amendment to article VI.A.3 of the Statute of the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency (TIAS 3873). Done
at Vienna October 4, 1901.'
Acceptance deposited: South Africa, February 20, 1962.
Aviation
Convention on international civil aviation. Done at Chi-
cago December 7, 1044. Entered into force April 4,
1957. TIAS 1591.
Adherence deposited: Saudi Arabia (vrith a statement),
February 19, 1962.
Trade and Commerce
Acknowledged applicable riyhts and obligations of United
Kingdom: Tanganyika, January 16, 1962, with respect
to the following :
Declaration on provisional accession of the Swiss Con-
federation to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade. Done at Geneva November 22, 1958. Entered
into force January 1, 1960; for the United States April
29, 1960. TIAS 4461.
Declaration on relations between contracting parties to
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the
Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. Done at
Geneva May 25, 1959. Entered into force November 16,
19.59 ; for the United States November 19, 1959. TIAS
4385.
Declaration on provisional accession of Israel to the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva
May 29, 1959. Entered into force October 9, 1959; for
the United States December 19, lO.^SO. TIAS 4384.
BILATERAL
Bolivia
Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act
of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709),
with exchanges of notes. Signed at La Paz February
12, 1962. Entered into force February 12, 1962.
Luxembourg
Treaty of friendship, establishment, and navigation
Signed at Luxembourg February 23, 1962. Enters int«
force 1 month after exchange of instruments of ratifica-
tion.
Pakistan
Agreement amending the agreement of September 23,
1950, as amended (TIAS 2116 and 3919), for financing
certain educational exchange programs. Effected by
exchange of notes at Karachi July 29, 1960, July 10,
1961, and November 13, 1961. Entered into force No-
vember 13, 1961.
United Arab Republic
Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act
of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455: 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709),
with exchange of notes. Signed at Cairo February 10,
1962. Entered into force February 10, 1962.
DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE
' Not in force.
Mission to West Indies Terminated;
Office Reverts to Consulate General
Depart7nent Announcement
Press release 100 dated Febrnary 14
In view of the statement by the British Govern-
ment on February 6, 1962, that it intends to intro-
duce legislation into Parliament enabling it to
dissolve the federation of The West Indies, the
Department of State has decided to terminate the
United States Mission in Port-of-Spain, effective
Marcli 1, 1962. As of that date the office in Port-
of-Spain will revert to its former status of a con-
sulate general responsible for American consular
activities in Trinidad and Tobago.
Confirmations
The Senate on February 19 confirmed the following
nominations :
W. Averell Harriman to be an Assistant Secretary of
State.
Walter P. McConaughy to be Ambassador to Pakistan.
(For biographic details, see Department of State press
release 134 dated March 1.)
Walt Whitman Rostow to be Counselor of the Depart-
ment of State.
438
Department of State Bulletin
March 12, 1962
Index
Vol. XLVI, No. 1185
Atomic Energy. U.S., U.K. Pledge Redoubled Ef-
forts To Reach Nuclear Test Ban Agreement
(text of report) 409
Cameroon. Presidents of Cameroon and Cypnis To
Visit United States 418
Cyprus. Presidents of Cameroon and Cypnis To
Visit United States 418
Department and Foreign Service
Confirmations (Ilarriman, McConaugliy, Rostow) . 438
Mission to West Indies Terminated ; Office Reverts
to Consulate General 438
Dominican Republic. Dr. Pico Named Special Rep-
resentative of President in Dominican Republic . 425
Economic Affairs
CENTO Economic Committee (delegation) . . . 436
GATT Members Conclude Long-Term Cotton Tex-
tile Arrangement (text of agreement) .... 430
The Less Developed Countries and the Atlantic
Partnership (Ball) 412
Policy for the Western Alliance— Berlin and After
(Bundy) 419
Trade and Aid — Essentials of Free-World Leader-
ship (Rusk) 403
United States and Luxembourg Sign FEN Treaty . 437
The United States in a Competitive World Econ-
omy (Coppock) 426
World Bank Reports Total Reserves of $651.7
Million 435
Europe
The Less Developed Countries and the Atlantic
Partnership (Ball) 412
Policy for the Western Alliance — Berlin and After
(Biindy) 419
The United States in a Competitive World Econ-
omy (Coppock) 426
Finland. President Kennedy Congratulates Presi-
dent of Finland on Reelection 418
Foreign Aid
Dr. Pico Named Special Representative of Presi-
dent in Dominican Republic 425
Trade and Aid — Essentials of Free-World Leader-
ship (Rusk) 403
United States Agrees To Support Tunisian De-
velopment Effort 425
Germany. Policy for the Western AUiance — Berlin
and After (Bundy) 419
International Organizations and Conferences
CENTO Economic Committee (delegation) . . . 436
GATT Members Conclude Long-Term Cotton Tex-
tile Arrangement (text of agi-eement) .... 430
Secretary General of CENTO Visits Washington . 411
World Bank Reports Total Reserves of $651.7
Million 435
Japan. U.S.-Japan Committee Called Model for
Scientific Cooperation (Rusk) 425
Luxembourg. United States and Luxembourg Sign
FEN Treaty 437
Middle East
CEXTO Economic Committee (delegation) . . . 436
Secretary General of CENTO Visits Washington . 411
Military Affairs. Policy for the Western Alliance —
Berlin and After (Bundy) 419
Pakistan. McConaughy confirmed as Ambassador . 438
Philippines. Letters of Credence (Abello) .... 418
Presidential Documents
President Kennedy Congratulates President of Fin-
land on Reelection 418
U.S. Prepares New Proposals for Space Research
With Soviet Union 411
Science
U.S.-Japan Committee Called Model for Scientific
Cooperation (Rusk) 425
U.S. Prepares New Proposals for Space Research
With Soviet Union (Kennedy, Khrushchev) . . 411
Treaty Information
Current Actions 438
G.\TT Members Conclude Ijong-Term Cotton Tex-
tile Arrangement (text of agreement) .... 430
United States and Luxembourg Sign FEN Treaty . 437
Tunisia. United States Agrees To Support Tunisian
Development Effort 425
U.S.S.R.
IT.S. Prepares New Proposals for Space Research
With Soviet Union (Kennedy, Khrushchev) . . 411
U.S., U.K. Pledge Redoubled Efforts To Reach Nu-
clear Test Ban Agreement (text of report) . . 409
United Kingdom. U.S., U.K. Pledge Redoubled Ef-
forts To Reach Nuclear Test Ban Agreement
(text of report) 409
United Nations
Current U.N. Documents 436
U.S. Files Statement on Financial Obligations of
U.N. Members 435
U.S., U.K. Pledge Redoubled Efforts To Reach Nu-
clear Test Ban Agreement (text of report) . . 409
West Indies, The. Mission to West Indies Termi-
nated ; Office Reverts to Consulate General . . . 438
Name Index
Abello, Emilio 418
Ball, George W 412
Bundy, McGeorge 419
Coppock, Joseph D 426
Harrinian, W. Averell 438
Kennedy, President 411, 418
Khrushchev, Nikita 411
McConaughy, Walter P 438
Rostow, Walt Whitman 438
Rusk, Secretary 403, 425
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: February 19-25
Press releases may be obtained from the Office
of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.
Releases appearing in this issue of the Bulletin
which were issued prior to February 19 are Nos.
98, 99, and 100 of February 14, and 106 of February
16.
Sabject
U.S. participation in international con-
ferences.
Stewart sworn in as Ambassador to
Venezuela (biographic details).
Philippines credentials (rewrite).
ICJ advisory proceeding on U.N. fi-
nances.
U.S.-U.K. report on Geneva test talks.
Rusk : Chamber of Commerce, Char-
lotte, N.C.
Economic aid to Tunisia.
Delegation to CENTO Economic Com-
mittee (rewrite).
Treaty of friendship, establishment,
and navigation with Luxembourg.
CENTO Secretary General visits
Washington (rewrite).
Rusk : Davidson College.
Cultural exchange (Germany).
♦Not printed.
tlleld for a later issue of the Bulletin.
No.
Date
*108
2/19
*109
2/20
110
111
2/20
2/20
112
113
2/21
2/21
114
115
2/21
2/23
116
2/23
117
2/23
tll8
*119
2/23
2/23
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IREIGN
POLICY
Vol. XLVI, No. 1186 ]VHaEc|i^9i:l962
B. P- ^-
NUCLEAR TESTING AND DISARMAMENT • Address
by President Kennedy « 44o
PRESIDENT KENNEDY REAFFIRMS VIEWS ON
FRAMEWORK FOR CONDUCT OF DISARMAMENT
NEGOTIATIONS • Exdumge of Messages Between
President Kennedy and Soviet Premier Khrushchev .... 46a
AMERICA'S GOAL— A COMMUNITY OF FREE
NATIONS • Address by Secretary Rusk 448
SECRETARY RUSK'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF
MARCH 1 455
AMERICAN AGRICULTURE IN FOREIGN TRADE • by
Assistant Secretary Martin 471
For index see inside back cover
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Vol. XLVI, No. 1186 • Publication 7352
March 19, 1962
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Nuclear Testing and Disarmament
Address by President Kennedy ^
Seventeen years ago man unleashed the power of
the atom. He thereby took into his mortal hands
the power of self-extinction. Throughout the
years that have followed, under three successive
Presidents, the United States has sought to banish
this weapon from the arsenals of individual na-
tions. For of all the awesome responsibilities en-
trusted to this office, none is more somber to con-
template than the special statutory authority to
employ nuclear aims in the defense of our people
and freedom.
But until mankind has banished both war and
its instruments of destruction, the United States
must maintain an effective quantity and quality
of nuclear weapons, so deployed and protected as
to be capable of surviving any surprise attack and
devastating the attacker. Only through such
strength can we be certain of deterring a nuclear
strike, or an overwhelming ground attack, upon
our forces and allies. Only through such strength
can we in the free world — should that deterrent
fail — face the tragedy of another war with any
hope of survival. And that deterrent strength, if
it is to be effective and credible when compared
with that of any other nation, must embody the
most modem, the most reliable, and the most ver-
satile nuclear weapons our research and develop-
ment can produce.
The testing of new weapons and their effects is
necessarily a part of that research and develop-
ment process. Without tests — to experiment and
verify — progress is limited. A nation which is
refraining from tests obviously cannot match the
gains of a nation conducting tests. And when all
nuclear powers refrain from testing, the nuclear
arms race is held in check.
That is why this nation has long urged an ef-
fective worldwide end to nuclear tests. And that
is why in 1958 we voluntarily subscribed, as did
the Soviet Union, to a nuclear test moratoriimi,^
during which neither side would conduct new nu-
clear tests and both East and West would seek con-
crete plans for their control.
But on September 1st of last year, while the
United States and the United Kingdom were ne-
gotiating in good faith at Geneva, the Soviet
Union callously broke its moratorium with a 2-
month series of more than 40 nuclear tests.^ Prep-
arations for these tests had been secretly under
way for many months. Accompanied by new
threats and new tactics of terror, these tests — con-
ducted mostly in the atmosphere— represented a
major Soviet effort to put nuclear weapons back
into the arms race.
Once it was apparent that new appeals and pro-
posals were to no avail, I authorized on September
5th a resumption of U.S. nuclear tests imder-
ground,* and I announced on November 2d —
before the close of the Soviet series — that prepara-
tions were being ordered for a resumption of at-
mospheric tests and that we would make whatever
tests our security required in the light of Soviet
gains.'
This week the National Security Council has
completed its review of this subject. The scope of
the Soviet tests has been carefully reviewed by
the most competent scientists in the country. The
scope and justification of proposed American tests
have been carefully reviewed, determining which
' Delivered from the White House by television and
radio on Mar. 2 (White House press release).
" For a statement by President Eisenhower, see Bulle-
tin of Sept. 8, 1958, p. 378.
' For background, see ihid., Sept. 18, 19G1, p. 47.").
* nid.
' Ihid., Nov. 20, 1961, p. 844.
March 19, 1962
443
experiments can be safely deferred, whicli can be
deleted, wliicli can be combined or conducted im-
derground, and which are essential to our military
and scientific progress. Careful attention has been
given to tlie limiting of radioactive fallout, to the
future course of arms control diplomacy, and to
our obligations to other nations.
Every alternative was examined. Every avenue
of obtaining Soviet agreement was explored. We
were determined not to rush into imitating their
tests. And we were equally determined to do
only what our own security required us to do.
Although the complex preparations have con-
tinued at full speed while these facts were being
uncovered, no single decision of this administra-
tion has been more thoroughly or more thought-
fully weighed.
Having carefully considered these findings, hav-
ing received the unanimous recommendations of
the pertinent department and agency heads, and
having observed the Soviet Union's refusal to ac-
cept any agreement which would inhibit its free-
dom to test extensively after preparing secretly,
I have today authorized the Atomic Energy Com-
mission and the Department of Defense to conduct
a series of nuclear tests — beginning when our
preparations are completed, in the latter part of
April, and to be concluded as quickly as possible
(within 2 or .3 months)— such series, involving
only those tests which cannot be held underground,
to take place in the atmosphere over the Pacific
Ocean.
These tests are to be conducted under conditions
which resti'ict the radioactive fallout to an ab-
solute mininuim, far less than the contamination
created by last fall's Soviet series. By paying
careful attention to location, wind, and weather
conditions, and by holding these tests over the
open sea, we intend to rule out any problem of
fallout in the immediate area of testing. More-
over, we will hold the increase in radiation in the
Northern Hemisphere, where nearly all such fall-
out will occur, to a very low level.
Natural radioactivity, as everyone knows, has
always been part of the air around us, with certain
long-range biological effects. By conservative
estimate, the total effects from this test series will
be roughly equal to only 1 percent of those duo to
this natural backgromid. It has been estimated,
in fact, tliiit the exposure due to radioactivity from
these tests will be less than one-fiftieth of the dif-
ference which can be experienced, due to variations
444
in natural radioactivity, simply by living in differ-
ent locations in this country. This will obviously J
be well within the guides for general population \
health and safety, as set by the Federal Radiation
Council, and considerably less than one-tenth of 1
percent of the exposure guides set for adults who
work with industrial radioactivity.
Nevertheless, I find it deeply regrettable that
any radioactive material must be added to the
atmosphere — that even one additional individual's
health may be risked in the foreseeable future.
And however remote and infinitesimal those
hazards are judged to be, I still exceedingly regret
the necessity of balancing these hazards against
the hazards to himdreds of millions of lives which
would be created by any relative decline in our
nuclear strength.
In the absence of a major shift in Soviet poli-
cies, no American President — responsible for the
freedom and safety of so many people — could in
good faith make any other decision. But because
our nuclear posture affects the security of all
Americans and all free men — because this issue
has aroused such widespread concern — I want to
share with you and all the world, to the fullest
extent our security permits, all of the facts and
thoughts which have gone into my decision.
Many of these facts are hard to explain in sim-
ple terms — many are hard to face in a peaceful
world — but these are facts which must be faced
and must be understood.
Significance of Soviet Tests
Had the Soviet tests of last fall reflected merely
a new effort in intimidation and bluff, our se-
curity would not have been affected. But in fact
they also reflected a highly sophisticated tech-
nology, the trial of novel designs and techniques,
and some substantial gains in weaponry. Many of
their tests were aimed at improving their defenses
against missiles — others were proof tests, trying
out existing weapons systems — but over one-half
emphasized the development of new weapons, par-
ticularly those of greater explosive power.
A primary purpose of these tests was the de-
velopment of warheads which weigh very little
compared to the destructive efficiency of their
thermonuclear yield. One Soviet test weapon ex-
ploded with the force of 58 megatons — the equiva-
lent of 58 million tons of TNT. This was a re-
duced-yield version of their much-publicized 100-
Deparfmenf of Sfofe Bulletin
megaton bomb. Today Soviet missiles do not ap-
pear able to carry so lieavy a warhead. But there
is no avoiding the fact that other Soviet tests, in
the 1 to 5 megaton range and up, were aimed at vm-
leashing increased destructive power in warlieads
actually capable of delivery by existing missiles.
Much has also been said about Soviet claims
for an antimissile missile. Some of the Soviet
tests which measured the effects of high-altitude
nuclear explosions — in one case over 100 miles
high — were related to this problem. While ap-
parently seeking information (on the effects of
nuclear blasts on radar and communication) which
is important in developing an antimissile defense
system, these tests did not, in our judgment, re-
flect a developed system.
In short, last fall's tests, in and by themselves,
did not give the Soviet Union superiority in nu-
clear power. They did, however, provide the So-
viet laboratories with a mass of data and experi-
ence on which, over the next 2 or 3 yeai-s, they
can base significant analyses, experiments, and
extrapolations, preparing for the next test series
which would confirm and advance their findings.
And I must report to you in all candor that
further Soviet series, in the absence of further
Western progress, could well provide the Soviet
Union with a nuclear attack and defense capability
so powerful as to encourage aggressive designs.
Were we to stand still while the Soviets surpassed
us — or even appeared to surpass us — the free
world's ability to deter, to survive, and to respond
to an all-out attack would be seriously weakened.
Purposes of New U.S. Test Series
The fact of the matter is that we cannot make
similar strides without testing in the atmosphere
as well as underground. For, in many areas of
nuclear weapons research, we have reached the
point where our progress is stifled without experi-
ments in every environment. The information
from our last series of atmospheric tests in 1958
has all been analyzed and reanalyzed. It can tell
us no more without new data. And it is in these
very areas of research — missile penetration and
missile defense, for example — that further major
Soviet tests, in the absence of further Western
tests, might endanger our deterrent.
In addition to proof tests of existing systems,
two different types of tests have therefore been
decided upon. The first and most important are
called "effects tests" — determining what effect an
enemy's nuclear explosions would have upon our
ability to survive and respond. We are spending
great sums of money on radar to alert our defenses
and to develop possible antimissile systems — on
the communications which eiuible our command
and control centers to direct a response — on hard-
ening our missiles sites, shielding our missiles and
their warheads from defensive action, and pro-
viding them with electronic guidance systems to
find their targets. But we cannot be certain how
much of this preparation will turn out to be use-
less: blacked out, paralyzed, or destroyed by the
complex effects of a nuclear explosion.
We know enough from earlier tests to be con-
cerned about such phenomena. We know that
the Soviets conducted such tests last fall. But
until we measure the effects of actual explosions in
the atmosphere under realistic conditions, we will
not know precisely how to prepare our future de-
fenses, how best to equip our missiles for penetra-
tion of an antimissile system, and whether it is
possible to achieve such a system for ourselves.
Secondly, we must test in the atmosphere to
permit the development of those more advanced
concepts and more effective, efficient weapons
which, in the light of Soviet tests, are deemed
essential to our security. Nuclear weapon tech-
nology is still a constantly changing field. If our
weapons are to be more secure, more flexible in
their use and more selective in their impact — if
we are to be alert to new breakthroughs, to exper-
iment with new designs — if we are to maintain
our scientific momentum and leadership — then our
weapons progress must not be limited to theory
or to the confines of laboratories and caves.
This series is designed to lead to many im-
portant, if not always dramatic, results. Improv-
ing the nuclear yield per pound of weight in our
weapons will make them easier to move, protect,
and fire — more likely to survive a surprise at-
tack— and more adequate for effective retaliation.
It will also, even more importantly, enable us to
add to our missiles certain penetration aids and
decoys and to make those missiles effective at
higher altitude detonations, in order to render in-
effective any antimissile or interceptor system an
enemy might some day develop.
Wlienever possible, these development tests will
be held underground. But the larger explosions
can only be tested in the atmosphere. And while
our teclinology in smaller weapons is unmatched,
March 19, J 962
445
we know now that the Soviets have made major
gains in developing larger weapons of low weight
and high explosive content — of 1 to 5 megatons and
upward. Fourteen of their tests last fall were in
this category, for a total of 30 such tests over
the years. The United States, on tlie other hand,
had conducted, prior to the moratorium, a total
of only 20 tests within this megaton range.
U.S. Obligation To Protect Free-World Security
"While we will be conducting far fewer tests than
the Soviets, with far less fallout, there will still
be those in other countries who will urge us to re-
frain from testing at all. Perhaps they forget
that this country long refrained fi-om testing, and
sought to ban all tests, while the Soviets were
secretly preparing new explosions. Perhaps they
forget the Soviet threats of last autumn and their
arbitrary rejection of nil appeals and proposals,
from both the U.S. and the U.N. But those free
peoples who value their freedom and security, and
look to our relative strength to shield them from
danger — those who know of our good faith in seek-
ing an end to testing and an end to the arms
race — will, I am confident, want the United States
to do whatever it must do to deter the threat of
aggression.
If they felt we could be swayed by threats or
intimidation — if they thought we could permit a
repetition of last summer's deception — then surely
they would lose faith in our will and our wisdom
as well as our weaponry. I have no doubt that
most of our friends around the world have shared
my own hope that we would never find it neces-
sary to test again — and my own belief that, in the
long run, the only real security in this age of
nuclear peril rests not in armament but in dis-
ai-mament. But I am equally certain that they
would insist on our testing once that is deemed
necessary to protect free-world security. They
know we are not deciding to test for political or
psycliological reasons — and they also know that
we cannot avoid such tests for political or psycho-
logical reasons.
Decision May Strengthen Prospects for Peace
The leacl'irs of the Soviet Union are also watch-
ing this decision. Should we fail to follow the
dictates of our own security, they will chalk it
up, not to good will but to a failure of will — not
to our confidence in AVestern superiority but to
446
our fear of world opinion, the very world opinion
for which they showed such contempt. They
could well be encoui-aged by such signs of weak-
ness to seek another period of no testing without
controls — another opportunity for stifling our
progress while secretly preparing, on the basis of
last fall's experiments, for the new test series
which might alter the balance of power. With
such a one-sided advantage, why would they
change their strategy, or refrain from testing,
merely because we refrained? Wliy would they
want to halt their drive to surpass us in nuclear
technology? And why would they ever consider
accepting a true test ban or mutual disarmament ?
Our reasons for testing and our peaceful inten-
tions are clear — so clear that even the Soviets
could not objectively regard our resumption of
tests, following their resumption of tests, as pro-
vocative or preparatory for war. On the contrary,
it is my hope that the prospects for peace may
actually be strengthened by this decision — once
the Soviet leaders realize that the West will no
longer stand still, negotiating in good faith, while
they reject inspection and are free to prepare fur-
ther tests. As new disarmament talks approach,
the basic lesson of some 3 years and 353 negotiat-
ing sessions at Geneva is this — that the Soviets
will not agree to an effective ban on nuclear tests
as long as a new series of offers and prolonged
negotiations, or a new uninspected moratorium,
or a new agreement without controls, would en-
able them once again to prevent the West from
testing while they prepare in secret.
But inasmuch as this choice is now no longer
open to them, let us hope that they will take a
different attitude on banning nuclear tests — that
they will prefer to see the nuclear arms race
checked instead of intensified, with all the dangei-s
that intensification is likely to bring: the spread
of nuclear weapons to other nations; the constant
increase in world tensions; the steady decrease in
all prospects for disarmament; and, with it, a
steady decrease in the security of us all.
Proposals for Geneva Disarmament Conference
If the Soviets sliould change their position, we
will have an opportunity to learn it immediately.
On the 14th of March, in (touovu, Switzerland, a
new 18-power conference on disarmament will be-
gin. A statement of agreed principles * has been
' For text, soo ihid.. Oct. 0, 1061, p. 589.
Department of State Bulletin
worked out with the Soviets and endorsed by the
U.N. In the Ions: nm, it is the constructive pos-
sibilities of that conference — and not the testing
of new destructive weapons — on which rest the
hopes of all mankind. However dim those hopes
may sometimes seem, they can never be aban-
doned. And however far off most steps toward
disarmament appear, there are some that can be
taken at once.
The United States will offer at the Geneva con-
ference— not in the advance expectation they will
be rejected, and not merely for purposes of propa-
ganda— a series of concrete plans for a major
"breakthrough to peace." We hope and believe
that they will appeal to all nations opposed to
war. They will include specific proposals for fair
and enforcible agreements : to halt the production
of fissionable materials and nuclear weapons and
their transfer to other nations — to convert them
from weapon stockpiles to peaceable uses — to de-
stroy the warheads and the delivery systems that
threaten man's existence — to check the dangers of
surprise and accidental attack — to reserve outer
space for peaceful use — and progressively to re-
duce all armed forces in such a way as ultimately
to remove forever all threats and thoughts of war.
And of greatest importance to our discussion
tonight, we shall, in association with the United
Kingdom, present once again our proposals for a
separate comprehensive treaty — with appropriate
arrangements for detection and verification — to
halt permanently the testing of all nuclear
weapons, in every environment: in the air, in
outer space, under ground, or under water. New
modifications will also be offered in the light of
new experience.
The essential arguments and facts relating to
such a treaty are well known to the Soviet Union.
There is no need for further repetition, propa-
ganda, or delay. The fact that both sides have
decided to resume testing only emphasizes the
need for new agreement, not new argument. And
before charging that this decision shatters all
liopes for agreement, the Soviets should recall
that we were willing to work out with them, for
joint submission to the U.N., an agreed statement
of disarmament principles at the very time their
autumn tests were being conducted. And Mr.
Khrushchev knows, as he said in 1960, that any
nation which broke the moratorium could expect
other nations to be "forced to take the same road."
Our negotiators will be ready to talk about this
treaty even before the conference begins on
March 14th — and they will be ready to sign well
before the date on which our tests are ready to
begin. That date is still nearly 2 months away.
If the Soviet Union should now be willing to
accept such a treaty, sign it before the latter part
of April, and apply it immediately — if all testing
can thus be actually halted — then the nuclear
arms race would be slowed down at last, the
security of the United States and its ability to
meet its commitments would be safeguarded, and
there would be no need for our tests to begin.
But this must be a fully effective treaty. We
know enough now about broken negotiations,
secret preparations, and the advantages gained
from a long test series never to offer again an
iminspected moratorium. Some may urge us to
try it again, keeping our preparations to test in
a constant state of readiness. But in actual prac-
tice, particularly in a society of free choice, we
cannot keep topflight scientists concentrating on
the preparation of an experiment which may or
may not take place on an uncertain date in the
future. Nor can large technical laboratories be
kept fully alert on a standby basis waiting for
some other nation to break an agreement. This
is not merely difficult or inconvenient — we have
explored this alternative thoroughly and found it
impossible of execution.
In short, in the absence of a firm agreement that
would halt nuclear tests by the latter part of
April, we shall go ahead with our talks — striving
for some new avenue of agreement — but we shall
also go ahead with our tests. If, on the other
hand, the Soviet Union should accept such a
treaty in the opening months of talks, that single
step would be a monumental step toward peace —
and both Prime Minister Macmillan and I would
think it fitting to meet Chairman Khrushchev at
Geneva to sign the final pact.
The Ultimate Objective
For our ultimate objective is not to test for the
sake of testing. Our real objective is to make our
own tests unnecessary, to prevent others from
testing, to prevent the nuclear arms race from
mushrooming out of control, to take the first steps
toward general and complete disarmament. And
that is why, in the last analysis, it is the leaders
of the Soviet Union who must bear the heavy
rasponsibility of choosing, in the weeks that lie
March 19, 7962
447
ahead, whether we proceed with these steps — or
proceed with new tests.
If they are convinced that their interests can
no longer be served by the present course of events,
it is my fervent hope that they will agree to an
effective treaty. But if they persist in rejecting
all means of true inspection, then we shall be left
no choice but to keep our own defensive arsenal
adequate for the security of all free men.
It is our hope and prayer that these grim, un-
welcome tests will never have to be made — that
these deadly weapons will never have to be fired —
and that our preparations for war will bring us
the preservation of peace. Our foremost aim is
the control of force, not the pursuit of force, in a
world made safe for mankind. But whatever the
future brings, I am sworn to uphold and defend
the freedom of the American people, and I in-
tend to do whatever must be done to fulfill that
solemn obligation.
America's Goal — A Community of Free Nations
Address hy Secretary Rusk ^
It gives deep satisfaction to any Davidson man
to return to Davidson College. I feel that I have
known this campus for 70 years, because my father
gave his children an intimate picture of Davidson
of the 1890's. Like other alumni, I have followed
its affairs with affectionate interest and have
shared their pride as it has moved from strength
to strength.
In returning to this familiar scene I naturally
reflect on the vast changes that have occurred in
the world since I was graduated 31 years ago.
What is only history for most of you is indelibly
stamped upon some of the rest of us as personal
experience.
The gravest problems of even the next decade
had not yet taken shape. The Japanese militarists
had not yet invaded Manchuria — that came in
September 1931. Hitler had not yet achieved
power in Germany. The speed of the usual air-
plane was little more than 100 miles per hour.
We had our worries and difficulties, and they
were not small. Millions of Americans were un-
employed, and other millions were earning no
more than a meager subsistence. We were waiting
impatiently for the corner around which, it was
' Made at Davidson OoIIoko, Havidsou, N.C., on Feb. 2^
(press release 118 dated Feb. 23).
said, lay prosperity. And we had a massive back-
log of unsolved social problems.
But we felt secure against the rest of the world.
The oceans and a small Navy seemed adequate for
our protection. Our regular Army was a tiny
skeleton. We did not dimly perceive that in little
more than a decade we would be fighting a war
for survival on all the continents and seas. Still
less did we perceive the world as it is today; nu-
clear weapons were still locked up in E = MC', the
campus ROTC had seen no bazookas — let alone
intercontinental missiles — space was just giving
up its ether, and we were timid about anything
resembling world responsibilities.
We bear worldwide responsibilities, not because
we want them but because we must bear them if
we wish our civilization to survive. We can be
safe only to the extent that our total environment
is safe. V>y environment I mean not only the land
and waters and air of the earth but the adjoining
areas of space, as far out as man can project in-
struments capable of influencing significantly the
life and affairs of the planet.
In this world of rapid and revolutionary
changes, we would have problems enough even if
there were no forces deliberately determined to
destroy freedom. But those forces exist, and in
many ways they are powerful. The ruloi-s of the
448
Department of State Bulletin
leadinji; Communist states are not only Marxists
who believe that their sj'stem is destined to prevail
over all others. They are Leninists, determined
to accelerate this alleged historical inevitability
by all practicable means.
The Main Business of Free Peoples
Our first great task is to get on with the main
business of free peoples. President Kennedy put
it succinctly in his state of the Union message last
month : '
Yet our basic goal remains the same: a peaceful world
community of free and independent states, free to choose
their own future and their own system so long as it does
not threaten the freedom of others.
Some may choose forms and ways that we would not
choose for ourselves, but it is not for us that they are
choosing. We can welcome diversity — the Communists
cannot. For we offer a world of choice — they offer the
world of coercion. And the way of the past shows clearly
that freedom, not coercion, is the wave of the future. At
times our goal has been obscured by crisis or endangered
by conflict, but it draws sustenance from five basic sources
of strength :
— the moral and physical strength of the United States ;
— the united strength of the Atlantic community ;
— the regional strength of our hemispheric relations ;
— the creative strength of our efforts in the new and
developing nations; and
^the peacekeeping strength of the United Nations.
The Major Obstacle to Peace
I shall return to certain of these matters in a
moment, but I should like to comment briefly on
the major obstacle to a peaceful world in the
1960's. "We have heard a great deal from the
other side of the Curtain about their world revo-
lution. They predict its success, they back it with
action, they argue among themselves about how
best to get there — not about whether they should
try. What we have not heard about is the great-
est revolutionary potential they hold in their
hands — the revolution which the world would ex-
perience if they made a simple decision to live in
peace with it. Indeed it taxes our imagination to
picture the world which would be within the grasp
of mankind if the Communist bloc would act in
accordance with the United Nations Charter and
their own commitments made at the end of World
War II. The lifting of the shadows of fear, the
dispersal of the fog of suspicion, the freeing of
vast resources for the constructive tasks of man-
kind would, indeed, usher us into a new age.
This has not been their choice and the result
has been a series of crises in the postwar scene,
affecting every continent and adding danger and
anxiety to every year of our recent history. It is
not enough to note that so many of their efforts
have failed, that no people has yet embraced their
system in free elections, that no newly independent
nation has passed under their control. The crises
continue; if one is resolved, another takes its
place; others simply endure from year to year.
The great business of freedom requires constant
attention to these points of conflict and a major
effort by free men to insure that the revolution
of coercion does not succeed.
A year ago there was serious fighting in Laos,
fighting which was visiting tragedy upon a peace-
ful people in a land which ought not to become a
contending battleground for outsiders. Just as
we had no desire to establish bases or a military
position of our own in that country, so we could
not accept that it be swallowed up by aggression
from the north. An effort has been made, there-
fore, to find ways and means to permit Laos to
survive as a neutral and independent nation. In-
ternational agreement was reached on the stated
objective; the difficulty has been to bring the ob-
jective to reality. A precarious cease-fire, tangled
and complex negotiations among Laotian leaders,
and some unfinished business at the Geneva con-
ference lie behind the shifting news from that
still unhappy country.^ We believe the object is
sound — a genuinely neutral and independent
country — and we continue to give it the closest
attention. We should like to believe that peace
there is possible, that those who have proclaimed
unlimited appetites will leave the Laotians alone
to work out their own affairs, but I cannot in can-
dor report that the end of the crisis is clearly in
view.
In Viet-Nam we found an even more dangerous
problem. For several years a guerrilla war has
been built up in South Viet-Nam by the North
Viet-Nam regime. Thousands of men have been
trained, infiltrated, in part supplied, and certainly
directed from north of the 17th parallel. The
Geneva Accords of 1954* have been systemati-
^ Bulletin of Jan. 29, 1962, p. 159.
March 19, 7962
•For bacliground, see ihid., July 10, 19G1, p. 8.5.
' For texts, see American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955:
Basic Documents, vol. I, Department of State publication
6446, p. 750.
449
cally violated by the North Viet Minh since the
clay of their sijziiing. A new and promising nation
in the south of that divided country, having found
its feet against severe odds, is being subjected to
attack, terror, assassination, and ambush. This is
not a war of "national liberation"; it is a gangster
war of terror and intimidation.
In the face of this systematic aggression we —
and others — have joined with the Government
of South Viet-Nam in additional measures to pre-
serve the independence of that nation.
The stakes are greater than South Viet-Nam
itself. All Southeast Asia — the independence of
its peoples and their right to develop in their own
way — is at stake. And beyond this region the in-
ternational community confronts a question that
afl'ects the lives of men and women — and of na-
tions— on every continent: Shall this form of ex-
ternal aggression be allowed to succeed?
In Korea the international community proved
that overt aggression was unprofitable. In Viet-
Nam we must prove — once again, alas — that semi-
covert aggression across international boundaries
cannot succeed.
The United States has no national requirements
in that area. If the campaign to destroy the Re-
public of Viet-Nam is stopped, the measures we
are taking to assist its defense efforts will no
longer be necessary. We stand by our statement
made in 1954 at the Geneva conference ° that we
would refrain from the threat or use of force to
disturb the Geneva Accords but that we would
view any renewal of aggression in violation of
these accords with grave concern and as seriously
threatening international peace and security'. We
are determined that South Viet-Nam shall have
the chance to develop independence; and we are
determined that this ugly and dangerous form of
external aggression shall be effectively resisted.
In the Congo we have supported the effort of
the United Nations. To bring about a unified and
independent Congo seems to us to be the only
objective that offers a realistic chance for the ad-
vancement of the peoples of the Congo and for
peace in central Afiica. In midsummer 1960
President Eisenhower committed the United
States to the support of a United Nations solu-
tion; the alternative would almost certainly have
injected a great-power struggle into the heart of
Africa with its immense costs, heightened dan-
' For text, see Bulletin of Aug. 2, 1954, p. 162.
450
gers, and tragic consequences for the African peo-
ples. His decision was the right one.
The execution of United Nations policy in the
Congo has been an extraordinarily difficult and'
often painful enterprise; but the objective is cor-
rect, and the progress made toward it in recent
weeks has been most encouraging. When the Con-
go has been effectively organized under a govern-
ment impervious to outside infiltration, it can get
on with the task of building a nation under
constitutional arrangements of its own choosing.
The Congo should be a thriving nation, for it is
richly endowed with natural resources; it will in-
evitably have enormous influence upon the rest of
Africa. The stakes are very large, and those who
are seeking a decent world order will not under-
estimate them.
The Challenge in Berlin
It is in Berlin that we face the most direct and
fundamental Soviet challenge to the position of
the United States — and indeed of the entire free
world. Having fenced off and walled off their
areas of occupation in East Germany and East
Berlin, the Soviets now seek to encroach on the
free western sectors of Berlin. West Berlin is not
just a dot or a part of a dot on your map. It is a
thriving metropolis — 214 million people — which
has a larger population than 37 of the 104 members
of the U.N. and which produces more economic
wealth than 62 of the membei-s of the U.N
The Western allies, backed by all the NATO
powers, have the most solemn obligation to pro-
tect the freedom of the West Berliners. This is
a duty to ourselves as well and to our own security,
for the freedom of West Berlin is the key to the
freedom of us all. To protect this freedom re-
(juires the continued presence of Allied troops
and free rights of access. These are vital interests
which the West shares with the West Berliners.
The most dangerous aspect of the Soviet challenge
is the challenge to these rights of access. The
Soviets assert that by unilateral action they could
extinguish the Western rights on which this ac-
cess depends and submit access to the hostile con-
trol of the authorities they have established in
East Germany.
Frankly there is no genuinely satisfactory solu-
tion to the ])roblems of Germany and Berlin short
of the reunification of the comitry and the reestab-
lishment of a united Berlin as its capital. We
Department of Slate Bulletin
have made it clear, however, that we are pre-
pared to discuss current problems and to seek
arrangements which, with good will on both sides,
could ease the confrontation and reduce tensions.
To this end we have recently proposed that to
remove this dangerous question from the areas of
conflict we should agree with the Soviets to es-
tablish an International Access Authority " which
would control the movements along the Autoiahn
and in the air corridors from Berlin to Western
Germany and the outer world.
We have made it clear that M'e ourselves do not
seek or intend to use force to change the present
circumstances. However, the rights and interests
for Berlin to which I have refeiTcd are basic to
our security and to our position in the world. The
President has made it clear that they are not
to be surrendered either to force or through
appeasement.
The Communist Threat in the Western Hemisphere
Nearer home, in concert with our Latin Ameri-
can neighbors, we have taken steps to insulate the
Western Hemisphere against inroads by Commu-
nist imperialism. Last month at Punta del Este,
the members of the Organization of American
States voted unanimously (excepting for Cuba)
that the Castro Communist offensive is a clear
and present danger to the unity and freedom of
the American Republics and that "the present
Government of Cuba, which has officially identi-
fied itself as a Marxist-Leninist government, is
incompatible with the principles and objectives of
the inter- American system." '
The Castro government has now in fact been
excluded from the Council of the OAS. Special
machinery has been set up within the OAS to
recommend joint action to deal with Communist
subversive activities. In accordance with another
resolution, adopted unanimously, the OAS de-
termined to stop trade or illicit traffic m anns be-
tween Cuba and other American countries. And
the OAS Council is instructed to consider further
trade restrictions, with special attention to items
of strategic importance.
Thus we are working, in cohcert with our neigh-
bors, to assure that the process of modernization
now at work in the hemisphere shall not be per-
verted or exploited by commiuiism. And the story
of freedom in Cuba has not reached its final chap-
' See p. 463.
' Bulletin of Feb. 19, 1962, p. 270.
ter; the peoples of the hemisphere have made it
clear that they look forward to the return of the
Cuban people to their ranks.
These critical problems have not reached a final
solution. Some may be with us for years. Othei-s
will certainly arise; for we live in a time of tur-
moil, in which new nations are being born and are
seeking to modernize their way of life. And the
international Communist movement aims to ex-
ploit this turmoil to its advantage. It does not
become a confident and powerful nation, faced
with such prospects, to give way to moods of im-
patience and frustration.
The stonns are not the main story. They beset
our course, and we must go on learning the arts
of driving through or around them and of using
the strong winds to move us forward. But we have
our own course, our own goal.
The world in our centuiy is passing through the
disintegration of the international order that pre-
vailed in the last century toward a more compre-
hensive order in the next. The outlines of the new
order are foreshadowed in the opening pages of
the U.N. Charter.
Our goal is a free community of nations — inde-
pendent but interdependent — uniting North and
South, East and West, in one great family of man,
outgrowing and transcending the great antago-
nisms that rend our age. This goal is not abstract.
It is not a matter of words. In our day — in our
time — we are moving toward it, following a policy
that has four major components.
Tightening Bonds Among the Developed Nations
First, we seek to strengthen the bonds of associ-
ation among the more mdustrialized free nations,
which mainly lie in the northern half of the world.
In Europe we see emerging, through an exciting
constitutional process — recalling often the Ameri-
can debates of the 1780's — a new great power.
Carrying forward the momentum of the Marshall
plan, Europe in the 1950's achieved a pace of
progress unexampled in its long history, a pace
which even Europe's most optimistic friends never
predicted in the dark aftermath of the Second
World War. But from that war, and from the
difficult history of this century, Europeans of
many nations drew the conclusion that their con-
tinent could again be great only if it moved toward
unity.
Americans can take satisfaction from the fact
March 79, 7962
451
that we, in the immediate postwar years, urged
this course upon our European friends. Now, as
that unity begins to become a reality, we must all
adjust our affairs to this massive fact of history.
We aim to develop a new partnership with
Europe in all the dimensions that responsibility as
a great power in the 19G0's requires: in military
affairs; in sustained assistance to the under-
developed areas; in trade; in managing together
the monetary problems upon which the stability
of our economy rests; and in the major issues of
international politics.
It is in this large perspective that the President
has asked Congress for new trade legislation.*
We must negotiate with Europe in ways which do
not merely protect American economic interests
but which also reduce tariff barriers and trade dis-
crimination throughout the whole of the free
world. New legislation is needed to insure that
the movement toward unity in Europe is accom-
panied by trading adjustments which will unite,
and not split, the free world.
It is not our intent to join the European Com-
mon Market. We cannot hope to enter into as
intimate arrangements with these countries as
they will form among each other. Our interests
and responsibilities run not merely to Europe but
also to Latin America and to the whole commu-
nity of free nations. We look to a partnership
between the United States and an increasingly
unified Europe. The organs of Atlantic coopera-
tion which are at hand— in NATO and the OECD
[Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development] — are the active instruments of that
partnership. We are working to strengthen those
instruments, even as we encourage and assist the
progress of European integration.
We are a Pacific as well as an Atlantic power.
As part of our efforts to tighten the bonds among
the developed nations of the Northern Hemi-
sphere, we have begun a new era of closer associa-
tion with our friends in the Pacific.
Like Western Europe, Japan experienced in the
1950's an economic miracle of revival and growth.
Like Europe, Japan is day by day entering on
the world scene as an important and responsible
power, prepared to play its part in the free world's
common enterprises of construction and mutual
interest.
' For text of President Kennedy's message on trade, see
ibid., Feb. 12, 1062, p. 231.
Working With the Developing Nations
The second component of our policy is to work
in long-term association with the developing na-
tions of Latin America, Africa, the Middle East,
and Asia. There — notably in the southern half
of the globe — we see a great revolutionary proc-
ess. These nations are determined to modernize
their economic, social, and political life — in their
own way, in their own time, in harmony with their
own history and aspirations. Throughout this
generation and beyond they will be undergoing
fundamental changes. Where colonialism still
exists, it will pass from the scene. Where politi-
cal and social power — and land — is still held by a
few, it will give way to the assumption of power —
and of the ownership of land— by the many. In
the cities new generations of men and women will
be coming forward, asserting new ambitions for
themselves and for their nations, demanding
and achieving the right to assume political
responsibility.
We cannot expect this process of modernization
to take place smoothly in all nations and at all
times. Tliere have been and will be upheavals;
but behind them are powerful, constructive forces:
the determination of citizens that their lives and
the lives of their children shall be enriclied and
that their nations shall have a place of dignity on
the world scene.
We intend that the United States shall work in
constructive partnership with those who would
modernize their societies on the basis of national
independence. And we intend to help those who
would frustrate the Communist attempt to exploit
this revolutionary process, to impose a totalitarian
straitjackct on their way of life and their institu-
tions, and to deny their citizens the right of choice
in shaping their future.
This is the objective of our programs of foreign
aid and the Peace Corps. This is the objective of
the Alliance for Progress. This is the basis for
our policy in the Organization of American
States.
The task ahead will take time. Communists
are determined to exploit the inevitable disrup-
tions that occur as underdeveloped nations
modernize. But we look to the developing half
of the free world with sober confidence. These
nations wish to strengthen their independence, not
to surrender it. In this finidamental objective
Americans are at one with them. And this fact
452
Department of State Bulletin
from day to day is becoming: increasingly clear.
"Wo and our children can live our kind of life
in a world of many self-respecting, independent
nations. This the Communists cannot say and
cannot believe as long as they believe their own
dogma. Here is an abiding strength in our posi-
tion and a basic weakness in theirs.
The underdeveloped nations of the free world
are full of vitality. Some are forging steadily
ahead with well-shaped national development
programs. Others, we are confident, will be
organizing such programs over the next few years.
But almost everywhere one can see energy and
determination and new generations coming
forward.
On the other hand, where Communists have
seized control, as in China and North Viet-Nam,
there are hunger and apathy — the products of
out-of-date, reactionary theories, brutally ap-
plied— as well as the tragic human costs of
totalitarianism.
The process of modernization in these southern
regions will be with us for many years. There
will be disappointments, frustrations, and set-
backs. But if we play our part there is every
reason to believe that the principles of national
independence and of human freedom will tri-
umph ; for in the end they represent the efBcieni
way teclinically as well as the right way morally.
Free-World Partnership
The third element in our policy requires that
not merely ourselves but all our partners in the
North build a new, expanded partnership with
the developing nations. "VVe are already be-
ginning to create the framework for such a free-
world partnership among equals, aided by the
imaginative transformation from colonialism to
independence within the British Commonwealth
and the French Conmiunity.
Over the past year this partnership has taken
the practical form of economic assistance, con-
certed among several governments, to India,
Pakistan, Tanganyika, Nigeria, Brazil, and
Bolivia. We hope this international pattern of
aid will be extended during 1962 by common
effoi-ts through the OECD, the World Bank, the
Colombo Plan, and other instruments of inter-
national collaboration.
We are working together on equally important
problems of trade. We will continue to do so
with increasing vigor.
But we look to more than a technical and eco-
nomic i)artiiership. In the Congo and in other
enterprises of the United Nations, representatives
fi'om the developed and underdeveloped nations
are working side by side to bi-ing about political
solutions in the common interest.
The men and women of the developed and less
developed nations are coming together, day by
day, in a wide range of other human activities : in
scientific, cultural, medical, and civic affairs. The
ties between them as fellow citizens of a common
planet in an exciting century are becoming
stronger. They form an essential basis for prog-
ress toward the community of free nations.
It is also plain that there are differences of view
between developed and less developed countries
within the free world, notably those arising fi'om
old colonial experience. These differences have
been disruptive at times, but they should not be
exaggerated. We shall find, as time goes on, a
widened area of community between the more
industrialized and the less industrialized peo-
ples— a community based on a common desire for
peace, a common dedication to the principles of
independence and free choice, a common commit-
ment to the United Nations Charter.
Demonstrating the Values of Free Choice
A fourth element in our policy is gradually to
draw all men into the community of independent
nations.
Communism as a creed and a system of interna-
tional power is dedicated in deadly earnest to the
destruction of national independence and human
freedom as we understand it. This is a hard fact,
and we must face this fact by mounting and main-
taining forces that frustrate the Communist im-
pulse to expand, over the whole spectrum of ag-
gression— from guerrilla infiltration to nuclear
war.
Equally we must meet the challenge of commu-
nism as a competing method for organizing soci-
eties by demonstrating, and helping others to
demonstrate, that human and national aspirations
can better be met under the banners of free choice
and interdependence.
But we have a task which goes beyond the mili-
tary and ideological defense of the free world.
The peoples who live within the Communist bloc
live in nations as well as within the international
Communist system. Their historic interests and
cultures are still there, beneath the surface of the
Morch 19, 1962
453
conformity imposed upon them. The idea of na-
tional independence is alive within the Communist
bloc, as it is elsewhere in the world; and it is
growing. We have witnessed in the past year new
assertions of this historic force, no respecter of
ideological boundaries.
In East Germany, a politically and morally
bankrupt regime, with the popularity and men-
tality of an occupation force, had to build a wall
across a world-famous city to complete the prison
whose boundaries of barbed wire run through
Central Europe. But more lasting than any wall
is the loyalty of Germans and East Europeans to
their nationhood, their culture, and their liopes for
independence.
On the mainland of China dramatic failure has
occurred in the past 3 years. It is rooted in the
persistent inability of Communists to organize the
capacity and incentive of men to grow food effi-
ciently— but it is a failure that reaches far beyond
agriculture itself. Behind this failure lies not only
the peculiarly close relationship required between
man and the soil he tills, but his relationship to
his own family and to the other human values
which make his life worth living. The cultural
heritage of the Chinese people will survive these
assaults on some of its more fundamental values.
In this setting of dual crisis within the Com-
munist bloc, the Communist parties of the world
have quarreled on issues of ideology, power, and
personality on a scale new to Communist history.
However difficult and slow-yielding may be the
problems of the free world — the problems of alli-
ances and the divergent interests of strongminded
men and independent groups — we should be grate-
ful that our difficulties and quarrels are those
appropriate to a commonwealth of free men, not
to a convention of prison wardens.
What is our policy toward the Communist coun-
tries ? What view should we take of the possibility
of businesslike dealings on matters of mutual
advantage ?
Where we find that the interests of the free
world and the interests of a Communist state au-
thentically overlap — even where the overlap is
very narrow — we are prepared to talk and to ne-
gotiate, to find areas of agreement and even areas
of common action.
The greatest interest shared by peoples on botli
sides of the Iron Curtain is, of course, the preserva-
tion of peace. We think that the Soviet leadei-s
understand what a war fought with modern weap-
ons would cost them as well as others. But until
these and other arms are brought under control
and all nations refrain from aggression, there will
remain the danger of a great war.
In this past year we have created, within the
Government, the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency. We have developed and will develop
practical, technically effective plans designed to
bring weapons under control and to lift from
mankind the threat under which we all live.
At the disarmament conference scheduled to
convene next month we shall be prepared to talk
seriously and precisely about the problems of dis-
armament. But we shall not mistake talk for
progress, slogans for workable arrangements. If
the Soviets are prepared for disarmament, with
effective verification, they will find us responsive.
We hope also that the Soviets will join us in
measures to prevent the extension of the arms race
into space,^ in developing the peaceful iises of
atomic energy, and in other constructive enter-
prises for the benefit of mankind.
I do not expect a sure peace to dawn tomorrow.
But I am not pessimistic about finding a safer and
more rational way for us all to live on this small
planet. And I believe that we can, by our national
conduct, bring influences to bear upon the Com-
munist states that may, in time, modify their re-
lentless hostility to the West and contribute to
practical arrangements based upon a mutual in-
terest in survival. '
The community of independent nations is an
open concept, rooted in the principles of the
United Nations Charter. For a long time to come
I believe there will be a fairly clear line between
the world of commimism and the world of free
choice; but we should be prepared to work pa-
tiently— beginning now — toward the day when the
community of independent nations and the United
Nations itself become identical.
Our main lines of policy are open for all to
judge and to debate. It looks to the spread
throughout the world of the principles of inde-
pendence and liberty on which this nation and this
society have been erected.
' For uu exchange of ui»>ssaKes between President Ken-
nedy and Soviet Premier Khrushchev, see ibid.. Mar. 12,
1962, p. 411.
454
Department of Slate Bulletin
Secretary Rusk's News Conference off March 1
Press release 138 dated March 2
Secretary Ru^k: I would like to open today
with a statement on Viet-Nam. We have noted
recent comments from Peiping, Moscow, and
Hanoi about the nature and purposes of Anaerican
aid to Viet-Nam. I should like, therefore, to make
a brief comment on that situation.
Communist Aggression Against Viet-Nam
These comments from Communist capitals
wholly neglect tlie fact that the Republic of Viet-
Nam is under attack of Communist guerrillas
who are directed, trained, supplied, and reinforced
by North Viet-Nam — all in gross violation of the
1954 Geneva Accords.^ Irrefutable evidence of
this illegal and aggressive activity has been made
public; I can add that what is known publicly
is strongly and conclusively reinforced by intelli-
gence information.
United States military and economic assistance
and technical advice are being extended to the
Republic of Viet-Nam at its request to assist the
Vietnamese people to maintain their independ-
ence against this aggression.^ There have been
other examples, in almost every continent, of this
type of aggression.
The United States is assisting with training,
logistics, transportation, and advisory personnel
to enable the Government of Viet-Nam to deal
with this conspiratorial effort to take over that
counti-y by violent means. We have no combat
units in that country, and we have no desire for
bases or other United States military advantages.
All we want is that the Vietnamese be free to
determine their own future.
In reference to the demand by the Communists
'For text, see American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955:
Basils Documents, vol. I, Department of State publication
644(5. p. 7.50.
■ For an exchange of messages between President Ken-
nedy and President Ngo Dinh Diem, see Bulletin of
Jan. 1, 1962, p. 13.
that the cochairmen of the 1954 Geneva confer-
ence and other countries concerned consult re-
garding Viet-Nam, the United States is always
prepared to talk about situations which represent
a threat to the peace, but what must be talked
about is the root of the trouble; in this case it is
the Communist aggression against Viet-Nam in
disregard of the Geneva Accords.
The President made it clear last Decemljer in
responding to the Vietnamese request for assist-
ance that
. . . our primary purpose is to help your people main-
tain their independence. If the Communist authorities
in North Viet-Nam will stop their campaign to destroy
the Republic of Viet-Nam, the measures we are taking
to assist your defense efforts will no longer be necessary.
There is no threat to the peace of Southeast
Asia from the south or from across the Pacific
Ocean; the threat comes only from the north,
from those who have declared their intention to
force the rest of the world into their pattern —
despite the fact that no people has yet cliosen
that pattern in a genuinely free election. Tliere
can be peace overnight in Viet-Nam if those re-
sponsible for the aggression wish peace. The sit-
uation is just as simple as that.
Foreign Service Retirement Benefits
I might comment quite informally on some dis-
cussions which have occurred with respect to the
Foreign Service and the effect of a law which
makes certain additional retirement benefits avail-
able up to May 31st of this year, a law which was
passed, I think, in 1960. We have not had a rush
of applications for retirement to take advantage
of this law from among our senior and competent
Foreign Service officers, although there will be
some who will undoubtedly take this particular
provision of law into account when they consider
their own personal situation. For example, in the
case of some individuals who are considering tills
problem, if you wish to consider it in terms of
March 19, 7962
455
what it would cost to buy an annuity from insur-
ance companies to provide the equivalent retire-
ment of the special increment which is available
up to May 31st, in many cases the capital value
of this particular feature is in the order of $40,000
or $50,000. In a profession where men are not
able to save substantially and provide estates for
their family, and so forth, this is an important
factor to be taken into account.
But on the other hand we do not have the im-
pression that this is impelling Foreign Service
officers to change drastically their own personal
approach to this problem. Indeed we have a num-
ber of Foreign Service officers who are working
free, in the sense that, if they were to retire today,
their retirement would be somewhat larger than
the present salary of their present posts. We
have a great sense of dedication in the Foreign
Service, and I do not believe that this is going
to be a major element in that situation.
Also I think it is fair to point out that we have
in this administration made great use of our pro-
fessional service. I think the percentage of our
posts abroad held by career officers is something
over 70 percent. It is true that we have sent a
niunber of younger men to new posts. I think
that I have had the privilege of bidding Godspeed
to almost 25 Foreign Service officers who have
gone out to their first chief-of -mission post. But
let me add that some of the posts to which they
are going require young men under the circum-
stances of the situation.
Finally I should like to say that I do not have
the impression, sitting where I sit, that members
of the Foreign Service are acting like scared
rabbits with respect to policy matters. It is the
duty of a professional service to support the ad-
ministration which is in power at the time and to
give it its best judgment and advice. We are very
pleased to see the vigor, the intelligence, and the
capacity which is brought to bear by our pro-
fessional service, including sticking their necks
out on proposing policy, analyzing situations,
estimating, and predicting. We have, I am glad
to say, a vigorous Foreign Service, to which I am
extremely grateful.
Perhaps we could take questions.
Q. Mr. Secretary, there is a story this morning
in the Herald Tribune about a possible nuclear
partnership hetioeen NATO and the United
States. Could you comment on that?
A. Well, you will recall that in Ottawa the
President indicated we would be prepared to dis-
cuss that question with our NATO allies.' Those
discussions are now going on. It is to consider
in what way a NATO nuclear deterrent might be
formed which in any way varies from the present
arrangements. The NATO alliance now has the
powerful support of vei"y great nuclear power,
and those arrangements are well understood within
the alliance. But we are at the present time talk-
ing within NATO, at the North Atlantic Council
and between governments, about the possibilities
of what is generally called a NATO nuclear deter-
rent. I cannot be specific about details, because
those discussions are going on and will presum-
ably go on for some time, but this is one of the
matters that will come up as a very specific and
important matter at the May meeting of NATO
in Athens.
Geneva Disarmament Conference
Q. Mr. Secretary, the Geneva Disarmament
Conference is only 2 weeks off now. Mr. Khru-
shchev has sent a new message to General de
Gaulle saying he still wants a meeting at tJie
summit. Do you know whether there is going to
be a Geneva Disarmament Conference or not?
A. Yes, there will be a Geneva Disarmament
Conference. It has been agreed to. There will
midoubtedly be representatives of the 18 nations
there. I suppose that what is in your mind is who
will be there. We have invited me to be there
among others. Our proposal has been that we
start that conference with foreign ministers,* and
I hope very much that that proposal will turn
out to be acceptable. At the present time there is
no specific agreement among all those involved as
to just who will be there, but there will be a con-
ference, there will be negotiations, and we hope
that that conference can get down to serious
business.
Q. Mr. Secretary, there is a report in that con-
nection in the paper this morning tlmt you plan
to go whether Mr. Gromyko shoivs up or not. Is
that correct?
A. No, I think it would be fair to say that I
hope to go. I hope that the conference will open
* lUiL, June 5, 1961, p. 83.0.
* See p. 465.
456
Department of State Bulletin
at the foreign ministers level, but in the various
contingencies that are not yet sorted out and may
not be sorted out for a few days I don't know just
exactly who will be there, but I would hope to be
there.
Q. Mr. Secretary, in relation to your statement
on Viet-Nam, do you consider that the Chinese,
North Vietnamese, and R\i,ssian statements repre-
sent a rather concerted action, or do you see a
special degree of belligerence from the Chinese in
this situation?
A. I would not wish to speculate about that this
morning. "We know of discussions, differences,
and problems that have occurred within the Com-
munist bloc; whether these statements that have
Ijeen made in different ways by the three capitals
represent a concerted action is something for us
to think about rather than to talk about at this
particular point.
Q. Mr. Secretary, yesterday in an interview °
you indicated that you would he prepared to dis-
cuss Berlin and Southeast Asia at Geneva if Mr.
Gvomyho hrings it up. Would you be prepared
to discuss this in a detailed xoay to assist or to take
the plaice of the Moscow talks?
A. In that interview, my first appearance on
German television, I simply pointed out that if
the foreign ministers get together they are likely,
in their garrulous way, to talk about a good many
things. The agenda would be disamiament, and
we would hope that we could get disarmament off'
to a good start. But when such people are to-
gether, other questions almost certainly would
come up. I would not at this point want to say
whether that would involve any systematic dis-
cussion of the sort that would in any sense be a
substitute for, or a new chapter in, the talks which
Mi-. Thompson [Llewellyn E. Thompson, U.S.
Ambassador to the U.S.S.E.] has been having.
Q. Could you comment, Mr. Secretary, on Lord
Home's apparent suggestion that there may be an
exchange guarantee on access to Berlin for recog-
nition of East Germany?
A. "We believe, on the question of access, that
tlie first essential is for the other side to recognize
° For transcript of an interview with Secretary Rusk on
a German television program produced by Radio Free
Berlin and North German Radio on Feb. 28, see Depart-
ment of State press release 131 dated Feb. 28.
March J 9, 1962
631146—62 3
tJio basic rights of the AYest. "We have suggested
that tliere be some sort of international machinery
for insuring access.^ If this is to be a matter of
sensitivity and irritation and possible danger, one
of the best ways is to get these basic rigiits, which
the other side cannot change, in the hands of an
international authority which can manage them
without the irrelevancies or ii-ritations wliich
might otherwise develop. I have not seen the par-
ticular statement you referred to, but our position
is that we do not expect to recognize East
Germany.
Q. Mr. Seci^etary, there have been reports in
tlie papers today tliat the President will shortly
announce a resumption of nuclear tests.'' Could
you tell us, if this is true, what impact this would
Juive on the disarmament negotiations?
A. This is a matter wliich is being handled by
the President, and I would prefer not to make any
comments on that subject this morning.
Availability of Nuclear Weapons for Canada
Q. Mr. Secretary, the Canadian Prime Min-
ister [John Dlefenbaker'] said tlmt his Govern-
ment will not seek nuclear warheads so long as
tlie United States law does not permit of its having
joint control. But he has also said that in the
event of war, nuclear warheads would be instantly
available to Canada. Is there any such agreement
in effect, or do physical arrangements exist for
such a quick transfer?
A. My attention has been drawn to tliese recent
exchanges in the House of Commons in Canada
concerning the availability of nuclear weapons
for Canadian forces in Canada and Europe. Now,
of course, whether Canada wishes to arrange with
the United States to have nuclear weapons avail-
able for Canadian forces is a matter for Canada
to decide. The custody of United States nuclear
weapons made available for the forces of our
allies must remain with the United States. In
addition to assuring the safety and security of
nuclear weapons, this is one of the ways in which
the United States seeks to prevent the prolifera-
tion of independent national nuclear capabilities.
However, insofar as control over the use of such
weapons by Canadian forces is concerned, the
United States is willing to work out arrangements
" For a Department statement of Mar. 3, see p. 463.
' See p. 443.
457
for joint control fully consistent with national
sovereignty. The United States remams prepared
at any time to discuss such arrangements with the
Government of Canada, and we have of course dis-
cussed such arrangements with other governments.
Q. Mr. Secretary, in reference to your opening
statement on Viet-Nam, were you anticipating that
there might at some stage he major-power talks
on the situation in Viet-Nam?
A. I don't know today what might be in the
future on the matter of talks. "Wliat I wanted to
point out was that the issue there is extremely
simple. There is no problem in South Viet-Nam
if the other side would stay its hand, would leave
Viet-Nam alone, would stop this infiltration of
cadres and supplies and direction and control from
the north. Then the problem of peace in Viet-
Nam could be settled very quickly indeed. I don't
at the moment envisage any particular form of
discussion on that matter, but that is the issue and
it could be settled very simply.
NATO Nuclear Deterrent
Q. Mr. Secretary, would it he correct to infer
from your earlier ansiaer ahout a NATO nuclear
deterrent that %oe are noiv taking the initiative to
try to work out some sort of a plan rather than
letting someone else take the lead, as we had
hefore?
A. We are in a rather special situation in that
field, because in the course of development of the
nuclear problem, a very heavy responsibility rests
upon the United States.
At the present time the nuclear deterrent is very
largely with the United States and with the
United Kingdom. We would be glad to know
what the other governments of NATO feel about
any alternative arrangements that they might
prefer, but we also know that these discussions
are not likely to move forward without our direct,
interested, and lively participation. So, rather
than saying we are taking the initiative, let me
say that we are a part of these discussions which
are going on.
I discussed these questions with NATO at the
meeting in December,' and the North Atlantic
Council is talking about them at the present time.
We are active participants on this matter from
'For text of a coniininiiquc issued at the close of the
meeting, see Bulletin of Jan. 8, 19C2, j). 51.
458
here on out, and we will be consulting with the
other goverimients of NATO on tliis point.
Q. Would you he in favor of a meeting hetxoeen
the Foreign Ministers of the United States, Brit-
ain, and Russia in advance of the Disarma7nent
Conference to take up specifically the question of
nuclear disarmament and a test han?
A. That was in our mind when we made the
proposal that the Foreign Ministers of the
U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, and the U.S.
should meet ahead of the Disarmament Confer-
ence. It was thought that we who had been talk-
ing about nuclear test ban treaties might profitably
have some preliminary talk before the conference
opened. It was our proposal, as j^ou will recall.
that we meet a few days ahead of the opening of
the conference. This is our invitation, and we
hope it can be brought about, because I think there
could be some useful talk in such a meeting.
Q. Is it a correct interpretation of the statement
that you made ahout Canada that there has heen
no request from Canada for an arrangement for
joint control of nuclear weapons in Canada, and
secondly, if so, is the United States satisfied with
that situation in view of the fact that the U.S.
is stipplying $91 million worth of missiles to
Canada?
A. My statement was intended to clarify the
situation with respect to our own law and our own
arrangements and our own ability to talk about
these matters with other governments. I did not
intend, nor do I now intend, to get into the diplo-
matic questions which are being or may be dis-
cussed between the two Governments on this
matter.
Q. Mr. Secretary, time is getting short before
March H. How many days do you need to get
ready to get there in time for a preconference Big
Three foreign ministers meeting?
A. We have been working intensively on the
issues which we expect to come up there for the
h'.st several months. We have the disarmament ad-
ministration in our State Department. We had
tlie statement of agreed principles last fall in the
United Nations, as well as the exchange of letters
on one point of substantial disagreement," and of
course a great deal of detailed and preparatory
• For texts, see tBirf., Oct. 9, 1961, p. 5S9.
Deparfment of State Bulletin
work has been going on. I don't tliink that we
will go to Geneva unprepared. Of course, as you
move to an actual meeting the pace of preparation
steps up, and I will be working on it very hai'd
and in the hope and expectation that I will be
going.
Talks With NATO Allies Concerning Cuba
Q. Mr. Secretary., couhl you say, sir, something
about the success xohich the administration has had
in its talks xoith the NATO allies ahout alining
their policy on Cuba loith that of the United
States?
A. I think that particular point has been ele-
vated in importance perhaps beyond the world
situation. It has been for many months the prac-
tice in NATO to get a full report on important
matters that go on in other parts of the world
which are not the specific and immediate business
of NATO. In this instance we had an important
conference at Punta del Este,'° and our colleagues
in NATO had expressed the hope that we could
have someone who was present at Punta del Este
come over and give them a full report on the dis-
cussions and the situation. We sent Walt Rostow,
a senior and competent officer of assistant secre-
tary rank, who was at Punta del Este, for that
purpose. We did tell NATO members what the
Organization of American States had done, and
we expressed the hope that NATO members would
take into account the attitudes of the OAS, as ex-
pressed at Punta del Este, in the formulation of
their own policies toward Cuba.
For example there was a unanimous declaration
by the inter-American countries that steps ought
to be taken to interfere with the trade and traffic
in arms to Cuba or from Cuba. We would hope
that our friends in NATO would aline their
policies with that sort of provision. This was a
part of what has come to be a fairly normal pro-
cedure in making a full explanation to NATO
about what is going on in other parts of the world.
We have done that with respect to Southeast Asia
and other matters.
Q. Mr. Secretary, this is a question on tactical
nuclear iveapons, and I understand from Army
sources that one of the best capsule loeapons is the
demolition explosion of the nuclear type, and I
knoxo it is in use in exercises in NATO. I am
wondering if we have any inhibitions about using
tactical nuclear weapons in guerrilla tear fare in
Viet-Nam.
A. Well, I would not suppose that nuclear
weapons are a counterguerrilla weapon of high
priority or that they are likely to be used in this
situation. I don't fit nuclear weajDons into the
problem of Viet-Nam in this situation.
Q. These are just landmines. They are not any
bigger than that.
A. Just low nuclear landmines? (Laughter.)
No, those are not contemplated. I would make
that very clear.
Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us what pleased
you and what gave you some concern in the re-
port of the Attorney General [Robert F. Ken-
nedyl ?
A. Concern? Or are you simply speculating?
The Attorney General's trip " was most worth-
while. I will be having lunch with him today,
and we will be going over it in detail. I did talk
with him a little while immediately upon his re-
turn late yesterday. Our reports from all of the
counti'ies and the cai^itals that he visited were most
positive. There is no doubt whatever that his
visit was of very great help to all of us in our
foreign policy and in our relations with the coun-
tries he had a chance to see.
No Specific Form for Talks on Viet-Nam
Q. Mr. Secretary, in your opening statement you
said the United States was always toilling to talk
about the Vietnamese situation. What sort of
talks do you think would be most fruiffxil? For
example, would a second round of the 195^ Geneva
talks do any good with the United States?
A. I do not have in mind any specific form of
talk. The message that we want to get across to
the other side in the face of these comments and
declarations that they have made through various
channels is that there is no problem about peace in
Viet-Nam if they will simply decide to leave it
alone. It is just as simple as that. We have no
ambitions of a national sort ourselves. We can
think of a great many other things to do with our
resources or our manpower than the task we have
undertaken to assist the Government of South
' For background, see ibid., Feb. 19, 1962, p. 270.
" For announcements concerning Mr. Kennedy's trip,
see iUd., Jan. 8, 1962, p. 50, and Jan. 15, 1962, p. 99.
Morch 19, J 962
459
Viet-Nam in that situation. We have seen this
story before in other parts of the world since
1945. Peace could be immediate if this aggressive
effort would be suspended, if it were called off, if
it were canceled, and it is just as simple as that.
There are various ways, including this press con-
ference today, in which we hope to make that clear
to the other side.
Q. Mr. Secretary, do you feel that the talks he-
tioeen Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Ulbricht [Walter
Ulbricht of East Germany] have changed the
Berlin situation in any way?
A. We do not, of course, have detailed infor-
mation on those talks, but I would suppose that
they do not change the basic situation because we
have basic rights there, basic interests there, and
we hold the Soviet Union responsible for them
insofar as any action or conduct of theirs is con-
cerned. So I don't see how talks between Mr.
Khrushchev and Mr. Ulbricht could change the
situation as far as the West is concerned.
Q. Do you see any more pressures forthconning
in the near future?
A. I would not want to speculate on the future
on that. We have made it very clear what oiu'
vital interests are and that we will intend to insist
by whatever action is necessary that those vital
interests be respected.
Expropriation Case in Brazil
Q. What are the prospects for an early settle-
ment of the IT&T expropriation case in Brazil,
and what, if anything, can he done to safeguard
similar American industries in the future?
A. We are discussing that matter with the Gov-
ernment of Brazil. The company and state au-
thorities are also in touch with each other. I think
there are two rather separate points here. One is
the constitutional right of a government to deal
with persons and property within its own sovereign
jurisdiction. The other is the policy question as
to whether under a particular circumstance it is
wise to invoke that right.
There are some special problems, as we know,
in this country about the relationships between
public utilities and governmental authority.
Broadly speaking, wo feel very strongly that pri-
vate investment is an important part of the eco-
nomic and social development effort in any of
these countries with which we are closely asso-
ciated, which we are trymg to help get on with
that job.
We would hope very much that the large private
investment increment or component of the Alli-
ance for Progress will not be discouraged by atti-
tudes toward foreign private investment in this
hemisphere, or indeed in countries in other parts of
the world where economic and social development
is a major issue. In the indications that we made
at the first Punta del Este conference '- on the Al-
liance for Progress as to the kind of assistance that
might be expected, private investment was an im-
portant component. We believe that e\-eryone
should keep in mind the importance of creating a
climate in which this great energizing effort from
the private field can be linked to efforts made in
the public sector to get on with this job. Other-
wise I think that our contribution will be neces-
sarily limited in terms of what can be done in
particular situations.
There are some special difficulties in this par-
ticular case: we are talking about those with the
Brazilian Government.
Contacts Witii Foreign Educators and Students
Q. Mr. Secretary, the Attorney General on his
return yesterday made the point that we dorCt
seem to he getting through to the students and the
intellectuals in some of these countries. I know
you didnH mean to suggest hy your earlier answer
that you were not concerned about this, but I
wondered what thoughts you might have about
how ice could equip ourselves to meet these people
more directly.
A. That is a matter of very considerable im-
portance, one that I have had some personal as-
sociation with in private life for the last 10 years
in fellowships and scholarships to foreign students
and assistance to foreign univei-sities. I laiow that
we need to do more through our cultural exchange
programs and, indeed, in our aid programs to
strengthen the educational and intellectual life of
countries which are now moving into a new
chapter in their modernization.
In many situations the bottleneck is not money
but people. We have a considerable contribution
to make in this field. Indeed, in the development
field wo have a unique contribution, and that is in
" For background, see iftii?., Aug. 28, 1961, p. 355, and
Sept. 11, 19U1, p. 459.
460
Deparlment of Slate Bullefin
what might be called ihc land-grant -college type
of higher education. We are now celebratmg our
hundredth anniversary of that system. This is a
system of education that was devised to assist with
development, and it is something in which we have
had a lot of experience.
If we can expand our contact with these educa-
tional institutions abroad, with the students and
professors, this Avill give them not only a better
understanding of the United States, which is im-
portant, but it will help put them in a better posi-
tion to make a direct and immediate contribution
to their own countries. So this is something that
we must develop and move on with and put more
funds and more effort into.
West New Guinea Dispute
Q. Mr. Secretary, in vieio of the Attorney Gen-
eroTs talks in both Djakarta and The Hague on the
West Neio Guinea prohlem, do you see a possi-
bility now for further progress toward a peaceful
settlement of that dispute?
A. I think there is a real possibility for a peace-
ful settlement of that matter, and I think both
sides want a peaceful settlement. Naturally they
have somewhat different views about what a peace-
ful settlement should be, but we do believe that
there is a basis for a peaceful settlement between
tlie two Governments, and we also know that the
general community, the international community,
would hope very much tliat a peaceful settlement
could be achieved.
I'll be talking about that in more detail today
at lunch with the Attorney General, and among
other steps I will be seeing Foreign Minister
[J.M.A.H.] Luns, who will be coming through
here tomorrow on the way to Tokj'o, and I will
have a chance to talk with him about it.
Q. Mr. Secretary, I wonder if we could clanfy
your statement on Viet-Nam. You said in your
initial statement that the U.S. is always prepared
to talk about situations that are a threat to peace.
That seemed to leave the impression that the
United States is indeed willing to have a major-
power conference. Later you said that if the Com-
munists were to cease and desist, there would be no
problem. Are you saying that it is a condition or
v^ould be a condition for any talks on Viet-Nam
that the Communists take the action of ceasing
and desisting?
March 79, 7962
631146—62 4
A. Xo, I was not talking at all about any par-
ticular fomi of discussion. I was simply saying
that in any contacts on the subject the primary
subject must be this matter of assistance from the
north to dissident elements in South Viet-Nam.
Achieving peace in South Viet-Nam is a very
simple thing, and complicated and prolonged talks
are not required if there is a desire for i)eace on
both sides.
Approach to Disarmament Negotiations
Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of the past history of
disagreement and deadlock in dimrmament, are
you any more hopeful that this current Geneva
meeting will ease this problem or come up loith
specific agreements?
A. Well, I think we have to approach such a
critically important question as disarmament
with a measure of hope. We also must approach it
on a basis of realistic proposals. One of the rea-
sons why we suggested that the conference open
with foreign ministers and that there be some con-
sultation before the meeting actually convened was
that we want to make a real effort to get this dis-
armament question, if we can, out of the general
field of simply exchanging propaganda. It must
be evident to people on both sides of the Iron
Curtain that the trail ahead of us in this arms race
is a murky and dangerous trail. The arms race is
pressing onto the competence of the mind of man
in some of its technical aspects. Both sides of the
Iron Curtain have a fundamental interest in main-
taining the general peace. We would hope that
we would not go there and exchange propaganda
statements and freeze ourselves in position on all
sides and leave it at that. We have had enough of
that since 1945. We should sit down and talk
systematically and in detail and specifically about
steps which can be taken to begin to turn this race
downward instead of letting it continue in-
definitely upward.
No, we have to hope. We have to try on the
basis of hope. We approach it on that basis and
hope that all those who are present will do so.
Perhaps we can take some steps that will make a
big difference to the future of the human race, if
one can put it in such broad terms.
Q. In rejecting last xoeek the Khrushchev pro-
posal that the disarmament conference be opened
icith a summit level. President de Gatille held that
461
tlie key to disarmament was nuclear disarmament
and proposed a Four Power meetimj on that. If
there is a meeting of the United States, Britain,
and Russia to open the Disarmament Conference
with discussion of nuclear disarmament, do you
see the possibility of France joining that dis-
cussion?
A. We are in touch with all of the "Western
Five, who were members of the original Commit-
tee of 10. That is the United Kingdom, France,
Italy, Canada, and the United States. As a mat-
ter of fact, we are consulting as a group here in
Washington at the present time. We shall be in
close touch with them on it. The whole field of
nuclear weapons is a very important part of the
total disarmament problem, but I cannot go into
further detail at this time.
Alliance for Progress
Q. A year ago this month, the Alliance for
Progress got under way." Are we completely
satisfied at the pace with which most of the Latin
American nations are engaging in self-help
measures?
A. On the Alliance for Progress we and the
Latin American governments ought never be satis-
fied. Here is something that requires what a
former colleague of mine once called "divine dis-
content." We will have no problem in committing
the fmids that we told our Latin American friends
we would commit in this fiscal year. We are going
ahead, and there is no difficulty in meeting those
targets. But for years to come this will be un-
finished business. There will always be something
more to be done. It is an urgent problem, and
there will be many things done that ought to have
been done sooner. I would not suppose that we
are ever really going to be satisfied or contented,
because this great problem of growth and develop-
ment is insatiable, at least as far into the future
as we can see.
We are trying to move ahead in our own pro-
cedures in order to come to our conclusions with
dispatch, with a minimum of redtape and com-
plexity, and at the same time to press our friends
in Latin America to get on with their plans and
their steps with more speed and clarity. They
have some problems because the Alliance for
Progress is based on the notion that rapid eco-
nomic and social development can occur within
free institutions. That means that many of them
have their own legislatures, their own procedures,
their own laws to pass, their own administrative
arrangements to devise, their own steps to take,
and some of these are controversial in their coim-
tries. Similar steps were taken in our country
as we moved on in our own development. So are
we satisfied? No. Do we expect to be satisfied?
No. Are we working at it ? Yes I
Framework of Disarmament Talks
Q. Mr. Secretary, in connection icith the Dis-
armament Conference and initial measures in ad-
vance of disarma7nent, there has been some hope
expressed that you may make progress on the Irish
resolution, or point three of the Presidenfs state-
ment at the U.N. on disarmament.'^* In the event
you did make this progress and agreement seemed
likely, tootdd the United States go along with if
without the participation of Communist China?
A. Well, the whole issue is one which would
come up within the framework of the disarma-
ment talks. Of course, as the President said,
there are some important steps in disarmament
which could not be taken unless the authorities in
Peiping joined the party.
Q. Joined the conference?
A. I said joined the arrangements that were
made, but this is a matter for the future.
Q. Mr. Secretary, does the United States agree
with Prime Minister Macmilla7is view in his let-
ter to Mr. Khnishchev that there should be a sum-
mit gathering out of the Geneva meeting in case
there is either progress or a deadlock, ichich
would seem to guarantee a summit meeting of
what happens?
iV. The Presidenfs reply and the Prime Min-
ister's reply were based on a conunon undei-stand-
ing between them as to our attitude on these and
other points.
The President, in his reply, indicated that there
might be certain i>oints of difficulty which might
be resolved only at the heads-of-government level.
This would be in relation to the presence of, and
prospects for, general progress. The President's
attitude — and as I read the Prime Minister's re-
' For background, see ibid., Apr. 3, 19C1, p. 471.
462
" For text, see ihid., Oct. IG. 1961. p. 622.
Department of Slate Bulletin
ply, the Prime Minister's attitude — is that we
should start these negotiations at the foreign-min-
isters level, that if there came a point where the
heads of government could fruitfully, profitably,
and usefully meet to get on with this job, then they
would be prepared to consider the possibility of
doing so. But I think the basic approach of the
two is the same.
Q. Mr. Secretary, you have had now a number
of exchanges toith the Soviets on the question of
Geneva arrangements. Do you see any evidence
in these exchanges that the Soviet Government
shares the view you expressed of a hopeful ap-
proach to Geneva and of a determination to lift
disarmament 7}egotiations mit of the field of
propaganda?
A. I wouldn't want to certify to an answer on
that ix)int today. Certainly I would hope that
they would come there M-ith some hope and deter-
mination to move this problem along. But I am
not going to guarantee what their attitude will
be, certainly at this point.
Q. Mr. Secretary, back on the subject of Viet-
Nam. You have said that the United States is
xoilling to talk, but you say you think that talks
are not required in 07'der to bring peace to the
area. As a practical matter, do you think it would
be possible to get the Cormnunisfs to cease and
desist aiding the North Vietnamese icithout hav-
ing some sort of negotiations?
A. This is not something on which the other
side is unaware of our view. No, I would think
that the subject of discussion would be relatively
simple, and I wouldn't now want to predict exactly
how discussions, if any occur, might go on. This
matter did come up in the Geneva conference on
Laos, where references were made to Viet-Nam
and to the Geneva Accords.
I don't want to pursue this question of exactly
how any talks might occur among governments.
Obviously there are talks, because the authorities
in Peiping and other capitals have addressed com-
munications, for example, to the cochairmen
through public channels, and there are the ICC
[International Control Commission] activities,
which are intergovernmental discussions. But I
don't at the moment foresee anj' specific form or
method of discussion.
Q. Thank you. sir.
U.S. Suggests International Authority
To Control Berlin Access Routes
Department Statement '
As the President suggested in his interview
with Mr. Adzhubei [Aleksei Adzhubei, editor of
1 2 vest ia] on November 25, 1961, the idea of an
International Access Authority would provide a
reasonable solution to the problem of access to
Berlin. We believe that this could eliminate the
dangers in the present situation while taking ac-
count of interests of both sides.
The one area in the world where extremely
grave danger exists of a collision between Soviet
and Western armed forces is in the Berlin access
routes, should any attempt be made to block access
to the city. The suggestion for the Access Au-
thority is intended to eliminate this danger by
placing an international authority in control of
the routes so that Berlin traffic will be able to
move freely without being subject to disruption
and harassment for political purposes.
What we have in mind would be the establish-
ment by agreement between the United States,
Britain, France, and the Soviet Union of an In-
ternational Access Authority to govern access
between West Germany and West Berlin on the
Autobahn and through the three existing air
corridors.
The Authority would be given control over the
Helmstedt-Berlin Autobahn, the Berlin Air
Safety Center, airport facilities in West Berlin,
and other facilities in West Berlin necessary for
free air traffic in the air corridors. It would also
govern air traffic in the corridors and in the Berlin
air control zone.
Such an Authority would also be empowered to
appoint officials to carry out its functions, to fix
rules governing the use of the transportation and
commimications facilities under its control, to
charge fees to cover the costs of its operations, to
construct facilities along the highway, to operate
the Berlin Air Safety Center, and to engage in
other activities necessary to the carrying out of
its functions.
Such an arrangement would supplement exist-
ing access arrangements. Prior to its coming into
'Made by a Department press oflBcer on Mar. 3; for a
reply by Secretary Rusk to a question on this subject at
his news conference on Mar. 1, see p. 457.
Alorch 19, J 962
463
effect the Western allies on the one hand and the
U.S.S.R. on the other would, of course, have to
make arrangements to insure that the agreement
would be legally effective and binding respective-
ly in West Germany and West Berlin and in East
Germany and East Berlin.
Secretary Rusk Interviewed
on ''Eyewitness to History"
Following is the transcript of an interview of
Secretary Rusk hy George Herman on the Colum-
hia Broadcasting System's television program,
'■'■Eyewitness to History'''' on March 2.
Press release 140 dated March 2
Mr. Herman: Mr. Secretary, do you see any-
thing about President Kennedy's speech tonight ^
which will have any impact on the forthcoming
disarmament conference in Geneva ?
Secretary Rnsk: The decision which the Presi-
dent discussed with the Nation earlier this eve-
ning adds great impetus to the importance of the
disarmament discussions in Geneva. There are
two aspects of the President's decision which af
feet the security of the United States.
The first is in the military side. And in the
absence of effective controls and disarmament, it's
important for us to maintain the validity of our
nuclear weapons. But the other, the disarma-
ment side, is just as important to our security, Ije-
cause when we look down the road ahead and we
see an arms race that threatens to spiral beyond
the competence of the mind of man, surely it is in
the interest of the security of the human race tliat
every feasible effort be made to bring this race to
a halt, to turn it downward, to try to bring these
weapons under control.
Some weeks ago the President was asked what
the principal disappointment was in his first year
of office. His reply was the failure to obtain a
nuclear test ban treaty in the negotiations in
Geneva in the spring of last year. It would be of
great importance that we make real gains, real
headwav in tliis field of disarmament. And I
can't but believe that the President's decision, fol-
lowing on the resumption of nuclear tests by the
Soviet Union, will add urgency and an underlying
sense of realism to the discussions in Geneva in
mid-March.
Mr. Herman; You do not feel then that a re-
sumption of American open-air nuclear testing
will detract from the possibilities of achieving a
realistic disarmament agreement?
Secretary Rusk ; No. I think that it adds to the
importance of realistic and careful and systematic
negotiations to see what can be done in this very
important field.
Mr. Herman: Does it add, do you think, any
kind of pressure or increased need on the other
side to resume realistic disarmament talks?
Secretary Rusk: Well that would be for them
to decide. As the President pointed out, Mr.
Khrushchev had indicated earlier that he assumed
that his resumption of tests would lead othei-s to
resume testing. I would think that they would
have to consider the same factors that all of us
are considering, what's best for their own security
and, indeed, the security of the entire Imman race.
But we do believe that testing itself, and talking,
can go forward. The President pointed out that
during the Soviet tests we did reach agreement
last fall at the United Nations in a statement of
agreed principles on disarmament. These are not
necessarilj^ contradictory. And indeed the dem-
onstration of the importance of disarmament, I
think, will make a contribution to the conference.
Mr. Herman: Are you personally as confident
as you were yesterday - that there will ho a con-
ference in Geneva ?
Secretary Ru^k: Oh, I'm sure there will be a
conference.
Mr. Herman: You believe you will be there?
Secretary Rusk: We have invited the foreign
ministers to come, and that means that we have
invited me to come; so I'm hoping tliat the situa-
tion will l)e such that I go.
' See p. 443.
' For the tran.script of Srcrctar.v Rusk's news confer-
ence of Mar. 1, see p. 455.
464
Departmcn/ of Sta/e Bulletin
President Kennedy Reaffirms Views on Frameworit
for Conduct of Disarmament Negotiations
Following is an exchange of messages between
President Kennedy and Nikita KhrusJichev,
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the
U.S.S.R.
PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S MESSAGE OF FEB-
RUARY 24 >
White House press release (Palm Beach, Fla.) dated February 25
February 25, 1962
Dear Mr. Chairman: I regret that in your
message of February 21 you seem to challenge the
motivations of Prime Minister Macmillan and
myself in making our proposal of February 7 -
that the forthcoming Disarmament Conference
open at the Foreign Minister level. I believe that
there can be a legitimate difference of opinion
on the most effective and orderly way to make
progress in the \'itally important field of disarma-
ment. You have presented your own views and
I do not wish to imply that they are motivated
by anything other than your own conviction that
the way you suggest is the best way to proceed.
However, I must say that even though I have
given the most careful thought to the considera-
tions you advance, I continue to hold to my view
that the personal participation in Geneva by the
Heads of Government should be reserved until a
later stage in the negotiations when certain pre-
liminary work has been accomplished.
Indeed some of the statements you make rein-
force my view in this respect. Your discussion
of the control problem, for example, is based, in
my view, on a fundamental misconception of the
United States position that can probably best be
clarified in the light of discussion of specific veri-
fication requirements for specific disarmament
measures. It is not true, as you allege, that the
United States is seeking to establish complete con-
trol over national armaments from the beginning
of the disarmament process. Our position is a
quite simple one and it is that whatever disarma-
ment obligations are undertaken must be subject
to satisfactory verification. For example, if, as
we have both proposed, there is an agreement to
reduce the level of armed forces to a specified
nmnber, we must be able to ensure tlu-ough proper
verification mechanisms that this level is not ex-
ceeded. I do not propose here to discuss this
subject at length. I wish merely to point out that
this is the type of issue on which more work
should be done before it can usefully be dealt
with at a Heads of Government meeting.
If it were not for the existence of the Statement
of Agreed Principles " which was worked out so
laboriously between representatives of our two
countries last year, there might be greater force
to your reasoning that Heads of Govermnent
should meet at the outset to set directions for the
negotiations. In my view the Statement of
Agreed Principles constitutes just the type of
framework which would be the most that could be
expected at this point from a meeting of the Heads
of Government. Since this has already been done,
I believe now we need to have our representatives
do further exploratory work of a more detailed
nature.
As I have said and as I now repeat, I think it
is of the utmost importance that the Heads of
Government of the major nuclear powers assume
a pei-sonal responsibility for directing their coun-
tries' participation in and following the course of
these negotiations. I can assure you that the
Secretary of State would present my views with
complete authority. Even so, I hope develop-
ments in the Conference and internationally would
make it useful to arrange for the personal partici-
pation of the Heads of Government before June 1.
I do not, however, believe that this should be done
' Delivered at Moscow on Feb. 25.
' For text, see Bulletin of Mar. 5, 1962, p. 355.
' For text, see iUd., Oct. 9, 1961, p. 589.
March J 9, J 962
465
at the outset and I must say frankly, Mr. Chair-
man, that I believe this view is well founded.
I believe that to have such a meeting at this point
would be to begin with the wrong end of the prob-
lem. The Heads of Government should meet to
resolve explicit jjoints of disagreement which
might remain after the issues have been carefully
explored and the largest possible measure of
agreement has been worked out at the diplomatic
level.
I continue to hope that you will agree to the
proposed procedure which was set forth in Prime
Minister Macmillan's and my initial letter of Feb-
ruary 7. I believe that the replies which have
been made by other prospective participants to
your messages indicate a general support for this
approach and I trust that you will give a favor-
able response.
I cannot conclude this letter without mention-
ing briefly the problem of nuclear testing. Since
I assumed the Office of President of the United
States, the conclusion of a nuclear test agreement
has been a primary objective of mine. The record
of American participation in the negotiations on
this subject has demonstrated fully the creative
effort we made to achieve agreement. It must be
understood that in the absence of an agreement
which provides satisfactory assurance that all
states will abide by the obligations they under-
take, there is no real basis for securing a safe end
to the competition in the development of nuclear
weapons. It is strange for the Soviet Union,
which first broke the truce on nuclear testing, now
to characterize any resumption of testing by the
United States as an aggressive act.
It was resumption of testing by the Soviet Union
which put this issue back into the context of the
arms race and that consequently forced the United
States to prepare to take such steps as may be
necessary to insure its own security. Any sucli
steps could not be characterized now as "aggres-
sive acts." They would be a matter of prudent
policy in the absence of the effectively controlled
nuclear test agreement that we have so earnestly
sought.
In our February 7 message, the Prime Minister
and I attempted to lay a further framework for
the conduct of the negotiations. We believe that
in a preliminary meeting among the Foreign Mbi-
isters of the United States, United Kingdom and
U.S.S.R. views could be exchanged and agreement
reached on the three parallel approaches we sug-
gested and on some of the procedural aspects which
we might jointly recommend to guide the Com-
mittee's work. Such a discussion, together with
the Statement of Agreed Principles, could give a
valuable direction and impetus to the Committee's
work.
Mr. Chairman, I think you agree that we must
approach this meeting with utmost seriousness and
dedication if we are to avoid a gradual drift to
the same kind of aimless and propaganda-oriented
talk which has characterized so much of past dis-
armament negotiations. This can be best achieved
if we who are ultimately responsible for the posi-
tions we take, and our chief diplomatic officials,
concern ourselves directly, as we are now doing,
with this subject. I believe we should consider
most carefully as we proceed when and how our
actual participation at the conference table could
be of most benefit.
John F. Ivennedy
MR. KHRUSHCHEV'S MESSAGE OF FEBRUARY 21
UnofBclal translation
Deab Me. Pbesident : I have received your reply to
the proposal of the Soviet Government that the work of
the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee be initiated by
the Heads of Government (State) of the countries rep-
resented in that Committee. I must say frankly that I
am chagrined by your negative attitude toward that
proposal.
I shall not conceal that for a long time I have been
hatching the thought of beginning the work of the dis-
armament committee at the highest level. And as I have
already written,* your message of February 7 reached me
at the very moment when I was working on a message
on this question to the participants in the forthcoming
negotiations, and that encouraged me even more.
However, after your reply to my message," the situation
looks entirely different.
According to your message, you believe that even if
participation by the Heads of Government in disarma-
ment negotiations is possible it should be imstpoued until
such time when definite progress has been reached in
negotiations. But the legitimate question arises — who,
then, can ensure with the greatest probability of success
such progress, who can create a favorable situation for
negotiations? Those who are vested with the full breadth
of authority and who have the leading role in shaping
policy or, on the other hand, those who are not veste<l
with such resi)()nsibility and consequently are limited in
their actions by previously determined instructions? It
seems to me that there can be no two answers to this
* For text of Mr. Khrushchev's message of Feb. 10, 1962,
see ibid.. Mar. D, 1002, p. SX.
° For text of President Kennedy's message of Feb. 14,
1902, see ibid., p. 358.
466
Deparlment of Stale Bulletin
question. It is clear that the Heads of Government
have much greater possibilities for this than anybody else.
The question may also be raised in the following man-
ner : what i.s better, what will yield greater benefits —
leadership exercised by the Heads of Goverunieut from
a distance, or on the other hand when they themselves,
having rolled up their sleeves, undertake the most difficult
and give a correct orientation to the negotiations and en-
sure the progress of which you speak in your message.
As for me, the guiding precept of my life is to be where
the main work is being done, where it is most important to
obtain success. As I understand it, the position of Head
of State requires thi.s. If we remained far from Geneva,
we would, whether we wanted it or not, have to consider
the problems arising in the course of the disarmament
negotiations merely as one among many other important
matters with which officials in our position have to deal
every day.
Frankly, I am surprised at the inconsistency in certain
arguments advanced in your message. You agree that
the Heads of Government .should assume personal respon-
sibility for the success of the disarmament negotiations
to be opened in Geneva on March 14 of this year. But
at the same time you propose that we wait until the
Ministers of Foreign Affairs have achieved definite
progress. Well, if, as was the case in the past, disarma-
ment negotiations should fail to make progress — what
then, should the Heads of State wash their hands? But
then what will there be left of their personal responsibility
for the course of negotiations, the Importance of which
you emphasize in your message? No, you cannot really
make these things jibe.
Nor do I find convincing your statement that before it
becomes possible for the Heads of State to examine the
situation arising in the disarmament negotiations there
should be done a great deal of work in clarifying the
positions of the sides. I shall go even further and say
that your statement that something is yet to be fully
clarified was extremely disappointing to me. The un-
fortunate thing lies precisely in the fact that so far dis-
armament has not gone beyond clarification of positions.
How long can one continue to engage in eliciting, study-
ing, and clarifying each other's positions, when negotia-
tions, meetings and contacts at various levels, endless
arguments and disputes, which have been going on for
some fifteen years, have been devoted essentially to this
task.
Do we not have enough documents accumulated which
give a complete schedule of the stages of disarmament,
which set forth in all the details and minutiae the meth-
ods of disarmament and the measures of control over it,
in short, documents which quite clearly set forth the
positions of the respective governments? Of course to
this pile of documents more than one heap of papers
could be added, but that would not reduce the existing
armies even b.v one division or even one soldier, or arma-
ments by a single rocket or a single bullet. The delay is
cau.sed not by the lack of clarity as to the questions
where we disagree but rather as to where our views are
closer together. For a long time now the problem has
been not that of clarifying positions but rather of how
the differences that have emerged should be overcome
and how the path toward agreement should be paved. To
say, then, that somebody still has to engage in clarifying
positions — that is simply refusal to attempt to direct dis-
armament negotiations in a practical channel.
If the previous negotiations have really left certain
questions unanswered, then this is apparently not at all
because little effort has been made to clarify them. As
I have already indicated, disarmament intrudes in the
sacrosanctum of every state, in the area of ensuring their
security, which, in the present world situation, everybody
prefers to keep far from the e.ves of others. A certain
degree of trust and responsibility, without which it is
impossible even to come close to the solution of disarma-
ment problems, can therefore be reached only among
those who bear the highest responsibility before the peo-
ples of their countries for their security. And nobody
else but the Heads of Government (State) bear such
responsibility. Moreover, many of them would have to
a.ssume the leadership of the armed forces of their coun-
tries should times of trial occur. Nor is it necessary to
prove that personal contacts among Heads of State can
sooner lead to a better understanding of one another's
aspirations, greater trust, and as a consequence — who
knows — perhaps even new ideas.
If the experience of previous disarmament negotiations
has been in any way useful, then it is primarily because
it has demonstrated how few practical moves in the
matter of disarmament one can expect without the most
direct and businesslike participation in negotiations of
officials holding the highest position. It is precisely be-
cause the positions of the participants in negotiations
have been overly clarified that the conclusion ari.ses by
itself that only such officials can move the disarmament
question off dead center, if, of course, all parties desire
this.
Therefore neither Ministers, whatever esteem they may
enjoy on the part of the governments and the peoples of
their countries, nor other representatives, whatever their
rank, will achieve anything if the Heads of State do not
place the negotiations on a solid foundation, having
demonstrated the will and desire to reach agreement on
disarmament problems.
If you have no desire to head now the U.S. Delegation
to the negotiations in the 18-Nation Committee and you
use in explanation of your position such an artificial
argument as lack of appropriate preparations, then this
can only indicate that the re.solution to reach agreement
on disarmament questions has not yet become ripe in
your mind. There unavoidably ari.ses the question — is
it not, Mr. President, because in your ovpn mind you have
already condemned the 18-Nation Committee to failure
and are thinking in advance in terms of this Committee's
failing to ensure the solution of the questions for which
it has been created that you do not wish to go to Geneva
now? It appears that the Western Powers are not yet
ready for a disarmament agreement and you therefore
think that for the time being it is more convenient to
keep somevi'hat aside from the negotiations on this ques-
tion. This is how all thinking people will have to assess
your unwillingness to have the Disarmament Committee
meet at the highest level.
To unload the work in the 18-Nation Committee on the
March 19, ?962
467
Ministers of Foreign Affairs is to demonstrate clearly —
and the Ministers will, of course, understand tills — tliat
the Heads of Government, the Heads of State, do not wish
to assume the responsibility for a possible failure of ne-
gotiations and prefer that all sins be charged to the
Ministers.
It is easy to imagine what the situation may turn out
to be in the final analysis. The Ministers of Foreign
Affairs, who are busy people, transfer — and this happens
quite frequently — the conduct of negotiations to persons
of a somewhat lower rank and those, in turn, to officials
who are another step lower on the ladder. This is how it
turns out that negotiations, as a matter of fact, are
finally conducted among bureaucrats. And then try to
find out where that personal responsibility of the Heads
of Government for negotiations, of which you now speak,
actually is.
In your message of February 14, you, Mr. President,
refer to the fact that there are substantial differences be-
tween our countries in the question of control of disarma-
ment. That is correct, such differences exist, but what
is their root? You seek the Soviet Union's agreement to
the establishment of control not only over armed forces
and armaments which are being reduced or destroyed
under the agreement but also over that portion which
will remain in the possession of states for the time being.
It appears that the U.S. and its allies would like to have
the Soviet Union place under control all of its armed
forces and open up its entire defense system even before
disarmament has really begun.
I must say frankly that with such an approach to the
question of control you will attain nothing because to this
we will not agree.
The Soviet Union is interested in the establishment of
the strictest international control over the fulfillment of a
disarmament agreement. If, for instance, we reach
agreement on general and complete disarmament in
stages, then, in our opinion, the implementation of all
disarmament measures provided for each stage must be
thoroughly verified. We want no less than anybody else
to have assurance that the armaments and armed forces
to be liquidated at a given stage are actually being liqui-
dated or are being treated in such a manner as had been
agreed in advance and recorded in the Treaty. This
precisely is real, effective control over disarmament. On
the other hand, you propose not control over disarmament
but something entirely different.
Let us imagine that we are negotiating reduction of the
armed forces of our countries by several divisions. We
are prepared to agree to this.
But you demand that control be established not only
over the disbanding of those divisions but over all of tli(>
armed forces and armaments that are at the disposal of
states. This is really like the saying: "A ruble for a lamb
with ten rubles for change".
In the age of rocket and nuclear weapons — and we
have entered that age — masses of troops have far less
significance than they had in the first and second world
wars. Today, war would immediately assume an all-
embracing, universal character and its outcome would
depend not on the actions of troops placed at the line
dividing the belligerent iiarties but rather on the appli-
cation of rocket and nuclear weapons, with which the
468
deciding strike can be made even before mass armies have
been mobilized and introduced into combat.
Thus, under modern conditions reduction of the armed
forces of states by several divisions would in no way
change the situation. Control over the military poten-
tial of states which you wish to obtain in exchange for
an essentially insignificant reduction in armed forces, is
another matter. The establi.shment of such control would
yield a major strategic advantage to the state planning
aggression.
The control propo.sed by the Western Powers, i.e., con-
trol actually before disarmament, we regard with full
justification as espionage. Such control would permit an
aggressive state to place its intelligence agents on the
territories of peace-loving states and to collect infor-
mation about their defense systems : and then to decide
the question whether to agree to further disarmament or
turn the course of events toward war.
We do not wish this. The Soviet Union strives for an
honest agreement which would provide guarantee that
neither during the process of disarmament nor after its
completion a threat to the security of any state will arise.
This is why we say — let us work out a treaty on general
and complete disarmament under the strictest inter-
national control and let us implement the provisions of
that treaty in stages so that control be commensurate
with the disarmament steps undertaken. Having com-
pleted one stage of disarmament under control let us move
to the implementation of the next stage, also under con-
trol. This is a sound, realistic approach to the question
of control, and so far no one has been able to propose
a better one.
In the initial stages of disarmament there will of course
remain some armed forces and armaments which will
temporarily be outside the sphere of international control.
But will this change anything as compared with what we
have today? After all, even now we do not know exactly
the amounts of armaments at the disposal of the other
side. Under staged disarmament we will reduce the
armed forces and armaments by agreed increments and
therefore the correlation of forces and the balance which
has by now been established will not be disturbed. As
to the amount of armed forces and armaments on which
we will have no exact data after the completion of each
stage, it will constantly decrease until it comes down to
zero.
Where, then, does this Involve a threat to strategic
security of states? There is no suc-h threat and it cannot
exist with this approach.
This can in no way be said about inoposals of the
Western Powers. In insisting that control march before
disarmament the Western Powers only strengthen the
suspicions that they are pursuing any possible objective
other than disarmament. Tlie impression is created that
some kind of a disarmament game is being played. The
peoples of the entire world demand disarmament, they
want to throw off their shoulders the burden of military
expenditures, to clear the horizon of the thinider clouds
of war, while the Western Powers do not feel like dis-
arming. This is why all sort-s of plans appear, deliber-
ately calculated to be rej(H>ted by the other side- All
tills resembles trickery which is resorted to in order to
bury a live cause.
Department of State Bulletin
Now how else can one assess such recipes for disarma-
ment as provide for the reduction in troops by one per-
cent and for the extension of control over all of the oUier
ninety-nine percent of armed forces? How else can one
understand the refusal of the Western Powers to reduce
the scope of their military preparations, at least to some
extent, for example, to liquidate the military bases in
foreign territories and to withdraw their troops from
Europe to the conlines of their states. The Soviet Union
is prepared even now to bring home its troops which are
outside the country if the Western Powers do the same.
Where is there to be found here real partnership, under-
standing of the aspirations of the peoples, and the desire
to remove the danger of a rocket and nuclear war, which
would bring unbelievable disaster and suffering to all of
mankind ? There is not even a trace of that.
With this attitude on the part of the Governments of
the Western Powers toward the cause of disarmament,
where behind ostensible bustle around the questions of
control there is being pushed somewhere into the back-
yard the main thing — disarmament of the military estab-
lishment of states, one has really to fear lest the new
Committee be facing the sorry lot of its predecessors.
If there is no desire to agree on a realistic basis, then
obviously disarmament negotiations will amount to
nothing, whether the work of the Committee started with
the participation of the Heads of Government or at the
Foreign Minister level, or any other level.
I am not used to playing the hypocrite and hiding the
truth in my pocket and therefore shall say without beat-
ing around the bush : Your reply message, Mr. President,
as well as the message from Prime Minister Macmillan
have generated in me the feeling that those journalists
who see some special purposes in your proposal to begin
the work of the 18-Nation Committee at the Foreign
Minister level are perhaps right. They connect this pro-
posal directly with the statement of the Governments of
the United States and Great P.ritain about their intention
to resume nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere.
What is the reasoning of the journalists? They under-
stand that the Soviet Union will not leave that aggressive
action unanswered. The unrestrained desire on the part
of the United States and Great Britain to increase their
nuclear arsenal and to increase the destructive power of
their nuclear weapons will unavoidably lead to the Soviet
Union's being drawn into competition in the sphere of ac-
cumulation and perfection of nuclear weapons. It is un-
derstandable that the Soviet Union, which incidentally
has conducted far fewer experimental nuclear explosions,
will not wish to lag behind and will do everything to
maintain its nuclear weapons at the proper level. As a
result, swings will be set in motion to heights never seen
before, raising the nuclear armaments race to ever-higher
levels. Naturally, the peoples will place the responsibility
for this on the Governments of the United States and
Great Britain.
It is in connection with this that it is being said that
in advancing the idea of conducting disarmament negotia-
tions at the Ministerial level, the Governments of the
United States and Great Britain sought somehow to
paralyze the negative attitude of public opinion toward
the planned resumption of nuclear tests and to sweeten the
bitter pill by making a gesture in the direction of dis-
March 19, 7962
armament. This opinion became even stronger when the
United States and Great Britain replied in the negative
to the concrete, businesslike proposal of the Soviet Union
to begin the work of the disarmament committee at the
highest level with participation by the Heads of Govern-
ment, a proposal that gives greater assurance of success
in negotiations. As much as I would like to avoid un-
pleasant words — but the conclusion imposes itself that
apparently there is some truth in such commentaries by
journalists.
Where then is the matter going? We live in a time
when science and technology are developing swiftly and
new scientific and technological achievements are born
literally not every day but every hour. Rocket and nu-
clear armaments are ever increasing and now both we
and you already have thousands of units of such weapons.
They are manned by many thousands of personnel and that
number is ever increasing as the number of rockets in-
creases. But the more people are assigned to the manning
of lethal rockets and nuclear weapons, the greater the
probability that the unexpected may occur. After all,
there have already been cases in the United States where
bombers on alert missions with a payload of nuclear bombs
had accidents and fell to the ground causing considerable
unpleasant consequences.
And is it really out of the question that something simi-
lar can happen not only with bombers but also with
rockets equipped with thermonuclear warheads? In addi-
tion to all sorts of other reasons, this or that human
being manning a rocket-launching site may suffer a men-
tal breakdown and then an irreparable event would occur :
A nuclear explosion would occur on the territory of an-
other state. It would then be diflicult to prove that this
was the consequence of an accident and nothing more.
Moreover, would there be time for any explanations or
for the hearing of such explanations? The accidental
launching of a rocket with a thermonuclear warhead
could serve as a signal for a world-wide military
catastrophe.
Hunters have a good unwritten rule : Even if you know
that your gun is not loaded, never aim it in the direction
of a human being, even for fun. It is not for nothing that
they say that once in ten years even an unloaded gun
goes off.
Comparatively recently there was a report in the press
that the life of the great American writer Hemingway
had been ended by an accidental shot while a shotgun
was being cleaned. As great as this loss may be, still
in this instance only one human being lost his life as a
result of careless handling of a weapon. On the other
hand an accident in handling rocket and nuclear weapons
would bring about the death of millions upon millions of
people, while many would be condemned to slow death
as a result of radioactive contamination.
All this brings to mind once again that the leading
oflBcials of states, who bear the responsibility for the
destinies of peoples, must realize the actual state of
affairs which has already been brought about by the rocket
and nuclear armaments race and to which this race is
leading. General and complete disarmament, that is,
complete destruction of all armaments, particularly nu-
clear, has become in our time a vitally necessary task,
which stands above everything else. In the interests of
469
the speediest solution of this task the Soviet Govern-
ment has been and still is for having the 18-Nation Dis-
armament Committee begin its work at the highest level.
The search for agreement on disarmament problems
requires that unnecessary punctiliousness be cast aside
and that the interests of the cause, the interests of
strengthening peace, be placed above everything else.
This is why I should like to hope that you, Mr. President,
have not yet said your last word concerning your partici-
pation Ln the negotiations in the 18-Nation Disarmament
Committee.
The Soviet Government sincerely seeks to reach agree-
ment on disarmament and has proposed with the best of
intentions that the work of the 18-Nation Committee be
begun at the highest level.
The Soviet Government believes that the proposals for
general and complete disarmament under strict interna-
tional control advanced by it provide a basis for reaching
agreement without prejudice to any individual party and
without advantage to any other party. Of course we are
prepared to consider other propo.sals as well if they reall.v
will ensure the solution of the problem of general and
complete disarmament.
If the Governments of the Western Powers desire
agreement on disarmament problems — and the Soviet
Union and the other socialist countries do wish to reach
it — then one could definitely hope that negotiations with
the participation of the Heads of Government will yield
tangible results, and agreement will become possible.
This would be a great honor to those who would have
laid, at the beginning of the negotiations, the foundation
for a future agreement and found ways of overcoming
the existing difficulties. And what a great reward it
would be for the Heads of Government, Heads of State,
then to sign a treaty on general and complete disarma-
ment and to become participants in an historic event
which would remain in the memories of all mankind for
ages to come.
Respectfully,
N. Khrushchev
Mos(X)W
February 21, 1962
Prime Minister of Norway
To Visit United States
White House press release dated February 21
The President announced on February 21 that
Einar Gerhardsen, Prime Minister of Norway, has
accepted an invitation to visit the United States.
He will be in the United States for a 5-day Presi-
dential guest visit beginning May 8, with 2 days
at Washington. The American Ambassador to
Norway, Clifton R. Wharton, extended the invi-
tation to the Prime Minister on February 16.
Workers of Brazil Contribute
to West's Ideals and Hopes
Statement by President Kennedy ^
Mr. Minister, on this occasion of your visit to
the United States I want to extend through you
my greetings and best wishes to the leaders and
members of the democratic trade-union movement
of Brazil.
For many years the workers of Brazil have
played an important and prominent role in the in-
ternational labor organizations of the free world.
I want to congratulate them and to express my
confidence that they will continue to contribute
their strength and their knowledge to the free
labor movement. The contribution of free labor
to the achievement of our mutually held ideals and
hopes is becoming daily more significant.
Under the Alliance for Progress the democratic
labor movements of all our countries have an im-
portant part to play. By the combined effort of
all sectors of our free society we shall reach the
goal of a better life in freedom and dignity.
$150 Million in Loans Made
Available to Argentina
White House press release (Palm Beach, Fla.) dated February 25
The Wliite House announced on February 25
that the United States is making $150 million
available in loans to Argentina for its economic
development imder the Alliance for Progress.
The money will be used for specific development
projects and balance-of-payinents assistance.
In making the announcement the President re-
affirmed the intention of the United States to work
with Argentina in carrying forward a plan of
development designed to bring a rapid increase in
the economic and social welfare of the Argentine
people.
"The development of Argentina's economy
within a framework of representative democracy
is one of the principal goals of the Alliance for
Progress," stated the President.
^ Made on Feb. 19 following a meeting at Washington
between President Kennedy and Andr4 Franco Montoro,
Minister of Labor of Brazil (White House press release).
470
Department of State Bulletin
American Agriculture in Foreign Trade
by Edwin M. Martin
Assistant Secretary for fLconomic Affairs '
It is a matter of great pleasure for me to return
to tlie Midwest and be with you here today. I
regret that my schedule does not permit me tc-
stay for the full 2-day program which the Na-
tional Fann Institute Committee has planned
for you. The choice of speakers and subjects
indicates that you will have a stimulating and
helpful review of the stake and prospects of
American agriculture in foreign trade.
To contribute to this total picture the commit-
tee has suggested that I should discuss what the
European Common Market means for American
farm exports and the closely related subject of
the President's new trade program.^ I assume
that I owe the privilege of being selected to dis-
cuss these matters with you to the fact that my
office is one of the nerve centere — and the term
is on some days peculiarly apt — one of the nerve
centers, or command posts, which share responsi-
bility for what is being done with regard to both
of these issues.
I should like at the outset to emphasize that the
Trade Expansion Act is the culmination of a
series of major initiatives which the United States
has taken since the war with a special bearing
on our economic relations with Europe, the other
major free-world economic power center. You
will recall them :
1. The Marshall plan to restore the war-dam-
aged economies to health.
2. The creation of a large Common Market in
Western Europe with political as well as economic
objectives.
3. The reorganization on an Atlantic basis of
the OEEC [Organization for European Economic
Cooperation] by bringing the United States and
Canada in as full members and reorientating its
work to reflect our common global responsibilities.
The Marshall plan was a huge success: The
dollar gap with which we were struggling has
disappeared, and European rates of growth ai'e
outstripping our own.
The Common Market is a fact; it is achieving
its goal of free movement of goods, people, and
capital more rapidly than originally planned, and
it is making significant progress toward greater
political cohesion in Western Europe.
The OEEC has been replaced by the OECD
[Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment] , which, though less than 6 months old,
is already contributing important leadership to
the economic strengthening of the free world.
Last summer the United Kingdom decided it
wished to join the Six rather than continuing to
lead a competing organization.^ This is a further
step which we have welcomed and supported,
though it is too early to tell whether the U.K.
negotiations will succeed.
Now the President has proposed that, in the
interest of even closer free-world cooperation and
to enable the United States economy to share more
fully in the free-world prosperity which previous
United States policies have done so much to make
possible, the United States should take a new in-
itiative designed to lower significantly the tariff
barriers which still divide us.
' Address made before the National Farm Institute at
Des Moines, Iowa, on Feb. 16 (press release 102 dated
Feb. 15).
' For text of the President's trade message to Congress,
see Bulletin of Feb. 12, 19C2, p. 2,S1 ; for a brief summary
of the bill (H.R. 9900), see ihid., Feb. 26, 1962, p. 343.
' The six members of the Common Market are Belgium,
France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Nether-
lands ; seven nations — Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portu-
gal, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom — are
members of the European Free Trade Association
(EFTA).
March 19, 7962
471
Here are five major initiatives in the United
States' interest in this one area since the war.
None were responses to Soviet moves. Tliree have
succeeded, and the two latest have good prospects
of success. They liave all aroused sharp reactions
from the Kremlin, whose occupants have found
no way of blocking or even slowing down our
progress. By our joint efforts we are emphatically
ramming home to them the futility of counting on
the collapse of capitalism in an outburst of eco-
nomic warfare among the Western Powers. I do
not suggest we don't still have many problems but
only point out the continuity and success of U.S.
foreign policy actions in this area, a record of
which I think we can all be proud.
U.S. Economic Assets
As I have just noted, this latest proposal is de-
signed both to achieve important foreign policy
objectives and to strengthen the United States
economy. To deal with the latter point first, I
think we can all agree that we need a more rapid
rate of economic growth; we need more jobs at
good wages for American workers and higher in-
comes for American farmers. We need to bring
our balance of payments into reasonable equilib-
rium, not only in our ovm interest but because of
the importance of a sound dollar to world trade
generally — it is after all one of the two basic re-
serve currencies. We think the President's new
trade program can contribute importantly to all
these goals by expanding exports more rapidly
than imports.
The approach of the new program is directly in
the American tradition of a flexible, aggressive,
expansive, competitive economy, accustomed to
change. This spirit has made us much the richest
and strongest nation in the world today. This is
an asset on which to build, a force to use.
Until recently our explosive energies have been
largely occupied in developing the huge resources
of this continent and in meeting the needs of a
rapidly growing and increasingly well-off popula-
tion. In the world of the sixties we must take
advantage of the social and technological changes
which have taken place to expand our economic
horizons to the whole free world. Only on such a
broadened scale can United States ingenuity and
skill and productive genius find a purchasing pub-
lic large and varied enough to challenge it, to make
it grow, and to keep it profitable. Only by ex-
ploiting this wider export market will the United
States people be able to afford to import products
from all over the globe to satisfy tlieir more so-
phisticated tastes, their greater willingness and
ability to do their shopping in the markets of the
whole free world, their still-growing wealth to
spend on products above the necessity level.
Our best chance of success in pressing large vol-
umes of United States exports into this global
market lies in concentrating on those products in
which we have an economic advantage. It seems
to me to be fairly obvious to any American that
we are at our best in the case of mass-produced
products which require relatively large capital
investment, coupled with a high proportion of
skilled workers and backed by large research pro-
grams, keeping productivity and the product al-
ways a little out in front of the competition. This
is the battleground on which we can win, and
here we should choose to make our stand.
It should be noted that the sectors of industry
which meet these criteria tend to be "growth" in-
dustries, to use a stockjobber's phrase. They are
also the industries with the highest wage rates.
Thus emphasis on expanding their opportunities
not only offers most promise of expanding United
States export sales, but in doing so we will im-
prove our rate of economic gi'owth and raise the
standard of living of our labor force.
Government Support for Expanding Exports
Insofar as Government action can affect the
world of business, it should therefore lend its sup-
port primarily to improving the ability of United
States producers to take advantage in foreign mar-
kets of these special United States assets. What
are we doing?
To encourage increased investment in modern
equipment the Treasury Department is reviewing
all of its guidelines which determine depreciation
schedules and has already modified in a favorable
way the rates for two major industries.* In addi-
tion the President will be pressing the Congress to
approve proposals for special tax allowances for
new investment. More generally the monetary
authorities have been endeavoring to keep down
the interest rate on long-term borrowing, so im-
portant to major business investment.
In many respects more fundamental than cap-
* For liackfrroniid, see Bulletin of Oct. 30, 1961, p. 730,
and Mar. 5, 1962, p. 3S1.
472
Department of Stale Bulletin
ital put into buildings and machines is that de-
voted to training scientists, engineers, and skilled
workers. Failure to replace a machine or build a
new factory can be remedied in a year or two at
most; to train a scientist or engineer takes almost
a generation. And without them we cannot invent
the new products, develop the new seeds and fer-
tilizer, design the new machines, or operate the
automated factories that are so essential to main-
taining our present trade advantages. Hence the
economic importance of the President's program
for expanding educational opportunities and
particularly for increasing the output of scien-
tists and engineers.
Overall, however, even the most up-to-date
United States products can only compete abroad
if their costs are reasonable. No Government
action can substitute for the producer's effort to
cut costs, to eliminate frills, increase efficiency, and
to price competitively. But the Government can
and is helping. The President's plan for a bal-
anced budget in fiscal year 1963 will avoid pressure
of Government expenditures on the price level.
The President's Labor-Management Committee is
actively engaged in seeking ways to avoid the
wage-price spiral from starting again. The
recent wage guidelines suggested by the White
House have received a remarkably warm welcome
from all quarters. Lower United States tariffs
can render an important assist to i-eaching this
goal, as industries and unions faced with foreign
competition will be cautious about increasing
wages and prices so rapidly as to invite larger
imports. These efforts have so far met with con-
siderable success, as prices of United States goods
have held relatively stable for an unusually long
period.
But most important just now is to insure that,
as these efforts produce results, foreign markets
for these products in which we are specially com-
petitive will be open for United States exports.
This is the heart of the President's new trade pro-
gram. We must be able to offer the tariff con-
cessions necessary to secure the cuts in trade
barriers by others that will provide adequate
opportunities for the output of our own most
efficient industries, the products of our farms and
mines and factories. We propose to lead fi'om
our known strength. We propose to operate
on the principle that the best defense is a strong
offense. I think our whole history supports the
view that this is truly the American approach.
Recent Experience in Trade Expansion
This may seem to be a plausible theoretical case,
but is there any evidence it could work in practice?
Can we expand our exports? Aren't we pretty
much priced out of world markets ? Are we good
as exporters in these more sophisticated fields?
Can we hope to expand our exports more rapidly
than our imports? No one can of course predict
the future, but our recent experience is certainly
encouraging.
In the past 10 years our exports have doubled,
a greater rate of increase than in imports or gross
national product, and last year almost reached
$21 billion. They exceeded our imports in 1961
by nearly $6 billion. Last year we sold $700 mil-
lion more to the Japanese than they to us. In a
key category of highly manufactured goods like
nonmilitary machinery and vehicles we sold
abroad in 1960 four times as much as we imported.
Even to important "low wage" competitors in this
field, like the EEC [European Economic Com-
munity] and Japan, our exports of these items
exceeded our imports.
In 1960 we sold abroad over $4 billion worth of
machinery, nearly $3 billion of transportation
equipment, almost $2 billion of chemicals. And
from our mechanized and efficient farms we ex-
ported about 15 percent of total output, including
roughly half of our rice, wheat, and cotton produc-
tion and large volumes of feed grains, soybeans,
and poultry.
These figures do not suggest we cannot compete,
that our costs or wage rates are out of line. And
an opportunity for future growth clearly exists,
especially in the European Economic Community,
for which the President is seeking especially ex-
tensive bargaining authority. If the United King-
dom joins, it will represent a market which im-
ported in 1960 from third countries over $30
billion of goods, more than twice our own figure.
During the past 3 years its industry has grown
at a rate of 8 percent per year. The EEC has also
noted that its imports from third countries have
increased recently by 10 percent per year. Our
exports of manufactures to it expanded by two-
thirds from 1957 to 1960. We sold them in 1960
over a billion dollars' worth of farm products.
With reasonable reductions in tariff barriers this
huge market should grow even more attractive for
U.S. exporters. Needing machinery and equip-
ment to keep up its rapid rate of industrial expan-
sion and just entering the phase of mass purchases
March 79, 1962
473
of consumer durables in which we have experi-
enced an efficient mass output, it will be needing
more and more the things we make best. There
is every reason to believe that with their rapidly
expanding purchasing power and their rising costs
we can, with energy and skill and wise policies,
continue to boost our exports to them and do so
more rapidly than they can expand their exports
to us. This is why we think we can look to the
President's trade program to contribute im-
portantly to an improvement in our rate of
growth, in the volume of employment, in the levels
of our incomes, and in the strength of our balance
of payments.
But if we do not act now, new patterns of trade
and investment will become frozen behind their
tariff walls and we shall gradually lose the oppor-
tunities opened up for us by this gi-eat new market,
except for those larger United States companies
which can jump the tariff wall and build plants
in the area which will give jobs to European
workers.
Need for Markets for U.S. Agricultural Products
What I have said so far may appear perhaps to
have emphasized industrial products and markets.
Actually, United States commercial agriculture
meets all the requirements for an American growth
industry. Its present extremely high rate of pro-
ducti\aty is based on the same assets of large
capital investment, of extensive research, and of
highly skilled application of the results of that
research. Unfortunately this growth has out-
stripped markets.
For this reason we have here again an important
challenge to our ability to find outlets for Ameri-
can products. And here again the format ioTi of
the EEC is altering the conditions of our access to
one of the most important of our existing export
markets. While trade barriers within that market
are being lowei'ed, barriers against imports are
being maintained. Agricultural production is a
highly protected area in most countries of the
world, with strong political support behind this
protection and many means of protection oilier
than tariffs in use.
The six states of the EEC, in developing a com-
mon agricultural policy for the chief products of
the area, are not turning their backs on the prin-
ciple of protection, except insofar as they modify
the form and extent of protection now gi^en to
various groups of producers within the area. The
exact levels of support for the various products
under the common agricultural policy have not yet
been set, but it now seems clear that the average
level of protection, which has been high relative
to our own, will not be significantly reduced. For
most of the products covered, moreover, it has
been decided to use variable import levies as the
central protective device, supplanting all other ex-
isting forms of protection. Tlie levy will be set
to bring the price of the imported product up to
the domestic level or, in some cases, perhaps
slightly above.
The elimination of import quotas, mixing reg-
ulations, bilateral agreements, and the other non-
tariff restrictions which have hindered our past
access to the Western European agricultural mar-
ket is welcome, but the new fonn of protection
may unfortunately tend to leave as only residual
suppliers the outside sellers of agricultural prod-
ucts like ourselves. Among the products afl'ected
are wheat and flour, feed grains, pork, and poul-
try. Our objective must be to limit the level of
these variable levies, so that internal support prices
will not be fijced so high as to encourage expansion
of production within this area to levels which are
wholl}' uneconomic and out of line with costs else-
where and especially in the United States. This
objective is made more urgent by the fact that the
European countries, led by France, are starting to
experience the revolution in agricultural produc-
tivity to which we have shown the way, and high
support prices will lead quickly' to surpluses which
will not only hurt outside suppliers but may, \n
some cases, compete with them in third markets.
Factors Favoring Expansion of Agricultural Trade
In the course of the tariff negotiations which
we are just concluding with tlie EEC wc have ob-
tained some important concessions which will im-
prove, on balance, our access to its markets for
cei-tain agricultural products — among them soy-
beans, tallow, hides and skins, certain fruits and
vegetables, and cotton, our single most important
expoi't to the EEC. For those important com-
modities covered by the common agricultural
policy, including wheat and feed grains, we have,
however, received a standstill agreement, pending
further negotiations.
To keep our pi-ospects in perspective, it is im-
portant (t) hear in mind, of course, that factoi'S
474
Departmenf of Sfafe Bulletin
favorable to an exjiansion of U.S. agricultural
trade with Europe are at work alongside the oth-
ers which I have mentioned. The first and most
important of these is the expansion in total demand
for foodstuffs and agricultural raw materials being
generated by the fonnation and growth of the
EEC. Economists have long recognized that both
trade-creating and trade-divci-ting forces are set
in motion by the fonnation of a customs union;
the tlieory has been that the trade-creating forces
would in time pretlominate, as access to broader
markets sets in motion the self-generating cycle
of increased investment, increased purchasing
power, and expanded demand. The EEC is a
customs union on a scale never contemplated by
the theoreticians. It has already, at this early
stage, achieved a record of growth and expanding
demand and rising living standards that exceeds
the expectations of its most optimistic proponents.
The effects of rising economic activity and pros-
perity on demand for agricultural products will
vary, of course, from commodity to commodity.
In the case of wheat, higher consumer incomes
can unfortunately have a negative effect on de-
mand. They will, however, lead to substantially
increased demand for many other agricultural
commodities, including livestock products and, in
turn, feed grains and protein feed.
Moreover, in particular cases, economic consid-
erations will exert a moderating influence upon
levels of price supports and, indirectly, of pro-
duction. For example, since the livestock indus-
try is important in the economies of all member
states of the EEC, there will be an incentive to
hold down feed-grain prices as an important deter-
rent to any attempt to achieve a maximum degree
of self-sufficiency in feed-grain production through
raising price supports to the point this would
require.
If the EEC is broadened in time to include the
United Kingdom and the several other countries
now interested in membership, the prospects for
any substantial degree of self-sufficiency within
the Common Market will tend to be reduced and
the economic and political forces favoring re-
liance on low-cost imports rather than high-cost
home production substantially strengthened. The
United Kingdom is the world's largest food-deficit
area, with an economy geared to low prices for
both domestic and imported foodstuffs.
We have here, in other words, both a major
challenge and a major opportunity. A rich and
fast-growing market for agi'icultural products is
offered by the EEC, particularly if it is broad-
ened to include the United Kingdom and other
areas. It is a market that has much to offer for
third-country suppliers, notwithstanding the
somewhat restrictive aspects of the EEC's com-
mon agricultural policy as presently projected —
provided we move quickly and resolutely to seize
the opportunity. A major objective of our na-
tional policy is to do precisely this — to move hard
to maintain and expand our access to that market.
In view of the EEC's rapid progress in agricul-
tural as well as industrial fields, it is imperative
that we get the authority we need now, so that as
soon as possible we can resume negotiations with
the better b'^.rgaining tools needed to insure suc-
cess. For this question of future access to the
EEC agricultural market is a matter of major
current concern to tlie U.S. Government, given
the importance of our farm exports to U.S. agri-
culture, to the U.S. economy as a whole, and to
the U.S. balance of payments.
Provisions of New Trade Expansion Act
The new trade agreements legislation sought by
the administration will be a principal tool relied
upon in this effort, though, of course, we shall
continue to use our rights under the GATT [Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] to the full
to eliminate existing quantitative restrictions on
exports of our agricultural products. Let me out-
line briefly what the proposed Trade Expansion
Act will provide. It will give the President gen-
eral authority to negotiate reductions in existing
duties by as much as 50 percent. It will give him
special authority for negotiations with the EEC,
whereby he may reduce still further, or eliminate
altogether, tariffs on those categories of products
for which the U.S. and the EEC together account
for 80 percent of world trade or, in the case of an
agricultural product which would not qualify
under the principal-supplier criterion, where such
reduction will benefit U.S. exports of that product.
We are required as in the past to insist that tariff
cuts by others be fully reciprocal so that actually
we get the promised benefits. Another special
provision, designed to help the countries of Latin
America, Africa, and Asia, will permit elimination
of duties on tropical products not produced in sig-
nificant quantities in the U.S., provided the EEC
March J 9, 1962
475
takes parallel action. Finally there will be au-
thority to transfer items to the free list M'here ex-
isting rates are 5 percent or less. To facilitate
adjustment to lowered United States tariffs, re-
ductions will be spread over a 5-year period. To
assist firms or workers who find it difficult to ad-
just to increased imports into the U.S., the act will
establish a trade adjustment assistance program.
If it turns out that adjustment is likely to be slow
and difficult, the President is authorized to restore
duties for a period of years.
An important innovation will be that so-called
across-the-board tariff reductions can be made.
This is a "must" if we are to be able to bargain
effectively with the EEC. The Community has
found, both in staging the reduction and elimina-
tion of tariff barriers within its own market and
in its negotiations of reductions in its common
external tariff, that the item-by-item approach is
impossible. An effort to get six countries to agree
on how to handle hundreds of individual items
would fall in the crossfire of internal differences,
whereas agreement has proved possible on progres-
sive moderate reductions in tariffs for broad cate-
gories of products. The United States found
itself handicapped in its recent negotiations with
the EEC because it could not trade concessions on
this same broad basis. It had authority to make
the same 20 percent cut in tariffs offered by the
EEC, but under past procedures for determining
the products on which the President could negoti-
ate, reductions could only be offered on a dispro-
portionately small list of products compared to
the EEC's offer.
In the proposed new legislation — although there
will be a "reserve list" on which products previ-
ously found to require relief from import compe-
tition under the provisions of our trade agreements
law must be placed and to which other items may
be added if cuts seem to the President, after con-
sulting the Tariff Commission, apt to displace
unduly U.S. production and jobs — the range of
possible bargaining will be substantially broad-
ened and we will be able to deal with the EEC on
more equal terms.
If the legislation the President has requested
is enacted, we will use the special authority for
negotiating with the EEC — in combination with
the general tariff-reducing authority — to achieve
a package of reciprocal concessions tailored to the
particular needs of our trade. We want a pack-
age that will assure us improved opportunities to
export both the industrial and agricultural prod-
ucts for whicli our export prospects are best. Our
bargaining power in getting improved access for
U.S. agricultural exports will not depend solely,
or even principally, upon the concessions we can
offer on Europe's agricultural exports to us. As
you know, in agriculture we sell to Europe vastly
more than we buy from them. We would propose
therefore to bargain our tariff cuts for whatever
concessions will best help U.S. exports, whether
agricultural or industrial.
In the meantime, in respect of wheat and feed
grains, we are also currently beginning to explore
the possibilities of some form of a multilateral
agreement which will safeguard access to markets
for exporting countries. A meeting is now going
on in Geneva, under the auspices of the GATT,
to give preliminary consideration to this matter.
Traditionally this country seeks to avoid govern-
mental or intergovernmental controls over trade.
Realistically, however, we have had to recognize
that in the case of many agricultural products, no-
tably wheat, trade is already extensively controlled
by governments, acting individually and on an
uncoordinated basis. The result is a patchwork
of national measures influencing production,
prices, and trade. These have stimulated uneco-
nomic production, shrunk the commercial maikets
open to efficient producers, and piled up hea\'y
surpluses which cannot be sold or even, beyond
a point, given away. The International Wheat
Agreement has suggested that, in such a case, there
may be merit in an intergovernmental arrange-
ment to introduce a measure of control and order
into the trade picture. We would be remiss if we
did not explore the possibilities of a more extensive
and ambitious arrangement than the Wheat Agree-
ment, which might both ease the current trade
problem of major exporting countries and lead to
a more rational structure in the world grains
economy.
We are also prepared to explore, jointly with
other trading nations, ways to improve conditions
of access to world markets for other agricultural
products. If successful, this second type of ap-
proach to current problems of agricultural trade
would not supplant, but would be an important
supplement to, our efforts to open markets through
reciprocal negotiations under the proposed Trade
Expansion Act.
476
Department of State Bulletin
Political Factors
I have emphasized so far only the economic
benefits which the Trade Expansion Act will pro-
vide, throuf^h bieaking down tlie barriers of trade
between the United States and the EEC. There
is an equally important political side of the coin.
If we allow the existing and prospective barriers
to stand, we will soon have two vast markets on
either side of the Atlantic, representing almost
90 percent of the free world's industrial strength,
which are separated and may tend to grow apart.
Increasing economic disunity would make it diffi-
cult to maintain the political unity which is abso-
lutely essential to the free world's security.
Through lowering the barriers, on the other hand,
we can put into double harness the economic
resources of these two great markets, give added
stimulus to the growth in each, and tighten the
political unity of the Atlantic community with
bonds of shared economic interests and reciprocal
economic advantages. The massive and dynamic
economic power attained by the merger of two
markets will be our answer to the Communists'
prediction that the capitalist world will soon
destroy itself in a struggle for markets and to
Khrushchev's boast that he will soon be waving
to us as he passes us by. It will also be our an-
swer to any doubts of the uncommitted nations of
the world as to whether democracy and free enter-
prise really work well enough to be a practicable
pattern to follow in today's world.
From many standpoints the United States looks
with favor on the application of the U.K. to be-
come a member of the Common Market. It will
greatly strengthen this vital free-world bastion
politically and economically. The U.K. will be a
strong force within the Community for liberal
trading relations with third countries, including
the U.S. But its entry could create economic
problems for members of the Commonwealth, now
benefiting from preferential entry into the U.K.
market, and for the U.K.'s partners in EFTA, the
"Outer Seven." Solutions for these difficulties
have been proposed which would enlarge preferen-
tial arrangements with adverse effects on the trade
of the U.S. and other countries. The lowered
duties which could result from our negotiations
with the Common Market under the President's
new program could substantially reduce the seri-
ousness of the difficulties faced by these countries
and thus facilitate U.K. entry without harmful
side effects to U.S. interests.
There is equal need for strengthening our
economic and political relations with countries
outside the EEC, including particularly the less
developed countries. Here again we can expect to
accomplish much through exercise of the author-
ity of the proposed new act. Our negotiations
with the EEC will indirectly give these countries
improved access to that market and help them to
meet the challenge and the opportunity of the new
situation that is unfolding in Europe, for any
concessions in tariffs that we make to each other
will also be extended to them. In addition our
direct negotiations with them will result in an
improved flow of trade between our market and
theirs which will be mutually beneficial.
For just as the welfare of American agriculture
and of the American economy generally is heavily
influenced by the vigor or lack of vigor in our
foreign trade, so the welfare of the whole free
world grows better or worse according to the
course of free-world trade. The economic and po-
litical health of other free-world countries, their
willingness and capacity to resist Communist
penetration, their ability to continue their eco-
nomic development with less and less outside as-
sistance and to repay the moneys already loaned
them, the potential of their hundreds of millions of
underfed and underclothed and undersupplied
peoples to become an expanding market for U.S.
exports, are inextricably dependent upon their
trading opportunities.
Protecting Broad Range of Interests
There are thus, as you can see, many strong
reasons, economic and political, domestic and for-
eign, for the President's program, but there may
nevertheless, I fear, be opposition to it from those
who fear the possible impact of imports upon par-
ticular producers who are, or who consider them-
selves, vulnerable to import competition. It is
implicit in this whole bargaining process that in
order to secure outlets for the products of a high-
wage industry in which the United States has
particular advantages, we shall have to open our
markets more widely for imports in which others
have advantages. To some extent we may be able
to provide these opportunities in areas where we
are highly competitive, in the expectation that the
energy and ingenuity of American producers will
prevent lower tariffs from resulting in substan-
tially increased imports. In other areas more im-
March 19, 1962
477
ports must be expected to come in. Since this
increased competition will take place because of a
governmental policy which is in the common inter-
est of the people as a whole, it is only fair that the
people as a whole, represented by their Govern-
ment, should be concerned about these social costs
and take whatever steps may be necessary to mini-
mize them.
But before going into the specific steps which
it may prove necessary for the Government to take
for this purpose, I should like to make several
observations bearing on the probable size of this
job.
First, as I observed earlier, the United States
has the strength it has because, for a variety of
reasons connected with our history and the char-
acter of our people, we have combined an aggres-
sive and competitive spirit with a highly flexible
and adaptable economic system. It has been a
system in which change almost seemed to be a
good, in and of itself. People were always ready
to move to new places, to take new jobs, to try new
products, to start new plants, to experiment with
new ways of doing things. The success of the
American private-enterprise system is founded on
this unparalleled appetite for change, fed by a
fierce competitive spirit. Our road to riches is
littered with the skeletons of obsolete industries
and inefficient plants.
If we ever reach the stage when we value safety
and security in the economic struggle more highly
than new ideas or products or than better and
cheaper ways of doing things, we shall be starting
down the path of hardening economic arteries,
which can only be the beginning of the end for
United States economic and political power. As
we are to an increasing degree dependent on our
trade with a worldwide market, we must, to an
increasing degree, accept the changes resulting
from our competition in this market as being as
necessary to progress and as possible to make as
the changes we have used as steppingstones to bet-
ter things within the United States economy ever
since this country was founded. And we should
recognize that our economy over the years has be-
come better adapted to change tlian any other.
We should build on this fact as an asset in our
attempt to open up new trade patterns and as a
basis for confidence that we can exploit these new
patterns to our net advantage.
Second, as we can improve the rate of economic
growth in the United States by expanding exports
and by other means, we will make a major con-
tribution to easing the task of adjusting to imports.
In a rapidly growing economy, alternative uses
for capital and manpower and facilities will be
easier to find. Here is another administration
policy which is both good in itself and helpful in
making more practicable the bold venture the
President has proposed in his new trade program.
Third, two-thirds of all imports are not compet-
itive with United States products. They are
things we must have to survive and grow. The
remaining imports are not exclusively bad. They
will often cut costs and provide desired variety to
producers and consumers, thus making us more
competitive exporters and raising the real stand-
ard of living of our people. They can stimulate
United States ingenuity. I need only mention
compact cars, the answer of our industry to for-
eign small cars — a far more fruitful answer, I
would suggest, from the United States consumers'
standpoint, as well as that of the auto industry,
than higher tariffs. Another case is provided by
transistor radios, a field first exploited by the Jap-
anese on the basis of a United States invention but
the market for which is now being largely recap-
tured by the United States industry. During the
first half of 1961 Japanese exports of transistor
radios fell half a million units below the 1960 level
and deliveries from United States producers rose
by 1 million.
Moreover imports have not, even in the case of
the one-third where they are directly competitive,
been able to make deep, across-the-board inroads
on U.S. output, for in these very categories 88 per-
cent of U.S. consumption is still met from U.S.
factories and farms.
Fourth, wage rates have been much exaggerated
as a measure of costs and of competitive position.
They cannot, of couree, be wholly disregarded, but
from coal to cotton textiles to airplanes we are suc-
ceeding as exporters, despite wage rates 2, 3, or 10
times those of our competition. Quality, design,
worker productivity and skill, raw material and
energy costs — a dozen factors — are also important.
Coal is a bulky material, but we can sell it competi-
tively at the door of the Ruhr despite the $3.25
per hour our coal miners earn, and we do so be-
cause ours produce five times as much coal per
manshift as the European miners. As trade is
more and more in sophisticated products with
smaller and smaller labor content, and as wage
rates and prices abroad continue to increase more
478
Deparfment of Sfate Bulletin
rapidly than our own, such weight as this factor
now has is being reduced. And I must stress
again tliat our own practical experience com-
pletely undermines the validity of the charge that
wage rates are the dominant factor in trade com-
petition. Our most successful export industries
are our high-wage industries, and the most fre-
quent complaints about imports seem to come from
less efficient industries whose wage rates are below
the United States average.
But if necessary, we shall, we hope, have au-
thority from the Congress to assist firms, em-
ployees, or even industries to carry out approved
plans either to increase their ability to compete
with imports or to convert to new industries or
occupations with more promising futures. In
this way, without subsidies, we will be helping
meet the costs of adjustments required in the gen-
eral interest. And if all else fails, the President
would, of coui-se, be empowered to restore tariffs
and establish quotas to protect essential U.S.
interests.
The Trade Expansion Act is so designed, in
other words, as to enable the President to protect
and serve the interests of all. It will not require
the sacrifice of some for the common good. The
act contains explicit recognition that it will serve,
and is intended to serve, a broad range of national
interests.
As the President stated in his trade message to
Congress, ". . . enactment of this measure will
benefit substantially every State of the Union,
every segment of the American economy, and
every basic objective of our domestic economy and
foreign policy." And as he said in his state of the
Union message : ' "The United States did not rise
to greatness by waiting for others to lead. This
nation is the world's foremost manufacturer,
farmer, banker, consumer, and exporter. The
Common Market is moving ahead at an economic
growth rate twice ours. The Communist eco-
nomic offensive is under way. The opportunity is
ours, the initiative is up to us, and I believe that
1962 is the time."
' Ibid., .Ian. 29. 1962, p. 159.
News Media Invited To Attend
Foreign Policy Briefing
The Department of State announced on Febru-
ary 28 (press release 130) that a foreign policy
briefing conference would be held at Washington
March 26 and 27 for the press and the broadcast-
ing industry of the United States.
Editors of the daily and periodical press and
public affairs broadcasters of radio and television
from all 50 States are being invited to the con-
ference by Secretary Rusk. President Kennedy,
Secretary Rusk, and other principal officers of the
Department of State and other Government agen-
cies concerned with foreign policy will participate
in the meeting.
The conference will be the fourth of its kind.
Two were held in April and a third in August of
last year. Regional conferences have also been
held since last July at San Francisco, Denver,
Kansas City, Dallas, Chicago, and St. Paul. The
purpose of these meetings is to help in keeping the
American public informed about the foreign af-
fairs of the United States.
"The important developments since August
1961, when the last such conference was held
here— developments in Southeast Asia, in the Con-
go, at the United Nations, and elsewhere — make it
seem desirable that another meeting be arranged
at an early date," Secretary Rusk wrote in his let-
ter of inidtation.
The conference sessions will be conducted, as be-
fore, on a "background" basis, which means that
the information presented by the briefing officers
may be published and broadcast but without at-
tribution to an individual officer or to his agency.
Letters of Credence
Greece
The newly appointed Ambassador of Greece,
Alexander A. Matsas, presented his credentials to
President Kennedy on February 28. For texts of
the Ambassador's remarks and the President's re-
ply, see Department of State press release 132
dated February 28.
March 19, J 962
479
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings'
Adjourned During February 1962
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights: 14th Session of the New Yorli Jan. 8-Feb. 2
Subcoramission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection
of Minorities.
ICAO Communications Division: 7th Session Montreal Jan. 9-Fcb. 9
ITU CCITT Plan Subcommittee for Africa Dakar Jan. 22-Feb. 2
UNESCO Conference on Development of Information Media in Paris Jan. 24-Feb. 6
Africa.
North Pacific Fur Seal Commission: Scientific Committee .... Ottawa Jan. 29-Feb. 9
GATT Cotton Textiles Committee: 2d Session Geneva Jan. 29-Feb. 9
WMO Commission for Instruments and Methods of Observation: New Delhi Jan. 29-Feb. 16
3d Session.
U.N. ECOSOC Regional Seminar on the Participation of Women Singapore Jan. 30-Feb. 12
in Public Life.
U.N. ECAFE Committee on Industry and Natural Resources: 14th Bangkok Jan. 31-Feb. 9
Session.
OECD Trade Committee Paris Feb. 5-6
IMCO/ICAO/WMO Joint Expert Working Group on Coordination London Feb. 5-7
of Safety at Sea and Air: Preparatory Meeting.
3d Regional Civil Aviation Conference Bogotd Feb. 5-10
North Pacific Fur Seal Commission: 5th Meeting Ottawa Feb. 7-9
OECD Development Assistance Committee: Ad Hoc Coordinating Paris Feb. 8-9
Group on Economic Development in Latin America.
NATO Food and Agriculture Planning Committee Paris Feb. 8-9
NATO Science Committee Paris Feb. 8-9
GATT Working Party on Cereals Geneva Feb. 12-16
FAO Intergovernmental Committee on World Food Program: 1st Rome Feb. 12-19
Session.
U.N. ECAFE Inland Transport and Communications Committee: Bangkok Feb. 12-19
10th Session.
ITU CCIR Study Group IX (Radio Relay Systems) and Joint Paris Feb. 12-23
CCIR/CCITT Study Group on Television Transmission Over
Lon« Distances.
FAO Cocoa Study Group: Committee on Statistics Rome Feb. 13 (1 day)
OECD Oil Committee: Working Group on Stockpiling Paris Feb. 13-14
OECD Maritime Transport Committee: 2d Session Paris Feb. 14-16
U.N. Economic Commission for Africa: Presession on Work Pro- Addis Ababa Feb. 14-16
gram for Plenary Session.
U.N. ECLA Committee of the Whole: 8th Session Santiago Feb. 14-16
FAO Committee on Commodity Problems: 6th Session of Consult- Rangoon Feb. 15-26
ative Subcommittee on the Economic Aspects of Rice.
OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party III (Balance Paris Feb. 19-20
of Payments).
OECD Committee for Scientific and Technical Personnel .... Paris Feb. 19-23
U.N. ECE Conference of European Statisticians: Group of Rap- Geneva Feb. 19-23
porleurs on Comparison of Systems of National Accounts in Use
in Europe.
GATT Committee III on Expansion of International Trade . . . Geneva Feb. 19-28
U.N. ECOSOC Committee on Nongovernmentul Organizations . . New York Feb. 20 (1 day)
I MCO Council: Gth Session London Feb. 20-23
OECD Economic Policy Committee Paris Feb. 21-22
OECD Manpower Committee: 1st Meeting Paris Feb. 22-23
CENTO Economic Committee Washington Feb. 26-28
IBE Executive Committee Geneva Feb. 27-28
' Prepared in the Office of International Conferoncos, Feb. 28, 19fi2. Following is a list of abbreviations: CCIR,
Comite consultatif international dcs radio cotninunications; CCITT, Comitfi consultatif international telegraphique et
telephoni(|ui'; CE.NTO, Central Treaty Orgaiiizalion; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far E:ust; ECE,
Economic Commission for Europe; ECLA, Economic Commission for Latin America; ECOSOC, Economic and Social
Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAE.\, International
Atomic Energy Agency; IBE, International Bureau of Education; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization;
ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU, Inter-
national Telecommunication Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OAS, Organization of American States;
OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.
480 Departmenf of State Bulletin
Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings — Continued
In Session as of February 28, 1962
Geneva Oct. 31, 195S-
Confercnce on Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests (not
meeting).
5th Round of G ATT Tariff Negotiations Geneva Sept. 1, 1900-
InternatioiKil Conference for tlie Settlement of the Laotian Question. Geneva May 16, 1961-
United Nations General Assembly: 16th Session (recessed Feb- New York Sept. 19, 1961-
ruary 23).
OAS Group of Experts on Compensatory Financing of Export Re- Washington Jan. 5-
ceipts.
United Nations Wheat Conference Geneva Jan. Bi-
ll. N. Economic Commission for Africa: 4th Session Addis Ababa Feb. 19-
GATT Contr;icting Parties: Council of Representatives Geneva Feb. 22-
ILO Governing Body: 1 5 Ist Session (and its committees) .... Geneva Feb. 26-
lAEA Board of Governors Vienna Feb. 27-
United States Delegations
to International Conferences
18th ECAFE Session
The Department of State announced on March
2 (press release 139) that Philip M. Klutznick,
■will serve as U.S. representative to the 18th session
of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far
East, which will be held at Tokyo March 6-19.
Edward J. Doherty, Counselor for Economic
Affairs, American Embassy, Tokyo, and Kufus
B. Smith, Counselor for Economic Affairs, Amer-
ican Embassy, New Delhi, will serve as alternate
U.S. representatives. Advisers to the delegation
are:
Saul Baran, Chief. Japan-Korea Section, Bureau of Inter-
national Programs, Department of Commerce
Arthur Blaser. American Embassy, Tokyo
Robert L. Brown, Economic Development Division, De-
partment of State
William E. Culbert, American Embassy, Tokyo
Philip M. Davenport, American Emhas.sy, Bangkok
Clifford C. Jlatlock, Office of Development Planning,
Bureau of Far East, Agency for International Develop-
ment
Paul E. Lanius, Jr., Office of International Economic and
Social Affairs, Department of State
The Commission meets annually to approve tlie
program of activities for the next 12 months.
One of the highlights of this session -will be a dis-
cussion of the program of teclinical assistance in
the Far East.
Secretary Rusk To Attend ANZUS
Meeting at Canberra
Press release 125 dated February 27
The Secretary of State has accepted an invita-
tion from the Australian Government to attend
the nth ANZUS Council Meeting, which will be
lield at Canberra May 7-8, 1962. Secretary Rusk
will fly directly to Australia from Athens follow-
ing the NATO ministerial meeting scheduled for
May 3-5, 1962. He will spend 1 day, May 9, in
Wellington before returning to Washington on
May 10. Because of the tightness of his schedule,
he will be unable to make other stops en route.
Previous ANZUS meetings have been held in
the United States. The last ANZUS meeting
held at Washington was in October 1959.^ The
Council meetings are held at mutually convenient
times under the terms of the security treaty be-
tween Australia, New Zealand, and the United
States, which was signed in 1951 and which pro-
vides for the foreign ministers of the respective
countries to consult from time to time regarding
the implementation of the treaty. ANZUS Coun-
cil meetings are based on broad informal discus-
sions of matters of mutual interest following no
fixed procedure. The forthcoming talks will pro-
vide the three governments with an opportunity
for a useful review of world developments.
' Bulletin of Nov. 16, 1959, p. 708.
March 79, J 962
481
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
United Nations
Memorandum of understanding concerning a grant to the
United Nations of Congo francs accruing to the United
States under the agricultural commodities agreement of
November 18, 1961 (TIAS 4925), between the United
States and the Republic of the Congo (L^poldville).
Signed February 13, 1962. Entered into force Feb-
ruary 13, 1962.
MULTILATERAL
Law of the Sea
Convention on the continental shelf. Done at Geneva
April 29, 1958.'
Ratification deposited: Colombia, January 8, 1962.
Postal Services
Universal postal convention with final protocol, annex,
regulations of execution, and provisions regarding air-
mail with final protocol. Done at Ottawa October 3,
1957. Entered into force April 1, 1959. TIAS 4202.
Adherence deposited: Sierra Leone, January 29, 1962.
DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE
Confirmations
The Senate on March 1 confirmed John Bartlow Martin
to be Ambassador to the Dominican Republic. (For bio-
graphic details, see Department of State press release 136
dated March 2.)
BILATERAL
Cameroon
Agreement amending the agreement of May 26, 1961
(TIAS 4801), relating to economic, technical, and re-
lated assistance. Effected by exchange of notes at
Yaounde December 8, 1961. Entered into force De-
cember 8, 1961.
Colombia
Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agree-
ment of October 6, 1959, as amended (TIAS 4337, 4747,
and 4911). Effected by exchange of notes at Bogoti
January 31 and February 14, 1962. Entered into force
February 14, 1962.
Greece
Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agree-
ment of October 18, 1961 (TIAS 4876). Effected by
exchange of notes at Athens February 13, 1962. En-
tered into force February 13, 1962.
Jamaica
Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace Corps
program in Jamaica. Effected by exchange of notes at
Kingston February 15 and 22, 1962. Entered into force
February 22, 1962.
Morocco
Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of
1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709).
Effected by exchanges of notes at Rabat February 9,
1962. Entered into force February 9, 1962.
Tunisia
Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace Corps
program in Tunisia. Effected by exchange of notes at
Tunis February 7 and 13, 1962. Entered into force
February 13, 1962.
Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of
1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709),
with exchange of notes. Signed at Tunis February 16,
1962. Entered into force February 16, 1902.
' Not in force.
482
Cliecic List of Department of State
Press Releases: February 26-IViarcli 4
Press releases may be obtained from the OflSce
of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.
Releases appearing in this issue of the Bulletin
which were issued prior to February 26 are Nos.
102 of February 15 and 118 of February 23.
Subject
Mann : Laredo, Texas.
U.S. participation in international
conferences.
Rostow : CENTO Economic Committee.
American polo teiixn visits Pakistan.
Rusk : VOA 20th anniversary.
Rusk to attend ANZUS meeting.
Mann : "The Semantics of Commu-
No. Date
tl20
•121
2/26
2/26
tl22
•123
tl24
125
tl26
2/26
2/26
2/26
2/27
2/28
tl27
2/27
tl28
2/27
tl29
2/27
130
2/28
•131
2/28
132
•133
♦134
2/28
2/28
3/1
•135
•136
3/1
3/2
•137
138
139
3/2
3/2
3/2
140
3/2
Preparedness
nism.
Ball : Senate Special
Subcommittee.
Trezise : Senate Foreign Relations
Committee.
Tubby : Senate Special Preparedness
Subcommittee.
Foreign policy briefing conference (re-
write).
Rusk : interview on German tele-
vision.
Greece credentials (rewrite).
Visit of Thai Foreign Minister.
McConaughy sworn in as Ambassador
to Pakistan (biographic details).
Visit of President of Cameroon.
Martin sworn in as Ambassador to
Dominican Republic (biographic de-
tails).
Salute to new nations of Africa.
Rusk : news conference.
Delegation to 18th BCAFE session ( re-
write).
Rusk : interview on "Eyewitness to
History."
•Not printed.
tlleld for a later Issvie of the Bulletin.
Department of State Bulletin
March 19, 1962
Ind
Agriculture. American Agriculture in Foreign
Trade (Martin) 471
American Republics. America's Goal — A Commu-
nity of Free Nations (Rusk) 448
Argentina. $150 Million In Loans Made Available
to Argentina 470
Asia. ISth ECAFK Session (delegation) .... 481
Atomic Energy
Nuclear Testing and Disarmament (Kennedy) . . 443
Secretary Rusk Interviewed on "Eyewitness to
History" (Herman, Rusk) 464
Australia. Secretary Rusk To Attend ANZUS
Meeting at Canberra 481
Brazil. Workers of Brazil Contribute to West's
Ideals and Hopes ( Kennedy ) 470
Canada. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of
March 1 455
Congo (Leopoldville). America's Goal — A Com-
munity of Free Nations (Rusk) 448
Cuba. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of
March 1 455
Department and Foreign Service
Confinnationa (Martin) 482
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of March 1 . 455
Disarmament
America's Goal — A Community of Free Nations
(Rusk) 448
^uclear Testing and Disarmament (Kennedy) . . 443
President Kennedy Reafltoms Views on Framework
for Conduct of Disarmament Negotiations (Ken-
nedy, Khrushchev) 465
Secretary Rusk Interviewed on "Eyewitness to His-
tory" (Herman, Rusk) 464
Secretary Ru.sk's News Conference of March 1 . 455
Dominican Republic. Martin confirmed as Ambas-
sador 482
Economic Affairs
American Agriculture In Foreign Trade (Martin) . 471
I8th ECAFE Session (delegation) 481
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of March 1 . 455
Bducational and Cultural Affairs. Secretary Rusk's
News Conference of March 1 455
Foreign Aid. $150 Million in Loans Made Available
to Argentina 470
Germany
America's Goal — A Community of Free Nations
(Rusk) 448
e X Vol. XLVI, No. 1186
U.S. Suggests International Authority To Control
Berlin Access Routes 463
Greece. Letters of Credence (Matsas) 479
Indonesia. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of
March 1 455
International Organizations and Conferences
Calendar of International Conferences and Meet-
ings 480
18th ECAFE Session (delegation) 481
Secretary Rusk To Attend ANZUS Meeting at Can-
berra 481
Labor. Workers of Brazil Contribute to West's
Ideals and Hopes (Kennedy) 470
Laos. America's Goal — A Community of Free Na-
tions (Rusk) 448
Netherlands. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of
March 1 4.55
New Zealand. Secretary Rusk To Attend ANZUS
Meeting at Canberra 481
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Secretary
Rusk's News Conference of March 1 . . . . 455
Norway. Prime Minister of Norway To Visit United
States 470
Presidential Documents
Nuclear Testing and Disarmament 443
President Kennedy ReaflSrms Views on Framework
for Conduct of Disarmament Negotiations . . . 465
Workers of Brazil Contribute to West's Ideals and
Hopes 470
Public Affairs. News Media Invited To Attend For-
eign Policy Briefing 479
Treaty Information. Current Actions 482
U.S.S.R. President Kennedy ReafBrms Views on
Framework for Conduct of Disarmament Negotia-
tions (Kennedy, Khrushchev) 465
Viet-Nam
America's Goal — A Community of Free Nations
(Rusk) 448
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of March 1 . 455
Name Index
Herman, George 464
Kennedy, President 443,465,470
Khrushchev, Nikita 466
Martin, Edwin M 471
Martin, John Bartlow 482
Matsas, Alexander A 479
Rusk, Secretary 448,455,464
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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Vol. XLVI, No. 1187
March 26, 1962
IE
FICiAL
EEKLY RECORD
IITED STATES
IREIGN POLICY
m
THE REALITIES OF FOREIGN POLICY • Remarks by
Secretary Rusk 4o7
U.S.S.R. AGREES TO BEGIN DISARMAMENT TALKS
AT FOREIGN-MINISTER LEVEL • Exchange of Mes-
sages Between President Kennedy and Soviet Premier
Khrushchev 494
SPEECH REVIEW PROCEDURES OF THE DEPART-
MENT OF STATE • Statement by Under Secretary Ball
and Remarks by Assistant Secretary Tubby 513
PROGRESS IN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT THROUGH
CENTO • Statement by Walt ff. Rostoic and Text of
Communique "
THEORIES, DOGMAS, AND SEMANTICS OF COM-
MUNISM • by Ambassador Thomas C. Mann .... 500
For index see inside hack cover
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Vol. XLVI, No. 1187 • PuBUCATioN 7354
March 26, 1962
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The Realities of Foreign Policy
REMARKS BY SECRETARY RUSK <
It's a very great pleasure indeed to be here. I
don't know whether it's symbolic or not that your
program says that after you have heard from
the Secretary of State you will then bo given a
break. (Laughter.) But I am happy to be with
the Advertising Council. I have known some-
tliing of the public service of this Council both
as a private citizen and as an official, and I have
very great respect and appreciation for it.
I might apologize to my friends in the press
that I am not able to give you a piece of paper
which will bear a reasonable resemblance to what
I am going to say this afternoon, but I am speak-
ing informally, from rough notes. There are
times when I think that I ought to make my con-
tribution to protect the working press against
excessive automation. (Laughter.)
But all of us who are engaged in talking to the
public, through whatever medium, face the prob-
lem of context — how to present what we have to
say with integrity, within the time or space avail-
able. This is especially difficult in the field of
foreign affairs, where each major problem is in-
finitely complex, where what we do on one matter
affects seriously what we do on many others,
where a part cannot be handled except in relation
to the whole, and where the whole is almost im-
possible to grasp all at one time.
Wliat we try to avoid is to reduce great policy
matters to empty or misleading slogans or pat
phrases. We do so because we miist forever con-
cern ourselves with the underlying realities of
policy, in the real world in which we live and in
the light of real responsibilities, real threats, real
opportunities, and the prospects for building a real
environment in the world in which our institutions
of freedom can flourish. It is inevitable, however,
that public debate, which is crucial to the vitality
' Made before the Advertising Council, Inc., at Wash-
ington, D.C., on Mar. 6 (press release 149 dated Mar. 8).
of our democracy, produces oversimplification.
And some of this conceals rather than illuminates
the truth.
I am referring not only to the most notorious
use of inverted and distorted language of our
present time — the corruption by commumsm of
such notions as "peace," "democracy," "aggres-
sion," "liberation." ^ I have in mind also the some-
times well-meaning but confused men in our own
society who hamper the conduct of our foreign
policy by propagating myths and fallacies which
divert us from the real job at hand. I have in
mind especially the various groups of pessimistic
sloganeers who apparently believe that the Com-
munists are as invincible as they claim to be, who
concede to them victories which they have not won,
who doubt the intelligence and dedication of our
own people and appear to distrust the ability of
our principles and ideals to prevail in open com-
petition.
The Federal Trade Commission has the power
to blow the whistle on certain advertising which
it deems false and misleading. Fortunately —
and I emphasize "fortunately" — there is no au-
thority in our society which can halt the output
of false and misleading ideas and allegations about
our foreign policy, for these are matters which
require lively debate and we are committed in our
society to the ability of free speech to sort out the
true and the false.
But I should like to direct your attention to a
few false notions which continue to crop up here
and there. And first I should like to mention
just one or two which have to do with the Depart-
ment for which I am responsible.
One still sees allegations or insinuations that
the State Department is soft or naive in its atti-
tudes toward communism. The global struggle
for freedom is our main business in foreign af-
' For an address by Ambassador Thomas C. Mann on
the theories, dogmas, and semantics of communism, see
p. 500.
March 26, 1962
487
fairs, just as it has been our main business here
at home since the founding of our Republic. My
colleagues and I give intensive attention, day by
day, to Communist strategy and tactics. I doubt
that any other government collects and analyzes
and gives as much thought to as much informa-
tion on this central subject as do we in our own
Government. No one has to convince us that the
contest between Communist imperialism and free-
dom is for keeps, and nobody has to convince us
that when Khrushchev said he would bury us he
was proclaiming not just an alleged historical
inevitability but an objective toward which Com-
munists work relentlessly to the best of their
abilities.
Any sensitive department of government in the
United States is subject to special efforts of pene-
tration on the part of those who would bring us
down. This responsibility for the loyalty and
security of the some 14,000 men and women who
serve us in the Department of State is a direct
and personal responsibility of mine, to wliich I
give personal attention. I am determined that
if there is any problem of that sort we shall dis-
cover it and remedy it. But I am also determined
that in administering this basic accommodation to
insure the loyalty and integrity of our SerAnce we
shall do so consistent with justice to the individual.
Competence of Department Personnel
Sometimes we still hear that old phrase about
"striped-pants cookie pushers in the Department
of State." I am almost embarrassed to have to
refer to that again, because we as a nation should
long since have learned what that situation is.
Of course there are formalities in diplomacy;
there have been for several hundred years. And
these formalities are deliberately designed to fa-
cilitate civil exchange among governments, to
make it easy to decide how these communications
shall go forward between governments, to answer
a great many questions which in olden times used
to cause fighting among diplomats in the streets
of London or Paris, formalities which take the
accidents of personality out of great dealings be-
tween governments on major matters of state.
Of course there are formalities, but just as parades
are not the main business of soldiers, so protocol
is not the main business of diplomacy. And I
can testify to you that the representatives of the
United States here and abroad dealing with for-
eign governments are people who make a vigorous
representation of American interests, who try to
extend those in whatever way i^ossible, who try to
find the bases of common agreement and interest
between us and other governments, who in the
face of a dispute will find a way — will seek a
way — to resolve it and, where disputes cannot be
resolved, to find a way to insulate them and to
isolate them so as to reduce the danger to us and
to the rest of the world.
I am proud of the competence of our men and
women in the Department of State. Not long
ago I was called on by a distinguished group of
privata citizens who had helped us in our several
selection and promotion boards in the Department
of State. Unanimously they told me personally
about their impressions of the high quality of
personnel in our Department. One of them, Mr.
Charles Lewis, of the American Tobacco Com-
pany, was quoted the other day as saying, having
served on one of these committees, that "as the
record unfolded I became simply flabbergasted
at the quality of the young women and young
men we were reviewing. Frankly, they were so
much better quality people, in my judgment, than
comparable people in business that it was hard
to believe."
I want to say just a word about courage and
gallantry in our Service, because in peacetime we
tend to forget it. We tend to overlook tliose 72
members of the Foreign Ser\ace whose names are
on a tablet in the Department of State and who
gave their lives in active service abroad.
We tend to forget that our men are serving in
distant, difficult, and frequently dangerous parts
of the world, that one week an ambassador will
have a grenade tossed at his car — which fortu-
nately does not go off ; that another week a man —
by the way, whose blank, before the promotion
board, opposite the category called "courage," had
inscribed on it "Nothing special to rejwrt" — that
this man, the very week that the board was looking
at that blank, with a personal act of heroism
rescued certain United Nations people in the
Congo at ( he risk of his own life.
The courage and gallantry of our men and
their wives, their families — oiu" men and women —
is something that is deeply impressive as I go
about this daily business.
Turning aside from the Department of State
for a second, there are some other slogans that
seem to be {lassed aroimd these days, as I read
488
Department of Stale Bulletin
some of the literature that comes to me at the
oflice and also is dropped in my mailbox at home.
We hear such phrases as a "no win" policy. We
hear demands that we withdraw from the United
Nations, demands tluit we withdraw from NATO,
demands that we stop foreign aid, demands that
we stop contacts with Yugoslavia or that we cease
any kind of communication or exchange with
members of the Communist bloc. As I look
through this material from time to time I am not
quite clear whether those who are this small mi-
nority— I think it is a small minority — expect us
to incinerate the Northern Hemisphei'e or to
abandon the game to the opposition. Because this
is what some of these things amount to.
If we ourselves fully understand the nature of
the task, I think the good sense, the dedication,
and the broad judgment of the American people
will make themselves felt.
The President pointed out just the other day
that basically what we are after is to find ways
and means to protect and defend the vital interests
of the United States and its allies, the free world,
by peace, if possible, and that all of our efforts are
bent in that direction.
It is possible, of course, to debate particular
aspects of policy. But I hope that we can find
ways to get at the reality involved. And if there
are those, for example, who want us to break con-
tacts with Yugoslavia, one can make an argument
for that. But those who want to pursue that policy
should make an argument for pursuing a policy
which would drive Yugoslavia back into the Soviet
bloc. And those who would want us to impose
sanctions upon all governments whose leaders may
say things or do things from time to time with
which we may not agree or which we don't find
comfortable — they should stand up and defend the
policy of increasing isolationism for this country
in the conduct of our world affairs. Somehow we
must find ways beneath the slogans, behind the
short phrases, to get at the reality of policy.
Importance of the U.N. System
Let's take, for a moment, this matter of with-
drawal from the United Nations. The enlarge-
ment of its membership to 104, a membership
which may very well go to 125 before the process
is completed — this enlargement of the membership
has led a good many people to feel frustrated and
disappointed in the United Nations.
Many things are said there that we don't like.
Many votes are taken which we don't find partic-
ularly congenial. But the important thing to bear
in mind is that in the United Nations system we
have a society of governments all of which are
committed to the basic prmciples of the United
Nations Charter— and I am thinking particularly
of the preamble and of articles 1 and 2 of that
charter. If any of you have read those brief
sections recently, I think you would understand
that the long-range foreign policy of the American
people is entirely congenial with those articles.
It's a matter of no small importance that you do
not hear in the debates of the United Nations
cynicism about the charter. Even those who may
be acting or speaking, in our view, most contrary
to the charter feel under pressure to go to con-
siderable lengths to reconcile what they are saying
with the commitments of that charter.
There is a very important American interest
in working with that kind of an organization,
with those commitments, with that gravitational
pull on the course of debate, with that kind of
standard established by formal declaration, with
that environment of discussion. We cannot aban-
don this field to the opposition. We cannot give up
the opportunities that are there for us in that
forum. We cannot suppose that those commit-
ments are empty as we talk to 104 members about
their own policy and their own f utui'e.
At its recent session the enlarged General As-
sembly beat down, for example, the Soviet troika
scheme and put U Thant in office, with no limita-
tions on the power of the Secretary-General.
It dealt straightforwardly with the issue of seat-
ing Red China, following the first full debate on
the merits of that question which had occurred in
the last 10 years.
It endorsed three major United States pro-
posals: the U.N. Decade of Development, a new
start on cooperation in outer space, and a new
$100 million world food program.
It reaffirmed the position of the United Nations
on Communist injustice in Korea and Hungary
and Tibet.
It endorsed a United States plea for renewal
of talks in Geneva on a nuclear test ban.
Within the so-called "Afro- Asian bloc" — which
seems to worry some people — there are vast dif-
ferences of political outlook and national interest,
religious influence, racial feeling, et cetera. But
March 26, 1962
489
the voting record on important issues does not
bear out the allegation that new African coun-
tries, for example, will tend to vote Communist,
as I have seen it quoted. As recently as January
30, 20 African states gave the Communists a
severe rebuff by opposing a Soviet effort to pro-
mote tension and chaos in the Congo by reopening
debate in the Security CouncU.
New nations, of course, tend to be preoccupied
with colonial issues and with emotions engendered
by their colonial past in struggles for independ-
ence. But the recent U.N. record shows that most
resolutions relevant to colonialism have been
adopted in moderate form, while parallel resolu-
tions in extreme form usually have been defeated.
A very recent and striking example is the reso-
lution on Euanda-Urundi, a Belgian trust terri-
tory adjoining the Republic of the Congo, which
is scheduled to become independent, as two na-
tions, on July 1st, subject to approval of the Gen-
eral Assembly. The original version of this
resolution would have required complete removal
of all Belgian forces before independence. Afro-
Asian nations took the lead in introducing a com-
promise resolution which would permit Belgian
forces to remain in Ruanda-Unmdi with the con-
sent of the authorities involved after independ-
ence, for they were not blind to the lessons of the
Congo's bitter experience.
We may note also how the Afro- Asian countries
joined our Latin American neighbors in rejecting
Communist bloc efforts at the United Nations to
distort the Cuban issue.
The United Nations is, among other things, a
great educational institution for its members, edu-
cational for us as well as for the new membei-s
who have joined its ranks in considerable num-
bers in the last few years.
Relations With Allies and Neutrals
There is another set of questions which has to
do with alliances and neutrals.
First, let me speak for a moment about those
questions which come up with respect to our con-
cern for, attention to, and seriousness about our
alliances.
This country has several hundred thousand
troops scattered in almost every continent, with
heavy concentrations, of couree, in the NATO
area as a demonstration of the seriousness with
which we take our alliance.
Over the years we formed these alliances for one
essential purpose — to move together with other
governments and other nations on a mutual basis
to guarantee their and our safety and independ-
ence. We take those alliances seriously and are
engaged daily in discussing with our allies the
important issues which we and they have before
us and which have to do with the solidarity of our
alliances.
The very fact that we do occasionally have dif-
ferences with an ally is itself a sign of the kind
of alliance we have. We did not buy satellites
through our alliances. We did not attempt to do
so. We did not pledge ourselves to become a
satellite of others because we joined an alliance.
We are associations of independent nations, each
considering its own vital interests, each finding
the broadest basis of common interest on which
we can proceed together, but all willing at all times
to discuss great issues to see where we can con-
solidate and coordinate our policy.
It may come as a surprise to some of you, in
view of some of these remarks that have been made
in criticism of alliance policy, that during this
last General Assembly, in all of the votes taken —
on something like 100 issues before the General
Assembly — the United States, along with Greece,
most frequently voted with the majority of the
NATO alliance. It should be evident that we do
not control the vote of any other member of that
alliance, but it should be equally evident that we
also take our alliances seriously. We do a great
deal about them. We have made basic commit-
ments that pledge our strength and the life of this
nation to our alliances, and we are in daily con-
sultation with all 40 of our allies to see to what
extent we can agree on these great issues arising
aromid the world.
As for the neutrals: Wliy do we suppose that
there is such a fundamental difference between
our allies and the neutrals? I have already noted
that wo were not buying satellites when we went
into alliances. We weren't trying for that. We
are interested in the independence of nations, and
over the years our alliances have been formed in
order that others can have our support in tlieir
own attempt to be free and independent under
pressure.
The President and others before him have de-
clared that the basic policy of this country is to
work toward a world community of independent
nations, free to work out their own lives as they
490
Department of State Bulletin
see fit but cooperating across national frontiers on
matters of common interest and joining to get
mutual jobs accomplished.
From that point of view, the difference between
an ally and a neutral is not fundamental and far-
reaching. The independence of neutrals is also
important to us. The vitality of independent
neutral states is a part of that world community
which we see ahead of us as we work along on
these foreign policy questions.
So in our approach to these questions there is
no severe shock to our ultimate goals when we
pass from the problems of alliances to the prob-
lems of other states, because our basic purpose —
as can be read in the United Nations Charter — is
a community of independent nations cooperating
in common interest for the preservation of peace
and for the accomplishment of great common
objectives.
We don't cater to neutrals. But we do believe
that any nation and people who want to preserve
their independence are on the same side in this
great global struggle. Certainly it is not in our
interest to push them into the arms of the Com-
munist world by any expression of hostility to-
ward them at a time when they are, themselves,
struggling for their independence.
Some independent nations are not as sharply
aware, perhaps, as they should be of the tactics
and the intentions of the Communists. But many
have been learning from experience, and several
nations which a few years ago seemed to be lean-
ing rather heavily toward the Communist bloc
have been in the process of pulling back domesti-
cally and to an extent in their foreign affairs. It
is a matter of some importance that no country
that has become independent since World War
II has moved behind the Curtain.
Competitive Quality of Free Institutions
Finally, before I come to your questions, let
me make a remark on this matter of the competi-
tive quality of free institutions. One can make
a rousing speech on this subject. I will make
some quiet remarks, because I think we are entitled
to deep confidence in the competitive capabilities
of the ideas and the institutions of the free world
and in its performance.
The most powerful revolutionary idea at work
in the world today is the notion that governments
derive their just powers from the consent of the
governed. The nationalist revolution, the revolu-
tion of freedom, is the most powerful force
throughout most of the world. And even behind
the Curtain the impact of this notion of the con-
sent of the governed is making itself felt.
In the economic field compare what is happen-
ing from East Germany eastward to North Viet-
Nam with the surging vitality of the economic
life of the free world, whether in Western Europe,
Japan, this country, or elsewhere. Mr. Khru-
shchev talked about incentive yesterday in his
speech on agriculture before the Central Commit-
tee. Nowhere has the force of incentive made
itself more dramatically felt than in free
institutions.
I do not myself believe that we need worry as
much as we used to about the intellectual impact
of Marxism. Some decades ago, when there was
a certain intellectual fashion in the Marxist analy-
sis of capitalism and free institutions, the Amer-
ican economic depression occurred and seemed to
some to prove this analysis correct. The ideologi-
cal impact of that depression was perhaps more
far-reaching and important in its consequence than
was the economic impact. But that has been
changing. And how? Because the application
of Marxist analysis behind the Curtain has been
modified from decade to decade; because the de-
bate between Moscow and Peiping has injected
confvision into that analysis; because the attempt
to identify modern, vital, socially conscious, pub-
licly responsible capitalism with the kind of
capitalism which Karl Marx was talking about —
or thought he was talking about — in the middle
of the 19th century is patently absurd to all who
wish to look; and because the performance of
those who have committed themselves to these
notions has fallen far behind their promises and
their performance is far less attractive to those in
the rest of the world.
As we move ahead on the basis of our commit-
ments to free societies and our commitment to
build a decent world order as described in the
United Nations Charter, I think we shall find
natural allies who have a common purpose and
wish to join in a common effort toward that goal.
These allies will be a great source of strength to
all of us in the years to come.
Eighty percent of the work of the Department
of State is not concerned with the great crises but
with the day-by-day and week-by-week business of
/March 26, 1962
491
building a decent world order. In that area we
have few contentious issues between allies and
neutrals. We have no great voting problems, be-
cause unanimity is usually present. We have the
job of getting on with the world's work, with the
humane work of mankind, on which we are agreed
and on which we have — I think in good conscience
we can say we have — the good wishes, the support,
the interest, the appreciation of men and women
and of governments in all parts of the world.
We need not consult our timidity and our fears.
We need to consult our confidence and move on to
get this job done.
Thank you very much.
QUESTION-AND-ANSWER PERIOD
Secretary Rusk: I believe there is an oppor-
tunity for a few questions before the break.
Q. How much help did Colonel Glenn's flight
do to our international prestige?
A. Well, I am not sure that I should say this
on the record, but I was, of course, watching his
flight. My own sense of what was at stake there,
from a foreign policy point of view, was such that
I am quite sure my pulse was twice as fast as his
at the moment of takeoff.
I will say this : It was very inspiring to see the
world reaction, as it came through my office, to
that performance. There were not only good
wishes and respect, but it was quite clear that
regardless of political orientation throughout
most of the world there was real joy that that
effort had succeeded.
I think it made an enormous difference to us.
But the stakes were very high there.
Q. [JohnJ.McCloy^. I am veiy glad you said
what you did. I have a question, but Pd like to
make a little speech first.
A. It won't be the first time you have made a
speech to me that I have observed. (Laughter.)
Q. On what you said about the personnel of the
State Departm^ent, I was a heneficiary of the qual-
ity, the experience, the training of that personnel
in a rather active post at one point. I want to
endorse the comment that you read from. I thinJc
the personnel of the State Department compares
favorably with any other personnel that I have
been coivnected with, either in the law business.
banking, or the military. They are devoted, they
are courageous, and I think it is time we got rid
of this notion that they only wear panties, rather
than troupers.
I have a question that puzzles me, that deals
with an area that I am not familiar with — very
faTniliar with, at least — that is Latin America
and this Alliance for Progress.
This juxtaposition of our aid together with land
reform — how far can they fit together — what —
how much — how do they march together? Can
we impose on a country, as a beneficiary — a po-
tential beneficiary of our aid — a condition that
they take some steps in what really affects their
fundamental constitutions, their political systems?
I imagine how disturbed we would be if someone
was trying to press us from the outside. I just
wonder if you would expand on that a little,
because I have heard a good deal of com/ment
about it.
Alliance for Progress
A. Yes. I may get in the way of my colleague,
Mr. Fowler Hamilton [Administrator, Agency
for International Development], who will be here
in a moment and may be exposed to similar
questions.
Let me say that here again is a notion which
ought not to be reduced to a simple slogan, and
there is danger in this idea.
I had, before I came to this particular post, a
considerable amount of experience with agricul-
tural problems in Latin America. I think it would
be wrong to try to generalize about what ought
to be done in this field throughout the continent.
There are some situations where land reform has
been carried to such an extent that the productiv-
ity of the particular unit has dropped below effi-
ciency and where recombination of small holdings
might be more effective in terms of total produc-
tivity. But I think that this is something which
has to be gone into country by country, and it is
not something which we can automatically impose
from the outside.
We have a certain — we have a certainty of cer-
tain strains as we move forward in the Alliance
for Progress. On the one side, we want to do all
that wo can to help them spur the energies of their
own peoples in their own resources and institu-
tions in economic development. On the otlier side,
492
Department of State Bulletin
we are concerned that this should proceed under
free mstitutions.
When we look back over our own 40- or 50-year
experience of astonishing development in this
country under free institutions, we can recall that
a great many of the steps which were vital to our
own economic development were highly contro-
versial, and we dealt with them through demo-
cratic institutions.
Some of these governments are going to be in the
position of proposing to their legislatures, of hav-
ing public debates, of submitting these issues to
democratic processes, and we cannot sit here in
this country and tell them what the answer must
be. So that we have got a job to do there. But
the thing that I think we can do for them — and
which is something which you gentlemen in busi-
ness can be of great help on — is to try to disclose
to them, try to recall to their minds, the essential
elements of rapid economic and social develop-
ment within free institutions. Because I think we
have in one generation learned a great deal about
this.
Tlie notion tliat it takes two or three hundred
years to develop is something we should scrap.
Tliat kind of talk has given the Communists an
advantage which we should not confer upon them,
because the examples of dramatic and rapid eco-
nomic development that we have in the modern
world are to be found in the free world.
We have added more to our gross national prod-
uct since 1920 than the present total gross national
product of the Soviet Union. In 1920 we had 1
percent of our farms electrified. Now 98 percent
of our farms are electrified. Look at our univer-
sity and school enrollments. This can be patterned
out in other free institutions.
Look at the economic vitality of free societies
like the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan,
compared to some of these others.
But we can call to their attention, through
public as well as private channels — and sometimes
more insistently through private channels than
public channels — the relationship between educa-
tion, hard work, extension service, aspiration and
ambition, reasonable sacrifice in the public inter-
est, the determination on the part of the family
unit to increase — to improve its own position —
the notion that great development comes from
building, from improving from the ground up and
not just decapitating from the top and trying to
March 26, J 962
distribute that. And some of these elementary
experiences of rapid development under free in-
stitutions is something I think we can find ways
to pass along.
I don't think there is a simple formula on land
reform, Mr. McCloy. This is something that has
to be studied very carefully in particular institu-
tions. But in many situations the ability of the
private farmer to own his own land is a very im-
portant incentive to development, as we found out
in this country. And by means of credit facilities
and land distribution and things of that sort, I
think we can make considerable advance in this
matter.
Perhaps one other question before we go.
OAS^Actions on Cuba
Q. Would you say a feto words about Cuba?
A. I think that the most important thing to be
said about Cuba at the present time is that there
has been a dramatic recognition in the hemisphere
over the last 2 years that what has happened in
Cuba must not happen elsewhere in the inter-
American system.
We had, for pei'haps some special reasons, some
disagreement at Punta del Este on the question of
how and whether we should expel Cuba from
the Organization of American States.' But there
was unanimity on the notion that this Marxist-
Leninist regime in Cuba is basically incompatible
with the inter-American system, and there was
imanimity in rejectmg the notion that the Com-
munist penetration of this hemisphere should be
accepted. And what is most important is to see
the extent to which in tliis hemisphere, both among
governments and among peoples, the early bloom
of the Castro revolution has worn off as it moved
away from the picture of a popular vote against a
dictatorship and it has become an obnoxious dic-
tatorship and has itself demonstrated it has no
miraculous answer to the problem of economic and
social development.
I think that the influence of Cuba in this hemi-
sphere has greatly diminished and there is a gen-
eral desire to see to it that tlus effort in this hemi-
sphere shall be isolated and not be permitted to
pose a security or other threat to other countries
here. I think that is the significance of what has
' For background, see Bulletin of Feb. 19, 1962, p. 270.
493
happened in the last several months with respect
to Cuba. And of course the end of that story
has not come.
At the Punta del Este conference I think again
there was imanimity that the inter- American sys-
tem is waiting for the time when they can wel-
come back into this system a free Cuban people
and a government and institutions which are
compatible with tlie commitments of the inter-
American system.
U.S.S.R. Agrees To Begin Disarmament
Talks at Foreign-Minister Level
Following is an exchange of messages hetween
President Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev,
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the
U.S.S.R.
PRESIDENT KENNEDY TO MR. KHRUSHCHEV
White House press release dated March 6
March 5, 1962
Dear Mr. Chairman: I have received your
message of March 3, and I am glad to know of
your agreement that the meeting in Geneva on
March 14 should be opened by Foreign Ministers.
I am particularly glad that Mr. Gromyko will be
able to join with Lord Home and Secretary Rusk
before the meeting for preliminary discussions;
our hope is that these conversations might begin
on March 12. It will be the purpose of the repre-
sentatives of the United States, headed by Secre-
tary Rusk, to make every possible effort, to find
paths toward disarmament.
Our object now must be to make real progress
toward disarmament, and not to engage in sterile
exchanges of propaganda. In that spirit, I shall
not undertake at this time to comment on the
many sentiments in your letter with wliich, as I
am sure you know, the United States Goverimient
cannot agree. Let us, instead, join in giving our
close personal support and direction to the work
of our representatives, and let us join in working
for their success.
MR. KHRUSHCHEV TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY
Dnofflclal translation
Makch 3, 1962
Dbae Mb. President : I have carefully studied your
message of February 25 ' last. Having thought about
the considerations advanced by you concerning the forth-
coming negotiations in the 18-Nation Disarmament Com-
mittee, I continue to adhere to the conviction that per-
sonal participation of the most responsible state officials
would be particularly necessary in the initial stage, and
I repeat — precisely in the initial stage of negotiations,
when their direction is being determined and, conse-
quently, their outcome is being predetermined to no small
degree.
You know that disarmament negotiations have been
continuing for a good fifteen years, now becoming active,
now dying out again, as if only to raise the hopes of
peoples to destroy these hopes again. All sorts of methods
of conducting such negotiations have been used : creation
of various committees and subcommittees, commissions
and subcommissions, discussion of disarmament questions
in the halls of the U.N., and exchange of views through
diplomatic channels, but, as they say, the cart is still
stuck.
To what conclusions, then, does this lead? First of all
that it would be at least short-sighted again to rely on
those methods that have already proven their uselessness
in the past and, secondly, that it is the direct duty of the
states participating in disarmament negotiations to find
new, more reliable methods for conducting such negotia-
tions. This Is what the Soviet Government did in ad-
dressing the Governments of all the countries included in
the 18-Nation Committee with the suggestion that the
work of that Committee be initiated at the highest level,
with the participation of the Heads of State or
Government."
Our proposal was dictated by only one thing: by the
desire to free disarmament negotiations from the routine
in which those negotiations became entangled as soon
as they started and to pave the way for an agreement
on general and complete disarmament. It would seem
incontestable that those state leaders who are vested
with the broadest authority and occupy the most respon-
sible position in their country also have much greater
possibilities of coping with these difficult tasks. There-
fore we regret that our proposal to begin the work of the
18-Nation Committee at the highest level has not met
with imderstanding on your part. The arguments ad-
vanced in your message are not capable of affecting the
weighty and serious considerations which speak in favor
of the fact that the course proposed by the Soviet Gov-
ernment is the best course.
You yourself note the necessity of approaching the
forthcoming negotiations in the 18-Nation Committee
Sincerely yours,
John F. Kennedy
' For texts of a U.S. message of Feb. 25 and a Soviet
message of Feb. 21, see Bulletin of Mar. 19, 1962, p. 465.
• For text of a Soviet note of Feb. 10, see ihid.. Mar. 5,
1962, p. 356.
494
Department of State Bulletin
with the utmost seriousness and purposefulness and have
come out in favor of the leading state officials devoting
undeviatlng attention to these negotiations. You also
recognize that personal participation of the Heads of
State in disarmament negotiations may prove to be use-
ful, although you adhere to the view that such participa-
tion should be deferred to a later stage in the negotia-
tions. In this connection you express the hope that
developments in the 18-Nation Committee and interna-
tionally will make it useful to arrange for the personal
participation of the Heads of Government before June 1
of this year.
Thus, as a result of the exchange of messages among
the leading officials of state.s, general agreement has
emerged with regard to the significance which the dis-
armament negotiations in the 18-Nation Committee are
acquiring. It is no less important that everybody has
now recognized the personal responsibility of the Heads
of Government and State for the success of these negotia-
tions and the necessity of direct participation by state
officials of the highest level in the work of the 18-Nation
Disarmament Committee. We take this as a definite step
toward our position. Inasmuch as the United States
and some of our other partners in the forthcoming nego-
tiations are not prepared for the time being to have the
leading state officials participate personally in the work
of the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee from the very
beginning, we shall proceed, Mr. President, on the basis
that we both, as well as the leading state officials of the
other states members of the committee, will do that
somewhat later.
The most important thing, of course, is to achieve re-
sults, to reach agreement on general and complete dis-
armament, and, at every stage of the negotiations, we
shall do everything that depends on us in order to ensure
their success. Of course, we are in favor of fully utiliz-
ing the possibilities of the Foreign Ministers, who can
play their useful role if all the participants in the 18-
Nation Committee demonstrate the desire to reach agree-
ment on disarmament. The situation has developed in
such a way that the ministers are to be the first to set
sail after the creation of the 18-Nation Committee. Well
then, let us wish them success ! Of course there is no
objection to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the United
States and the United Kingdom meeting, as you have
proposed, with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
U.S.S.R. before the 18-Nation Committee begins its work.
Tour message also touches upon some questions relat-
ing to the substance of the disarmament problem. In
this connection I would like to make some comments of
my own.
First of all, a few words about control. You believe
that the considerations set forth with regard to this
point in my preceding message are based on an "incor-
rect understanding of the United States position".'
I would only be glad if the position of the United
States Government on the question of control were ac-
tually to prove different from what we have understood it
to be until now. Unfortunately, however, there are no
facts which would provide grounds for such a conclusion.
The attitude of the Soviet Union toward the question
of control has already been covered in my preceding
message of February 21 last. Is it really necessary to
repeat that the Soviet Union is for an honest agreement
on disarmament under strict international control. I
can confirm once more our repeated statements to the
effect that the Soviet Union is prepared to accept any
proposals of the Western powers for control over disarma-
ment if the Western powers accept our proposals for
general and complete disarmament. If the United
States Government is really concerned about how to
reach agreement on the establishment of control over
disarmament, then this readiness of ours removes
a priori all difficulties, and there remains no room for
substantive differences.
Now about nuclear weapon tests. Let us talk plainly.
I have just familiarized myself with your statement*
in which you said that you had decided that the United
States would conduct, beginning in the latter part of
April of this year, a series of nuclear tests in the atmos-
phere. No matter how you try to justify this decision,
there cannot be two views about the fact that it repre-
sents a new expression of the aggressive course in inter-
national affairs, a blow to the 18-Nation Committee
which is just about to begin its work, and a blow to the
forthcoming disarmament negotiations. No matter how
much you may try to prove the contrary, the shock wave
from the American nuclear tests in the Pacific Ocean will
reach to the Palais des Nations at Geneva.
You state that it is absolutely necessary for the United
States to conduct nuclear tests in order not to lag behind
the Soviet Union. But you failed to utter even one word
about the fact that the United States and its NATO
allies have conducted many more nuclear test explosions
than the Soviet Union. That is a fact, and everyone
who does not have as his specific objective to misinform
world public opinion must be aware of the fact that, if
the United States and its allies add to the nuclear tests
already conducted another series of such tests for the
purpose of perfecting their nuclear weapons, then the
Soviet Union will be faced with the necessity of conduct-
ing such tests of new types of its nuclear weapons as may
be required under those conditions for the strengthening
of its security and the maintenance of world peace. Sev-
eral months ago the Soviet Union was already compelled
to conduct such tests by the aggressive preparations of
NATO states.
In asserting that the United States can in no way do
without new nuclear weapons tests, you leave much
unsaid. After all, the effect of the action planned by the
Government of the United States cannot be limited merely
to those nuclear explosions that have been planned by
the United States itself or its allies in military blocs.
No, you are beginning a new round of competition in the
creation of ever more lethal types of nuclear weapons
and you are unleashing, as it were, a chain reaction
which, what is more, will become ever more violent. And
this is what you called in your message a "reasonable
policy" !
' Ihid., Mar. 19, 1962, p. 465.
March 26, 7962
' For text, see iljid., p. 443.
495
Where then, Mr. President, is logic? On the one hand
you have repeatedly said in your statements that the
United States is superior to the Soviet Union with regard
to the power of nuclear weapons stockpiles. And your
military are openly boasting that they can allegedly wipe
the Soviet Union and all the countries of the Socialist
camp from the face of the earth.
On the other hand, you now say that the United
States has to conduct nuclear weapon tests for the al-
leged purpose of not lagging behind the Soviet Union in
armaments. These two things clearly do not jibe.
Your entire logic, Mr. President, adds up to the fact
that you have now announced the beginning of a new
series of nuclear weapon tests by the United States. But
quite recently you and the entire Western press argued—
and argued correctly — how harmful such tests are.
How much was said at that time about the fact that
nuclear tests contaminate the air, soil, and vegetation,
that radioactive fallout, together with contaminated
plants, reaches the organism of animals, and particularly
cows, and that such fallout is transmitted through milk
consumed by children.
But now it turns out that all these arguments were
directed only against the Soviet Union and were used
merely for the purpose of enabling the United States to
preserve its superiority in certain types of armaments.
And now that you yourself have come to the conclusion
that you need to conduct such tests, where did (hose
arguments go, where is that hunianitarianism with which
you were so generous in your statements and messages?
After the United States has been accumulating huge
stockpiles of nuclear weapons throughout the post-war
years who is to profit from new nuclear tests? Appar-
ently this is to the advantage of the monopolists who
profit from the arms race, in whom the desire for profit
outweighs all the dangers connected with the contamina-
tion of the atmosphere, the water, and the soil by radio-
active fallout.
Yet the people of the United States of America, just
as all the peoples of the world, are merely victims of
the policy conducted in the interests of monopolistic
capital. On the one hand, nuclear weapons are being
produced, and the monopolies are profiting from their
accumulation. On the other hand, by intimidating the
world and not lastly the people of their own country with
these weapons, the monopolists profit from (he construc-
tion of shelters against such weapons and in this manner
the monopolies trim the income of the population and
mercilessly exploit the peoples.
It appears that all the talk about humanitarianism and
love for one's follow man ceases immediately as soon as
the question of the monopolies' profits arises.
You and your allies in aggressive blocs justify your
decision to begin new nuclear tests with references to the
Soviet Union's having conducted such tests. This argu-
ment does not stand up because the whole world knows
it was (he Uni(cd S(ates of America which was the first
to make the atom bomb and that the first nuclear tests
were also conducted by the United States of America.
Moreover, the United States has not only tested in the
atmosphere bu( has also exploded atom boinl)s over the
Japanese cities of Nagasaki and Hiroshima. It was pre-
cisely the United States and no one else who compelled the
Soviet Union to embark on the creation and accumulation
of nuclear weapons for the purpose of ensuring its se-
curity. Therefore, if one is to be logical and if one is
to strive sincerely for mutual understanding and agree-
ment on disarmament on the basis of equality, it is cec-es-
sary to recognize that the Soviet Union should be the
last to terminate nuclear weapon tests. The tests con-
ducted by the Soviet Union were from the very beginning
merely actions in response to the nuclear arras race
imposed by the Western powers.
In your statement, Mr. President, you said that the
United States would begin tests in the atmosphere in the
latter part of April. But in fact you have already given
the order to begin tests and you are delaying them by
six or eight weeks apparently only for the purpo.se of
somehow preparing the world public to swallow this
bitter pill.
Of course you yourself understand that, if the United
States begins experimental explosions of nuclear weapons,
then the Soviet Union, in the interest of ensuring its
security and world peace, will unquestionably be com-
pelled to respond to this too by conducting a series of
new tests of its own. And we do have the technical
capabilities for this, and they are at least equal to yours.
Consequentl.v, with your tests you will start a new stage
in the race in the creation of deadly weapons. But we
would like to compete with the United States and other
countries in the creation of better conditions for the peace-
ful life of mankind, and we would like to unite efforts
with you in the cause of ensuring peace throughout the
world.
The decision of the United States Government to con-
duct a new series of nuclear tests spurs on the perfecting
and the stockpiling of precisely those types of modem
weapons which represent the greatest danger : atomic and
hydrogen bombs, nuclear warheads for rockets, and
rockets themselves. But, one may ask, what is then to be
negotiated in disarmament negotiations? Is it perhaps
how many machine guns and rifles should be scrapped,
or by how many soldiers we should reduce the guards
around the arsenals where ever greater stockpiles of nu-
clear and rocket weapons will continue to accumulate?
Perhaps the Soviet Union Is expected to give an answer
as to whether it is prepared, before the United States
begins its nuclear tests in April, to agree to the provisions
already rejected by us — of a treaty that would, under
the guise of international control over the cessation of
tests, lead to the creation of a ramified system of intelli-
gence and espionage? I hope that this is not cxpe<'te<i
of us ; otherwise that would very much smack of atomic
blackmail. I am sure that you yourself know full well
that such methods in dealing with the Soviet Union have
not yielded success to anybody in the past ; they will not
yield any results toda.v, nor will (hey (omorrow.
Thus, as a result of (he decision of the Ignited States
Government to conduct a new series of nuclear tests,
state oflicials, particularly of those countries which bear
the main responsibility for the preservation of peace are
faced with very serious questions, including the ques-
496
Department of Stale Bulletin
tion of the prospects which await the 18-Nation Disarma-
ment Committee. I consider it my duty to tell you frankly
about all this.
I am convinced that an end can be put to the unre-
strained increase In the power of nuclear weapons. It
is precisely this objective that we pursue in our recent
proposals for the cessation of nuclear weapons tests, with
which you are familiar. It is conclusion of an agreement
on the cessation of nuclear tests, not their resumption,
that would be a demonstration of the reasonableness In
policy of which you speak in your message.
Respectfully,
N. Khbushchev
U.S. Plan To Resume Nuclear Testing
Explained to Japanese Prime Minister
Following is an exchange of messages between
President Kennedy and Prime Minister Hayato
Ikeda of Japan.
President Kennedy to Prime Minister Ikeda
February 28, 1962
Dear Mr. Prime Minister: Recognizing the
deep concern -with which your Government and
your nation view the testing of nuclear weapons,
and in the light of our agreement last June ^ to
consult together on issues of great international
significance, I have asked Ambassador [Edwin
O.] Reischauer to convey to you this personal
message.
After deep consideration, I have with great
reluctance reached a decision that I must order the
resumption of nuclear weapons testing in the at-
mosphere. I am issuing this order, in the knowl-
edge that it will bring disappointment to many,
both in my own country and abroad, upon the
single and decisive ground that such tests are now
necessary for the military security of the entire
free world. The nuclear test moratorium which
was so brutally broken by the Soviet Union in
1961 ^ cannot now be kept by our side alone, if we
' For background, see Buixetin of .July 10, 1961, p. 57 ;
for an exchange of notes with Japan in September 1961
on the subject of nuclear tests, see ihid., Oct. 2, 1961,
p. &14.
" For background, see ihid., Sept. 18, 1961, p. 475.
are to avoid the hazard of advances by the Soviet
Union which might imperil us all.
I cannot stress too strongly that this decision is
governed by strictly military considerations.
Study and analysis of the recent scries of atmos-
pheric tests by the Soviet Union reveal strides in
technique and design which could, over time, shift
the balance of military power in favor of that
nation. Wliile some have maintained that an
American resumption of atmospheric testing
would be morally wrong, I believe that it would be
the ultimate in immorality to allow the deterrent
force of the United States to decline, relative to
that of the Soviet Union, to the point where the
United States and its allies might become vul-
nerable to diplomatic extortion or even direct
military action.
I wish to assure you, Mr. Prime Minister, that
this nation will continue to press vigorously for
nuclear and other disarmament under a reasonable
system of international controls and safeguards.
The Soviet Union, with its test series of 1961, has
dramatically intensified the nuclear arms race;
my Government will not rest until this race, with
all its dangers, is brought to a close. To this end
we have proposed that a supreme effort be made
at the forthcoming 18-nation conference on
disarmament.^
Wliile I am ordering that nuclear tests be re-
sumed, the series which is in preparation will not
begin until the middle of April, and between now
and then we shall be urging the Soviet Govern-
ment once again to join with Great Britain and
with us in an effective nuclear test ban treaty.
If such a treaty can be signed in this period, there
will be no American atmospheric tests.
The position of this Government will be more
fully explained in a major address which I shall
make on Thursday, March 1st, to the American
people.-* I trust that this letter and my coming
address will make it plain to you with what regret
I have come to this necessary decision and how
deeply I hope that the Soviet Government may be
brought to accept the necessity of effectively con-
trolled disarmament, especially in this dangerous
area of nuclear testing.
I ask your understanding, and that of the Japa-
nese people, for this action which my Government
"See p. 494.
* For text, see Bulletin of Mar. 19, 1962, p. 443.
March 26, 1962
497
is forced to take in the vital security interests of
all Free World nations.
Sincerely,
John F. Kennedy
Prime Minister Ikeda to President Kennedy °
Deae Me. President: I wish to express to you my
appreciation for your personal message conveyed to me
by Ambassador Reischauer explaining to me, prior to
ofBcial announcement of your decision to resume nuclear
weapons testing in the atmosphere, the circumstances
which led you to this decision. This is in line with our
understanding of last June to consult with each other
on major issues of international significance, and is also
indicative of your understanding of the deep concern and
anxiety with which the government and people of Japan
view the testing of nuclear weapons.
The circumstances which compelled you with great
reluctance to make this decision, as explained in your
letter, came about, I believe, because the Soviet Union,
In complete defiance of the hopes of mankind, unilaterally
broke the moratorium on nuclear weapons testing and
Vigorously conducted a series of some fifty such tests.
However, as I made clear at our talks last June, it
has been and continues to be the constant and earnest
hope of Japan that the testing of nuclear weapons is
never conducted whatever its reason may be. The Japa-
nese people who have experienced the tragic consequences
of nuclear explosion deeply deplore nuclear weapons
testing in the atmosphere.
At present when nuclear weapons have been developed
to an extraordinary degree and when we are recognizant
of the urgency of securing the welfare and security of
mankind and the peace of the world, it is obvious that
the nuclear race should not be continued endlessly be-
tween East and West. I must express my earnest hope,
Mr. President, that you will reconsider your present
decision to resume testing.
From these considerations, may I hope that before you
actually resume your tests you will make a supreme
efCort, as you have indicated in your letter, to bring about
together with the countries concerned an agreement for
the suspension of nuclear weapons testing under effective
international control and inspection.
From what I have expressed in this letter, I trust,
Mr. President, that you and the people of your country
will shov*' a most serious regard to the feelings of the
government and people of Japan.'
Sincerely,
Hayato Ikeda
' Delivered to the President on Mar. 2 by Japanese
Ambassador Koichiro Asakai.
"After reading the Prime Minister's letter President
Kennedy asked Ambassador Asakai to convey to Mr.
Ikeda his strong hope that a test ban agreement can be
achieved In time to permit cancellation of the U.S. tests
scheduled to commence in late April.
Secretary Rusk, Thai Foreign Minister
Discuss Matters of Mutual Concern
Following is the text of a joint statement issued
by Secretary Rusk and Thanat Khoman, Foreign
Minister of Thailand, on March 6. The Foreign
Minister visited Washington March 1-6, where
he conferred with President Kennedy, Secretary
Rush, and other Government officials.
Press release 145 dated March 6
The Foreign Minister of Thailand, Thanat
Khoman, and the Secretary of State, Dean Eusk,
met on several occasions during the past few days
for discussions on the current situation in South-
east Asia, the Southeast Asia Collective Defense
Treaty and the security of Thailand.
The Secretary of State reaffirmed that the
United States regards the preservation of the
independence and integrity of Thailand as vital
to the national interest of the United States and
to world peace. He expressed the firm intention
of the United States to aid Thailand, its ally and
historic friend, in resisting Communist aggres-
sion and subversion.
The Foreign Minister and the Secretary of State
reviewed the close association of Thailand and
the United States in the Southeast Asia Collec-
tive Defense Treaty and agreed that sucli asso-
ciation is an eifective deterrent to direct Com-
munist aggression against Thailand. They agreed
that the Treaty provides the basis for the signa-
tories collectively to assist Thailand in case of
Communist armed attack against that coimtry.
The Secretary of State assured the Foreign Min-
ister that in the event of such aggression, the
United States intends to give full effect to its
obligations under the Treaty to act to meet the
common danger in accordance with its constitu-
tional processes. The Secretary of State reaffirmed
that tliis obligation of the United States does not
depend upon the prior agreement of all other par-
ties to the Treaty, since this Treaty obligation is
individual as well as collective.
In reviewing measures to meet indirect aggres-
sion, the Secretary of Stat© stated that the United
States regards its commitments to Thailand imder
the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and
under its bilateral economic and military assist-
ance agreements with Thailand as providing an
important basis for United States actions to help
Thailand meet indirect aggression. In this con-
498
Department of State BuUetin
nection the Secretary reviewed with the Foreign
Minister the actions being taken by the United
States to assist the Republic of Viet-Nam to meet
the threat of indirect aggression.
The Foreign Minister assured the Secretary of
State of tlie determination of the Government of
Thailand to meet the threat of indirect aggression
by pursuing vigorously measures for the economic
and social welfare and the safety of its people.
The situation in Laos was reviewed in detail
and full agreement was reached on the necessity
for the stability of Southeast Asia, of achieving
a free, independent and truly neutral Laos.
The Foreign INIinister and the Secretary of State
reviewed the mutual efforts of their governments
to increase tlie capabilities and readiness of the
Thai armed forces to defend the Kingdom. They
noted also that the United States is making a
significant contribution to this effort and that the
United States intends to accelerate future deliv-
eries to the greatest extent possible. The Secre-
tary and the Foreign Minister also took note of
the work of the Joint Thai-United States Com-
mittee which has been established in Bangkok to
assure effective cooperation in social, economic
and military measures to increase Thailand's na-
tional capabilities. They agi"eed that this Joint
Committee and its subcommittees should continue
to work toward the most effective utilization of
Thailand's resources and those provided by the
United States to promote Thailand's development
and security.
The Foreign Minister and the Secretary were in
f uU agreement that continued economic and social
progress is essential to the stability of Thailand.
They reviewed Thailand's impressive economic
and social progress and the Thai Government's
plans to accelerate development, particularly Thai-
land's continuing determination fully to utilize its
own resources in moving toward its development
goals.
The Foreign Minister and the Secretary of State
also discussed the desirability of an early conclu-
sion of a treaty of friendship, commerce and navi-
gation between the two countries which would
bring into accord with current conditions the ex-
isting treaty of 1937.
United States Recognizes
New Government of Burma
Department Statement
Press release 147 dated March 6, for release March 7
At 10 a.m., March 7, Rangoon tune (10:30 p.m.,
e.s.t., March 6) the United States Ambassador to
Burma [Jolui S. Everton] delivered to the Bur-
mese Foreign Office a note ^ replying to a Burmese
note [of March 2] ^ which had called attention to
the expressed desire of the new Burmese Govern-
ment to maintain and strengthen the Union of
Burma's friendly relations with all countries.
This communication expressed the United States
Government's good wishes and "sincere desire to
maintain the cordial relations which have existed
between the Governments and peoples of our two
coiuitries."
The note delivered by the Ambassador is an ex-
pression of recognition of the present Government
of Burma by the United States Government.
Letters of Credence
Gam,eroon
The newly appointed Ambassador of the Fed-
eral Republic of Cameroon, Jacques Kuoh Mou-
kouri, presented his credentials to President Ken-
nedy on March 9. For texts of the Ambassador's
remarks and the President's reply, see Depart-
ment of State press release 154 dated March 9.
Morocco
The newly appointed Ambassador of Morocco,
Ali Bengelloun, presented his credentials to Pres-
ident Kemiedy on March 5. For texts of the
Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply,
see Department of State press release 142 dated
March 5.
' Not printed.
March 26, 7962
499
Theories, Dogmas, and Semantics off Communism
Following are two addresses made hy Thomas
C. Mann, Amhassador to Mexico, hefore joint
meetings of the civic associations of Laredo, Tex.,
on February 25 and 28.
ADDRESS OF FEBRUARY 25
Press release 120 dated February 26
Today I would like to say a few words about
the theories and doctrines of communism and the
historical developments which gave rise to them.
More specifically I will undertake to compare
some of the principal tenets of the American Eev-
olution with some of the principal Communist
dogmas.
In the next few days I hope to make some addi-
tional remarks about another aspect of commu-
nism: how Communists disguise their doctrines
behind a curtain of words.
Roots of Communism
Communist doctrine has its roots in the Indus-
trial Revolution, which began nearly 200 years
ago.
You will recall that, in the darkness which de-
scended on Europe after the fall of Rome, political
and economic power was in the hands of kings and
noblemen. Land, a principal source of wealth, was
divided between them. The right to govern de-
scended with the land from generation to genera-
tion. Most of the people were serfs, bound to the
land and bound to the service of its owner in peace
and in war. They accepted an inferior status for
themselves and for their children as an immutable
law of nature. Industry was limited and con-
sisted of the small "cottage" kind managed by
skilled craftsmen who organized themselves into
guilds. Those who wished to learn a trade were
required to apprentice themselves to a master.
This primitive pattern of society was changed
suddenly by the discovery of machines to replace
hand looms in the manufacture of textiles, of ways
to harness steampower in industry and transpor-
tation, of the use of coal in the manufacture of
iron and steel, and of electricity and the means
of its use. Other advances were made in indus-
trial engineering and in transportation and
communications.
The industrial age, the age of the machine, had
arrived, and with it mankind had, for the first
time, an opportunity to produce consumer goods
for all the people. For the first time there were
prospects of raising the masses of people out of
their misei-y and into a new world of relative
abundance.
For the nobility the arrival of the machine age
meant the beghmmg of the end of their power and
wealth. For the peasant on the land it meant
large-scale migration to new, mushrooming fac-
tory and mining towns unprepared to receive him.
It meant working for whatever wages were of-
fered, often at below subsistence levels. It meant
chronic unemployment, child labor, long working
hours in inhuman working conditions. It meant
miserable housing, poverty, disease, and despair.
For governments the age of the machine created
an urgent need to reform systems and doctrines
so as to be able to cope with new political, social,
and economic problems in a society suddenly
grown complex. Economics was in its infancy,
yet new fiscal and monetary policies had to be
devised. The problem of the cycle of "boom and
bust" which seemed to plague all economies had
to be solved if steady economic growth and
stability in levels of employment were to be
achieved. There was an urgent need to devise
means to prevent a growing disparity in the in-
come of the few rich and the many poor — to
achieve a more equitable distribution of the na-
tional income.
For the few who had the capital to build fac-
tories and expand them, to open mines and ex-
500
Department of State Bulletin
ploit them, it meant mushroominfi fortunes. For
them it also meant a new political power based
not on social position or ownership of land but on
industry and commerce.
All of these developments set the stage for
revolution. Changes in political, economic, and
social practices were both desirable and inevitable.
The only i"cal question was the direction they
would take.
Objectives of American Revolution
By 177C, before the Industrial Kevolution had
reached its full momentum, our own Revolution
had already been launched. Its immediate aim
was to safeguard and expand for our people the
liberties which the common man had so slowly
and painfully won from his masters. It therefore
radically altered the old political order through
the creation of constitutional and representative
government, all of whose powers were derived
from the people.
Our political system was grounded on the simple
premise that the people could not only be trusted
to govern themselves but they could also be trusted
to debate and decide what changes should be made
so as to bring about the greatest good for the
greatest number.
Thomas Jefferson, in a letter to one of his
contemporaries, described this principle in these
words :
We both consider the people as our children and love
them with parental affection. But you love them as
infants whom you are afraid to trust without nurses;
and I as adults whom I freely leave to self-government.
Another eminent Revolutionary theorist, James
Wilson, expanded on this principle. He main-
tained that the people rather than the state were
the masters. It was the people who had the right
to elect their representatives and to depose them
when they were unfaithful to their trust. He con-
ceived of the state as :
... a complete body of free, natural persons, united
together for their common benefit; as having an under-
standing and a will; as deliberating, resolving and acting;
as possessing interests which it ought to manage; as en-
joying rights which it ought to maintain; as lying under
obligations which it ought to perform.
Wliile our Revolution was initially political in
character, its doctrines of freedom and equality
based on the dignity and inalienable rights of the
individual opened the way for eliminating the
March 26, J 962
632040—62 3
economic and social injustices which came with
the Industrial Revolution. It was based on the
premise that if the people are given power they
can be depended on to look after their interests.
This premise has been proven sound by history.
Reform did come — political reform, social reform,
and economic reform. They continue unabated
to this day.
But our Revolution did not seek to destroy the
existing social and economic system. On the con-
trary it recognized the value of Christian ethics
in man's relationship to man and in international
relations. It sought to conserve what was good
in these systems and to change what was bad.
Our Revolution moreover did not seek to cast
the mind and spirit of man into a mold of total
and absolute conformity. Rather it sought to free
the mind and spirit of man so that he could con-
tinue his age-old search for a more perfect truth,
so that he could continue to learn from experience,
to improve, to change, to progress. This cardinal
principle of our Revolution was expressed by
Thomas Jefferson in these words :
I have sworn upon the altar of God, eternal hostility
against every form of tyranny over the mind of man.
American and Communist Revolutions Compared
Another kind of revolution was proposed by
Karl Marx, a German philosopher who lived in
"Western Europe between 1818 and 1883. Marx's
ideas were later interpreted and expanded by
Lenin. In the comparison of the principles of our
Revolution with Marxist-Leninist doctrine are to
be found the principal issues which today divide
the free world and the Sino-Soviet bloc.
First, Marx and Lenin thought that the only
reality was material. This idea needs to be better
understood by us. It means they ascribed no value
to the spirit or the dignity of man, that they be-
lieved man does live by bread alone. It means that
no value is given to ethics, to charity. Listen to
the words of Lenin :
■RTien people talk to us about morality we say : For the
Communist, morality consists entirely of compact united
discipline and con.scious mass struggle against the ex-
ploiters. We do not believe in eternal morality, and we
expose all fables about morality.
This thesis is in basic and fundamental conflict
with our principle that human dignity is worth-
while and that the individual has certain inalien-
able rights. On this encompassing concept of the
absolute Importance of the material rest other
501
concepts of Marx and Lenin to wliich I will now
refer.
Second, Marx and Lenin differed from our
principles in that they did not trust the people to
govern themselves — to decide for themselves
which reforms would achieve the greatest good
for the greatest number. Hence, instead of
democracy they proposed dictatorship. They pro-
posed not even a dictatorship by the majority of
the people but a dictatorship of the "proletariat,"
defined in Marxist doctrine to mean the minority
who work for wages, particularly in the mines and
in the factories. The small farmer, the student,
the white-collar worker, the intellectual, the busi-
nessman, the professional man are, in Marxist-
Leninist theory, excluded from the term "pro-
letariat." When Communist doctrine condescends
to refer to these social groups at all, it refers to
them collectively as the "toiling masses" ; no pro-
vision whatever is made for their participation in
government.
Marxist-Leninist theory recognizes two kinds of
democracies. One is "bourgeois," defined as all
those whose economic systems permit employers
of labor to own means of production. The other
is "socialist," defined as all those patterned after
the Soviet Union. In neither definition does the
quality of freedom which individuals enjoy nor
the degree of their participation in government
decisions have any relevancy.
This is a fair summary of the theory. Now let
us look for a moment at the practice.
The "proletariat" — the factory worker and the
miner — are used, as theory says they should be,
in the first violent and bloody stages of revolution.
But once the party apparatus is firmly in power,
there is no instance in all history where the prole-
tariat has actually had any voice in government.
Also used to prepare the way for the overthrow
of constitutional and parliamentary institutions
and to participate in the violent stages of revolu-
tion are individuals from all social groups who,
rightly aspiring to the correcting of social injus-
tices, have been deluded into thinking that they
are doing good for their people when they turn
them over to the tender mercies of a Communist
dictatorship.
It is diilicult to believe that these people really
understand that they themselves are, in Commu-
nist doctrine, marked for extinction. Communism
devours its own children. But it first destroys
not only the opposition but all those who are con-
sidered to he potential opposition because they
might have an independent thought of their own.
In Communist theory refusal to submit to the
"discipline" of the party is to be guilty of "devia-
tionism," the most serious of all Communist
crimes. Gratitude for help given to Communists
in difficult times is, in Communist doctrine, not a
virtue. In Communist theory the only virtue, the
only end, is to gain power for the party and then
to hold it permanently and exclusively. The means
by which this is accomplished are imimportant.
It is the Communist Party which actually rules
or, more precisely, a very small group at the top
of the party hierarchy and sometimes, as in the
case of Stalin, only one man.
Membership in the party is, of course, by invita-
tion only. But although party members consti-
tute only a small fraction of the population, a
Communist government is always a party govern-
ment, a Communist army is always a party army, a
Communist state always a party state. Party
members occupy all important government posi-
tions. They are the only ones who have and exer-
cise overall power. They are the new lords and
nobles. They are the new ruling class.
They exercise more power than any aristocracy
of the Middle Ages because they control all prop-
erty, tangible and intangible, real and personal,
agricultural and industrial. Since individuals
under their control have no property and no possi-
bility of producing wealth of their own, they have
no resources with which to oppose tyranny. This
monopoly of the "means of production" is an ef-
fective means of crushing all opposition — of de-
priving the people of what Jefferson referred to
as the "right of revolution." This is the central
reason why no country on which communism has
fastened itself has ever even temporarily regained
its freedom against the wishes of its rulers.
The Communist ruling class is more ruthless
than the old aristocracy because it is without ethics
and charity. Every Communist revolution has
been written in the blood of its people. Every
Communist regime has been built on the bones of
its people.
The point which I wish to stress here is that
the acceptance of Marxist-Leninist doctrine and
practice inevitably and automatically means the
loss of all the rights of the individual so slowly and
painfully acqtiired through the ages. It means a
return to semi feudal tenets: All industry and all
land belong to the Cro-mi; the people ai-e bound
502
Department of Stale Bulletin
to a particular industry or farm selected for them
by their rulers. It means a return to serfdom
under a new set of masters. It signifies the be-
trayal of the basic principles written into the con-
stitution of every republic.
Third, Marxist doctrine differs from our Eevo-
lution in that it sets up a new kind of tyranny over
the mind of man. Marx wrote, and Communists
still claim, that his doctrine was the only "scien-
tific" explanation of history, of events past and to
come. The doctrine claims there is no possibility
of error in it, that it is the alpha and the omega
of all truth, that it brings all reality, past, present,
and future, into one complete frame.
I suppose one should not be too surprised that
one man should claim to have a monopoly on truth,
that he should believe mankind has nothing more
to learn from experience and meditation, that the
human mind should be cast into a 19th-century
mold of dogmatism. But it seems incredible that
any intellectual of our day and time would accept
this as either noble or true.
[Milovan] Djilas is one of the most eminent
theorists in the Yugoslav Communist movement.
I do not agree with everything he has written. But
he knows communism in theory and in practice and
his descriptions of Communist tyranny over the
mind are accurate and graphic:
A citizen in the Communist system lives oppressed by
the constant pangs of his conscience, and the fear that
he has transgressed. He is always fearful that he will
have to demonstrate that he is not an enemy of
socialism. . . .
The school system and all social and intellectual activ-
ity work toward this type of behavior. From birth to
death a man is surrounded by the solicitude of the ruling
party, a solicitude for his consciousness and his conscience.
Journalists, ideologists, paid writers, special schools,
approved ruling ideas, and tremendous material means
are all enlisted and engaged in this "uplifting of social-
ism." In the final analysis, all newspapers are official.
So are the radio and other similar media. . . .
These oligarchs and soul-savers, these vigilant protec-
tors who see to it that human thought does not drift into
"criminal thought" or "anti-socialist lines" ; . . . these
holders of obsolete, unchangeable, and immutable ideas —
have retarded and frozen the intellectual impulses of their
people. They have thought up the most antihuman
words — "pluck from the human consciousness" — and
act according to these words, just as if they were dealing
with roots and weeds instead of man's thoughts. . . .
On the one hand the ideological discrimination in Com-
munist systems aims at prohibiting other ideas ; on the
other, at imposing exclusively its own ideas. These are
two most striking forms of unbelievable, total
tyranny. . . .
History will pardon Communists for much. . . . But
the stifling of every divergeut thought, the exclusive
monopoly over thinking for the purpn.se of defending their
personal interests, will nail the Communists to a cross
of shame in history.
Fourth, our Revolution held that a government
"of the people, by the people, for the people" was
desirable and necessary to guarantee the essential
rights of the individual and to protect him from
the tyrannies of classes and groups; to provide
free education for the people; to pass laws and
guarantee their administration with equal justice
for all ; to prevent man's exploitation by man ; and
to provide for the common good and for the na-
tional defense. Marxist-Leninist doctrine, on the
other hand, insists tlmt since government is the tool
of the bourgeoisie and that since the triumph of
communism will signify the abolition of classes,
government in a "classless" society will no longer
be necessary and will "wither away."
Few would dispute the triumph of the Com-
munists in the Soviet Union more than 40 years
ago. All of the "classes" that existed under the
czars were ruthlessly liquidated and a "new or-
der" was established, based on Marxist-Leninist
doctrine, in which the Commimists themselves were
the sole masters. But the Soviet Government
shows neither any sign of "withering away" or
any intention of reducing the privileges and
powers of its bureaucrats. Now more than ever the
principal purpose of the party is to perpetuate
itself in power.
Do Communist leaders today still believe in this
Utopian myth of the disappearance of the state?
This would seem doubtful even allowing for nuin's
capacity for self-deception. But they could never
admit their disbelief, not only because Marxist-
Leninist doctrine is for them a secular religion but
because to do so would remove the only doctrinal
justification they have for their rise to power by
blood and terror. So the myth remains as a hope
for their people of a better life hereafter.
Fifth, American doctrine is that it is both
feasible and inevitable that the social and economic
injustices which existed within the society of the
18th and 19th centuries will be corrected by the
people themselves operating through democratic
institutions. We have nearly 200 years of history
with which to judge this claim.
In the days of Marx a few families owned all of
the great industries. Today literally millions of
stockholders own our industry. Profits are di-
March 26, 1962
503
vided so widely that our type of capitalism today
has been accurately described as a "people's
capitalism."
Workers for wages have organized themselves
into powerful unions and confederations which
have achieved what Marx could only have con-
sidered an unbelievable miracle. The voice of
labor is one of the most powerful in our land. Old
problems of child labor, inhuman hours of work,
unfair wages, unhealthful and unsafe working
environment, and chronic, widespread unemploy-
ment have all been corrected.
Our farmer, like the worker, enjoys the highest
standard of living in history based on land and
other reforms which took place many decades ago.
Monopolies have not been tolerated since passage
of the Sherman and Clayton antitrust acts, many
years ago.
Our taxation is based on ability to pay so that it
is no longer possible to acquire very large fortunes
or to pass them on to succeeding generations. We
have achieved, in sum, a social justice that goes
hand in hand with ownership by the people of our
industries and farms. And we have achieved this
without sacrificing freedom.
In Marxian theory of 1850 none of this could
happen. Marx wrote that "class struggle" be-
tween the proletariat and the bourgeoisie was in-
evitable. More than a hundred years of history
not only in our land but in many othere proves that
this was a bad guess. But the Communists are
stuck with a doctrine they cannot abandon, and
so they must continue to talk as if we still lived in
the mid-19th century of "imperialism," "exploita-
tion," "monopolies," and "social injustice."
Persistence of Principles of American Revolution
Our principles and our faith are the product of
the experience of hundreds of millions of people
who through the ages have survived on many fron-
tiers and by trial and error progressed to ever
higher horizons of freedom and justice.
Our principles are the product of a long and
rich cultural heritage based on the philosophy of
the Greeks, the law of the Romans, the long
struggle for freedom of the peoples of the West,
on the revolutionary concepts of the Enlight-
enment.
We will not abandon our principles. We will
not surrender our freedom. We will instead re-
new our faith in our countiy, in its leadership, and
in the inevitable triumph of freedom.
ADDRESS OF FEBRUARY 28
Press release 12C dated February 28
Communism is not content with havuig already
imposed a dictatorship on hundreds of millions of
people. It seeks to impose its rule on the entire
free world. This was made clear by Marx as early
as 1848:
The Communists disdain to conceal their views and alms.
They openly declare that their ends can be attained
only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social
conditions.
Stalin said the same thing in 1924:
The revolution which has been victorious in one coun-
try [Russia] must regard Itself not as a self-sufficient
task, but as an aid, a means for hastening the victory of
the proletariat in all countries.
In 1957 Khrushchev used different words :
We have retained a great revolutionary spirit, and we
assure the comrades . . . that we shall always be true to
the principles of Marxism-Leninism, to the principles of
proletarian internationalism. . . . We give assurances
that we shall firmly hold in our hands the Leninist ban-
ner, shall confidently march towards the victory of com-
munism, and shall persistently struggle for peace through-
out the world.
The juxtaposition of the phrases "victory of
communism" and "struggle for peace" illustrates
how Communists disguise their aims behind a cur-
tain of words designed to deceive and divide peo-
ple who live in freedom. This tactic is the subject
of my remarks today.
"Nationalism" and "Internationalism"
Let us begin with two words, "nationalism" and
"internationalism," which are often used by Com-
munist orators and theorists.
Marx wrote that the "struggle of the proletariat
with the bourgeoisie is at first a national struggle."
He wrote, however, that nationalism was on its
way out and that its place would be taken by "pro-
letarian internationalism."
Wliat is this proletarian internationalism that
is to take tlie place of country? Yyshinskj- gave
a clear answer in 1948 :
At present the only determining criterion of revolution-
ary proletarian internationalism is : are you for or against
the USSR, the motherland of the world proletariat? An
internationalist is not one who verbally recognizes inter-
national solidarity or sympathizes with it. A real inter-
nationalist is one who brings his sympathy and recognition
up to the ixiint of practical and maximal liolp to the USSR
in support and defense of the USSR by every means and
in every possible form.
504
Department of State Bulletin
Stalin had said substantially the same thing
■earlier :
An internationalist is he who, unreservedly, without
hesitation, without conditions, is ready to defend the
USSR because the USSK is the base of the world revolu-
tionary movemeut.
The test of whether a person is an "internation-
alist," a "revolutionary," or a "Communist" is the
same. It was defhied over Radio Moscow in 1951 :
The strategy and tactics of a Communist Party of any
one country can be correct only If that party does not
confine itself to the interests of its own country and pro-
letariat but on the contrary, taking account of the
circumstances prevailing in that country, gives precedence
to the Interests of the international proletariat. . . .
At present a Marxist-Leninist revolutionary is he who
is completely and unconditionally prepared to defend the
USSR.
The Russians are apparently having some diffi-
culty in explaining to some Communist associates
that they should give absolute and total obedience
to the U.S.S.R. But the leaders of Communist
parties in many countries continue to make peri-
odic pilgrimages to Moscow for instructions and
training.
"Peace" and "Revolution"
It is not accidental that Communists speak of
world revolution and peace as parts of a single
concept. In 1928 the Comintern explained that
in Communist theory there is no contradiction be-
tween the two things:
The international policy of the USSR is a peace policy
which conforms to the interests of the ruling class in
Soviet Russia, viz., the proletariat. This policy rallies
all the allies of the proletarian dictatorship around its
banner and provides the best basis for taking advantage
of the antagonisms among the imperialist States. The aim
of this policy is to guard the international revolution. . . .
The proletariat in the Soviet Union harbors no illusions
as to the possibility of a durable peace with the im-
perialists. . . . There is a glaring contradiction be-
tween the imperialists' policy of piling up armaments and
their hypocritical talk about peace. There is no such
contradiction, however, between the Soviet government's
preparations for defense and for revolutionary war and
a consistent peace policy. Revolutionary war of the
proletarian dictatorship is but a continuation of revolu-
tionary peace policy "by other means."
Could anything be clearer? A "revolutionary
peace policy" and a "revolutionary war of the pro-
letarian dictatorship" are but different means to
achieve the same end.
In 1958 Khrushchev explained why a policy of
"peace" serves the revolutionary purposes of the
Soviet Union :
It is not an army, but peace that is required to propagate
communist ideas, disseminate them, and establish them
in the minds of men.
The real purpose of "peace" campaigns was
accurately described by Lenin himself :
Every "peace program" is a deception of the people and
a piece of hypocrisy unless its principal object is to ex-
plain to the masses the need for a revolution, and to
support, aid and develop the revolutionary struggle of
the masses that is starting everywhere (ferment among
the masses, protests, . . . strikes, demonstrations . . . ).
It is not strange tliat the so-called "peace" move-
ments we have seen are international rather than
national in character. They are not indigenous.
They are launched from Moscow in many coun-
tries simultaneously. They are real and authentic
Soviet tactics described by Lenin in these words:
The strictest loyalty to the ideas of Communism must
be combined with the ability to make all the necessary
practical compromises, to "tack," to make agreements,
zigzags, retreats and so on, in order to accelerate [world
revolution].
"Self-Determination"
Now let us consider for a moment the phrase
"self-determination."
The United Nations Charter speaks of peaceful
and "friendly relations among nations based on
respect for the prmciple of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples" and of "universal re-
spect for, and observance of, human rights and
fimdamental freedoms for all."
This same concept of the "self-determination of
peoples" is contained in the Charter of the Organ-
ization of American States, which says :
The solidarity of the American States and the high
aims which are sought through it require the political
organization of those States on the basis of the effective
exercise of representative democracy.
By definition, then, the phrase "self-determina-
tion" is incomplete without the words "of peoples."
And how do the people determine their destinies?
They can do so only on the basis of the effective
exercise of representative democracy and respect
for human rights and fundamental freedoms.
There has never been a dictator who did not
claim to represent the will of the majority of
the people even as he uses fear and terror to sup-
press opposition. But free men are not fooled by
this tactic, and they will continue to believe that
March 26, 7962
505
the principle of self-determination does not pro-
tect dictators and Communist intervention but is
rather an obligation on the part of dictators to
give every people an opportunity to exercise their
fundamental right to cast their ballots in demo-
cratic elections.
Indeed, to Communists the term "self-determi-
nation" is completely foreign to the idea that the
people have a right to determine their own destiny.
As Lenin explained :
The right of nations to self-determination means only
the right to independence in a political sense, the right to
free, political secession from the oppressing nation.
And this concept of political secession is closely
related to the Communist aim of dividing the free
world. As Bukharin said to the party congress in
Russia :
If we propound the solution of the right of self-deter-
mination for the colonies — we lose nothing by it. On the
contrary, we gain, for the national gain as a whole will
damage foreign imperialism. . . . The most outright na-
tionalist movement, for example that of the Hindus, Is
only water for our mill, since it contributes to the destruc-
tion of English imperialism.
Lenin had previously said the same thing :
As long as we have not conquered the whole world . . .
we must adhere to the rule that we . . . take advantage
of the antagonisms and contradictions existing among the
imperialists.
Another interesting aspect of the Communist
definition of self-determination is that it applies
only to the democracies. We need only to look at
history to understand tliat it has never been
applied to Communist countries.
In 1920 Russia crushed Azerbaijan, Khiva,
Bokhara, and Armenia. In 1921 the independent
state of Georgia fell, and in 1923 the Ukraine. In
the confusion preceding and during the Second
World War there were added to the Soviet empire
parts of Finland, the eastern provinces of Poland,
the Rumanian provinces of Bessarabia and Buko-
vina, and the independent states of Estonia, Lat-
via, and Lithuania, the Konigsberg area, slices of
Czechoslovakia, South Sakhalin, the Kurile Is-
lands, and Tannu Tuva. Following the last war
Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania,
Czechoslovakia, and China were swallowed up, to
say nothing of East Germany, North Viet-Nam,
and North Korea. The threats to West Berlin
and Laos are the latest moves.
Wliere is the right of the peoples in all these
lands to independence and self-determination?
The reality is they have no right to make even
such elementary determinations as where they will
live and work and whether they will go from one
place to another. Millions of East Germans es-
caped to freedom before tlie wall was built divid-
ing Berlin. But hundreds of millions behind the
Iron Curtain are forbidden the right even to
cross the Iron Curtain because they would be able
to compare their living standards with those of
other peoples and learn of freedom.
"Intervention" and "Aggression"
And now let us turn to the word "intervention,"
which in Communist jargon is often referred to
as "interference" and "aggression."
Lenin explains the Conamunist definition :
Obviously ... it is not the offensive or the defensive
character of the war, but the interests of the class strug-
gle of the proletariat, or, rather, the interests of the inter-
national movements of the proletariat that represent the
only possible point of view from which the question of the
attitude of Social-Democracy towards a given phenomenon
in international relations can be considered. . . .
The character of a war (whether reactionary or revolu-
tionary) is not determined by who the aggressor was, or
whose land the "enemy" has occupied. It is determined
by the class which is waging the war, and the politics of
which the war is the continuation.
In the Soviet definition a war is a "just" war,
and an intervention or interference is proper and
legal, if it has as its purpose the imposition of
Communist domination, which they call "libera-
tion." They are "unjust" and "illegal" if they
are actions taken to resist subversion or invasion
by Communists. Thus in the Korean conflict the
Soviets argued that it was the United Nations
rather than the invading North Koreans and
Chinese "volunteers" who were the aggressors.
The basis for this definition is the Communist
assertion that Communist states are by their very
nature incapable of aggression or of intervention
since they represent dictatorship by the proletariat
and are "building" a classless international society
which they assert will bring permanent peace — a
Pax Muscovite.
We have quite a dilferent definition of aggres-
sion and intervention. It is based on established
principles of international law and morality. In
our definition the use of force and subversion by a
foreign power to overthrow a constitutional gov-
ernment, or the use of force by a foreign power to
install and maintain a dictatorship against the will
506
Department of State Bulletin
of the people, is the essence of intervention. This
is especially true where the objective of the foreign
power is not to help a people regain their right
to govern themselves but to impose hegemony of
the world Communist movement. For the free
•world this is not merely a juridical question ; it in-
volves their survival in freedom.
"Imperialism"
"Imperialism" is another word from the Marx-
ist-Leninist dictionary that is often applied to
free-world countries and to the United States in
particular.
In Webster's dictionary imperialism is defined
as:
The policy, practice, or advocacy of seeking to extend
the control, dominion, or empire of a nation.
It may strike my fellow citizens as odd that a
nation which has subjugated hundreds of millions
of people and whose policies aim at world domina-
tion should describe as imperialist a nation whose
flag flies over no people against their will and
which has no desire to impose itself on others. We
must therefore look for a new and different defini-
tion— a Communist definition. Lenin gives us the
answer :
Imperialism is capitalism in that stage of development
In which the domination of monopolies and finance capital
has established itself; In which the export of capital has
acquired pronounced importance ; in which the division
of the world among the international trusts has begun.
Let us look at some of the words in this defini-
tion and the ideas conjured up by them.
First, Lenin says we are imperialists because we
are capitalists. Capital is defined by Webster as :
A stock of accumulated wealth ; specifically : . . . (b)
An aggregation of (economic) goods used to promote the
production of other goods, instead of being valuable solely
for immediate enjoyment
Obviously every economy, including that of the
Soviet Union, has and uses capital. Otherwise it
would not be possible to build industry or agricul-
ture.
There is, however, a difference in who owns the
capital.
In the United States capital is owned by tens of
millions of people. Ownership is so widely
diffused that our system is often called a "people's
capitalism." In the Soviet Union capital is owned
by the state or, more precisely, by those who man-
age the state, the new Russian ruling class. Thus
Russia has a system of state capitalism; we have
a system of private ownership of capital.
And this brings us to some other words in
Lenin's definition. He says we are imperialists
because we have monopolies and trusts. This is
one of the great deceptions in the Communist
dialectic.
The Soviet system of international trade does
not consist of a number of monopolies; it consists
of a single monopoly, the Soviet trading organ-
ization. If a nation wants to trade with the Soviet
Union, there is only one organization to deal with.
This organization tixes artificially the prices of
Russian exports. In this way it also determines,
for all practical purposes, the value of the goods
Russia imports. This is the technique of barter.
But even allowing for the "padding" of the prices
of Russian exports, the prices which Russia pays
for its miports seldom exceed, and sometimes do
not equal, the prices fixed by competition in the
free markets of the world.
The best evidence of Soviet generosity in inter-
national trade is to be found in the comparative
rates of economic growth in recent decades as be-
tween the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and its
satellites on the other. East Germany, Rumania,
Bulgaria, Hungary, and other satellites have had
a painfully slow rate of economic growth while
that of Russia has been relatively high. But of
course the fact that the people in the poor satellite
countries work hard without progressing is not
Soviet economic "imperialism." It is "socialist
cooperation."
In contrast those who engage in international
trade with the free world may not only choose be-
tween countries which compete with each other in
price and quality ; they may choose their supplier
within a country and negotiate with him in the
certain knowledge that liis competitors within the
same country are anxious to bid. Since prices are
ruled largely by the cost of labor and materials in
a free competitive system, the successful exporter
is the one who by his own initiative has achieved
greater efficiency or who is willing to accept a
smaller margin of profit.
But here again the best evidence of who is the
real exploiter is to be found in the comparative
rates of economic growth as between the United
States and its trading partners. If we look at
Latin America the figures for the last decade show
March 26, 1962
507
that their economic growth rate lias been twice
as high as that of the United States and much
higher than those countries surrounding Russia
•which have been "liberated" by the Soviet Union.
The truth is tliere have been no "monopolies" or
"trusts" in the United States since the passage of
antitrust legislation by our Congress many years
ago. Our system is based on the principle that
producers must be competitive in order to survive.
All attempts to fix prices, to divide markets — all
practices limiting competition — are promptly
penalized by civil and even criminal actions in our
courts. But since the Communist dialectic was
cast by Marx in a 19th-century mold of dogma-
tism, Communists must continue to talk in terms
of practices which have long since disappeared in
the free world.
Monopolies and trusts do exist today in the
Soviet Union. It is the Soviets who fit squarely
into Lenin's definition of economic imperialism.
Finally, Lenin's definition says we are imperial-
ists because we export capital, because the export
of our capital has acquired "pronounced impor-
tance" and tends to "divide" the world between
foreign investors.
One of the ways in which the United States ex-
ports capital is by loans and grants from the
public sector of its economy. Yet Communist
governments, which profess to being disciples of
Marx and Lenin and wliich constantly talk about
"imperialism," are eager to obtain United States
Government aid and loans. They apparently do
not consider that United States economic aid of-
fends their sovereignty or subjects them to ex-
ploitation. How, then, can these same Communist
countries assert with a straight face that the export
of capital from the United States public sector
to countries which have not been "liberated" by
the Communists constitutes United States "im-
perialism"?
Our people have been willing to make unparal-
leled sacrifices to help free nations develop eco-
nomically and socially. I hope they will continue
to do so under such programs as the Alliance for
Progress prescribed in tlie Bogota ' and Punta del
Este^ agreements. These programs of aid are
nobly inspired in the best American traditions.
They are among our best contributions to world
peace and progress. But we do not force our
' For text, see Bulletin of Oct. 3, 1960, p. 537.
' For text, see ibid., Sept. 11, 1961, p. 463.
loans on those who believe our programs are "im-
perialistic." We need our capital for our own
development. We do not even quarrel with coun-
tries which prefer to generate their own develop-
ment capital through intensified efforts to mobilize
their own resources.
The same considerations apply to the export of
United States development capital through private
enterprise. We have been willing to permit in-
vestments of our capital in other countries to speed
up others' economic progress. I hope we will con-
tinue to be able to do this in spite of our balance-
of-payments and other problems. But here again
we need our private capital for our own develop-
ment. We have no wish to force it on others. We
will always concede others the right to choose a
slower rate of economic growth by discouraging
new United States private investments and by
purchasing existing United States private invest-
ments at their fair value. Unfortunately the prin-
cipal obstacle to a faster rate of purchase is the
reluctance of others to accept the smaller profits
and higher reinvestment ratios which are the proud
hallmark of the United States capitalist.
But perhaps the greatest error in the Marxian
dialectic of economic imperialism was Marx's mis-
calculations of the importance of foreign capital
in world economic development. We now know
from experience unavailable to Marx that ap-
proximately 90 percent of development capital is
of domestic origin. Only about 10 percent is for-
eign. Obviously then the rate of economic growth
is primarily determined by internal policies and
practices of the developing country, by the degree
of confidence on the part of domestic investors,
by national fiscal, monetary, and investment poli-
cies, by the selfless dedication of public servants
to economic and social progress and other do-
mestic factors. These are the decisive ingredients
of growth. United States public and private cap-
ital can supplement but it can never be a substitute
for domestic effort and domestic policies.
Finally it should be pointed out that United
States private foreign investments have never ac-
quired the "pronounced importance" predicted
by Marx. Our foreign investments are largest
in the highly industrialized countries of Western
Europe and Canada. In the developing countries,
our foreign investments constitute only a very
small fraction of our invested capital. It also
constitutes only a small part of the capital of other
countries. It is economic nonsense and the most
508
Deparlment of Sfafe Bulletin
blatant demagoguery to say that nonexistent
"trusts" are "dividinc;" the world between them.
Yet this is another Marxian myth which lives on,
like the tales of Alice in Wonderland^ by the sheer
force of repetition. But in any case the trend is
toward reducing still further the proportion of
United States investments. In the last few months
the rate of new United States private investments
in Latin America has declined by approximately
66 percent.
Comparison of Soviet and U.S. Economic Systems
There are various ways in which the compara-
tive merits of the United States and Soviet sys-
tems of ownership and control of capital can be
tested. But since the avowed purpose of com-
mimism is to help the common man, let us apply
this test : Which system has actually achieved the
highest standard of living for its people?
The answer is clear. Our free-enterprise indus-
try has concentrated principally on producing
consumer goods which directly and immediately
benefit the people. State capitalism in the Soviet
Union has been principally employed in the manu-
facture of capital goods, particularly armaments.
The result is apparent for all to see. Our farm-
ers, our factory workers, our miners, our profes-
sional workers, our artists — our masses of
people — enjoy an infinitely higher standard of
living than do the Soviet people. The proof is
that leaders of the Soviet Government, after 40
years in power, continue to speak about "reaching
and overtaking" us.
T\Tiether one talks in terms of gross national
product or in terms of per capita income or in
terms of volume of production for the consumer
the Soviet Union has a long way to go to catch up
with the United States. And with the emergence
of the European Common Market, which has more
people and more industrial capacity than the
Soviet Union, the latter has been relegated not to
second but to third place.
The essentially competitive character of our
economy is the best guarantee of constant improve-
ment in efficiency of our production. This has
and will continue to translate itself into higher
quality goods at a lower cost and in greater quan-
tity for the people. The living standards of any
people depend on the abundance, the quality, and
the cost of goods produced plus the purchasing
power of the people who need the goods.
Deception by Semantics
There are other words in the Marxist-Leninist
dictionary that could be discussed if time per-
mitted. They have, however, the same common
denominator: All definitions must be consistent
with and support the myth that the Soviet Union
is a "democracy" of a "classless society" which
holds "free elections" and is the leader among the
"peace-loving" world Communist movement.
I believe someone has already observed that the
international Communist conspiracy cannot bring
rationality and order to international life. It can
only make a virtue of chaos, delusion a habit, crisis
a necessity, deception a principle of conduct, and
paranoia a synonym for achievement.
The few who have taken the time to learn about
Communist doctrines are not fooled because they
understand that Marxist-Leninist definitions bear
little or no relation to our words as we understand
them. But many do not know the dialectic. And
they are deceived by Commiuiist appropriation of
the words they like best because they associate them
with all that is good and noble in the past.
Because of the success of the American Revolu-
tion and the wide acceptance of its principles we
are not as aware as we should be of the urgent
need to awake from our "sleep of the just." In
these critical times, when even the meanings of our
most cherished precepts are placed in doubt, all
who love freedom should make a personal effort
to combat this deception by semantics. The most
effective way to do this is by word and deed to
affirm and reaffirm the true meanings of those pre-
cepts to which throughout our history we have
pledged our honor, our fortune, and, many times,
our lives.
The Communists have been persistent and ex-
plicit about the meanings they attach to our pre-
cepts. We must be equally persistent and explicit
in making clear that the American people continue
to support those principles which have flourished
on our soil and which have ever been the hope of
mankind.
March 26, 1962
509
Secretary Greets Voice of America
on 20th Anniversary
Remarks hy Secretary Rush ^
Wlien the Continental Congress sent instruc-
tions some 185 years ago to Benjamin Franklin,
the father of our diplomacy, for his conduct at
the court of France, there were two which had
the flavor of modern times :
Tou are to lay before the court the deranged state of
our finances. . . . and show the necessity of placing them
on a more respectable footing. . . .
Tou are, by every means in your power, to promote a
perfect harmony, concord, and good understanding, not
only between the allied powers, but also between and
among their subjects, that the connexion so favourably
begun may be perpetuated.
Franklin was assiduous in telling America's
story to what we would now call opinion molders,
as well as officials, and made good use of an un-
steady flow of newspapers, gazettes, and pamphlets
for that purpose.
Information has been an ancient arm of di-
plomacy, growing with the means available and
with the increasing role of ordinary citizens in
the course of public afi'airs.
Diplomacy today has many dimensions — eco-
nomic and technical assistance, military aid, and
information and cultural activities among them.
Today we proudly mark the 20th anniversary of
the Voice of America, one of the oldest of the
modem American ventures in international in-
formation.
I say "modern" because periodically through
our history we have sought to explain ourselves
to the people of the world as well as to their
leaders. Our first efforts, in fact, date back to
the very beginnings of this nation, when our Dec-
laration of Independence noted the American de-
sire for a "decent respect to the opinions of man-
kind."
Although we made a small effort during the
First World War, it was not until World War II
that we Americans fully realized how much our
country's security and stature depended on what
ordinary people everywhere thought of us, our
institutions and our intentions. In 1942. at the
'Made at Washington, D.C., on Feb. 26 (press release
124) at ceremonies marking the anniversary.
high-water mark of enemy advance, President
Roosevelt launched the Voice of America and
shortly thereafter asked the celebrated radio news
analyst Elmer Davis to head an Office of War In-
formation and tell America's story to the world.
After the war the United States for the first
time made information activities a permanent part
of our work abroad. Today we in the State De-
partment consider the information program an
indispensable dimension of American diplomacy.
The Voice of America and our other information
activities demonstrate our respect for the opinions
of people as well as their governments.
We in this country define responsible govern-
ment as that which is responsible to, and periodi-
cally accountable to, the people in whose name it
acts. However, not every government accepts this
definition. And yet even in these countries public
opinion is not a negligible factor in the considera-
tions of their rulers. It is precisely in those coun-
tries in which public participation is the smallest
where the greatest precautions are taken to control
the information reaching the public.
If, then, the public in coimtries controlled by
dictatorships can exercise a moderating influence
on their government officials, we must see to it
that the public knows the facts. It must have
more information than its own governments are
willing to make available. This is an important
part of the job of the U.S. Information Agency
and its Voice of America.
Thus the first responsibility of the Voice of
America is to broadcast the news, fully and fairly.
This the Voice is doing, and it should not be
otherwise. In its commentaries the Voice of
America should explain clearly the policies and
views of the United States Govermnent. This the
Voice is doing, and it should not be otherwise.
These days VOA commentaries deal with the
most important subjects of current affairs: the
Berlin crisis, and our determination that this city
shall remain free and accessible; disarmament,
and our determination to reach agreement on an
effective program of general and complete dis-
armament; the United Nations, and our determi-
nation that this peacekeeping body shall be
strengthened, not weakened; man's desire to
choose liis own future, and our determination that
freedom of choice shall be cherished and extended ;
and tlio efforts of newly developing nations to
510
Department of Slate Bulletin
niotlernize their economies and societies, and our
determination to lielp them.
Now 20 years old, the international information
program is a full-fledged partner in the conduct
of American foreign affairs. I welcome and ap-
preciate this opportunity to participate in these
ceremonies marking the 20th birthday of the Voice
of America. My colleagues in the State Depart-
ment at home and abroad join me in wishing this
voice of freedom many happy returns of the day.
With confidence in the future of our country
and free men everywhere, I am certain there will
be many more such happy anniversaries.
Regional Operations Conference
Meets at Baguio
The Department of State announced on March
8 (press release 150) that it would hold a Far
East Regional Operations Conference at Baguio,
Philippines, March 12-14. United States ambas-
sadors and other top U.S. officials from 17 Far
Eastern posts were expected to attend.
The 3-day conference was chaired by Chester
Bowles, the President's Special Representative
and Adviser on African, Asian, and Latin Ameri-
can Affairs. It followed a 2-day Far East chiefs-
of-mission meeting, also at Baguio, on March 10
and 11, under the chairmanship of W. Averell
Harriman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far
Eastern Affairs.
The Regional Operations Conference is similar
to those held last year in Nigeria, India, Cyprus,
Peru, and Costa Rica for senior U.S. representa-
tives in Africa, South Asia, the Middle East, and
Latin America. A major purpose of the confer-
ence is to strengthen and coordinate U.S. opera-
tions in the Far East by emphasizing the role of
the ambassador as coordinator of all U.S. Govern-
ment activities in the country of assignment. This
concept was the subject of a Presidential letter to
all ambassadors last May.'
Accompanying the ambassadors to the con-
ference were the chiefs of the U.S. Information
Service, the administrators of U.S. foreign aid,
and the heads of the U.S. Military Assistance
Groups.
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Migration
Coustitution of the Intergovernmental Committee for
European Migration. Adopted at Venice October 19,
1953. Entered Into force November 30, 1954. TIAS
3197.
Acceptances deposited: Bolivia, December 1, 1960; Ecua-
dor, November 12, 1959 ; Panama, November 13, 1958 ;
United Kingdom, May 11, 1961.
Notifications of withdrawal: Federation of Rhodesia
and Nyasaland, March 22, 1960, effective December 31,
1960; Sweden, June 21, 1961, effective December 31,
1961.
Narcotic Drugs
Protocol for limiting and regulating the cultivation of
the poppy plant, the production of, international and
wholesale trade in, and use of opium. Done at New
Yorl< June 23, 1953.'
Notification received that it considers itself bound:
Cameroon, January 15, 1902.
Telecommunications
International telecommunication convention with six
annexes. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered
into force January 1, 1961 ; for the United States
October 23, 1961. TIAS 4892.
Ratification deposited: Australia (including the Terri-
tories of Papua, Norfolk Island, Cocos (Keeling) Is-
lands, Christmas Island, and the Trust Territories of
New Guinea and Nauru), February 1, 1962.'
Radio regulations, with appendixes, annexed to the inter-
national telecommunication convention, 1959 (TIAS
4892). Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered
into force May 1, 1961 ; for the United States October 23,
1961. TIAS 4893.
Notification of approval: Australia (including the Ter-
ritories of Papua, Norfolk Island, Cocos (Keeling) I.s-
lands, Christmas Island, and the Trust Territories of
New Guinea and Nauru), February 1, 1962.
Trade and Commerce
Agreements relating to the multilateral General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade, signed during the 1960-61
tariff conference at Geneva :
Interim agreements, with schedules. Signed March 5-7,
1962, with the following countries : Denmark, Finland,
Israel, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Portugal,
Sweden (subject to ratification by Sweden), and Swit-
zerland, March 5, 1962; Austria (subject to ratification
by Austria) and Japan (subject to approval), March 6,
1962 ; Canada, European Economic Community, and
United Kingdom, March 7, 1962. The concessions set
forth in the schedule of a party take effect (or will be
applied), except as otherwise provided in the schedule,
.30 days after the date on which that party has notified
' For text, see Bth-letin of Dec. 11, 1961, p. 993.
March 26, 7962
■ Not in force.
" With reservations contained in final protocol.
511
the other party of its intention to put such concessions
into effect (or has given notification of application to
the other party), except that the concessions set forth
in the schedule of New Zealand take effect on July 1,
1962.
Agreement with the European Economic Community pur-
suant to artiile XXIV :(5 of the General Asreement on
Tariffs and Trade. Signed March 7, 1962. The con-
cessions set forth in the .schedule shall take effect on
the same date as that on which the schedule of the
European Community annexed to the interim agreement
between the United States and the European Economic
Community takes effect.
Joint declaration with the European Economic Commu-
nity. Signed March 7, 1962.
Agreement with the European Economic Community and
its member states with respect to corn, sorghum, ordi-
nary wheat, rice, and poultry. Signed March 7, 1962.
Agreement with respect to quality wheat with the Euro-
pean Economic Community, the member states of the
European Economic Community, and non-European
Economic Community countries signatory to the agree-
ment. Signed March 7, 1962.
Agreements providing compensatory concessions under
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade for certain
tariff actions taken by the United States. Effected
by exchanges of letters with the following countries on
the dates Indicated : Belgium, Luxembourg, and Neth-
erlands, January 29 and February 1, 1962; Denmark,
January 26 and February 12, 1962; Federal Republic
of Germany, January 29, 1962; Italy, December 8 and 9,
1961, and March 7, 1962; Japan, February 9, 1962;
United Kingdom, January 26 and February 16, 1962.
Acknotcledyed applicable rights and obligations of United
Kingdom: Tanganyika, January 18, 1962, with respect
to the following :
Protocol of rectification to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade. Signed at Habana March 24, 1948.
Entered into force March 24, 1948. TIAS 1761.
Protocol modifying certain provisions of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Habana
March 24, 1948. Entered into force April 15, 1948.
TIAS 1763.
Special protocol modifying article XIV of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Habana
March 24, 1948. Entered Into force April 19, 1048.
TIAS 1764.
Special protocol relating to article XXIV of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Signed at Habana
March 24, 1948. Entered into force June 7, 1948.
TIAS 1765.
Second protocol of rectifications to the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade. Signed at Geneva Sep-
tember 14, 1948. Entered into force September 14,
1948. TIAS 1888.
Protocol modifying part I and article XXIX of the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Signed at
Geneva Se|)teniber 14, 1948. Entered into force Sep-
tember 24, 19.j2. TIAS 2744.
Protocol modifying part II .nnd article XX^'I of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Signed at
Geneva September 14, 1948. Entered into force Decem-
ber 14, 1948. TIAS 1800.
First protocol of modifications to the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Aiinecy August 13, 1949.
Entered Into force September 24, 19.">2. TIAS 274.'').
Third protocol of r-ectlHcatlons to the General Agreement
on Tiiriffs iind Trade. Done at Annecy August 13, 1949.
Entered Into force October 21. 19r,l. TIAS 2.".!)3.
Protocol modifying" iirticle XXVI of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Annecy August 13,
1940. Entered into force March 28, 1000. TIAS 2300.
Protocol replacing schedule I (Australia) of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Annecy
August 13, 1949. Entered into force October 21, 1051.
TIAS 2394.
Protocol replacing schedule VI (Ceylon) of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Annecy
August 13, 1949. Entered into force September 24,
1952. TIAS 2746.
United Nations
Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization. Done at London Novem-
ber 16, 1945. Entered into force November 4, 1946.
TIAS 1580.
Signature and acceptance: Mauritania, January 10,
1062.
BILATERAL
Austria
Agreement amending the agreement of June 6, 1950, as
amended (TIAS 2072 and 3279), for the financing of
certain educational exchange programs. Effected by
exchange of notes at Vienna January 9 and March 13,
1901. Entered into force March 13, 1901.
Canada
(Convention for avoidance of double taxation and preven-
tion of fiscal evasion with re.spect to taxes on the
estates of deceased persons. Signed at Washington
February 17, 1961."
Ratified by the President of the United States: Feb-
ruary 7, 1962.
Greece
Agreement correcting convention for avoidance of double
taxation and prevention of fiscal evasion with respect
to taxes on income of February 20, 1950 (TIAS 2902).
Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Novem-
ber 20 and December 10, 1061. Entered Into force
December 19, 1961.
Indonesia
Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act
of 1054, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709),
with exchanges of notes. Signed at Djakarta Febru-
ary 19, 1962. Entered into force February 19, 1062.
Iran
Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act
of 1054. as amended (68 Stat. 4.-)5 ; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1700),
with exchange of notes of January 29 and February 8,
1962. Signed at Tehran January 29, 1962. Entered
into force January 20, 1962.
Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agree-
ment of Jnnuary 20, 1962. Effected by exchange of
notes at Tehran February 17 and 20, 1962. Entered
into force February 20, 1962.
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Agreement on exchanges In the scientific, technical, edu-
cational, cultural, and other fields in 1962-1903.
Signed at Washington March S, 1902. Entered into
force March 8, 1962.
' Not in force.
512
Department of Sfafe Bulletin
THE CONGRESS
Speech Review Procedures of the Department of State
Following are texts of a statement made by
Under Secretary George W. Ball and remarks
made hy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs
Roger W. Tubby before the Special Preparedness
Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Com-
mittee on February 27.
STATEMENT BY MR. BALL
Press release 127 dated February 27
I come before this subcommittee this morning
as the first witness to speak on behalf of the De-
partment of State. I am pleased to add my testi-
mony to that of representatives of the Department
of Defense and officers of the armed services who
have testified earlier. Their testimony has dis-
closed a fairly general agreement that speeches to
be made by senior representatives of the United
States Government, whether military or civilian,
and which deal with matters of foreign policy,
should be reviewed by the Department of State
to insure not only that the Government speaks
with one voice but that that voice advances and
does not impair our foreign policy.
But, even granting that the review of speeches
may be necessary, this committee is quite properly
concerned that the procedures for review be appro-
priate and that the principles applied in recom-
mending deletions or alterations be sound and
consistent.
Let me start with the principles.
In the conduct of United States foreign policy
we are aware every day that the United States is
an open society. In many ways this makes the
conduct of an effective foreign policy more com-
plex and difficult. "VVe live in a house with open
windows, and the whole world hears what we say
to one another.
But we would not change the system. Not only
does it reflect the fundamental values in which we
believe, but we are the stronger for it. Since
foreign policy in a democracy is responsive to
public opinion, it has the incalculable advantage
of a broadly based popular support, particularly
when our people are as informed, alert, aware of
world events as they are in this country.
It is therefore essential, as this subcommittee
has recognized, that those officials of the Govern-
ment who are responsible for the formulation and
administration of our foreign policy should be
diligent in keeping the American people advised
as to what they are doing and why they are doing
it.
This is, of course, the principal purpose to be
served by speeches of American officials to Amer-
ican audiences — the purpose of advising and
informing.
Four Audiences for Foreign Policy Speeches
When a representative of the United States
seeks to advise or inform the American people in
a public speech, he should be fully aware — Lu the
extent that his speech touches on the foreign policy
of the United States — that he is speaking not to
one audience but to at least four. The extent to
which the speaker's voice is likely to be heard by
all four audiences is directly related to the de-
gree and character of his official responsibility.
Wliat are those four audiences to which I refer?
First, of course, the American domestic audience.
Speechwriters and speechmakers, whether or not
they happen in a particular case to be one and the
same person, quite naturally design speeches pri-
marily for the immediate audience — whether the
audience in the hall or that larger American pub-
lic reached through radio, television, or the news
media.
But a speech well designed for the American do-
mestic audience may not serve equally well the
purposes of our country if it is also heard or read
March 26, 7962
513
by the three other audiences who are watching and
listening. What are those audiences?
First, the peoples and governments in the coun-
tries allied with us in our common struggle to pre-
serve freedom.
Second, the peoples and governments in those
countries — many of which have just acquired na-
tion status — that are uncommitted in the strug-
gle between the free world and the Sino-Soviet
bloc but whose independence and continued re-
sistance to Communist infiltration or aggression is
a vital concern to all of us.
Third, the Communist leadership in the Iron
Curtain countries, which operates a gigantic
propaganda machine that feeds on the distortion
of public statements by representatives of the
American Government, whether civilian or
military.
It is clearly too much to expect that officers in
our Military Establishment or officials of Gov-
ernment departments other than the Department
of State, who speak on aspects of our foreign
policy, should be fully informed as to the exact
construction that may be placed upon their words
in countries allied to us or in the uncommitted na-
tions, or be able to anticipate the manner in which
their words may be distorted by the propaganda
machinery of the Commimist bloc.
It is out of concern for the impact of speeches
on these latter three audiences, as well as on the
American domestic audience, that the State De-
partment has been entrusted with the review of
speeches not only by its own officers but by civilian
and military officers throughout the executive
branch. In performing this role what are tlie
considerations that miist enter into such a review ?
Considerations Entering into Review of Speeches
The effect of foreign policy statements made in
any speech is necessarily a fvmction of the time
in which the speech is made, events or trends
visible or invisible that may affect international
relations, and the position and responsibility of
the speaker.
Let me comment on each of these.
First, the timing of statements must he con-
sidered in relation to events of foreign policy sig-
nificance that are taking place or impending.
Consider, for example, the first part of 1961 : In
February the United Nations Security Council
was debating the strengthening of the United Na-
tions mandate in the Congo, against the back-
ground of the murder of [Patrice] Lumumba. In
March nuclear test talks resumed in Geneva. In
April came the Cuban crisis. Then the United
States and the United Kingdom presented a draft
treaty for a nuclear test ban at the Geneva talks,
and a week later we agreed to a call for a cease-fire
in Laos. In the same month [Yuri] Gagarin
orbited the earth and there was the so-called "re-
volt of the generals" against the Government of
France. In May the 14-nation conference on Laos
opened at Geneva, with foreign ministers in at-
tendance. In June the President went on an ex-
tensive trip abroad which included his Vienna
meeting with Premier Khrushchev.
These are only some of the most important
events which occurred in a space of only 5 months
to contribute to the changing climate in which
speeches were to be delivered. In addition there
was, and is at all times, an imending stream of
smaller but nonetheless significant happenings —
debates in the United Nations, speeches and state-
ments by foreign leaders, visits by heads of state
to this country or other countries, international
conferences, and the like. Moreover, there are at
all times confidential conversations imder way be-
tween nations — discussions that in tlie nature of
diplomatic discourse cannot be publicly disclosed.
Unless one is professionally immersed in these
events, he will not know how a particular utter-
ance may affect the development of this kaleido-
scopic pattern.
Second, toe must consider the interpretation that
may be given the speech in the light of the posi-
tion and responsibility of the speaker. Two con-
siderations must be borne in mind in tliis
connection.
One is the well-established tradition in demo-
cratic societies that civilians not only administer
but enunciate foreign policy. This is clearly im-
derstood within the American Government, and
I suppose that no one would question the prin-
ciple. However, it is important that it be observed
in practice. This is one of the considerations that
enters into the review of speeches.
The other consideration is that special attention
must be given to the effect on world opinion of
statements by high-ranking officers wlio conmiand
the vast military power of the United States. A
"bellicose" speech by a general or admiral charged
with responsibility for the deployment and em-
ployment of our military might is not likely to
514
Department of State Bulletin
frighten the governments in the Communist bloc
countries. Our experience has shown that those
governments are impressed not with words but
with the hard facts of our military capability.
Thus, for example, the Soviet Government has
unquestionably taken into accoimt our recent mili-
tary buildup in shaping its policies during the
Berlin crisis.
Not only will the Soviet leaders be immune
from threatening words of a high-ranking Amer-
ican military officer, but the people in the bloc
countries will be immimized. They will not hear
them at all — unless it serves the purposes of Com-
munist policy to permit them to do so.
The real impact of "warlike" statements by our
military leaders is most likely to be felt on the
other two audiences — the governments and peoples
in the Allied countries and in the uncommitted
nations.
One of the pernicious myths that the Soviet
propaganda machine seeks to spread around the
world is that America is dominated by a blood-
thirsty and irresponsible military clique prepared
to unleash atomic destruction unless kept in check
by Communist might. Anyone who keeps abreast
of the Communist propaganda line put forth by
the Soviet or Chinese radio or set out in the
speeches of Communist officials or in Communist
publications must necessarily be impressed with
the amount of space and time devoted to this at-
tempt to create the impression that United States
policy is dominated by warmongering generals
and admirals.
The absurdity of this propaganda does not nec-
essarily diminish its effectiveness among people
who have either been sealed off from direct access
to the free world or who are so ill-informed or
ill-educated that they lack the ability for critical
judgment. For this reason it is imperative that
statements by high-ranking officers of our Mili-
tary Establishment be given scrutiny by profes-
sionals versed in the techniques of Communist
propaganda. Statements may be perfectly well
intentioned and factually quite accurate. They
may be of a kind that would be fully imderstood
by the American audience to which they are ad-
dressed. Yet they may still lend themselves to
being wrenched out of context and distorted for
the malign purposes of the Commimist propa-
ganda machine. Employed in this manner, they
can create among our allies a false impression of
recklessness, while seriously undermining the
good faith and peaceful intentions of America
among the peoples of the micommitted nations.
There is, of course, a time and a place for vig-
orous statements with regard to the magnitude of
our military might. But we should employ such
statements only after careful consideration of all
the circumstances, so that they will contribute to
the objectives of American foreign and defense
policy rather than provide material for distortion
by those who would destroy lis. For example, the
President's speech in July on the Berlin crisis^
was designed to, and did, drive home the effective
buildup we were making and the seriousness of
our intentions.
How the Reviewing Procedure Operates
Let me turn now to the procedures which the
State Department follows in applying these prin-
ciples to the review of speeches and other public
statements.
The Department of Defense has been submit-
ting an increasing volume of material for review.
In 1959 it forwarded to the State Department
283 speeches, 218 articles, and 27 press releases —
a total of 528 matters for review.
In 1960 it forwarded 368 speeches, 257 articles,
and 78 press releases — a total of 703 matters for
review, or an increase of 175.
Last year it sent us 598 speeches, 495 articles,
and 86 press releases — a total of 1,179 matters for
review, or an increase of 476 over the preceding
year.
Of the speeches included in the above statistics
approximately 75 percent were to be delivered by
military officers, the remainder by civilians in the
Defense Department.
Let me describe briefly how this procedure
operates.
As you well know, the Department of Defense
decides in the first instance whether a particular
speech by a military or civilian representative of
that Department appears to involve some aspect
of om- foreign policy so as to need review by the
State Department. Once a speech is received by
the Department of State, our procedures are de-
signed primarily to insure that any statements in
that speech relevant to particular aspects of our
foreign policy are examined by those officers in
the Department who are engaged in the direction
and execution of that aspect of policy. This is
' For text, see Buixetin of Aug. 14, 1961, p. 267.
March 26, 1962
515
essential to an effective review system, since in
many instances only the top officers in a par-
ticular bureau of the State Department concerned
with a specific area of the world may be fully
informed as to a substantive policy that we are
attempting to carry out at that time. Such offi-
cer must be made responsible for insuring so far
as possible that statements made by either mili-
tary or civilian representatives of the United
States Government will advance that policy and
not diminish the chances of its effectiveness.
In practice, speeches are forwarded from De-
fense to the Policy Plans and Guidance Staff of
the Department of State. This staff is located in
the office of the Assistant Secretary of State for
Public Affairs. Each speech is logged in on a
register. It is then assigned to a member of the
staff. He routes it to the bureaus or offices having
responsibility for various aspects of the subject
matter involved.
Let us suppose, for example, that the speech re-
fers to the situation now prevailing in the Congo
and involves more than a casual reference to that
situation. Under such circumstances the speech
would be sent to the Public Affairs Officer in the
Bureau of African Affairs, who would be respon-
sible for making sure that it was reviewed by the
officers in the bureau working on Congo matters.
If it appeared to involve any matter of special
delicacy, it would be read by the Assistant Secre-
tary for African Affairs or his deputy.
A speech on the Congo might in addition touch
on matters that would be of concern to our Bel-
gian or, say, our British allies. In that event the
speech would be considered by the appropriate of-
ficers in our Bureau of European Affairs as well
as the African bureau. The speech would prob-
ably also touch on the United Nations pi'oblems
and activities in that turbulent country. In that
event it would also need examination by officers
in our Bureau of International Organization
Affairs.
Similarly, if a speech should contain language
that concerned our relations with the Soviet Union
or some aspect of the Communist offensive, it
would, if of more than routine character, be re-
viewed by the Department of State specialists on
Soviet policy. These specialists are in touch not
only with the day-to-day developments of that
policy but are also expert in the nattire of the Com-
munist system and sensitive to the manner in
which the Communist propaganda machine might
distort such material to reinforce the propaganda
line it was following at the moment.
From these examples one can see that the ob-
jective of our State Depai'tment procedures is to
make sure that a speech receives the attention of
the individual or individuals best able to deter-
mine if it serves or impairs the policies that the
United States may at the time be pursuing. In
our opinion our procedures have served this pur-
pose effectively. The State Department is receiv-
ing an average of three or four speeches or articles
a day from the Department of Defense. On some
days it has received as many as 18. The average
time permitted for review is not more than 2 or ?>
days, and in some cases review is requested on an
urgent basis, since the speech is to be made the
following day.
Under such circumstances it is possible that the
responsible State Department officer concerned
with the development or administration of a par-
ticular policy may not be able to devote a great
deal of time or attention to the study of a speech
that could have some bearing on that policy. And
since the review process necessarily involves an
element of judgment, it is underetandable that,
from time to time, an alteration or deletion may
seem somewhat arbitrary to the officer or official
who is to deliver the speech.
But the review procedure has never been final
and categorical. Any officer or official who felt
that a particular alteration or deletion recom-
mended by the State Department was unjustified
has always been entitled to request a satisfactory
explanation for the change or to insist on recon-
sideration. In fact, early in December of last
year the appeal procedure — which had always
been recognized in fact — was made quite explicit
in a formal joint memorandum of policy - by the
State and Defense Departments.
Although wo feel our procedures have served
the national interest effectively, this does not mean
that they are not subject to improvement. In
fact, since this subcommittee began its inquiry we
have carefully rcstudied them. We have some
possible revisions in mind, and it is likely that
after wo have had the benefit of the subcommittee's
own findings and recommendations, the Secretary
of State will make some technical changes in the
administration of this responsibility.
' Not printed.
516
Department of State Bulletin
Department Prepared To Explain Changes
Members of tlie subcommittee have sought to
obtain from previous witnesses explanations as to
why specific deletions or alterations were recom-
mended in particular speeches. As I have tried
to make clear in this statement, recommendations
for each alteration or deletion are made against
the background of a whole series of conditioning
facts :
One, the rank or position of the individual mak-
ing the speech and to whom the views expressed
will be attributed ;
Ttoo, the audience to which the speech is being
addressed ;
Three, the nature of policies which the United
States is attemptmg to carry out at the particular
time in the particular area or in relation to the
particular country to which the comment in the
speech relates ;
Four, the effect of the speech in relation to cer-
tain publicly known events, such as impending
international conferences, negotiations, et cetera;
Five, the effect of the speech in relation to cer-
tain diplomatic moves or impending events that
are not publicly known ;
Six, the susceptibility of the speech to distor-
tion by the Communist propaganda machine;
Seven, the possibility of the speech being mis-
interpreted as a comment on, or a response to,
statements made, or positions recently taken, by
leaders of allied or neutralist countries.
The Department of State is prepared to pro-
vide the subcommittee with an explanation as to
why any change was made in any speech in the
light of such conditioning facts as I have set forth
above. If the subcommittee will indicate particu-
lar changes with respect to which it has questions,
we shall be glad to submit an explanation in writ-
ing promptly. Or if the subcommittee pi'efers,
we can prepare an explanation for all of the
changes and deletions that have been made over
the past years. I am sure, however, Mr. Chair-
man, that you would not feel that this was a very
profitable employment of the Department's man-
power resources.
If after submission of this material any member
of the subcommittee has questions about the rea-
sons for particular alterations or deletions, a De-
partmental witness will be glad to appear to dis-
cuss them with you. And, of course, the officers
having primary responsibility for speech review
are scheduled to appear to discuss our practices
and procedures in greater detail.
As the subcommittee is aware, however, the
President has ordered witnesses not to identify
the particular person who recommended any spe-
cific deletion or alteration in a given speech. As
the President said in his letter to Secretary [of
Defense Robert S.] McNamara, instructions to this
effect were being issued to the Department of State
as well as to the Defense Department. I am pre-
senting for the record a copy of the President's
letter to the Secretary of State.^
Nothing Gained by Oversimplifying Problems
We are satisfied that the State Department has
performed its duties in connection with the re-
view of speeches in a creditable and responsible
manner. We are concerned, therefore, about at-
tempts to use isolated changes or deletions to
create the impression that officers in the Depart-
ment of State do not fully comprehend the fate-
ful forces working in the world today or the ma-
lignant nature of the international Communist
conspiracy. It has been suggested that certain
of these alterations or deletions disclose the ex-
istence of a "no win" philosophy.
I am not sure that I understand just what is
intended by this particular slogan. To the ex-
tent that I do underetand it, I should like to reply
by a pei-sonal comment. I came to the Department
of State just over a year ago from a long career
as a private lawyer in an environment of private
enterprise. During the course of my relatively
brief service it has been my pri\dlege to work
closely with officers drawn from all over the De-
partment. I have been impressed again and again
with their dedication to the interests of the United
States and their determination to advance those
interests so that a world of freedom may prevail
against a world of Communist tyranny.
I have been impressed, moreover, with the
knowledge that these professionals possess and
with their alert awareness of the nature and mag-
nitude of the forces arrayed against us. They
recognize— and display that recognition in their
whole approach to the business of the Depart-
ment— that we must bring to bear a profound and
detailed understanding of those forces in order to
• Not printed here.
March 26, ?962
517
design and administer policies that will mean vic-
tory for the values that we Americans hold most
important.
Nothing can be gained by oversimplifying the
problems before us. The characterization of a
policy as a "win" or "no win" policy does not re-
flect the realities of today's world. The cold war
is not an adult game of cops and robbers.
The conduct of foreign affairs today is an in-
tricate, subtle, changing, and always uncertain
task. We are not the only country in the world —
or, fortimately, the only country in the free world.
The population of the United States is less than
one-tenth of the earth's population. For us to win
against the forces marshaled against us we must
succeed on many fronts, not merely on one.
We must persuade people, by our example, of
the essential soundness and validity of our ideas.
We must expose, by our example, the falsehoods
put forward by our adversaries. We must build
and strengthen our alliances. We must maintain
at all times — and at the ready — an unassailable
military posture — a nuclear force that will effec-
tively deter aggression and a conventional force
that will enable us to meet the challenge of local
conflicts.
In the arsenal of our cold-war weapons there is
no place for boasting or bellicosity, and name call-
ing is rarely useful. As Secretary of State Eusk
has said : *
The issues called the cold war are real and cannot be
merely wished away. They must be faced and met. But
how we meet them makes a difference. They will not
be scolded away by invective nor frightened away by
bluster. They must be met with determination, confi-
dence, and sophistication. . . . Our discussion, public or
private, should be marked by civility; our manners
should conform to our dignity and power and to our good
repute throughout the world. But our purposes and
policy must be clearly expressed to avoid miscalculation
or an underestimation of our determination to defend
the cause of the freedom.
Tlie solemn nature of the times calls for the
United States to develop maximum strength but
to utilize that strength with wisdom and restraint.
Or, in other words, as President Theodore
Roosevelt aptly said at an earlier time, we shoidd
"speak softly and carry a big stick."
This, I submit, Mr. Chairman, is the only appro-
priate posture for the leading nation in the world.
* Bulletin of Apr. 10, 1961, p. 515.
518
REMARKS BY MR. TUBBY
Press release 129 dated Febrnary 27
Under Secretary Ball has outlined the reasons
for the speech review procedure and the general
way in which it is carried out by the Department
of State. I should like to discuss somewhat in
more detail the speech review operations in the
Bureau of Public Affairs and the Department.
First, however, may I say a few words about
my own background and approach to information
work. I have spent approximately 12 years in
Government information posts and 12 years as a
country newspaperman. I presently have an in-
terest in a small paper, the Adirondack Daily
Enterprise, at Saranac Lake, New York, where,
before coming to Washington, I was editor. I
also have an interest in the Lake Placid, New
York, News, a weekly.
In both newspapering and Government work
I've been especially interested in those programs,
local or national, which strengthen our society.
As editor I supported measures for better schools
and roads, more industry, conservation of natural
resources, more recreation facilities, and greater
participation in politics by people in both parties.
As president of the Adirondack Park Association
I worked on programs to enhance the welfare of
that very sizable and beautiful portion of the
State.
I have believed as an editor, and as a Govern-
ment information man, that it is vitally important
that our people understand as fully as possible
the nature of problems which are, or should be,
of concern to them. These hearings are most use^
fid, I think, in bringing a better understanding
of the complexities of foreign policy operations,
especially with respect to preparation and review
of speeches and articles by high officials.
With this perhaps too personal preamble, I
would like now to turn to the speech review pro-
cedures in the Bureau of Public Affairs and the
Department of State.
During the latter part of World War II and the
period immediately following, the responsibility
within the Department of State for reviewing
speeches was placed in the office of the Special As-
sistant to the Secretary for Press Relations. Fol-
lowing the issuance by President Truman in
December 1950 of his formal directive, the respon-
sibility was shifted to the Executive Secretariat
of the Secretary's office. In June 1!)55 the central
DepaMment of State Bulletin
responsibility for ascertaining the Department's
views on the speeches of oiEcials of other agencies
was then assigned to the Assistant Secretary for
Public Affairs, where it has continued since that
time.
Within the office of the Assistant Secretary, the
specific responsibility has rested with different in-
dividuals or units. Between 1955 and 1960 the
general practice was to have an officer or officers
with the title of Special Assistant to the Assistant
Secretary coordinate the Department's review,
and this was generally done under the direct su-
pervision of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Public Affairs. Late in October 1960 the respon-
sibility for ascertaining the Department's views
on speeches received from other agencies was as-
signed as a general staff function to the Policy
Plans and Guidance Staff in my bureau. At this
time most of the members of that staff became
involved in the coordination of the Department's
speech review process.
Tlie Policy Plans and Guidance Staff consists
of six officers and four secretaries. During the
year 1961 approximately 30 percent of the total
time of the staff was devoted to the speech review
function. The other responsibilities of the Policy
Plans and Guidance Staff, in wliich it has been
engaged for some years, cover a wide range of
activities.
Speeches sent to the Department from other
agencies are, as has been pointed out, initially re-
ceived in the Policy Plans and Guidance Staff of
the Bureau of Public Affairs. There the speeches
are logged in. This involves a recording of the
name of the speaker, the date the speech is to be
made, the occasion and the place, the date and
time when the speech was received from the origi-
nating agency, and the assignment of a State De-
partment control number. The speech is then
given to one of the staff members, who then be-
comes responsible for obtaining whatever Depart-
mental comments there may be on it. This officer
determines which other parts of the Department
should be consulted. Since most of the speeches
received involve several aspects of foreign policy
in which expert advice should be sought, they are
usually routed to one or more other offices in the
Department which have responsibility for the
specific subject matter involved.
If the subject matter deals with a foreign policy
matter such as U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations, the speech
is routed to the Bureau of European Affairs for
its comments. Perhaps more than one part of that
bureau will be given the task of commenting upon
it. If this speech deals with political-military
implications of a foreign policy matter, it is also
routed to the Office of Politico-Military Affairs.
If an additional question pertaining to the use of
outer space is involved, there is consultation with
the office in the Department which handles atomic
energy and outer space matters. The comments
of each of these bureaus are sent tx) the officer in
the Policy Plans and Guidance Staff who has been
assigned responsibility for this particular speech.
The responsible officer then prepares a consoli-
dated Departmental reply to the originating
agency. Tlie speech is logged out with an indica-
tion of the date the final action is taken and is
returned to the agency which submitted it to the
Department of State.
Every effort is taken in this process to get the
best expert advice available in the Department.
Our records show at least 150 officers have been
involved in the review process during the past
year.
Tliis may appear on the surface as being unnec-
essarily time-consuming. I should like to point
out, however, that a great deal of emphasis has
been placed on the service aspect of this process.
Notwithstanding the very large volume of speeches
received for review and the number of offices
which at times must be consulted, every effort is
exerted in the State Department to meet the dead-
lines or "suspense" dates established by the De-
fense Department or other agencies. In a signifi-
cant number of cases the comments are provided
the same day a speech is received. In other in-
stances, where the "suspense" date permits, sev-
eral days or a week might be involved. However,
as Mr. Ball has indicated, the average time period
within which speeches are cleared is 2 to 3 days.
Only in rare cases are speech deadlines not met.
I will now be happy to answer your questions,
as best I can.
Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy
87th Congress, 1st Session
Impact of Imports and Exports on Employment (Cheese).
Hearings before the Subcommittee on the Impact of
Imports and Exports on American Employment of the
March 26, J 962
519
House Education and Labor Committee. Part 2.
June 30, 1961. 85 pp.
Impact of Imports and Exports on Employment (Glass,
Pottery, and Toys). Hearing before the Subcommittee
on the Impact of Imports and Exports on American
Employment of the House Education and Labor Com-
mittee. Part 3. July 12, 1961. 162 pp.
Impact of Imports and Exports on Employment (Apparel
and Apparel-Related Products). Hearings before the
Subcommittee on the Impact of Imports and Exports
on American Employment of the House Education and
Labor Committee. Part 6. August 21-23, 1961. 351
pp.
Antarctica Legislation — 1961. Hearings before the Sub-
committee on Territorial and Insular Affairs of the
House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee.
August 24-25, 1961. 68 pp.
Impact of Imports and Exports on Employment (Con-
sumer Goods and Services; Metal Products, Building
Materials, Lead, Zinc). Hearings before the Sub-
committee on the Impact of Imports and Exports on
American Employment of the House Education and
Labor Committee. Part 7. August 28-31, 1961. 465
pp.
Department Supports Approval of 1960
Safety of Life at Sea Convention
Statement hy Philip H. Tresise^
The treaty presently in force which specifies
minimum standards of safety of ships in inter-
national trade is the Intei-national Convention for
the Safety of Life at Sea, 1948.^ This treaty was
the successor to a 1929 convention on this subject,
which itself brought a 1914 convention up to date.
The 1948 convention entered into force for the
United States on November 19, 1952.
Following the Stockholm-Andrea Doria disas-
ter Jmie 25, 1956, in which 50 lives were lost and
the Andrea Doria sank, there was worldwide con-
cern about the adequacy of the 1948 convention,
particularly the construction standards and oper-
ating procedures incorporated therein. At the
Department of State's request the Coast Guard
was directed by the Secretary of the Treasury to
act as the initiating and coordinating agency for
investigation of the need for possible revision of
the 1948 convention. Detailed studies of various
aspects of marine safety were initiated by seven
major committees to deal with construction, life-
saving equipment, radio installation, safety of
navigation (including rules for preventing colli-
sions), nuclear power, leadlines, and the carriage
of grain and dangerous goods. Designers, ship
' Made l)efore the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
on Feb. 27 (press release 128). Mr. Trezise is Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs.
' Treaties and Other International Acta Series 2495.
operators, shipbuilders, navigation societies, labor
unions, port authorities, professional societies, and
trade organizations, as well as the interested gov-
ernment agencies, were represented.
Between May 17 and June 17, 1960, an Inter-
national Safety Conference was held under the
auspices of the Intergovernmental Maritime Con-
sultative Organization. This conference was at-
tended by official delegations from 45 countries
and by observers from an additional 7 countries.
The delegation of the United States was made up
of 65 individuals, expert in one or another of the
matters dealt with by the conference. The de-
tailed studies referred to above did, of course, con-
stitute the basis for the United States positions
advanced at the conference. The United States
delegation was successful for the most part in
working out solutions consonant with the posi-
tions on various aspects advanced by the United
States.
The 1960 convention adheres to the framework
of the 1948 convention and modifies its chapters so
as to reflect technical advances. The new conven-
tion adds two additional chapters of technical reg-
ulations, one relating to nuclear-powered ships and
the other separating the subjects of carriage of
dangerous goods from the carriage of grain and
ore.
The 1960 Safety of Life at Sea Convention is an
important step forward in international agree-
ment on technical regulation matters concerning
maritime safety. The Department of State recom-
mends advice and consent to ratification of this
convention hy the Senate. It also recommends
that this action be taken as soon as possible for the
positive value that this would have in encouraging
acceptances and ratification of these important
standards by other nations. At the present time,
according to the IMCO secretariat, which acts as
the depository for the 1960 SOLAS Convention,
the instrument has been accepted by France, Nor-
way, Haiti, and the Government of the Eepublic
of Viet-Nam.
Failure to date by other nations to accept the
convention may be attributed to procedural delays
and not at all to dissatisfaction with or hesitation
concerning the substance of the 1960 convention.
The con\-ention will enter into force 12 months
after the date on which not less than 15 accept-
ances, including 7 by countries each with not less
than 1 million gross tons of shipping, have been
deposited.
520
Department of State Bulletin
President Recommends Expansion
of Peace Corps
Following is the text of a letter from President
Kennedy to Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the
Senate. An identical letter was sent on the same
day to John W. McCormach, Speaker of the House
of Representatives.
White House press release dated February 26
February 26, 1962
Dear Mr. President : The Peace Corps is now
one year old. Twelve months ago I asserted that
only through the most careful planning and ne-
gotiation could its success be assured.^ Today I
am pleased to report to the Congress that its
early successes have fulfilled expectations.
Carefiil preparation and sound training have
assured the selection of qualified men and women
and minimized health and other hazards. Econ-
omy of operation has held actual expenditures
for each volunteer recruited, selected, trained and
supported overseas to an admirably low level.
Careful selection of administrative pereonnel,
both at home and abroad, has resulted in maxi-
mum efficiency with minimum staff.
I am transmitting herewith, for the consider-
ation of the Congress, legislation to enable con-
tinuation of the current Peace Coi-ps program,
and to make possible a further expansion of its
work. This legislation will permit the Peace
Corps to have 6,700 volunteers in the field by
June 30, 1963, compared to the maximum of 2,400
permitted under the present appropriation.
Wliile this number will still not permit us to meet
all requests from foreign countries, it will enable
us to make the most of an historic opportunity to
achieve better understanding among nations.
By June 30th of this year there will be 2,400
Peace Corps Volunteers in service or in training.
Another 2,700 are scheduled to enter training in
July or August of this year. But the overwhelm-
ing response to this program in actual operation
abroad makes further expansion both necessary
and desirable. Volunteers have been welcomed
with friendliness and affection in every one of the
villages, towns, schools, factories and hospitals
to which they have gone to share their skills with
the peoples of less developed nations.
In many instances Peace Corps Volimteers are
' Bulletin of Mar. 20, 1961, p. 400.
/March 26, 7962
working where no American has ever lived or even
travelled. The enthusiasm with which they are
received is perhaps best reflected in this statement
on the Peace Corps by President Alberto Lleras
Camargo of Colombia: ". . . the finest way in
which the United States could prove to the hum-
ble people of this and other lands that the primary
purpose of its international aid program is to
build a better life in all of the free world's villages
and neighborhoods."
The reception accorded the Peace Corps is un-
derscored by the fact that every one of the twelve
countries in which volunteers are now at work has
requested additional volunteers. In most cases
the Peace Corps has been asked to triple and
quadruple the number of men and women already
supplied. Nigeria, for example, has requested
400 additional teachers.
Equally heartening has been the enthusiasm for
the Peace Corps in our own country. More than
20,000 Americans have volunteered to serve — a
convincing demonstration that we have in this
country an immense reservoir of dedicated men
and women willing to express by their actions
and convictions the highest values of our society.
Although the average age is 24% for men and
25 for women, many of the volunteers are in their
thirties and forties — and three are in their sixties.
Approximately i^ are women — nurses, home econ-
omists, social workers and teachers. These volun-
teers are from every part of the Nation and
represent every segment of American life. As an
extra bonus to our own country. Peace Corps
graduates will constitute an invaluable addition
to the veiy limited pool of trained manpower in
our own country with this kind of constructive
overseas experience; and I have no doubt that
many of them will go on to make still further
contributions to their country in the Foreign
Service and other posts.
The Peace Corps has successfully weathered its
experimental period, and has enjoyed widespread
bi-partisan support. I urge prompt consideration
of the legislation authorizing an increase in the
authorization to 63.75 million dollars for Peace
Corps programs in fiscal year 1963. This legis-
lation will also effect a small number of other
changes designed to make it more effective. I
urge the Congress to give prompt consideration
and approval to this clearly justified measure.
Sincerely,
John F. Kennedy
521
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
Progress in National Development Through CENTO
The Economic Com/mittee of the Central Treaty
Organization held its 10th session February 26-28
at Washington, D.C} Following are a statement
rrmde at the opening session on February 26 hy
Walt W. Rostow, Counselor and Chairman of the
Policy Planning Council, Department of State,
and the text of a com/munique issued at the close
of the session.
STATEMENT BY MR. ROSTOW
Press release 122 dated February 26
I am delighted to welcome you here, both as
old allies and colleagues in the great adventure of
economic development. I am honored to greet
you officially on behalf of my Government. We
are deeply committed to CENTO ; we are honor-
ing our commitments to its objectives and enter-
prises; and we intend to move forward with you
in the spirit of this alliance.
Although I have never before had the occasion
to attend a CENTO meeting, I have followed for
some years the collective enterprises sponsored by
this Committee as well as the economic develop-
ment of Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. I have
taught a generation of American students the il-
luminating story of Turkey's modernization and
followed the Turkish economy since the days after
the war when I was engaged, like many other
Americans, in problems of European reconstruc-
tion. In Cambridge, Massachusetts, during the
1950's a great many of us worked on problems
of the developing nations; and, although it was
my friends at Harvard, rather than at MIT, who
were most directly associated with the Govern-
ments of Iran and Pakistan, we shared our ex-
periences along the Charles River and became
equally caught up with the emerging plans and
programs generated in Tehran and Karachi.
' For an announcement of the meeting and names of the
members of the U.S. delegation, see BtJLLETiN of Mar. 12,
1962, p. 436.
CENTO has always been identified with prob- .
lems of both defense and economic development,
and it is increasingly clear why that identification
is right and natural at this point in history. The
tasks of defense and of economic development are
related means to a larger end — an end which
transcends the CENTO region. The nations of
Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America
are in the midst of the process of modernizing
their societies. Some are well along that road;
others are just beginning. What we sometimes
call underdeveloped nations represent a very wide
spectrum, with different problems marking each
stage along the road to self-sustained growth.
And, in the end, each nation, like each individual,
is in an important sense unique. What is common
throughout these regions is that men and women
are determined to bring to bear what modem
science and technology can afford in order to ele-
vate the standards of life of their peoples and to
provide a firm basis for positions of national dig-
nity and independence on the world scene.
The United States is firmly committed as a
nation to support this effort. We look forward
to the emergence of strong, assertive nations
which, out of their own traditions and aspirations,
create their own forms of modern society. We
take it as our duty to help maintain the integrity
and the independence of the modernization proc-
ess going forward in many parts of the world,
insofar as our resources and our ability to influ-
ence the course of events permit.
That possibility is challenged by Communist
objectives and Communist policy. The Commu-
nists also perceive that the process of moderniza-
tion involves fundamental social, political, and
economic change. These are boimd to be turbulent
times; and it is the Communist intent to exploit
the turbulence of this transitional process in order
to seize power and to mold the emerging world
in their image and link it tightly to the Commu-
nist empire.
522
Deparfmenf of Sfafe Bi///ef/n
It is often said that what we can observe in the
contemporary world is a struggle between two
blocs. This is not the case. What is at stake is
whether a new world order shall be created by
the voluntary association and cooperation of inde-
pendent nations, each having fashioned its own
modem personality, or a world order, dominated
from a single center, of nations forced into a single
mold.
We in the United States can live comfortably
in a pluralistic world because our life at home is
based on the principle of cooperation among dig-
nified equals; but the Communists are driven, by
their methods for organizing power, to violate
equally the integrity of individuals and of na-
tions. Thus, when seeking power, they aim to
associate themselves with all manner of forward-
looking human and national aspirations. Once
in power, they drag from the shelves their dreary,
archaic handbooks and impose a pattern of organ-
ization which runs against the grain of human
and national character and personality. In the
end that is why the Communist offensive will fail.
We have not forgotten the lesson of Korea. We
cannot assume the Commvmists will not again
overtly cross frontiers with military force, and
our dispositions with respect to the CENTO area
and elsewhere take that possibility into accoimt;
but it is also clear that for some years they have
been relying heavily on the possibility of exploit-
ing the internal turbulence which inevitably comes
with the drive toward modernization, to seize
power from within.
In defense of the independence of nations and
the national integrity of the modernization proc-
ess, we are, therefore, equally concerned with
problems of defense and with the constructive
tasks of development.
If I may add a personal word : I have for many
years been professionally interested in the prob-
lems of economic development, and there are those
who may fiiid it odd for an economist to be also
concerned, as I have been, with the problems of
countering Commimist methods of guerrilla war-
fare and subversion.^ But it is, in fact, quite
natural for a student of modernization to interest
himself in the economic, social, and political de-
velopment of Viet-Nam and also in its protection
against indirect invasion from the north, with the
* For an address by Mr. Rostow on guerrilla warfare in
the underdeveloped areas, see ibid., Aug. 7, 1961, p. 233.
Alliance for Progress and also the defense of Latin
America from the infection which the Communists
are seeking to impose upon it, and with all the
related military and constructive activities of
CENTO. For communism is not the wave of the
future; it is a disease of the transitional process
which well-trained, well-organized professional
cadres seek to impose on societies at the early
stages of modernization.
Postwar Experience in Economic Development
In any case the policy of my Government is to
do what it can both to assist those who would
modernize their societies and to help them defend
their national independence as modernization
goes forward. We must build together, and we
must protect what we are building.
As we move into the 1960's all of us in the free
world are trying to consolidate and to build on
the lessons we have learned about economic
development since the end of the Second World
War.
The first lesson is that aid from outside a
country can only be helpful to its development to
the extent that the government and people of a
nation organize their own resources. Economic
growth is primarily a national enterprise. As you
have demonstrated by some of the CENTO
regional projects, development cannot and should
not be wholly viewed in national terms; and cer-
tainly external assistance is important, but the
heart of economic development consists of national
measures of self-help.
Second, national planning of the development
process is required as a basis both for the domestic
mobilization of resources and effective foreign aid.
National plans are needed because — as Adam
Smith noted long ago, when prescribing for under-
developed Britain of the 18th century— govern-
ments must create the framework within which a
modem economy can develop. It is the govern-
ment which must organize and finance the educa-
tional system and shape it to the nation's needs.
It is the government which must lay out and, in
most cases, finance the fundamental social over-
head projects — in transport, electric power, and
other sectors — on which development depends. It
is the government which must solve problems of
land tenure and create the framework within which
agricultural productivity can be improved by the
individual peasant. It is the government which
March 26, 7962
523
must assure that the savings of the coinmunity
are effectively mobilized by equitable taxation, so
that investment projects can be financed without
inflation and on terms the people will regard as
fair. It is the government which must devise
policies which insure that the foreign accounts
are kept in balance and that the development ef-
fort is not frustrated by a foreign exchange crisis.
These minimal fimctions were performed by
governments even in nations most deeply com-
mitted to private enterprise, blessed with ample
land and an old tradition of private entrepreneur-
ship — like Canada and the United States. In our
own time, and where these initial circumstances
do not exist, governments may have to go further
and help set the national targets for the private-
enterprise sector or even, for a time, manage a
portion of the industrial system.
It may seem strange that we in the United
States, who are so deeply attached to the virtues
of private enterprise, should be the advocates of
national planning in the underdeveloped areas.
There is, in fact, no incompatibility between a be-
lief that national planning is essential in the early
stages of development and a belief in the wisdom
of leaving to private enterprise a wide and ex-
panding range of economic activities. How wide
that range is each coimtry will, of course, decide
for itself in tlie light of its own problems and pos-
sibilities. But the framework within which a
modern private-enterprise system can develop
must, in large part, be created initially by the
effort and initiative of governments. It is this
perception which has drained away much of the
fervor from the argument about government
versus private enterprise in the development
process — an argiunent which, even a few years
ago, seemed to be central to the whole business.
As nations have acquired practical experience in
economic development, it is becoming increasingly
clear that each of the two sectors has a job to do
and that their jobs are supplementary and
mutually reinforcing.
When self-sustained and regular growth has
been attained the natural course of events is for
the private sector to expand rapidly, for efficiency
in producing many diverse manufactured prod-
ucts is hard for a government to attain. The les-
son of history is that the interests of an advancing
society are best served when the bulk of industry
and agriculture are managed by individuals or
firms forced by competition to keep their costs
low, their methods modem, and their output re-
sponsive to the changing tastes of the people. But
even then the government does not lose all its
functions in the economy — as the state of things in
the United States and Western Europe suggests.
Although national planning is crucial to the
development process — notably when nations are
approacliing the stage of takeoff into self-sus-
tained growth — we have also come to understand
what is involved in making a plan effective. Good
paper plans are not enough. With all due respect
to my profession, economists cannot build roads,
or administer powerplants, or go out to the vil-
lages to teach more efficient ways of growing food.
An effective plan must be backed by the whole
administrative apparatus of the state, not merely
its planning organization. It must be capable
of generating feasibility studies and blueprints
for individual projects. It must provide not only
goals but the means to achieve those goals step by
step, day by day. And in the end the plan must
engage the minds and hearts of the people — from
the cabinet to the villages.
Importance of Long-Term Planning
A third lesson of our postwar experience is that
foreign aid is likely to be most effective if it is
geared into national development programs on a
long-term basis. In committing themselves and
their peoples to ambitious development goals —
and demanding the sacrifices and efforts which are
necessary for their fulfillment — it is natural that
governments should wish to know in advance how
much foreign aid they can count on over any
planning period.
American foreign aid legislation has now taken
this factor into account, and we ha^e been joined
by our partners in Western Europe, Canada, and
Japan. We are rapidly learning to weave to-
gether the national and international contribu-
tions to development in a systematic way, and we
look forward to extending this method as new
national development programs come forward.
We would expect the OECD [Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development] and its
Development Assistance Committee to become an
increasingly important instrument for this col-
laborative pui'pose as time goes on.
A fourth lesson is this: Altliough we are still
learning this job together — and have much to
leani — we are confident that the methods of free
524
Department of State Bulletin
men will prove more effective than the apparently
more efficient techniques of totalitarian i-egimes.
Quite aside from the inhumanity of Communist
methods, it appears to be a technical fact that the
most powerful system of control is an inadequate
substitute for the incentives and commitment of
the individual citizen, once he can be engaged.
Development is a process which requii-es that mil-
lions of human beings and many organized groups
assume responsibility for mo%ang things forward
on their narrow part of the front. There are
simply not enough Communist cadres or secret
policemen available to substitute for the energy
and commitment of men and women who under-
stand what needs to be done and why it is their
interest to do it. This weakness of communism is
most apparent in the field of agriculture. Com-
munist methods have managed to shift one Com-
munist countrj' after another from food-surplus
to food-deficit status; and in the Soviet Union
itself they must maintain perhaps twice the work-
ing force in agriculture they would need if they
were not committed to the method of control they
feel necessary for the political safety of the regime.
This is no trivial matter, for an increase in agri-
cultural productivity is required not merely to
feed the people and the expanding cities; it is
essential for the development of industry and
industrial markets and for the maintenance of a
healthy balance-of-payments situation. The vast
general economic crisis in Communist China
should be studied as a lesson in the crucial im-
portance of agricultural productivity to the devel-
opment process as a whole.
The difference between Communist planning
and planning in the free world comes to this:
Communist planning is a device for maximum
political control over the individual, and it
thereby burdens the state with functions it can-
not efficiently carry and destroys individual in-
centives needed for a vital economy; planning for
underdeveloped countries in the free world is a
device for assuring balance in the growth process
and for creating a framework within which in-
dividual incentives and individual initiative can
l)e effective.
In short, the lesson of our experience thus far
is that we should be confident that, in going for-
ward with economic development by the methods
of pragmatic planning and individual consent
which are natural to us, we are on the right track
technically as well as morally.
We have drawn, then, from the first phase of
postwar experience with development an aware-
ness that foreign aid can only be helpful in pro-
portion to the efforts of self-help within a
country; an imderstanding of the crucial role of
national development plans in creating the
framework for the whole development process;
an understanding of the need to make available
foreign aid on a long-term basis in relation to
national development plans; and an inner confi-
dence that while the tasks ahead are enormous,
there is no reason to believe that communism rep-
resents a technique of organizing for development
which cannot be outmatched by the methods of
more open societies if we put our minds fully to
the task.
I am aware that each of the nations from the
CENTO region is now committed to the method
of national planning for development. I believe
that all three of the nations concerned with the
development process represented here can move
forward in confidence that their national pro-
grams, either now in effect or to be placed into
effect, will find steady assistance not merely from
the United States but from other industrialized
nations of the free world. The truth of the matter
is that the real shortage at the moment in the field
of development is not money but carefully de-
signed national programs and well-staffed proj-
ects. There is great creative ferment throughout
Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America ;
and although plans and projects cannot be turned
out overnight, I am confident that we shall see
in the next few years a sharp increase in the num-
ber of development plans which deserve support
and which will get support on a long-term inter-
national basis — not merely from the United States
but from Western Europe, Canada, and Japan.
In greeting you I have tried to make clear why
we would now place great emphasis on the gen-
eration of national development plans, notably for
nations as far along in the growth process as those
present here. But such plans are, of course, means
to a larger end, not an objective in themselves.
Tliey are not merely a device for mobilizing a na-
tion's resources but a way of focusing a nation's
talent and energy in a common enterprise — a way
of enhancing a sense of common national objec-
tives and of common nationhood. More than that,
international cooperation, as we all envisage it,
must be rooted in strong national states which
laiow where they are going and can relate what
March 26, 1962
525
they wish to do with others with what they wish
to do at home. Tlie strength of CENTO depends
on the strength of each of us. Our ability to col-
laborate with each other here — and to play our
part in wider enterprises of the free world — de-
pends on the soundness of our domestic arrange-
ments. Regional cooperation, rooted in this
principle, can strengthen, both economically and
politically, countries which work together. Much
progress has been made through CENTO in this
direction, and more is possible.
May I say again how glad I am for having had
the opportunity to meet with you. I wish you a
fruitful session.
FINAL COMMUNIQUE
Washington, Fetruary 28, 1962
The Economic Committee of the Central Treaty Organ-
ization (CENTO) has concluded three days of close ex-
amination of the Organization's technical assistance and
capital investment programs in Iran, Paliistan and Turkey
with particular attention to the aid being provided by the
United States and the United Kingdom.
Under the Chairmanship of the Honorable "William M.
Rountree, Leader of the United States Delegation, the
delegates from the five participating countries approved
a Report and a series of recommendations relating to the
welfare and future development of the region for the
consideration of the CENTO Council of Ministers which
will meet in London on April 30, 1962. Considerable at-
tention was given to regional aspects of the economic de-
velopment of Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, the importance
of economic justifications and priorities for CENTO
projects and the policies which the United States and the
United Kingdom have established for the efiicient and ef-
fective provision of financial and other assistance to sup-
plement the substantial domestic investments made by
Iran, Pakistan and Turkey.
The representatives of the United States announced new
aid criteria, based on the conviction that total resources
available to a country, domestic and foreign, can be most
effective If utilized in accordance with a national develop-
ment plan. In this way foreign assistance can support
projects and programs to which the countries are intend-
ing to apply their domestic resources.
The Committee also reviewed the technical assistance
activities of the Organization which are directly promot-
ing the welfare of the peoples of the region in a wide and
varied field, notably in the provision of experts, fellow-
ships and other training and educational facilities, and
the supply of technical equipment. The Committee noted
that these technical assistance activities are in the main
financed from U.K. and U.S. funds but that mutual assist-
ance between the countries of the region is playing an in-
creasingly significant part in their execution.
At the conclusion of the final meeting of the Tenth
Session of the Economic Committee, the Chairman sum-
marized the views of the five delegations by stating that,
while coming to grips with a great number of complex
technical and economic policy problems, the Tenth Session
of the CENTO Economic Committee introduced a new
clarity for the achievement of cooperative objectives and,
as a consequence, generated a more practical program for
accelerated economic development for the CENTO region.
He felt that the tangible benefits to the nations concerned
should become more evident with the passage of time.
Current U.N. Documents:
A Selected Bibliography
Mimeographed or processed documents {such as those
listed helow) may be consulted at depositary libraries
in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be
purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations,
United Nations Plaza, N.Y.
General Assembly
Additional statements of qualifications of candidates for
election as members of the International Law Commis-
sion. A/4780/ Add. 4. November 17, 1961. 8 pp.
Letter dated November 20 from the Minister for Foreign
Affairs of Italy to the Acting Secretary-General con-
cerning the massacre of Italian airmen in the Congo.
A/4976. November 21, 1961. 2 pp.
Addendum to the 19th progress report of the U.N. Con-
ciliation Commission for Palestine. A/4921/Add. 1.
November 22, 1961. 24 pp.
Agreement between the U.N. and the Congo (L4opold-
ville) relating to the legal status, facilities, privileges
and immunities of the United Nations Organization in
the Congo. A/49S6. November 27, 1961. 14 pp.
Report of the Secretary-General on a United Nations in-
ternational school. A/4991. November 28, 1961. 16
pp.
Provision of food surpluses to food-deficient i»eoples
through the U.N. system. A/4907/ Add. 1 and Corr. 1,
November 29, 1961, 12 pp. ; Add. 2, December 6, 1961,
3 pp.
Report of the U.N. Commission for Ruanda-Urundi.
A/4994 and Coit. 1 and 2, November 30, 1961, 143 pp. ;
Add. 1, November 30, 1961, 138 pp.
Report of Sir Leslie Muuro, U.N. Special Representative
on the Question of Hungary, and letter dated Decem-
ber 12 from the chairman of the Hungarian delegation
addressed to the Acting Secretary-General. A/4996,
December 1, 1961, 9 pp.; A/u028, December 12, 1961,
4 pp.
Letters from the Soviet permanent representative concern-
ing discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests. A/4990,
November 27, 1961, 8 pp.; A/5009, December 5, 1961,
3 pp. ; A/5034, December 14, 1961, 4 pp.
Letters concerning the situation with regard to the imple-
mentation of the declaration on the granting of Indfv
pendence to colonial countries and peoples. A/49So,
November 25, 1961, 12 pp. ; A/49S9, November 27, 1961,
2 pp. ; A/5077, December 20, 1961, 6 pp.
Economic and Social Council
Administrative budgets of the specialized agencies for
19G2. A/5007. December 4, 1961. .53 pp.
Review of the activities and organization of the Secre-
tariat. A/.500G. December 5. 1961. 7 pp.
Supplementary report of the U.N. Commission for the Uni-
fication and Rehabilitation of Korea. A/4900/Add. 1.
December 6, 1961. 8 pp.
526
Department of Stale Bulletin
March 26, 1962
Index
Vol. XLVI, No. 1187
Africa. The Realitiea of Foreign Policy (Rusk). . 487
American Republics. The Realities of For-
eign Policy (Rusk) 487
Asia. Regional Operations Conference Meets at
Baguio 511
Atomic Energy
U.S.S.R. Agrees To Begin Disarmament Talks at
Foreign-Minister Level (Kennedy, Khrushchev) . 494
U.S. Plan To Resume Nuclear Testing Explained
to Japanese Prime Minister (Ikeda, Kennedy) . 497
Burma. United States Recognizes New Govern-
ment of Burma 499
Cameroon. Letters of Credence (Moukouri) . . 499
Communism. Theories, Dogmas, and Semantics
of Communism (Mann) 500
Congress, The
Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign
Policy 519
Department Supports Approval of 1960 Safety of
Life at Sea Convention (Trezise) 520
President Recommends Expansion of Peace Corps . 521
Speech Review Procedures of the Department of
State (Ball, Tubby) 513
Department and Foreign Service
The Realities of Foreign Policy (Rusk) .... 487
Regional Operations Conference Meets at Baguio . 511
Disarmament. U.S.S.R. Agrees To Begin Disarma-
ment Talks at Foreign-Minister Level (Kennedy,
Khrushchev) 494
Economic Affairs
Department Supports Approval of 1960 Safety of
Life at Sea Convention (Trezise) 520
Progress in National Development Through CENTO
(Rostow, text of communique) 522
Foreign Aid. President Recommends Expansion of
Peace Corps 521
International Information. Secretary Greets Voice
of America on 20th Anniversary (Rusk) . . . 510
International Organizations and Conferences
Progress in National Development Through CENTO
(Rostow, text of communique) 522
U.S.S.R. Agrees To Begin Disarmament Talks at
Foreign-Minister Level (Kennedy, Klirushchev) . 494
Japan. U.S. Plan To Resume Nuclear Testing
Explained to Japanese Prime Minister (Ikeda,
Kennedy) 497
Middle East. Progress in National Develop-
ment Through CENTO (Rostow, text of com-
munique) 522
Morocco. Letters of Credence (BengeUoun) . . 499
Presidential Documents
President Recommends Expansion of Peace Corps . 521
U.S.S.R. Agrees To Begin Disarmament Talks at
Foreign-Minister Level 494
U.S. Plan To Resume Nuclear Testing Explained
to Japanese Prime Minister 497
Public Affairs. Speech Review Procedures of the
Department of State (BaU, Tubby) 513
Thailand. Secretary Rusk, Thai Foreign Minister
Discuss Matters of Mutual Concern (text of
joint statement) 498
Treaty Information
Current Actions 511
Department Supports Approval of 1960 Safety of
Life at Sea Convention (Trezise) 520
U.S.S.R.
Theories, Dogmas, and Semantics of Communism
(Mann) 500
U.S.S.R. Agrees To Begin Disarmament Talks at
Foreign-Minister Level (Kennedy, Khrushchev) . 494
United Nations
Current U.N. Documents 526
The Realities of Foreign Policy (Rusk) .... 487
Name Index
Ball, George W 513
BengeUoun, All 499
Ikeda, Hayato 493
Kennedy, President 494, 497, 521
Khrushchev, Nikita 494
Mann, Thomas C 500
Moukouri, Jacques Kuoh 499
Rostow, Walt W 522
Rusk, Secretary 487,498,510
Thanat Khoman 498
Trezise, Philip H 520
Tubby, Roger W 518
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: March 5-11
Press releases may be obtained from the Office of
News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.
Releases appearing in this issue of the Bulletin
which were issued prior to March 5 are Nos. 120,
122, and 124 of February 26 ; 126 of February 28 ;
and 127, 128, and 129 of February 27.
Subject
Harrlman: Commonwealth Club of
California (excerpts).
Morocco credentials (rewrite).
U.S. participation in international
conferences.
Rusk: death of Spanish Ambassador.
Rusk-Thai Foreign Minister: joint
statement.
Ball : "Progress and Partnership."
Recognition of new Government of
Burma.
Foreign Relations volume on China.
Rusk : Advertising Council.
Far East regional operations confer-
ence (rewrite).
Text of U.S.-Soviet cultural exchange
agreement (rewrite).
Bohlen : U.S.-Soviet cultural exchange
agreement.
Program for visit of Cameroon Presir
dent.
Cameroon credentials (rewrite).
U.S.-Chile communique on develop-
ment financing.
Delegation to Disarmament Committee
(rewrite).
Kearney designated Deputy Legal Ad-
viser (biographic details).
Williams : "The Challenge of Africa to
the Youth of America."
Gardner : "Extending Law Into Outer
Space."
* Not printed.
t Held for a later issue of the Buixetin.
No.
Date
*141
3/5
142
*143
3/5
3/5
*144
145
3/5
3/6
•146
147
3/6
3/6
tl48
149
150
3/7
3/8
3/8
tl51
3/8
tl52
3/8
*153
3/9
154
tl55
3/9
3/9
tl56
3/9
•157
3/9
tl58
3/9
tl59
3/10
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